2024-03-29T04:36:50Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:71
2019-09-28T04:31:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D41:4131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71/
Scientific Revolution? A Farewell to EconWPA. MPRA is welcome.
Harin, Alexander
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
A1 - General Economics
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
A new approach is presented. It is based on a generalization of a breach of a term of contract and on the economic uncertainty principle. Problems, which can be solved, research fields, which can be augmented or created, and fields of applications in practical economy are reviewed. The role of information media is described.
2006-10-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71/1/MPRA_paper_71.pdf
Harin, Alexander (2006): Scientific Revolution? A Farewell to EconWPA. MPRA is welcome.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:102
2019-09-27T16:48:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102/
When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content
Lupia, Arthur
Menning, Jesse
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
H30 - General
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Analysts make competing claims about when and how politicians can use fear to gain support for suboptimal policies. Using a model, we clarify how common attributes of fear affect politicians’ abilities to achieve self-serving outcomes that are bad for voters. In it, a politician provides information about a threat. His statement need not be true. How citizens respond differs from most game-theoretic models – we proceed from more dynamic (and realistic) assumptions about how citizens think. Our conclusions counter popular claims about how easily politicians use fear to manipulate citizens, yield different policy advice than does recent scholarship on counterterrorism, and highlight issues (abstract, distant) and leaders (secretive) for which recent findings by political psychologists and public opinion scholars will – and will not – generalize.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102/1/MPRA_paper_102.pdf
Lupia, Arthur and Menning, Jesse (2005): When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:105
2019-09-30T13:34:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D41:4131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105/
Scientific Revolution? A Farewell to EconWPA. MPRA is welcome.
Harin, Alexander
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
A1 - General Economics
A new approach is presented. It is based on a generalization of a breach of a term of contract and on the economic uncertainty principle. Problems, which can be solved, research fields, which can be augmented or created, and fields of applications in practical economy are reviewed. The role of information media is described.
2006-10-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/105/1/MPRA_paper_105.pdf
Harin, Alexander (2006): Scientific Revolution? A Farewell to EconWPA. MPRA is welcome.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:117
2019-10-05T05:41:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3131
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453137
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/117/
The Stochastic Advance-Retreat Course: An Approach to Analyse Social-Economic Evolution
Feng, Dai
Yuan-Zheng, Zhong
O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
E17 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods
The paper presents the basic theory and conceptual model for advance-retreat course and provides the analytic model the stochastic advance-retreat course and the solving method of it, discusses the relations between the endogenous resistance and subject interests increase with the periodic vibration in an advance-retreat course, gets some results, like heightening appropriately the risk-free interest rate will be favorable to subject interests’ increasing in stable, interests increasing in high-speed will result in the fast increase of resistance, the subject progress in a appropriate pace may bring the conclusion such as lasting interests increase and return with higher-level interests, etc. Finally, the empirical researches empirical, on data of USA GDP (chained) price index, has been made to the stochastic advance-retreat model, and the results show that the stochastic advance-retreat model can describe USA economic development process in recent 65 years.
2006-10-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/117/1/MPRA_paper_117.pdf
Feng, Dai and Yuan-Zheng, Zhong (2006): The Stochastic Advance-Retreat Course: An Approach to Analyse Social-Economic Evolution.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:142
2019-09-26T18:59:34Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/142/
Random Marginal and Random Removal values
Calvo, Emilio
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: The random marginal and the random removal values. The main characteristic of these proposals is that they always select a unique payoff allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen, 1989) for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley, 1953). The random removal coincides with the solidarity value (Novak and Radzik, 1994) in TU-games. In large games it is showed that, in the special class of market games, the random marginal coincides with the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley,1969), and that the random removal coincides with the equal split solution.
2006-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/142/1/MPRA_paper_142.pdf
Calvo, Emilio (2006): Random Marginal and Random Removal values.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:145
2019-09-28T11:51:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463531
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/145/
Multiagent negotiation for fair and unbiased resource allocation
Iyer, Karthik
Huhns, Michael
F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
This paper proposes a novel solution for the n agent cake cutting (resource allocation) problem. We propose a negotiation protocol for dividing a resource among n agents and then provide an algorithm for allotting portions of the resource. We prove that this protocol can enable distribution of the resource among n agents in a fair manner. The protocol enables agents to choose portions based on their internal utility function, which they do not have to reveal. In addition to being fair, the protocol has desirable features such as being unbiased and verifiable while allocating resources. In the case where the resource is two-dimensional (a circular cake) and uniform, it is shown that each agent can get close to l/n of the whole resource.
2005-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/145/1/MPRA_paper_145.pdf
Iyer, Karthik and Huhns, Michael (2005): Multiagent negotiation for fair and unbiased resource allocation. Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science , Vol. 3760, (October 2005): pp. 453-465.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:181
2019-09-28T11:00:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4E:4E35:4E3531
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/181/
Managerial Strategies of the Cotton South
Saito, Tetsuya
N51 - U.S. ; Canada: Pre-1913
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
J41 - Labor Contracts
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Relative efficiencies of antebellum slave farms are suggested by many empirical studies. This paper considers a theoretical aspect of those results using a repeated principal-agent problem. Within its theoretical analysis, with relevance to profitability of slave farms, it will be shown that when inter-temporal punishments are necessary and when they can perform efficiently in production. Applying those theoretical results, some empirical studies on relative profitability and relative efficiencies are discussed. In the empirical study, relative efficiencies of each farm scale—free farms, task farms, and gang farms—are estimated region by region by a stochastic profit frontier model.
2005-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/181/1/MPRA_paper_181.pdf
Saito, Tetsuya (2005): Managerial Strategies of the Cotton South.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:367
2019-10-01T05:20:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/367/
What if Hayek goes shopping in the bazaar?
Lamieri, Marco
Bertacchini, Enrico
D80 - General
L10 - General
C70 - General
D40 - General
The paper presents a comparative analysis of the peculiar institutional features of two retail markets: the middle eastern Bazaar and the western Mall (shopping center). We study the informational functions and performance of the different market institutions using an Agent Based Computational Economics (ACE) model under the assumption of behavioral learning by agents. Sellers decide which price setting strategy to adopt whereas buyers form their price beliefs exploring the market and decide which price to accept.
The agents learn how to adapt and behave within the specific institutional framework to carry out their economic transactions, but market institutions, as mechanisms to coordinate information of market participants are expected to affect the price dynamics. The main area of interest concerns the question of whether the economic argument on the presumed underperformance of bazaar institutions respect to more competitive markets holds true or it is necessary a reassessment on it.
2006-06-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/367/1/MPRA_paper_367.pdf
Lamieri, Marco and Bertacchini, Enrico (2006): What if Hayek goes shopping in the bazaar?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:414
2019-10-21T13:50:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/414/
Social Consequences of Commitment
Isaac, Alan G
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling
This paper begins with a detailed computational introduction to a classic ACE model:
an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma.
The paper presents a simple but fully coded object oriented implementation of this model.
(We use the Python programming language, which is shown to be a natural ally for ACE research).
Using these tools,
we demonstrate that player type evolution is affected by cardinal payoffs.
We then explore a possible social benefit to commitment,
where 'commitment' denotes an unwillingness to surrender a reciprocal strategy.
2006-10-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/414/1/MPRA_paper_414.pdf
Isaac, Alan G (2006): Social Consequences of Commitment.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:437
2019-09-29T21:38:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443930
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433639
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/437/
Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
Kumabe, Masahiro
Mihara, H. Reiju
D90 - General
C69 - Other
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C71 - Cooperative Games
It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable simple games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.
2006-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/437/1/MPRA_paper_437.pdf
Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2006): Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:440
2019-09-30T01:47:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443930
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433639
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/440/
Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
Kumabe, Masahiro
Mihara, H. Reiju
D90 - General
C69 - Other
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C71 - Cooperative Games
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. Further classify them into sixty-four classes in terms of finiteness (existence of a finite carrier) and computability. For each such class, we either show that it is empty or give an example of a game belonging to it. We observe that if a type contains an infinite game, then it contains both computable infinitegames and noncomputable ones. This strongly suggests that computability is logically, as well as conceptually, unrelated to the conventional axioms.
2006-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/440/1/MPRA_paper_440.pdf
Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2006): Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:470
2019-09-28T08:45:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/470/
Nash equilibria applied to Spot-financial equilibria in General equilibrium incomplete market models
Fugarolas, Guadalupe
D52 - Incomplete Markets
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We consider a two period pure exchange
economy with a finite number of states of nature at the second
date. The economy consists of a real asset structure and a finite
set of durable goods in the initial period that depreciate; we
suppose that there is only one single good available in each state
of nature at the second date. In this paper, we demonstrate that
the spot-financial equilibrium can be obtained as a Nash
equilibrium of a market game in which the strategies of the
players consist in suggesting prices and quantities for both goods
and assets.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/470/1/MPRA_paper_470.pdf
Fugarolas, Guadalupe (2006): Nash equilibria applied to Spot-financial equilibria in General equilibrium incomplete market models.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:478
2019-09-28T16:49:12Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/478/
Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej
Jurdziak, Leszek
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game.
Based on the simple model of the lignite deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account nested pits generated by the pit optimisation process. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of two-stage game. In the first step (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to existence of information asymmetry and the mine predominant strategy attainment of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation techniques, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further research.
