2024-03-28T12:12:54Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:70
2019-10-01T19:23:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70/
Competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling
Armstrong, Mark
Vickers, John
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
We examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit, consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly. When consumers buy all their products from one firm (the one-stop shopping model), nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare, but often lower consumer surplus, than linear pricing. By contrast, in a unit-demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm, bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus. In a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product, nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects. Compared with linear pricing, nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when: (i) demand is elastic, (ii) there is substantial product differentiation, (iii) there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand, (iv) consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm, and (v) a consumer's brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product. Nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) hold, but (iii) does not.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70/1/MPRA_paper_70.pdf
Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2006): Competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:131
2019-09-28T09:29:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/131/
Markets with Search and Switching Costs
Wilson, Chris
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
By incorporating the additional existence of switching costs into an oligopoly search model by Stahl (1989), this paper dispels the misleading idea that search costs can simply be treated as a form of switching cost. Due to the assumption that search costs, unlike switching costs, are incurred unconditionally on the decision to switch suppliers it is shown that the anticompetitive effects of search costs are consistently larger than those from an equivalent level of switching costs. The finding suggests that obfuscation practices that aim to deter consumers from searching, such as competing on deliberately complex tariffs, may be particularly powerful relative to practices that increase the costs of substitution between firms, such as loyalty programs or termination fees.
2006-05-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/131/1/MPRA_paper_131.pdf
Wilson, Chris (2006): Markets with Search and Switching Costs.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:235
2019-09-30T09:43:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443932
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3331
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/235/
Technological Progress in Races for Product Supremacy
Nguyen, Thang
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
How does market organization affect quality innovation efforts and social welfare? Three stochastic dynamic market structures considered are monopoly, duopoly, and social planning. Products can be either linearly or nonlinearly substitutable. The introduction of a step function allows richer innovation strategies. First, given nonlinear substitution, a duopoly may follow an unbalanced evolution path and have a technology frontier not dominated by that in social planning. This result does not hold for the linear substitution case. Second, ex ante and long-run welfare values are always the highest in social planning and the lowest in monopoly. Thus, policies should encourage static and dynamic competition.
2004-05-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/235/1/MPRA_paper_235.pdf
Nguyen, Thang (2004): Technological Progress in Races for Product Supremacy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:367
2019-10-01T05:20:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/367/
What if Hayek goes shopping in the bazaar?
Lamieri, Marco
Bertacchini, Enrico
D80 - General
L10 - General
C70 - General
D40 - General
The paper presents a comparative analysis of the peculiar institutional features of two retail markets: the middle eastern Bazaar and the western Mall (shopping center). We study the informational functions and performance of the different market institutions using an Agent Based Computational Economics (ACE) model under the assumption of behavioral learning by agents. Sellers decide which price setting strategy to adopt whereas buyers form their price beliefs exploring the market and decide which price to accept.
The agents learn how to adapt and behave within the specific institutional framework to carry out their economic transactions, but market institutions, as mechanisms to coordinate information of market participants are expected to affect the price dynamics. The main area of interest concerns the question of whether the economic argument on the presumed underperformance of bazaar institutions respect to more competitive markets holds true or it is necessary a reassessment on it.
2006-06-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/367/1/MPRA_paper_367.pdf
Lamieri, Marco and Bertacchini, Enrico (2006): What if Hayek goes shopping in the bazaar?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:473
2019-09-27T11:52:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/473/
Electricity prices and cross-border trade: volume and strategy effects
Parisio, Lucia
Bosco, Bruno
L94 - Electric Utilities
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D44 - Auctions
In this paper we derive equilibrium bid functions in isolated domestic electricity markets and then analyse their modifications when cross-border trade among them is managed using the implicit auction method. We show that cross-border trade can induce price convergence across countries and thereby reallocate gains and losses as a result of two concomitant effects: a “volume” effect due to the mere increase/decrease of demand and supply in each market and a “bid effect” due to the modifications of bid functions brought about by interconnection. The latter effect can either contrast or reinforce the former. We derive conditions affecting the net result.
2006-10-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/473/1/MPRA_paper_473.pdf
Parisio, Lucia and Bosco, Bruno (2006): Electricity prices and cross-border trade: volume and strategy effects.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:478
2019-09-28T16:49:12Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/478/
Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej
Jurdziak, Leszek
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game.
Based on the simple model of the lignite deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account nested pits generated by the pit optimisation process. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of two-stage game. In the first step (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to existence of information asymmetry and the mine predominant strategy attainment of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation techniques, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further research.
2006-02-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/478/1/MPRA_paper_478.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej. Published in: Energetyka , Vol. 59, No. No.2 (620) (February 2006)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:487
2019-10-03T04:48:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/487/
Interconnection of Cable Networks: A Regulation Proposal for Broadband Internet Services
Leitão, João
L51 - Economics of Regulation
D40 - General
In this article a brief revision of the European and Portuguese Regulatory frameworks is made, especially in terms of the interconnection of broadband internet services that are offered by cable operators. A formalization with two cable networks is presented, in order to obtain a benchmark for symmetric networks, and two scenarios: collusion and regulated market; are developed. This justifies the implementation of regulatory policies, with the establishment of caps for the interconnection tariffs, in order to assure a larger penetration rate of the broadband internet services and a bigger total welfare.
2006-10-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/487/1/MPRA_paper_487.pdf
Leitão, João (2006): Interconnection of Cable Networks: A Regulation Proposal for Broadband Internet Services.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:530
2019-10-06T11:59:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/530/
Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym
Jurdziak, Leszek
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Opencast lignite mine and power plant as a bilateral monopoly in classical solution
Based on example of opencast lignite mine and power plant operating on liberalized energy market the classical solution maximizing joint profits of bilateral monopoly has been presented. The graphic solution of finding the optimal quantity of coal production and contract curve has been presented based on demand, marginal revenue and cost curves. The advantage of vertical integration has been shown as well as alternative possibility of finding optimal solution using formula price contracts with agreed profit division. The need of further adaptation of presented classical bilateral model and its solution has been stressed in order to take into account restrictions imposed by the fact that one side of bilateral monopoly is an opencast mine exploiting unique lignite deposit. Usage of mining optimization programs has been proposed to determine supply of coal and cost curves.
2006-10-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/530/1/MPRA_paper_530.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym. Published in: Górnictwo i Geologia VII , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 106 (2004)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:531
2019-10-02T04:43:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/531/
Wpływ optymalizacji kopalń odkrywkowych na rozwiązanie modelu bilateralnego monopolu: kopalnia & elektrownia w długim okresie
Jurdziak, Leszek
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
THE INFLUENCE OF LIGNITE OPENCAST MINE OPTIMISATION ON SOLUTION OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY MODEL OF LIGNITE MINE & POWER PLANT IN LONG RUN
The classical and modified solution of bilateral monopoly for the system of opencast mine and power plant has been presented both using graphical and analytical methods. Determined through pit optimization and parameterization the influence of lignite base price on lignite supply in long run and on volatility of nested pits’ parameters (e.g. overburden to coal ratio) and quality of lignite contained in them (calorific value, sulphur and ash content) has been used to find optimal solution for bilateral monopoly: mine & power plant. It was shown that in contrary to the classical solution the modified one is determined not only in area of quantity of intermediate product (lignite) but also in its price. The hypothetical solution for the pit placed on the “Szczerców” deposit has been shown and discussed.
2006-10-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/531/1/MPRA_paper_531.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Wpływ optymalizacji kopalń odkrywkowych na rozwiązanie modelu bilateralnego monopolu: kopalnia & elektrownia w długim okresie. Published in: Gornictwo Odkrywkowe No. Nr 7-8 (2004)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:533
2019-10-03T14:29:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/533/
Wpływ struktury organizacyjno-właścicielskiej na funkcjonowanie bilateralnego monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L94 - Electric Utilities
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON OPERATION
OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY OF LIGNITE MINE AND POWER PLANT
Lignite mine & power plant can operate as two separate entities (having the same or different owners), two entities operating in one holding (with joint owner) or as one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has the influence on operation of this body including realization of its parts and the whole entity objectives, price negotiation etc. In the paper an attempt has been made to show these problems from the point of view of economic effectiveness.
2006-10-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/533/1/MPRA_paper_533.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Wpływ struktury organizacyjno-właścicielskiej na funkcjonowanie bilateralnego monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Published in: Materiały konferencyjne , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wroclawskiej Nr 112 (2005)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:534
2019-09-27T02:13:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/
Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L94 - Electric Utilities
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Is vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom?
Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits from reduction of transactional costs described by Williamson. Additional benefits can be attained by application of open pit optimisation which leads to the solution of modified bilateral monopoly of lignite mine and power plant. Cooperation can assure joint profits maximisation and rivalry leads to suboptimal solution in Pareto sense. Due to asymmetry of information about the deposit the mine has information advantage and can apply its predominant solution maximising only their own profits in long run.
2005-03-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/1/MPRA_paper_534.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2005): Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo? Published in: Biuletyn URE No. Nr 2 (February 2005)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:575
2019-10-01T00:27:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/575/
An Experimental Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees
Datta, Shakun
Offenberg, Jennifer
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference. Lesser use of guarantees, combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level, suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior.
2003-08-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/575/1/MPRA_paper_575.pdf
Datta, Shakun and Offenberg, Jennifer (2003): An Experimental Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:646
2019-10-05T16:39:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3535
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3739
7375626A656374733D46:4630:463031
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3131
7375626A656374733D43:4334:433434
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3231
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3139
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513133
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3234
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513137
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433232
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453330
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/646/
Causality and Efficiency in the Coffee Futures Market
Kebede, Yohannes
O55 - Africa
L79 - Other
F01 - Global Outlook
O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
C44 - Operations Research ; Statistical Decision Theory
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
O21 - Planning Models ; Planning Policy
O19 - International Linkages to Development ; Role of International Organizations
Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness
M31 - Marketing
D41 - Perfect Competition
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
O24 - Trade Policy ; Factor Movement Policy ; Foreign Exchange Policy
Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
C22 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes
F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
D40 - General
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
E30 - General
O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products
L78 - Government Policy
Tests for causality and rationality in the coffee futures market were carried out using data from the New York Market. Tests of causality indicated that futures prices strongly influence variations in spot price eight weeks or more to maturity. However, beginning seven weeks to maturity there seems to be a strong causal relationship going from futures to spot and from spot to futures. Risk constancy or neutrality, equality of risk premium and spot price, and efficiency were rejected for the period 18, 51, and 33 weeks or more to maturity. However, simultaneity of risk neutrality and efficiency was accepted for contracts with 55-77 weeks to maturity. The general conclusion from this study is that coffee futures market can be used as an indicator of spot market prices for contracts with 55-77 weeks to maturity. While benefits can be obtained through short term adjustment of available stock and making use of quality storage facilities, planning longer term planting and marketing decisions (e.g., ≥ 77 weeks) on the basis of futures market price can result in misallocation of resources and welfare loss.
1992-03-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/646/1/MPRA_paper_646.pdf
Kebede, Yohannes (1992): Causality and Efficiency in the Coffee Futures Market. Published in: Journal of International Food & Agribusiness Marketing , Vol. 5, No. 1 (1993): pp. 55-71.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:702
2019-10-04T15:37:34Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/702/
Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited
Dubra, Juan
D44 - Auctions
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equilibrium in asymmetric English auctions. The use of this property has the advantage of yielding an ex post efficient equilibrium without assuming differentiability of valuations or that signals are drawn from a density. These technical, non economic, assumptions have been ubiquitous in the study of (potentially) asymmetric English auctions. Therefore, my work highlights the economic content of what it takes to obtain efficient ex post equilibria.
I generalize prior work by Echenique and Manelli (2006) and by Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). Relative to Krishna (2003), I weaken his single crossing properties, drop his differentiability and densities assumptions, but I assume that one player's valuation is weakly increasing in other players' signals, while he uses a different assumption (neither stronger nor weaker).
