2024-03-29T12:26:41Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:70
2019-10-01T19:23:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70/
Competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling
Armstrong, Mark
Vickers, John
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
We examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit, consumer surplus and welfare in a duopoly. When consumers buy all their products from one firm (the one-stop shopping model), nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare, but often lower consumer surplus, than linear pricing. By contrast, in a unit-demand model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from another firm, bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost consumer surplus. In a more general model where consumers may buy from more than one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product, nonlinear pricing has ambiguous effects. Compared with linear pricing, nonlinear pricing tends to raise profit but harm consumer surplus when: (i) demand is elastic, (ii) there is substantial product differentiation, (iii) there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand, (iv) consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm, and (v) a consumer's brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand preference for another product. Nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains when (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) hold, but (iii) does not.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70/1/MPRA_paper_70.pdf
Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2006): Competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:209
2019-09-26T19:50:49Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/209/
Accounting for inequality in the EU: Income disparities between and within member states and overall income inequality
Papatheodorou, Christos
Pavlopoulos, Dimitris
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D3 - Distribution
In fighting inequality and poverty in the EU emphasis has been placed in reducing
differences between countries and/or regions regarding certain macroeconomic
indicators, such as the GDP per capita. However, from a policy perspective it is
important to know the extent to which overall inequality in the EU is attributed to
inequality between the individual countries and the extent to which it is attributed to
inequality within them. In addition, it is important to know the extent to which income
disparities in each individual member state contribute to overall EU inequality.
Following certain assumptions, hypotheses and alternative scenarios, this paper
investigates the above questions, employing a decomposition analysis of inequality by
population subgroup and utilizing data and information provided by the CHER
programme. A number of alternative inequality indices were used to capture the
different aspects of inequality and test the robustness of the estimates. The suggested
typologies of welfare state regimes were also examined to explain the differences in
income inequality between countries and their contribution to overall EU inequality.
Policy analysts and policy makers could benefit greatly from such information in
evaluating, designing and implementing interventions to deal with inequality and
poverty in the EU.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/209/1/MPRA_paper_209.pdf
Papatheodorou, Christos and Pavlopoulos, Dimitris (2003): Accounting for inequality in the EU: Income disparities between and within member states and overall income inequality. Published in: CHER Working paper 9, CEPS/INSTEAD, Differdange, G.-D. Luxemburg (2003)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:379
2019-09-26T18:49:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D52:5231:523133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/379/
Prospects for a unified urban general equilibrium theory
Berliant, Marcus
R13 - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
D60 - General
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
This is a short essay on open questions in urban economic theory.
2006-08-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/379/1/MPRA_paper_379.pdf
Berliant, Marcus (2006): Prospects for a unified urban general equilibrium theory.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:492
2019-09-27T03:41:09Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3132
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D46:4635
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/492/
Die endlose Tuerkei-Debatte
Tausch, Arno
Z12 - Religion
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
F15 - Economic Integration
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
The article shows that reservations in Europe against Turkey's future membership are really groundless. A Muslim nation already was a member of the EU: Algeria. When Algeria was still a colony, it joined the EU (then: European Economic Community) on January 1st 1958 as a French "Departement", and it remained so until its independence in 1962. The now famous Copenhagen criteria obviously did not apply at that time: 400.000 French troops fought a colonial war against the local population. Are Muslims in the European Union only welcome as a colonized people? The dossier presented brings up to date earlier materials published on the subject by the same author. There are new sections on the situation of women at the time of the beginning of the negotiation process for each of the 25 EU members based on United States Department of State materials, as well as time series comparisons of gender politicies in the EU 25, and in the candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. Of course, the tasks ahead are still very large, including in the field of gender policies, but Turkey should in no way be excluded from the start of membership negotiations.
2004
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/492/1/MPRA_paper_492.pdf
Tausch, Arno (2004): Die endlose Tuerkei-Debatte. Published in: Studien von Zeitfragen, Frankfurt, ISSN-1619-8417 , Vol. 4, No. 38 (2004): pp. 1-183.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:601
2019-09-29T00:13:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D44:4437
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/601/
No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems
Gomez-Rua, Maria
Vidal-Puga, Juan
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
C71 - Cooperative Games
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
In the context of cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, we introduce a property called No Advantageous Merging. This property implies that no group of agents can be better off claiming to be a single node. We show that the sharing rule that assigns to each agent his own connection cost (the Bird rule) satisfies this property. Moreover, we provide a characterization of the Bird rule using No Advantageous Merging.
2006-10-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/601/1/MPRA_paper_601.pdf
Gomez-Rua, Maria and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2006): No advantageous merging in minimum cost spanning tree problems.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:627
2019-10-21T13:13:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/627/
Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money
Pivato, Marcus
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
`Relative Utilitarianism' (RU) is a version of classical utilitarianism, where each person's utility function is rescaled to range from zero to one. As a voting system, RU is vulnerable to preference exaggeration by strategic voters. The Groves-Clarke Pivotal Mechanism elicits truthful revelation of preferences by requiring each voter to `bid' a sum of real money to cast a pivotal vote. However, this neglects wealth effects and gives disproportionate power to rich voters. We propose a variant of the Pivotal Mechanism using fixed allotments of notional `voting money'; this `Voting Money Pivotal Mechanism' (VMPM) is politically egalitarian and immune to wealth effects. In the large-population limit, the only admissible (i.e. weakly undominated) voting strategies in the VMPM are approximately truthful revelations of preferences; thus the VMPM yields an arbitrarily close approximation of RU.
2006-10-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/627/1/MPRA_paper_627.pdf
Pivato, Marcus (2006): Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1127
2019-09-26T18:57:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1127/
Selbständige und ihre Altersvorsorge: Sozialpolitischer Handlungsbedarf?
Fachinger, Uwe
Oelschläger, Angelika
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D60 - General
One of the characteristics of the structural development in the Federal Republic of Germany is the increase of self-employment. In contrary to the regulations for dependent employees, a large part of self-employed persons are not included in the social security system. Social security insurances for self-employed only exist as exceptions. Therefore, the increase of selfemployment without social security may cause problems within the social security system.
Our analysis shows that at present the data base is insufficient for statements about old-age security of self-employed. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that most of the self-employed are not included within the obligatory system of old-age security and that the existing structures are heterogeneous.
2000
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1127/1/MPRA_paper_1127.pdf
Fachinger, Uwe and Oelschläger, Angelika (2000): Selbständige und ihre Altersvorsorge: Sozialpolitischer Handlungsbedarf?
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1129
2019-09-27T09:18:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1129/
Selbständige in der EU: Einige Anmerkungen zu den Problemen ihrer sozialen Absicherung
Fachinger, Uwe
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D60 - General
J23 - Labor Demand
The aim of the paper is to point to some emerging problems concering the social security of the self-employed. There is a call for action related to the social security systems of the single states and the intergovernmental coordination. In this context the point of view of the European Commission is of special interest and therefore special attention is paid to this matter in the paper.
The short survey shows, that there are special aspects which have to be considered to derive some options for social policy measures, which are the result of inter alia
1. the different principles of taxes within the member states,
2. the cross-border production of goods and services,
3. the relocation of self-employed people between the member states and
4. the change of the working status, e. g. the change from dependent employee to selfemployed person et vice versa.
Further the analysis elucidates, that the priority of the employment policy in respect to social policy within the EU-context has to be taken into consideration for all proposed reforms and that the European Institutions will carefully keep an eye on the guarantee of the four rights of freedom and that no measure will thwart the competition policies and employment policies.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1129/1/MPRA_paper_1129.pdf
Fachinger, Uwe (2003): Selbständige in der EU: Einige Anmerkungen zu den Problemen ihrer sozialen Absicherung.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1130
2019-09-27T16:47:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1130/
Selbständige und ihre Altersvorsorge: Möglichkeiten der Analyse anhand der Mikrozensen und erste Ergebnisse
Dräther, Hendrik
Fachinger, Uwe
Oelschläger, Angelika
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D60 - General
J23 - Labor Demand
During the last few years a structural change in gainful employment is observed within the Federal Republic of Germany, which takes impact on the social security system. In this paper we try to find answers to the question, what the consequences of the substitution of dependent employment by self-employment for the organization of old-age security of self-employed are.
It may be possible, that socio-political reactions are necessary to avoid a erosion of the financial base of the statutory old-age security system and material poverty of former self-employed and retired people. A fundamental analysis of the status quo – as a first step - is presented.
A short overview of the available statistical data in the Federal Republic of Germany gives as main result, that only the Microzensus contains representative information both for the gainful employment and old age provision. Therefore we tried to select comprehensive information out of the Microzensus about gainful employment and the old age provision for groups of selfemployed, which are covered by obligatory old-age security systems. “Versicherte kraft Gesetz” (insured by operation of law), “Handwerker” (self-employed craftsmen), “Bezirksschornsteinfegermeister” (district master craftsmen of chimney-sweep), “Künstler und Publizisten” (artists and publicist), “Landwirte” (farmers) and “Freie Berufe” (independent profession)belong to these groups. In order to examine the validation, we have compared our results with the results of the statistics of the Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (VDR).
The results are quite unsatisfactory. On the one side, there are big difference between our results elaborated out of the Microzensus and the official statistics of the VDR. On the other side, information about groups, which are covered by other obligatory old-age security systems as the statutory one, seems not to be very valid. For example, although in the Microzensus too many self-employed declared to be insured in the statutory old-age security system, in the group of “artists and publicist” the number of people, shown as insured in the statutory old-age security system, is to low.
The reasons for these differences are not clear. Methodical problems are obvious in data capture and in the identification of the self-employed by using the occupational numbers for creating the groups “insured by operation of law”, “self-employed craftsmen” etc. A further reason is supposed in the simple fact, that the persons are ignorant about their status of being compulsory or voluntary insured in the statutory old-age security system.
All in all, this leads to the final appraisal, that the Microzensus-data used here are limited in analysing the statutory old-age provision of the self-employed.
2001
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1130/1/MPRA_paper_1130.pdf
Dräther, Hendrik and Fachinger, Uwe and Oelschläger, Angelika (2001): Selbständige und ihre Altersvorsorge: Möglichkeiten der Analyse anhand der Mikrozensen und erste Ergebnisse.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1243
2019-09-29T22:46:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1243/
Economic theory and social justice
Johnson, Joseph
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Is justice individualistic or both individualistic andsocial? Opposite views on this question include
von Hayek, who said that `social justice' was an oxymoron, and the late Holy Father who, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis said that some socio-economic institutions can have`structures of sin' in their architectures.
The Old Testament prophets have been interpreted either way!
Using results from the Capital Controversy in economic theory,
Sen's work on famines, and the
Parsonian theory of the institution, we show that
the `social'-justice dimension of an individual act is where its justice is
unintelligible in merely individualistic terms, but requires institutional analysis.
2006-10-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1243/1/MPRA_paper_1243.pdf
Johnson, Joseph (2006): Economic theory and social justice.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1535
2019-10-01T05:40:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1535/
Yours, Mine, and Ours: The Effect of Ersatz Property Rights on Outcome Based Fairness and Reciprocity.
Oxoby, Robert J.
Spraggon, John
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C70 - General
We report laboratory data on earned wealth effects in a series of anonymous
dictator games. In addition to a standard (baseline) treatment in which wealth
was determined by the experimenter, we conduct treatments in which either the
dictator or the receiver earned wealth used in the subsequent dictator game. In
our baseline treatment, we observe the standard result: on average, dictators allocate
receivers twenty percent. In treatments where the dictator earned wealth,
we observe the theoretic prediction of zero offers to receivers. In treatments
where the receiver earned wealth, we observe distributions of offers in which the
receiver’s share exceeds fifty percent. We interpret these results as evidence of
the importance of property rights in determining individuals’ social preferences.
2004
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1535/1/MPRA_paper_1535.pdf
Oxoby, Robert J. and Spraggon, John (2004): Yours, Mine, and Ours: The Effect of Ersatz Property Rights on Outcome Based Fairness and Reciprocity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1575
2019-09-30T14:42:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483537
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3430
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1575/
Too much or not enough crimes? On the ambiguous effects of repression
Langlais, Eric
D62 - Externalities
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
H57 - Procurement
K40 - General
D60 - General
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal enforcement of the penal code when criminals invest in a specific class of avoidance activities termed dissembling activities (i.e. self-protection efforts undertaken by criminals to hedge their illegal gains in case of detection and arrestation). We show that the penal law has two screening effects: it separates the population of potential criminals between those who commit the crime and those who do not, and in the former group, between those who undertake dissembling efforts and those who do not. Then, we show that it is never optimal to use less than the maximal fine in contrast to what may occur with avoidance detection (i.e. efforts undertaken in order to reduce the probability of arrestation: Malik (1990)); and furthermore, that the optimal penal code may imply overdeterrence. Finally, we show that any reform of the penal code has ambiguous effects when criminals undertake dissembling activities which are a by-product of illegal activities, since increasing the maximum possible fine may increase or decrease the number of crimes committed and may increase or decrease the proportion of illegal gains hedged by criminals.
