2024-03-29T00:14:34Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:857
2019-09-26T14:33:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/857/
Organismos reguladores del sistema de salud colombiano: Conformación, funcionamiento y resposabilidades
Velandia Naranjo, Durfari
Restrepo Zea, Jairo Humberto
Rodríguez Acosta, Sandra
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
L51 - Economics of Regulation
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Regulation is a way of intervention of the public sector, which uses its legitimate and coercive power to establish restrictions to agent’s activities who participate in the market and guarantee the efficient allocation of goods and services and social welfare. In Colombia, as an interesting international experience, the health care sector adopted a scheme of regulated competition in which three organisms with regulation functions
participate; one of those is a committee of public choice and the other two are executive central branches. In this case, analyzing who, what and how is regulated, we find critical aspects trapped in the lack of long term strategic planning and some inherent elements to the committee structure which puts in doubt its autonomy
and the search for social welfare in decision making. In this context, questions about how is the agent’s participation in the regulation can direct the taken measures, as well as issues that consider representativeness of the committee and the election mechanisms of their representatives.
2002-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/857/1/MPRA_paper_857.pdf
Velandia Naranjo, Durfari and Restrepo Zea, Jairo Humberto and Rodríguez Acosta, Sandra (2002): Organismos reguladores del sistema de salud colombiano: Conformación, funcionamiento y resposabilidades. Published in: Borradores del CIE No. 1 (August 2002): pp. 1-24.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1018
2019-09-28T16:38:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1018/
Political Bad Reputation
Canegrati, Emanuele
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
The goal of this paper is to explore how the connection between
political ideology and voters’ preferences is able to generate different
equilibria in a yardstick competition game, where good incumbents are
forced to create a bad reputation or, in other words, to mimic the bad
incumbents’ behavior in order to win the elections in a two-candidate
political competition.
2006-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1018/1/MPRA_paper_1018.pdf
Canegrati, Emanuele (2006): Political Bad Reputation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1224
2019-10-10T18:12:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3538
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1224/
The Single Mindedness Theory of Labor Unions
canegrati, emanuele
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
J58 - Public Policy
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
In this paper I analyse a labor market where the wage is endogenously
determined according to a Right-to-Manage bargaining process
between a firm and a labor union whose members are partitioned into
two social groups: the old and the young. Furthermore, I exploit the
Single Mindedness theory, which considers the existence of a density
function which endogenously depends on leisure. I demonstrate that,
when preferences of the old for leisure are higher than those of the
young and when the level of productivity of the young is higher than
that of the old, the young suer from higher tax rates and gain higher
level of wage rates and lower levels of leisure. Finally, since the old are
more single minded than the young, they exploit their greater political
power to get positive transfers from the young in a PAYG system.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1224/1/MPRA_paper_1224.pdf
canegrati, emanuele (2006): The Single Mindedness Theory of Labor Unions.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1667
2019-09-28T19:01:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3134
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1667/
The Single-Mindedness theory: micro-foundation and applications to social security systems
Canegrati, Emanuele
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
J18 - Public Policy
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; Economics of the Handicapped ; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H31 - Household
The central purpose of this paper is to introduce a new political economy explanation to modern Social Security Systems. This approach is based on the Single-Mindedness Theory (SMT), which assumes that the more single-minded groups are able to exert a greater power of influence on Governments (and eventually obtain what they require) than those groups which dissipate their mindedness on several issues. Governments are considered as voting-maximizer policymakers, whose unique goal is winning elections. Using an OLG model
and a probabilistic voting approach, I will analyse a society divided into two groups, the old and the young, which only dier for their preferences for leisure. I will show that, in order to win elections, the Government sets the optimal policy vector taking into account preferences for leisure of both groups; eventually, the old obtain a lower
eective marginal tax rate and retire earlier, so that they can spend all their time in leisure, a fraction of which is used to undertake political activities whose aim is the capture of politicians.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1667/1/MPRA_paper_1667.pdf
Canegrati, Emanuele (2006): The Single-Mindedness theory: micro-foundation and applications to social security systems.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1842
2019-09-26T18:20:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1842/
Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access
Cotton, Christopher
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D44 - Auctions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
In competition for access, interest groups provide contributions to a politician and those that provide the highest contributions win access. Groups with access present information that may influence the politician's beliefs about the socially optimal policy. Because equilibrium contributions are chosen endogenously, the politician learns about the information quality of all interest groups, even when he grants access to only some of the
groups. Contribution limits reduce the signaling power of the equilibrium contributions, resulting in a less informed politician, and strictly reducing expected social welfare.
2007-02-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1842/1/MPRA_paper_1842.pdf
Cotton, Christopher (2007): Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1896
2019-10-08T04:48:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483237
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1896/
A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness
Canegrati, Emanuele
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H31 - Household
H27 - Other Sources of Revenue
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This work intends to specify a formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic
Voting Models with Single Mindedness Theory. The goal is to find an
equivalent expression to the Ramsey’s rule for a political economy environment
where Governments are assumed to be Leviathans rather than benevolents.
2007-02-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1896/1/MPRA_paper_1896.pdf
Canegrati, Emanuele (2007): A formula for the optimal taxation in Probabilistic Voting Models characterized by Single Mindedness.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2254
2019-09-29T04:46:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3230
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483633
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3134
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483630
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2254/
On redistribution effects of public debt amongst single-minded generations
Canegrati, Emanuele
J20 - General
H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J18 - Public Policy
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; Economics of the Handicapped ; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
H60 - General
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
In this paper I will introduce a new political economy model,
where there exists a competition amongst two political candidates,
which aim to set a policy which enables them to win elections, max-
imising the probability of winning. I will show that, if taxes neces-
sary to repay the debt are not lump sum but proportional to income,
we have dramatic distorting effect on the labour supply. The prob-
lem is exacerbate once we take into account that the Government
set taxes in order to favour the most in‡uencing social group. As a
consequence, effective marginal tax rates are differentiated amongst
social groups and thus the burden of public debt is not equally borne.
2007-03-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2254/1/MPRA_paper_2254.pdf
Canegrati, Emanuele (2007): On redistribution effects of public debt amongst single-minded generations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2320
2019-10-01T08:14:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3233
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3236
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3538
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443931
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2320/
The single-mindedness of labor unions when transfers are not Lump-Sum
canegrati, emanuele
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
J23 - Labor Demand
H61 - Budget ; Budget Systems
J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J18 - Public Policy
J26 - Retirement ; Retirement Policies
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
J58 - Public Policy
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
H31 - Household
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice ; Life Cycle Models and Saving
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
J11 - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; Economics of the Handicapped ; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
In this paper I analyse a labour market where the wage is endogenously
determined according to an Efficient Bargaining process
between a firm and a labour union whose members are partitioned
into two social groups: the old and the young. Furthermore, I exploit
the Single-Mindedness theory, which considers the existence of a density
function which endogenously depends on leisure. I demonstrate
that, when preferences of one group for leisure are higher than those
of the other group the latter suffers from higher tax rates and with
lower level of wage rates and lower levels of leisure. Finally, since the
former is more single-minded, it may exploit its greater political power
in order to get a positive intergenerational transfer which takes place
via labour income taxation. Empirical evidence from the WERS 2004
survey confirms main results of the model.
2007-03-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2320/1/MPRA_paper_2320.pdf
canegrati, emanuele (2007): The single-mindedness of labor unions when transfers are not Lump-Sum.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2461
2019-09-28T04:41:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2461/
Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis
Bougette, Patrice
Turolla, Stéphane
L40 - General
K21 - Antitrust Law
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms' characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinant factors of the Commission's decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti's policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2461/1/MPRA_paper_2461.pdf
Bougette, Patrice and Turolla, Stéphane (2006): Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2832
2019-09-29T11:51:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483536
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483531
7375626A656374733D43:4333:433335
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433235
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2832/
The Single-mindedness theory: empirical evidence from the U.K.
