2024-03-28T22:23:16Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:145
2019-09-28T11:51:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463531
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/145/
Multiagent negotiation for fair and unbiased resource allocation
Iyer, Karthik
Huhns, Michael
F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
This paper proposes a novel solution for the n agent cake cutting (resource allocation) problem. We propose a negotiation protocol for dividing a resource among n agents and then provide an algorithm for allotting portions of the resource. We prove that this protocol can enable distribution of the resource among n agents in a fair manner. The protocol enables agents to choose portions based on their internal utility function, which they do not have to reveal. In addition to being fair, the protocol has desirable features such as being unbiased and verifiable while allocating resources. In the case where the resource is two-dimensional (a circular cake) and uniform, it is shown that each agent can get close to l/n of the whole resource.
2005-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/145/1/MPRA_paper_145.pdf
Iyer, Karthik and Huhns, Michael (2005): Multiagent negotiation for fair and unbiased resource allocation. Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science , Vol. 3760, (October 2005): pp. 453-465.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:478
2019-09-28T16:49:12Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/478/
Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej
Jurdziak, Leszek
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game.
Based on the simple model of the lignite deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account nested pits generated by the pit optimisation process. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of two-stage game. In the first step (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to existence of information asymmetry and the mine predominant strategy attainment of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation techniques, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further research.
2006-02-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/478/1/MPRA_paper_478.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej. Published in: Energetyka , Vol. 59, No. No.2 (620) (February 2006)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:534
2019-09-27T02:13:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/
Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L94 - Electric Utilities
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Is vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom?
Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits from reduction of transactional costs described by Williamson. Additional benefits can be attained by application of open pit optimisation which leads to the solution of modified bilateral monopoly of lignite mine and power plant. Cooperation can assure joint profits maximisation and rivalry leads to suboptimal solution in Pareto sense. Due to asymmetry of information about the deposit the mine has information advantage and can apply its predominant solution maximising only their own profits in long run.
2005-03-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/1/MPRA_paper_534.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2005): Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo? Published in: Biuletyn URE No. Nr 2 (February 2005)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1515
2019-10-09T22:23:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1515/
Firm Size and Pricing Policy
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
D40 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We relate the pricing policy
of the firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the
size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a
firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational
backlash if it reneges. This allows the firm to effectively commit
to its offers, leading to a unique equilibrium without delay, where
the firm extracts the whole of the surplus. For smaller firms,
however, the reputational effects are much less intense and,
consequently, the equilibria involve reneging possibilities. In this
case the equilibria are non-unique, and may involve delays as well.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1515/1/MPRA_paper_1515.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2006): Firm Size and Pricing Policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1600
2019-09-26T11:19:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/
Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
C71 - Cooperative Games
L94 - Electric Utilities
Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search.
2006-09-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/1/MPRA_paper_1600.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Published in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium Continuous Surface Mining , Vol. ISBN 3, No. Department of Mining Engineering III, RWTH Aachen University (24 September 2006): pp. 469-476.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1620
2019-10-02T04:45:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1620/
On the Value of Participation: Endogenous Emergence of Social Norms in a Three-Player Ultimatum Game
Grimalda, Gianluca
Kar, Anirban
Proto, Eugenio
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We report results from two different settings of a 3-player ultimatum game. Under the monocratic rule, a player is randomly selected to make an offer to two receivers. Under the democratic rule, all three players make a proposal, and one proposal is then extracted. A majority vote is required to implement the proposal. Although the two rules are strategically equivalent, different patterns of behaviour seem to emerge as the number of interactions increase. Under the monocratic rule proposers seem to be entitled to claim a larger share of the pie, and receivers more likely to accept, in comparison with the democratic rule. We speculate that ‘institutions’ allowing more participation in the process of collective choice lead to more ‘socially responsible’ behaviour in the players.
2006-12-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1620/1/MPRA_paper_1620.pdf
Grimalda, Gianluca and Kar, Anirban and Proto, Eugenio (2006): On the Value of Participation: Endogenous Emergence of Social Norms in a Three-Player Ultimatum Game.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1906
2019-09-27T07:43:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1906/
College Admissions under Early Decision
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper, we model college admissions under early decision in a many-to-one matching framework with two periods. We show that there exists no stable matching system, involving an early decision matching rule and a regular decision matching rule, which is nonmanipulable via early decision quotas by colleges or via early decision preferences by colleges or students. We then analyze the Nash equilibria of the game, in which the preferences of colleges and students in each period are common knowledge and every college determines a quota for the early decision period given its total capacity for the two periods. Under college-optimal and student-optimal matching systems, we show that a pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. However, when colleges or students have common preferences over the other set of agents, 'terminating early decision program' becomes a weakly dominant strategy for each college if every student, choosing to act early, always applies early to his or her top choice college.
2007-01-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1906/1/MPRA_paper_1906.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2007): College Admissions under Early Decision.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1907
2019-09-27T17:02:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1907/
Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse
We study the problem of marriage formation and marital distribution in a two-period model of matching, extending the matching with bargaining framework of Crawford and Rochford (1986). We run simulations to find the effects of alimony rate, legal cost of divorce, initial endowments, couple and single productivity parameters on the payoffs and marital status in the society.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1907/1/MPRA_paper_1907.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2006): Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1908
2019-09-29T08:24:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1908/
One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
D62 - Externalities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a sufficiency result for the existence of the stable set and the core. We also present several findings on the issues of
gender optimality, lattices, strategy-proofness, and rationalizability.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1908/1/MPRA_paper_1908.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2006): One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1913
2019-10-01T05:33:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1913/
Firm-Specific Skills, Wage Bargaining, and Efficiency
Mumcu, Ayşe
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show that, in the contract renewal stage, the worker's ability to use his firm-specific skills strategically increases his bargaining power vis-a-vis the firm. The firm can threaten to fire the worker and hire a new inexperienced worker, but this threat is not always credible. Even though the bargaining takes place in an environment with perfect information, the game has inefficient equilibria where delays occur in real time.
1999
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1913/1/MPRA_paper_1913.pdf
Mumcu, Ayşe (1999): Firm-Specific Skills, Wage Bargaining, and Efficiency.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2384
2019-09-26T10:16:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice (in long run) or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract (in short run e.g. one of year). It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/1/MPRA_paper_2384.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 43-57.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2385
2019-09-30T12:59:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
D40 - General
For methods of the profit division in the bilateral monopoly of the mine and the power station sug-gested in the first part of this paper the formulae for lignite price and shares in the joint profit of the mine and the power station are calculated. The proposed profit division contain: the egalitarian, normal and asymmetrical Nash solution, the proportional division, assuring equal and proportional profit margins division (in it calculated only on the basis of prime costs) and Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with individual utility functions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/1/MPRA_paper_2385.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 59-68.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2388
2019-09-30T08:16:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443839
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D89 - Other
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
For the hypothetical deposit with parameters similar to KWB “Konin” S.A. conditions; lignite prices and proposed divisions are calculated and results were discussed under the angle of the fairness (equity) of the division and the possibility of their approval by both sides. A sensitivity analysis of shares of the mine in joint profits, the level of border prices outlining break-even points, lignite prices, the total profit and the profit of the mine for the price change of the energy, costs of the mine and the power station was carried. Results were discussed under the angle of correction of the division in the next period with taking into consideration the inflation, changes in prices of the energy and level of total costs of the mine and the power station and of the potential temptation of the change in the proportion of shares by increasing expenses. Lignite mines and power stations cooperating with them were invited for discussion about proposed divisions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/1/MPRA_paper_2388.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 69-80.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2466
2019-09-26T22:14:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/
Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
The newest outcome of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant analysis have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution maximising joint profits not only in quantity of lignite - the size and shape of the ultimate pit (characteristic to classical solution) but also in its price has been stressed. It is proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a cooperative, two-stage, two-person, non zero-sum game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM should be chosen and in the second one, during bargaining, the split of profit ought to be decided together with choosing the transfer price of lignite. The level of lignite prices has been presented in the time of their control and confirmation (1996-2003) as well as their new profit sharing role in the period of their freely negotiation. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM due to its rational conditions. The application of this solution on example from the “Szczerców” deposit has been presented.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/1/MPRA_paper_2466.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES’06 (20 September 2006): pp. 32-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2467
2019-10-03T14:29:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/
Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
L94 - Electric Utilities
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Lignite mine and power plant can operate as two separate entities, two entities in one holding or joint venture and as the one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has the influence on operation of this tandem including realization of its individual and joint objectives, price negotiation, transactional costs, irreversible investments (sunk costs), different access to information (asymmetric information), cooperation or rivalry, possibility of opportunistic behaviour and other threats, which can be used against the second side. An attempt has been made to show these problems from the point of view of economic effectiveness based on a bilateral monopoly (BM) model and game theory approach with usage of pit optimisation methods. Advantages and disadvantages of different solutions have been presented as well as rational incentives to vertical integration due to inherent conflict of individual and group rationality in BM. This conflict of interest can lead to Pareto sub optimal solution in case of lack of cooperation between both sides. Concentration on lignite price can lead to waste of potential profit and decrease of mineable reserves - excavation of smaller pit, which is optimal only to the mine but not to the whole BM.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/1/MPRA_paper_2467.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES/06 (20 September 2006): pp. 26-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2474
2019-09-28T16:50:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2474/
Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining
Mumcu, Ayşe
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
We study the bargaining relationship between a firm and its incumbent worker who possesses firm-specific human capital. We show that the worker's ability to disclose his skills strategically increases his bargaining power. The game may have inefficient equilibria where delays occur in real time. With the addition of outside options for both the firm and the worker, delays are shortened whenever outside options are credible threats. Our model also predicts that wages are procyclical, and there can be a variation in wages for a given job level.
1999
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2474/1/MPRA_paper_2474.pdf
Mumcu, Ayşe (1999): Strategic Disclosure of Firm-Specific Skills in Wage Bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2770
2019-09-27T07:27:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D52:5231:523132
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2770/
Urban growth and subcenter formation: A trolley ride from the Staples Center to Disneyland and the Rose Bowl
Berliant, Marcus
Wang, Ping
R12 - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
The long-term trends of urbanization suggest: not only have more cities formed, but the leading metropolises have grown larger, with a number of peripheral subcenters developing over time. Conventional models of urban growth are limited, in that commuting cost and congestion eventually result in decreasing returns in a monocentric city as population becomes very large. We construct a general-equilibrium model with dynamic interactions between spatial agglomeration and urban development, driven by location-dependent knowledge spillovers. Our contribution allows endogenous development of subcenters to capture benefits from knowledge spillovers and offset diminishing returns from urban congestion, thus permitting more sustained city growth.
2007-04-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2770/1/MPRA_paper_2770.pdf
Berliant, Marcus and Wang, Ping (2007): Urban growth and subcenter formation: A trolley ride from the Staples Center to Disneyland and the Rose Bowl.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3248
2019-09-27T09:57:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3248/
Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator
Binmore, Ken
Harbord, David
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to act as monopolists in pricing call termination on their networks has recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G’s entry into European mobile markets. The European Commission’s electronic communications regime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobile termination rates if an operator is found to possess “significant market power”. This requires that the mobile operator not be constrained by the "countervailing buyer power" of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailing buyer power has been repeatedly dismissed because of their obligation to interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous. We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates and demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligation is entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3G having no market power at all in pricing call termination on their own networks.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3248/1/MPRA_paper_3248.pdf
Binmore, Ken and Harbord, David (2005): Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator. Published in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2005): pp. 449-472.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3592
2019-09-28T21:51:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3592/
College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C71 - Cooperative Games
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.