2007-01-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1575/1/MPRA_paper_1575.pdf
Langlais, Eric (2007): Too much or not enough crimes? On the ambiguous effects of repression.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1667
2019-09-28T19:01:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3134
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1667/
The Single-Mindedness theory: micro-foundation and applications to social security systems
Canegrati, Emanuele
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
J18 - Public Policy
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; Economics of the Handicapped ; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H31 - Household
The central purpose of this paper is to introduce a new political economy explanation to modern Social Security Systems. This approach is based on the Single-Mindedness Theory (SMT), which assumes that the more single-minded groups are able to exert a greater power of influence on Governments (and eventually obtain what they require) than those groups which dissipate their mindedness on several issues. Governments are considered as voting-maximizer policymakers, whose unique goal is winning elections. Using an OLG model
and a probabilistic voting approach, I will analyse a society divided into two groups, the old and the young, which only dier for their preferences for leisure. I will show that, in order to win elections, the Government sets the optimal policy vector taking into account preferences for leisure of both groups; eventually, the old obtain a lower
eective marginal tax rate and retire earlier, so that they can spend all their time in leisure, a fraction of which is used to undertake political activities whose aim is the capture of politicians.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1667/1/MPRA_paper_1667.pdf
Canegrati, Emanuele (2006): The Single-Mindedness theory: micro-foundation and applications to social security systems.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1728
2019-10-01T14:20:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433830
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1728/
On the re-assessment of inequality in Indonesia: household survey or national account?
Yusuf, Arief Anshory
C80 - General
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper is motivated by the inconsistency between food and non-food ex-penditure estimated from household survey data (SUSENAS) and from nationalaccount (I-O table) and its connection on the issue of inequality in Indonesia.Since non-food expenditure tend to be under-estimated when compared withnational account data, it imply the under-representation of the rich in the cal-culation of inequality in Indonesia. This paper, then applies an approach toreconciling household survey and national accounts data, by re-estimating thesampling weight through minimization of entropy distance of information takinghousehold survey weight as prior, while satisfying some aggregation constraints.The estimated weight then is used to calculate standard indicator of inequalityin Indonesia. The results suggests that while inequality in rural Indonesia doesnot change much, due to possible under-representation of the rich in the survey, inequality in urban Indonesia is highly under-estimated. The "Jakarta factor"seems to account mostly to this discrepancy.
2006-08-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1728/1/MPRA_paper_1728.pdf
Yusuf, Arief Anshory (2006): On the re-assessment of inequality in Indonesia: household survey or national account?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1896
2019-10-08T04:48:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483237
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1896/
A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness
Canegrati, Emanuele
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H31 - Household
H27 - Other Sources of Revenue
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic
Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an
equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment
where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.
2007-02-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1896/1/MPRA_paper_1896.pdf
Canegrati, Emanuele (2007): A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1908
2019-09-29T08:24:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1908/
One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail
D62 - Externalities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a sufficiency result for the existence of the stable set and the core. We also present several findings on the issues of
gender optimality, lattices, strategy-proofness, and rationalizability.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1908/1/MPRA_paper_1908.pdf
Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2006): One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2052
2019-09-26T17:25:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2052/
Universal Basic Income and Negative Income Tax: Two Different Ways of Thinking Redistribution
Davide, Tondani
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
This article examines two redistributive programs: Negative Income Tax and Universal Basic Income. Its aim is to show that, even if the two programs – through the implementation of an appropriate tax-benefit system – can get the same distributive outcome, they are deeply different both from an economic point of view and an ethic perspective. The approach adopted integrates positive and normative analysis so that an explicit attention to ethical issues can provide a more complete descriptive economics. We show that Negative Income Tax scheme is consistent with the libertarian idea of distributive justice, while Basic Income matches with the egalitarian thought.
2007-03-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2052/1/MPRA_paper_2052.pdf
Davide, Tondani (2007): Universal Basic Income and Negative Income Tax: Two Different Ways of Thinking Redistribution.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2254
2019-09-29T04:46:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3230
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483633
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3134
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483630
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2254/
On redistribution effects of public debt amongst single-minded generations
Canegrati, Emanuele
J20 - General
H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J18 - Public Policy
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; Economics of the Handicapped ; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
H60 - General
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model,
where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates,
which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max-
imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces-
sary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to income,
we have dramatic distorting effect on the labour supply. The prob-
lem is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government
set taxes in order to favour the most in‡uencing social group. As a
consequence, effective marginal tax rates are differentiated amongst
social groups and thus the burden of public debt is not equally borne.
2007-03-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2254/1/MPRA_paper_2254.pdf
Canegrati, Emanuele (2007): On redistribution effects of public debt amongst single-minded generations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2320
2019-10-01T08:14:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3233
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3538
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443931
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2320/
The single-mindedness of labor unions when transfers are not Lump-Sum
canegrati, emanuele
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
J23 - Labor Demand
H61 - Budget ; Budget Systems
J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J18 - Public Policy
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
J58 - Public Policy
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
H31 - Household
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice ; Life Cycle Models and Saving
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
J11 - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; Economics of the Handicapped ; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
In this paper I analyse a labour market where the wage is endogenously
determined according to an Efficient Bargaining process
between a firm and a labour union whose members are partitioned
into two social groups: the old and the young. Furthermore, I exploit
the Single-Mindedness theory, which considers the existence of a density
function which endogenously depends on leisure. I demonstrate
that, when preferences of one group for leisure are higher than those
of the other group the latter suffers from higher tax rates and with
lower level of wage rates and lower levels of leisure. Finally, since the
former is more single-minded, it may exploit its greater political power
in order to get a positive intergenerational transfer which takes place
via labour income taxation. Empirical evidence from the WERS 2004
survey confirms main results of the model.
2007-03-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2320/1/MPRA_paper_2320.pdf
canegrati, emanuele (2007): The single-mindedness of labor unions when transfers are not Lump-Sum.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2523
2019-09-27T15:44:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4330
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443639
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2523/
L'influence de la connaissance du genre du partenaire dans les relations de confiance et de réciprocité: une étude expérimentale
Bonein, Aurélie
Serra, Daniel
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C0 - General
D69 - Other
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
Gender differences are often observed in real life-situations. We implement an experiment on the investment game which explores the influence of knowledge of partner's gender in trust and reciprocity by means of two treatments of information: the first one, without knowledge of partner's gender and the second treatment where gender's partner is common knowledge. A great heterogeneity of individuals’ behaviors is observed: from selfish behavior to complete trust and trustworthiness. Knowledge of responder’s gender does not imply different sending, even if men trust more their partners than women. However, a phenomenon of gender bias dominates in trustworthiness behavior.
2006-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2523/1/MPRA_paper_2523.pdf
Bonein, Aurélie and Serra, Daniel (2006): L'influence de la connaissance du genre du partenaire dans les relations de confiance et de réciprocité: une étude expérimentale.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2535
2019-09-28T06:20:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3638
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3635
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2535/
Optimal State-Contingent Unemployment Insurance
Sanchez, Juan M.
J68 - Public Policy
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J65 - Unemployment Insurance ; Severance Pay ; Plant Closings
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
Since the probability of finding a job is affected not only by individual effort but also by the aggregate state of the economy, designing unemployment insurance payments conditional on the business cycle could be valuable. This paper answers a fundamental question related to this issue: How should the payments vary with the aggregate state of the economy?
2006-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2535/1/MPRA_paper_2535.pdf
Sanchez, Juan M. (2006): Optimal State-Contingent Unemployment Insurance.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2548
2019-10-01T09:50:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483530
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483631
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443330
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483630
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2548/
A Single-Mindedness model with n generations
Emanuele, Canegrati
H50 - General
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H61 - Budget ; Budget Systems
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
D30 - General
C72 - Noncooperative Games
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
H31 - Household
J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
H60 - General
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n
generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new
expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump-
sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic
labour income taxation. Since the Government has to clear the budget,
some generations obtain a benefit, whilst some other must pay the entire
cost of social secutiry systems. I will demonstrate that generations which
are more single-minded on leisure are the most better off since they are
more able to capture politicians in the political competition. Further-
more, it could be the case that candidates are not forced to undertake the
same policies in equilibrium and I will demonstrate that this result holds
only once an endogenous density function for individual preferences for
politicians is considered.
2007-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2548/1/MPRA_paper_2548.pdf
Emanuele, Canegrati (2007): A Single-Mindedness model with n generations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2637
2019-09-26T10:11:57Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2637/
Twofold Optimality of the Relative Utilitarian Bargaining Solution
Pivato, Marcus
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
Given a bargaining problem, the `relative utilitarian' (RU) solution maximizes the sum total of the bargainer's utilities, after having first renormalized each utility function to range from zero to one. We show that RU is `optimal' in two very different senses. First, RU is the maximal element (over the set of all bargaining solutions) under any partial ordering which satisfies certain axioms of fairness and consistency; this result is closely analogous to the result of Segal (2000). Second, RU offers each person the maximum expected utility amongst all rescaling-invariant solutions, when it is applied to a random sequence of future bargaining problems which are generated using a certain class of distributions; this is somewhat reminiscent of the results of Harsanyi (1953) and Karni (1998).
2007-04-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2637/1/MPRA_paper_2637.pdf
Pivato, Marcus (2007): Twofold Optimality of the Relative Utilitarian Bargaining Solution. Forthcoming in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2727
2019-09-26T14:22:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2727/
Mixed Feelings: Theories and Evidence of Warm Glow and Altruism
Konow, James
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper presents theoretical and empirical analyses of experiments that test competing theories of altruism, including pure altruism (a preference for the well-being of others), warm glow (a good feeling from giving) and impure altruism (a combination of pure altruism and warm glow). These theories produce different predictions regarding crowding out, i.e., the reduction in private donations due to public spending. Variations on dictator experiments involving both students and charities examine the incidence of crowding out and provide a new direct measure of the effect of giving on feelings. The results indicate that crowding out is incomplete, i.e., less than dollar for dollar. The evidence on warm glow suggests mixed feelings: giving may be associated with good or bad feelings, depending on the context. As a way to resolve apparent inconsistencies and reconcile the evidence on crowding out and feelings, this paper proposes a theory of conditional altruism, which extends previous models to incorporate social norms that arise in the workplace, marketplace and laboratory.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2727/1/MPRA_paper_2727.pdf
Konow, James (2006): Mixed Feelings: Theories and Evidence of Warm Glow and Altruism.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2728
2019-09-26T13:39:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2728/
The Hedonistic Paradox: Is Homo Economicus Happier?
Konow, James
Earley, Joseph
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
The “Hedonistic Paradox” states that homo economicus, or someone who seeks happiness for him- or herself, will not find it, but the person who helps others will. This study examines two questions in connection with happiness and generosity. First, do more generous people, as identified in dictator experiments, report on average greater happiness, or subjective well-being (SWB), as measured by responses to various questionnaires? Second, if the answer is affirmative, what is the causal relationship between generosity and happiness? We find a favorable correlation between generosity and happiness (i.e., SWB is directly related to several measures of happiness and inversely related to unhappiness) and examine various possible explanations, including that material well-being causes both happiness and generosity. The evidence from this experiment, however, indicates that a tertiary personality variable, sometimes called psychological well-being, is the primary cause of both happiness and greater generosity. In contrast to field studies, the experimental method of this inquiry permits anonymity measures designed to minimize subject misrepresentation of intrinsic generosity (e.g., due to social approval motives) and of actual happiness (e.g., because of social desirability biases) and produces a rich data set with multiple measures of subjective, psychological and material well-being. The results of this and other studies raise the question of whether greater attention should be paid to the potential benefits (beyond solely the material ones) of policies that promote charitable donations, volunteerism, service education, and, more generally, community involvement, political action, and social institutions that foster psychological well-being.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2728/1/MPRA_paper_2728.pdf
Konow, James and Earley, Joseph (2007): The Hedonistic Paradox: Is Homo Economicus Happier? Published in: Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 92, No. 1-2 (February 2008): pp. 1-33.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2729
2019-09-26T22:18:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2729/
Double Standards: Social Preferences and Moral Biases
Croson, Rachel
Konow, James
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
A consensus seems to be emerging in economics that at least three motives are at work in many strategic decisions: distributive preferences, reciprocal preferences and self-interest. An important obstacle to this research, however, has been moral biases, i.e., the distortions created by self-interest that can obscure social preferences. Among other things, this has led to disagreement about the relative importance of distributive preferences, reciprocal preferences, or both. This paper describes a simple experiment that decomposes behavior into these three forces and examines their interactions without the confounds that have compromised other designs. We compare the decisions of implicated “stakeholders” with those of impartial “spectators,” who have no stake. Several surprising and interesting results emerge. For example, stakeholders respond less forcefully to kindness and unkindness towards them than do spectators acting on their behalf. We also find an asymmetry in reciprocity: stakeholders punish but do not reward, whereas spectators both reward and punish. This result suggests that the lack of positive reciprocity found in other studies is not due to an asymmetry in underlying reciprocal preferences but rather to a moral bias by stakeholders in the application of that preference. More generally, we find that all three hypothesized motives have important and significant effects on final allocations.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2729/1/MPRA_paper_2729.pdf
Croson, Rachel and Konow, James (2007): Double Standards: Social Preferences and Moral Biases.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2730
2019-09-27T09:06:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2730/
Is Fairness in the Eye of the Beholder? An Impartial Spectator Analysis of Justice
Konow, James
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
A popular sentiment is that fairness is inexorably subjective and incapable of being determined by objective standards. This study, on the other hand, seeks to establish evidence on unbiased justice and to propose and demonstrate a general approach for measuring impartial views empirically. Most normative justice theories associate impartiality with limited information and with consensus, i.e., a high level of agreement about what is right. In both the normative and positive literature, information is usually seen as the raw material for self-serving bias and disagreement. In contrast, this paper proposes a type of impartiality that is associated with a high level of information. The crucial distinction is the emphasis here on the views of impartial spectators, rather than implicated stakeholders. I describe the quasi-spectator method, i.e., an empirical means to approximate the views of impartial spectators that is based on a direct relationship between information and consensus, whereby consensus refers to the level of agreement among actual evaluators of real world situations. Results of surveys provide evidence on quasi-spectator views and support this approach as a means to elicit moral preferences. By establishing a relationship between consensus and impartiality, this paper seeks to help lay an empirical foundation for welfare analysis, social choice theory and practical policy applications.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2730/1/MPRA_paper_2730.pdf
Konow, James (2006): Is Fairness in the Eye of the Beholder? An Impartial Spectator Analysis of Justice. Published in: Social Choice and Welfare , Vol. 33, No. 1 (June 2009): pp. 101-127.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3142
2019-10-03T03:55:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3142/
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Santos-Pinto, Luís
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C72 - Noncooperative Games
The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly
the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments
have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support
for it. By contrast, the experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are
modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous.