Emanuele, Canegrati
H31 - Household
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
H56 - National Security and War
H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; Discrete Regressors ; Proportions
C25 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; Discrete Regressors ; Proportions ; Probabilities
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J14 - Economics of the Elderly ; Economics of the Handicapped ; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
In this paper I will exploit answers coming from the British Election
Study in order to assess the validity of the Single Mindedness Theory. In
particular, I will evaluate whether political preferences of voters for political candidates depend on their age and some other characteristics such
as gender, education, religion, social and economic conditions. Performing LOGIT and PROBIT regression I will demonstrate that variable age
is statistically significant, demonstrating that Single Mindedness Theory
assumptions hold in the UK political environment.
2007-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2832/1/MPRA_paper_2832.pdf
Emanuele, Canegrati (2007): The Single-mindedness theory: empirical evidence from the U.K.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3113
2019-09-27T22:29:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D49:4930:493030
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443230
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3113/
Prospettive per un nuovo Welfare.
Reggiani, Tommaso
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
I00 - General
D40 - General
D20 - General
"Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" (A.O. Hirschman 1970) is a theoretical concept derived from the work of Albert O. Hirschman (1970) which is focused on two essential options in organizatios and products decline, being "exit" and "voice".The basis concept is as follows: members of an organization, whether consumers , or any other kind of human grouping, have essentially two possible responses when they perceive that the producer/organization is demonstrating a decrease in quality or benefit to the consumer/member: they can EXIT (withdraw from the relationship-the standard market strategy); or, they can VOICE (attempt to repair or improve the relationship through communication of the complaint, grievance or proposal for change -the standard political strategy). In this article we apply this approach to welfare and health care markets, emphasizing the main importance of LOYALTY option (a mixed "voice-exit" strategy).
2007-03-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3113/1/MPRA_paper_3113.pdf
Reggiani, Tommaso (2007): Prospettive per un nuovo Welfare. Published in: Appunti di cultura e politica , Vol. vol. 2, No. march-april (2007) (26 April 2007): pp. 35-38.
it
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5747
2019-09-30T04:32:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5747/
Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access
Cotton, Christopher
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D44 - Auctions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
There is substantial evidence that political contributions buy access to politicians. This paper incorporates access into a model of informational lobbying, then uses the access framework to analyze the impact of contribution limits on policy outcomes and representative citizen welfare. In the competition for access model, interest groups provide contributions to a politician and those that provide the highest contributions win access. A group with access can present verifiable evidence in favor of its preferred policy. Because equilibrium contributions are chosen endogenously, the politician learns about the evidence quality of all interest groups, even when he grants access to only some of the groups. A contribution limit reduces the amount of information available to the politician and tends to result in worse policy. Under a variety of assumptions, a limit has an unambiguously negative impact on representative citizen welfare. However, when the politician can choose whether to sell access or sell policy favors, a contribution limit can improve citizen welfare by making it more likely that the politician sells access.
2007-10-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5747/1/MPRA_paper_5747.pdf
Cotton, Christopher (2007): Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6117
2019-09-29T04:36:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6117/
A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Direct Taxation
Emanuele, Canegrati
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
In this paper I analyse a probabilistic voting model where political
candidates choose a direct taxation policy to maximise the probability
of winning elections. Society is divided into groups which have di¤erent
preferences for consumption of leisure or, in other words, are di¤erently
single-minded on the amount of leisure. The use of a probabilistic voting
model characterized by the presence of single-minded groups breaks down
the classic results obtained by using the median voter theorem, because it
is no longer only the level of income which drives the equilibrium policies
but also the ability of groups to focus on leisure. The robustness of these
results is also demonstrated in the presence of heterogeneity in the labour
income. Finally, using data from the Luxemburg Income Study, I demon-
strate that the cohort-speci�c inequality is signi�cantly a¤ected by the
structure of the taxation system and that policies chosen by politicians
do not seem to be originated by the goal of equality.
2007-12-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6117/1/MPRA_paper_6117.pdf
Emanuele, Canegrati (2007): A Contribution to the Positive Theory of Direct Taxation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7850
2019-09-30T03:28:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443835
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7850/
A Network-Economic Policy Study of Identity Management Systems and Implications for Security and Privacy Policy
Repkine, Alexandre
Hwang, Junseog
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
L51 - Economics of Regulation
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Solving the problems associated with identity management in the “virtual” world is proving to be one of the keys to full realization of the economic and social benefits of networked information systems. By definition, the virtual world lacks the rich combination of sensory and contextual cues that permit organizations and individual humans interacting in the physical world to reliably identify people and authorize them to engage in certain transactions or access specific resources. Being able to determine who an online user is and what they are authorized to do thus requires an identity management infrastructure. Some of the most vexing problems associated with the Internet (the deluge of spam, the need to regulate access to certain kinds of content, securing networks from intrusion and disruption, problems of inter-jurisdictional law enforcement related to online activities, impediments to the sharing of distributed computing resources) are fundamentally the problems of identity management. And yet, efforts by organizations and governments to solve those problems by producing and consuming identity systems may create serious risks to freedom and privacy. Thus the implementation and maintenance of identity management systems raises important public policy issues.
The identity management systems (the IMS-s) often tend to require more information from the consumers than would otherwise be necessary for the authentication purposes. The typical choice being analyzed in IMS is the one between a completely centralized or integrated system (one ID - one password, and a single sign-on) and the one comprising a plethora of (highly) specialized IMS-s (multiple ID-s and passwords). While the centralized system is the most convenient one, it is also likely to require too much personal information about the users, which may infringe on their rights to privacy and which definitely will result in serious damage should this personal information be stolen and/or abused. When more than two IMS-s interconnect (more of a practical side with various types of commercial values), they share the private information with each other, thus increasing consumers’ exposure to possible information misuse. It is thus rather obvious that the public policy plays an important role to maintain the structure of identity management systems ensuring the existence of a sound balance between the authentication requirements and consumers’ rights to privacy. The focus of this paper is on investigating this type of tradeoff by employing a theoretical framework with agents whose utility depends on the amount of private information revealed, and on making policy recommendations related to the issue of interconnection between alternative IMS-s. Our model derives optimal process of interconnection between IMS-s in the simple case of three IMS-s, then generalizing it to the case of more than three firms. The socially optimal outcome of the interconnection process in our model implies encouraging the interconnection between smaller rather than larger IMS-s.
2004-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7850/1/MPRA_paper_7850.pdf
Repkine, Alexandre and Hwang, Junseog (2004): A Network-Economic Policy Study of Identity Management Systems and Implications for Security and Privacy Policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8343
2019-10-02T02:45:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8343/
Ashamed to be Selfish
Dillenberger, David
Sadowski, Philipp
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D80 - General
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available alternative, may inflict shame on DM. DM has preferences over sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation that identifies DM's selfish ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the most prominent motive that can explain non-selfish choice. We identify a condition under which shame to be selfish can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for finitely many recipients and applied to explain a social decision maker's incentive for obfuscation.
2008-04-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8343/1/MPRA_paper_8343.pdf
Dillenberger, David and Sadowski, Philipp (2008): Ashamed to be Selfish.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9020
2019-09-30T17:09:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9020/
Ashamed to be Selfish
Dillenberger, David
Sadowski, Philipp
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D80 - General
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available alternative, may inflict shame on DM. DM has preferences over sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation that identifies DM's selfish ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the most prominent motive that can explain non-selfish choice. We identify a condition under which shame to be selfish can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for finitely many recipients and applied to explain a social decision maker's incentive for obfuscation.
2008-04-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9020/1/MPRA_paper_9020.pdf
Dillenberger, David and Sadowski, Philipp (2008): Ashamed to be Selfish.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9292
2019-10-01T10:23:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D41:4133:413339
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D48:4838:483833
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D59:5934
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D49:4933
7375626A656374733D52:5235
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D46:4635
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493238
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9292/
State of Governance in Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects.