2006-10-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/702/1/MPRA_paper_702.pdf
Dubra, Juan (2006): Asymmetric English Auctions Revisited.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:786
2019-09-27T16:33:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3331
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443932
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/786/
Technological Progress in Races for Product Supremacy
Nguyen, Thang
O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
How does market structure affect quality innovation efforts and social welfare? This study considers three allocation mechanisms in a model of dynamic quality innovation: monopoly, duopoly, and the social planner. In this model, quality advances depend upon a stock of accumulated know-how, allowing for more flexible innovation strategies and direct comparisons of technology frontiers which show the largest reachable know-how stocks. When products are perfectly substitutable, the technology frontier is highest under the social planner, lower under duopoly, and lowest under monopoly. However, when products are less substitutable, a duopoly may surpass the technology frontier under the social planner along an unbalanced innovation path. Ex-ante and long-run social welfare are always highest under the social planner and lowest under monopoly.
2004-05-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/786/1/MPRA_paper_786.pdf
Nguyen, Thang (2004): Technological Progress in Races for Product Supremacy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:934
2019-09-28T16:38:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/934/
Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs
Lu, Jingfeng
D44 - Auctions
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
This paper studies endogenous entry and ex ante revenue-maximizing auctions in an independent private value setting where potential bidders have private-information entry costs. The contribution of this paper is four-fold. First, we show that any equilibrium entry can be characterized through a set of continuous and monotonic shutdown curves that separate the bidders' types into participating and nonparticipating categories. Second, the expected winning probability of a participant does not depend on his private entry cost. Furthermore, the expected winning probabilities of the participating types are given by the slopes of the shutdown curves. Third, symmetric entry equilibria (shutdown curves) implemented by the classes of ex post efficient or ex post revenue-maximizing mechanisms are completely characterized. Fourth, within these two classes of mechanisms, a modified Vickrey auction with uniform reserve price and entry subsidy is ex ante revenue-maximizing. The desired entry subsidy and reserve price are determined by the lower end of the corresponding shutdown curve.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/934/1/MPRA_paper_934.pdf
Lu, Jingfeng (2006): Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:935
2019-09-28T01:32:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/935/
When and how to dismantle nuclear weapons
Lu, Jingfeng
D44 - Auctions
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
This paper first derives revenue-maximizing auctions with identity-specific externalities among all players (seller and buyers). Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, a modified second-price sealed-bid auction with appropriate entry fees and reserve price is revenue-maximizing. Secondly, seller may physically destroy the auctioned item if the item is unsold or use destroying the item as nonparticipation threat. Thirdly, the revenue-maximizing auction induces full participation of buyers. Fourthly, each losing buyer's payment includes an externality-correcting component that equals the allocative externality to him. These components eliminate the impact of externalities on strategic bidding behavior. The paper further studies revenue-maximizing auctions with financial externalities. One-to-one correspondences between revenue-maximizing auctions for settings with and without financial externalities are established through incorporating externality-correcting payments. This result provides a general method for designing revenue-maximizing auctions in different settings of financial externalities, since revenue-maximizing auctions can be obtained through transforming the revenue-maximizing auctions for the regular settings without externalities.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/935/1/MPRA_paper_935.pdf
Lu, Jingfeng (2006): When and how to dismantle nuclear weapons.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:943
2019-10-01T14:35:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/943/
Auctions design with private costs of valuation discovery
Lu, Jingfeng
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D44 - Auctions
This paper extends the pre-bid R&D and auctions design literature to an independent private value setting where each bidder incurs a private-information valuation discovery cost upon entry. The seller commits to a mechanism before the bidders' entry decisions. The main findings are as follows. Firstly, a second-price auction with no entry fee and a reserve price equal to seller's valuation is ex ante efficient. Secondly, a second price auction with the same reserve price and appropriate ex ante entry fees is revenue-maximizing. Every bidder's ex ante entry fee equals the hazard rate of his entry cost distribution, evaluated at the desired entry-threshold for him. Thirdly, the revenue-maximizing entry differs from the ex ante efficient entry. Fourthly, even for the symmetric setting, the ex ante efficient/revenue-maximizing entry could be asymmetric. Lastly, for the symmetric setting, when the cumulative distribution function of the entry costs changes rather slowly with respect to its argument, the efficient entry must be symmetric across bidders and it is the unique entry equilibrium of the efficient auction. If the hazard rate of the entry cost distribution is additionally increasing, then the revenue-maximizing entry must also be symmetric and it is the unique entry equilibrium of the revenue-maximizing auction. These results mean that large dispersion in the entry costs restores the symmetry in the efficient/revenue-maximizing entry.
2006-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/943/1/MPRA_paper_943.pdf
Lu, Jingfeng (2006): Auctions design with private costs of valuation discovery.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:948
2019-09-28T04:35:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/948/
Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data
Lu, Jingfeng
Perrigne, Isabelle
D44 - Auctions
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
Estimating bidders’ risk aversion in auctions is a challeging problem because of identification issues. This paper takes advantage of bidding data from two auction designs to identify nonparametrically the bidders’ utility function within a private value framework. In particular, ascending auction data allow us to recover the latent distribution of private values, while first-price sealed-bid auction data allow us to recover the bidders’ utility function. This leads to a nonparametric estimator. An application to the US Forest Service timber auctions is proposed. Estimated utility functions display concavity, which can be partly captured by constant relative risk aversion.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/948/1/MPRA_paper_948.pdf
Lu, Jingfeng and Perrigne, Isabelle (2006): Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1046
2019-09-27T13:27:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4E:4E31
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D4E:4E38
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1046/
The Real Thing: Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886–1959
Levy, Daniel
Young, Andrew
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
L10 - General
N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics ; Industrial Structure ; Growth ; Fluctuations
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
N8 - Micro-Business History
M31 - Marketing
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
M10 - General
D40 - General
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
We report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to the customer “inconvenience cost.” We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.
2004-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1046/1/MPRA_paper_1046.pdf
Levy, Daniel and Young, Andrew (2004): The Real Thing: Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886–1959. Published in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , Vol. Volume, No. Issue No. 4 (August 2004): pp. 765-799.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1082
2019-09-27T12:35:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1082/
Uniform pricing and social welfare
Bertoletti, Paolo
L51 - Economics of Regulation
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
D42 - Monopoly
We re-examine the case for uniform pricing in a monopolistic third-degree price-discrimination setting by introducing differentiated costs. A profit-maximizing monopolist could then use price differentiation to reduce the production of the more costly goods, thereby decreasing average cost and increasing welfare. Indeed, monopolistic price differentiation can improve welfare and also aggregate consumer surplus even if, as in the benchmark linear case, total output does not increase. Accordingly, the welfare criterion based on total output fails and should be replaced by the computation of well-defined price indexes. These results possibly pave the way for a more optimistic assessment of monopolistic pricing.
2005-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1082/1/MPRA_paper_1082.pdf
Bertoletti, Paolo (2005): Uniform pricing and social welfare.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1083
2019-09-27T18:02:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1083/
On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games
Bertoletti, Paolo
D44 - Auctions
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
We show that the seller’s optimal reserve price in an all-pay auction with complete information is higher than in a standard auction. We use our results to re-consider some findings of the literature that models lobbying games as all-pay auctions. In particular, we show that the so-called Exclusion Principle appears to rely crucially on the implicit assumption of a “weak” (in terms of bargaining power) seller, and does not hold if she regards bidders’ valuations as iid according to a monotonic hazard rate. Our preliminary results for the case of independent but asymmetric bidders make it even more suspicious.
2006-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1083/1/MPRA_paper_1083.pdf
Bertoletti, Paolo (2006): On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1085
2019-09-29T20:27:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1085/
A note on the Exclusion Principle
Bertoletti, Paolo
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D44 - Auctions
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of fully-informed potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that it does not apply if the seller regards the bidders’ private valuations as belonging to the class of identical and independent distributions with a monotonic hazard rate.
2006-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1085/1/MPRA_paper_1085.pdf
Bertoletti, Paolo (2006): A note on the Exclusion Principle.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1144
2019-10-01T14:33:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433533
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D43:4333:433332
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1144/
A structural model for corporate profit in the U.S. industry
Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo
C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods
D41 - Perfect Competition
C32 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes ; State Space Models
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
I estimate a theoretically and statistically satisfying model to account for corporate profit represented by Net Rental Income (NRI) for one of the largest Real Estate Investment Trust companies (REIT) in the U.S. I claim that I have found an accurate method to forecasts the direction and dollar amount of corporate profit in the apartment industry in The U.S. that can be extended to the remaining branches of the U.S. industry. The variables that together account for ninety seven percent of the variation in NRI for this apartment company are, one-period time lag of lease renewals, the Federal Funds interest rate end of month, total gross potential of the company, total concessions, two-period time lag of move-ins, the ratio between total non-farm employment and total construction permits authorized, the inventory of houses in the U.S, one-period time lag of move-outs and this REIT apartment units occupied.
2006-05-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1144/1/MPRA_paper_1144.pdf
Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo (2006): A structural model for corporate profit in the U.S. industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1468
2019-09-29T12:41:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1468/
Non-linearities in mark-up on costs
Wlazlowski, Szymon
Binner, Jane
Giulietti, Monica
Joseph, Nathan
Q40 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D40 - General
C52 - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
Abstract
This study employs an error-correction SETAR model to analyse the non-linearities in the behaviour of the mark-up on costs charged by the filling stations in the New York metropolitan area. While usual price transmission gained significant attention in the literature, the mark-up portion of the price has not been analysed to date. The results indicate that the adjustment to mark-ups to their long run values is non-linear, but the speeds with they adjust to their long-run values are equal across regimes for two out of three series analysed. For one of the series the adjustment is beneficial for the end consumers such that prices fall faster than they rise. The findings are somewhat surprising, indicating that there is no need for government intervention in the NY petroleum market.
2006-11-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1468/1/MPRA_paper_1468.pdf
Wlazlowski, Szymon and Binner, Jane and Giulietti, Monica and Joseph, Nathan (2006): Non-linearities in mark-up on costs. Published in: Aston Working Papers No. 2006 (2006): pp. 1-21.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1486
2019-09-27T16:54:41Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443439
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1486/
Petrol and Crude Oil Prices: Asymmetric Price Transmission
Wlazlowski, Szymon
D40 - General
D49 - Other
Q40 - General
This paper examines the relationship between crude oil prices, the dollar-pound exchange rate and petrol prices in the UK over the period 1982-2001. Quantitative methods were used to examine the existence of the long-run equilibrium and test for the presence of asymmetric patterns in the short-run responses to upstream price changes. Also the degree of asymmetry in the adjustment towards long-run equilibrium was analysed. Results confirm that short-run response is greater for increases in upstream prices and that the long-run equilibrium is reached faster after increase in upstream prices. Thus the opinion held by drivers in the UK is confirmed. Detailed analysis confirmed close relationship between the asymmetry and the size and change in the market margin.
2001
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1486/1/MPRA_paper_1486.pdf
Wlazlowski, Szymon (2001): Petrol and Crude Oil Prices: Asymmetric Price Transmission. Published in: Ekonomia , Vol. 11, (2003): pp. 1-25.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1503
2019-09-26T09:43:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1503/
Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
D44 - Auctions
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We examine a simple model of collusion under a
single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter
conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy,
nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an
effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1503/1/MPRA_paper_1503.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2006): Controlling Collusion in Auctions: The Role of Ceilings and Reserve Prices.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1515
2019-10-09T22:23:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1515/
Firm Size and Pricing Policy
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
D40 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
We relate the pricing policy
of the firms to their size, where firm size is interpreted as the
size of the clientele served by the concerned firm. We argue that a
firm with a large clientele faces a more severe reputational
backlash if it reneges. This allows the firm to effectively commit
to its offers, leading to a unique equilibrium without delay, where
the firm extracts the whole of the surplus. For smaller firms,
however, the reputational effects are much less intense and,
consequently, the equilibria involve reneging possibilities. In this
case the equilibria are non-unique, and may involve delays as well.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1515/1/MPRA_paper_1515.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2006): Firm Size and Pricing Policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1600
2019-09-26T11:19:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/
Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
C71 - Cooperative Games
L94 - Electric Utilities
Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search.