This paper generalizes Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing games
by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. I explore the theoretical
implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical
evidence. I find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental
evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not
able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous timing games.
2006-02-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3142/1/MPRA_paper_3142.pdf
Santos-Pinto, Luís (2006): Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3143
2019-10-02T23:46:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3143/
Reciprocity, inequity-aversion, and oligopolistic competition
Santos-Pinto, Luís
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper extends the Cournot and Bertrand models of strategic interaction
between firms by assuming that managers are not only profit maximizers,
but also have preferences for reciprocity or are averse to inequity. A reciprocal
manager responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions, while at the
same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions. An inequity
averse manager likes to reduce the difference between own profits and the rivals’
profits. The paper finds that if firms with reciprocal managers compete à
la Cournot, then they may be able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a constructive
reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare may emerge
under a destructive reciprocity equilibrium. If there is Cournot competition between
firms and their managers are averse to advantageous (disadvantageous)
inequity, then firms are better (worse) off than if managers only care about maximizing
profits. If firms compete à la Bertrand, then only under very restrictive
conditions will managers’ preferences for reciprocity or inequity aversion have
an impact on equilibrium outcomes.
2006-05-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3143/1/MPRA_paper_3143.pdf
Santos-Pinto, Luís (2006): Reciprocity, inequity-aversion, and oligopolistic competition.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3151
2019-09-27T08:17:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D48:4830:483030
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3151/
Let's make the tax system more lovable
Paunić, Alida
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
H00 - General
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Making the taxes acceptable to large number of people by allocating their obligation to the chosen project is the main subject of this paper. In this way a greater objectivity, transparency and local goals are set in according to the preferences of the tax contributors. State Investment office prevents the rule of invisible hand of market by allocation part of tax money to the less developed regions reducing difference between them.
2007-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3151/1/MPRA_paper_3151.pdf
Paunić, Alida (2007): Let's make the tax system more lovable.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3257
2019-09-26T20:32:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3257/
Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity
Bonein, Aurélie
Serra, Daniel
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper highlights a new social motivation, the indirect reciprocity, through a three-player dictator-ultimatum game. Player 2 has the opportunity to reward or punish indirectly the player 1 by inciting – with her offer - player 3 to accept or to reject the division. We implement three treatments: in the first two we vary player 2’s available information whereas in treatment 3, players take part in a dictator game - as proposers - before being player 2s in the dictator-ultimatum game. Results show that 55% of subjects in treatment 2 and 28% in treatment 3 behave as indirect reciprocity predicts. Another reciprocal behavior - the generalized reciprocity - is investigated through a three-player dictator game. Our data show that 80% of players 2 act according to this reciprocal behavior. Finally, our findings confirm that the more complex the strategic interaction becomes the more self-regarding behavior is likely and the less other-regarding behaviors, such as reciprocity, dominate.
2007-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3257/1/MPRA_paper_3257.pdf
Bonein, Aurélie and Serra, Daniel (2007): Another experimental look at reciprocal behavior: indirect reciprocity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3354
2019-09-26T08:14:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493131
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483531
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3354/
The advantages and disadvantages of needs-based resource allocation in integrated health systems and market systems of health care provider reimbursement
Gugushvili, Alexi
I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
This paper reviews the vital health care resource allocation in integrated systems and contrasts it with the market-based health care resource provisions. It is believed that among several alternatives a method of centrally managed needs-based resource distribution is best suited for universally appraised code of “equal treatment of equals”. However, the main problem hides in identification and measurement of “need” and in economic effectiveness of the methodology. Supposedly, from the 1980s, as an innovative approach, the market system of health care provider reimbursement had to resolve the problems associated with centralised needs-based resource allocation, maintaining the main achievements and improving the effectiveness of the systematic distribution. Nonetheless, as this paper shows, so far there is little evidence that the market-based health care provider reimbursement advances the allocative performance of various health care systems.
2007-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3354/1/MPRA_paper_3354.pdf
Gugushvili, Alexi (2007): The advantages and disadvantages of needs-based resource allocation in integrated health systems and market systems of health care provider reimbursement.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3388
2019-09-26T22:00:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3134
7375626A656374733D4E:4E34:4E3432
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3534
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483536
7375626A656374733D4E:4E34:4E3436
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433232
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503130
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3537
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3388/
Using the Beveridge & Nelson decomposition of economic time series for pointing out the occurrence of terrorist attacks
Gómez-Sorzano, Gustavo
O51 - U.S. ; Canada
K14 - Criminal Law
N42 - U.S. ; Canada: 1913-
O54 - Latin America ; Caribbean
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H56 - National Security and War
N46 - Latin America ; Caribbean
C22 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
P10 - General
O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper continues my research program on violence and terrorism started 15 years ago. It presents in the first part through empirical exercises, the suitability of The Beveridge and Nelson decomposition of economic time series for pointing out the occurrence of terrorist attacks. It presents the simulation results of the hypothetical case of U.S., and Colombia experiencing, additional, and first three terrorist attacks similar to 9/11, 2001: for the U.S. additional attacks are simulated occurring in 1996, and 1998 with 24,950, and 61,516 casualties respectively; while for Colombia three attacks are artificially constructed independently in 1993 with 3,000 casualties, and 2001 with alternatives scenarios of 3,000 and 4,299 casualties. In the second part, while the model for terrorist attacks in U.S. soil is developed, and knowing that the geo-political context of the war in Iraq is different, Its objective, is to use the experience from Colombia to help policy, and decision makers understand the probable outcomes and implications of decisions taken today in regards to the war in Iraq. It uses the terrorist murder and attacks indicator from 1946 to 2001 for Colombia that assumes a 9/11 in Colombia killing 3,000 civilians, and that as its consequence the Colombian army started a strong confrontation against the enemy as the U.S did at that time. This indicator is used as dependent variable to re-estimate the model for cyclical terrorist murder for Colombia (Gómez-Sorzano 2006B, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/539/01/MPRA_paper_539.pdf) using it, for sensitivity analysis scenarios including troop deployment decisions identical to those already taken by the U.S. during the war in Iraq. The last section concludes showing dynamically how at this point, moderate troop withdrawals and disarmament, will reduce both the intensity of the conflict and the estimated terrorist murder and attacks indicator for the U.S.
2006-12-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3388/1/MPRA_paper_3388.pdf
Gómez-Sorzano, Gustavo (2006): Using the Beveridge & Nelson decomposition of economic time series for pointing out the occurrence of terrorist attacks.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3438
2019-10-01T18:10:43Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4436
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D48:4832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3438/
INCOMPLETE PROPERTY RIGHTS, REDISTRIBUTION, AND WELFARE
Amegashie, J. Atsu
D6 - Welfare Economics
K0 - General
H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
In a world where the private protection of property is costly, government redistribution can lead to an increase in aggregate output. This result is not new. The novelty of this paper lies in specifying the conditions under which this efficiency-enhancing redistribution improves everyone’s welfare including the welfare of those whose labor finances the redistributive program (i.e., the rich) and how this is affected by the protection of property rights. The state may directly enhance economic rights through investments in security and the protection of property or it may indirectly do so through the redistribution of income. Under certain conditions, redistribution becomes desirable in situations where the state has exhausted its ability to enhance efficiency through the direct enforcement of property rights. In this case, redistribution can make all members of a society better off. Specifically, this occurs when the cost of predation is sufficiently low and the technology of private protection of property rights is sufficiently weak. The adverse effects of redistribution may be the consequence but not the cause of state failure. The real cause is a corrupt and inept state.
2006-02-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3438/1/MPRA_paper_3438.pdf
Amegashie, J. Atsu (2006): INCOMPLETE PROPERTY RIGHTS, REDISTRIBUTION, AND WELFARE. Forthcoming in: Social Choice and Welfare
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3509
2019-09-27T15:29:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443639
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3509/
The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
Khalil, Elias
D69 - Other
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
The mirror-neuron system (MNS) becomes instigated when the spectator empathizes with the principal’s intention. MNS also involves imitation, where empathy is irrelevant. While the former may attenuate the principal’s emotion, the latter paradoxically reinforces it. This paper proposes a solution of the contradictory attenuation/reinforcement functions of fellow-feeling by distinguishing two axes: “rationality axis” concerns whether the action is efficient or suboptimal; “intentionality axis” concerns whether the intention is “wellbeing” or “evil.” The solution shows how group solidarity differs from altruism and fairness; how revulsion differs from squeamishness; how malevolence differs from selfishness; and how racial hatred differs from racial segregation.
2007-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3509/1/MPRA_paper_3509.pdf
Khalil, Elias (2007): The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3513
2019-10-01T15:41:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4334:433433
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3537
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3513/
A Note on Human Development Indices with Income Equalities
Mishra, SK
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation
O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries
Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index obtained by a weighted aggregation of other three indices, each measuring one aspect, namely life expectancy, education and real per capita income. Intra-country equality in income distribution, however, is very important with regard to quality of life and, thus, human development. This paper is concerned with the question that if the measure of income equality also were included in construction of the HDI, then what would be the relative weights of different indices. One method could be to assign equal weights to all the four, but it is too pragmatic. Alternatively, the principal component analysis (PCA) may be applied to derive weights. But, again, the PCA is an overly elitist method that undermines the poorly correlated set of variables, which might be very important in their own right, in favor of highly correlated set of variables. We propose an alternative method that maximizes the sum of absolute coefficients of correlation of the composite index with the constituent indices. Such an index is inclusive in nature and gives proper representation to weakly correlated variables also. The method has been applied to data of 125 countries and the HDI so constructed has been compared with the PCA HDI and HDR (UNDP) HDI. We find substantial ups and downs in the HDI ranks of different countries.
2007-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3513/1/MPRA_paper_3513.pdf
Mishra, SK (2007): A Note on Human Development Indices with Income Equalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3515
2019-10-03T18:03:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3515/
DRMs, Innovation and Creation
Geffroy, Olivier
Geffroy, Anne-Gaëlle
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D62 - Externalities
L96 - Telecommunications
K21 - Antitrust Law
DRMs are intellectual property institutions. They transpose the empirical principle of copyright, which implicitly recognizes that specific ownership rules should be attached to non scientific creation, into the digital era. The legal protection of DRMs, a private means of enforcing content excludability, participates in the "privatization" of copyright protection. This, in turn, means that a proprietary software — governed by intellectual property rights, reinforced by public law — becomes the key to the vertical relations shaped by exclusive copyright. DRMs consequently represent a major stake in the competition to capture network effects in the content distribution vertical chain
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3515/1/MPRA_paper_3515.pdf
Geffroy, Olivier and Geffroy, Anne-Gaëlle (2006): DRMs, Innovation and Creation. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 62 : pp. 34-47.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3599
2019-09-26T21:57:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443639
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3599/
The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
Khalil, Elias
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
D69 - Other
The mirror-neuron system (MNS) becomes instigated when the spectator empathizes with the principal’s intention. MNS also involves imitation, where empathy is irrelevant. While the former may attenuate the principal’s emotion, the latter paradoxically reinforces it. This paper proposes a solution of the contradictory attenuation/reinforcement functions of fellow-feeling by distinguishing two axes: “rationality axis” concerns whether the action is efficient or suboptimal; “intentionality axis” concerns whether the intention is “wellbeing” or “evil.” The solution shows how group solidarity differs from altruism and fairness; how revulsion differs from squeamishness; how malevolence differs from selfishness; and how racial hatred differs from racial segregation.