2006-02-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/478/1/MPRA_paper_478.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej. Published in: Energetyka , Vol. 59, No. No.2 (620) (February 2006)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:534
2019-09-27T02:13:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/
Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L94 - Electric Utilities
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Is vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom?
Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits from reduction of transactional costs described by Williamson. Additional benefits can be attained by application of open pit optimisation which leads to the solution of modified bilateral monopoly of lignite mine and power plant. Cooperation can assure joint profits maximisation and rivalry leads to suboptimal solution in Pareto sense. Due to asymmetry of information about the deposit the mine has information advantage and can apply its predominant solution maximising only their own profits in long run.
2005-03-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/1/MPRA_paper_534.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2005): Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo? Published in: Biuletyn URE No. Nr 2 (February 2005)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:601
2019-09-29T00:13:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4437
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/601/
No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems
Gomez-Rua, Maria
Vidal-Puga, Juan
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
C71 - Cooperative Games
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
In the context of cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, we introduce a property called No Advantageous Merging. This property implies that no group of agents can be better off claiming to be a single node. We show that the sharing rule that assigns to each agent his own connection cost (the Bird rule) satisfies this property. Moreover, we provide a characterization of the Bird rule using No Advantageous Merging.
2006-10-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/601/1/MPRA_paper_601.pdf
Gomez-Rua, Maria and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2006): No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:635
2019-10-28T18:16:21Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:702
2019-10-04T15:37:34Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/702/
Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited
Dubra, Juan
D44 - Auctions
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post efficient equilibrium without assuming differentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiquitous in the study of (potentially) asymmetric English auctions. Therefore, my work highlights the economic content of what it takes to obtain efficient ex post equilibria.
I generalize prior work by Echenique and Manelli (2006) and by Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). Relative to Krishna (2003), I weaken his single crossing properties, drop his differentiability and densities assumptions, but I assume that one player's valuation is weakly increasing in other players' signals, while he uses a different assumption (neither stronger nor weaker).
2006-10-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/702/1/MPRA_paper_702.pdf
Dubra, Juan (2006): Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:856
2019-09-26T13:57:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/856/
The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis
Siddiqi, Hammad
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
We model the toilet seat problem as a 2 player non-cooperative game. We find that the social norm of leaving the toilet seat down is inefficient. However, to the dismay of “mankind”, we also find that the social norm of leaving the seat down after use is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Hence, sadly, this norm is not likely to go away.
2006-11-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/856/1/MPRA_paper_856.pdf
Siddiqi, Hammad (2006): The social norm of leaving the toilet seat down: A game theoretic analysis.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:872
2019-09-30T16:46:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/872/
Fighting Collusion in Tournaments
Chen, Zhijun
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
This paper proposes a new approach of fighting collusion in tournaments which sheds light on the principle of divide and conquer: the principal can benefit from manipulating information revelation, by which he brings asymmetric information between the agents and thus creates a distortion of efficiency in the coalition. We employ a simple tournament setting where, due to perfect collusion, the efficient effort levels are impossible to be implemented through simple mechanisms. We propose a sophisticated mechanism with a biased promotion rule that allows the principal to manipulate the revelation of information and make asymmetric information between the agents, which brings trade-offs between rent-extraction and distortion of efficiency into the coalition. We show that, it is possible to implement efficient effort levels under the sophisticated mechanism.
JEL Classification: C72, D82
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/872/1/MPRA_paper_872.pdf
Chen, Zhijun (2006): Fighting Collusion in Tournaments.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:873
2019-09-27T23:28:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/873/
Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design
Chen, Zhijun
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer. We relax the restriction of publicly enforced grand contract in the framework of Laffont-Martimort-Itoh, which allows us to incorporate the approach of private enforcement into the theory. In a setting of moral hazard with mutually observable actions, we develop a multi-stage mechanism integrated with secret reporting and private transferring and show that the first-best allocation can be implememted in spite of collusion, which implies that preventing collusion entails no cost under new approach.
2006-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/873/1/MPRA_paper_873.pdf
Chen, Zhijun (2006): Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:915
2019-09-29T05:08:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/915/
Coalition Formation, Bargaining and Investments in Networks with Externalities: Analysis of the Eurasian Gas Supply Network
Ikonnikova, Svetlana
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C71 - Cooperative Games
We present a new methodology to study how upstream (e.g.
producers) and downstream (e.g. transiters) players form
coalitions, bargain over joint profit sharing and invest. Within
coalitions players combine resources, coalitions compete on a
market. Profit of each coalition depends on the cooperation among
the outside players. Hence, we consider a game with externalities.
To find the equilibrium coalition structure and the expected
payoffs, we use the solution proposed by Maskin (2003). Payoffs
reflect the bargaining power and depend on capacities of players.
We show, how investment options available to players matter.
We apply the study to analyze the Eurasian gas supply network.
Russia and Turkmenistan - producers and Ukraine, Belorus,
Azerbaijan, Iran - transiters form coalitions to supply gas and
bargain over profit sharing. Besides, the players invest in
pipelines. We derive the bargaining power of the countries from
the architecture of the network and calculate the strategic value
of the different pipeline projects.
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/915/1/MPRA_paper_915.pdf
Ikonnikova, Svetlana (2005): Coalition Formation, Bargaining and Investments in Networks with Externalities: Analysis of the Eurasian Gas Supply Network.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:945
2019-09-26T21:48:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/945/
Contest design and optimal endogenous entry
Fu, Qiang
Lu, Jingfeng
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper derives the effort-maximizing contest rule and the optimal endogenous entry in a context where potential participants bear fixed entry costs. The organizer is allowed to design the contest under a fixed budget with two strategic instruments: he sets the value of the prize purse, and arranges a monetary transfer (entry subsidy or fee) for each participating contestant. In other words, the budget can either be used to subsidize participation or an entry fee can be charged to fund the prize purse. The results show that the optimally designed contest attracts exactly two participating contestants in its unique subgame perfect equilibrium (when there is a positive fixed entry cost) and extracts all the surplus from participating contestants. The study also shows that the direction and amount of the monetary transfer depend on the magnitude of the entry cost: the contest organizer subsidizes entry when contestants bear substantial entry costs, but charges an entry fee to fund the prize purse whenever the entry cost is sufficiently low.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/945/1/MPRA_paper_945.pdf
Fu, Qiang and Lu, Jingfeng (2006): Contest design and optimal endogenous entry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:946
2019-09-26T13:24:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D43:4337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/946/
The optimal multi-stage contest
Fu, Qiang
Lu, Jingfeng
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper investigates the optimal (effort-maximizing) structure of multi-stage sequential-elimination contests with pooling competition in each stage. We allow the contest organizer to design the contest structure in two arms: contest sequence (the number of stages, and the number of remaining contestants in each stage), and prize allocation. First, we find that the optimality of "winner-take-all" (single final winner, single final prize, no intermediate prizes) is independent of the contest sequence. Second, we show that the more complete the contest sequence is, the more efforts can be induced from the contestants. Therefore, the optimal contest eliminates one contestant at each stage until the finale, while a single winner takes over the entire prize purse. Our results not only rationalize various forms of multi-stage contests conducted in reality, such as the well-known Fox TV show "American Idol", but also shed light on the design of internal organizational hierarchy.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/946/1/MPRA_paper_946.pdf
Fu, Qiang and Lu, Jingfeng (2006): The optimal multi-stage contest.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:947
2019-10-02T04:46:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D43:4337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/947/
The beauty of "bigness" in contest design: merging or splitting?
Fu, Qiang
Lu, Jingfeng
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper studies in a multiple-winner contest setting how the total efforts may vary between a grand contest and a set of subcontests. We first show that the rent-dissipation rate increases when the numbers of contestants and prizes are "scaled up". In other words, the total efforts of a contest exhibit a striking "increasing return to scale" property: when the numbers of contestants and prizes scale up proportionally, the total efforts of the contest increase more than proportionally. Thus, the total efforts must increase when a set of identical subcontests are merged into a grand contest. Equivalently, the total efforts decrease when a grand contest is evenly divided. We further allow the grand contest to be split into uneven subcontests. We show that under a mild and plausible condition (regular contest technology), the grand contest generates more efforts as compared to any split contests.
2006-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/947/1/MPRA_paper_947.pdf
Fu, Qiang and Lu, Jingfeng (2006): The beauty of "bigness" in contest design: merging or splitting?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:966
2019-10-01T15:24:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/966/
Evolution of Tax Evasion
Lipatov, Vilen
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
In this paper we analyze a tax evasion game with taxpayer learning by
imitation. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive
share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the
existing literature that yields full compliance of audited taxpayer who are
rational, have a lot of information and thus do not need to interact. When
the authority adjusts auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing
occurs. Thus, the real life phenomenon of compliance fluctuations is
explained within the model rather than by exogenous parameter shifts.