Ahmad, Sayed Javed
A39 - Other
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
J18 - Public Policy
Y4 - Dissertations (unclassified)
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
O2 - Development Planning and Policy
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
R5 - Regional Government Analysis
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I28 - Government Policy
This paper discusses the problems and issues on the political failures in Bangladesh as well as identifies some possible solutions. The approach here is analytical mostly reviewing current news, reports and other related materials. A comparative study is also done between the present and proposed system to get a quick glimpse on the overall situation. The idea here is to seek out reasonable and practical solutions that would yield better result for Bangladesh and bring about positive changes in the political scenario that would allow the country to move forward as a successful and dignified nation. I’ve kept the scope of this paper limited to political party, elections and governance.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9292/1/MPRA_paper_9292.pdf
Ahmad, Sayed Javed (2008): State of Governance in Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9358
2019-09-27T01:57:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3236
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9358/
Gründungshemmnisse in Marktmechanismen und Marktumfeld: Facetten empirischer Evidenz
Block, Jörn
Brockmann, Heiner
Klandt, Heinz
Kohn, Karsten
L26 - Entrepreneurship
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
M13 - New Firms ; Startups
Vor dem Hintergrund von Markt- und Staatsversagenstatbeständen leitet die wirtschaftstheoretische
Literatur mögliche Hemmnisse für Existenzgründungen ab. Die vorliegende Studie unternimmt eine
Systematisierung unterschiedlicher Facetten entsprechender empirischer Evidenz. Hierbei liegt ein Schwerpunkt
auf Studien für Deutschland.
Diese Studien identifizieren verschiedene Hemmnisse auf Faktor- und Absatzmärkten, wobei besonderes Augenmerk
auf die Existenz von Finanzierungsschwierigkeiten gerichtet wird. So zeigen Gründer- und Unternehmensbefragungen,
dass sich insbesondere innovative Gründer und kleine, junge Unternehmen auf Finanzmärkten
Schwierigkeiten bei der Mittelbeschaffung gegenübersehen; auf Arbeitsmärkten fällt es Gründungen im Vergleich
zu etablierten Unternehmen schwerer qualifiziertes Personal zu gewinnen; und beim Eintritt in einen Absatzmarkt
werden Kundensuche und Auftragsakquisition als schwierig empfunden, während auf der Lieferantenseite
kaum Hindernisse gesehen werden.
Hinsichtlich staatlicher Rahmenbedingungen deuten Umfragestudien und internationale Institutionenvergleiche
darauf hin, dass bürokratische Hürden und Regelungen des Arbeits- und des Insolvenzrechts gründungshemmend
wirken können. Steht schließlich die Gründerperson im Blickfeld, so zeigen individualpsychologische
Studien, dass in Deutschland gründungshemmende Defizite im Bereich der persönlichen Risikotoleranz sowie
beim Vertrauen in eigene unternehmerische Fähigkeiten bestehen. Andererseits sind einige gründungsförderliche
Eigenschaften wie z. B. Leistungsbereitschaft im Ländervergleich stark ausgeprägt.
Insgesamt legt unsere Synopsis eine Vielzahl von Gründungshemmnissen offen, deren Existenz durch eine breite
Palette empirischer Evidenz untermauert ist. Wie allerdings diese Hemmnisse, die beispielsweise aus internationalen
Vergleichen institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen herauszulesen sind oder die im Zuge von Umfragestudien
artikuliert werden, letztendlich einzuordnen sind und ob sie tatsächlich auf Marktversagen (bspw. bei der
Gründungsfinanzierung) oder Staatsversagen (bspw. im Zusammenhang mit rechtlichen Rahmensetzungen)
zurückzuführen sind, bleibt trotz der Fülle empirischer Studien offen – zu defizitär sind häufig die Datengrundlagen
und verwendeten Methoden, die hinreichend abgesicherte Aussagen diesbezüglich ermöglichen würden.
2008-06-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9358/3/MPRA_paper_9358.pdf
Block, Jörn and Brockmann, Heiner and Klandt, Heinz and Kohn, Karsten (2008): Gründungshemmnisse in Marktmechanismen und Marktumfeld: Facetten empirischer Evidenz.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9598
2019-09-28T04:32:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523538
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3135
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9598/
Work-Life Reconciliation Policies From Well-Being To Development: Rethinking EU Gender Mainstreaming
Garofalo, M.R.
Marra, M
R58 - Regional Development Planning and Policy
O15 - Human Resources ; Human Development ; Income Distribution ; Migration
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
Across the European Union (EU), gender policies are cross-cutting initiatives incorporated within the major axes of regional operational programs, and specifically, within active labor-market, local development and inclusion policies. This is the so-called gender mainstreaming across EU Structural Funds, calling for increasing policy instruments integration. The aim of this paper is to understand if and how to improve women’s well-being and subsequently participation in collective action through reconciliation policies. These measures aim to allow women and men to choose how they can reconcile family care, paid work, career advancement, and leisure. The idea is that such a choice implies a time allocation pattern, which is not exclusively determined by market mechanisms and/or policy measures, but also by cultural trajectories, moral values, intrinsic motivations and rules (Folbre, Nelson 2002; North, 2005; Witt 2003), varying across regions and within groups. Furthermore, the outcomes of this choice are not completely internalized as individual well-being but they can also create positive externalities. First, this paper reconstructs reconciliation policies and their governance structures across less-developed regions in Italy (so-called EU Objective 1 areas) within the EU programming phase 2000-2006. Drawing upon this reconstruction, out analysis seeks to account for differences in both contextual conditions and individual characteristics, which, in turn, shape regional development processes. Second, the paper focuses on the design of conciliation policies to unveil what underlying microeconomic premises explain the expected beneficiaries’ behavioural change. Departing from the inadequacy of standard economics, whereby work-life reconciliation would be reduced to a unique choice pattern at the individual level, the paper examines those factors of subjective identities and contextual characteristics that actually affect work-life reconciliation choices, and by this way they can have a development impact (Bowles 1998, Ray, 2000, Sen 1999). In fact, the traditional public choice approach to gender policy may not only perpetuate a male-dominated structure of socioeconomic relations but it may also keep the economy working at a less efficient level. In other words, reconciliation policies may end up reinforcing a path dependent equilibrium of low efficiency, accentuating institutional, economic, social, and cultural traps (Bowles, Durlauf and Hoff 2006). By contrast, our idea is that reconciliation policies can work as development policies as long as they alter current power structures and enhance women capabilities. Building upon this critical review of the existing gender policy framework, we put forward a cognitive framework for work-life reconciliation as a driving force to development.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9598/1/MPRA_paper_9598.pdf
Garofalo, M.R. and Marra, M (2007): Work-Life Reconciliation Policies From Well-Being To Development: Rethinking EU Gender Mainstreaming.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10156
2019-09-26T19:35:50Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523538
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3338
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3332
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10156/
Cooperation networks and innovation: A complex system perspective to the analysis and evaluation of a EU regional innovation policy programme
Russo, Margherita
Rossi, Federica
R58 - Regional Development Planning and Policy
O38 - Government Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Recent developments in innovation theory and policy have led policymakers to assign particular importance to supporting networks of cooperation among heterogeneous economic
actors, especially in production systems composed of small and medium enterprises.
Such innovative policies call for parallel innovations in policy analysis, monitoring and assessment. Our analysis of a policy experiment aimed at supporting innovation networks in the Italian region of Tuscany intends to address some issues connected with the design, monitoring and evaluation of such interventions. Combining tools from ethnographic
research and social networks analysis, we explore the structural elements of the policy programme, its macroscopic impact on the regional innovation system, and the success of individual networks in attaining their specific objectives. This innovative approach allows us to derive some general methodological suggestions for the design and evaluation of similar programmes.