2007-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3599/1/MPRA_paper_3599.pdf
Khalil, Elias (2007): The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3601
2019-10-02T04:11:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443639
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3601/
The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
Khalil, Elias
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
D69 - Other
The mirror-neuron system (MNS) becomes instigated when the spectator empathizes with the principal’s intention. MNS also involves imitation, where empathy is irrelevant. While the former may attenuate the principal’s emotion, the latter paradoxically reinforces it. This paper proposes a solution of the contradictory attenuation/reinforcement functions of fellow-feeling by distinguishing two axes: “rationality axis” concerns whether the action is efficient or suboptimal; “intentionality axis” concerns whether the intention is “wellbeing” or “evil.” The solution shows how group solidarity differs from altruism and fairness; how revulsion differs from squeamishness; how evil differs from selfishness; and how racial hatred differs from racial segregation.
2007-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3601/1/MPRA_paper_3601.pdf
Khalil, Elias (2007): The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3629
2019-09-27T02:03:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443930
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3629/
Parental altruism, life expectancy and dynamically inefficient equilibria
d'Albis, Hippolyte
Decreuse, Bruno
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D90 - General
E21 - Consumption ; Saving ; Wealth
Macrodynamic models with finite lifetime and selfish individuals may feature
(dynamically) inefficient equilibria, while models with infinite lifetime and altruistic
individuals cannot. Do strong intergenerational altruism and high life expectancy
prevent the occurence of inefficient equilibria? To answer this question, we present
a continuous time OLG model which generalizes the Blanchard-Buiter-Weil model.
Our main innovation relies on the introduction of parental altruism, whose intensity
is variable. We show that parental altruism and life expectancy actually favor
overaccumulation. Theoretical results are illustrated by a parametrization from
US data. Our numerical exercises suggest that the US economy is dynamically
inefficient, mainly because life expectancy is sufficiently short.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3629/1/MPRA_paper_3629.pdf
d'Albis, Hippolyte and Decreuse, Bruno (2007): Parental altruism, life expectancy and dynamically inefficient equilibria.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3636
2019-09-28T04:51:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3634
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3636/
Choosy search and the mismatch of talents
Decreuse, Bruno
J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D62 - Externalities
This paper proposes a multi-sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector-specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector-specific mean productivity among the pools of job-seekers. Consequently, workers prospect too many market segments, and there is room for public policy even when the so-called Hosios condition holds.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3636/1/MPRA_paper_3636.pdf
Decreuse, Bruno (2003): Choosy search and the mismatch of talents.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3657
2019-09-29T04:33:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5035
7375626A656374733D44:4436
7375626A656374733D48:4831
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3657/
Allocation of scarce resources when rationality is one of them: some consequences of cognitive inequalities for theory and policy
Pelikan, Pavel
P5 - Comparative Economic Systems
D6 - Welfare Economics
H1 - Structure and Scope of Government
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
"Rationality" is understood in the empirical sense of cognitive abilities of human brains for solving economic problems, and consequently recognized bounded in individually unequal ways. This is shown to require treating it as a unique scarce resource, used for deciding on its own uses. This uniqueness disturbs axiomatic economics by a tangled hierarchy, and implies that rationality-allocation can approach efficiency only by means of an institutionally shaped trial-and-error evolution. Applied to the markets vs. government issue, a comparative institutional analysis of rationality-allocation yields novel insights with non-standard policy implications, and thus demonstrates that rationality-allocation matters.
2007-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3657/1/MPRA_paper_3657.pdf
Pelikan, Pavel (2007): Allocation of scarce resources when rationality is one of them: some consequences of cognitive inequalities for theory and policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3694
2019-10-12T17:55:35Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443639
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3694/
The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
Khalil, Elias
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
D69 - Other
Mirror neurons become instigated when the spectator empathizes with the principal’s intention. But when they involve imitation, empathy (understanding) is irrelevant. While understanding may attenuate the principal’s emotion, imitation escalates it. A solution of the contradictory attenuation/escalation pathways of fellow-feeling is to distinguishing two axes: “rationality axis” concerns whether the action is efficient or suboptimal; “intentionality axis” concerns whether the intention is wellbeing or evil. The solution shows how group solidarity differs from altruism and fairness; how revulsion differs from squeamishness; how sympathy differs from adulation; how evil differs from selfishness; and how racial hatred differs from racial segregation.
2007-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3694/1/MPRA_paper_3694.pdf
Khalil, Elias (2007): The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3793
2019-10-06T06:08:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4334:433433
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3537
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3793/
A Note on Human Development Indices with Income Equalities
Mishra, SK
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation
O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries
Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index obtained by a weighted aggregation of other three indices, each measuring one aspect, namely life expectancy, education and real per capita income. Intra-country equality in income distribution, however, is very important with regard to quality of life and, thus, human development. This paper is concerned with the question that if the measure of income equality also were included in construction of the HDI, then what would be the relative weights of different indices. One method could be to assign equal weights to all the four, but it is too pragmatic. Alternatively, the principal component analysis (PCA) may be applied to derive weights. But, again, the PCA is an overly elitist method that undermines the poorly correlated set of variables, which might be very important in their own right, in favor of highly correlated set of variables. We propose an alternative method that maximizes the sum of absolute coefficients of correlation of the composite index with the constituent indices. Such an index is inclusive in nature and gives proper representation to weakly correlated variables also. The method has been applied to data of 125 countries and the HDI so constructed has been compared with the PCA HDI and HDR (UNDP) HDI. We find substantial ups and downs in the HDI ranks of different countries.
2007-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3793/1/MPRA_paper_3793.pdf
Mishra, SK (2007): A Note on Human Development Indices with Income Equalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3961
2019-10-01T14:47:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443639
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3961/
The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
Khalil, Elias
D69 - Other
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Mirror neurons become instigated when the spectator empathizes with the principal’s intention. But when they involve imitation, empathy (understanding) is irrelevant. While understanding may attenuate the principal’s emotion, imitation escalates it. A solution of the contradictory attenuation/escalation pathways of fellow-feeling is to distinguishing two axes: “rationality axis” concerns whether the action is efficient or suboptimal; “intentionality axis” concerns whether the intention is wellbeing or evil. The solution shows how group solidarity differs from altruism and fairness; how revulsion differs from squeamishness; how sympathy differs from adulation; how evil differs from selfishness; and how racial hatred differs from racial segregation.
2007-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3961/1/MPRA_paper_3961.pdf
Khalil, Elias (2007): The Mirror-Neuron Paradox: How Far is Sympathy from Compassion, Indulgence, and Adulation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3964
2019-09-29T07:38:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3964/
A non-monetary form of Clarke pivotal voting
Pivato, Marcus
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
The Clarke Pivotal Voting Mechanism (CPVM) elicits truthful revelation of utility functions by requiring any `pivotal' voter to pay a monetary `Clarke tax'. This neglects wealth effects and gives disproportionate power to rich voters. We propose to replace the `Clarke tax' with a lottery, wherein the pivotal voter risks long-term exclusion from the CPVM (and any other formal political participation). The resulting voting mechanism is nonmanipulable, politically egalitarian, and implements something close to Relative Utilitarianism.
2007-07-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3964/1/MPRA_paper_3964.pdf
Pivato, Marcus (2007): A non-monetary form of Clarke pivotal voting.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4148
2019-09-28T04:42:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D44:4431
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4148/
Many hands make hard work, or why agriculture is not a puzzle
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés
D6 - Welfare Economics
A14 - Sociology of Economics
Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products
The shift from hunting and gathering to agriculture, some 10,000 years ago, triggered the first demographic explosion in history. Along with population, working time increased, while food consumption remained at the subsistence level. For that reason, most anthropologists regard the adoption of agriculture as an economical puzzle.
I show, using a neoclassical economic model, that there is nothing puzzling about the adoption of agriculture. Agriculture brings four technological changes: an increase in total factor productivity, a stabilization of total factor productivity, less interference of children on production, and the possibility of food storage. In my model, each of those changes induces free, rational and self-interested hunter-gatherers to adopt agriculture. As a result, working time increases while consumption remains at the subsistence level, and population begins to grow until diminishing returns to labor bring it to a halt. Welfare, which depends on consumption, leisure, and fertility, rises at first; but after a few generations it falls below its initial level. Still, the adoption of agriculture is irreversible. The latter generations choose to remain farmers because, at their current levels of population, reverting to hunting and gathering would reduce their welfare.
2007-01-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4148/1/MPRA_paper_4148.pdf
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés (2007): Many hands make hard work, or why agriculture is not a puzzle.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4344
2019-09-30T05:16:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4344/
An Analysis on Market Structure of Broadcast Service – Issues on Optimal Level of Channel Variety –
Shishikura, Manabu
Kasuga, Norihiro
D40 - General
L50 - General
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
D60 - General
Unlike general goods, broadcasting service is financed not only by consumer’s direct
payment but also by advertisement revenue. In other words, broadcasting service is
supported by direct and indirect financial sources. However, rate of dependence on those
financial sources are different by each media type; Terrestrial broadcasting carrier
primarily depends on advertisement revenue while cable TV carrier and satellite carrier,
which is called as pay-TV primarily depend on payment from audience in addition to
small amount of advertisement revenue.
In this paper, we examine broadcast market, where carriers with different financial
sources compete in the market, and analyze market performance as a result of
competition. Especially, we focus on the effect of competition in the mixed market which
includes advertising supported media and subscription fee supported media.
We made economic model and analyze the difference on several types of market. Our
principle results of Case III, the market that an advertisement supported carrier and a
subscription supported carrier compete in the market, are as follows;.
(1) The greater the substitutability is, the number of channels supplied by advertisement
supported media increases while those supplied by subscription fee supported carrier
decreases.
(2) Total number of channels supplied by advertisement supported carrier and
subscription fee supported carrier is equal to the number of channels supplied by an
advertisement supported carrier (Case II).
(3) Total TV watching time of Case III is equal to Case II.
(4) Because the amount of payment by consumer increases compared to Case II, consumer
surplus decreases.
General economic model predicts that the increase of the number of entrants brings the
increase of consumer surplus. However, in our model, we show here that the increase of
the number of entrants does not necessarily bring the increase of consumer surplus.
2007-08-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4344/1/MPRA_paper_4344.pdf
Shishikura, Manabu and Kasuga, Norihiro (2007): An Analysis on Market Structure of Broadcast Service – Issues on Optimal Level of Channel Variety –.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4581
2019-09-29T06:07:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3239
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4581/
The Strength of Weak Cooperation:an Attempt to Understand the Meaning of Web 2.0
Cardon, Dominique
Cardon, Christophe
D62 - Externalities
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L96 - Telecommunications
K29 - Other
This paper examines some continuities and ruptures in the use of Web 2.0 such as blogs, social media, user-generated content services etc. vis-à-vis earlier web services. We hypothesize that one of the sociological characteristics of Web 2.0 services is that making personal production public creates a new articulation between individualism and solidarity, which reveals the strength of weak cooperation. Web 2.0 services allow individual contributors to experience cooperation ex post. The strength of the weak cooperation arises from the fact that it is not necessary for individuals to have an ex ante cooperative action plan or altruistic intention. They discover cooperative opportunities only by making public their individual production. The paper illustrates this phenomenon by analysing the uses of different services and by looking at the new process of innovation that appears through Barcamp and Coworking spaces.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4581/1/MPRA_paper_4581.pdf
Cardon, Dominique and Cardon, Christophe (2007): The Strength of Weak Cooperation:an Attempt to Understand the Meaning of Web 2.0. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 51-65.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4682
2019-10-28T19:07:12Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4700
2020-01-01T05:37:46Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4806
2019-09-27T16:38:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30:4D3030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4806/
The Economics of "Private Politics": Corporate Social Responsibility
Otto, Brøns-Petersen
D60 - General
M00 - General
Increasingly, private corporations engage in “private politics”, or “corporate
social responsibility” (CSR). In some cases, such as the infamous Enron affair,
huge discrepancies between stated and actual policies have been revealed, while
in others corporations seem to have been taken hostage by interest groups, even
if stated and actual polices matched.
The paper attempts to model the “private politics” of CSR in economic terms.
On the one hand, it is assumed that corporations can generate economic rent by
favourable responses from policy makers, regulators and consumers to building
a CSR image. Building an image is, however, costly. On the other hand, the
rent might be subject to rent-seeking activities from pressure groups, labour (in
the form of “rent sharing”) etc. The resulting game is modelled as a Stackleberg
rent-seeking game. A corporation is assumed to be able to deter attacks on its
CSR rent by direct investments in deterrence (public policy, advertising etc.)
and by backing up its CSR image by actual policies. Both of these are costly,
too.
The model illustrates the effect on CSR of risk aversion and of comparative
advantages in implementing CSR policies as well as in creating defending “image
rents”. CSR activities might also result from principal-agent problems between
owners and management.