2003-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/966/1/MPRA_paper_966.pdf
Lipatov, Vilen (2003): Evolution of Tax Evasion.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1028
2019-10-04T16:27:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1028/
When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content
Lupia, Arthur
Menning, Jesse
H30 - General
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
Analysts make competing claims about when and how politicians use fear to gain support for suboptimal policies. Using a model, we clarify how common attributes of fear affect politicians’ abilities to achieve outcomes that are bad for voters. In it, a politician can provide information about a threat. His statement need not be true. How citizens respond differs from most game-theoretic models – we proceed from more dynamic (and realistic) assumptions about how citizens react to fear. Our conclusions counter popular claims about how easily politicians use fear to manipulate citizens; yield different policy advice than does recent counterterrorism scholarship; and highlight issues (abstract, distant) and leaders (secretive) for which recent findings by political psychologists and public opinion scholars will – and will not – generalize.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1028/1/MPRA_paper_1028.pdf
Lupia, Arthur and Menning, Jesse (2005): When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1048
2019-09-27T01:19:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1048/
When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content
Lupia, Arthur
Menning, Jesse
H30 - General
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
Analysts make competing claims about when and how politicians can use fear to gain support for suboptimal policies. Using a model, we clarify how common attributes of fear affect politicians’ abilities to achieve self-serving outcomes that are bad for voters. In it, a politician provides information about a threat. His statement need not be true. How citizens respond differs from most game-theoretic models – we proceed from more dynamic (and realistic) assumptions about how citizens think. Our conclusions counter popular claims about how easily politicians use fear to manipulate citizens, yield different policy advice than does recent scholarship on counterterrorism, and highlight issues (abstract, distant) and leaders (secretive) for which recent findings by political psychologists and public opinion scholars will – and will not – generalize.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1048/1/MPRA_paper_1048.pdf
Lupia, Arthur and Menning, Jesse (2005): When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1151
2019-10-06T07:19:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30:4B3030
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1151/
Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking
Giuseppe, Dari-Mattiacci
Bruno, Lovat
Eric, Langlais
Francesco, Parisi
K00 - General
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper presents a general rent-seeking model in which participants
decide on entry before choosing their levels of efforts. The conventional
wisdom in the rent-seeking literature suggests that the rent dissipation
increases with the number of potential participants and with their
productivity of effort. In this paper, we show that this result of the
rent-seeking literature is far from general and applies only when
participants are relatively weak and enter the game with certainty. In the
presence of strong competitors, the expected total dissipation actually
decreases, since participation in the game is less frequent. We further
consider the impact of competitors' exit option, distinguishing between
\textquotedblright redistributive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ and
\textquotedblright productive rent-seeking\textquotedblright\ situations. In
redistributive rent-seeking, no social loss results from the fact that all
competitors exit the race. In productive rent-seeking, instead, lack of
participation creates a social loss (the \textquotedblright lost
treasure\textquotedblright\ effect), since valuable rents are left
unexploited. We show that the lost-treasure effect perfectly counterbalances
the reduction in rent dissipation due to competitors' exit. Hence, unlike
redistributive rent-seeking, in productive rent-seeking the total social
loss remains equal to the entire rent even when parties grow stronger or the
number of players increases.
2004-10-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1151/1/MPRA_paper_1151.pdf
Giuseppe, Dari-Mattiacci and Bruno, Lovat and Eric, Langlais and Francesco, Parisi (2004): Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent seeking.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1195
2019-09-28T04:38:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433837
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433633
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513235
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1195/
NISOCSol an algorithm for approximating Markovian equilibria in dynamic games with coupled-constraints
Krawczyk, Jacek
Azzato, Jeffrey
C87 - Econometric Software
C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling
Q25 - Water
C72 - Noncooperative Games
E62 - Fiscal Policy
In this report, we outline a method for approximating a Markovian (or feedback-Nash) equilibrium of a dynamic game, possibly subject to coupled-constraints. We treat such a game as a "multiple" optimal control problem. A method for approximating a solution to a given optimal control problem via backward induction on Markov chains was developed in Krawczyk (2006). A Markovian equilibrium may be obtained numerically by adapting this backward induction approach to a stage Nikaido-Isoda function (described in Krawczyk & Zuccollo (2006)).
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1195/1/MPRA_paper_1195.pdf
Krawczyk, Jacek and Azzato, Jeffrey (2006): NISOCSol an algorithm for approximating Markovian equilibria in dynamic games with coupled-constraints.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1264
2019-09-27T16:42:55Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443932
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1264/
Non-hierarchical signalling: two-stage financing game
Miglo, Anton
Zenkevich, Nikolay
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their "types" is usually based on the duality of "good" and "bad" types (GB approach), where "good" type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types hierarchy. Different types have the same average qualities but different profiles of quality over time which are their private information. We apply this idea to analyze a financing-investment game where firms' insiders have private information about the firm's profit profile over time. If transporting cash between period is costless equilibrium is pooling with up-front equity financing. Otherwise equilibrium is either pooling with debt when the economy is stagnating, or separating when the economy is growing (some firms issue debt and some firms issue shares). This provides new theoretical results that cannot be explained by the standard GB models and which are consistent with some financial market phenomena.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1264/1/MPRA_paper_1264.pdf
Miglo, Anton and Zenkevich, Nikolay (2005): Non-hierarchical signalling: two-stage financing game. Forthcoming in: Game Theory and Applications, Nova Science Publishers Inc., NY , Vol. Volume,
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1283
2019-09-28T04:37:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473333
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473234
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443932
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1283/
Debt-equity choice as a signal of profit profile over time
Miglo, Anton
G33 - Bankruptcy ; Liquidation
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
G24 - Investment Banking ; Venture Capital ; Brokerage ; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
This paper analyzes debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment when a firm’s insiders have private information about the firm’s expected earnings. When private information is one-dimensional (for example when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term earnings are private information) a separating equilibrium does not exist. When private information is two-dimensional a separating equilibrium may exist where firms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue debt and firms with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity. This provides new insights into the issue of different kinds of securities by different types of firms under asymmetric information as well as the link between debt-equity choice and operating performance.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1283/1/MPRA_paper_1283.pdf
Miglo, Anton (2006): Debt-equity choice as a signal of profit profile over time.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1440
2019-09-26T17:15:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
7375626A656374733D44:4438
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1440/
Endogenous Network Formation In the Laboratory
Celen, Bogachan
Hyndman, Kyle
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
A14 - Sociology of Economics
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
This paper provides an experimental test of a theory of endogenous network formation. A group of subjects face a decision problem under
uncertainty. The subjects are endowed with a private information about the fundamentals of the problem, and they are supposed to make a
decision one after the other. The key feature of the experiment is that a subject can observe the decisions of the preceding subjects by
forming links. A link is costly, yet it enables a subject to observe previous decisions of those to whom he is linked. We show that subjects respond to changes in the information structure and the cost of link formation in the expected manner. However, we also show that behavior systematically deviates from the Bayesian benchmark as subjects form more links than theory predicts. Subjects also exhibit a tendency to conform rather than follow their own information. In order to explain this pattern, we provide an econometric model that posits that subjects care about their relative standing in the group. We show that the modified model provides a better fit than a standard QRE.
2006-12-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1440/1/MPRA_paper_1440.pdf
Celen, Bogachan and Hyndman, Kyle (2006): Endogenous Network Formation In the Laboratory.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1503
2019-09-26T09:43:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1503/
Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
D44 - Auctions
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We examine a simple model of collusion under a
single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter
conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy,
nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an
effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1503/1/MPRA_paper_1503.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2006): Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1515
2019-10-09T22:23:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1515/
Firm Size and Pricing Policy
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
D40 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We relate the pricing policy
of the firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the
size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a
firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational
backlash if it reneges. This allows the firm to effectively commit
to its offers, leading to a unique equilibrium without delay, where
the firm extracts the whole of the surplus. For smaller firms,
however, the reputational effects are much less intense and,
consequently, the equilibria involve reneging possibilities. In this
case the equilibria are non-unique, and may involve delays as well.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1515/1/MPRA_paper_1515.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2006): Firm Size and Pricing Policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1535
2019-10-01T05:40:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1535/
Yours, Mine, and Ours: The Effect of Ersatz Property Rights on Outcome Based Fairness and Reciprocity.
Oxoby, Robert J.
Spraggon, John
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C70 - General
We report laboratory data on earned wealth effects in a series of anonymous
dictator games. In addition to a standard (baseline) treatment in which wealth
was determined by the experimenter, we conduct treatments in which either the
dictator or the receiver earned wealth used in the subsequent dictator game. In
our baseline treatment, we observe the standard result: on average, dictators allocate
receivers twenty percent. In treatments where the dictator earned wealth,
we observe the theoretic prediction of zero offers to receivers. In treatments
where the receiver earned wealth, we observe distributions of offers in which the
receiver’s share exceeds fifty percent. We interpret these results as evidence of
the importance of property rights in determining individuals’ social preferences.
2004
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1535/1/MPRA_paper_1535.pdf
Oxoby, Robert J. and Spraggon, John (2004): Yours, Mine, and Ours: The Effect of Ersatz Property Rights on Outcome Based Fairness and Reciprocity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1555
2019-12-28T11:49:25Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1599
2019-10-11T04:47:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1599/
Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria
Oyama, Daisuke
Tercieux, Olivier
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information (Kajii and Morris, Econometrica 65 (1997)) and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction (Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic Theory 65 (1995)). Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided.