2008-06-26
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10156/1/MPRA_paper_10156.pdf
Russo, Margherita and Rossi, Federica (2008): Cooperation networks and innovation: A complex system perspective to the analysis and evaluation of a EU regional innovation policy programme. Forthcoming in: Evaluation. The International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice. , Vol. 15, No. 1 (January 2009)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10287
2019-10-01T12:52:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473233
7375626A656374733D47:4733
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D42:4235:423532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3531
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10287/
Gouvernement d'entreprise et décisions d'emploi
Boyer, Tristan
K2 - Regulation and Business Law
G14 - Information and Market Efficiency ; Event Studies ; Insider Trading
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions ; Financial Instruments ; Institutional Investors
G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
K31 - Labor Law
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
À l’origine de cette thèse se trouve la question suivante : « Qu’est-ce qui rend possible et justifie que les licenciements économiques soient de plus en plus nombreux dans les entreprises en bonne santé ? »
Autrement dit : « en quoi les décisions de licenciement sont-elles des décisions raisonnables ? ».
C’est-à-dire, pour reprendre les mots de Laurent Thévenot,
D’une part : quelles sont les raisons sur lesquelles les entreprises s’appuient pour agir ? i.e. les raisons qui régissent la décision rationnelle.
Et d’autre part : en quoi ces raisons sont de bonnes raisons ? qu’est-ce qui les rend acceptables, objectivables, justifiables au regard d’autres personnes.
À l’issue du travail sur cette question, cette thèse donne une lecture de ce qui rend raisonnable les décisions de licenciement.
L’objectif de ce travail est d’armer la critique de ce type de licenciement. Comment donner les moyens d’une critique de ce que de nombreux observateurs appellent « la gestion financière des ressources humaines » ?
Selon nous, cette critique suppose de remettre en question les représentations sur lesquelles se fonde le fonctionnement de l’entreprise.
Ce travail est donc structuré en deux parties : la première porte sur les licenciements et leurs justifications et la deuxième qui consiste à remettre en question les représentations couramment admises de l’entreprise et de son fonctionnement.
*******
Notre travail a donc commencé par l’analyse du cadre de la décision de licenciement économique collectif.
C’est en effet le préalable à l’étude des argumentaires des projets de licenciements : pour comprendre quelles contraintes et quels passages obligés pouvaient exister dans l’expression des motivations des décisions de licenciement, il était indispensable de déterminer le cadre juridique, économique, sociologique et historique du licenciement économique.
Sur le plan juridique, la loi de modernisation sociale apportait une définition plus restrictive des causes économiques d’un licenciement collectif. Toutefois, le Conseil Constitutionnel a décidé, au début de cette année (le 17 janvier 2002), de censurer cette nouvelle définition au nom de la liberté d’entreprendre.
Il en résulte donc le maintien des trois causes possibles antérieures : les difficultés économiques de l’entreprise, les mutations technologiques, la réorganisation en vue de sauvegarder la compétitivité de l’entreprise.
Il convient d’ajouter que le juge n’a pas le pouvoir de déterminer à lui seul la réalité de la situation économique de l’entreprise : il se borne à constater le caractère légal de la justification de la décision de licencier.
Quant au cadre d’analyse économique, si l’analyse économique néo-classique donne une image conforme à celle du droit des motivations possibles du licenciement économique collectif, elle bute néanmoins sur la prise en compte du travail comme une marchandise différente des autres.
Les approches en termes de capital humain, même si elles permettent de prendre en compte la dimension temporelle de la relation de travail, notamment à travers les questions de compétences et de formation, ne permettent pas de concevoir son aspect de contrat à durée indéterminée.
L’approche en terme de contrats implicites bute quant à elle sur la nécessité, pour analyser le licenciement économique collectif, de le concevoir comme résultant d’une décision unilatérale de l’employeur. Enfin, l’approche de Williamson, même si elle constitue une avancée majeure pour les économistes, reste limitée dans son analyse du licenciement économique collectif, car elle ne permet pas réellement de prendre en compte son aspect dépersonnalisé, c’est-à-dire collectif.
Sur le plan sociologique et historique, il semble que l’apparition des licenciements collectifs dans le cadre de la réorganisation des entreprises en vue de sauvegarder la compétitivité, au début des années 90, ait marqué un tournant important par rapport aux licenciements collectifs antérieurs.
Les licenciements économiques collectifs, qui étaient jusqu’alors essentiellement destinés à restaurer la rentabilité des entreprises, deviennent alors destinés à améliorer cette rentabilité.
C’est un véritable changement dans la nature des licenciements économiques : la décision de licenciement ne peut plus alors être conçue comme une décision prise en situation de crise : c’est inévitablement une décision qui se fonde sur l’interprétation d’indicateurs de gestion.
La décision de licenciement économique collectif apparaît alors nécessairement comme une décision stratégique : parce qu’elle a un impact déterminant sur l’entreprise et parce qu’elle est prise dans une perspective stratégique, c’est-à-dire avec des objectifs définis et évaluables.
Les indicateurs de gestion tiennent un rôle déterminant dans les processus de décision des entreprises. Ils déterminent, par leurs structures, les objectifs de l’entreprise : ils sont le prisme au travers duquel les dirigeants analysent la situation de l’entreprise et sont à l’origine du diagnostic porté.
On comprend donc que certains auteurs aient pu voir dans l’instrumentation de gestion un facteur déterminant à l’origine des licenciements, comme la notion de licenciement réflexe le suppose.
Toutefois, il nous semble que cette perspective doit être nuancée du fait de la nature essentiellement stratégique de cette décision, ce qui l’insère dans une structure d’instrumentation de gestion, amis aussi dans une structure organisationnelle.
Le projet de licenciement apparaît alors comme un objet de cette gestion stratégique.
*
Le deuxième temps de notre réflexion s’est alors axé sur les justifications des plans de licenciement (à propos de l’ensemble constitué par le plan social proprement dit et par l’argumentaire économique (ou volet économique), nous parlerons du plan de licenciement).
Le cadre théorique que nous avons choisi est celui des Économies de la Grandeur, qui met au centre de toute coordination la notion de justification : dans ce cadre, pour être applicable, une décision doit pouvoir être justifiée.
Le terrain auquel s’applique cette analyse repose sur des entretiens avec des DRH, des directeurs financiers, des avocats et des consultants qui travaillent pour le compte des directions d’entreprise. Afin de multiplier les angles d’approche, nous avons aussi travaillé avec des experts de comité d’entreprise et leurs avocats sur des cas de licenciement économique collectif et, bien entendu, sur les documents qui s’y rapportent.
De cette approche croisée résulte une analyse qui permet de mettre en valeur deux aspects de la décision de licenciement :
1. D’une part, la décision de licenciement est justifiée sur le plan économique, comme la loi l’exige, mais cette justification ne donne que le contexte de la décision des dirigeants.
Les justifications des dirigeants relèvent de la gestion, c’est-à-dire de leur appréciation souveraine de ce qui doit être fait face à un contexte économique donné. Leur interprétation du contexte économique de la décision étant explicitée par la justification économique.
Il appartient donc aux lecteurs des argumentaires économiques de plan de licenciement de déterminer la justification de gestion pour pouvoir proposer des alternatives. En effet, celle-ci n’est jamais explicitement formulée dans le plan de licenciement : elle est du domaine exclusif des dirigeants, elle ne fait pas partie de la justification économique proprement dite.
2. D’autre part, et c’est le deuxième enseignement de notre travail de terrain, les justifications des décisions de licenciement reposent sur trois arguments. Ces trois arguments forment la base et le contour des argumentaires. On peut ainsi résumer la logique des plans de licenciement : « le marché a conduit l’entreprise à de mauvais résultats auxquels il convient de réagir par une amélioration de la productivité et/ou de la rentabilité qui passe par des licenciements douloureux mais indispensables à la survie de l’entreprise ».