2006-09-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/1/MPRA_paper_1600.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Published in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium Continuous Surface Mining , Vol. ISBN 3, No. Department of Mining Engineering III, RWTH Aachen University (24 September 2006): pp. 469-476.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1773
2019-09-27T04:52:26Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5234:523431
7375626A656374733D52:5234:523430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3931
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1773/
Transporte público en Cartagena: ¿Qué factores determinan las preferencias de los usuarios?
Toro González, Daniel
Alvis Arrieta, Jorge
Arellano Cartagena, William
R41 - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion ; Travel Time ; Safety and Accidents ; Transportation Noise
R40 - General
L91 - Transportation: General
D40 - General
This document analizes the preferences of public transportation system users in Cartagena de Indias - Colombia. The research uses related variables on transportation modes chosen by people and some other characteristics of the people who make such decisions. The analysis allows us to understand the behavior of public urban transportation system users in the city of Cartagena, and shows us evidence about some probable reasons associated with new informal public transportation modes, which at this moment play an important role in the public transportation market in the city. The research uses binary choice probabilistic models (Probit) and primary information collected by a survey for system users.
2004-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1773/1/MPRA_paper_1773.pdf
Toro González, Daniel and Alvis Arrieta, Jorge and Arellano Cartagena, William (2004): Transporte público en Cartagena: ¿Qué factores determinan las preferencias de los usuarios? Published in: Economía & Región , Vol. Vol.2, No. No.3 (July 2005): pp. 7-54.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1842
2019-09-26T18:20:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1842/
Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access
Cotton, Christopher
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D44 - Auctions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
In competition for access, interest groups provide contributions to a politician and those that provide the highest contributions win access. Groups with access present information that may influence the politician's beliefs about the socially optimal policy. Because equilibrium contributions are chosen endogenously, the politician learns about the information quality of all interest groups, even when he grants access to only some of the
groups. Contribution limits reduce the signaling power of the equilibrium contributions, resulting in a less informed politician, and strictly reducing expected social welfare.
2007-02-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1842/1/MPRA_paper_1842.pdf
Cotton, Christopher (2007): Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1844
2019-09-27T03:33:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1844/
Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.
Cotton, Christopher
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D44 - Auctions
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about his private valuation over time (as he has more time to consider using the item), and (2) there is a positive probability he is unable to return to the auction to submit a bid in a later period.
2007-02-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1844/1/MPRA_paper_1844.pdf
Cotton, Christopher (2007): Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1977
2020-01-12T18:28:33Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2134
2019-10-01T03:33:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2134/
Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders
Masili, Gustavo
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D44 - Auctions
The paper compares different auction formats for sale of a single patented innovation for budget constrained bidders. This unit decreases the marginal cost of production in the aftermarket for its owner by an amount which depends on the money invested on the development of this technology. As the bidders have a fixed budget that must be used to pay the final auction price and also to develop the new technology, the winner has incentives to pay a low amount for his unit to increase the amount available to invest in cost reduction. Conversely the loser has incentives to induce induce a higher price to be paid by the winner in order to increase aftermarket profits. This conflict of interest generates the willingness to pay (WTP) for the patent through an endogenous process, which may end up by stablishing a higher WTP for the lowest financed firm. Given this background, the case in which the players have different initial budgets may generate multiple equilibria for all studied auction mechanisms. These equilibria produce di¤erent consumer surplus and, thus, a central government with an unti-trust behavior is able to choose the auction that generates the re�ned equilibrium leading to the highest consumer surplus.
2006-07-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2134/1/MPRA_paper_2134.pdf
Masili, Gustavo (2006): Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2384
2019-09-26T10:16:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice (in long run) or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract (in short run e.g. one of year). It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/1/MPRA_paper_2384.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 43-57.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2385
2019-09-30T12:59:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
D40 - General
For methods of the profit division in the bilateral monopoly of the mine and the power station sug-gested in the first part of this paper the formulae for lignite price and shares in the joint profit of the mine and the power station are calculated. The proposed profit division contain: the egalitarian, normal and asymmetrical Nash solution, the proportional division, assuring equal and proportional profit margins division (in it calculated only on the basis of prime costs) and Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with individual utility functions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/1/MPRA_paper_2385.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 59-68.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2388
2019-09-30T08:16:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443839
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D89 - Other
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
For the hypothetical deposit with parameters similar to KWB “Konin” S.A. conditions; lignite prices and proposed divisions are calculated and results were discussed under the angle of the fairness (equity) of the division and the possibility of their approval by both sides. A sensitivity analysis of shares of the mine in joint profits, the level of border prices outlining break-even points, lignite prices, the total profit and the profit of the mine for the price change of the energy, costs of the mine and the power station was carried. Results were discussed under the angle of correction of the division in the next period with taking into consideration the inflation, changes in prices of the energy and level of total costs of the mine and the power station and of the potential temptation of the change in the proportion of shares by increasing expenses. Lignite mines and power stations cooperating with them were invited for discussion about proposed divisions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/1/MPRA_paper_2388.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 69-80.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2443
2019-10-03T01:18:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2443/
Telecommunications Technologies: Deployment in Developing Countries
Gasmi, Farid
Recuero Virto, Laura
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
This paper examines some policies pursued in developing countries for the
provision of telecommunications services in rural areas. These policies significantly differ
from those typically implemented in developed countries in their fundamental objectives,
the technological strategies deployed and the market and institutional environments they
rest on. A review of some representative experiences suggests that thinking about public
utility reforms in this part of the world is quite a challenging exercise. We point out some
economic and institutional characteristics of these countries that we believe normative
analysis of the reforms should explicitly take into account
2005-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2443/1/MPRA_paper_2443.pdf
Gasmi, Farid and Recuero Virto, Laura (2005): Telecommunications Technologies: Deployment in Developing Countries. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 58 (June 2005): pp. 19-41.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2466
2019-09-26T22:14:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/
Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
The newest outcome of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant analysis have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution maximising joint profits not only in quantity of lignite - the size and shape of the ultimate pit (characteristic to classical solution) but also in its price has been stressed. It is proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a cooperative, two-stage, two-person, non zero-sum game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM should be chosen and in the second one, during bargaining, the split of profit ought to be decided together with choosing the transfer price of lignite. The level of lignite prices has been presented in the time of their control and confirmation (1996-2003) as well as their new profit sharing role in the period of their freely negotiation. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM due to its rational conditions. The application of this solution on example from the “Szczerców” deposit has been presented.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/1/MPRA_paper_2466.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES’06 (20 September 2006): pp. 32-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2467
2019-10-03T14:29:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/
Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
L94 - Electric Utilities
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Lignite mine and power plant can operate as two separate entities, two entities in one holding or joint venture and as the one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has the influence on operation of this tandem including realization of its individual and joint objectives, price negotiation, transactional costs, irreversible investments (sunk costs), different access to information (asymmetric information), cooperation or rivalry, possibility of opportunistic behaviour and other threats, which can be used against the second side. An attempt has been made to show these problems from the point of view of economic effectiveness based on a bilateral monopoly (BM) model and game theory approach with usage of pit optimisation methods. Advantages and disadvantages of different solutions have been presented as well as rational incentives to vertical integration due to inherent conflict of individual and group rationality in BM. This conflict of interest can lead to Pareto sub optimal solution in case of lack of cooperation between both sides. Concentration on lignite price can lead to waste of potential profit and decrease of mineable reserves - excavation of smaller pit, which is optimal only to the mine but not to the whole BM.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/1/MPRA_paper_2467.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES/06 (20 September 2006): pp. 26-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2498
2019-09-26T16:57:05Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3333
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2498/
Internet Governance: exploring the development link
Williams, Howard
O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences ; Diffusion Processes
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L96 - Telecommunications
This paper seeks to explore the issues of Internet governance from a development perspective. The WSIS process and the report of the UN Working group on Internet Governance provide an initial framework within which to develop the issues.
These issues not only concern the equitable distribution of Internet resources and the ways in which a secure and reliable function of the Internet can be achieved, but also include issues of multi-lingualism and local content as well as the institutional setting of Internet governance mechanisms and participation. The paper observers that realising the contribution of the Internet to development goals requires a shift in policy focus away from supply side initiatives in the telecommunications sector to more co-ordinated approaches.
2005-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2498/1/MPRA_paper_2498.pdf
Williams, Howard (2005): Internet Governance: exploring the development link. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 58 (June 2005): pp. 81-103.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2501
2019-10-03T04:48:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2501/
P2P: From File Sharing to Meta-information Pooling
Dagiral, Eric
Dauphin, Florian
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K21 - Antitrust Law
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
P2P networks have mainly been used for downloading cultural goods. This sociological research focuses on the practices and norms of users and designers. Drawing on a qualitative survey, it explores the many ways sharing takes place. It looks at P2P networks as file sharing communities and probes the underpinnings of such file sharing. This article particularly scrutinizes the way in which users are brought together in communities founded on exploration and discovery. The latest developments seem to point towards a type of community chiefly based on exchanging meta-information.
2005-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2501/1/MPRA_paper_2501.pdf
Dagiral, Eric and Dauphin, Florian (2005): P2P: From File Sharing to Meta-information Pooling. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 59 (September 2005): pp. 35-51.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2503
2019-10-05T05:18:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2503/
Investing in a Website: A Top Dog or a Resource-Based Strategy for Firms?
Martin, Ludivine
Penard, Thierry
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
L10 - General
This article is aimed at analyzing the motivations on the part of firms to invest in
websites. What are the drivers behind such investments? In order to address this issue,
we have considered two alternative theoretical frameworks. The first relies upon resourcebased theory; the approach herein states that firms with greater resources and competencies are expected to invest more heavily in Internet technologies, especially those firms present in rent-yielding markets (concentrated markets with strong entry barriers). The theory of industrial organization constitutes a second framework and leads
to the alternative conjecture that firms should have more incentive to invest in a website
when they are in highly-competitive markets. A website can indeed serve as a strategic
means for creating artificial entry barriers and eliminating rivals. We have tested these two hypotheses using a French database and found the resource-based approach to be more
relevant in explaining the drivers of website investment. In particular, firms tend to invest more in websites when markets are highly concentrated and little exposed to international trade.
2005-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2503/1/MPRA_paper_2503.pdf
Martin, Ludivine and Penard, Thierry (2005): Investing in a Website: A Top Dog or a Resource-Based Strategy for Firms? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 59 (September 2005): pp. 77-98.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2513
2019-10-01T00:33:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2513/
Inter-Modal Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States
Shelanski, Howard A.
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K21 - Antitrust Law
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
This article discusses changes in the U.S. telecommunications market over the last decade and argues that increasing competitive substitution from wireless and internetbased communications has undermined the rationale for conventional monopoly regulation of incumbent local telephone carriers. The article suggests that the time is right to shift from a regime of a priori rules governing incumbent-form conduct to a regime of ex post competition enforcement.
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2513/1/MPRA_paper_2513.pdf
Shelanski, Howard A. (2005): Inter-Modal Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 15-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2514
2019-10-02T09:40:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2514/
Is the U.S. Dancing to a Different Drummer?
Marcus, J. Scott
H41 - Public Goods
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
Is the United States in full retreat from internationally recognized regulatory best practice? Or is it instead headed toward some different destination – "dancing to the beat of a different drummer"? Where is this likely to lead?
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2514/1/MPRA_paper_2514.pdf
Marcus, J. Scott (2005): Is the U.S. Dancing to a Different Drummer? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 39-58.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2605
2019-09-28T13:50:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3330
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2605/
Mobile Call Termination: a Tale of Two-Sided Markets
Valletti, Tommaso
L96 - Telecommunications
O30 - General
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Mobile telephony is described as a "two-sided" market where customers are seen as senders and receivers of communications that are mutually beneficial both to callers and receivers. This has implications in terms of market definition and market power. The economics of mobile call termination is discussed in this context.