2004-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1599/1/MPRA_paper_1599.pdf
Oyama, Daisuke and Tercieux, Olivier (2004): Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1600
2019-09-26T11:19:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/
Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
C71 - Cooperative Games
L94 - Electric Utilities
Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search.
2006-09-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/1/MPRA_paper_1600.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Published in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium Continuous Surface Mining , Vol. ISBN 3, No. Department of Mining Engineering III, RWTH Aachen University (24 September 2006): pp. 469-476.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1618
2019-09-26T22:02:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D48:4830:483030
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1618/
Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors
Lupia, Arthur
Zharinova, Natasha
Levine, Adam Seth
C72 - Noncooperative Games
H00 - General
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
Many claims about political behavior are based on implicit assumptions about human reasoning. One such assumption, that political actors think in complex and similar ways when assessing strategies, is nested within widely used game theoretic equilibrium concepts. Empirical research casts doubt on the validity of these assumptions in important cases. For example, the finding that some citizens expend limited cognitive energy to social concerns runs counter to the assumption that citizens (e.g., jurors) base all decisions on complex thoughts. Similarly, evidence that some political actors (e.g., Democrats and Republicans) think about political cause-and-effect quite differently runs against the assumption that all players reason about politics in similar ways. The self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) concept provides a means for evaluating the robustness of theoretical conclusions to the introduction of a broad range of psychological assumptions. Through arguments and examples, we explain opportunities and challenges inherent in using the SCE concept. We find that the concept provides an improved foundation for more serious and constructive interactions between formal theoretic and psychology-oriented literatures.
2007-01-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1618/1/MPRA_paper_1618.pdf
Lupia, Arthur and Zharinova, Natasha and Levine, Adam Seth (2007): Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Explaining the Choices of Cognitively Limited Actors.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1620
2019-10-02T04:45:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1620/
On the Value of Participation: Endogenous Emergence of Social Norms in a Three-Player Ultimatum Game
Grimalda, Gianluca
Kar, Anirban
Proto, Eugenio
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We report results from two different settings of a 3-player ultimatum game. Under the monocratic rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the democratic rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then extracted. A majority vote is required to implement the proposal. Although the two rules are strategically equivalent, different patterns of behaviour seem to emerge as the number of interactions increase. Under the monocratic rule proposers seem to be entitled to claim a larger share of the pie, and receivers more likely to accept, in comparison with the democratic rule. We speculate that ‘institutions’ allowing more participation in the process of collective choice lead to more ‘socially responsible’ behaviour in the players.
2006-12-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1620/1/MPRA_paper_1620.pdf
Grimalda, Gianluca and Kar, Anirban and Proto, Eugenio (2006): On the Value of Participation: Endogenous Emergence of Social Norms in a Three-Player Ultimatum Game.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1687
2019-10-01T12:30:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1687/
The value of a new idea: knowledge transmission, workers' mobility and market structure
Marini, Marco A.
C70 - General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
We model the process of knowledge transmission among firms via workers mobility as a multi-stage game. In our setup an idea to be realized needs that the agent informed about the idea recruits another agent from a pool of uninformed people. This constraint generates a recursive effect of knowledge transmission via players mobility across firms
which affects simultaneously the players payoffs and the number of active players engaged in market competition. We provide sufficient conditions for the game to possess a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which all incumbent players deter the exit of their collaborators. The equilibrium outcome is shown to depend upon the success of the
idea over time, expressed by the behaviour of the market demand and on playerstime preferences. A few other intuitions are provided on the interplay between technology, market structure and the market value of an innovative idea.
2005-07-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1687/1/MPRA_paper_1687.pdf
Marini, Marco A. (2005): The value of a new idea: knowledge transmission, workers' mobility and market structure. Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals , Vol. 29, No. 29, 2006 (2006): pp. 697-706.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1689
2019-09-26T13:05:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1689/
A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities
Marini, Marco A.
Currarini, Sergio
C70 - General
C71 - Cooperative Games
This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply this result to Cournot and Bertrand games and to public goods economies.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1689/1/MPRA_paper_1689.pdf
Marini, Marco A. and Currarini, Sergio (2003): A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities. Published in: Koray S. and Sertel, M. R. (eds.), pp.233-250, Advances in Economic Design, Springer Verlag, Berlin & London (2003): pp. 233-251.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1889
2019-09-27T13:12:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3431
7375626A656374733D4E:4E37:4E3735
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1889/
Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited
Harbord, David
J41 - Labor Contracts
N75 - Asia including Middle East
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
We revisit Greif's (1993) analysis of trade between the 11th-century Maghribi traders and present two different models which bring into play, in an essential way, historical features of the Maghribi's organization which had no role in Greif's own analysis. Our reformulation of the Maghribi's "punishment strategies" incorporates principal components of their actual historical practice and explains why they may have been necessary to sustain cooperation, especially in the presence of uncertainty or imperfect information. We also model "formal friendships," or trade through bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and predict the Maghribi's practice of providing agency services without pecuniary compensation. We are thus able to provide a richer and more accurate picture of how that organization facilitated trade between widely-dispersed traders in the absence of a reliable legal system to enforce merchant contracts.
2006-11-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1889/1/MPRA_paper_1889.pdf
Harbord, David (2006): Enforcing cooperation among medieval merchants: The Maghribi traders revisited.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1906
2019-09-27T07:43:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1906/
College Admissions under Early Decision
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper, we model college admissions under early decision in a many-to-one matching framework with two periods. We show that there exists no stable matching system, involving an early decision matching rule and a regular decision matching rule, which is nonmanipulable via early decision quotas by colleges or via early decision preferences by colleges or students. We then analyze the Nash equilibria of the game, in which the preferences of colleges and students in each period are common knowledge and every college determines a quota for the early decision period given its total capacity for the two periods. Under college-optimal and student-optimal matching systems, we show that a pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. However, when colleges or students have common preferences over the other set of agents, 'terminating early decision program' becomes a weakly dominant strategy for each college if every student, choosing to act early, always applies early to his or her top choice college.
2007-01-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1906/1/MPRA_paper_1906.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2007): College Admissions under Early Decision.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1907
2019-09-27T17:02:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1907/
Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse
We study the problem of marriage formation and marital distribution in a two-period model of matching, extending the matching with bargaining framework of Crawford and Rochford (1986). We run simulations to find the effects of alimony rate, legal cost of divorce, initial endowments, couple and single productivity parameters on the payoffs and marital status in the society.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1907/1/MPRA_paper_1907.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2006): Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1908
2019-09-29T08:24:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1908/
One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
D62 - Externalities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a sufficiency result for the existence of the stable set and the core. We also present several findings on the issues of
gender optimality, lattices, strategy-proofness, and rationalizability.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1908/1/MPRA_paper_1908.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2006): One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1913
2019-10-01T05:33:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1913/
Firm-Specific Skills, Wage Bargaining, and Efficiency
Mumcu, Ayşe
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show that, in the contract renewal stage, the worker's ability to use his firm-specific skills strategically increases his bargaining power vis-a-vis the firm. The firm can threaten to fire the worker and hire a new inexperienced worker, but this threat is not always credible. Even though the bargaining takes place in an environment with perfect information, the game has inefficient equilibria where delays occur in real time.
1999
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1913/1/MPRA_paper_1913.pdf
Mumcu, Ayşe (1999): Firm-Specific Skills, Wage Bargaining, and Efficiency.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1959
2019-09-30T06:02:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438
7375626A656374733D41:4131
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453232
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473232
7375626A656374733D43:4337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1959/
Principle of uncertain future and utility
Harin, Alexander
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
A1 - General Economics
E22 - Investment ; Capital ; Intangible Capital ; Capacity
G22 - Insurance ; Insurance Companies ; Actuarial Studies
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
The principle of uncertain future: the probability of a future event contains a degree of (hidden) uncertainty. As a result, this uncertainty (in a sense, similar to vibrations, fluctuations) pushes the probability value back from the bounds to the middle of its range (from ~100% and ~0% to the middle probability values). In other words, the real values of high probabilities are lower than the preliminarily determined ones. Conversely, the real values of low probabilities are higher than the preliminarily determined ones. This result provides the uniform solution of a number of fundamental problems: the underweighting of high and the overweighting of low probabilities, the Allais paradox, risk aversion, loss aversion, the Ellsberg paradox, the equity premium puzzle, etc. The principle and its consequences can be applied in the fields of banking, investment, insurance, trade, industry, planning and forecasting. Explanations of the principle and examples of solution of three types of basic utility problems are provided.
2007-02-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1959/1/MPRA_paper_1959.pdf
Harin, Alexander (2007): Principle of uncertain future and utility.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2035
2019-10-02T04:50:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433930
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2035/
Selfish in the End?:An Investigation of Consistency and Stability of individual Behavior
Brosig, Jeannette
Riechmann, Thomas
Weimann, Joachim
C90 - General
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper puts three of the most prominent specifications of ‘other-regarding’ preferences to the experimental test, namely the theories developed by Charness and Rabin, by Fehr and Schmidt, and by Andreoni and Miller. In a series of experiments based on various dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games, we try to uncover which of these concepts, or the classical selfishapproach, is able to explain most of our experimental findings. The experiments are special with regard to two aspects: First, we investigate the consistency of individual behavior within and across different classes of games. Second, we analyze the stability of individual behavior over time by running the same experiments on the same subjects at several points in time.