Cet enchaînement presque mécanique permet de concevoir la décision de licenciement comme inévitable. On trouve ici les grandeurs marchandes, industrielles et civiques définies par Boltanski et Thévenot.
En effet, il n’y a que dans les registres marchands et industriels que les licenciements économiques collectifs peuvent être considérés comme des actions justifiées, et selon la terminologie de ces auteurs, comme une décision guidée par un bien supérieur commun.
En ce sens, les argumentaires de plan de licenciement revêtent un certain formalisme, mais ils permettent cependant de rechercher, à travers la description du contexte économique de la décision des dirigeants, ce qui les a guidés sur le plan stratégique, même si, sur ce point, d’autres grandeurs peuvent avoir été mobilisées (comme les grandeurs domestiques et connexionnistes).
Il résulte de cette analyse et de notre travail d’intervenant dans des cas de difficultés économiques analogues que la décision de licenciement n’est en aucun cas la seule possible pour redresser une entreprise.
Il en résulte aussi que les actionnaires jouent un rôle déterminant dans ces décisions, soit en permettant de les éviter en remettant les finances de l’entreprise à flot, soit à travers l’image que les dirigeants et les membres du conseil d’administration peuvent avoir des exigences des actionnaires, notamment en matière de rendement de l’action.
*******
L’importance de l’image des attentes des actionnaires nous a conduit à nous interroger sur le rôle des principes de Corporate Governance dans les décisions d’emploi.
Les principes de Corporate Governance résument les attentes des actionnaires, et en particulier des fonds de pension, en matière de communication de l’entreprise avec les marchés financiers.
Ils reposent sur l’idée que, pour faire fructifier leurs investissements, les actionnaires doivent pouvoir contrôler les actions des dirigeants de l’entreprise.
On comprend qu’un grand nombre d’analyses théoriques des pratiques de Corporate Governance distinguent alors des modèles qui varient selon le contexte légal des pays considérés. On comprend aussi qu’il s’agit, pour les entreprises qui souhaitent se conformer ainsi aux principes de Corporate Governance, de répondre aux attentes des investisseurs.
C’est cette interprétation des dirigeants des entreprises que nous avons appelée « convention de financiarisation » et qui consiste, à travers la stratégie de l’entreprise mise en œuvre, à satisfaire la supposée exigence de rendement de l’action à court terme des investisseurs.
En mobilisant de nombreuses études à l’appui de notre raisonnement, nous avons montré que cette convention de financiarisation est illégitime en ce qui concerne les décisions de licenciement : elle ne permet pas aux entreprises qui l’appliquent d’atteindre leur objectif de satisfaction des actionnaires pas plus que de justifier leur décision du point de vue juridique, RH ou économique.
En effet, les études concernant les liens entre licenciement et cours de l’action montrent que la réaction des marchés financiers est globalement négative lors de l’annonce de licenciement ou de réduction d’effectif. Ces résultats deviennent franchement négatifs au fur et à mesure que l’on accroît la période sur laquelle on analyse l’impact de l’annonce.
Il apparaît cependant que ce résultat peut être positif si l’entreprise annonce une stratégie de redressement cohérente qui impose entre autres choses de réduire les effectifs.
Toutefois, ces études montrent aussi de manière évidente que les entreprises qui licencient n’améliorent pas sensiblement leur performance économique en 3 ans et que les entreprises qui ne licencient pas et celles qui embauchent voient leur cours augmenter de manière nettement plus rapide que les autres.
Il apparaît donc, et cela est confirmé par des études sur les critères de décision des investisseurs et nos entretiens avec des traders, que les acteurs des marchés financiers ont une analyse plus élaborée et fine des entreprises que la convention de financiarisation pouvait le laisser supposer.
Il nous a alors paru nécessaire de s’interroger sur ce qui est l’enjeu principal de la Corporate Governance : en fonction de quels intérêts une entreprise doit-elle être gouvernée ?
De cette question découle la question de la représentation de l’entreprise : quel est son périmètre, qui la compose, comment définir son intérêt et ses responsabilités ?
*
Le droit autant que l’économie ne conçoivent pas, dans leurs théories classiques, l’existence de l’entreprise : pour l’économiste, elle se réduit à la figure de l’entrepreneur maximisateur, tandis que pour le juriste, l’entreprise se réduit à la personne morale de la société.
Un détour par les théories juridiques du pouvoir, notamment, montre la difficulté à concevoir l’entreprise comme une unité. C’est donc à travers la notion de système autopoïétique (développée par G. Teubner) à propos du droit et du groupe de société que nous avons tenté de définir l’entreprise.
L’intérêt de cette approche est de considérer l’entreprise comme un système fonctionnant de manière analogue à un système vivant, c’est-à-dire en interaction avec son environnement dans une relation d’interprétation réciproque des messages de l’un et de l’autre.
Cette perception permet de concevoir l’entreprise comme un système qui s’organise lui-même, se régule et se reproduit. C’est un apport réel à la question de la définition de l’entreprise et de son contour. Toutefois, de cette conception découle une perception totalement désincarnée de l’entreprise.
Nous avons alors tenté de rapprocher l’acteur et le système. Cette perspective s’appuie sur les travaux de Crozier et de Friedberg qui s’appuient sur la notion de pouvoir et sur la notion de système d’action concret qui conjugue les raisonnements stratégiques et systémiques.
Nous avons cependant voulu proposer une autre possibilité de rapprochement à travers la notion d’objet-système que nous avons conçu comme une introduction à l’idée de système autopoïétique comme objet saisi dans « l’action ensemble » (Thévenot). Dans cette perspective, l’objet dépasse la seule perception que les acteurs qui s’en saisissent peuvent en avoir pour interagir, selon les principes du système autopoïétique avec eux et avec l’environnement.
Loin d’être une théorie complète et finie, cette intuition théorique doit plutôt être regardée comme l’amorce d’un rapprochement qui nous semble nécessaire ou du moins extrêmement fécond entre acteur et système.
Si, en ce sens, cette approche théorique ne permet pas de répondre directement à la question de la définition des stakeholders de l’entreprise, elle permet de comprendre que ceux qui sont concernés par l’entreprise ne sont pas seulement ses dirigeants et/ou ses actionnaires, mais aussi tous ceux qui peuvent s’en saisir dans l’action : salariés, fournisseurs, citoyens, clients et même dans une certaine mesure l’environnement.
*******
Pour conclure, cette thèse concerne le licenciement et son impact et montre la nécessité d’une conception élargie de l’entreprise dans ses décisions. En ce sens, c’est une pierre dans la construction d’outils susceptibles de permettre l’élaboration d’une théorie de l’entreprise « élargie » qui puisse prendre en compte les intérêts de ses parties prenantes et en être tenue pour responsable.
English Abstract: This work aims at explaining the decision process of employment decisions within the firm through a pluridisciplinary approach (especially economy, management and law). Relying on the study of specific issues as corporate governance, accounting norms, monitoring tools, and through the use of many event studies looking at the link between stock price, economic performance in the US and France, this work is also based on a theoretical reflection about the nature of the firm (with an institutional approach of the legal and organizational structure).
2002
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10287/1/MPRA_paper_10287.pdf
Boyer, Tristan (2002): Gouvernement d'entreprise et décisions d'emploi. Published in:
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10460
2019-10-01T17:54:49Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513137
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10460/
La protección arancelaria al comercio agrícola mundial diez años después de la firma del acuerdo sobre agricultura de la Ronda Uruguay
Mahia, R.
Arce, Rafael de
Escribano, Gonzalo
Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
In this paper, an analysis of current state of agricultural trade barriers is carried out alter ten years of Uruguay Round Agricultural Trade Agreement Signature The descriptive analysis showed that small advances in trade barriers removing have been taken out. About the heterogeneity in tariff applications, tariff progresivity and peak tariffs, the same situation is pointed out.