2006-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2605/1/MPRA_paper_2605.pdf
Valletti, Tommaso (2006): Mobile Call Termination: a Tale of Two-Sided Markets. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 61 : pp. 61-77.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2606
2019-09-26T20:55:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3330
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2606/
Retail Payment Systems: What can we Learn from Two-Sided Markets?
Verdier, Marianne
O30 - General
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Some retail payment systems can be modelled as two-sided markets, where a payment system facilitates money exchanges between consumers on one side and merchants on the other. The system sets rules and standards, to ensure usage and acceptance of its payment instruments by consumers and merchants respectively. Some retail payment systems exhibit indirect network externalities, which is one of the main criteria used to define two-sided markets. As more consumers use the payment platform, more merchants are encouraged to join it. Conversely, the value of holding payment instruments increases with the number of merchants accepting them. The theory of two-sided markets contributes to a better understanding of these retail payment systems, by showing that an asymmetric allocation of costs is needed to maximise the volume of transactions. It also starts to offer results that could explain competition between payment platforms. However, this theory entails some limits to a thorough understanding of retail payment systems. Firstly, we show that some retail payment systems, such as credit transfer or direct debit systems, do not necessarily fulfil all the theoretical criteria used to define twosided markets. Moreover, this theory does not take into account specific features of the payment industry, such as risk management or fraud prevention. This leads us to propose new research directions.
2006-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2606/1/MPRA_paper_2606.pdf
Verdier, Marianne (2006): Retail Payment Systems: What can we Learn from Two-Sided Markets? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 61 (March 2006): pp. 37-59.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2713
2019-10-03T14:19:41Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D42:4235
7375626A656374733D42:4235:423531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2713/
Microfoundations of macroeconomics. Post-Keynesian contributions on the theory of the firm
Canale, Rosaria Rita
D40 - General
B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches
B51 - Socialist ; Marxian ; Sraffian
Looking through contributions about microeconomic theory, from classics to modern theory, it is possible to identify various attitudes on the role that firms play in the market. To simplify the existing multiplicity of opinion, two distinct positions can be recognized: 1) the first one considers the theory of the firm, its choices about price and production as ruled by consumer sovereignty, assuming that it is the eagerness to buy that drives the market. The entrepreneur’s and consumer’s interests converge thanks to automatic mechanisms leading to equilibrium. It is well-known that neoclassical economists can be ascribed to this trend of study. 2) the second position, on the other hand, considers the side of production as having a higher incidence in the identification of market equilibrium, as firms are able to set prices and co-ordinate demand behaviour. This turn-round in causality defines a market where the demand-supply relationship does not follow the rules of competitive-marginalist equilibrium, but alternative principles. The aim of this study is to analyse the contribution of Post-Keynesian scholars about this theme in the belief that the fundamental assumptions and conclusions they have drawn represent an alternative to the traditional theory, and are worth being considered carefully.
However, in the identification of the theoretical foundations of Post-Keynesian microeconomics theory, one can run into the difficulty of reducing to few unification principles the content of very different contributions, which often stand out for their critical positions vis-à-vis orthodox theory rather than for setting up the parts of a single alternative paradigm .
Besides, Post-Keynesians have a strong taste for macroeconomics themes, rather than for microeconomics ones, since they believe that the macro aggregates determine the behaviour of small decision-making units. In fact, looking at this literature, one can find a lot of contributions on this subject: the most reputed (Kalecki 1954, and, for an expansion of this, Asimakopulos 1975 and Cowling 1982) explain the formation of prices and produced quantities as the results of decision-making process of firms as a whole. These theories set themselves out as theories of investment decisions, profit accumulation, and the conflicting nature of income distribution. This point of view, however, is submitted to the criticism of those who argue that Post-Keynesian theory does not possess persuasive microeconomics bases and that, even though it can be maintained that in the process of aggregation the firms behave uniformly in influencing aggregate production and income distribution, it is always necessary to define the rules that allow each unit to take its production choices.
Most recently, some scholars have committed themselves to define the rules of such a decision-making process and to clarify the reasons why the interests between consumers and producers in the market do not converge. In so doing, they have tried to provide a microeconomic foundation to the distributive conflict identified at an aggregate level. These different contributions underline various dimensions of the undertaker’s decision-making mechanism. However, I believe that they share some common elements, as they are characterized by a common global vision that brings about a persuasive alternative to the theoretical system of neoclassical microeconomics.
The aim of the present study is that of presenting the key elements of the Post-Keynesian global vision on the theory of the firm, and of explaining why price mechanisms prevail over quantity-determining mechanism.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2713/1/MPRA_paper_2713.pdf
Canale, Rosaria Rita (2003): Microfoundations of macroeconomics. Post-Keynesian contributions on the theory of the firm. Published in: Atti del Convegno AISPE 2003 (2005)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2761
2019-09-27T18:21:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2761/
Price Rigidity and Flexibility: Recent Theoretical Developments
Levy, Daniel
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
E50 - General
M30 - General
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D40 - General
M20 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
E52 - Monetary Policy
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
The price system, the adjustment of prices to changes in market conditions, is the primary mechanism by which markets function and by which the three most basic questions get answered: what to produce, how much to produce and for whom to produce. To the behaviour of price and price system, therefore, have fundamental implications for many key issues in microeconomics and industrial organization, as well as in macroeconomics and monetary economics. In microeconomics, managerial economics, and industrial organization, economists focus on the price system efficiency. In macroeconomics and monetary economics, economists focus on the extent to which nominal prices fail to adjust to changes in market conditions. Nominal price rigidities play particularly important role in modern monetary economics and in the conduct of monetary policy because of their ability to explain short-run monetary non-neutrality. The behaviour of prices, and in particular the extent of their rigidity and flexibility, therefore, is of central importance in economics. This introductory essay briefly summarizes the eight studies of price rigidity that are included in this special issue.
2007-04-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2761/1/MPRA_paper_2761.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2007): Price Rigidity and Flexibility: Recent Theoretical Developments.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2762
2019-09-27T14:55:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453538
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2762/
Price Rigidity and Flexibility: New Empirical Evidence
Levy, Daniel
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
E50 - General
M30 - General
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D40 - General
M20 - General
E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
E52 - Monetary Policy
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
The marketplace, along with its price system, is the single most important institution in a western-style free enterprise economy. The ability of prices to adjust to changes in supply and demand conditions enables the market to function efficiently and lies behind the magical invisible hand mechanism. To the behaviour of prices and in particular to the ability of prices to adjust to changes in market conditions, therefore, have fundamental implications for many key issues in many areas of both microeconomics as well as macroeconomics. It is, therefore, critical to study and understand whether there are barriers to price adjustments, what are the nature of these barriers, how the barriers lead to price rigidity, what are possible implications of these rigidities, etc. This introductory essay briefly summarizes the fourteen empirical studies of price rigidity that are included in this special issue.
2007-04-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2762/1/MPRA_paper_2762.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2007): Price Rigidity and Flexibility: New Empirical Evidence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2837
2019-09-29T05:01:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433633
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2837/
Using Genetics Based Machine Learning to find Strategies for Product Placement in a dynamic Market
Fent, Thomas
C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D40 - General
M31 - Marketing
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
In this paper we discuss the necessity of models including complex adaptive systems in order to eliminate the shortcomings of neoclassical models based on equilibrium theory. A simulation model containing artificial adaptive agents is used to explore the dynamics of a market of highly replaceable products. A population consisting of two classes of agents is implemented to observe if methods provided by modern computational intelligence can help finding a meaningful strategy for product placement. During several simulation runs it turned out that the agents using CI-methods outperformed their competitors.
1999-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2837/1/MPRA_paper_2837.pdf
Fent, Thomas (1999): Using Genetics Based Machine Learning to find Strategies for Product Placement in a dynamic Market.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3013
2019-10-01T03:53:21Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453130
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443439
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3013/
Determination of Profit and Loss Sharing Ratios in Interest-Free Business Finance
Hasan, Zubair
E10 - General
D49 - Other
D40 - General
This paper discusses how profit and loss sharing ratios will be determined at the micro and micro levels in an interest free system of financing business operating side by side of an interest based conventional financing.It shows that leverage magnification of return on owners' equity is also available under the Islamic financing. It argues that for the bank Islamic finance may be more profitable than conventional financing
1985
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3013/1/MPRA_paper_3013.pdf
Hasan, Zubair (1985): Determination of Profit and Loss Sharing Ratios in Interest-Free Business Finance. Published in: Journal of Research in Islamic Economics , Vol. 3, No. 1 (1985): pp. 13-29.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3047
2019-10-03T04:57:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3230
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3831
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3047/
Discussion of "Lumpy Price Adjustments: A Microeconometric Analysis" by Dhyne, et al. (2007)
Levy, Daniel
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
D42 - Monopoly
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
L20 - General
M21 - Business Economics
M31 - Marketing
M10 - General
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
D40 - General
Discussion of "Lumpy Price Adjustments: A Microeconometric Analysis" by Emmanuel Dhyne, Catherine Fuss, Hashem Pesaran, and Patrick Sevestre (2007); Presented at the Spring 2007 Conference of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Banque De France on "Micro-Data and Macroeconomic Implications," April 27-28, 2007, Eltville, Germany.
2007-04-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3047/1/MPRA_paper_3047.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2007): Discussion of "Lumpy Price Adjustments: A Microeconometric Analysis" by Dhyne, et al. (2007).
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3048
2019-10-05T16:15:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433830
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433831
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3230
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3048/
Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence," by Fabiani, S., et al. (2004)
Levy, Daniel
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
D42 - Monopoly
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C80 - General
C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data ; Data Access
L20 - General
M21 - Business Economics
M31 - Marketing
M10 - General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence" by S. Fabiani, M. Druant, I. Hernando, C. Kwapil, B. Landau, C. Loupias, F. Martins, T. Mathä, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl, and A. Stockman (2004); Presented at the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) Conference on "Inflation Persistence in the Euro Area," European Central Bank, Frankfurt, December 10-11, 2004.
2004-12-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3048/1/MPRA_paper_3048.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2004): Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence," by Fabiani, S., et al. (2004).
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3113
2019-09-27T22:29:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D49:4930:493030
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443230
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3113/
Prospettive per un nuovo Welfare.
Reggiani, Tommaso
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
I00 - General
D40 - General
D20 - General
"Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" (A.O. Hirschman 1970) is a theoretical concept derived from the work of Albert O. Hirschman (1970) which is focused on two essential options in organizatios and products decline, being "exit" and "voice".The basis concept is as follows: members of an organization, whether consumers , or any other kind of human grouping, have essentially two possible responses when they perceive that the producer/organization is demonstrating a decrease in quality or benefit to the consumer/member: they can EXIT (withdraw from the relationship-the standard market strategy); or, they can VOICE (attempt to repair or improve the relationship through communication of the complaint, grievance or proposal for change -the standard political strategy). In this article we apply this approach to welfare and health care markets, emphasizing the main importance of LOYALTY option (a mixed "voice-exit" strategy).
2007-03-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3113/1/MPRA_paper_3113.pdf
Reggiani, Tommaso (2007): Prospettive per un nuovo Welfare. Published in: Appunti di cultura e politica , Vol. vol. 2, No. march-april (2007) (26 April 2007): pp. 35-38.
it
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3142
2019-10-03T03:55:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3142/
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Santos-Pinto, Luís
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C72 - Noncooperative Games
The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly
the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments
have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support
for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are
modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous.
This paper generalizes Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing games
by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. I explore the theoretical
implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical
evidence. I find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental
evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not
able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous timing games.
