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Publicly provided private goods: education and selective vouchers

Piolatto, Amedeo (2008): Publicly provided private goods: education and selective vouchers.

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Abstract

The literature on vouchers often concludes that a vouchers-based system cannot be the outcome of a majority vote. This paper shows that, when the value of vouchers and who is entitled to receive them are fixed exogenously, the majority of voters are in favour of selective vouchers. On top of that, as long as the introduction of vouchers does not undermine the existence of the public school system, introducing selective vouchers induces a Pareto improvement. Middle class agents are the only one using vouchers in equilibrium, while the poorest agents in the economy profit from the reduction in public school congestion.

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