2005-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10460/1/MPRA_paper_10460.pdf
Mahia, R. and Arce, Rafael de and Escribano, Gonzalo (2005): La protección arancelaria al comercio agrícola mundial diez años después de la firma del acuerdo sobre agricultura de la Ronda Uruguay. Published in: Información Comercial Española ICE No. 820 (February 2005): pp. 223-233.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11409
2019-09-30T13:35:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503131
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483633
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433630
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413131
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523538
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3338
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D48:4838:483833
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3136
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11409/
Reforma da Administração Pública: Antes e Depois da Democracia
Martins, J. Albuquerque
P11 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt
C60 - General
A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists
R58 - Regional Development Planning and Policy
L38 - Public Policy
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
O16 - Financial Markets ; Saving and Capital Investment ; Corporate Finance and Governance
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
D00 - General
After the micro politics, the complexity of the “public management”, polity and policies, is the same of the “private management” or the management of the others sectors of the social production reality. The science of management it is not defined by products, functions, sectors and so on, as occurs in the economic as discipline with it focus on finance or bank.
The reasons for the activity of public and the private management are the same: the persons (market). In a post-modernism way and by influence or “imposition” of non-public big organizations, nowadays, we said “objectives”, corporate, agency theory and others best and next steps like new public management.
In this form any drive is valid and, after all, the driver don’t require any content. In that form, we are entering in the world of anaesthetics impressionisms and modernism. The costs, crisis and bankruptcy of that are enormous. Nowadays we know it, but, in fact, we know it since 1960-1980 by project PIMS, MBO, bureaucracy/autocracy and others mechanics budgets accounts.
That idealisticism and arithmetic management, economics, and influent organizations put in market one socio-psychologism and not an objective management. So, by descriptive and evidence mode, we conclude that when it applied in public administration, independently of the regime, the desired reform of the organization –in a strategic line, “society”- not occurs.
2008-03-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11409/1/MPRA_paper_11409.pdf
Martins, J. Albuquerque (2008): Reforma da Administração Pública: Antes e Depois da Democracia.
pt
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11730
2019-10-04T22:26:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4335
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11730/
Forecasting Elections from Voters’ Perceptions of Candidates’ Ability to Handle Issues
Graefe, Andreas
Armstrong, J. Scott
C5 - Econometric Modeling
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Ideally, presidential elections should be decided based on how the candidates would handle issues facing the country. If so, knowledge about the voters’ perception of the candidates should help to forecast election outcomes. Our model, named PollyIssues, provides a forecast of the winner of the popular vote in U.S. Presidential Elections based on the voters’ overall perception of which candidate will do the best job in handle the issues facing the country. The PollyIssues correctly picked the winner for the last ten elections from 1972 to 2008 and provided an idea of the margin of victory. In predicting the two-party vote percentages for the last three elections from 2000 to 2008, its out-of-sample forecasts outperformed those derived from well-established econometric models.
2008-08-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11730/1/MPRA_paper_11730.pdf
Graefe, Andreas and Armstrong, J. Scott (2008): Forecasting Elections from Voters’ Perceptions of Candidates’ Ability to Handle Issues.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11853
2019-09-26T22:13:41Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11853/
Financial consequences of the sales variation
Burja, Camelia
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
The risk represents a continuously presence within the economical environment specific for one market economy, being an essential element for substantiating the economic decisions. The paper presents many analysis models for the operating risk based on studying the breakeven point, the positioning index and the elasticity coefficient. The analysis conclusions are stronger through studying the factors which influence the elasticity coefficient extend. The analysis is illustrated by an adequate study case.
2008-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11853/1/MPRA_paper_11853.pdf
Burja, Camelia (2008): Financial consequences of the sales variation. Published in: Proceedings International Conference on Applied Economics 2008 Kastoria Greece (May 2008): pp. 105-110.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12388
2019-10-07T16:29:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3331
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12388/
Put your money where your mouth is
Malki, Elli
L31 - Nonprofit Institutions ; NGOs ; Social Entrepreneurship
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This article presents a method for nonprofits to calculate a budgetary allocation which is consistent with their strategic goals. The method is based on the application of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to budgetary allocation. A proposed index, which is based on a comparison between the calculated budgetary allocation and the actual one, can help nonprofits to determine the level of fit between their goals and their budgetary priorities.
2008-12-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12388/1/MPRA_paper_12388.pdf
Malki, Elli (2008): Put your money where your mouth is.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12766
2019-09-27T11:11:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453634
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12766/
A simulation on the 2013 EU Regional Policy Outcome
Torrisi, Gianpiero
E64 - Incomes Policy ; Price Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J18 - Public Policy
The aim of this paper is to estimate the effects of EU regional policy with respect to
economic convergence. In particular, I tried to “measure” the effect of EU regional
policy on the per capita Gross Domestic Product by means of a simulation that starts
from the GDP growth rate estimated by Eurostat concerning the 2006-2008 sample.
The original point of my work consists in a way to consider separately GDP growth and
Population growth.
I acted as follows: first, I considered the estimated GDP growth rate in the sample
2006-2008 and I calculated the average rate; second, I calculated the average population
growth rate in the sample 1998-2003 and, finally, I used the two rate to forecast the
GDP per capita in the 2013. The idea behind this technical procedure is that change in
demographic variable have a stronger inertia than change in the economic variable.
It is important to underline that the purpose of this paper is not to make a good
forecast of the 2013 situation concerning the GDP per capita, but representing an
optimistic frame that does not consider many theoretical factors that should worsen the
whole economic performance.
Despite the simplicity of the method adopted this framework may be very powerful.
In fact it is able to analyse not only a ceteris paribus scenario, but also the effect of
Public Policy eventually even year by year without complex assumption on such a rule
that governs the two rate here considered.
In this work I propose an analysis that may be thought as divided into two main
parts. The first one with the aim to provide a synthesis of the main results achieved in
literature about the economic convergence. In a second part, I provide a forecast based
on empirical evidence. At margin note that the empirical evidence here considered is
consistent with some assertion provided by literature.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12766/1/MPRA_paper_12766.pdf
Torrisi, Gianpiero (2007): A simulation on the 2013 EU Regional Policy Outcome.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13069
2019-09-27T07:22:26Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473138
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433139
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13069/
Composite and decomposable indicators for evaluating RIA systems in practice: proposals for discussion and testing
de Panizza, Andrea
G18 - Government Policy and Regulation
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
C19 - Other
This paper proposes a first attempt for the development of a statistical tool where basic measures and/or tests (i.e. individual indicators) are organised and grouped in composite indices addressing different dimensions within Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The latter can be variously combined, resulting also in more general, synthetic indicators, preserving the components’ constituent elements. Due to current limitations in information availability, weights for aggregation are left undetermined in practice; the same reason impacts on selection of elementary indicators and the shape of composites, so that appropriate methodologies ought to be applied to get to a fully operational stage. A derived frame is also proposed, limited to a monetary perspective on the overall performance of RIA national systems, by means of a handful of key indicators which are less dependent on issues of aggregation
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13069/1/MPRA_paper_13069.pdf
de Panizza, Andrea (2007): Composite and decomposable indicators for evaluating RIA systems in practice: proposals for discussion and testing. Published in: ENBR working papers , Vol. 2007, No. 9 (2007): pp. 1-21.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13595
2019-10-24T18:02:51Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14746
2019-09-28T16:30:49Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14746/
Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
Baldursson, Fridrik M.
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
K10 - General
This paper briefly summarizes recent research on justice, in particular Konow’s (2003) positive theory of justice. This research is then applied to recent events in Iceland: the attempt by Iceland’s largest bank to take over a savings bank. Shortly after the deal was announced the Icelandic Parliament quickly and unanimously passed a law which blocked it by creating a hold-up situation for the savings bank board: if it converts the bank to a corporation – as is necessary prior to takeover – an outside board will replace the present board. It is argued that the strong support for the law is puzzling when seen from the perspective of theories of pressure groups, regulatory threat and privatization. However, the paper claims that this may be explained by positive analysis of justice: the board played an ultimatum game against the general public and made what was perceived as an unfair proposal. The proposal was soundly rejected by the public, as usually happens when unfair offers are made in ultimatum games.