2006-02-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3142/1/MPRA_paper_3142.pdf
Santos-Pinto, Luís (2006): Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3143
2019-10-02T23:46:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3143/
Reciprocity, inequity-aversion, and oligopolistic competition
Santos-Pinto, Luís
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper extends the Cournot and Bertrand models of strategic interaction
between firms by assuming that managers are not only profit maximizers,
but also have preferences for reciprocity or are averse to inequity. A reciprocal
manager responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions, while at the
same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions. An inequity
averse manager likes to reduce the difference between own profits and the rivals’
profits. The paper finds that if firms with reciprocal managers compete à
la Cournot, then they may be able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a constructive
reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare may emerge
under a destructive reciprocity equilibrium. If there is Cournot competition between
firms and their managers are averse to advantageous (disadvantageous)
inequity, then firms are better (worse) off than if managers only care about maximizing
profits. If firms compete à la Bertrand, then only under very restrictive
conditions will managers’ preferences for reciprocity or inequity aversion have
an impact on equilibrium outcomes.
2006-05-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3143/1/MPRA_paper_3143.pdf
Santos-Pinto, Luís (2006): Reciprocity, inequity-aversion, and oligopolistic competition.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3236
2019-09-28T04:42:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3831
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3230
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3236/
Discussion of "Inflation and Relative Price Asymmetry" by Ratfai, A.
Levy, Daniel
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce
L20 - General
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
M10 - General
D42 - Monopoly
M31 - Marketing
D40 - General
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
M21 - Business Economics
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
This is a discussion of Ratfai (2007), presented at the 2007 Macroeconomics Workshop of the Rimini Center for Economic Analysis on "The Macroeconomics of Price Setting," May 10-11, 2007, University of Bologna, Rimini, Italy.
2007-05-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3236/1/MPRA_paper_3236.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2007): Discussion of "Inflation and Relative Price Asymmetry" by Ratfai, A.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3239
2019-10-02T16:58:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3239/
Equilibrium Market and Pricing Structures in Virtual Platform Duopoly
Behringer, Stefan
D44 - Auctions
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
We investigate the equilibrium market sturcture in virtual platform
duopoly (auctions or other market forms) that are prevalent in internet
settings. We take full account of the complexity of network effects in
such markets and determine optimal pricing strategies. We invstigate the
welfare implications of such strategies, look at the impact of non-exclusive
services and at what happens in large markets.
2005-12-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3239/1/MPRA_paper_3239.pdf
Behringer, Stefan (2005): Equilibrium Market and Pricing Structures in Virtual Platform Duopoly.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3242
2019-09-29T04:30:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3242/
Spacial Predation in the UK Newspaper Industry
Behringer, Stefan
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper investigates the alleged predatory behaviour in the UK quality newspaper industry in the 1990s using a horizontal differentiation model and industry data.
2007-08-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3242/1/MPRA_paper_3242.pdf
Behringer, Stefan (2007): Spacial Predation in the UK Newspaper Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3248
2019-09-27T09:57:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3248/
Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator
Binmore, Ken
Harbord, David
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to act as monopolists in pricing call termination on their networks has recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G’s entry into European mobile markets. The European Commission’s electronic communications regime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobile termination rates if an operator is found to possess “significant market power”. This requires that the mobile operator not be constrained by the "countervailing buyer power" of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailing buyer power has been repeatedly dismissed because of their obligation to interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous. We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates and demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligation is entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3G having no market power at all in pricing call termination on their own networks.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3248/1/MPRA_paper_3248.pdf
Binmore, Ken and Harbord, David (2005): Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator. Published in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2005): pp. 449-472.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3289
2019-09-27T03:43:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3289/
Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach
Hoffmann, Magnus
Schmidt, Frederik
D42 - Monopoly
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
In the following, we examine a market of a digital consumption good with
monopolistic supply. In this market, it is the ability of the consumer to bypass
(”crack”) the copy-protection of the monopolist which induces a lower price of
the digital good, compared to an uncontested monopoly (textbook case). We
analyze the complex relationship between the cracking efforts of the consumer,
the copy-protection efforts and the pricing decision of the monopolist, and the
welfare of the economy. We find, for example, that the monopolist will deter
piracy if the (exogenous) relative effectiveness of the consumer’s bypassing
activity is low compared to the copy-protection technology. In this case welfare
is lower than the welfare in the textbook case. On the contrary, welfare
rises above the textbook case level if the relative effectiveness of cracking is
sufficiently high.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3289/1/MPRA_paper_3289.pdf
Hoffmann, Magnus and Schmidt, Frederik (2007): Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3353
2019-10-02T09:51:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3353/
Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
D41 - Perfect Competition
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
We examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs
where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity,
are free to supply less than the quantity demanded, and there is
discrete pricing. If firms are symmetric then, for a large class of
residual demand functions, there is a unique equilibrium in pure
strategies whenever, for a fixed grid size, the number of firms is
sufficiently large. Moreover, this equilibrium price is within a
grid-unit of the competitive price. The results go through to a
large extent when the firms are asymmetric, or they are symmetric
but play a two stage game and the tie-breaking rule is `weakly
manipulable'.
2007-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3353/1/MPRA_paper_3353.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2007): Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3382
2019-09-29T07:18:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3382/
Mixed Oligopoly, privatization and strategic trade policy: a note
Sepahvand, Mehrdad
Cornes, Richard
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
In debates over privatization and global competition mixed Cournot oligopoly models have
been used to show that the presence of a state-owned enterprise in the host country is always
associated with a distortionary effect that may justify privatization even if the public firm is
just as efficient as its private counterparts. This study argues that this result is valid only under
Cournot competition and Cournot competition is not a plausible modelling assumption in this
context because in this type of market the firms’ simultaneous play strategies lack credibility.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3382/1/MPRA_paper_3382.pdf
Sepahvand, Mehrdad and Cornes, Richard (2005): Mixed Oligopoly, privatization and strategic trade policy: a note.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3515
2019-10-03T18:03:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3515/
DRMs, Innovation and Creation
Geffroy, Olivier
Geffroy, Anne-Gaëlle
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D62 - Externalities
L96 - Telecommunications
K21 - Antitrust Law
DRMs are intellectual property institutions. They transpose the empirical principle of copyright, which implicitly recognizes that specific ownership rules should be attached to non scientific creation, into the digital era. The legal protection of DRMs, a private means of enforcing content excludability, participates in the "privatization" of copyright protection. This, in turn, means that a proprietary software — governed by intellectual property rights, reinforced by public law — becomes the key to the vertical relations shaped by exclusive copyright. DRMs consequently represent a major stake in the competition to capture network effects in the content distribution vertical chain
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3515/1/MPRA_paper_3515.pdf
Geffroy, Olivier and Geffroy, Anne-Gaëlle (2006): DRMs, Innovation and Creation. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 62 : pp. 34-47.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3526
2019-09-28T04:52:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3526/
Monopoly pricing of social goods
Sääskilahti, Pekka
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
We analyse the roles of social network topology and size on the monopoly pricing of network goods in a market, where consumers interact with each other and are characterised by their social relations. The size effect is the well-known network externalities phenomenon, while the topological effect has not been previously studied in this context. The topological effect works against, and dominates, the size effect in monopoly pricing by reducing the monopoly's capacity to extract consumer surplus. Under asymmetric information about consumer types, the monopoly prefers symmetric network topologies, but the social optimum is an asymmetric network.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3526/1/MPRA_paper_3526.pdf
Sääskilahti, Pekka (2007): Monopoly pricing of social goods.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3553
2019-09-27T07:22:31Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443435
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3553/
Service Bundling and the Role of Access Charge in the Broadband Internet Service Market
SHIM, Sunghee
OH, Jungsuk
D45 - Rationing ; Licensing
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
K21 - Antitrust Law
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
D42 - Monopoly
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Using the classical Hotelling model, this paper analyzes the incentive for a CATV service provider to bundle broadband internet services when entering the broadband internet services market. In addition, the effect of such service bundling by an entrant on the market incumbent with ownership over existing bottleneck facilities is analyzed. Furthermore, an access charge that maximizes social welfare is explored and determined. Two cases are considered: in the first case, the market is fully covered; and in the second case, the market is not fully covered. With full market coverage, an entrant has an incentive for service bundling if there is sufficient service differentiation. The entrant's bundling strategy reduces the incumbent's profit. In this case, the total social welfare is independent of the level of the access charge and only has an effect of redistributing the net surplus between consumers and the incumbent. With partial market coverage, the entrant has an incentive for service bundling at a low access charge. The incumbent's profit increases if the access charge is higher than the cost of access provisioning. In this case, the total social welfare is dependent on the level of access charge and the welfare maximizing access charge is less than the unit cost of providing access.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3553/1/MPRA_paper_3553.pdf
SHIM, Sunghee and OH, Jungsuk (2006): Service Bundling and the Role of Access Charge in the Broadband Internet Service Market. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 63 (September 2006): pp. 73-91.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3571
2019-09-28T23:11:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3571/
Infrastructure-Based Versus Service-Based : Competition In Telecommunications
Lundborg, Jörg
Lundborg, Martin
Lundborg, Ernst-Olav
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Unbundling of the local loop (ULL) has seen quite different "success stories" in the various countries across Europe. Although the obligation for the provision of ULL was implemented in the regulatory framework early and mostly parallel to other means of liberalisation, national implementation has been rather heterogeneous. One question of decisive importance for national regulatory authorities (NRAs) was whether to foster service-based competition in the first phase of liberalisation or to focus on infrastructurebased competition. The different NRAs chose to head down different roads. This paper analyses whether the strategy of NRAs has had any mid-term effect on the economic welfare created in the communications markets. It indicates that infrastructure-based competition has a positive effect on innovation. Moreover, infrastructure-based competition appears to be more important for business customers than for residential clients. On the other hand, service-based competition lowers call prices and appears to be more important to residential markets. The results of this study point out the importance of a balanced approach to both types of policies.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3571/1/MPRA_paper_3571.pdf
Lundborg, Jörg and Lundborg, Martin and Lundborg, Ernst-Olav (2006): Infrastructure-Based Versus Service-Based : Competition In Telecommunications. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 64 (December 2007): pp. 67-87.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3573
2019-09-29T04:29:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3573/
Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future?