2007-06-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3592/1/MPRA_paper_3592.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2007): College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3622
2019-09-26T15:02:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3622/
Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator
Binmore, Ken
Harbord, David
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to act as monopolists in pricing call termination on their networks has recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G’s entry into European mobile markets. The European Commission’s electronic communications regime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobile termination rates if an operator is found to possess “significant market power”. This requires that the mobile operator not be constrained by the "countervailing buyer power" of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailing buyer power has been repeatedly dismissed because of their obligation to interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous. We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates and demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligation is entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3G having no market power at all in pricing call termination on their own networks.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3622/1/MPRA_paper_3622.pdf
Binmore, Ken and Harbord, David (2005): Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator. Published in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2005): pp. 449-472.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4142
2019-09-29T05:56:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513330
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30:4C3030
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4142/
Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne
Jurdziak, Leszek
Q30 - General
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L10 - General
Q4 - Energy
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C71 - Cooperative Games
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L00 - General
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
The newest findings in analysis of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution not only in quantity of lignite (the size and shape of the ultimate pit) but also in its price has been depicted. It has been proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a two stage, cooperative, non-zero sum two-person game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximizing the joint profit of BM would be chosen and in the second during bargaining the split of profit would be decided together with the transfer price of lignite. The differences of strategic and tactical negotiations have been depicted and the needs of frequent adjustments to changing conditions have been stressed. It has been proposed to treat this adjustment as a real option to change scale of activity. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM and conditions of good solution have been discussed.
2006-01-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4142/1/MPRA_paper_4142.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. Vol. X, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 73-80.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4163
2019-10-03T14:29:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/
Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych
Jurdziak, Leszek
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
Q4 - Energy
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
C02 - Mathematical Methods
L10 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L0 - General
C71 - Cooperative Games
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation have been presented. The novel approach is the creation of lignite price contours on the mine and power plant profit distribution chart. It shows the inherent contradiction between individual and group rationality in bilateral monopoly (BM) and the reduction of incentive to opportunism together with the increase of lignite price. The opportunism due to asymmetry of information and possession of dominant strategy of mine (optimization of ultimate pit) creates a real threat to cooperation between both sides of BM. The full confidence in joint profit maximization and full control of accepted profit sharing without increase of transactional costs is possible only in vertically integrated energy producer offering equal access to information for both sides. As it was shown in [4] such solution does not create any threat for energy market efficiency – on the contrary it can allow on better level of deposit recovery through excavation of the greater ultimate pit. The interesting proposal is the treatment of pit optimization as a real option of mine size change. Presented methods, tools and solutions should help both firms in real negotiation in finding their strategic positions and avoiding potential threats. But eventually from negotiating sides it depends if they will choose the cooperation or competition, rational arguments or rational threats, maximization of joint profits or only their own.
2006-01-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/1/MPRA_paper_4163.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. XLIX, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 81-88.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4327
2019-09-27T16:51:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4327/
Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market
Morrow, John
Sivan, Yoav
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
There have been few attempts to empirically explain the pursuit of
short term relationships and sex in a formal context. Previous work has lamented
the paucity of empirical studies which utilize incentive driven behavior to draw
conclusions and recommend policy. We develop a model of social network formation
through sexual matching, provide an empirical approach derived from the
model and apply it to a population of high interest. Specifically, we apply the approach
to a population of sexually active men who have sex with men (MSM) in
a large metropolitan area and derive qualitative conclusions regarding how individuals
behave in the marketplace for sex.
2006-01-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4327/1/MPRA_paper_4327.pdf
Morrow, John and Sivan, Yoav (2006): Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4526
2019-10-08T09:40:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4526/
College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
In this paper, we study the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game over early admissions plans using a many-to-one matching framework. We characterize the equilibrium strategies of each college involving its early quota out of its total capacity, and the set of admissible and deferred students within its applicant pool independently from the early admissions plans of the colleges in the market. Given these strategies, we show that for each college early action is a weakly dominant choice between early admissions plans.
2007-06-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4526/1/MPRA_paper_4526.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2007): College Admissions Game: Early Action or Early Decision?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4580
2019-09-26T09:10:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4580/
What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software
O'Reilly, Tim
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L96 - Telecommunications
L90 - General
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K41 - Litigation Process
This paper was the first initiative to try to define Web2.0 and understand its implications for the next generation of software, looking at both design patterns and business modes. Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices; Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more people use it, consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while providing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects through an "architecture of participation," and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich user experiences.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4580/1/MPRA_paper_4580.pdf
O'Reilly, Tim (2007): What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 17-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4584
2019-10-21T07:12:15Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4584/
Product Development 2.0
Hinchcliffe, Dion
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Web 2.0 principles will not only revolutionize the web experience, the design pattern and the business models of software companies. They can indeed be applied to a lot of industries for new approaches to product development. The web can be used to put users in control and co-create better and richer products in a reduced timeframe.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4584/1/MPRA_paper_4584.pdf
Hinchcliffe, Dion (2007): Product Development 2.0. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 105-111.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4650
2019-09-28T16:31:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4650/
Preference-based Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Whole Population Cooperation without Information Flow across Matches
Jung, Hanjoon Michael
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
This paper studies the possibility of cooperation based on players' preferences. Consider the following infinitely repeated game, similar to Ghosh and Ray (1996). At each stage, uncountable numbers of players are randomly matched without information about their partners' past actions and play a prisoner's dilemma game. The players have the option to continue their relationship, and they all have the same discount factor. Also, they have two possible types: high ability player (H) or low ability player (L). H can produce better outcomes for its partner as well as for itself than L can. I look for an equilibrium that is robust against both pair-wise deviation and individual deviation and call such equilibrium a social equilibrium. I show that in this setting, long term cooperative behavior can arise in a social equilibrium. H wants to match and play only with another H because an HH match produces better outcomes for H than an HL match. So H would break a match with L to increase the possibility of meeting another H, and thus H would not play any cooperative action with L. L knows this intention of H and realizes that L can only cooperate with another L. Consequently, both HH and LL matches are endowed with a scarcity value. This scarcity value is utilized by players to sustain cooperative relationships. Therefore, in a social equilibrium, whole players can play long term cooperative actions because of their preferences for their partners' types.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4650/1/MPRA_paper_4650.pdf
Jung, Hanjoon Michael (2007): Preference-based Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Whole Population Cooperation without Information Flow across Matches.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6024
2019-10-17T05:06:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6024/
Preference-based Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Jung, Hanjoon Michael
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
This paper studies the possibility of whole population cooperation based on players' preferences. Consider the following infinitely repeated game, similar to Ghosh and Ray (1996). At each stage, uncountable numbers of players are randomly matched without information about their partners' past actions and play a prisoner's dilemma game. The players have the option to continue their relationship, and they all have the same discount factor. Also, they have two possible types: high ability player (H) or low ability player (L). H can produce better outcomes for its partner as well as for itself than L can. I look for an equilibrium that is robust against both pair-wise deviation and individual deviation and call such equilibrium a social equilibrium. In this setting, long-term cooperative behavior among the whole population can take place in a social equilibrium because of the players' preferences for their partners' types. In addition, a folk theorem of this model is proposed.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6024/1/MPRA_paper_6024.pdf
Jung, Hanjoon Michael (2007): Preference-based Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6196
2019-09-27T03:43:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6196/
The Social Benefit of War
Hoffmann, Magnus
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Recent findings in economic theory show that cooperation (settlement) between two identical players with conflicting interests in a valuable and contestable resource always Pareto dominates violent dispute (war), given that cooperation is presented using a symmetric bargaining norm. Necessary conditions for settlement to arise are the destructibility of war, and the costless and exogenous enforcement of any agreement made by the two players. We
show that endogenous enforcement of the agreements alters the incentives of the players to bargain. This causes a shift in the Pareto frontier so that - under certain conditions - war Pareto dominates settlement.
2007-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6196/1/MPRA_paper_6196.pdf
Hoffmann, Magnus (2007): The Social Benefit of War.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6262
2019-10-13T05:03:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463232
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3135
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6262/
Migration, Learning, and Development
Zakharenko, Roman
F22 - International Migration
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
O15 - Human Resources ; Human Development ; Income Distribution ; Migration
J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility ; Immigrant Workers
US-educated Indian engineers played a major role in the establishment of the “Silicon Valley of Asia” in Bangalore. The experience of India and other countries shows that returning well-educated emigrants, despite their small numbers, can make a difference. This paper builds a model of “local” knowledge spillovers, in which migration of a small number of highly skilled individuals greatly affects country-level human capital accumulation. All economic activity occurs in pairs of individuals randomly matched to each other. Each pair produces the consumption good; the skills of the two partners are complementary. At the same time, the less skilled partner increases human capital by learning from the more skilled colleague. With poor institutions at home, highly skilled individuals leave the country seeking better opportunities abroad. On the contrary, improved institutions foster return migration of emigrants who have acquired more knowledge while abroad. These return migrants greatly amplify the positive effect of better institutions.
2007-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6262/1/MPRA_paper_6262.pdf
Zakharenko, Roman (2007): Migration, Learning, and Development.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6882
2019-09-27T12:07:07Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D51:5130:513031
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6882/
The general validity of comparative advantage in trade exchanges
Dogaru, Vasile
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Q01 - Sustainable Development
A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists
In a recent article, Alan Deardorff (2005) analyses the strength of the comparative advantage’s principle. The present article’s purpose is to follow the generalization of some recent results (Dogaru, 2000; 2005b) and also to sustain the unification’s necessity of some comparative advantage’s presentation drafts, in the analytical economy’s basis. This way the statement of real assumptions inside economics can be assured, connected to processes developed in an extended economic time and space. From this perspective comparative advantage’s analysis is necessary due to the existence of the tendency in which once with some new instruments’ creations, usually more formal and using a mathematical instrument more sophisticated, the validity of comparative advantage’s classic principle would be denied. The idea of introducing the validity of the comparative advantage’s principle in the trade exchanges – considered by Samuelson versus Stanislaw Ulam an accepted truth by all economists (and not only) as being un undemonstrated one – is not a productive one from an analytical point of view, which could contribute to the economics’ development.