Our results demonstrate that in the first wave of experiments, all theories of other-regarding preferences explain a high share of individual decisions. Other-regarding preferences seem to wash out over time, however. In the final wave, it is the classical theory of selfish behaviorthat delivers the best explanation. Stable behavior over time is observed only for subjects, who behave strictly selfish. Most subjects behave consistently with regard to at least one of the theories within the same class of games, but are much less consistent across games.
2007-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2035/1/MPRA_paper_2035.pdf
Brosig, Jeannette and Riechmann, Thomas and Weimann, Joachim (2007): Selfish in the End?:An Investigation of Consistency and Stability of individual Behavior. Published in: FEMM Working Paper Series No. 05/2007 (February 2007): pp. 1-33.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2073
2019-09-28T03:52:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4633:463332
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2073/
Is It Time to Get Radical? A Game Theoritic analysis of Asian Crisis and Capital Control
Martawardaya, Berly
Salotti, Simone
F32 - Current Account Adjustment ; Short-Term Capital Movements
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Policymakers in modern and open economies face a macroeconomic trilemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2005). There are three main sought-after objectives:
1. to stabilize the exchange rate;
2. to enjoy free international capital mobility
3. to engage in a monetary policy oriented toward domestic goals.
Three main questions that we try to answer are : How the crisis exacerbated by international investor racing to pull out their capital from affected coutnries? Can capital control reduce it? Can capital control reduce contagion effect and regional financial instability?
Using game theoritical framework and insight from behavioral economics, we analyzed herd behaviour of international investors in the time of financial crisis. Under free international capital mobility, uncertainty and lack of coordination among investors with short-horizon, we found prisoner dilemma type of arrangement that exacerbated financial crisis.
Applying the anylisis to multi-stage game with government, we found that a credible threat of capital control could reduce herd behaviour and escape the worst of financial crisis. Therefore, fredom to employ capital control is a policy tool that enable escape from the trilemma and pursue all three goals at the same time.
We modify the framework to include multiple countries under financial crisis and fear of contagion. We found the ability to impose capital control, under certain conditions, will isolate the crisis and reduce contagion effect. We also explore the critical value when capital control should be enacted with regard to domestic economic condition, on which government political mandate base upon, and differences of reactions in relation to political regime.
We conclude by citing incidences of insistance toward comitment against capital control by IMF in loans approcal and US in free trade agreement as misdirected, unncessesary and even harmful in some cases.
2006-11-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2073/1/MPRA_paper_2073.pdf
Martawardaya, Berly and Salotti, Simone (2006): Is It Time to Get Radical? A Game Theoritic analysis of Asian Crisis and Capital Control.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2134
2019-10-01T03:33:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2134/
Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders
Masili, Gustavo
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D44 - Auctions
The paper compares different auction formats for sale of a single patented innovation for budget constrained bidders. This unit decreases the marginal cost of production in the aftermarket for its owner by an amount which depends on the money invested on the development of this technology. As the bidders have a fixed budget that must be used to pay the final auction price and also to develop the new technology, the winner has incentives to pay a low amount for his unit to increase the amount available to invest in cost reduction. Conversely the loser has incentives to induce induce a higher price to be paid by the winner in order to increase aftermarket profits. This conflict of interest generates the willingness to pay (WTP) for the patent through an endogenous process, which may end up by stablishing a higher WTP for the lowest financed firm. Given this background, the case in which the players have different initial budgets may generate multiple equilibria for all studied auction mechanisms. These equilibria produce di¤erent consumer surplus and, thus, a central government with an unti-trust behavior is able to choose the auction that generates the re�ned equilibrium leading to the highest consumer surplus.
2006-07-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2134/1/MPRA_paper_2134.pdf
Masili, Gustavo (2006): Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2178
2013-02-11T14:26:10Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2179
2020-03-11T06:34:20Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2236
2019-09-30T23:19:04Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2236/
Game Theoretic Models as a Framework for Analysis: The Case of Coordination Conventions
Aydinonat, N. Emrah
B41 - Economic Methodology
C70 - General
This paper examines game theoretic models of coordination conventions. Firstly, the paper shows that static models of coordination cannot explain the emergence of coordination conventions. The best interpretation of these models is that they study the conditions under which coordination is possible. The examination of these conditions suggests that history and existing institutions are important in the process of emergence of institutions. Secondly, an examination of dynamic models of coordination conventions reveals that some of these models explicate some of the ways in which coordination may be brought about in the model world. Nevertheless, consideration of these models fortifies the point that history and existing institutions are crucial for explaining the emergence of conventions in the real world. Based on these observations, the paper suggests that game theory as a framework of analysis is the best possible interpretation of game theoretic models of coordination conventions.
2006-06-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2236/1/MPRA_paper_2236.pdf
Aydinonat, N. Emrah (2006): Game Theoretic Models as a Framework for Analysis: The Case of Coordination Conventions. Published in: Advances in Economics: Theory and Applications , Vol. 2, (2006): pp. 9-34.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2384
2019-09-26T10:16:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice (in long run) or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract (in short run e.g. one of year). It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/1/MPRA_paper_2384.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 43-57.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2385
2019-09-30T12:59:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
D40 - General
For methods of the profit division in the bilateral monopoly of the mine and the power station sug-gested in the first part of this paper the formulae for lignite price and shares in the joint profit of the mine and the power station are calculated. The proposed profit division contain: the egalitarian, normal and asymmetrical Nash solution, the proportional division, assuring equal and proportional profit margins division (in it calculated only on the basis of prime costs) and Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with individual utility functions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/1/MPRA_paper_2385.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 59-68.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2388
2019-09-30T08:16:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443839
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D89 - Other
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
For the hypothetical deposit with parameters similar to KWB “Konin” S.A. conditions; lignite prices and proposed divisions are calculated and results were discussed under the angle of the fairness (equity) of the division and the possibility of their approval by both sides. A sensitivity analysis of shares of the mine in joint profits, the level of border prices outlining break-even points, lignite prices, the total profit and the profit of the mine for the price change of the energy, costs of the mine and the power station was carried. Results were discussed under the angle of correction of the division in the next period with taking into consideration the inflation, changes in prices of the energy and level of total costs of the mine and the power station and of the potential temptation of the change in the proportion of shares by increasing expenses. Lignite mines and power stations cooperating with them were invited for discussion about proposed divisions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/1/MPRA_paper_2388.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 69-80.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2466
2019-09-26T22:14:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/
Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
The newest outcome of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant analysis have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution maximising joint profits not only in quantity of lignite - the size and shape of the ultimate pit (characteristic to classical solution) but also in its price has been stressed. It is proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a cooperative, two-stage, two-person, non zero-sum game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM should be chosen and in the second one, during bargaining, the split of profit ought to be decided together with choosing the transfer price of lignite. The level of lignite prices has been presented in the time of their control and confirmation (1996-2003) as well as their new profit sharing role in the period of their freely negotiation. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM due to its rational conditions. The application of this solution on example from the “Szczerców” deposit has been presented.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/1/MPRA_paper_2466.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES’06 (20 September 2006): pp. 32-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2467
2019-10-03T14:29:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/
Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
L94 - Electric Utilities
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Lignite mine and power plant can operate as two separate entities, two entities in one holding or joint venture and as the one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has the influence on operation of this tandem including realization of its individual and joint objectives, price negotiation, transactional costs, irreversible investments (sunk costs), different access to information (asymmetric information), cooperation or rivalry, possibility of opportunistic behaviour and other threats, which can be used against the second side. An attempt has been made to show these problems from the point of view of economic effectiveness based on a bilateral monopoly (BM) model and game theory approach with usage of pit optimisation methods. Advantages and disadvantages of different solutions have been presented as well as rational incentives to vertical integration due to inherent conflict of individual and group rationality in BM. This conflict of interest can lead to Pareto sub optimal solution in case of lack of cooperation between both sides. Concentration on lignite price can lead to waste of potential profit and decrease of mineable reserves - excavation of smaller pit, which is optimal only to the mine but not to the whole BM.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/1/MPRA_paper_2467.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES/06 (20 September 2006): pp. 26-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2474
2019-09-28T16:50:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2474/
Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining
Mumcu, Ayşe
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show that the worker's ability to disclose his skills strategically increases his bargaining power. The game may have inefficient equilibria where delays occur in real time. With the addition of outside options for both the firm and the worker, delays are shortened whenever outside options are credible threats. Our model also predicts that wages are procyclical, and there can be a variation in wages for a given job level.
1999
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2474/1/MPRA_paper_2474.pdf
Mumcu, Ayşe (1999): Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2527
2019-10-01T23:46:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453232
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
7375626A656374733D42:4235:423532
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2527/
An adaptive evolutionary behaviour for the demand-led growth adjustment
Bonaventura, Luigi
Caserta, Maurizio
E22 - Investment ; Capital ; Intangible Capital ; Capacity
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
Investment activity produces effects on two different economic variables. On the one hand, it adds to the existing productive capacity, on the other, it represents a component of demand. What is required for demand may not be required for accumulation, and viceversa. As a consequence different adjustment mechanisms have been put forward in the economic literature to make the two aspects of investment compatible to each other. In all cases, a distinction has been made between the fundamentally macroeconomic nature of the demand aspect, and the fundamentally microeconomic nature of the capacity-augmenting aspect. This paper tries to discuss the foundations of a non-perverse adjustment mechanism based on the internalisation of the demand aspect of investment.