Flacher, David
Jennequin, Hugues
Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé
L50 - General
L52 - Industrial Policy ; Sectoral Planning Methods
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L51 - Economics of Regulation
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
This paper addresses the question of what options are available to regulate the sector in the near future. In order to answer this question, the paper focuses on the problem of investment and innovation in an ex ante regulated sector. Relying on existing literature, we argue that ex ante regulation could represent a danger for the long-term development of the sector by delaying or cancelling investment projects, especially (but not only) concerning the construction of new infrastructures. We also argue that ex ante regulation is distorting investment itself: incremental investment is privileged as opposed to radical investment. In this context, we identify three possible options for regulation in the near future: 1) continuing ex ante regulation, 2) substituting ex post regulation for ex ante regulation and 3) implementing an industrial policy for macro-strategic reasons. After describing a few major mutations in the sector that must be taken into account by regulators and presenting the major dilemmas that the latter are facing, we propose two possible solutions inspired by foreign policy. The first solution consists of offering investors regulation holidays, with regular reviews to deem whether these holidays should be prolonged or not. The second solution consists of implementing an industrial policy that could take the form of a contract negotiated between the regulator and operators. This would guarantee the absence of ex ante regulation if the conditions of the contract (in terms of regional planning, price, quality of service, types of investment…) are met.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3573/1/MPRA_paper_3573.pdf
Flacher, David and Jennequin, Hugues and Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé (2006): Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 64 (December 2006): pp. 105-123.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3622
2019-09-26T15:02:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3622/
Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator
Binmore, Ken
Harbord, David
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
The conventional wisdom that mobile operators are able to act as monopolists in pricing call termination on their networks has recently been challenged by Hutchison 3G’s entry into European mobile markets. The European Commission’s electronic communications regime allows national regulatory authorities to regulate mobile termination rates if an operator is found to possess “significant market power”. This requires that the mobile operator not be constrained by the "countervailing buyer power" of incumbents. The claim that incumbent operators possess countervailing buyer power has been repeatedly dismissed because of their obligation to interconnect with other networks. This conclusion is erroneous. We analyse bargaining over fixed-to-mobile termination rates and demonstrate that the existence of an interconnectivity obligation is entirely consistent with new entrants such as Hutchison 3G having no market power at all in pricing call termination on their own networks.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3622/1/MPRA_paper_3622.pdf
Binmore, Ken and Harbord, David (2005): Bargaining Over Fixed-to-Mobile Termination Rates in the Shadow of the Regulator. Published in: Journal of Competition Law and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2005): pp. 449-472.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3702
2019-09-27T07:11:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3702/
Market distortions and public enterprise strategies in an international mixed oligopoly
Cornes, Richard
Sepahvand, Mehrdad
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies ; Fragmentation
This study investigates the possible sources of distortions in an international mixed oligopoly. We extend the existing linear/quadratic model to a general framework and show that a public enterprise may either serve as a regulatory device or may itself create an additional level of distortion. Which of these is the case depends critically on the timing of firms output decisions. We then extend the basic quantity setting game to incorporate a preplay stage at which firms can choose the timing of action, rather than moving in an exogenously imposed sequence, in order to determine endogenously the equilibrium sequence of moves. We argue that the distortions associated with a public enterprise and the welfare gain of privatization found in earlier studies can be attributed to an arbitrary and unjustified modeling assumption concerning the order of play, rather than to public ownership.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3702/1/MPRA_paper_3702.pdf
Cornes, Richard and Sepahvand, Mehrdad (2005): Market distortions and public enterprise strategies in an international mixed oligopoly.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4142
2019-09-29T05:56:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513330
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30:4C3030
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4142/
Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne
Jurdziak, Leszek
Q30 - General
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L10 - General
Q4 - Energy
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C71 - Cooperative Games
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L00 - General
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
The newest findings in analysis of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution not only in quantity of lignite (the size and shape of the ultimate pit) but also in its price has been depicted. It has been proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a two stage, cooperative, non-zero sum two-person game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximizing the joint profit of BM would be chosen and in the second during bargaining the split of profit would be decided together with the transfer price of lignite. The differences of strategic and tactical negotiations have been depicted and the needs of frequent adjustments to changing conditions have been stressed. It has been proposed to treat this adjustment as a real option to change scale of activity. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM and conditions of good solution have been discussed.
2006-01-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4142/1/MPRA_paper_4142.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. Vol. X, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 73-80.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4163
2019-10-03T14:29:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/
Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych
Jurdziak, Leszek
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
Q4 - Energy
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
C02 - Mathematical Methods
L10 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L0 - General
C71 - Cooperative Games
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation have been presented. The novel approach is the creation of lignite price contours on the mine and power plant profit distribution chart. It shows the inherent contradiction between individual and group rationality in bilateral monopoly (BM) and the reduction of incentive to opportunism together with the increase of lignite price. The opportunism due to asymmetry of information and possession of dominant strategy of mine (optimization of ultimate pit) creates a real threat to cooperation between both sides of BM. The full confidence in joint profit maximization and full control of accepted profit sharing without increase of transactional costs is possible only in vertically integrated energy producer offering equal access to information for both sides. As it was shown in [4] such solution does not create any threat for energy market efficiency – on the contrary it can allow on better level of deposit recovery through excavation of the greater ultimate pit. The interesting proposal is the treatment of pit optimization as a real option of mine size change. Presented methods, tools and solutions should help both firms in real negotiation in finding their strategic positions and avoiding potential threats. But eventually from negotiating sides it depends if they will choose the cooperation or competition, rational arguments or rational threats, maximization of joint profits or only their own.
2006-01-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/1/MPRA_paper_4163.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. XLIX, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 81-88.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4296
2019-09-26T19:35:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443439
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D46:4633:463337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4296/
Market characteristics and chaos dynamics in stock markets: an international comparison
Mattarocci, Gianluca
D49 - Other
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
F37 - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
The chaos theory assumes that the returns dynamics are not normally distributed and more complex approaches have to be used to study these time series. In fact, the Fractal Market Hypothesis assumes that the returns dynamics are not independent of the investors’ attitudes and represent the result of the interaction of traders who, frequently, adopt different investment styles.
The studies proposed in literature try to identify the best approach to define the fractal dimension using, in particular, data of highly developed financial markets where a more complete set of information is available and the price determination mechanism is more efficient.
A fault found with these approaches is that the results do not allow making out if there is a relationship between fractal dimension and market characteristics and, besides, it is hard to understand which aspects are more relevant in the definition of the fractal market dimension. In fact, previous studies analysed market liquidity for a limited number of countries and no other aspects related to market transactions have been considered.
Using a large sample of world stock indexes, I try to identify the main market characteristics that influence returns dynamics. This study, carried out having recourse to the Rescaled Range Analysis (R/S) approach, shows that markets characteristic, like liquidity, type of admissible orders and so on, influence the R/S capability to study returns dynamics.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4296/1/MPRA_paper_4296.pdf
Mattarocci, Gianluca (2006): Market characteristics and chaos dynamics in stock markets: an international comparison.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4344
2019-09-30T05:16:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4344/
An Analysis on Market Structure of Broadcast Service – Issues on Optimal Level of Channel Variety –
Shishikura, Manabu
Kasuga, Norihiro
D40 - General
L50 - General
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
D60 - General
Unlike general goods, broadcasting service is financed not only by consumer’s direct
payment but also by advertisement revenue. In other words, broadcasting service is
supported by direct and indirect financial sources. However, rate of dependence on those
financial sources are different by each media type; Terrestrial broadcasting carrier
primarily depends on advertisement revenue while cable TV carrier and satellite carrier,
which is called as pay-TV primarily depend on payment from audience in addition to
small amount of advertisement revenue.
In this paper, we examine broadcast market, where carriers with different financial
sources compete in the market, and analyze market performance as a result of
competition. Especially, we focus on the effect of competition in the mixed market which
includes advertising supported media and subscription fee supported media.
We made economic model and analyze the difference on several types of market. Our
principle results of Case III, the market that an advertisement supported carrier and a
subscription supported carrier compete in the market, are as follows;.
(1) The greater the substitutability is, the number of channels supplied by advertisement
supported media increases while those supplied by subscription fee supported carrier
decreases.
(2) Total number of channels supplied by advertisement supported carrier and
subscription fee supported carrier is equal to the number of channels supplied by an
advertisement supported carrier (Case II).
(3) Total TV watching time of Case III is equal to Case II.
(4) Because the amount of payment by consumer increases compared to Case II, consumer
surplus decreases.
General economic model predicts that the increase of the number of entrants brings the
increase of consumer surplus. However, in our model, we show here that the increase of
the number of entrants does not necessarily bring the increase of consumer surplus.
2007-08-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4344/1/MPRA_paper_4344.pdf
Shishikura, Manabu and Kasuga, Norihiro (2007): An Analysis on Market Structure of Broadcast Service – Issues on Optimal Level of Channel Variety –.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4455
2019-09-27T21:50:58Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443130
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4455/
The effect of relative thinking on firm strategy and market outcomes: A location differentiation model with endogenous transportation costs
Azar, Ofer H.
D10 - General
M31 - Marketing
L10 - General
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Consumers often have to decide whether to go to a remote store for a lower price. Only the absolute price difference between the stores should be relevant in this case, but several experiments showed that people exhibit "relative thinking": they are affected also by the relative savings (relative to the good's price). This article analyzes the effects of this bias on firm strategy and market outcomes using a two-period game-theoretic model of location differentiation. Relative thinking causes consumers to make less effort to save a constant amount when they buy more expensive goods. In the location differentiation context this behavior can be modeled by consumers who behave as if their transportation costs are an increasing function of the good's price. This gives firms an additional incentive to raise prices, in order to increase the perceived transportation costs of consumers, which consequently softens competition and allows higher profits. Therefore, the response of firms to relative thinking raises prices and profits and reduces consumer surplus, in both periods. Total welfare is unchanged in the first period, and in the second period it is either unchanged or reduced, depending on whether the objective or subjective transportation costs are used to compute welfare. The main results of the model (firms' response to relative thinking increases prices and reduces consumer surplus) are likely to hold also in the context of search. The article also explains why "relative thinking" is a more appropriate term than "mental accounting" (which was often used before) to describe this behavior, and discusses why people might exhibit relative thinking.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4455/1/MPRA_paper_4455.pdf
Azar, Ofer H. (2007): The effect of relative thinking on firm strategy and market outcomes: A location differentiation model with endogenous transportation costs. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Psychology
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4484
2019-09-26T12:48:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4484/
Behavioral industrial organization, firm strategy, and consumer economics
Azar, Ofer H.
D40 - General
L10 - General
M20 - General
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
M30 - General
D10 - General
The field of behavioral economics is one of the fastest-growing fields in economics in recent years. Not long ago this was a small field, but over the last decade or so, the field gained more recognition, and today it seems clear that psychological motivations and biases affect economic behavior in many important ways. Insights from psychology were incorporated in several areas of economics. This paper offers a short review of the application of behavioral economics to industrial organization, which can be denoted “behavioral industrial organization,” and on the relationship between behavioral industrial organization, firm strategy, and consumer economics.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4484/1/MPRA_paper_4484.pdf
Azar, Ofer H. (2006): Behavioral industrial organization, firm strategy, and consumer economics.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4575
2019-09-30T16:37:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4575/
Can Price Discrimination be Bad for Firms and Good for All Consumers? A Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Market Price Constraints with Entry and Product Differentiation
Azar, Ofer H.
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L50 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
The article examines a differentiated-products duopoly model where the firms make entry decisions to two markets and then choose prices. The effects of product differentiation and entry costs are analyzed in two games: with and without price discrimination between the markets. Allowing price discrimination encourages more entry and tends to reduce prices and profits and to increase consumer welfare in both markets. The model suggests that firms might be better off if they agree not to price discriminate between different markets. It also suggests that when the market is not a natural monopoly, regulators should consider the effects of universal service requirements on entry before adopting them, because entry might be discouraged by such requirements, leading to less competitive markets.
2002
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4575/1/MPRA_paper_4575.pdf
Azar, Ofer H. (2002): Can Price Discrimination be Bad for Firms and Good for All Consumers? A Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Market Price Constraints with Entry and Product Differentiation. Published in: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 1, No. 3
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4581
2019-09-29T06:07:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3239
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4581/
The Strength of Weak Cooperation:an Attempt to Understand the Meaning of Web 2.0
Cardon, Dominique
Cardon, Christophe
D62 - Externalities
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L96 - Telecommunications
K29 - Other
This paper examines some continuities and ruptures in the use of Web 2.0 such as blogs, social media, user-generated content services etc. vis-à-vis earlier web services. We hypothesize that one of the sociological characteristics of Web 2.0 services is that making personal production public creates a new articulation between individualism and solidarity, which reveals the strength of weak cooperation. Web 2.0 services allow individual contributors to experience cooperation ex post. The strength of the weak cooperation arises from the fact that it is not necessary for individuals to have an ex ante cooperative action plan or altruistic intention. They discover cooperative opportunities only by making public their individual production. The paper illustrates this phenomenon by analysing the uses of different services and by looking at the new process of innovation that appears through Barcamp and Coworking spaces.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4581/1/MPRA_paper_4581.pdf
Cardon, Dominique and Cardon, Christophe (2007): The Strength of Weak Cooperation:an Attempt to Understand the Meaning of Web 2.0. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 51-65.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4858
2019-09-29T07:48:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4858/
Mobile Call Termination
Armstrong, Mark
Wright, Julian
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L96 - Telecommunications
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Motivated by recent UK experience, we study the problem of mobile call termination. This is an intriguing policy story, in which regulation has been imposed on what appears to be a competitive industry. We introduce a framework which integrates two existing literatures: one analyzing fixed-to-mobile call termination (where the predicted market failure involves the termination charge being set at the monopoly level), and one analyzing mobile-to-mobile network interconnection (where the predicted termination charge is below the efficient level). Our unified framework allows us to consider the impact of wholesale arbitrage and demand-side substitution. With these features, we find the unregulated termination charge lies between the efficient and the monopoly benchmarks. There remains a rationale for regulation, albeit reduced relative to the earlier literature.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4858/1/MPRA_paper_4858.pdf
Armstrong, Mark and Wright, Julian (2007): Mobile Call Termination.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4899
2019-09-26T08:34:46Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4899/
TÜRKİYE’DE UN SANAYİ SEKTÖRÜNÜN ANALİZİ
Aktas, Erkan
Yurdakul, Oğuz
D40 - General
In this research, firstly, the production of wheat, wheat flour, and, the situation of flour mill industry in the world and Turkey, were investigatited. The support policies which were applied to wheat in Turkey, the capacity for flour mill industry, production, import, export affair were discussed and the problem were determined.