2005-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6882/1/MPRA_paper_6882.pdf
Dogaru, Vasile (2005): The general validity of comparative advantage in trade exchanges. Published in: Romanian Economic Review , Vol. 49-50, No. 2004-2005 (2005): pp. 171-198.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6918
2019-09-29T04:47:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3437
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6918/
Some observations regarding the demythification of the comparative advantage’s principle within Manoilescu generalized scheme
Dogaru, Vasile
O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth ; Aggregate Productivity ; Cross-Country Output Convergence
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists
The validity in time of the comparative advantage’s principle, also of its application’s denial, can generate certain misunderstandings in the good exchange’s observation for an outsider (common sense), including the expert from other economics’ areas. The resolution for these cases can be made through checking requires’ discharging of the analytical economicity’s principle. In these conditions it can be noticed if the schemes, deducted in the analytical decomposition’s basis of the standard actions, can be used in the more precise and easier measurement than through empirical calculations in order to determine the comparative advantage’s size, of the gains from trade and the productivity effect. Manoilescu generalized scheme has, from this perspective the two main characteristics: its building has started from the empirical reality’s study of the exchange phenomena and the observation has been made only inside the economics’ borders. This way the scheme sustains the unitary explanations’ approaches of some different angles of understanding the comparative advantage on basis of some analytical efforts of other researchers. The suggested scheme separates the strictly economic analysis from the one inside the politic area (commercial politics), also of the productivity effect from more exact connections, decompounding the measurement in two steps. The identification through dialectical judgements, made as a continuation of the analytical ones, of the concordance between the built analytical reality and the empirical one, assures the check of the analytical economy’s principle. This step contributes to the permanent validity’s grounding of the comparative advantage’s principle in the exchange connections within the competitive economies. Meanwhile, the demythification of its full and permanent usage is also supported, in the way of its maximum potential’s capitalization in the manufactured and exchanged goods’ choice. The comparative advantage’s principle is nothing but an application of the minimum effort’s principle – the last one having a wider area of action – and will probably remain in the economies based on the social, competitive, monetary or natural relations.
2005-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6918/1/MPRA_paper_6918.pdf
Dogaru, Vasile (2005): Some observations regarding the demythification of the comparative advantage’s principle within Manoilescu generalized scheme.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6973
2019-09-27T03:11:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6973/
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)
Rosenkranz, Stephanie
Schmitz, Patrick W.
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this working paper, A. Muthoo’s book “Bargaining Theory with Applications” is discussed.
2002
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6973/1/MPRA_paper_6973.pdf
Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2002): Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999). Published in: Public Choice , Vol. 113, No. 3 (2002): pp. 491-495.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7445
2019-10-09T13:01:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7445/
A Theory of Continuum Economies with Idiosyncratic Shocks and Random Matchings
Karavaev, Andrei
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
E00 - General
Many economic models use a continuum of negligible agents to avoid considering one person's effect on aggregate characteristics of the economy. Along with a continuum of agents, these models often incorporate a sequence of independent shocks and random matchings. Despite frequent use of such models, there are still unsolved questions about their mathematical justification. In this paper we construct a discrete time framework, in which major desirable properties of idiosyncratic shocks and random matchings hold. In this framework the agent space constitutes a probability space, and the probability distribution for each agent is replaced by the population distribution. Unlike previous authors, we question the assumption of known identity - the location on the agent space. We assume that the agents only know their previous history - what had happened to them before, - but not their identity.
The construction justifies the use of numerous dynamic models of idiosyncratic shocks and random matchings.
2008-02-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7445/1/MPRA_paper_7445.pdf
Karavaev, Andrei (2008): A Theory of Continuum Economies with Idiosyncratic Shocks and Random Matchings.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7839
2019-09-28T03:53:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D45:4534:453430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7839/
A "double coincidence" search model of money
Amendola, Nicola
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
E40 - General
According to Engineer and Shi (1998, 2001) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), the double coincidence of wants problem seems to be not essential to rationalize the use of money in a search theoretic framework. This paper analyzes an endogenous price search model of money where there is universal double coincidence of wants. The existence of a monetary equilibrium depends, essentially, on the asymmetry in the role played by economic agents in the exchange and production processes. In particular, entrepreneurs are assumed to produce a fixed amount of a divisible consumption good by means of labour services provided by workers. Entrepreneurs can offer a co-operative (barter) contract or a monetary contract to workers. Under the co-operative contract real wages are determined in the labour exchange sector, while in the monetary regime real wages are determined in the commodity exchange sector. The monetary contract is proved to be an equilibrium strategy provided that: (i) the workers' labour disutility is sufficiently high and/or (ii) the entrepreneurs' bargaining power in the commodity market is sufficiently large relative to their bargaining power in the labour market. The rationale for money comes from the fact that entrepreneurs use it as an instrument to maximize their output share.
2008-03-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7839/1/MPRA_paper_7839.pdf
Amendola, Nicola (2008): A "double coincidence" search model of money.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8055
2019-09-29T04:36:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493239
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D5A:5A30:5A3030
7375626A656374733D48:4830:483030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8055/
Ranking Italian Universities and Other Research Institutions Taking Into Account Public Economics Publications
Molero, Juan Carlos
Pujol, Francesc
I29 - Other
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
Z00 - General
H00 - General
The different ways to rank universities regarding their research production include a great number of factors. The quality of journals where faculty members are publishing is one of the most relevant aspects in order to determine the quality of the affiliation institution.
Among other more traditional ways determining the quality of journals, this paper takes into account a new one based on the publishing behavior of top ranked authors, supposing a matching model approach among journals and authors. Using this methodology, the article establishes a ranking of the Italian universities and other research institutions regarding Public Economic Journals.
2004-07-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8055/1/MPRA_paper_8055.pdf
Molero, Juan Carlos and Pujol, Francesc (2004): Ranking Italian Universities and Other Research Institutions Taking Into Account Public Economics Publications. Published in: Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice , Vol. Nº 1/2, No. XII (2004): pp. 15-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8343
2019-10-02T02:45:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8343/
Ashamed to be Selfish
Dillenberger, David
Sadowski, Philipp
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D80 - General
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available alternative, may inflict shame on DM. DM has preferences over sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation that identifies DM's selfish ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the most prominent motive that can explain non-selfish choice. We identify a condition under which shame to be selfish can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for finitely many recipients and applied to explain a social decision maker's incentive for obfuscation.
2008-04-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8343/1/MPRA_paper_8343.pdf
Dillenberger, David and Sadowski, Philipp (2008): Ashamed to be Selfish.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8660
2019-10-10T13:23:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8660/
Three-sided matchings and separable preferences
Lahiri, Somdeb
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
2008-05-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8660/1/MPRA_paper_8660.pdf
Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Three-sided matchings and separable preferences.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8867
2019-09-27T16:45:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8867/
Three-sided matchings and separable preferences
Lahiri, Somdeb
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
2008-05-26
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8867/1/MPRA_paper_8867.pdf
Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Three-sided matchings and separable preferences.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8890
2019-10-10T12:06:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8890/
Three-sided matchings and separable preferences
Lahiri, Somdeb
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
2008-05-26
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8890/1/MPRA_paper_8890.pdf
Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Three-sided matchings and separable preferences.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8974
2019-09-30T16:54:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3132
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433933
7375626A656374733D44:4431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8974/
The family under the microscope: an experiment testing economic models of household choice.
Munro, Alistair
Bateman, Ian J.
McNally, Tara
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse
C93 - Field Experiments
D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
We devise and execute three experiments to test key features of models of household
decision-making. Using established couples (married and unmarried) we test income pooling,
unanimity and Pareto efficiency. Subjects make choices individually and jointly and are asked to
make predictions about their partner’s choices. Unanimity is rejected. Income pooling is not
rejected in joint choice but has less explanatory power in individual choice. In direct tests both
sexes do not pool income completely, but in econometric tests across all tasks, women place an
equal weight on payoffs but men discount their partner’s payoffs by between 15 and 20%. We
find that transparency has little impact on deviations from income pooling or indeed on behaviour
generally. Many joint choices deviate from the Pareto principle in a systematic manner suggesting
that choices made as a couple are more risk averse than individual decisions.
2008-06-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8974/1/MPRA_paper_8974.pdf
Munro, Alistair and Bateman, Ian J. and McNally, Tara (2008): The family under the microscope: an experiment testing economic models of household choice.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8976
2019-09-30T17:04:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3132
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433933
7375626A656374733D44:4431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8976/
Taking it in turn: an experimental test of theories of the household
Munro, Alistair
McNally, Tara
Popov, Danail
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse
C93 - Field Experiments
D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
Using a sample of established couples, we conduct an experiment on household
decision-making. Individual partners first make a series of dichotomous choices between
household goods and vouchers for experiences and then the couple jointly face the same
choices. A random lottery device is used to incentivize the decisions. We find clear
evidence of turn-taking as a method of resolving disagreements. In other words, when
one partner wins one disputed question, it raises the probability that the other partner
wins the next dispute. Given the arbitrary order of the questions this suggests that
standard decision-theoretic models of household behaviour are inadequate and that
instead, much behaviour might be concerned with relationship maintenance rather than
the allocation of goods.
2008-05-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8976/1/MPRA_paper_8976.pdf
Munro, Alistair and McNally, Tara and Popov, Danail (2008): Taking it in turn: an experimental test of theories of the household.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9020
2019-09-30T17:09:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9020/
Ashamed to be Selfish
Dillenberger, David
Sadowski, Philipp
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D80 - General
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available alternative, may inflict shame on DM. DM has preferences over sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation that identifies DM's selfish ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the most prominent motive that can explain non-selfish choice. We identify a condition under which shame to be selfish can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for finitely many recipients and applied to explain a social decision maker's incentive for obfuscation.
2008-04-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9020/1/MPRA_paper_9020.pdf
Dillenberger, David and Sadowski, Philipp (2008): Ashamed to be Selfish.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9239
2019-10-10T12:30:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9239/
Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system,
we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation
strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the nonexistence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.
2008-06-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9239/1/MPRA_paper_9239.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2008): Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10260
2019-09-26T23:26:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10260/
Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium
Penta, Antonio
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative
foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games
in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con-
straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub-
game Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian al-
locations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The main novelty of
the result is twofold: (1) it holds for any number of agents; (2) it
is robust to di¤erent speci�cations of the bargaining process.
2007-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10260/1/MPRA_paper_10260.pdf
Penta, Antonio (2007): Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11108
2019-09-27T12:41:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11108/
Information collection in bargaining
Li, Ming
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of preference settings, the uninformed player does not collect information when he is quite sure about his opponent’s type. There exist preference settings
in which the uninformed player collects information until he is sufficiently sure about his opponent’s type, as long as the information source is accurate enough. With additional assumptions, the uninformed player is more likely to draw signals and is better off, if the information is more accurate.
2002-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11108/1/MPRA_paper_11108.pdf
Li, Ming (2002): Information collection in bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11293
2019-10-02T03:38:34Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443133
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11293/
Microfinance and Gender Empowerment
Ngo, Thi Minh-Phuong
Wahhaj, Zaki
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
In the past 30 years, microfinance has carried many promises of social and economic transformation, with the shift towards targeting women being seen as a major strategic move through which the promise of social development could be most effectively delivered. However, ethnographic studies have shown that many women relinquish the use of their loans to male members of the household, belying the empowering promise of microfinance. We propose a simple model of household bargaining which examines how providing women with credit affects production and decision-making power in the household. Following Bergstrom (1996), we account for the roles of both divorce and non-cooperation in the household as relevant fall-back options in the bargaining strategy of each spouse. We show that the introduction of a microcredit programme is likely to have widely heterogeneous impacts, and can adversely affect the bargaining power of some women. We demonstrate that access to credit allows a woman to strengthen her bargaining position through an expansion of her autonomous activities (the causal mechanism hoped for) only under very specific circumstances: when she is able to invest her new capital profitably in an autonomous activity, and her husband has no alternative activity in which the same capital would generate comparable returns. The case in which the availability of credit is most likely to strengthen women's bargaining position in the household is when capital can be invested in a cooperative activity in which both spouses contribute in an important way.