2005-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4806/1/MPRA_paper_4806.pdf
Otto, Brøns-Petersen (2005): The Economics of "Private Politics": Corporate Social Responsibility.
da
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5331
2019-09-29T19:10:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493232
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5331/
(Mis-)Understanding Education Externalities
Mueller, Normann
I22 - Educational Finance ; Financial Aid
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
D62 - Externalities
This article critically evaluates the current state of research on education externalities. It occurs that much of the confusion regarding their magnitude results from conceptual misunderstandings pertaining to their nature. The essay distinguishes the concepts education, teaching, and knowledge. Whereas pure teaching yields externalities on the primary and secondary level, only the generation of knowledge may produce the spillovers which are typically linked to the tertiary level. The accumulation of education itself does not have such an effect. Education is argued to be a private good with well defined property rights. Individuals may exploit those and provide the production sector with the efficient amount of human capital. Following this rationale, it is demonstrated that empirical studies, contrasting estimations of private and social returns to education, are unsuitable to substantiate the existence of externalities. As a consequence, subsidies to tertiary programs are called into question.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5331/1/MPRA_paper_5331.pdf
Mueller, Normann (2007): (Mis-)Understanding Education Externalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5451
2019-10-18T16:53:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D50:5034:503438
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503337
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5451/
Zur Kluft zwischen Verfassungsgebung und Verfassungswirklichkeit im Demokratisierungsprozess Benins
Kohnert, Dirk
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
P37 - Legal Institutions ; Illegal Behavior
The process of democratization in Benin has been praised as a model for the whole of francophone Africa. Initiated by an independent National-Conference the process of democratic renewal started with a bloodless coup of representatives of different groups of the civil society. Declared aims of this conference were, to guarantee basic human rights, to substitute the "Marxist" Kérékou-Regime by a democratic elected government, and to draft a new liberal-democratic constitution. Officially, each of these aims had been reached within one year. The new constitution was adopted through a referendum by a large majority of the population in December 1990. In the following four years the formal constitutional political structures, meant to guarantee the balance of power were implanted. However, the political elite which dominated the democratization process pursued a hidden agenda. Moreover, the liberalization of society and economy, propagated by the international donor community, had ambiguous effects. The growth of the market economy had it repercussions not just within the realm of the economy, e.g. privatisation, separation of factors of production, land, labour, and capital; creation of business- and professional organizations. The transformation from subsistence into a market-economy was equally important concerning restructuring the political landscape. The adoption of democratic concepts by the population, based on neo-liberal concepts of exchange of equivalents via the market, the notion of equal legal status of all citizens, equal competition of politicians and political parties, and achievement-orientation, led to high flying expectations, but at the same time to a commercialization of social and political relations, including venality. Besides, democratization in Benin - the cradle of "vodun" - was neatly interwoven with the realm of occult belief systems. Both within the economy and politics, the established ‘traditional’ rules of the informal sector dominated the political agenda of the ‘neo-patrimonial’ state. Gender- and class specific interests of decision makers exerted a decisive influence on the democratisation process.
1996
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5451/1/MPRA_paper_5451.pdf
Kohnert, Dirk (1996): Zur Kluft zwischen Verfassungsgebung und Verfassungswirklichkeit im Demokratisierungsprozess Benins. Published in: Nord-Sued aktuell , Vol. 1.1996, No. 1.1996 (1996): pp. 73-84.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5655
2019-09-27T17:41:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433832
7375626A656374733D44:4439
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433532
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433837
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483434
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433533
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3534
7375626A656374733D4E:4E34:4E3436
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433232
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483536
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
7375626A656374733D43:4332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5655/
Developing the concept of Sustainable Peace using Econometrics and scenarios granting Sustainable Peace in Colombia by year 2019
Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C82 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data ; Data Access
D9 - Intertemporal Choice
C52 - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
C87 - Econometric Software
H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
O54 - Latin America ; Caribbean
N46 - Latin America ; Caribbean
C22 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes
H56 - National Security and War
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
C2 - Single Equation Models ; Single Variables
This paper belongs to my research program on violence and terrorism started in 1993, as a consequence of the growing concern regarding the increase in Colombian violence, and especially for its escalation during the 1990’s. After 14 years of research, particularly after developing a model of cyclical terrorist murder in Colombia 1950-2004, forecasts 2005-2019 (Gómez-Sorzano 2005, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/134/01/MPRA_paper_134.pdf), the econometrics of violence, terrorism, and scenarios for peace in Colombia from 1950 to 2019 (Gómez-Sorzano 2006, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/539/01/MPRA_paper_539.pdf), and Scenarios for Sustainable Peace in Colombia by year 2019 (Gómez-Sorzano 2006B, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/135/01/MPRA_paper_135.pdf) , I claim in this paper that I have formally developed the concept of Sustainable Peace using advanced econometrics. The concept of Sustainable Peace is thus presented to the international academic community, and is based in the construction of a structural econometric model for National murder, and a model for cyclical terrorist murder that have been simultaneously used for designing Scenarios granting Sustainable Peace in Colombia by year 2019.
2007-04-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5655/1/MPRA_paper_5655.pdf
Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo (2007): Developing the concept of Sustainable Peace using Econometrics and scenarios granting Sustainable Peace in Colombia by year 2019.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5779
2019-09-26T18:50:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5779/
Changing Income Structure, Ownership and Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector
Umakrishnan, K U
Bandyopadhyay, Arindam
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
D60 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
This paper investigates the relationship between the changing patterns of bank’s source of income and risk adjusted performance. A database of 77 banks over the period of 1999 to 2004 is constructed for the 27 public sector banks, 22 private banks, 25 foreign banks and 3 cooperative banks to compare their change in income composition. Bank’s performance is measured by risk adjusted return on BIS risk allocated capital (RARORAC). To examine the relationship between ownership pattern and performance, we compare the difference between new generation private sector banks and foreign banks with their public sector and cooperative banks counterparts. We argue that in a competitive financial market in order to change the profitability drivers in banking, Indian banks need to improve their non-interest income and also augment risk adjusted interest income through better risk based pricing.
2005-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5779/1/MPRA_paper_5779.pdf
Umakrishnan, K U and Bandyopadhyay, Arindam (2005): Changing Income Structure, Ownership and Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5865
2017-12-21T09:19:19Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5867
2019-10-03T04:46:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513236
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513235
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5867/
On combining stated preferences and revealed preferences approaches to evaluate environmental resources having a recreational use
Paccagnan, Vania
Q26 - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Q25 - Water
This work aims at analysing the value of recreational water uses for the Idro Lake (Lombardy, Northern Italy), which has been experiencing dramatic fluctuations in its levels in recent years, due to excessive productive withdrawal that affected recreational uses. It estimates the economic benefits deriving from recreational uses, by considering the current recreational demand and the hypothetical one obtained by considering an “improved quality” scenario. Through an on-site survey, we built a panel dataset. Following Whitehead et al. (2000) and Hanley et al. (2003) we get welfare estimates by combining SP and RP responses. The present CS is estimated in €134 per individual, whilst the increase in CS is estimated in €173 per individual. These figures can be confronted with the economic value of competitive uses and with the clean up costs, respectively, to infer some policy indications.
2007-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5867/1/MPRA_paper_5867.pdf
Paccagnan, Vania (2007): On combining stated preferences and revealed preferences approaches to evaluate environmental resources having a recreational use. Published in: IEFE Working Paper Series , Vol. IEFE W, (May 2007)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5992
2019-09-28T04:32:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3339
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5992/
Reichtum in Deutschland: Hohe Einkommen, ihre Struktur und Verteilung
Merz, Joachim
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J39 - Other
Die Verteilung des gesellschaftlichen Reichtums ist von zentraler Bedeutung für die wirtschaftliche,
soziale und kulturelle Entwicklung eines Landes. Unabhängig von der jeweiligen wirtschafts- und
sozialwissenschaftlichen Sicht ist die Einkommensverteilung ein wichtiger Baustein zur Erklärung von
Wirtschaftswachstum und Beschäftigungsentwicklung.
Der vorliegende Einkommensverteilungsbeitrag beleuchtet die Situation der Einkommens-Reichen.
Fundierte Informationen über hohe Einkommen, ihre Struktur und Verteilung werden erstmals auf der
Basis der anonymisierten individuellen Datensätze der Einkommensteuerstatistik 1995 vorgestellt.
Eingebettet in die Verteilungsanalyse über das gesamte Einkommensspektrum konzentriert sich der
Beitrag auf die Verteilung und Umverteilung hoher Einkommen mit unterschiedlichen
Reichtumsabgrenzungen für Selbständige und abhängig Beschäftigte. Zudem wird die sozioökonomische
Struktur der Reichen im Vergleich zu den Nicht-Reichen beschrieben. Die Signifikanz der
konkurrierenden Erklärungsfaktoren für die Wahrscheinlichkeit reich zu sein wird abschließend mit
einem multivariaten PROBIT-Ansatz aufgezeigt und diskutiert.
Dieses Papier ist eine revidierte und komprimierte Version meines Beitrags zum ersten Reichtums- und
Armutsbericht der Bundesregierung.
2002-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5992/1/MPRA_paper_5992.pdf
Merz, Joachim (2002): Reichtum in Deutschland: Hohe Einkommen, ihre Struktur und Verteilung.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6117
2019-09-29T04:36:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6117/
A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Direct Taxation
Emanuele, Canegrati
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
In this paper I analyse a probabilistic voting model where political
candidates choose a direct taxation policy to maximise the probability
of winning elections. Society is divided into groups which have di¤erent
preferences for consumption of leisure or, in other words, are di¤erently
single-minded on the amount of leisure. The use of a probabilistic voting
model characterized by the presence of single-minded groups breaks down
the classic results obtained by using the median voter theorem, because it
is no longer only the level of income which drives the equilibrium policies
but also the ability of groups to focus on leisure. The robustness of these
results is also demonstrated in the presence of heterogeneity in the labour
income. Finally, using data from the Luxemburg Income Study, I demon-
strate that the cohort-speci�c inequality is signi�cantly a¤ected by the
structure of the taxation system and that policies chosen by politicians
do not seem to be originated by the goal of equality.
2007-12-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6117/1/MPRA_paper_6117.pdf
Emanuele, Canegrati (2007): A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Direct Taxation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6174
2019-09-26T13:29:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513133
7375626A656374733D44:4438
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6174/
Cooperatives and Area Yield Insurance:A Theoretical Analysis
Pincheira, Pablo
Zeuli, Kimberly
D6 - Welfare Economics
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically investigate the potential benefits that arise from a cooperative selling a government subsidized area-yield contract (i.e., the Group Risk Plan). The indeminities in area-yield contracts are triggered by a geographically determined yield (e.g., a county-wide yield average) instead of the more conventional individual actual production history. Therefore, an area-yield contract would be appropriate for managing the cooperative's systemic throughput risk. The cooperative would also capture some of the substantial government subsidies that are normally given to a private insurance company. Our primary finding is that farmers should be indifferent when considering the decision to purchase area-yield insurance from a private company or encompass that business in their cooperative. We derive this result for the specific case of costless insurance and assume a Pareto Optimal contract. Under these assumptions, the government subsidies that the cooperative would hope to capture are simply a net deduction in their premiums. In other words, the benefit they capture from the subsidies is the same when they purchase the insurance from an outside firm or internally.
2007-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6174/1/MPRA_paper_6174.pdf
Pincheira, Pablo and Zeuli, Kimberly (2007): Cooperatives and Area Yield Insurance:A Theoretical Analysis.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6288
2017-12-22T03:28:20Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6307
2019-09-26T08:44:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3131
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4835
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493238
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6307/
(Mis-)Understanding Education Externalities
Mueller, Normann
O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
D62 - Externalities
H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
I28 - Government Policy
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
I22 - Educational Finance ; Financial Aid
This article reviews the current state of research on education externalities. It finds that
much of the confusion regarding their magnitude results from conceptual
misunderstandings about their nature. The concepts of 'education', 'teaching', and
'knowledge' need to be distinguished for a better understanding. Whereas pure teaching
yields externalities on the primary and secondary level, only the generation of knowledge
may produce the spillovers which are typically linked to the tertiary level. The
accumulation of education itself does not have such an effect. Education is argued to be a
private good with well defined property rights. Individuals may exploit those and provide
the production sector with the efficient amount of human capital. Following this rationale,
it is demonstrated that empirical studies, contrasting estimates of private and social
returns to education, are unsuitable to substantiate the existence of externalities. As a
consequence, subsidies to tertiary programs are called into question.
2007-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6307/1/MPRA_paper_6307.pdf
Mueller, Normann (2007): (Mis-)Understanding Education Externalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6324
2019-09-28T15:07:34Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6324/
Paretian evaluation of infinite utility streams: an egalitarian criterion
Alcantud, José Carlos R.
García-Sanz, María D.
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper contributes to qualifying the Basu-Mitra approach to the problem of intergenerational social choice, by analyzing the impact of the structure of the feasible set of utilities on Banerjee's (2006) impossibility theorem.