The producer of flour mill in Turkey were analysed. Investigation data was collected by questionnaire from 49 active firms where loceted different regions in Turkey. The capasities of the firms, technological levels, the production amount, the supply of row material, and marketing were examined and problems and solution were discussed. Industrial organisation model (Structure, Conduct and Performans) were used for analysis these data.
Determined problems are inactive capacity, low quality wheat and unfair competition. As a result, which can find solutions to their problems and keep their capital and technological power are claim a stable share in the field, otherwise they lost their shares in the market.
2001
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4899/1/MPRA_paper_4899.pdf
Aktas, Erkan and Yurdakul, Oğuz (2001): TÜRKİYE’DE UN SANAYİ SEKTÖRÜNÜN ANALİZİ. Published in: University of Cukurova, Journal of Social Sciences. , Vol. 8, No. No:8. (2001)
tr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4916
2019-09-27T10:40:45Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443538
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4916/
Market dynamics and agents behaviors: a computational approach
Derveeuw, Julien
D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
D40 - General
D53 - Financial Markets
We explore market dynamics generated by the Santa-Fe Artificial Stock Market
model. It allows to study how agents adapt themselves to a market dynamic without knowing
its generation process. It was shown by Arthur and LeBaron, with the help of computer experiments, that agents in bounded rationality can make a rational global behavior emerge in this context. In the original model, agents do not ground their decision on an economic logic. Hence, we modify indicators used by agents to watch the market to give them more economic rationality. This leads us to divide agents in two groups: fundamentalists agents, who watch the market with classic economic indicators and speculator agents, who watch the market with technical indicators. This split allows us to study the influence of individual agents behaviors on global price dynamics. In this article, we show with the help of computational simulations that these two types of agents can generate classical market dynamics as well as perturbed ones (bubbles and kraches).
2005-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4916/1/MPRA_paper_4916.pdf
Derveeuw, Julien (2005): Market dynamics and agents behaviors: a computational approach. Published in: (2005)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4918
2019-10-10T13:18:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4918/
Testing double auction as a component within a generic market model architecture
Derveeuw, Julien
Beaufils, Bruno
Mathieu, Philippe
Brandouy, Olivier
D40 - General
Since the first multi-agents based market simulations in the nineties, many different
artificial stock market models have been developped. There are mainly used to reproduce
and understand real markets statistical properties such as fat tails, volatility clustering and positive auto-correlation of absolute returns. Though they share common goals, these market models are most of the time different one from another: some are based on equations, others on complex microstructures, some are synchronous, others are asynchronous. It is hence hard to understand which characteristic of the market model used is at the origin of observed statistical properties. To investigate this question, we propose a generic model of artificial markets architecture which allows to freely compose modules coming from existing market models. To illustrate this formalism, we implement these components to propose a model of an asynchronous double auction based on an order-book and show that many stylized facts of real stock markets are reproduced with our model.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4918/1/MPRA_paper_4918.pdf
Derveeuw, Julien and Beaufils, Bruno and Mathieu, Philippe and Brandouy, Olivier (2007): Testing double auction as a component within a generic market model architecture. Published in: (September 2007)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5106
2019-09-28T06:33:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5106/
Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods
Sääskilahti, Pekka
D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
We analyse how consumer heterogeneity affects buying behaviour and the monopoly pricing of a network good and its usage. Under perfect information, sufficiently high heterogeneity yields a unique equilibrium, and the unit price is increasing in heterogeneity. Under incomplete information, we have a global game. The unit price is independent of heterogeneity, and it tends to be higher than the perfect information price, because the monopoly biases its tariff structure to incorporate the uncertainty over usage revenues. Under incomplete information, profits are decreasing in uncertainty. Consumer surplus increases in uncertainty, only if the level of uncertainty is high initially.
2006-03-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5106/1/MPRA_paper_5106.pdf
Sääskilahti, Pekka (2006): Buying Decision Coordination and Monopoly Pricing of Network Goods.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5236
2019-09-30T18:30:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483537
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5236/
The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions
De Silva, Dakshina G.
Kosmopoulou, Georgia
Lamarche, Carlos
D44 - Auctions
H57 - Procurement
In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses a¤ecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction projects. Using newly developed quantile regression approaches, this paper examines the impact of the policy change on aggressive entrants. First, we find that the information release eliminates the bidding differential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries. Second, we argue that the policy change a¤ects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market. We find that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37 percent longer,
while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68 percent. The policy has the potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition.
2007-06-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5236/1/MPRA_paper_5236.pdf
De Silva, Dakshina G. and Kosmopoulou, Georgia and Lamarche, Carlos (2007): The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5243
2019-09-26T15:54:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3431
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5243/
R&D, Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation : A Comment
Bianco, Dominique
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
This paper shows that the results of Bucci (2003) depend criti-
cally on the assumption that there are no difference between the intermediate
goods share in final output, the returns of specialization and the degree of
market power of monopolistic competitors. In this paper, we disentangle the
market power parameter from the intermediate goods share in final output
and the returns to specialization. The main result of this paper is that the
competition has no effect on growth contrary to Bucci (2003). This result is
explained by the fact that economic growth rate depends on the parameters
describing preference and the human capital accumulation technology but is
completely independent of competition and R&D activity.
2007-10-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5243/1/MPRA_paper_5243.pdf
Bianco, Dominique (2007): R&D, Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation : A Comment.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5389
2019-10-01T21:38:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3430
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3330
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5389/
An endogenous growth model with quality ladders and consumers’ heterogeneity
Marasco, Antonio
O40 - General
O30 - General
D40 - General
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with quality ladders where consumers
heterogeneity is assumed and is modelled through non homothetic preferences. We show that in such a model, unlike mainstream quality ladders models, the steady state equilibrium is
characterised by a duopoly were the state of the art technology and the one immediately below it are both able to survive and thrive, under given conditions for the income distribution. In the words of Schumpeter, this model delivers only partial creative destruction. Furthermore, we show that under duopoly, an increase in the degree of income inequality, raises the intensity of research activities and the growth rate of the economy.
2002-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5389/1/MPRA_paper_5389.pdf
Marasco, Antonio (2002): An endogenous growth model with quality ladders and consumers’ heterogeneity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5483
2019-10-02T06:32:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D47:4730:473030
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5483/
The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market in Turkey: The New Empirical Evidence
Aysan, Ahmet Faruk
Müslim, Nusret Ahmet
D41 - Perfect Competition
G00 - General
D40 - General
The high credit card interest rates in Turkey attracted considerable attention in recent years to regulate the Turkish credit card industry. Before any regulation decision taken, there needs to be better conceptualization and analysis of the Turkish credit card market. First, we highlight the most striking aspects of the Turkish credit card market. After exposing the problem, we benefit from the existing theoretical and empirical studies on the structure of competition in the credit card industry. Potential reasons for the lack of competitions are denoted. Having the existing studies in mind, we finally, construct an empirical model to estimate the market structure in the Turkish credit card industry. Newly disseminated data on the Turkish credit card industry is first introduced in this paper. Our empirical results are based on the panel data set of 22 banks from the second quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2005. In addition to random and fixed effects regressions, instrumental variable fixed effect regressions are run on this sample. Our results robustly conclude that the credit cards interest rates in Turkey are economically insensitive to the changes in the cost of fund. This result shows lack of strong competition Turkish credit card market.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5483/1/MPRA_paper_5483.pdf
Aysan, Ahmet Faruk and Müslim, Nusret Ahmet (2006): The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market in Turkey: The New Empirical Evidence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5624
2019-10-01T05:10:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453332
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D42:4231:423135
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D42:4235:423532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5624/
Inflation as restructuring. A theoretical and empirical account of the U.S. experience
Nitzan, Jonathan
P16 - Political Economy
B41 - Economic Methodology
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
P12 - Capitalist Enterprises
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
E32 - Business Fluctuations ; Cycles
O51 - U.S. ; Canada
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
B15 - Historical ; Institutional ; Evolutionary
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary
This work is a PhD dissertation, written at the Department of Economics, McGill University. The thesis offers a new framework for inflation as a process of restructuring. Contrary to existing theories of inflation, which tend to take structure and institutions as given for the purpose of analysis, we argue that inflation could be understood only in terms of ongoing structural and institutional change. In the modern context of large-scale business enterprise, inflationary restructuring arises as an integral part of capital accumulation. On the aggregate level, inflation appears as stagflation, with the expansion of pecuniary values in the 'business' sphere depending on the strategic limitation of productive activity in the 'industrial' realm. This stagflationary interaction between 'business' and 'industry' is, in turn, linked (on the disaggregate level) to the dynamic formation and reformation of 'distributional coalitions' and the process of aggregate concentration. An empirical analysis of the U.S. experience between the early 1950s and the late 1980s reveals two regimes of inflationary restructuring: the first, which lasted until 1970, involved rapid increases in aggregate concentration with relatively modest stagflation, whereas the second, post-1970 regime consisted of stable (or even declining) concentration amidst severe stagflation.
1992-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5624/1/MPRA_paper_5624.pdf
Nitzan, Jonathan (1992): Inflation as restructuring. A theoretical and empirical account of the U.S. experience.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5663
2019-09-29T04:44:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D43:4330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34
7375626A656374733D47:4730:473030
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5663/
Zelig and the Art of Measuring Excess Profit
magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
C0 - General
M4 - Accounting and Auditing
G00 - General
G30 - General
D46 - Value Theory
B40 - General
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
M2 - Business Economics
This paper tells the story of a student of economics and finance who meets a couple of alleged psychopaths, suffering from the ‘syndrome of Zelig’, so that they think of themselves to be experts of economic and financial issues. While speaking, they come across the concept of excess profit. The student tells them that the formal way to translate excess profit is to apply Stewart’s (1991) EVA model and shows that this model is equivalent to Peccati’s (1987, 1991, 1992) decomposition model of a project’s Net Present (Final) Value. The ‘Zeligs’ listen to him carefully, then try to apply themselves the EVA model: Unfortunately, both She-Zelig and He-Zelig seem to feel uneasy with basic mathematics, so they make some mistakes. Consequently, each of them miscalculates the excess profit. Strangely enough, they make different mistakes but both get to the (correct) Net Final Value of the project and, in addition, their excess profits do coincide. Further, the (biased) models presented by the Zeligs, though different from the EVA model, seem to bear strong relations to the latter. The student is rather surprised.
I give my version of this event, arguing that the Zeligs are offering us a rational way of measuring excess profit, alternative to the standard one (EVA) but equally valuable. As I see it, they are only adopting a different cognitive interpretation of the concept of excess profit, which is based on a counterfactual conditional that differs from Stewart’s and Peccati’s.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5663/1/MPRA_paper_5663.pdf
magni, Carlo Alberto (2006): Zelig and the Art of Measuring Excess Profit. Published in: Frontiers in Finance and Economics , Vol. 1, No. 3 (June 2006): pp. 103-129.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5673
2019-09-26T20:00:08Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473130
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5673/
Banking competition and financial fragility: Evidence from panel-data
Ruiz-Porras, Antonio
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
D40 - General
G10 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
We study how banking competition may affect the stability of banking systems. We develop our study by expanding the failure-determinant methodology to include panel-data techniques and by controlling the effects of financial structure and development. We use indicators for 47 countries between 1990 and 1997. The main findings show that banking concentration and foreign ownership are associated to bank-based financial systems and financial underdevelopment. They also show that banking credit and bank-based financial systems enhance banking fragility. Banking concentration is not a significant determinant. Furthermore our findings suggest that financial structure and, maybe, the property regime matter to assess fragility.