2004
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14746/1/MPRA_paper_14746.pdf
Baldursson, Fridrik M. (2004): Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir. Published in: Fjármálatíðindi , Vol. 51, No. 2 (2004): pp. 78-86.
is
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14749
2019-10-05T14:04:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14749/
Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir
Baldursson, Fridrik M.
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
K10 - General
This paper briefly summarizes recent research on justice, in particular Konow’s (2003) positive theory of justice. This research is then applied to recent events in Iceland: the attempt by Iceland’s largest bank to take over a savings bank. Shortly after the deal was announced the Icelandic Parliament quickly and unanimously passed a law which blocked it by creating a hold-up situation for the savings bank board: if it converts the bank to a corporation – as is necessary prior to takeover – an outside board will replace the present board. It is argued that the strong support for the law is puzzling when seen from the perspective of theories of pressure groups, regulatory threat and privatization. However, the paper claims that this may be explained by positive analysis of justice: the board played an ultimatum game against the general public and made what was perceived as an unfair proposal. The proposal was soundly rejected by the public, as usually happens when unfair offers are made in ultimatum games.
2004
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14749/1/MPRA_paper_14749.pdf
Baldursson, Fridrik M. (2004): Réttlæti og sérhagsmunir. Published in: Fjármálatíðindi , Vol. 51, No. 2 (2004): pp. 78-86.
is
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15220
2019-10-01T18:16:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15220/
Analysis of Risk Behavior of Households: Evidence from Gender Sensitive JFM Programme in West Bengal
Das, Nimai
Sarker, Debnarayan
Q23 - Forestry
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
H41 - Public Goods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
In an attempt to examine the extent of risk faced by households under gender sensitive JFM programme in West Bengal, this study suggests that JFM programme could reduce more risk related hardship for JFM households by their increase (decrease) in time and income on forest (non-forest) related works which non-JFM households fail to receive. Within JFM villages, female FPC-households not only yield higher per capita net real income but also contribute female’s higher share of their family income, which they only receive from forest source, than their men’s after JFM situation indicating higher diversification of forest works in female FPC-villages.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15220/1/MPRA_paper_15220.pdf
Das, Nimai and Sarker, Debnarayan (2008): Analysis of Risk Behavior of Households: Evidence from Gender Sensitive JFM Programme in West Bengal.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15232
2019-09-27T04:43:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15232/
Social Capital and Network Externalities: Evidence from Gender Sensitive JFM Programme in West Bengal
Das, Nimai
Sarker, Debnarayan
Q23 - Forestry
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
This empirical exercise examines the impact of network externalities of social capital in a gender sensitive planning on Joint Forest Management Programme in West Bengal. One impact is that the pre-existing traditional characteristics of community solidarity, mutual trust and coordinated actions are the inner dynamic of the development for higher level social capital in JFM compared with non-JFM villages after JFM situation. The positive complementary effect of network externalities is also higher for the former villages. These two effects are more pronounced in women FPC villages in general and among very poor categories of households in particular within JFM villages.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15232/1/MPRA_paper_15232.pdf
Das, Nimai and Sarker, Debnarayan (2008): Social Capital and Network Externalities: Evidence from Gender Sensitive JFM Programme in West Bengal.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15305
2019-10-02T04:36:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
7375626A656374733D51:5130:513031
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15305/
Can Joint Forest Management Programme Sustain Rural Life: A Livelihood Analysis from Community-based Forest Management Groups
Das, Nimai
Q23 - Forestry
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Q01 - Sustainable Development
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
This empirical study assesses the impact of community-based initiative under gender sensitive joint forest management (JFM) programme on sustainable rural livelihoods (SRL) across the socio-economic groups of forest fringe community based on JFM and non-JFM villages. The study suggests that strong livelihood sustainability criteria within the SRL framework meets for all marginal landholding and landless categories of households, which live below poverty line and that are almost dependent on forest resource for their livelihood security. The study also suggests that law or force can not effectively control the illegal collection of timber forest products (TFPs) for this poor households until and unless a considerable increase in the legal forest products (non-timber forest products like sal leaves and fuel wood) and wage income from forest meets their minimum livelihood security.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15305/1/MPRA_paper_15305.pdf
Das, Nimai (2009): Can Joint Forest Management Programme Sustain Rural Life: A Livelihood Analysis from Community-based Forest Management Groups.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15330
2019-10-05T16:36:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15330/
Distributional Aspect of Forest Income: A Study on JFM and non-JFM Forest Dependent Households
Das, Nimai
Sarker, Debnarayan
Q23 - Forestry
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H41 - Public Goods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
This study suggests that there is a narrower scope to expand inequality with the increase in forest sources of income to total income relative to non-forest income irrespective of the type of villages and types of FPCs. The addition of forest income in the JFM households after JFM reduces measured income inequality by about twelve percent, all else equal. But no such perceptible decrease has been found after JFM situation for non-JFM households. Categorically, forest income plays the dominant role in reducing measured income inequality for poor households who are relatively asset poor and that also live below poverty line. But this study also lends credence to the fact that the non-involvement in the JFM programme by the non-JFM households might bring about a major environmental shirking, because illegal timber income constitutes the major part of all sources of income for non-JFM households even after JFM situation.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15330/1/MPRA_paper_15330.pdf
Das, Nimai and Sarker, Debnarayan (2008): Distributional Aspect of Forest Income: A Study on JFM and non-JFM Forest Dependent Households.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16437
2019-09-28T06:13:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483531
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483732
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16437/
Federalism, Party Competition and Budget Outcome: Empirical Findings on Regional Health Expenditure in Italy
Giardina, Emilio
Cavalieri, Marina
Guccio, Calogero
Mazza, Isidoro
H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
In the last decade, Italy has experienced a considerable decentralization of functions to the regions. This transformation has been especially relevant for the National Health System that has de facto assumed a federal system design. The federal reform aimed at disciplining public health expenditure, which drains a substantial share of the budget of Italian regions and is among the main causes of the regional deficits. Political economic analysis, however, suggests that impact of federalism on public expenditure depends on central and local government strategies to win in the electoral competition. Results derived in this preliminary study indicate that political competition actually works as a tool of fiscal discipline; it shows a restraining effect on public health expenditure.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16437/1/MPRA_paper_16437.pdf
Giardina, Emilio and Cavalieri, Marina and Guccio, Calogero and Mazza, Isidoro (2009): Federalism, Party Competition and Budget Outcome: Empirical Findings on Regional Health Expenditure in Italy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16482
2019-10-02T01:02:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D45:4534:453432
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453532
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16482/
Country Size and Labor Market Flexibility in the European Monetary Union: Why Small Countries Have more Flexible Labor Markets
Zemanek, Holger
F15 - Economic Integration
E42 - Monetary Systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the Monetary System ; Payment Systems
E52 - Monetary Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
This paper explores the impact of country size on labor market flexibility in a monetary union with a common monetary policy as conducted in EMU. I apply a Barro-Gordon framework and test its result empirically for EMU. Results confirm that small countries demand higher labor market flexibility than large countries. Small countries use labor market flexibility to be protected against monetary policy in favor of large countries and use flexibility as a substitute for monetary policy. Thereby, national inflation volatilities and unemployment volatility are important determinants. Business cycle synchronization reduces the need of small countries for additional labor market flexibility.