2008-10-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11293/1/MPRA_paper_11293.pdf
Ngo, Thi Minh-Phuong and Wahhaj, Zaki (2008): Microfinance and Gender Empowerment.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11517
2019-09-26T09:00:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11517/
Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
Sengupta, Kunal
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D62 - Externalities
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one
buyer and many sellers, focussing on the tension between the
complementarity intrinsic to such a setup and efficiency. We address
this problem in a very general setup with a technology that allows
for variable degrees of complementarity, a bargaining protocol that
is symmetric and allows for both secret, as well as publicly
observable offers, and strategies that allow for history dependence.
We examine equilibria for all parameter values. Interestingly, and
in contrast to most of the literature, we demonstrate that there is
a large class of parameter values such that an asymptotically
efficient equilibrium with a positive buyer payoff exists - thus
demonstrating that strategic holdout is not a serious obstacle to
the working of the Coase theorem. For robustness we examine
alternative contractual forms, i.e. conditional and equity
contracts, as well as variations that allow for multiple project
implementation and asymmetric sellers.
2008-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11517/1/MPRA_paper_11517.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal and Sengupta, Kunal (2008): Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12776
2019-09-29T02:16:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12776/
Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
Athanassoglou, Stergios
Brams, Steven J.
Sethuraman, Jay
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We study the problem of dissolving an equal-entitlement partnership when the objective is to minimize maximum regret. We initially focus on the family of linear-pricing mechanisms and derive regret-optimizing strategies. We also demonstrate that there exist linear-pricing mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency. Next, we analyze a binary-search mechanism which is ex-post individually rational. We discuss connections with the standard Bayesian-Nash framework for both linear and binary-search mechanisms. On a more general level, we show that if entitlements are unequal, ex-post efficiency and ex-post individual rationality impose significant restrictions on permissible mechanisms. In particular, they rule out both linear and binary-search mechanisms.
2008-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12776/1/MPRA_paper_12776.pdf
Athanassoglou, Stergios and Brams, Steven J. and Sethuraman, Jay (2008): Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13002
2019-09-29T07:09:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3431
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433632
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13002/
Enjeux stratégiques du concours des Maîtres de Conférences
Haeringer, Guillaume
Iehlé, Vincent
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J41 - Labor Contracts
C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Contrary to most countries, the recruitment of assistant professors in France is centralized:
recruitment committees submit a ranking of candidates to the Ministry of Education,
the candidates submit their own ranking over the faculties that rank them and the Ministry
compute the final match accordingly to these lists. The strategic stakes of this procedure
are not well known in France. We show that the procedure satisfies desirable properties
of stability and optimality. In order to do so, we identify the matching rule used by the
Ministry using the information available to the candidates. The structure of the algorithm
that produce the final matching is also analyzed. Finally, we discuss the existence of quotas
on Departments rankings, the new features of the next campaign of recruitment and their
relationships with job mobility.
2008-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13002/1/MPRA_paper_13002.pdf
Haeringer, Guillaume and Iehlé, Vincent (2008): Enjeux stratégiques du concours des Maîtres de Conférences.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16294
2019-10-05T16:42:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16294/
How to Reform the Italian Domestic Adoptions System Through a Centralized Market Design
Reggiani, Tommaso
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
Using an innovative variation of the standard Matching Market Design framework, this draft aims to provide inputs useful to drive the reform of the current Italian Domestic Adoption System (Italian families that desire to adopt an Italian child).
The problem addressed in this draft, concern how to match the relative small number of waiting children to the large number of waiting families in the most rational and efficient way: each year, the adoptions system is not able to place the 20% of the children in foster care, despite the fact that the number of children (supply side) is very small respect the total amount of families (demand side) willing to adopt.
This project is oriented to solve the inefficiencies characterizing the current adoption program, substituting the actual decentralized setup with a more efficient centralized matching market criteria
2009-04-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16294/1/MPRA_paper_16294.pdf
Reggiani, Tommaso (2009): How to Reform the Italian Domestic Adoptions System Through a Centralized Market Design.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16598
2019-09-30T18:48:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503336
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3634
7375626A656374733D43:4333:433333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16598/
(In)Efficiency of Matching - The Case of A Post-transition Economy
Jeruzalski, Tomasz
Tyrowicz, Joanna
P36 - Consumer Economics ; Health ; Education and Training ; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
C33 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
This paper approaches the question of efficiency in job placement using regional data for Polish regions (policy relevant NUTS 4 level) over the time span of 2000-2008. Using a unique data set we estimate the matching function using stochastic frontier as well as difference-in-difference estimators. We use also managed to combine this unique data set with another unique source of data on the ALMPs coverage, unemployment structure across time and regions as well as the individual capacity of local labour offices. We use these data to explain the exceptional variation in estimated efficiency scores.
Our findings suggest that matching abilities are highly driven by demand fluctuations, while unemployment structure, ALMPs and individual labour office capacities have little explanatory power. Although without individual data it is fairly impossible to provide a reliable counterfactual, we raise some arguments to support the claim of job placement inefficiency by public employment services in Poland.
2009-08-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16598/1/MPRA_paper_16598.pdf
Jeruzalski, Tomasz and Tyrowicz, Joanna (2009): (In)Efficiency of Matching - The Case of A Post-transition Economy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16706
2019-10-09T21:02:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16706/
A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model
Steinbacher, Matej
Steinbacher, Matjaz
Steinbacher, Mitja
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
C15 - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.
2009-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16706/1/MPRA_paper_16706.pdf
Steinbacher, Matej and Steinbacher, Matjaz and Steinbacher, Mitja (2009): A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17113
2019-09-28T02:48:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17113/
A Theory of Continuum Economies with Independent Shocks and Matchings
Karavaev, Andrei
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
E00 - General
Numerous economic models employ a continuum of negligible agents with a sequence of idiosyncratic shocks and random matchings. Several attempts have been made to build a rigorous mathematical justification for such models, but these attempts have left many questions unanswered. In this paper, we develop a discrete time framework in which the major, desirable properties of idiosyncratic shocks and random matchings hold. The agents live on a probability space, and the probability distribution for each agent is naturally replaced by the population distribution. The novelty of this approach is in the assumption of unknown identity. Each agent believes that initially he was randomly and uniformly placed on the agent space, i.e., the agent's identity (the exact location on the agent space) is unknown to the agent.
2008-02-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17113/1/MPRA_paper_17113.pdf
Karavaev, Andrei (2008): A Theory of Continuum Economies with Independent Shocks and Matchings.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17596
2019-09-30T21:56:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17596/
Student Placement in Egyptian Colleges
Selim, Tarek
Salem, Sherif
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
We study students placement in Egyptian colleges under the current demand/supply placement mechanism implemented in Egypt (e-mechanism). We show that the e-mechanism is not Pareto efficient nor strategy proof and, moreover, it can not be improved to accommodate Pareto efficiency nor strategy proofness. The final conclusion is that it is better, from an efficiency point of view, to adopt a matching algorithm, like the Gale-Shapley mechanism, in students placement.
2009-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17596/1/MPRA_paper_17596.pdf
Selim, Tarek and Salem, Sherif (2009): Student Placement in Egyptian Colleges.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17606
2019-09-26T20:22:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17606/
Transparency, complementarity and holdout
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
Sengupta, Kunal
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D62 - Externalities
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. We address
this problem in a very general setup with a bargaining protocol that
is symmetric and allows for both publicly
observable, as well as secret offers, and a technology that allows for variable degrees of complementarity. The central insight is that the transparency of the bargaining protocol, formalized by whether offers are publicly observable or secret, as well as the extent of complementarity, play a critical role in generating efficiency. Even with perfect complementarity, holdout seems to be largely resolved whenever the bargaining protocol is public (but not if it is secret). Further, irrespective of the bargaining protocol, holdout is resolved if the marginal contribution of the last seller is not too large.
2009-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17606/1/MPRA_paper_17606.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal and Sengupta, Kunal (2009): Transparency, complementarity and holdout.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18461
2019-09-29T08:54:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18461/
On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining
Corchon, Luis
Ritzberger, Klaus
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the analyst.
1992
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18461/1/MPRA_paper_18461.pdf
Corchon, Luis and Ritzberger, Klaus (1992): On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18697
2019-09-28T22:58:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18697/
Sweet Talk: A Theory of Persuasion
Di Maggio, Marco
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
This paper introduces a model of sweet talk in which a seller may acquire verifiable information and selectively disclose it to a buyer to negotiate a deal. We start by analyzing a model with common priors in which the seller generates information for two reasons: a trading motive and a profit motive that is, to make trade possible or to increase the gains from it. There exists a negotiation region in which the seller continues to reveal information even if trading is already profitable. We extend the model, allowing for different prior beliefs about the value of the object, arguing that a complementarity between the seller's confidence and the precision of his information endogenously arises. Appointing an optimistic salesman may be costly because he may destroy profitable trading opportunities. We also allow the seller to choose in which market to trade: a matching market with a fixed price or a haggling market. Our model also provides a testable difference between a model of trading with homogenous priors and one with heterogeneous priors and finds application in understanding contracts as reference points.
2009-11-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18697/1/MPRA_paper_18697.pdf
Di Maggio, Marco (2009): Sweet Talk: A Theory of Persuasion.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18951
2019-10-21T07:52:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18951/
Land Acquisition: Fragmentation, Political Intervention and Holdout
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D62 - Externalities
This paper provides a theory of holdout based on the landowners' inability to manage large sums of money and consequent lack of consumption smoothing in case of sale. We find that under some reasonable conditions fragmentation increases holdout and moreover, this happens if and only if large landowners are relatively more willing to sale. Turning to the effects of politicization, we find that voice coupled with collective bargaining increases efficiency provided fragmentation is severe. Further, whether there is political intervention or not depends on the political maturity of the landowners, i.e. if they already have voice or not.
2009-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18951/1/MPRA_paper_18951.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2009): Land Acquisition: Fragmentation, Political Intervention and Holdout.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20999
2019-09-27T08:55:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3635
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3131
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3038
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3030
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3638
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3634
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433031
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443333
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453031
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453237
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3031
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20999/
Die Arbeitslosenversicherung in Deutschland – Beitrag zur Bekämpfung oder Ursache von Arbeitslosigkeit
Breiding, Torsten
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
J38 - Public Policy
J65 - Unemployment Insurance ; Severance Pay ; Plant Closings
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
J30 - General
J11 - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
J08 - Labor Economics Policies
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity
J00 - General
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
J68 - Public Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J0 - General
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
C13 - Estimation: General
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
C01 - Econometrics
D33 - Factor Income Distribution
E01 - Measurement and Data on National Income and Product Accounts and Wealth ; Environmental Accounts
E27 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
H31 - Household
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
J01 - Labor Economics: General
I21 - Analysis of Education
C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Abstract German (English abstract is added below)
Arbeitslosigkeit gilt als eines der schwerwiegendsten gesellschaftlichen Probleme unserer Zeit. Doch welche Gründe liegen, trotz der über die Jahre eingeleiteten Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit, für die anhaltende Beschäftigungskrise vor? Und in welchem Umfang hat das deutsche Sozial- und Wohlfahrtssystem zu der anhaltenden Misere beigetragen?