2007-10-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5673/1/MPRA_paper_5673.pdf
Ruiz-Porras, Antonio (2007): Banking competition and financial fragility: Evidence from panel-data. Forthcoming in: Estudios Economicos
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5695
2019-10-01T17:47:35Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D47:4733
7375626A656374733D47:4730:473030
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5695/
Opportunity cost, excess profit, and counterfactual conditionals
Magni, Carlo Alberto
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
G00 - General
M21 - Business Economics
Counterfactual conditionals are cognitive tools that we incessantly use during our lives for judgments, evaluations, decisions. Counterfactuals are used for defining concepts as well; an instance of this is attested by the notions of opportunity cost and excess profit, two all-pervasive notions of economics: They are defined by undoing a given scenario and constructing a suitable
counterfactual milieu. Focussing on the standard paradigm and Magni’s (2000, 2005, 2006) proposal this paper shows that the formal translation of the counterfactual state is not univocal and that Magni’s model retains formal properties of symmetry, additive coherence, homeomorphism,
which correspond to properties of frame-independence, time invariance, completeness. Two introductory studies are also presented to illustrate how people cope with these counterfactuals and ascertain whether either model is seen as more “natural”. A brief discussion of the results obtained is also provided.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5695/1/MPRA_paper_5695.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2003): Opportunity cost, excess profit, and counterfactual conditionals. Forthcoming in: Frontiers in Finance and Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5746
2019-09-28T18:59:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5746/
Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.
Cotton, Christopher
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D44 - Auctions
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about his private valuation over time (as he has more time to consider using the item), and (2) there is a positive probability he is unable to return to the auction to submit a bid in a later period.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5746/1/MPRA_paper_5746.pdf
Cotton, Christopher (2007): Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5747
2019-09-30T04:32:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5747/
Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access
Cotton, Christopher
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D44 - Auctions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
There is substantial evidence that political contributions buy access to politicians. This paper incorporates access into a model of informational lobbying, then uses the access framework to analyze the impact of contribution limits on policy outcomes and representative citizen welfare. In the competition for access model, interest groups provide contributions to a politician and those that provide the highest contributions win access. A group with access can present verifiable evidence in favor of its preferred policy. Because equilibrium contributions are chosen endogenously, the politician learns about the evidence quality of all interest groups, even when he grants access to only some of the groups. A contribution limit reduces the amount of information available to the politician and tends to result in worse policy. Under a variety of assumptions, a limit has an unambiguously negative impact on representative citizen welfare. However, when the politician can choose whether to sell access or sell policy favors, a contribution limit can improve citizen welfare by making it more likely that the politician sells access.
2007-10-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5747/1/MPRA_paper_5747.pdf
Cotton, Christopher (2007): Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5899
2019-09-27T11:08:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5899/
Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions
Marmer, Vadim
Shneyerov, Artyom
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
D44 - Auctions
We propose a quantile-based nonparametric approach to inference on the probability density function (PDF) of the private values in first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values. Our method of inference is based on a fully nonparametric kernel-based estimator of the quantiles and PDF of observable bids. Our estimator attains the optimal rate of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), and is also asymptotically normal with the appropriate choice of the bandwidth. As an application, we consider the problem of inference on the optimal reserve price.
2006-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5899/2/MPRA_paper_5899.pdf
Marmer, Vadim and Shneyerov, Artyom (2006): Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5942
2019-09-28T07:15:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D47:4733
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463534
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3132
7375626A656374733D59:5933
7375626A656374733D46:4635
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423431
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433830
7375626A656374733D4E:4E34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5942/
The scientist and the church
Nitzan, Jonathan
Bichler, Shimshon
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
F54 - Colonialism ; Imperialism ; Postcolonialism
P16 - Political Economy
Q4 - Energy
D46 - Value Theory
Z12 - Religion
Y3 - Book Reviews (unclassified)
F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
B41 - Economic Methodology
C80 - General
N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
The April 21, 2005 issue of the LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS carried a lead article titled ‘Blood for Oil?’ The paper is attributed to a group of writers and activists – Iain Boal, T.J. Clark, Joseph Matthews and Michael Watts – who identify themselves by the collective name ‘Retort.’ In their article, the authors advance a supposedly new explanation for the wars in the Middle East.
Much of their explanation – including both theory and fact – is plagiarized. It is cut and pasted, almost ‘as is,’ from our own work. The primary source is ‘The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition,’ a 71 page chapter in our book THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISRAEL (Pluto 2002). The authors also seem inspired, incognito, by our more recent papers, including ‘It’s All About Oil’ (2003), ‘Clash of Civilization or Capital Accumulation?’ (2004), ‘Beyond Neoliberalism’ (2004) and ‘Dominant Capital and the New Wars’ (2004).
In their paper, the Retort group credits us for having coined the term ‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’ – but dismiss our ‘precise calibration of the oil/war nexus’ as ‘perfunctory.’ This dismissal does not prevent them from freely appropriating, wholesale fashion, our concepts, ideas and theories – including, among others, the ‘era of free flow,’ the ‘era of limited flow,’ ‘energy conflicts,’ the ‘commercialization of arms exports,’ the ‘politicization of oil’ and the critique of the ‘scarcity thesis.’ Nowhere in their article do the authors mention the source of these concepts, ideas and theories; occasionally, they even introduce them with the prefix ‘Our view is. . . .’ Their treatment of facts is not very different. They freely use (sometimes without understanding) research methods, statistics and data that took us years to conceive, estimate and measure – again, never mentioning the source.
These concepts, theories and facts are far from trivial. Until recently, they were greeted with strategic silence, from both right and left. Their publication has been repeatedly denied and censored by mainstream as well as progressive journals (including, it must be said, by the LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, that turned down our paper on the subject). They cannot be found anywhere else in the literature, conservative or radical. To treat them as ‘common knowledge’ is deceitful. To cut and paste them without due attribution is blatant plagiarism. The first part of our paper illustrates this process of ‘intellectual accumulation-by-dispossession’ with selected examples.
The issue, though, goes well beyond personal vanity and self-aggrandizement. At the core, we are dealing here with the clash of science and church, with the constant attempt of organized faith – whether religious or academic – to disable, block and, if necessary, appropriate creativity and novelty. Creativity and novelty are dangerous. They defy dogma and undermine the conventional creed; they challenge the dominant ideology and threaten those in power; occasionally, they cause the entire edifice of power to crumble.
For these reasons, the latent purpose of intellectual accumulation-by-dispossession – like the accumulation of private property – is primarily negative. The word ‘private’ comes from the Latin ‘privatus,’ meaning ‘restricted,’ and from ‘privare,’ which means ‘to deprive.’ And, indeed, the most important feature of private ownership is not to enable those who own, but to disable those who do not. It is only through the threat of prevention – or ‘strategic sabotage’ as Thorsein Veblen called it – that accumulation can take place. It is only by restricting the free creativity of society that society itself can be controlled. The second section of the paper explains how the appropriators of ‘Blood for Oil?’ fit this pattern.
The final section of the paper is an epilogue. It describes our failed attempts to get this paper published with The LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS; Retort’s efforts to mislead us; and some additional insight from their AFFLICTED POWERS, a 2005 Verso book that contains the same plagiarism and more. The epilogue concludes with a few observations on the nature of academic dialectics.
2005-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5942/1/MPRA_paper_5942.pdf
Nitzan, Jonathan and Bichler, Shimshon (2005): The scientist and the church.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5944
2019-09-28T18:23:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5944/
Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach
Hoffmann, Magnus
Schmidt, Frederik
D42 - Monopoly
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
In the following, we examine a market of a digital consumption good with
monopolistic supply. In this market, it is the ability of the consumer to bypass
(”crack”) the copy-protection of the monopolist which induces a lower price of
the digital good, compared to an uncontested monopoly (textbook case). We
analyze the complex relationship between the cracking efforts of the consumer,
the copy-protection efforts and the pricing decision of the monopolist, and the
welfare of the economy. We find, for example, that the monopolist will deter
piracy if the (exogenous) relative effectiveness of the consumer’s bypassing
activity is low compared to the copy-protection technology. In this case welfare
is lower than the welfare in the textbook case. On the contrary, welfare
rises above the textbook case level if the relative effectiveness of cracking is
sufficiently high.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5944/3/MPRA_paper_5944.pdf
Hoffmann, Magnus and Schmidt, Frederik (2007): Piracy of Digital Products: A Contest Theoretical Approach.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5989
2019-09-26T10:44:16Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5989/
Labor as a source of value and capital formation:Ibn Khaldun, Ricardo and Marx – A Comparison
Hasan, Zubair
D46 - Value Theory
Exclusive writings on the contribution of Ibn Khaldun to economics in the English language have not been many, the references to his work also remain scanty and far between. Even in what little is available mostly authors talk about his views on professions, markets and the cloud he castes on merchants.
The present paper avoids treading the familiar tracks. It sees close similarities between the views of Ibn Khaldun (1332 – 1406), David Ricardo (1772 – 1823) and Karl Marx (1818 -I823) in regarding labour as the measure of value and source of capital formation in the course of economics maturing to an academic discipline. The three intellectuals agree, directly or indirectly, that labour creates economic surplus which it does not receive. Even so, the policy implications each derives from this conclusion are interestingly much different.
Ibn Khaldun did not -- indeed imbued with Islamic faith he could not – think of workers’ predicament becoming a source of social turmoil. Ricardo implicitly saw labour exploitation in a free enterprise system of organizing production but himself being a great capitalist he could not swallow the pill and once tended to regard cost of production – wages plus profit – as the measure of value. Marx regarded exploitation of labour as the intrinsic vice of capitalism that revolution alone could obliterate.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5989/1/MPRA_paper_5989.pdf
Hasan, Zubair (2007): Labor as a source of value and capital formation:Ibn Khaldun, Ricardo and Marx – A Comparison. Published in: JKAU: Islamic Economics , Vol. 20, No. 2 (2007): pp. 39-50.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6053
2019-09-26T21:50:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D42:4231:423132
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D42:4231:423133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6053/
Average Cost and Marginal Cost Pricing in Marshall: Textual Analysis and Interpretation
zamparelli, luca
D46 - Value Theory
B12 - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
D41 - Perfect Competition
B13 - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Stockholm School)
This paper proposes a textual analysis of Marshall’s theory of firm pricing behavior under competitive conditions. It considers to what extent average cost and marginal cost pricing rules characterize Marshall’s competitive partial equilibrium, and it shows that the two rules differ for origins and can be reconciled only with great difficulty in a general equilibrium framework.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6053/1/MPRA_paper_6053.pdf
zamparelli, luca (2007): Average Cost and Marginal Cost Pricing in Marshall: Textual Analysis and Interpretation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6098
2019-10-04T16:40:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438
7375626A656374733D44:4434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6098/
Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions
Che, Yeon-Koo
Kim, Jinwoo
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
We study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The second-best auction --- i.e., the optimal auction in a collusion-free environment --- can be made collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are multiple bidding cartels, or the second-best outcome involves a nontrivial probability of the object not being sold. In case the second-best outcome is not weak collusion-proof implementable, we characterize an optimal collusion-proof auction. This auction involves nontrivial
exclusion of collusive bidders --- i.e., the object is not sold to any collusive bidder with positive probability.
2007-09-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6098/1/MPRA_paper_6098.pdf
Che, Yeon-Koo and Kim, Jinwoo (2007): Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions.
en
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