The adjustment mechanism discussed earlier is based on investment reacting to positive or negative excess aggregate demand. Once it is shown that a collectively efficient equilibrium can be reached even on an entirely
arbitrary basis, one may set out to show that a behaviour which gets selected in a small population can be easily extended to a large one.
2004
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2527/1/MPRA_paper_2527.pdf
Bonaventura, Luigi and Caserta, Maurizio (2004): An adaptive evolutionary behaviour for the demand-led growth adjustment.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2548
2019-10-01T09:50:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483530
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483631
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443330
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483630
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2548/
A Single-Mindedness model with n generations
Emanuele, Canegrati
H50 - General
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H61 - Budget ; Budget Systems
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
D30 - General
C72 - Noncooperative Games
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
H31 - Household
J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
H60 - General
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n
generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new
expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump-
sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic
labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget,
some generations obtain a benefit, whilst some other must pay the entire
cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which
are more single-minded on leisure are the most better off since they are
more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further-
more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the
same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds
only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for
politicians is considered.
2007-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2548/1/MPRA_paper_2548.pdf
Emanuele, Canegrati (2007): A Single-Mindedness model with n generations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2770
2019-09-27T07:27:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D52:5231:523132
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2770/
Urban growth and subcenter formation: A trolley ride from the Staples Center to Disneyland and the Rose Bowl
Berliant, Marcus
Wang, Ping
R12 - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
The long-term trends of urbanization suggest: not only have more cities formed, but the leading metropolises have grown larger, with a number of peripheral subcenters developing over time. Conventional models of urban growth are limited, in that commuting cost and congestion eventually result in decreasing returns in a monocentric city as population becomes very large. We construct a general-equilibrium model with dynamic interactions between spatial agglomeration and urban development, driven by location-dependent knowledge spillovers. Our contribution allows endogenous development of subcenters to capture benefits from knowledge spillovers and offset diminishing returns from urban congestion, thus permitting more sustained city growth.
2007-04-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2770/1/MPRA_paper_2770.pdf
Berliant, Marcus and Wang, Ping (2007): Urban growth and subcenter formation: A trolley ride from the Staples Center to Disneyland and the Rose Bowl.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2837
2019-09-29T05:01:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433633
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2837/
Using Genetics Based Machine Learning to find Strategies for Product Placement in a dynamic Market
Fent, Thomas
C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D40 - General
M31 - Marketing
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
In this paper we discuss the necessity of models including complex adaptive systems in order to eliminate the shortcomings of neoclassical models based on equilibrium theory. A simulation model containing artificial adaptive agents is used to explore the dynamics of a market of highly replaceable products. A population consisting of two classes of agents is implemented to observe if methods provided by modern computational intelligence can help finding a meaningful strategy for product placement. During several simulation runs it turned out that the agents using CI-methods outperformed their competitors.
1999-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2837/1/MPRA_paper_2837.pdf
Fent, Thomas (1999): Using Genetics Based Machine Learning to find Strategies for Product Placement in a dynamic Market.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2838
2019-10-12T05:15:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433633
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2838/
Wissen gewinnen und gewinnen durch Wissen
Fent, Thomas
C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
According to Alfred Korzybski (1921) humans unlike plants and animals have the property to bind time, i.e. they are able to transfer experience through time. Humans are capable to collenct knowledge from the past and communicate their knowledge to the future. This paper investigates the possibilities and limitations to describe this capability by algorithms and implement it in artificial learning systems.
2000-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2838/1/MPRA_paper_2838.pdf
Fent, Thomas (2000): Wissen gewinnen und gewinnen durch Wissen.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3142
2019-10-03T03:55:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3142/
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Santos-Pinto, Luís
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C72 - Noncooperative Games
The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly
the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments
have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support
for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are
modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous.
This paper generalizes Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing games
by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. I explore the theoretical
implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical
evidence. I find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental
evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not
able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous timing games.
2006-02-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3142/1/MPRA_paper_3142.pdf
Santos-Pinto, Luís (2006): Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3248
2019-09-27T09:57:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3248/
Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator
Binmore, Ken
Harbord, David
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to act as monopolists in pricing call termination on their networks has recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G’s entry into European mobile markets. The European Commission’s electronic communications regime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobile termination rates if an operator is found to possess “significant market power”. This requires that the mobile operator not be constrained by the "countervailing buyer power" of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailing buyer power has been repeatedly dismissed because of their obligation to interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous. We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates and demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligation is entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3G having no market power at all in pricing call termination on their own networks.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3248/1/MPRA_paper_3248.pdf
Binmore, Ken and Harbord, David (2005): Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator. Published in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2005): pp. 449-472.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3257
2019-09-26T20:32:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3257/
Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity
Bonein, Aurélie
Serra, Daniel
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictator-ultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less other-regarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.
2007-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3257/1/MPRA_paper_3257.pdf
Bonein, Aurélie and Serra, Daniel (2007): Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3260
2019-09-26T09:46:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3260/
Enforcement of Property Rights in a Barter Economy
Hoffmann, Magnus
F10 - General
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
If property rights to consumption goods are insecure, the incentives to trade in a barter economy are reshaped. In a pure exchange economy, we examine the case where two contestable consumption goods are vital to two agents and initial endowments follow a binary distribution. In line with the existing literature, we examine in a two-stage game how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. We find that, in equilibrium, two different regimes emerge, depending on the exogenous preference and appropriationeffectiveness parameters: Peaceful coexistence and trade and appropriation,with the former regime strictly Pareto-dominating the latter regime.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3260/1/MPRA_paper_3260.pdf
Hoffmann, Magnus (2006): Enforcement of Property Rights in a Barter Economy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3289
2019-09-27T03:43:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3289/
Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach
Hoffmann, Magnus
Schmidt, Frederik
D42 - Monopoly
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
In the following, we examine a market of a digital consumption good with
monopolistic supply. In this market, it is the ability of the consumer to bypass
(”crack”) the copy-protection of the monopolist which induces a lower price of
the digital good, compared to an uncontested monopoly (textbook case). We
analyze the complex relationship between the cracking efforts of the consumer,
the copy-protection efforts and the pricing decision of the monopolist, and the
welfare of the economy. We find, for example, that the monopolist will deter
piracy if the (exogenous) relative effectiveness of the consumer’s bypassing
activity is low compared to the copy-protection technology. In this case welfare
is lower than the welfare in the textbook case. On the contrary, welfare
rises above the textbook case level if the relative effectiveness of cracking is
sufficiently high.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3289/1/MPRA_paper_3289.pdf
Hoffmann, Magnus and Schmidt, Frederik (2007): Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3296
2019-10-10T12:51:16Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443930
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433639
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3296/
Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
Kumabe, Masahiro
Mihara, H. Reiju
D90 - General
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C71 - Cooperative Games
C69 - Other
It was shown earlier that the class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.
2007-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3296/1/MPRA_paper_3296.pdf
Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2007): Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core. Forthcoming in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3301
2019-09-28T17:19:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473134
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3301/
INFORMATION : PRICE AND IMPACT ON GENERAL WELFARE AND OPTIMAL INVESTMENT. AN ANTICIPATIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL.
Ewald, Christian-Oliver
Xiao, Yajun
G14 - Information and Market Efficiency ; Event Studies ; Insider Trading
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
We consider a continuous time market model, in which agents influence asset prices.
The agents are assumed to be rational and maximizing expected utility from terminal
wealth. They share the same utility function but are allowed to possess different levels
of information. Technically our model represents a stochastic differential game with
anticipative strategy sets. We derive necessary and sufficient criteria for the existence
of Nash-equilibria and characterize them for various levels of information asymmetry.
Furthermore we study in how far the asymmetry in the level of information influences
Nash-equilibria and general welfare. We show that under certain conditions in a
competitive environment an increased level of information may in fact lower the level of
general welfare. This effect can not be observed in representative agent based models,
where information always increases welfare. Finally we extend our model in a way, that
we add prior stages, in which agents are allowed to buy and sell information from each
other, before engaging in trading with the market assets. We determine equilibrium
prices for particular pieces of information in this setup.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3301/1/MPRA_paper_3301.pdf
Ewald, Christian-Oliver and Xiao, Yajun (2007): INFORMATION : PRICE AND IMPACT ON GENERAL WELFARE AND OPTIMAL INVESTMENT. AN ANTICIPATIVE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3325
2019-09-28T04:40:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3325/
On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms
Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
Litan, Cristian M.
Marhuenda, Francisco
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of mixed Nash equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions.