Insbesondere der Arbeitslosenversicherung wird vorgeworfen, einer der Hauptverursacher der Probleme auf dem Arbeitsmarkt zu sein. Um Deutschland wettbewerbsfähig zu halten, versuchen die politischen Gruppierungen durch Reformen das Land im globalen Umfeld zu positionieren und so optimale Lebens- wie Investitionsbedingungen zu schaffen. Doch wie effizient sind diese Reformen und wie wirken sie auf den Arbeitsmarkt? Welche Rolle spielen dabei die Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung und wie wirken sich diese aus?
Dass eine Arbeitslosenversicherung in einem Wirtschaftssystem wünschenswert und auch notwendig ist, lässt sich mit dem Argument der sozialen Sicherheit begründen. Allerdings muss die Aufgabe einer Arbeitslosenversicherung die soziale Absicherung im Falle einer möglichen, temporären Arbeitslosigkeit sein. Der Betroffene ist für die Dauer der Suche nach einer neuen Arbeit, die bestmöglich der Qualifikation des Einzelnen entspricht, finanziell abgesichert. Ein Absinken unter die Armutsgrenze wird verhindert. Die Steuerung des Arbeitsangebotsverhaltens des Einzelnen ist jedoch ein Nebeneffekt der Arbeitslosenversicherung, den es zu untersuchen gilt. Das die Arbeitslosenversicherung Einfluss auf das Arbeitsangebotsverhalten der Arbeitnehmer hat und welche weiteren Effekte aus der im Sozialsystem eingebetteten Arbeitslosenversicherung entstehen, soll diese Arbeit zeigen.
Zur Strukturierung der genannten Fragen nimmt diese Arbeit eine Dreiteilung vor. Analysen der wirtschaftlichen Situation Deutschlands und die Identifikation von Problemgruppen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt sollen die Wirkungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung kausal darstellen. Konjunkturbedingte Veränderungen von Arbeitslosenzahlen sollen weitestgehend als exogene Größe betrachtet werden und nicht in die Bewertung der Arbeitslosenversicherung einfließen. Durch die Parallelität der Ereignisse lassen sich die tatsächlichen Auswirkungen arbeitsmarktpolitischer Maßnahmen jedoch oft schwer selektieren. Um Effekte zuordnen zu können, wird ein historischer Abriss der Entwicklung des Systems der Arbeitslosenversicherung gegeben. Ein internationaler Vergleich dient der Standortbestimmung des deutschen Systems.
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit den Einflüssen der Arbeitslosenversicherung in verschiedenen Modellansätzen. Durch die Betrachtung der prognostizierten Effekte wird ein Abgleich der Theorie mit der Praxis erfolgen. Sowohl die Anreizwirkungen auf individueller Ebene im Arbeitsangebots- und Suchverhalten werden modelltheoretisch aufgezeigt, als auch der Einfluss auf das Kalkül im optimalen Verhalten von Gruppen und Kollektiven. Der Abgleich der Modelle mit der Empirie zeigt verschiedene Anreizverzerrungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung. Auffallend ist, dass insbesondere die Bezugsdauer der Unterstützung Einfluss auf den Zugang in, den Abgang aus und die daraus resultierende Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit hat. Die vom Alt-Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder einstmals angestoßene Diskussion um die Mitnahme-Mentalität der Deutschen findet im Sozialsystem Argumente und Fundierung.
Die Implikationen der Hartz-Reformen sind vielfältig. Die positiven Aspekte werden im dritten Teil aufgezeigt und mögliche Verbesserungen vorgeschlagen. Trotz der Forderung nach mehr Eigenverantwortung der Transfer-Bezieher und weitreichenden Änderungen zur Verschlankung des administrativen Aufwandes ist der Erfolg des Hartz-Konzeptes zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt noch nicht bewertbar. Besonders kritisch sind die Lohnabstände bei Geringverdienern, wodurch zielgerichtete Nachbesserungen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit notwendig scheinen. Dazu werden Vorschläge zu Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung diskutiert. Ziel der Reformen sollte eine zeitgemäße Anpassung der Arbeitslosenversicherung an gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen sein.
This work analyzes the effects of the German unemployment insurance system on the unemployment rate and the individual job-seeking behavior. The duration of the unemployment benefits affects the time spend in unemployment. Another effect is the span between available jobs and the level of the payments. At the same time, a longer duration of unemployment benefits protects the individual of social catastrophies and provied the job seeker with adequate time to find the job that fits best. The GDP can be higher in a society with social security systems compared to other economies by providing each individual the perfect job. Finally, each individual has a higher productivity by a better usage of skills.
facts:
- the history of the German unemployment system
- the effects of the economical cycle on the unemployment rate
- a comparison of the German unemployment system compared to other countries
- the effects of the span between the high level of unemployment benefit payments compared to the wage earned in available jobs
- labour supply and matching
- a theoretical approach to analyze the effects of the German unemployment insurance
- the reality in Germany compared to the theory
- an evaluation of the German system
- reform proposition
2006-09-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20999/1/MPRA_paper_20999.pdf
Breiding, Torsten (2006): Die Arbeitslosenversicherung in Deutschland – Beitrag zur Bekämpfung oder Ursache von Arbeitslosigkeit.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22761
2019-09-29T07:07:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D41:4131
7375626A656374733D41:4132
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22761/
Uses of the argumentation in the negotiation
Estrada, Fernando
A1 - General Economics
A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
A10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
In the recent literature on conflict resolution tends to underline negotiation model based on the argument or dialogue. Exchange between different styles of argument some trends have emerged in the rhetoric applied to the law, especially in procedural law. During the last decade researchers have recognized the value of the argument to understand various problems of jurisprudence in cases of conflict and strife. This paper proposes a complementary design to the analysis of the negotiation process based on debate and dialogue. It advocates a theory of argumentation in negotiation processes for instances where rational agents use strategies unpredictable with incomplete information.
2010-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22761/1/MPRA_paper_22761.pdf
Estrada, Fernando (2010): Uses of the argumentation in the negotiation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22948
2019-09-27T10:03:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433633
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423430
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433632
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453230
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22948/
Landscape in the Economy of Conspicuous Consumptions
Situngkir, Hokky
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
B40 - General
C02 - Mathematical Methods
C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
E20 - General
A14 - Sociology of Economics
Psychological states side by side with the bounded rational expectations among social agents contributes to the pattern of consumptions in economic system. One of the psychological states are the envy – a tendency to emulate any gaps with other agents’ properties. The evolutionary game theoretic works on conspicuous consumption are explored by growing the micro-view of economic agency in lattice-based populations, the landscape of consumptions. The emerged macro-view of multiple equilibria is shown in computational simulative demonstrations altogether with the spatial clustered agents based upon the emerged agents’ economic profiles.
2010-05-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22948/1/MPRA_paper_22948.pdf
Situngkir, Hokky (2010): Landscape in the Economy of Conspicuous Consumptions. Published in: BFI Working Paper Series , Vol. WP-E-2, (7 May 2010)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23370
2019-09-26T13:46:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443730
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23370/
What if Achilles and the tortoise were to bargain? An argument against interim agreements
Samet, Dov
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
C70 - General
D70 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Zeno's paradoxes of motion, which claim that moving from one point to another cannot be accomplished in finite time, seem to be of serious concern when moving towards an agreement is concerned. Parkinson's Law of Triviality implies that such an agreement cannot be reached in finite time. By explicitly modeling dynamic processes of reaching interim agreements and using arguments similar to Zeno's, we show that if utilities are von Neumann-Morgenstern, then no such process can bring about an agreement in finite time in linear bargaining problems. To extend this result for all bargaining problems, we characterize a particular path illustrated by \cite{ra}, and show that no agreement is reached along this path in finite time.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23370/1/MPRA_paper_23370.pdf
Samet, Dov (2009): What if Achilles and the tortoise were to bargain? An argument against interim agreements.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24351
2019-10-01T18:12:47Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24351/
House allocation with fractional endowments
Athanassoglou, Stergios
Sethuraman, Jay
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper studies a generalization of the well known
house allocation problem in which agents may own fractions of
different houses summing to an arbitrary quantity, but
have use for only the equivalent of one unit of a house. It departs from the classical model by assuming that arbitrary
quantities of each house may be available to the market.
Justified envy considerations arise when two agents have the same initial
endowment, or when an agent is in some sense disproportionately
rewarded in comparison to her peers.
For this general model, an algorithm is designed to find a
fractional allocation of houses to agents that satisfies
ordinal efficiency, individual rationality, and no justified envy.
The analysis extend to the full preference
domain. Individual rationality, ordinal efficiency, and
no justified envy conflict with weak strategyproofness. Moreover, individual rationality,
ordinal efficiency and strategyproofness are shown to be incompatible. Finally, two reasonable
notions of envy-freeness, no justified envy and equal-endowment no envy, conflict in
the presence of ordinal efficiency and individual rationality. All of the impossibility results hold in the strict preference domain.
2010-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24351/1/MPRA_paper_24351.pdf
Athanassoglou, Stergios and Sethuraman, Jay (2010): House allocation with fractional endowments. Forthcoming in: International Journal of Game Theory
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24373
2019-10-03T14:46:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24373/
The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching
Lamping, Jennifer
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D44 - Auctions
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In many auctions, a good match between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties although information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. This paper examines the case in which the bidder is better informed about the quality of his match with the seller than the seller is. We derive the optimal mechanism for this setting and investigate whether the seller requires commitment power to implement it. It is shown that once the reserve price is set, it is optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism may be implemented without commitment. However, if matching is not sufficiently important, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The magnitude of this loss increases as the importance of matching decreases.
2008-09-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24373/1/MPRA_paper_24373.pdf
Lamping, Jennifer (2008): The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24374
2019-10-01T05:15:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24374/
Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller
Lamping, Jennifer
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D44 - Auctions
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However, information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. We consider the case in which each bidder observes the quality of his match with the seller but the seller does not observe the quality of his matches with the bidders. Our objective is to determine whether it is in the seller's interest to observe the matches before selecting the winner. It is shown that the seller’s value for the information may be negative: the seller’s knowledge of the matches generates an asymmetry across bidders which depresses bids. The more matching matters, the greater the penalty associated with observing the matches.
2008-08-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24374/1/MPRA_paper_24374.pdf
Lamping, Jennifer (2008): Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24807
2019-10-05T02:07:25Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24807/
A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share
Athanassoglou, Stergios
Brams, Steven J.
Sethuraman, Jay
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We study the problem of dissolving a partnership when agents have unequal endowments. Agents bid on the price of the entire partnership. The highest bidder is awarded the partnership and buys out her partners' shares at a per-unit price that is a function of the two highest bids. We show that there exists no price-setting mechanism satisfying certain mild regularity properties that is ex-post efficient, for any common prior of valuations. This result sharply contrasts the equal-endowment case in which efficient dissolution of the sort we are examining is possible through a simple k-double auction, as suggested by Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (Econometrica, 1987).