We prove that if the utilities that each generation can possess lie in $\NN \cup \{0\} $, then an explicit expression for a Paretian social welfare function that accounts for a strengthened form of Hammond Equity for the Future can be given.
2007-12-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6324/1/MPRA_paper_6324.pdf
Alcantud, José Carlos R. and García-Sanz, María D. (2007): Paretian evaluation of infinite utility streams: an egalitarian criterion.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6515
2019-09-28T12:17:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3437
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3236
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6515/
Crescimento da produtividade e organização do trabalho: discussão de alguns factores
Moniz, António
O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth ; Aggregate Productivity ; Cross-Country Output Convergence
M54 - Labor Management
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
L26 - Entrepreneurship
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
Recent studies continue to indicate the existence of a narrow relationship between flexible work organizations and the economic growth, in particular, Sweden and Germany. The measure of this relationship is many times the result of the value added per worker. Therefore, the causes of economic growth must be perceived from the interior of the company (work organization, technology, infrastructures, product design). On the other hand, the capacity of innovation can be perceived by the market through new products and services, and still significant changes with the introduction of new equipment and design of an efficient work organization.
In this article it is analyzed the evolution of the productivity and employment levels in Portugal and other European countries, over all, during the decade of 90. An analysis for sector is made still. One verifies often that economic growth can be without employment growth. However, the growth can be obtained when if it reaches bigger added value and the efficiency can be verified when there are diminished costs for a same period of time, although that the labor productivity is also the pointer of the quality of life in a economy, therefore it represents the value produced by the work.
Moreover, the total factors productivity is the measure of the technological and organizational progress (don’t includes only the technological investments). It is tried to get and to analyze the available statistics on these dimension in Portugal, concluding that Portugal presents an enterprise structure predominantly based on small and very small companies, a great number of which is market by a weak potential of adaptability, innovation and sustainability.
It becomes urgent to take the non-material factors that integrate the productivity dimension, as factors of intervention for a benchmarking that allows a process of sustainable growth.
2002-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6515/1/MPRA_paper_6515.pdf
Moniz, António (2002): Crescimento da produtividade e organização do trabalho: discussão de alguns factores. Published in: Economia e Prospectiva No. 21-22 (December 2002): pp. 89-108.
pt
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6882
2019-09-27T12:07:07Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D51:5130:513031
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6882/
The general validity of comparative advantage in trade exchanges
Dogaru, Vasile
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Q01 - Sustainable Development
A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists
In a recent article, Alan Deardorff (2005) analyses the strength of the comparative advantage’s principle. The present article’s purpose is to follow the generalization of some recent results (Dogaru, 2000; 2005b) and also to sustain the unification’s necessity of some comparative advantage’s presentation drafts, in the analytical economy’s basis. This way the statement of real assumptions inside economics can be assured, connected to processes developed in an extended economic time and space. From this perspective comparative advantage’s analysis is necessary due to the existence of the tendency in which once with some new instruments’ creations, usually more formal and using a mathematical instrument more sophisticated, the validity of comparative advantage’s classic principle would be denied. The idea of introducing the validity of the comparative advantage’s principle in the trade exchanges – considered by Samuelson versus Stanislaw Ulam an accepted truth by all economists (and not only) as being un undemonstrated one – is not a productive one from an analytical point of view, which could contribute to the economics’ development.
2005-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6882/1/MPRA_paper_6882.pdf
Dogaru, Vasile (2005): The general validity of comparative advantage in trade exchanges. Published in: Romanian Economic Review , Vol. 49-50, No. 2004-2005 (2005): pp. 171-198.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6918
2019-09-29T04:47:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3437
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6918/
Some observations regarding the demythification of the comparative advantage’s principle within Manoilescu generalized scheme
Dogaru, Vasile
O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth ; Aggregate Productivity ; Cross-Country Output Convergence
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists
The validity in time of the comparative advantage’s principle, also of its application’s denial, can generate certain misunderstandings in the good exchange’s observation for an outsider (common sense), including the expert from other economics’ areas. The resolution for these cases can be made through checking requires’ discharging of the analytical economicity’s principle. In these conditions it can be noticed if the schemes, deducted in the analytical decomposition’s basis of the standard actions, can be used in the more precise and easier measurement than through empirical calculations in order to determine the comparative advantage’s size, of the gains from trade and the productivity effect. Manoilescu generalized scheme has, from this perspective the two main characteristics: its building has started from the empirical reality’s study of the exchange phenomena and the observation has been made only inside the economics’ borders. This way the scheme sustains the unitary explanations’ approaches of some different angles of understanding the comparative advantage on basis of some analytical efforts of other researchers. The suggested scheme separates the strictly economic analysis from the one inside the politic area (commercial politics), also of the productivity effect from more exact connections, decompounding the measurement in two steps. The identification through dialectical judgements, made as a continuation of the analytical ones, of the concordance between the built analytical reality and the empirical one, assures the check of the analytical economy’s principle. This step contributes to the permanent validity’s grounding of the comparative advantage’s principle in the exchange connections within the competitive economies. Meanwhile, the demythification of its full and permanent usage is also supported, in the way of its maximum potential’s capitalization in the manufactured and exchanged goods’ choice. The comparative advantage’s principle is nothing but an application of the minimum effort’s principle – the last one having a wider area of action – and will probably remain in the economies based on the social, competitive, monetary or natural relations.
2005-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6918/1/MPRA_paper_6918.pdf
Dogaru, Vasile (2005): Some observations regarding the demythification of the comparative advantage’s principle within Manoilescu generalized scheme.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7016
2019-09-29T02:50:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7016/
Universal Basic Income and Negative Income Tax: Two Different Ways of Thinking Redistribution
Davide, Tondani
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
This article examines two redistributive policies: Negative Income Tax and Universal Basic Income. Its aim is to show that, although the two achieve the same distributive outcome through an appropriate tax-benefit system, they are fundamentally different from economic and ethical points of view. The approach integrates positive and normative analysis and explicit attention to ethical issues provides a more complete description of economic aspects. We show that Negative Income Tax scheme is coherent with the libertarian idea of distributive justice, while Basic Income follows egalitarian thought.
2008-02-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7016/1/MPRA_paper_7016.pdf
Davide, Tondani (2008): Universal Basic Income and Negative Income Tax: Two Different Ways of Thinking Redistribution.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7277
2019-09-26T17:52:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483230
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3130
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7277/
The Problem of Internalisation of Social Costs and the Ideas of Ronald Coase
Enrico, Baffi
D62 - Externalities
H20 - General
K10 - General
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
D60 - General
This work examines the influence of Coasian thought on the analysis of externalities as used by economists and legal economists. Ronald Coase, a Chicago scholar, advanced a series of critiques of the Pigovian tax system; the theorem that bears his name is merely the best known. In his 1960 work, he sought to demonstrate that the internationalisation of social costs was not always socially useful. In addition, he identified other institutional solutions to which systems can - and often do - resort. One of these solutions is to simply authorise the harmful activity without introducing mechanisms to internalise social costs. Beyond the abstraction of his ideas, Coase's method of analysis has not had a great influence on economists' thinking. His theorem, as it is commonly known, looks more like an elegant, abstract reflection then a tool for identifying institutional solutions to concrete societal problems. Among legal economists, however, Coase's teachings have had a greater influence. Unfortunately, even within this group of scholars, the conviction that external costs should, optimally, be internalised often emerges almost unconsciously in their literature. The risk inherent in this attitude lies in the possibility of finding systems for internalising social costs in legal institutions which do not appear to have such an underlying logic, as for example some kinds of tort liability.
2007-02-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7277/1/MPRA_paper_7277.pdf
Enrico, Baffi (2007): The Problem of Internalisation of Social Costs and the Ideas of Ronald Coase.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7407
2019-09-27T00:24:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453235
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443333
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7407/
Aggregate Productivity Loss and the Theil Index of Inequality
Aoki, Shuhei
E25 - Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
D33 - Factor Income Distribution
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
This paper suggests that the difference in the Theil indices of inequality between two economies approximately measures the relative loss of aggregate productivity caused by distortions in labor allocation. Moreover, the Theil index itself can be interpreted approximately as the possible maximum loss of aggregate productivity caused by these distortions.
2008-03-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7407/1/MPRA_paper_7407.pdf
Aoki, Shuhei (2008): Aggregate Productivity Loss and the Theil Index of Inequality.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7422
2019-09-26T20:06:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493330
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443230
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
7375626A656374733D46:4634:463433
7375626A656374733D4E:4E35:4E3536
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3530
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483730
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443133
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D49:4930:493030
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3130
7375626A656374733D49:4930
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443132
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413139
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513536
7375626A656374733D46:4634:463431
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7422/
Hacia la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en Mesoamérica. Estado de la Inseguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional y notas sobre políticas para su superación.
Mora-Alfaro, Jorge
Fernández-Alvarado, Luis Fernando
I30 - General
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D20 - General
H30 - General
F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies
N56 - Latin America ; Caribbean
M50 - General
H70 - General
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
I00 - General
A14 - Sociology of Economics
O10 - General
I0 - General
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
A19 - Other
Q56 - Environment and Development ; Environment and Trade ; Sustainability ; Environmental Accounts and Accounting ; Environmental Equity ; Population Growth
F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics
Q10 - General
In this document we may find the main characteristics about the food security situation in the Mesoamerican countries. The insufficient nourishment and nutrition, as well the poverty condition that involve an important proportion of the Central American and Mexican population, produce and human and social hardship frame, with and special emphasis in the rural areas of these countries. In addition to the risks that this situation represents to the persons, families and communities living in these conditions, the general circumstances increase the vulnerability in relation with the social, political and economical stability of these nations. This is a clear obstacle to their growth economic processes and to the more prompt integration in the international economy development. Primarily, when the inclusion of the population in the development process, the distributive policies and the social cohesion are crucial components of the socioeconomic and political model adopted by the countries where these situation prevail.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7422/1/MPRA_paper_7422.pdf
Mora-Alfaro, Jorge and Fernández-Alvarado, Luis Fernando (2005): Hacia la Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional en Mesoamérica. Estado de la Inseguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional y notas sobre políticas para su superación.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7629
2019-09-28T18:12:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D42:4231:423134
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423439
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3132
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7629/
Family evolution and contemporary social transformations
Sergio, Reuben
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
B14 - Socialist ; Marxist
H31 - Household
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
B49 - Other
J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse
D60 - General
In the first place, this paper intends to analyze the kind of relationships existing inside the family. In order to do that, the author makes an effort to reconsider its historical forming process applying the classical anthropological texts. At this stage, the analysis proposes two different types of relationships between human beings, the primal, which arose from the most elementary feelings of love, protection, accompaniment, and the strictly social, risen from the needs of cooperation and collective work. The family is the expression of both kinds of relationships. In the second place, this work analyzes the nuclear family as a result of a historical process associated to the development of capital and the social conditions that make possible its consolidation. And in the third place, the author proposes the discussion on the crisis of the nuclear family under the perspective of the contemporary global transformation of the accumulation of capital. As a conclusion: some reflections on the perspectives that these transformations offer to the role of the family.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7629/1/MPRA_paper_7629.pdf
Sergio, Reuben (2005): Family evolution and contemporary social transformations. Published in: Journal of comparative Family Studies , Vol. 37, No. No. 4
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7639
2019-09-26T14:57:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433638
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3533
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7639/
China’s New Development Strategy: Environment and Energy Security
Khan, Haider
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
D62 - Externalities
C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models
O53 - Asia including Middle East
O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products
This paper analyzes China's development strategy by focusing on both global and regional approaches to solving problems of energy security and ecological imbalance by addressing specifically the problems of China’s energy security. PRC’s growing energy dependence has become a major concern for both economic and national security policymakers in that country. The ambitious goal of modernization of the economy along the lines of the other newly industrialized economies(NIEs) of Asia has succeeded only too well, and it is difficult to reorient economic priorities. If examined rigorously, such an economic strategic assumption can be seen to entail the goal of creating further technological capabilities. In particular, China seems to be firmly committed to the creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation system as part of a knowledge-based economy of the future . Such innovation systems, called positive feedback loop innovation systems or POLIS have been created by advanced countries, and NIEs such as South Korea and Taiwan are proceeding to create these as well. But this will add to its energy burden and further dependence on the US as the power which controls the key sea lanes. Only a strategic reorientation to building a self-sustaining POLIS and appropriate regional cooperation institutions can lead to the way out of the current dilemma for China. Fortunately, such a model of POLIS which is distributionally and ecologically sensitive can be built for China and applied strategically to lead towards a sustainable development trajectory.