2007-05-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3325/1/MPRA_paper_3325.pdf
Kukushkin, Nikolai S. and Litan, Cristian M. and Marhuenda, Francisco (2007): On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3349
2019-09-27T04:21:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443030
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3349/
A Theory of Attribution
Feldman, Barry
D00 - General
C71 - Cooperative Games
C10 - General
Attribution of economic joint effects is achieved with a random order model of their relative importance. Random order consistency and elementary axioms uniquely identify linear and proportional marginal attribution. These are the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999, 2002) and Ortmann (2000)) values of the dual of the implied cooperative game. Random order consistency does not use a reduced game. Restricted potentials facilitate identification of proportional value derivatives and coalition formation results. Attributions of econometric model performance, using data from Fair (1978), show stability across models. Proportional marginal attribution (PMA) is found to correctly identify factor relative importance and to have a role in model construction. A portfolio attribution example illuminates basic issues regarding utility attribution and demonstrates investment applications. PMA is also shown to mitigate concerns (e.g., Thomas (1977)) regarding strategic behavior induced by linear cost attribution.
2007-03-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3349/1/MPRA_paper_3349.pdf
Feldman, Barry (2007): A Theory of Attribution.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3350
2019-10-03T14:36:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3350/
On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms
Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
Litan, Cristian M.
Marhuenda, Francisco
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of mixed Nash equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions.
2007-05-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3350/1/MPRA_paper_3350.pdf
Kukushkin, Nikolai S. and Litan, Cristian M. and Marhuenda, Francisco (2007): On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3404
2019-09-29T05:11:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443834
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3404/
Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors: When it is O.K. to Agree to Disagree
Hellman, Ziv
D84 - Expectations ; Speculations
C70 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Abandoning the oft-presumed common prior assumption, partitioned type spaces with disparate priors are studied. It is shown that in the two-player case, a unique fundamental pair of priors can be identified in each type space, from whose properties boundaries on the possible ranges of expected values under common knowledge can be derived. In the limit as the elements of this pair approach each other,a common prior is identified, and standard results stemming from the common prior assumption are recapitulated. It is further shown that this two-player fundamental pair of priors is a special case of the n-player situation, where a representative n-tuple of fundamentally associated priors can be selected, out of at most n-1 such n-tuples, to play an analogous role.
2007-05-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3404/1/MPRA_paper_3404.pdf
Hellman, Ziv (2007): Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors: When it is O.K. to Agree to Disagree.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3451
2019-09-28T10:07:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4438
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3451/
Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty
Anam, Mahmudul
Basher, Syed A.
Chiang, Shin-Hwan
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In this paper we introduce product demand uncertainty in a
mixed oligopoly model and reexamine the nature of sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) when firms decide in the first stage whether
to lead or follow in the subsequent quantity-setting game. In the
non-stochastic setting, Pal (1998) demonstrated that when the public
firm competes with a domestic private firm, multiple equilibria
exist but the efficient equilibrium outcome is for the public firm
to follow. Matsumura (2003a) proved that when the public firm's
rival is a foreign private firm, leadership of the public firm is
both efficient as well as SPN equilibrium. Our stochastic model
shows that when the leader must commit to output before the
resolution of uncertainty, multiple SPNE is possible. Whether the
equilibrium outcome is public or private leadership hinges upon the
degree of privatization and market volatility. More importantly,
Pareto-inefficient simultaneous production is a likely SPNE. Our
results are driven by the fact that the resolution of uncertainty
enhances the profits of the follower firm in a manner that is well
known in real option theory.
2007-06-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3451/1/MPRA_paper_3451.pdf
Anam, Mahmudul and Basher, Syed A. and Chiang, Shin-Hwan (2007): Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3592
2019-09-28T21:51:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3592/
College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C71 - Cooperative Games
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.
2007-06-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3592/1/MPRA_paper_3592.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2007): College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3622
2019-09-26T15:02:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3622/
Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator
Binmore, Ken
Harbord, David
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to act as monopolists in pricing call termination on their networks has recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G’s entry into European mobile markets. The European Commission’s electronic communications regime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobile termination rates if an operator is found to possess “significant market power”. This requires that the mobile operator not be constrained by the "countervailing buyer power" of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailing buyer power has been repeatedly dismissed because of their obligation to interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous. We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates and demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligation is entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3G having no market power at all in pricing call termination on their own networks.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3622/1/MPRA_paper_3622.pdf
Binmore, Ken and Harbord, David (2005): Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator. Published in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2005): pp. 449-472.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3684
2019-09-26T22:18:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433639
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3684/
The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
Kumabe, Masahiro
Mihara, H. Reiju
C69 - Other
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C71 - Cooperative Games
The Nakamura number of a simple game plays a critical role in preference aggregation (or multi-criterion ranking): the number of alternatives that the players can always deal with rationally is less than this number. We comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game impose on its Nakamura number. We find that a computable game has a finite Nakamura number greater than three only if it is proper, nonstrong, and nonweak, regardless of whether it is monotonic or whether it has a finite carrier. The lack of strongness often results in alternatives that cannot be strictly ranked.
2007-06-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3684/1/MPRA_paper_3684.pdf
Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2007): The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3794
2019-10-14T16:24:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3794/
Iterated Expectations, Compact Spaces and Common Priors
Hellman, Ziv
C70 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Extending to infinite state spaces that are compact metric spaces a result previously attained by Dov Samet solely in the context of finite state spaces, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players’ present beliefs only. A common prior exists if and only if for each random variable it is common knowledge that all its iterated expectations with respect to any permutation converge to the same value; this value is its expectation with respect to the common prior. It is further shown that the restriction to compact metric spaces is ‘natural’ when semantic type spaces are derived from syntactic models, and that compactness is a necessary condition. Many proofs are based on results from the theory of Markov chains.
2007-06-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3794/1/MPRA_paper_3794.pdf
Hellman, Ziv (2007): Iterated Expectations, Compact Spaces and Common Priors.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3843
2019-09-29T04:30:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443834
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3843/
Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach
Azrieli, Yaron
D84 - Expectations ; Speculations
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Inspired by the social psychology literature, we study the
implications of categorical thinking on decision making in the
context of a large normal form game. Every agent has a
categorization (partition) of her opponents and can only observe the
average behavior in each category. A strategy profile is a
Conjectural Categorical Equilibrium (CCE) with respect to a
given categorization profile if every player's strategy is a best
response to some consistent conjecture about the strategies of her
opponents.
We show that, for a wide family of games and for a particular
categorization profile, every CCE becomes almost Nash as the number
of players grows. An equivalence of CCE and Nash equilibrium is
achieved in the settings of a non-atomic game. This highlights the
advantage of categorization as a simplifying mechanism in complex
environments. With much less information in their hands agents
behave as if they see the full picture. Some properties of CCE when
players categorize `non-optimally' are also considered.
2007-05-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3843/1/MPRA_paper_3843.pdf
Azrieli, Yaron (2007): Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3844
2019-10-17T17:01:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3844/
Pure self-confirming equilibrium
Azrieli, Yaron
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In a Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993A) every
player obtains partial information about other players' strategies
and plays a best response to some conjecture which is
consistent with his information. Two kinds of information structures
are considered: In the first each player observes his own payoff
while in the second the information is the distribution of players
among the various actions. For each of these information structures
we prove that pure Self-Confirming Equilibrium exists in some
classes of games. Pure Nash equilibrium may fail to exist in these
classes.
2007-07-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3844/1/MPRA_paper_3844.pdf
Azrieli, Yaron (2007): Pure self-confirming equilibrium.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4051
2019-09-27T13:15:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4051/
Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model
Mengel, Friederike
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
We present and analyze a local interaction model where agents play a bilateral prisoner's dilemma game with their neighbors. Agents learn about behavior through payoff-biased imitation of their interaction neighbors (and possibly some agents beyond this set). We find that the [Eshel, I., L. Samuelson and A. Shaked, 1998, Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model, Am. Econ. Rev 88] result that polymorphic states are stochastically stable in such a setting is not robust. In particular whenever agents use information also of some agents beyond their interaction neighbors the unique stable outcome is one where everyone chooses defection. Introducing a sufficiently strong conformist bias into the imitation process we find that full cooperation always emerges. Conformism is thus identified as a new mechanism that can stabilize cooperation.
2007-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4051/1/MPRA_paper_4051.pdf
Mengel, Friederike (2007): Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4108
2019-10-01T08:58:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4108/
Best response adaptation under dominance solvability
Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Two new properties of a finite strategic game, strong and weak BR-dominance solvability, are introduced. The first property holds, e.g., if the game is strongly dominance solvable or if it is weakly dominance solvable and all best responses are unique. It ensures that every simultaneous best response adjustment path, as well as every non-discriminatory individual best response improvement path, reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The second property holds, e.g., if the game is weakly dominance solvable; it ensures that every strategy profile can be connected to a Nash equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path and with an individual best response path (if there are more than two players, unmotivated switches from one best response to another may be needed). In a two person game, weak BR-dominance solvability is necessary for the acyclicity of simultaneous best response adjustment paths, as well as for the acyclicity of best response improvement paths provided the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular.