2010-08-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24807/1/MPRA_paper_24807.pdf
Athanassoglou, Stergios and Brams, Steven J. and Sethuraman, Jay (2010): A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share. Forthcoming in: Mathematical Social Sciences
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24932
2019-09-28T08:41:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24932/
The Reality and Masquerade behind Bargaining over Welfare Pie Sizing, Delivery and Slicing.
Mullat, Joseph E.
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
The present analysis addresses the apparently critical issue of circulation of wealth in society. Three actors play the game of welfare-related taxation. The first actor, in the role of Negotiator No.1, stands up for citizens’ legal and moral rights to primary needs. The second actor, in the role of Negotiator No.2, proceeds in response to public will for the provision and delivery of public goods. Quite the opposite, the third actor, hereinafter named the Voter, who represents the taxpayers, prefers personal consumption to moral understanding and public activity. In fact, backed by electoral maneuvering, the Voter emanates a risk to break down negotiations. The result of the simulation provides an evidence for the claim that a 50% median income is close enough to be considered a realistic choice of poverty line within the variety or rules of the alternating-offers bargaining game and conditions for unanimous consent of voter-citizens.
2010-09-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24932/1/MPRA_paper_24932.pdf
Mullat, Joseph E. (2010): The Reality and Masquerade behind Bargaining over Welfare Pie Sizing, Delivery and Slicing.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24995
2019-09-28T00:11:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24995/
Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
Breitmoser, Yves
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In the proto-coalition model of government formation, formateur F appoints a proto-coalition and asks its members whether to start negotiating a coalition contract. If all accept, then the proto-coalition forms and starts negotiating; otherwise a caretaker government assumes office. I extend this model by allowing F to revise the chosen proto-coalition after rejections, that he states pre-conditions for the subsequent negotiations, and that F's opponents may publicly pre-commit to accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F's opponents can pre-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the standard model: it explains why F cannot always install his favored coalition (whatever the status quo) and why "important" coalition members may have more bargaining power in the subsequent negotiations than others.
2010-09-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24995/1/MPRA_paper_24995.pdf
Breitmoser, Yves (2010): Proto-coalition bargaining and the core.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25006
2019-09-28T16:48:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D44:4432
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25006/
Job Mix, Performance Pay, and Matching Outcomes: Contracting with Multiple Heterogeneous Agents
Kim, Jaesoo
Sly, Nicholas
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D2 - Production and Organizations
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We examine the problem of designing performance contracts with multiple agents when principals must compete for quality teams from a heterogeneous pool of agents. The trade-off principals face between good recruiting and good team performance provides micro foundations for agents to form stable matches, and for initially identical principals to adopt different organizational schemes. The equilibrium pattern of team formation exhibits two distinct, and inversely related, forms of assortative matching. We find that a greater share of principals offering diverse performance incentives across teammates (extensive margin), leads to a lesser degree of heterogeneity in abilities within teams on average (intensive margin). We apply the model to firm behavior to examine the mix of jobs offered and the degree of performance pay in a general equilibrium environment. At the aggregate level, increases in the supply of high-skilled workers leads to a polarization of jobs offered, i.e. relatively greater use of high- and low- skill occupations, consistent with changing labor demands in recent history. Moreover, skill accumulation among the labor force induces more firms to offer a steep set of performance contracts.
2010-07-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25006/1/MPRA_paper_25006.pdf
Kim, Jaesoo and Sly, Nicholas (2010): Job Mix, Performance Pay, and Matching Outcomes: Contracting with Multiple Heterogeneous Agents.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25508
2019-10-07T18:53:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453633
7375626A656374733D47:4730:473031
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483630
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D45:4534:453430
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D46:4633:463331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25508/
Market Myths in Contemporary Economics
Punabantu, Siize
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
D40 - General
E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy
G01 - Financial Crises
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
H60 - General
E50 - General
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
E40 - General
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
F31 - Foreign Exchange
This paper elaborates on the economic operating system (EOS) the role it can play in growth. It focuses on markets, price determination and forces of demand and supply in order to illustrate how an EOS model offers greater economic growth, stability and safety. This paper delves into market theory to determine whether what is commonly understood about market forces and free markets in contemporary economics is as reliable as might be expected; do free markets encourage or retard economic growth? It is often, for amusement, brought up how modern medicine despite its advances cannot cure the common cold. Contemporary economics has a similar pet peeve; it does not know how to cure common inflation and deflation. The same way medicine leaves the body’s immune system to deal with colds until a cure is found contemporary economics leaves inflation and deflation to market forces to sort out with the occasional booster shot of intervention when this process seems to fail. To this day the stand off between Keynesian and Monetarist models demonstrates the irascible nature of this economic bug; is seems in contemporary economics there is only one way to control it and that’s do nothing about it. This nothing in contemporary economics is what is referred to as free markets. Allowing free markets to set prices and act as a mechanism for managing inflation works, what doesn’t work is that free markets systems based on a Monetarist model lack reliable growth and not being able to do anything comprehensive when market forces begin to act up. In a downturn, suddenly the liberty of free markets can become a threat to economic stability. Free markets may work best in an economic operating system (EOS) model better able to exploit the efficiency of markets whilst accelerating economic growth.
2010-10-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25508/1/MPRA_paper_25508.pdf
Punabantu, Siize (2010): Market Myths in Contemporary Economics. Published in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25669
2019-10-01T05:46:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453633
7375626A656374733D47:4730:473031
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483630
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D45:4534:453430
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D46:4633:463331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25669/
Market Myths in Contemporary Economics
Punabantu, Siize
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
D40 - General
E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy
G01 - Financial Crises
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
H60 - General
E50 - General
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
E40 - General
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
F31 - Foreign Exchange
This paper elaborates on the economic operating system (EOS) the role it can play in growth. It focuses on markets, price determination and forces of demand and supply in order to illustrate how an EOS model offers greater economic growth, stability and safety. It delves into market theory to determine whether what is commonly understood about market forces and free markets in contemporary economics is as reliable as might be expected; do free markets encourage or retard economic growth? It is often, for amusement, brought up how modern medicine despite its advances cannot cure the common cold. Contemporary economics has a similar pet peeve; it does not know how to cure common inflation and deflation. The same way medicine leaves the body’s immune system to deal with colds until a cure is found contemporary economics leaves inflation and deflation to market forces to sort out with the occasional booster shot of intervention when this process seems to fail. To this day the stand off between Keynesian and Monetarist models demonstrates the irascible nature of this economic bug; it seems in contemporary economics there is only one way to control it and that’s do nothing about it. This nothing in contemporary economics is what is referred to as free markets. Allowing free markets to set prices and act as a mechanism for managing inflation works, what doesn’t work is that free markets systems based on a Monetarist model lack reliable growth and not being able to do anything comprehensive when market forces begin to act up. In a downturn, suddenly the liberty of free markets can become a threat to economic stability. Free markets may work best in an economic operating system (EOS) model better able to exploit the efficiency of markets. whilst accelerating economic growth.
2010-10-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25669/1/MPRA_paper_25669.pdf
Punabantu, Siize (2010): Market Myths in Contemporary Economics. Published in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25693
2019-09-29T04:33:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463136
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25693/
Labor Matching Behavior in Open Economies and Trade Adjustment
Sly, Nicholas
F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
This paper develops a model of costly trade and team production to examine the matching behavior of skilled workers in an open economy. Trade liberalization leads to a redistribution of rents across firms that differ in export status. When heterogeneous workers can bargain effectively and capture these rents, trade liberalization changes the supply of skilled production teams available for hire. Trade is shown to rationalize the matching behavior of workers, causing skill-upgrading within firms and infra-marginal improvements to firm-level productivity. Gains in productivity via skill-upgrading are distinct, and complementary, to the gains realized as low productivity firms exit and high productivity firms expand. All firms experience changes in skill composition, rather than just those on the margin of exit or exporting. Openness benefits those employed at exporting firms, however the likelihood of benefiting from trade is not necessarily increasing in skill. Wages in the open economy are tied to both worker skill and job type.
2008-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25693/1/MPRA_paper_25693.pdf
Sly, Nicholas (2008): Labor Matching Behavior in Open Economies and Trade Adjustment.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25781
2019-09-26T11:48:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3632
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25781/
The role of trading frictions in real asset markets
Gavazza, Alessandro
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
E22 - Investment ; Capital ; Intangible Capital ; Capacity
L62 - Automobiles ; Other Transportation Equipment ; Related Parts and Equipment
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
This paper investigates how trading frictions vary with the thickness of the asset market by examining patterns of asset allocations and prices in commercial aircraft markets. The empirical analysis indicates that assets with a thinner market are less liquid—i.e., more difficult to sell. Thus, firms hold on longer to them amidst profitability shocks. Hence, when markets for assets are thin, firms’ average productivity and capacity utilization are lower, and the dispersions of productivity and of capacity utilization are higher. In turn, prices of assets with a thin market are lower and have a higher dispersion.
2010-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25781/2/MPRA_paper_25781.pdf
Gavazza, Alessandro (2010): The role of trading frictions in real asset markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26330
2019-10-01T17:05:06Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26330/
A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share
Athanassoglou, Stergios
Brams, Steven J.
Sethuraman, Jay
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We study the problem of dissolving a partnership when agents have unequal endowments. Agents bid on the price of the entire partnership. The highest bidder is awarded the partnership and buys out her partners' shares at a per-unit price that is a function of the two highest bids. We show that there exists no price-setting mechanism satisfying certain mild regularity properties that is ex-post efficient, for any common prior of valuations. This result sharply contrasts the equal-endowment case in which efficient dissolution of the sort we are examining is possible through a simple k-double auction, as suggested by Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (Econometrica, 1987).
2010-08-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26330/1/MPRA_paper_26330.pdf
Athanassoglou, Stergios and Brams, Steven J. and Sethuraman, Jay (2010): A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share. Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences No. 60 (2010): pp. 191-195.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26405
2019-10-06T16:31:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433930
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433139
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443835
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483730
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433635
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D48:4838:483833
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26405/
Some Inquiries to Spontaneous Opinions: A case with Twitter in Indonesia
Maulana, Ardian
Situngkir, Hokky
C90 - General
C19 - Other
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
H70 - General
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
C02 - Mathematical Methods
H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
A14 - Sociology of Economics
The paper discusses opportunities to utilize the series of micro-blogs as provided by the Twitter in observation of opinion dynamics. The spontaneity of tweets is more, as the service is attached more to the mobile communications. The extraction of information in the series of tweets is demonstrated as in conceptual map and mention map. From the latter, the social network stylized properties, i.e.: power law distribution is shown. The exemplification of the methodology is on the 82nd commemoration of Indonesian Youth Pledge and the participatory movement of Indonesian capitol city, Jakarta.
2010-10-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26405/1/MPRA_paper_26405.pdf
Maulana, Ardian and Situngkir, Hokky (2010): Some Inquiries to Spontaneous Opinions: A case with Twitter in Indonesia. Published in: BFI Working Paper Series No. WP-10-2010 (2 November 2010)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27444
2019-10-18T16:41:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27444/
Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?