However, time is of the essence. Given the path dependence of development unless strategic disengagement from the existing path followed by a strategic engagement with the alternative strategy is begun within the next five years, it may well be too late. The stakes are indeed very high. A more detailed strategy paper based on the key ideas from the alternative strategy outlined here with concrete quantitative scenarios and feasibility studies along the lines of models sketched in the appendix ( and other, more detailed models) will go some distance towards giving the appropriate analytical foundations for the policy makers. The preliminary results confirm the predictions regarding fossil fuel-based energy shortage and lead towards a serious consideration of alternative energy sources. Achieving the twin goals of energy security and ecological balance are challenging but not impossible for China. Serious policy research can be used effectively if there is the political will to do so. The goal of regional cooperation is also achievable if patient negotiations in good faith can start in earnest. In particular, cooperation with other Asian economies, particularly Japan, Indonesia, Viet Nam and India will be crucial.This paper has sketched out the complexities of cooperation and conflict between China and Japan. Future work will address the problems of Regional cooperation for China in the East, South and South Asian context as well as in the context of Africa and Latin America.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7639/1/MPRA_paper_7639.pdf
Khan, Haider (2008): China’s New Development Strategy: Environment and Energy Security.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7684
2019-10-10T13:52:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7684/
Inequality: An explanation using State-Utility and Information Asymmetry
Gupta, Abhay
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
Having a formal understanding of what various institutions represent should be important. There
are few economic variables which can accumulate over time (and give us what i call as "state
utility"). All these institutions, like education, health, social (like caste system, dowry etc.), do is
change the way these state variables evolve.
Government affects these institutions by investing in them which changes the rate of evolvement
(via advances in technology or infrastructure or formal laws etc)
There are no "good" or "bad" institutions. There are institutions which are "in-line" with the
people's preferences and there are the ones who are "mismatch" with what people want.
As economist, we may think that since caste system etc. are not beneficial in "monetary" terms,
they are bad for growth. But comments like "i PREFER being hungry than borrow money from
some lower caste person (to start new business)" should make us realize that these institutions
are not like some mysterious forces. They represent the aggregate level mechanism by which
people let their preferences known and how these preferences evolve.
We should not force the kind of development (i.e. kind of institutions), we (policy makers) want
them to have. May be that is not what people want. Hence, having a formal understanding of
these institutions and the mechanisms through which government can know about these
"preferred" institutions becomes important.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7684/1/MPRA_paper_7684.pdf
Gupta, Abhay (2005): Inequality: An explanation using State-Utility and Information Asymmetry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7760
2019-10-01T20:04:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7760/
Incorporating fairness motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium concept: an application to experimental 2X2 games
Tavoni, Alessandro
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Substantial evidence has been accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts which perform better empirically, often by introducing a reference point to which players compare the available payoff allocations, as in impulse balance equilibrium (Selten & Chmura, forthcoming) and in the inequity aversion model (Fehr & Schmidt,1999). The purpose of this paper is to review some features of this recent literature and to propose a new, empirically sound, unifying concept which combines elements of fairness with reference considerations.
2007-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7760/1/MPRA_paper_7760.pdf
Tavoni, Alessandro (2007): Incorporating fairness motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium concept: an application to experimental 2X2 games.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8004
2019-09-27T05:34:29Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433632
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8004/
Application of functional analysis to models of efficient allocation of economic resources
Chichilnisky, Graciela
Kalman, P. J.
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
The present paper studies existence and characterization of efficient paths in infinite-horizon economic growth models: the method used is based on techniques of nonlinear functional analysis on Hilbert spaces developed earlier by Chichilnisky. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the existence of positive competitive price systems in which the efficient programs maximize present value and intertemporal profit. Approximation of these competitive price systems by strictly positive ones with similar properties is studied. A complete characterization is also given f a class of welfare functions (nonlinear operators defined on consumption paths) for continuity in a weighted L2-norm.
1979
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8004/1/MPRA_paper_8004.pdf
Chichilnisky, Graciela and Kalman, P. J. (1979): Application of functional analysis to models of efficient allocation of economic resources. Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications , Vol. 30, No. No. 1 (January 1980): pp. 19-32.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8044
2019-09-27T06:58:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D52:5234:523430
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8044/
In what circumstances is investment in HSR worthwhile?
de Rus, Gines
Nash, C.A.
R40 - General
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
The case for building new High Speed Rail (HSR) infrastructure depends its the capacity to generate social benefits which compensate for the construction, maintenance and operation costs. Decisions to invest in this technology have not always been based on sound economic analysis. A mix of arguments, besides time savings –strategic considerations, environmental effects, regional development and so forth– have often been used with inadequate evidence to support them.
We have explored under what conditions net welfare gains can be expected from new HSR projects. In this paper we use some simplifying assumptions with the aim of obtaining a benchmark: the minimum level of demand from which a positive social net present value could be expected when new capacity does not provide additional benefits beyond time savings from diverted and generated demand.
2007-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8044/1/MPRA_paper_8044.pdf
de Rus, Gines and Nash, C.A. (2007): In what circumstances is investment in HSR worthwhile?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8118
2017-12-22T06:56:02Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8123
2019-09-29T04:12:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4635
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443538
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8123/
On the mathematical foundations of political economy
Chichilnisky, Graciela
F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
D60 - General
Political economy views economic issues through the lens of political organisation. In today's world, it must focus on the roles of markets and of democracy, two concepts which are driving revolutionary changes in the political organisation of both Europe and Asia. There are two main paradigms for the analysis of markets and democracy, both of which have been mathematically advanced over a number of years: the general equilibrium theory of markets, and social choice theory, which examines practical aspects of democracy.' While it is true that political economy has made some limited use of the latter in order to examine political-economic issues of democracy, it has made little use of the former, the theory of market behaviour.
1990
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8123/1/MPRA_paper_8123.pdf
Chichilnisky, Graciela (1990): On the mathematical foundations of political economy. Published in: Cambridge Journal of Economics , Vol. 9, (1990): pp. 25-41.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8124
2019-10-02T20:12:58Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453234
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8124/
General equilibrium and social choice with increasing returns
Chichilnisky, Graciela
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
For any intransitive community preference, we construct a non-convex economy where all the marginal cost pricing general equilibria are Pareto inefficient (theorem 3.2). The result is valid without requiring a fixed income distribution rule (corollary 3.3). Intransitive community preferences are a frequent occurrence (theorem 3.1): necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the community preference fail in a set which is open and dense in the space of individual preferences with a standard topology.
1990
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8124/1/MPRA_paper_8124.pdf
Chichilnisky, Graciela (1990): General equilibrium and social choice with increasing returns. Published in: Annals of Operations Research , Vol. 23, (1990): pp. 289-297.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8260
2019-09-29T08:53:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8260/
Status Effects, Public Goods Provision, and the Excess Burden
Wendner, Ronald
Goulder, Lawrence H.
D62 - Externalities
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Most studies of the optimal provision of public goods or the excess burden
from taxation assume that individual utility is independent of other
individuals' consumption. This paper investigates public good provision and
excess burden in a model that allows for interdependence in consumption in
the form of status (relative consumption) effects. In the presence of such
effects, consumption and labor taxes no longer are pure distortionary taxes
but have a corrective tax element that addresses an externality from
consumption. As a result, the marginal excess burden of consumption taxes is
lower than in the absence of status effects, and will be negative if the
consumption tax rate is below the "Pigouvian" rate. Correspondingly, when
consumption or labor tax rates are below the Pigouvian rate, the second-best
level of public goods provision is above the first-best level, contrary to
findings from models without status effects. For plausible functional forms
and parameters relating to status effects, the marginal excess burden from
existing U.S. labor taxes is substantially lower than in most prior studies,
and is negative in some cases.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8260/1/MPRA_paper_8260.pdf
Wendner, Ronald and Goulder, Lawrence H. (2008): Status Effects, Public Goods Provision, and the Excess Burden.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8343
2019-10-02T02:45:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8343/
Ashamed to be Selfish
Dillenberger, David
Sadowski, Philipp
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D80 - General
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available alternative, may inflict shame on DM. DM has preferences over sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation that identifies DM's selfish ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the most prominent motive that can explain non-selfish choice. We identify a condition under which shame to be selfish can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for finitely many recipients and applied to explain a social decision maker's incentive for obfuscation.
2008-04-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8343/1/MPRA_paper_8343.pdf
Dillenberger, David and Sadowski, Philipp (2008): Ashamed to be Selfish.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8347
2019-09-26T08:23:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8347/
Life Satisfaction in Urban China: Components and Determinants
Song, Lina
Appleton, Simon
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J18 - Public Policy
Survey data from urban China in 2002 show levels of life satisfaction to be low, but not exceptionally so, by international comparison. Many of the determinants of life satisfaction in urban China appear comparable to those for people in other countries. These include, inter alia, unemployment, income, marriage, sex, health and age. Communist Party membership and political participation raise life satisfaction. People appear fairly satisfied with economic growth and low inflation, and this contributes to their overall life satisfaction. There is dissatisfaction over pollution, but this – like job insecurity – does not appear to impact on life satisfaction.
2008-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8347/1/MPRA_paper_8347.pdf
Song, Lina and Appleton, Simon (2008): Life Satisfaction in Urban China: Components and Determinants.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8348
2019-09-28T04:50:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8348/
In Search of Gender Bias in Household Resource Allocation in Rural China
Song, Lina
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
This paper tests three hypotheses concerning intra-household resource allocation in rural China. First, whether increasing the women's bargaining power alters household expenditure patterns. Second, whether households allocate fewer resources to daughters than to sons. Third, whether increasing the bargaining power of women reduces pro-boy discrimination. We find that expenditure patterns do vary with proxies for women's bargaining power. Pro-boy discrimination is suggested by: lower female outlay equivalent ratios for adult goods; greater sensitivity of household health spending to young boys than to young girls; and high male sex ratios. No evidence is found to support the third hypothesis.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8348/1/MPRA_paper_8348.pdf
Song, Lina (2008): In Search of Gender Bias in Household Resource Allocation in Rural China.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8377
2019-09-28T02:02:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503330
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3130
7375626A656374733D4E:4E33:4E3330
7375626A656374733D50:5035:503531
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8377/
Central Europe in transition: emerging models of welfare and social assistance
Cerami, Alfio
P30 - General
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
O10 - General
N30 - General, International, or Comparative
P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J18 - Public Policy
P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights
This paper discusses the emergence of a new model of welfare and social assistance in Central and Eastern Europe. It starts by briefly summarizing the most recent social policy developments occurring in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia and continues investigating the most urgent reform challenges and adaptational strategies. As argued elsewhere (see Cerami 2006a), the main argument of the paper is that CEECs are moving towards a new world of welfare capitalism, which combines old with new social policy characteristics. A special emphasis in this paper is, however, given to the systems of social assistance, since these represent the last public policy instrument to prevent citizens to fall into extreme poverty. As it will be argued, social assistance schemes did not only play a crucial role in the process of democratic transition cushioning the negative effects of the economic transformation, but they also represent important sources of democratic engineering providing legitimacy to the newly established market-oriented order. A substantial reconsideration in the social policy logic behind their establishment is, however, urgently required.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8377/1/MPRA_paper_8377.pdf
Cerami, Alfio (2008): Central Europe in transition: emerging models of welfare and social assistance.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8378
2019-09-26T07:53:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503330
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3130
7375626A656374733D4E:4E33:4E3330
7375626A656374733D50:5035:503531
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8378/
Poverty and Social Structure in Russia: An Analysis of the First Decade of Transition
Cerami, Alfio
P30 - General
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
O10 - General
N30 - General, International, or Comparative
P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J18 - Public Policy
P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights
This paper has four main objectives: (1) to monitor the rise of poverty and income inequality during the first decade of Russian transition; (2 to analyze the performance of the welfare state in reducing poverty and income inequality; (3) to identify the most vulnerable groups of transition; and (4) to elucidate the changes occurring in the social structure in terms of wage and income differences. The empirical evidences provided in the paper lead to the conclusion that the impact of the Russian welfare state has been rather limited with welfare institutions having only marginally succeeded in reducing poverty among people in need. This study has also highlighted how the Russian society is now slowly acquiring those characteristics of differentiation present in Western societies, which for so many years had been advocated by the population. Unfortunately, differentiation in wages has also implied a dramatic and excessive differentiation in life standards and opportunities. These are all challenges that the Russian welfare state is called to deal with. The individualization and monetarization of risks are, in fact, accentuating the self-perpetuating character of poverty, especially for children, elderly, large families with children, single mothers, farmers, manual workers, unemployed and social assistance beneficiaries.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8378/1/MPRA_paper_8378.pdf
Cerami, Alfio (2006): Poverty and Social Structure in Russia: An Analysis of the First Decade of Transition. Published in: Luxembourg Income Study No. Working Paper no. 445 (2006)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8444
2019-09-29T04:50:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433739
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8444/
Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem
Lahiri, Somdeb
C79 - Other
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together form a non-linear market equilibrium. The first result is used to establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the “fair share guaranteed” property.