2007-07-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4108/1/MPRA_paper_4108.pdf
Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2007): Best response adaptation under dominance solvability.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4120
2019-09-28T11:34:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433632
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4120/
On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes
Roy, Sunanda
Sabarwal, Tarun
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
C60 - General
This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be strategic complements. The main result here is that the equilibrium set in such models is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique equilibrium. Indeed, for a given parameter value, a pair of distinct equilibria are never comparable. Therefore, with multiple equilibria, some of the established techniques for exhibiting increasing equilibria or computing equilibria that use the largest or smallest equilibrium, or that use the lattice structure of the equilibrium set do not apply to such models. Moreover, there are no ranked equilibria in such models. Additionally, the analysis here implies a new proof and a slight generalization of some existing results. It is shown that when a parameter increases, no new equilibrium is smaller than any old equilibrium. (In particular, in n-player games of strategic substitutes with real-valued action spaces, symmetric equilibria increase with the parameter.)
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4120/1/MPRA_paper_4120.pdf
Roy, Sunanda and Sabarwal, Tarun (2006): On the (non-)lattice structure of the equilibrium set in games with strategic substitutes.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4142
2019-09-29T05:56:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513330
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30:4C3030
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4142/
Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne
Jurdziak, Leszek
Q30 - General
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L10 - General
Q4 - Energy
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C71 - Cooperative Games
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L00 - General
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
The newest findings in analysis of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution not only in quantity of lignite (the size and shape of the ultimate pit) but also in its price has been depicted. It has been proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a two stage, cooperative, non-zero sum two-person game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximizing the joint profit of BM would be chosen and in the second during bargaining the split of profit would be decided together with the transfer price of lignite. The differences of strategic and tactical negotiations have been depicted and the needs of frequent adjustments to changing conditions have been stressed. It has been proposed to treat this adjustment as a real option to change scale of activity. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM and conditions of good solution have been discussed.
2006-01-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4142/1/MPRA_paper_4142.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. Vol. X, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 73-80.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4163
2019-10-03T14:29:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/
Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych
Jurdziak, Leszek
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
Q4 - Energy
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
C02 - Mathematical Methods
L10 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L0 - General
C71 - Cooperative Games
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation have been presented. The novel approach is the creation of lignite price contours on the mine and power plant profit distribution chart. It shows the inherent contradiction between individual and group rationality in bilateral monopoly (BM) and the reduction of incentive to opportunism together with the increase of lignite price. The opportunism due to asymmetry of information and possession of dominant strategy of mine (optimization of ultimate pit) creates a real threat to cooperation between both sides of BM. The full confidence in joint profit maximization and full control of accepted profit sharing without increase of transactional costs is possible only in vertically integrated energy producer offering equal access to information for both sides. As it was shown in [4] such solution does not create any threat for energy market efficiency – on the contrary it can allow on better level of deposit recovery through excavation of the greater ultimate pit. The interesting proposal is the treatment of pit optimization as a real option of mine size change. Presented methods, tools and solutions should help both firms in real negotiation in finding their strategic positions and avoiding potential threats. But eventually from negotiating sides it depends if they will choose the cooperation or competition, rational arguments or rational threats, maximization of joint profits or only their own.
2006-01-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/1/MPRA_paper_4163.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. XLIX, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 81-88.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4185
2019-09-26T08:39:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4185/
Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimental evidence
Rapoport, Amnon
Otsubo, Hironori
Kim, Bora
Stein, William E.
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Two types of auction were introduced on the Internet a few years ago and have rapidly been gaining widespread popularity. In both auctions, players compete for an exogenously determined prize by independently choosing an integer in some finite and common strategy space specified by the auctioneer. In the unique lowest (highest) bid auction, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highest) bid, provided that it is unique. We construct the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solutions to the two auctions, and then test them in a sequence of experiments that vary the number of bidders and size of the strategy space. Our results show that the aggregate bids, but only a minority of the individual bidders, are accounted for quite accurately by the equilibrium solutions.
2007-07-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4185/1/MPRA_paper_4185.pdf
Rapoport, Amnon and Otsubo, Hironori and Kim, Bora and Stein, William E. (2007): Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimental evidence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4256
2019-09-27T15:59:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4256/
The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection
Osmani, Dritan
Tol, Richard
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
H41 - Public Goods
Abstract
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. Extending a model of Barrett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equality
2006-05-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4256/1/MPRA_paper_4256.pdf
Osmani, Dritan and Tol, Richard (2006): The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4321
2019-09-28T04:47:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4321/
Equilibrium Vengeance
Friedman, Daniel
Singh, Nirvikar
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
The efficiency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random interactions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolutionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the equilibrium set to two points. In one EPBE, only the non-vengeful type survives and there are no mutual gains. In the other EPBE, both types survive and reap mutual gains.
2007-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4321/1/MPRA_paper_4321.pdf
Friedman, Daniel and Singh, Nirvikar (2007): Equilibrium Vengeance.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4327
2019-09-27T16:51:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4327/
Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market
Morrow, John
Sivan, Yoav
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
There have been few attempts to empirically explain the pursuit of
short term relationships and sex in a formal context. Previous work has lamented
the paucity of empirical studies which utilize incentive driven behavior to draw
conclusions and recommend policy. We develop a model of social network formation
through sexual matching, provide an empirical approach derived from the
model and apply it to a population of high interest. Specifically, we apply the approach
to a population of sexually active men who have sex with men (MSM) in
a large metropolitan area and derive qualitative conclusions regarding how individuals
behave in the marketplace for sex.
2006-01-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4327/1/MPRA_paper_4327.pdf
Morrow, John and Sivan, Yoav (2006): Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4388
2013-04-26T19:32:04Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4403
2019-10-10T12:57:39Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443930
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433639
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4403/
Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
Kumabe, Masahiro
Mihara, H. Reiju
C71 - Cooperative Games
D90 - General
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C69 - Other
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura's theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.
2007-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4403/1/MPRA_paper_4403.pdf
Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2007): Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core. Forthcoming in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4405
2019-09-29T14:21:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443930
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433639
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4405/
Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
Kumabe, Masahiro
Mihara, H. Reiju
C71 - Cooperative Games
D90 - General
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C69 - Other
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. Further classify them into sixty-four classes in terms of finiteness (existence of a finite carrier) and algorithmic computability. For each such class, we either show that it is empty or give an example of a game belonging to it. We observe that if a type contains an infinite game, then it contains both computable infinite games and noncomputable ones. This strongly suggests that computability is logically, as well as conceptually, unrelated to the conventional axioms.
2007-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4405/1/MPRA_paper_4405.pdf
Kumabe, Masahiro and Mihara, H. Reiju (2007): Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4473
2019-09-27T15:20:35Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433133
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4473/
The pronouncements of paranoid politicians
Guido, Cataife
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C13 - Estimation: General
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper models the strategic encounter of two office-motivated candidates who may or may not announce policy. In the case of no announcement, the voters rank the candidates according to prior beliefs. In the case of announcement, the candidates cannot avoid a degree of noise in the voters' interpretation of their announcements. We show that this simple deviation from the standard Downsian setting suffices to overcome previous impossibility results which suggest that not announcing policy can never occur in equilibrium.
Also, we extend the model to study the equilibrium when candidates are ambiguity averse. An ambiguity averse candidate is interpreted as being concerned about an ongoing negative campaign against him. This negative campaign would consist in inducing the voters to adopt some interpretation of the candidate's announcement unfavorable to his electoral performance. We show that under ambiguity aversion the candidates opt not to announce position under less stringent conditions than expected utility.
Finally, we use data on U.S. Senate elections to test an empirical implication of the model. We find that the relevant coefficient has the sign predicted by the theory and is statistically significant.
2007-08-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4473/1/MPRA_paper_4473.pdf
Guido, Cataife (2007): The pronouncements of paranoid politicians.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4508
2019-09-29T09:52:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4508/
Procedural Concerns
Sebald, Alexander
C70 - General
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Different to other scientific disciplines traditional economic theory has remained
remarkably silent about procedural aspects of strategic interactions. Much to the contrast,
among psychologists there is by now a broad consensus that not only expected
outcomes shape human behavior, but also procedures that are used to take decisions.
It is argued that procedural concerns are especially pervasive in the resolution of conflicts.
In our paper we show that procedural concerns are in fact an inherent feature of
the interaction of reciprocal agents. More precisely, using Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004)’s theory of sequential reciprocity we demonstrate that procedural choices determine
the responsibility that people have for outcomes. The responsibility for outcomes
in turn influences peoples’ evaluations of intentions and, hence, subsequent reactions.
Two applications are discussed to highlight the impact and importance of procedural
concerns in strategic interactions.
2007-06-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4508/1/MPRA_paper_4508.pdf
Sebald, Alexander (2007): Procedural Concerns.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4526
2019-10-08T09:40:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4526/
College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.
2007-06-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4526/1/MPRA_paper_4526.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2007): College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4559
2019-10-01T11:28:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4559/
On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors
Oyama, Daisuke
Tercieux, Olivier
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper studies the impact of a small probability event on strategic behavior in incomplete information games with non-common priors. It is shown that the global impact of a small probability event (i.e., its propensity to affect strategic behavior at all states in the state space) has an upper bound that is an increasing function of a measure of discrepancy from the common prior assumption. In particular, its global impact can be arbitrarily large under non-common priors, but is bounded from above under common priors. These results quantify the different implications common prior and non-common prior models have on the (infinite) hierarchies of beliefs.
2005-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4559/1/MPRA_paper_4559.pdf
Oyama, Daisuke and Tercieux, Olivier (2005): On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4560
2019-10-25T06:13:57Z
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