Breitmoser, Yves
Tan, Jonathan H.W.
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Are "generous" bargaining offers made out of fairness or in fear of rejection? We disentangle risk and social references by analyzing experimental behavior in three majority bargaining games: (1) a random-proposer game with infinite time horizon; 2) a one round proposer game with disagreement payoffs equal to the infinite horizon continuation payoffs; and, (3) a demand commitment game. Inequity aversion predicts very differently across these games, but risk aversion does not. Observed strategies violate neither stationarity nor truncation consistency. This allows us to use structural models of bargaining behavior to estimate the latent type shares of subjects with CES, inequity averse, and Prospect theoretic preferences. The Prospect theoretic, i.e. reference-dependent, model of utility explains the observations far better than any mixture of alternative models.
2010-12-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27444/1/MPRA_paper_27444.pdf
Breitmoser, Yves and Tan, Jonathan H.W. (2010): Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27687
2019-09-28T06:46:04Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433030
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27687/
Independent Random Matching
Podczeck, Konrad
Puzzello, Daniela
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C00 - General
C02 - Mathematical Methods
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Random matching models with a continuum population are widely used in economics to study environments where agents interact in small coalitions.
This paper provides foundations to such models. In particular, the paper establishes an existence result for random matchings that are universal in the sense that certain desirable properties are satisfied for any assignment of types to agents. The result applies to infinitely many types of agents, thus covering random matching models which are currently used in the literature
without a foundation. Furthermore, the paper provides conditions guaranteeing uniqueness of random matching.
2009-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27687/1/MPRA_paper_27687.pdf
Podczeck, Konrad and Puzzello, Daniela (2009): Independent Random Matching. Forthcoming in: Economic Theory
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28576
2019-10-09T02:57:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28576/
Binomial menu auctions in government formation
Breitmoser, Yves
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D44 - Auctions
C72 - Noncooperative Games
In a menu auction, players submit bids for all choices the auctioneer A can make, and A then makes the choice that maximizes the sum of bids. In a binomial menu auction (BMA), players submit acceptance sets (indicating which choices they would support), and A chooses the option that maximizes his utility subject to acceptance of the respective players. Monetary transfers may be implicit, but players may also bid by offering "favors" and the like. BMAs provide a unified representation of both monetary and non-monetary bidding, which I apply to model government formation. First, I analyze general BMAs, characterize the solution under complete information and establish outcome uniqueness (for both, sealed bid and Dutch formats). Second, in case monetary transfers are possible, BMAs are shown to implement VCG mechanisms. Finally, in case transfers are impossible, BMAs extend the model of proto-coalition bargaining and are specifically applied to government formation.
2011-02-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28576/1/MPRA_paper_28576.pdf
Breitmoser, Yves (2011): Binomial menu auctions in government formation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28999
2019-09-28T19:09:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28999/
A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
Brams, Steven J.
Kaplan, Todd R
Kilgour, D. Marc
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism that induces two bargainers to be truthful in reporting their reservation prices in a 1st stage. If these prices criss-cross, the referee reports that they overlap, and the bargainers proceed to make offers in a 2nd stage. The average of the 2nd-stage offers becomes the settlement if both offers fall into the overlap interval; if only one offer falls into this interval, it is the settlement, but is implemented with probability 1/2; if neither offer falls into the interval, there is no settlement. Thus, if the bargainers reach the 2nd stage, they know their reservation prices overlap even if they fail to reach a settlement, possibly motivating them to try again.
2011-02-18
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28999/1/MPRA_paper_28999.pdf
Brams, Steven J. and Kaplan, Todd R and Kilgour, D. Marc (2011): A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:29193
2019-09-28T23:49:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29193/
Differentiable game complete analysis for tourism firm decisions
Carfì, David
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
In this paper we apply the complete analysis of a differentiable game (recently introduced by the author) to determine possible suitable behaviors (actions) of tourism firms during strategic interactions with other tourism firms, from both non-cooperative and cooperative point of view. To associate with a real strategic interaction among tourism firms a differentiable game any player’s strategy-set must, for instance, be a part of a topological vector space, closure of an open subset of the space. The most frequent case is that in which the strategy-sets are compact intervals of the real line. On the other hand, very often, the actions at disposal of a player can form a finite set, and in this case a natural manner to construct a game representing the economic situation is the von Neumann convexification (also known as canonical extension) that leads to a differentiable game with probabilistic scenarios, and thus even more suitable for the purpose of represent real interactions. For what concerns the complete analysis of a differentiable game, its first goal is the precise knowledge of the Pareto boundaries (maximal and minimal) of the payoff space, this knowledge will allow us to evaluate the quality of the different Nash equilibria (by the distances from the Nash equilibria themselves to Pareto boundaries, with respect to appropriate metrics), in order to determine some “focal” equilibrium points collectively more satisfactory than each other. Moreover, the complete knowledge of the payoff-space will allow to develop explicitly the cooperative phase of the game and the various bargaining problems rising from the strategic interaction of the tourist firms (Nash bargaining problem, Kalai-Smorodinski bargaining problem and so on). In the paper we shall deal with some practical study cases.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29193/1/MPRA_paper_29193.pdf
Carfì, David (2009): Differentiable game complete analysis for tourism firm decisions. Published in: Proceedings of THE 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TOURISM and WORKSHOP on Sustainable tourism within High Risk areas of environmental crisis (2009): pp. 1-10.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:30390
2019-09-26T17:33:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30390/
Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
Brams, Steven J.
Camilo, Gustavo
Franz, Alexandra D.
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally bourn out by the 5-4 decisions, whereas the predictions of the Martin-Quinn (2002) model, which assumes a single underlying dimension along which the justices can be ordered, are not. The present model also provides insight into the dynamic process by which subcoalitions build up into majority coalitions and, in addition, identifies "kingmakers” and “leaders” on the natural courts.
2011-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30390/1/MPRA_paper_30390.pdf
Brams, Steven J. and Camilo, Gustavo and Franz, Alexandra D. (2011): Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:31891
2019-10-01T14:00:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4634:463430
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D45:4536
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31891/
Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools
Carfì, David
Schilirò, Daniele
F40 - General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
C72 - Noncooperative Games
The crisis within the euro area have become frequent during 2010. First was the Greek economy to face a default problem of its sovreign debt, in November it was Ireland who has been in a serious financial situation at the verge of collapse causing difficulties to the euro. In this contribution we focus on the Greek crisis and we suggest, through a model of coopetition based on game theory and conceived at a macro level, feasible solutions in a
cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in Germany and Greece, with the aim of improving the position of Greece, Germany and the whole euro area, also making a contribution to expand the set of macroeconomic policy tools. By means of our general
analytical framework of coopetition, we show the strategies that could bring to feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for Germany and Greece,where these feasible solutions aim at offering a win-win outcome for both
countries, letting them to share the pie fairly within a growth path represented by a non-zero sum game. A remarkable analytical result of our work consists in the determination of the win-win solution by a new selection
method on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.
2010-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31891/1/MPRA_paper_31891.pdf
Carfì, David and Schilirò, Daniele (2010): Crisis in the Euro area: coopetitive game solutions as new policy tools.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:32035
2019-09-27T16:58:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513530
7375626A656374733D42:4232:423231
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463139
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32035/
Coopetitive games and global green economy
Carfì, David
Schilirò, Daniele
Q50 - General
B21 - Microeconomics
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
F19 - Other
C72 - Noncooperative Games
The paper aims at providing a Game Theory model of coopetition which addresses the problem of the global Green Economy. The Green Economy is a theoretical model of sustainable development. This sustainable development model should lead to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, determine the reduction of global pollution and the establishment of a sustainable and lasting global Green Economy, using mainly renewable resources.
The paper applies the notion of coopetition, originally devised at microeconomic level, at a country level. The country has to decide whether it wants to collaborate with the rest of the world in getting an efficient Green Economy, even if the country is competing in the global scenario.
The model provides a win-win solution, that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of sustainability and efficient resource allocation within a coopetitive framework.
2011-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32035/1/MPRA_paper_32035.pdf
Carfì, David and Schilirò, Daniele (2011): Coopetitive games and global green economy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33400
2019-09-28T10:33:11Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33400/
Barter relationships
Prendergast, Canice
Stole, Lars
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
F10 - General
We offer a simple economic model of repeated barter to explore current economic exchange in Russia: individuals trade with each other in a dynamic environment where the threat of dissolving the relationship constrains the incentives to cheat. We show how the value of future interactions affects the willingness of individuals to trade with each other; only when rates of interaction are large can trust compensate for an absence of money. Moreover, when trading relationships are asymmetric – either in the trading
partners’ values for each other’s goods or in their relative bargaining power – the resulting barter allocations are distorted, as goods must be used for liquidity reasons. When third-party middlemen exist who can facilitate barter, they command a premium for their services, and have preferences for improved liquidity which may or may not correspond with the other traders in the barter economy. Fourth, we demonstrate that the restriction of trading to tight trading networks may be a socially efficient response to insufficient barter interactions. Finally, we consider how liquidity constraints affect pricing, and illustrate how the existence of a barter market can mute incentives to change prices in response to credit crunches.
2000-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33400/1/MPRA_paper_33400.pdf
Prendergast, Canice and Stole, Lars (2000): Barter relationships. Published in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33613
2019-09-29T07:11:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33613/
Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives
Breitmoser, Yves
Tan, Jonathan H.W.
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
We show and explain how generosity beyond that explainable by social preferences can manifest in bargaining. We analyze an ultimata game with two parties vying to coalesce with a randomly chosen proposer. They simultaneously demand shares of the surplus. The proposer must then make an offer that meets at least one demand, or else the game either continues with a new round or breaks down with all earning zero. Self-interest, altruism, and inequity aversion univocally predict miniscule demands due to inter-party competition; proposers thus obtain the lion's share. We experimentally observe that proposers coalesce with the less demanding party by strategically matching demands, like ultimatum bargaining, but also give non-strategically to the other party, like dictator giving. The observations are incompatible with concave utilities, as implied by social preferences, but are compatible with reference dependent preferences.
2011-09-22
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33613/1/MPRA_paper_33613.pdf
Breitmoser, Yves and Tan, Jonathan H.W. (2011): Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33841
2019-10-03T05:52:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33841/
Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
Saglam, Ismail
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Each individual who has a nontransferable expected utility about the quality of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or to remain single at the beginning of the first period. Those who married in the first period learn the qualities of their marriages at the beginning of the second period and then decide whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that for any society, there exist matching environments where the probability of the marital dissolution is not decreasing in divorce costs under a gender-optimal matching rule. In such environments an allocation effect of divorce costs with ambiguous sign outweighs an incentive effect which is always negative.
2011-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33841/1/MPRA_paper_33841.pdf
Saglam, Ismail (2011): Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35245
2019-09-26T11:55:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513530
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513438
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513535
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513432
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35245/
A coopetitive model for the green economy
Carfì, David
Schilirò, Daniele
Q50 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
Q48 - Government Policy
C71 - Cooperative Games
Q55 - Technological Innovation
Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
C72 - Noncooperative Games
The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetiton is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a
Pareto solution in a win-win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low carbon technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon
technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.