2008-04-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8444/1/MPRA_paper_8444.pdf
Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8468
2019-09-29T22:00:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493330
7375626A656374733D51:5130:513030
7375626A656374733D41:4132:413230
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443330
7375626A656374733D48:4830:483030
7375626A656374733D4E:4E35:4E3536
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453630
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483730
7375626A656374733D46:4630:463030
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8468/
Desarrollo Territorial Rural en America Latina: Discurso y Realidades
Mora-Alfaro, Jorge
I30 - General
Q00 - General
A20 - General
D30 - General
H00 - General
N56 - Latin America ; Caribbean
E60 - General
H70 - General
F00 - General
F15 - Economic Integration
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
D60 - General
A14 - Sociology of Economics
The reorientation occurred in the socioeconomic, politic and institutional development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, since 80's decade, provoke significant transformations in the regional rural spaces. The socioeconomic bipolarization is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the new conditions of the rural areas: by one side, was conformed a dynamic sector of companies, familiar's producers and external investors, dedicated to goods exportation or a different non agriculture rural activities (NARA). On the other side, numerous rural families, without the resources and the capabilities to compete with the imported goods, were gradually excluded. The NARA and the familiar pluriactivity are two ways used by the rural families to incomes generations in this new context. But the persistent poverty shows that many of them couldn't obtain the resources needed for their wealth. The Territorial Rural Development Strategies (TRDS) are one of the proposals to impulse the productive, social and institutional development in the rural areas. But these strategies confront serious obstacles to concrete their objectives and to promote the population participation and the rural wealth. In this paper were analyzed the main obstacles to encourage the TRDS in the region.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8468/1/MPRA_paper_8468.pdf
Mora-Alfaro, Jorge (2006): Desarrollo Territorial Rural en America Latina: Discurso y Realidades.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8479
2019-09-28T17:15:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503330
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3130
7375626A656374733D4E:4E33:4E3330
7375626A656374733D50:5035:503531
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8479/
Social Change and Welfare State Developments in CEE and Russia
Cerami, Alfio
P30 - General
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
O10 - General
N30 - General, International, or Comparative
P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J18 - Public Policy
P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights
This paper provides a brief description of the main systemic problems (strukturprobleme) of post-communist capitalism(s), as well as exploring the main changes occurring in the social structure and the subsequent new social risks and welfare state responses emerging. It shows that post communist societies are characterized by more intense strukturprobleme, which are resulting in the materialization of broader social risks types and groups. As a consequence of a difficult and still uncompleted process of recalibration (functional, distributive, normative and institutional), the welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Russian Federation are called to face a double burden of responsibilities: they must ensure protection against old and new social risks for a larger proportion of citizens than those in the West, while, simultaneously, dealing with the most serious social, economic and political challenges stemming from the transition.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8479/1/MPRA_paper_8479.pdf
Cerami, Alfio (2007): Social Change and Welfare State Developments in CEE and Russia.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8482
2019-09-29T04:49:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503330
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3130
7375626A656374733D4E:4E33:4E3330
7375626A656374733D50:5035:503531
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8482/
New Social Policy Ideas in the Making: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe
Cerami, Alfio
P30 - General
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
O10 - General
N30 - General, International, or Comparative
P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J18 - Public Policy
P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights
Central and Eastern European countries have experienced a rapid transformation of their economic, political and welfare regime(s). From a state-paternalist welfare state, post-communist countries are now moving towards something new. A shift in the main social policy paradigm is, in fact, taking place: from central-planning to market-based welfare provisions, from public to private responsibility, from universal and flat-rate to insurance-based and contributions-related benefits. Most of these changes seem to be clearly paradigmatic, although it has still to be asked where the post-1989 social policy discourse originated. This paper aims to address this issue, by exploring the introduction of new social policy ideas in Central and Eastern Europe. The first section clarifies the difference between old and new social policy ideas within the specific context of Central and Eastern Europe. The second section provides a brief overview of the main changes in pension, health care and unemployment benefits, while the third section briefly summarizes the results. The main argument of the paper is that policy makers in the region have combined old with new social policy ideas in order to make the new welfare arrangement sustainable to internal and external pressures. In other words, they recasted the welfare state from within.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8482/1/MPRA_paper_8482.pdf
Cerami, Alfio (2006): New Social Policy Ideas in the Making: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8498
2019-10-09T20:26:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433739
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8498/
Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem
Lahiri, Somdeb
C79 - Other
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together form a non-linear market equilibrium. The first result is used to establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the “fair share guaranteed” property.
2008-04-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8498/1/MPRA_paper_8498.pdf
Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8540
2019-09-28T23:59:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8540/
Consumption Externalities and Pigouvian Ranking -- A Generalized Cobb-Douglas Example
Wendner, Ronald
D62 - Externalities
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper analyzes the impact of consumption externalities on the ``Pigouvian ranking,'' according to which the second-best level of public good provision is \emph{smaller} than the first-best level. Consumption externalities introduce exceptions to the Pigouvian ranking. Two necessary and sufficient conditions for reversal of the Pigouvian ranking are identified, when preferences for private goods (Cobb-Douglas) and the public good are weakly separable: (i) consumption generates a \emph{negative} externality, (ii) utility is not too concave in the subutility of private goods. If preferences are \emph{strongly} separable in the public good, the Pigouvian ranking is reversed if and only if the second-best consumption price is lower than the corrective (Pigouvian) consumption price.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8540/1/MPRA_paper_8540.pdf
Wendner, Ronald (2008): Consumption Externalities and Pigouvian Ranking -- A Generalized Cobb-Douglas Example.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8567
2019-10-05T16:19:14Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443138
7375626A656374733D44:4436
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D48:4838:483833
7375626A656374733D48:4835
7375626A656374733D49:4933
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8567/
La sociedad civil, el bienestar social y las transformaciones del Estado en Costa Rica
Reuben Soto, Sergio
D18 - Consumer Protection
D6 - Welfare Economics
H31 - Household
H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Several theoretical and methodological perspectives have been used to understand the trans-formations occurred during the last 20 years in the Costa Rican State. This work aims to de-fine a coherent approach of such transformations in order to understand them and be able to offer possible solutions to the social problems therefore originated. With that purpose, we formulate, in the first part, a theoretic-methodological proposal that will allow us to place those transformations and their associated social events in a consistent interpretative frame. In the second part, we order the main transformations and events accordingly to such frame. And in the third part, we suggest a general proposal to reorient those transformations in order to make them consistent with what appears to be the fate of our epoch.
2004-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8567/1/MPRA_paper_8567.pdf
Reuben Soto, Sergio (2004): La sociedad civil, el bienestar social y las transformaciones del Estado en Costa Rica. Published in: Reflexiones , Vol. 83, No. 1 (2004): pp. 21-30.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8698
2019-09-28T18:51:49Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31
7375626A656374733D44:4436
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3135
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8698/
Aspecte privind importanta resurselor umane pentru cresterea economica
Duda-Daianu, Dana Codruta
Izvercianu, Monica
Staicu, Florentiu
O1 - Economic Development
D6 - Welfare Economics
O15 - Human Resources ; Human Development ; Income Distribution ; Migration
D60 - General
This article tried to emphasize some aspects concerning the relation between economical increasing and investments in human resources. We proposed to study the correlation between economic performance and the application’s level of human resources management. The research was made on a number of firms from the West 5 Region. Supporting the role of investments in education and training, was sustained the idea of adapting the human resources to the structural changes of the economy imposed by the technical-scientific progress on efficiency criteria.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8698/1/MPRA_paper_8698.pdf
Duda-Daianu, Dana Codruta and Izvercianu, Monica and Staicu, Florentiu (2007): Aspecte privind importanta resurselor umane pentru cresterea economica. Published in: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on the Management of Technological Changes , Vol. Volume, (August 2007): pp. 179-184.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8725
2019-09-28T16:46:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433235
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8725/
Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments
Aadland, David
Kolpin, Van
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C71 - Cooperative Games
C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; Discrete Regressors ; Proportions ; Probabilities
The successful formation and long-term stability of a cooperative venture is often linked to the perceived fairness of the associated cost or resource allocation. In particular, the effectiveness of such collaborations can be hampered by the lack of a consensus view on what basis should be used for gauging an allocation’s “fairness.” Standards of equity in traditional cost-sharing applications could be assessed on many dimensions: per capita, per unit of demand, or per unit of revenue, to mention a few. This multiplicity of logically compelling “equity bases” is a feature common to many practical cost-sharing applications. Our analysis shows that features of the allocation environment are capable of explaining a substantial amount of the variation in the equity bases employed in practice and are consistent with the axiomatic principles of collective behavior.
2008-03-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8725/1/MPRA_paper_8725.pdf
Aadland, David and Kolpin, Van (2008): Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8748
2019-09-26T15:19:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493330
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503330
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483430
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3130
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3030
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8748/
EMERGENCE, ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS, AND DECLINE OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION
PONCE, ALDO
I30 - General
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
H41 - Public Goods
P32 - Collectives ; Communes ; Agriculture
J30 - General
P30 - General
H40 - General
J10 - General
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
J00 - General
D60 - General
P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights
This paper offers an institutional explanation for the growth, organizational transformations, and decline of the piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective based on Latin America. I analyze which institutional arrangements, political actors, and configurations of power contributed to the success and decline of the piqueteros. Applying the basic principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success, decline, and transformation of the organizational structures of the piquetero movement were mainly produced by a political cycle of deep political division within the ruling party (the Peronist party). Other socio-economic explanatory factors were the over-regulated Argentine labor market, and the exogenous impact of the Argentine economic crisis through relatively high unemployment rates.
2008-03-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8748/1/MPRA_paper_8748.pdf
PONCE, ALDO (2008): EMERGENCE, ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS, AND DECLINE OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8774
2019-09-28T20:07:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8774/
Is Segregation Robust?
Bøg, Martin
D62 - Externalities
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper studies the question of how well we understand segregation. The point
of departure is Schelling’s spatial proximity model in one dimension. By introducing
noise I show that segregation emerges as the long run prediction of neighborhood
evolution, both when residents have Schelling-type threshold preferences and strict
preferences for diversity. Analytical result are complemented with numerical simulations
which show that within a reasonable time frame full segregation does not occur.
When residents have a preference for diversity, I show that a natural perturbation
away from the diversity monomorphism dramatically alters the long run prediction:
integration is the unique long run prediction, even in the absence of noise.
2007-01-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8774/1/MPRA_paper_8774.pdf
Bøg, Martin (2007): Is Segregation Robust?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8780
2019-09-30T21:45:14Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8780/
A Characterization of Inefficiency in Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economies
Bloise, Gaetano
Calciano, Filippo L.
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D52 - Incomplete Markets
In this paper, we provide a characterization of interim
inefficiency in stochastic economies of overlapping generations
under possibly sequentially incomplete markets. With respect to
the established body of results in the literature, we remove the
hypothesis of two-period horizons, by considering longer, though
uniformly bounded, horizons for generations. The characterization
exploits a suitably Modified Cass Criterion, grounded on the
long-rung behavior of compounded safe interest rates and
independent of the length of horizons of generations. Thus, the
hypothesis of two-period horizons is purely heuristic in
establishing a criterion for inefficiency. In addition, for
sequentially incomplete markets, we adopt a suitable notion of
unambiguous inefficiency, separating the inefficient
intertemporal allocation of resources from incomplete
risk-sharing. Unambiguous inefficiency reduces to inefficiency
when markets are sequentially complete.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8780/1/MPRA_paper_8780.pdf
Bloise, Gaetano and Calciano, Filippo L. (2007): A Characterization of Inefficiency in Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economies. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Theory (2008)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8801
2019-10-05T20:52:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8801/
The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma
Mihara, H. Reiju
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Consider the problem of allocating k identical, indivisible objects among n agents, where k is less than n. The planner's objective is to give the objects to the top k valuation agents at zero costs to the planner and the agents. Each agent knows her own valuation of the object and whether it is among the top k. Modify the (k+1)st-price sealed-bid auction by introducing a small participation fee and the option not to participate in it. This strikingly simple mechanism (modified auction) implements the desired outcome in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. Moreover, no pair of agents can profitably deviate from the equilibrium by coordinating their strategies or bribing each other.
2008-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8801/1/MPRA_paper_8801.pdf
Mihara, H. Reiju (2008): The second-price auction solves King Solomon's dilemma.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8810
2019-10-04T04:55:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443537
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8810/
A general equilibrium theory of North-South trade
Chichilnisky, Graciela
D57 - Input-Output Tables and Analysis
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
D60 - General
This chapter presents an application of competitive general equilibrium theory of markets in the spirit of Walras, formalized in the 1950s by K. Arrow and by G. Debreu. In using general equilibrium theory to generate insight into current policy issues, it follows a tradition established by Arrow in his work on welfare economics of medical care (1963), on the organization of economic activity (1969), on the evaluation of public investment (Arrow and Lind, 1970), and in urban development (1970).
The intention if to use formalized general equilibrium theory to derive general statements about the economic behavior and interrelations between two groups of countries: industrial and developing countries.The goal is to obtain simple and general results, and for this purpose we consider a styled model with the minimum of characteristics needed for the task: two regions, two produced goods, and two factors of production. Within this simple model, we explore issues of current import, such as export-led policies and the transmission of economic activity between regions.
1986
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8810/1/MPRA_paper_8810.pdf
Chichilnisky, Graciela (1986): A general equilibrium theory of North-South trade. Published in: Equilibrium Analysis, essays in honor of Kennith J. Arrow , Vol. II, (1986): pp. 3-56.
en
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