2011-11-22
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35245/1/MPRA_paper_35245.pdf
Carfì, David and Schilirò, Daniele (2011): A coopetitive model for the green economy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35335
2019-09-29T13:48:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4432
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453233
7375626A656374733D43:4337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35335/
Balancing pairs of interfering elements
Carfì, David
Gambarelli, Gianfranco
Uristani, Angelo
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D2 - Production and Organizations
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
E23 - Production
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Many decisions in different fields of application have to take into account the joined effects of two elements that can interfere with each other. For example, in Industrial Economics the demand of an asset can be influenced by the supply of another asset, with synergic or antagonistic effects. The same happens in Public Economics, where two differing economic policies can create mutual interference. Analogously in Medicine and Life Sciences with drugs whose combined administration can produce extra damages or synergies. Other examples occur in Agriculture, Zootechnics and so on. When it is necessary to intervene in such elements, there is sometimes a primary interest for one effect rather than another. For example, if the importance of the effect of an element is ten times greater than the importance of the effect of another, then it is convenient to take this importance into consideration in deciding to what extent it should be employed. With this in mind, the model proposed here allows the optimal quantities of two elements that interfere with each other to be calculated, taking into account the minimum quantities to be allocated. Algorithms for determining solutions for continuous effects' functions are given, together with software specifically for the case of bilinear functions. It concludes with the presentation of applications particularly to economical problems.
2011
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35335/1/MPRA_paper_35335.pdf
Carfì, David and Gambarelli, Gianfranco and Uristani, Angelo (2011): Balancing pairs of interfering elements.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:36227
2019-10-01T18:26:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36227/
Trading mechanism selection with budget constraints
Selcuk, Cemil
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D40 - General
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
We present an equilibrium search model of competing mechanisms where some buyers are budget constrained. Absent budget constraints, the existing literature capitulates that if buyers differ in their valuations then in the unique equilibrium all sellers hold second price auctions (e.g. McAfee (1993)) whereas if buyers are homogeneous then sellers are indifferent across a large number of payoff-equivalent mechanisms (e.g. Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)). We show that these results are not robust to the presence of budget constrained buyers; merely lowering the budgets of a few buyers renders the auction equilibrium as well as payoff equivalence unsustainable. If buyers differ only slightly in terms of their ability to pay then sellers prefer fixed price trading; otherwise they prefer auctions.
2011-03-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36227/2/MPRA_paper_36227.pdf
Selcuk, Cemil (2011): Trading mechanism selection with budget constraints.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:36773
2019-09-27T02:04:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36773/
A simple axiomatization of the egalitarian solution
Saglam, Ismail
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
In this paper, we present a simple axiomatization of the n-person egalitarian solution. The single axiom sufficient for characterization is a new condition which we call symmetric decomposition.
2012-02-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36773/1/MPRA_paper_36773.pdf
Saglam, Ismail (2012): A simple axiomatization of the egalitarian solution.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37018
2019-09-29T04:31:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513432
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513330
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513536
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513230
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513538
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37018/
Global green economy and environmental sustainability: a coopetitive model
Carfì, David
Schilirò, Daniele
Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
Q30 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
Q56 - Environment and Development ; Environment and Trade ; Sustainability ; Environmental Accounts and Accounting ; Environmental Equity ; Population Growth
Q20 - General
Q58 - Government Policy
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carfì) to represent a basic green economy interaction among a country c and the rest of the world w. Our game G is a linear parametric (Euclidean) perturbation of the classic Cournot duopoly. In the paper we offer the complete study of the proposed model and in particular a deep examination of its possible coopetitive solutions.
2012-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37018/1/MPRA_paper_37018.pdf
Carfì, David and Schilirò, Daniele (2012): Global green economy and environmental sustainability: a coopetitive model.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37215
2019-09-26T11:00:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37215/
Stability, efficiency and monotonicity in two-sided matching
Salem, Sherif Gamal
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
we propose a fairness property called P-monotonicity that
we would like a matching mechanism to satisfy. We show that it is impossible to have a mechanism which is both stable and P- monotonic. Moreover, we show that it is impossible to have a mechanism which is both efficient and P-monotonic.
2012-03-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37215/1/MPRA_paper_37215.pdf
Salem, Sherif Gamal (2012): Stability, efficiency and monotonicity in two-sided matching.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37407
2019-09-28T03:04:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523538
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513334
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37407/
Saving the Mekong River Basin
Houba, Harold
Pham Do, Kim Hang
Zhu, Xueqin
R58 - Regional Development Planning and Policy
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
Q34 - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
C71 - Cooperative Games
The Mekong River (MR) is shared by six countries: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Over the years there have been both conflict and cooperation on managing the water resources to meet population growth, climate change and the desire for economic development. Currently, the MR Committee (MRC) has weak policy instruments. This paper exploits an axiomatic bargaining approach to examine how China and the MRC might negotiate effective joint management. We investigate what welfare improvements arise from strengthening the MRC and propose an alternative offering for the MR's joint management that is preferable to the status quo from the perspective of all nations. We show that there are little gains from cooperation unless international institutions provide a budget to promote cooperation with China. Alternatively, strengthening the MR Committee has the potential to achieve large welfare improvements.
2011-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37407/1/MPRA_paper_37407.pdf
Houba, Harold and Pham Do, Kim Hang and Zhu, Xueqin (2011): Saving the Mekong River Basin. Published in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37527
2019-09-26T21:38:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37527/
Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations
Roman, Mihai Daniel
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for cooperation and efficiency in repeated games. The Folk Theorem of repeated games is a very used result that shows if players are enough patience then it is possible to obtain a cooperative equilibrium of the infinite repeated game. We proof a new folk theorem for finitely repeated games and also we find new conditions (under stage number and minimum discount factor value) such that players cooperate at least one period in cooperative-punishment repeated games. Finally we present a study-case for Cournot oligopoly situation for n enterprises behavior under finitely and infinitely repeated negotiations. We found for this situation discount factor depends only on players number, not on different player’s payoffs.
2008-07-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37527/1/MPRA_paper_37527.pdf
Roman, Mihai Daniel (2008): Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations. Published in: Journal of Applied Quantitative Methods No. 1/2009 (30 January 2009): pp. 1-16.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37725
2019-09-26T21:38:42Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473232
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37725/
Risk aversion influence on insurance market
Raduna, Daniela Viviana
Roman, Mihai Daniel
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G22 - Insurance ; Insurance Companies ; Actuarial Studies
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Human behavior, rational or irrational one, influences one of the most complex markets worldwide: the insurance market. In most situations, insurance markets are not competitive and risk neutral insurers negotiate under asymmetric information with actors who exhibit risk aversion. In this paper we develop a game theory model that analyzes the negotiation of an insurance contract under risk aversion conditions (in static and dynamic approach). Risk aversion influence was introduced in the model by intermediary of a discount factor (the in equivalent to players’ patience) instead of using a utility function. The main conclusion is that the customer prefers to agree on a contract of insurance in the first stage of negotiation than having to wait for another round of negotiations, during which they could register various losses.
2011-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37725/1/MPRA_paper_37725.pdf
Raduna, Daniela Viviana and Roman, Mihai Daniel (2011): Risk aversion influence on insurance market. Published in: Economics and Finance Review , Vol. 1(12), (28 February 2012): pp. 19-29.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37901
2019-09-30T16:45:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37901/
The sugar-pie game
Mullat, Joseph E.
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
Playing a bargaining game the players are trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. However, HE is not very keen on sweets and does not prefer a piece of the pie if the size of the pie is too small or too large. In HIS view, too small or too large pies are not of a reasonable quality. In contrast, SHE, the second actor, likes sweets what ever they are. HE is a soft negotiator but SHE is a tough negotiator. The paper addresses the problem: what should be HIS power of negotiations if an equal ½-division of the pie is desirable.
2012-04-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37901/1/MPRA_paper_37901.pdf
Mullat, Joseph E. (2012): The sugar-pie game.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38389
2019-09-27T16:28:43Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483536
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38389/
A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences
Roman, Mihai Daniel
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
H56 - National Security and War
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
During history, an aggressive country seeks to force non-aggressive countries to made many concessions based on military force. In our paper we discuss the situation that one aggressive country is dissatisfied with its current position and try to obtain more concessions from a rival country. To analyze this situation we use a game theory dynamic model in complete and incomplete information. We analyze the countries behavior depending especially on aggressive or non-aggressive strategies and also on battle power. In this context we found conditions to obtain separating and pooling equilibriums for dynamic games in incomplete information. Main result shows that countries behavior depends especially on war costs and on country military power. There are many applications of these types of models, like in Israel - Palestinian war, recent Russian- Georgian conflict or US defense policy.
2010-07-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38389/1/MPRA_paper_38389.pdf
Roman, Mihai Daniel (2010): A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences. Published in: Proceedings of International conference NEW CHALLENGES IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY SCIENCES 2010 (28 September 2010): pp. 104-110.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38493
2019-10-02T16:44:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38493/
Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities
Saglam, Ismail
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse
In this paper, we use a two-period one-to-one matching model with incomplete information to examine the effect of changes in divorce costs on marital dissolution. Each individual who has a nontransferable expected utility about the quality of each potential marriage decides whether to marry or to remain single at the beginning of the first period. Those who married in the first period learn the qualities of their marriages at the beginning of the second period and then decide whether to stay married or to unilaterally divorce. We show that for any society, there exist matching environments where the probability of the marital dissolution is not decreasing in divorce costs under a gender-optimal matching rule. In such environments an allocation effect of divorce costs with ambiguous sign outweighs an incentive effect which is always negative.
2011-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38493/4/MPRA_paper_38493.pdf
Saglam, Ismail (2011): Divorce costs and marital dissolution in a one-to-one matching framework with nontransferable utilities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38508
2019-10-05T05:22:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513432
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513330
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513536
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513230
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513538
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38508/
A model of coopetitive game for the environmental sustainability of a global green economy
Carfì, David
Schilirò, Daniele
Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
Q30 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
Q56 - Environment and Development ; Environment and Trade ; Sustainability ; Environmental Accounts and Accounting ; Environmental Equity ; Population Growth
Q20 - General
Q58 - Government Policy
C72 - Noncooperative Games
The present paper provides a model of coopetitive game for environmental sustainability of a global green economy, looking for a win-win solution within a complex construct of a type originally devised by Branderburger and Nalebuff. The model here suggested is environmental sustainable since it should lead to maintain natural capital, by using mainly renewable resources. In addition, this model of coopetitive games for environmental sustainability aims at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, determining the reduction of global pollution, in this way it contributes to the establishment of a sustainable and lasting global green economy. Finally, the model determines a change in the patterns of consumption of households towards goods and human behaviors with a lower environmental impact. So the coopetitive strategy, in our model, consists in implementing a set of policy decisions, whose purpose is to be environmental sustainable and to enforce the global green economy. This is why the coopetitive variable is represented by a set of variables that together guarantee the achievement of the environmental sustainability of a global green economy. Thus, this original model aims to enrich the set of tools for environmental policies.
2012-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38508/1/MPRA_paper_38508.pdf
Carfì, David and Schilirò, Daniele (2012): A model of coopetitive game for the environmental sustainability of a global green economy.
en
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