2009-07-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16482/1/MPRA_paper_16482.pdf
Zemanek, Holger (2009): Country Size and Labor Market Flexibility in the European Monetary Union: Why Small Countries Have more Flexible Labor Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17569
2019-09-27T16:49:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493132
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483531
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17569/
Partnerships for Women's Health - Striving for Best Practice within the UN Global Compact / United Nations University Research Brief 1/2009 (www.unu.edu)
Timmermann, Martina
Kruesmann, Monika
I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I12 - Health Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
Every minute, at least one woman dies from pregnancy and childbirth complications; a further 20 suffer injury, infection or disease. Despite medical advances, and years of policy declarations, this tragic situation remains particularly severe in developing countries, violating a fundamental human right. Is a new approach possible, one that looks beyond common project paradigms and standards? What could such an approach look like, how might it operate, and what might be its effect?
The Women’s Health Initiative, an innovative public private partnership that drew reference from the UN Global Compact, provides a possible model.
2009-09-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17569/1/MPRA_paper_17569.pdf
Timmermann, Martina and Kruesmann, Monika (2009): Partnerships for Women's Health - Striving for Best Practice within the UN Global Compact / United Nations University Research Brief 1/2009 (www.unu.edu). Published in: UNU Research Brief No. 1/2009 : pp. 1-12.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17873
2019-09-27T16:25:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D44:4434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17873/
Liberalisation in a world of second best: evidence on European network industries
Ugur, Mehmet
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
This article reports mixed results about the impacts of liberalisation in European network industries. Telecommunications prices have fallen and converged across EU-15, but electricity and gas prices have either increased or diverged. Productivity has increased, but mainly as a result of falling employment in absolute and relative terms. Liberalised industries are still characterised by high levels of market concentration and low levels of transparency and market integration. These findings are in line with the predictions of the theory of second best and suggest that the case for liberalisation of network industries has been oversold.
2009-02-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17873/1/MPRA_paper_17873.pdf
Ugur, Mehmet (2009): Liberalisation in a world of second best: evidence on European network industries.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18235
2019-09-29T10:28:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453032
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453633
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18235/
Turkish economic policy under AKP government: an assessment for 2002-2007
Ugur, Mehmet
E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This article agrees with the received wisdom that the rule of AKP government has been associated with better macroeconomic outcomes in Turkey from 2002-2007. However, it argues that it is necessary to question the received wisdom for several reasons. First, AKP government’s contribution to Turkey’s economic performance from 2002-2007 was largely due to its consent to ‘tie its hands’ under the pre-existing International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Union (EU) accession conditionality rather than because of AKP-specific policy innovation. Secondly, AKP’s attempt at policy innovation after 2004 have been associated with less impressive economic outcomes. Finally, the AKP has been unsuccessful in addressing the structural constraints and vulnerabilities that threaten the long-run sustainability of Turkey’s economic growth and its macroeconomic stability.
2008-04-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18235/1/MPRA_paper_18235.pdf
Ugur, Mehmet (2008): Turkish economic policy under AKP government: an assessment for 2002-2007.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19131
2019-09-29T10:36:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D45:4534:453432
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453532
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19131/
Country Size and Labor Market Flexibility in the European Monetary Union: Why Small Countries Have more Flexible Labor Markets
Zemanek, Holger
F15 - Economic Integration
E42 - Monetary Systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the Monetary System ; Payment Systems
E52 - Monetary Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
This paper explores the impact of country size on labor market flexibility in a monetary union with a common monetary policy as conducted in EMU. I apply a Barro-Gordon framework and test its result empirically for EMU. Results confirm that small countries demand higher labor market flexibility than large countries. Small countries use labor market flexibility to be protected against monetary policy in favor of large countries and use flexibility as a substitute for monetary policy. Thereby, national inflation volatilities and unemployment volatility are important determinants. Business cycle synchronization reduces the need of small countries for additional labor market flexibility.
2009-07-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19131/1/MPRA_paper_19131.pdf
Zemanek, Holger (2009): Country Size and Labor Market Flexibility in the European Monetary Union: Why Small Countries Have more Flexible Labor Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19357
2019-09-28T17:34:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503131
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19357/
Fiscal Transfers and Structural Reforms in the European Monetary Union
Zemanek, Holger
F15 - Economic Integration
E62 - Fiscal Policy
P11 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
In a monetary union, fiscal transfers are an important policy tool to adjust to asymmetric shocks. However, fiscal transfers cannot substitute structural reforms especially when shocks are permanent. In this way, the design of fiscal transfer systems determine whether structural reforms or non-reforming is preferred by governments. Inter-regional transfers provide the lowest incentive for structural reforms. Inter-temporal transfers might promote structural reforms as long as debt cannot be accumulated. Therefore, I oppose an EU-tax budget, call for a strict application of the Stability and Growth Pact, and explain low reform activity in the EMU by interest rate convergence.
2009-12-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19357/1/MPRA_paper_19357.pdf
Zemanek, Holger (2009): Fiscal Transfers and Structural Reforms in the European Monetary Union.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19398
2019-09-28T06:53:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503131
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19398/
Fiscal Transfers and Structural Reforms in the European Monetary Union
Zemanek, Holger
F15 - Economic Integration
E62 - Fiscal Policy
P11 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
In a monetary union, fiscal transfers are an important policy tool to adjust to asymmetric shocks. However, fiscal transfers cannot substitute structural reforms especially when shocks are permanent. In this way, the design of fiscal transfer systems determine whether structural reforms or non-reforming is preferred by governments. Inter-regional transfers provide the lowest incentive for structural reforms. Inter-temporal transfers might promote structural reforms as long as debt cannot be accumulated. Therefore, I oppose an EU-tax budget, call for a strict application of the Stability and Growth Pact, and explain low reform activity in the EMU by interest rate convergence.
2009-12-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19398/3/MPRA_paper_19398.pdf
Zemanek, Holger (2009): Fiscal Transfers and Structural Reforms in the European Monetary Union.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20073
2019-09-26T11:26:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20073/
Manipulation in oligopoly
Corchon, Luis
Silva, Jose Luis
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
The purpose of this paper is to generalize the results obtained by Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) allowing for non-linear demand functions, many players and general attitudes to the risk by the players. We also generalize their set-up by introducing a more general measure of th aggresivity of players in the second stage of the game.
1994
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20073/1/MPRA_paper_20073.pdf
Corchon, Luis and Silva, Jose Luis (1994): Manipulation in oligopoly.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20628
2019-09-26T13:41:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20628/
Una proposta a sostegno dello sviluppo delle Cinque Valli Bolognesi
Ferrari, Filippo
Timoncini, Bruno
Conzatti, Silvia
Teglia, Egle
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
A14 - Sociology of Economics
The action research described in this article has produced a first integrated set of actions to lay the foundations for local development cooperative. In particular, we sought to broaden and strengthen the network of actors (institutions, associations, businesses, education, training institutions) operating in the territory for the exchange of skills, knowledge and experiences (tools, best practices) between operators, and to provide public employees tools and information to define for themselves the project guidelines for educational intervention and the appropriate method of financing
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20628/1/MPRA_paper_20628.pdf
Ferrari, Filippo and Timoncini, Bruno and Conzatti, Silvia and Teglia, Egle (2006): Una proposta a sostegno dello sviluppo delle Cinque Valli Bolognesi.
it
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20999
2019-09-27T08:55:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3635
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3131
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3038
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3030
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3638
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3634
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433031
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443333
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453031
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453237
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3031
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20999/
Die Arbeitslosenversicherung in Deutschland – Beitrag zur Bekämpfung oder Ursache von Arbeitslosigkeit
Breiding, Torsten
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
J38 - Public Policy
J65 - Unemployment Insurance ; Severance Pay ; Plant Closings
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
J30 - General
J11 - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
J08 - Labor Economics Policies
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity
J00 - General
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
J68 - Public Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J0 - General
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
C13 - Estimation: General
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
C01 - Econometrics
D33 - Factor Income Distribution
E01 - Measurement and Data on National Income and Product Accounts and Wealth ; Environmental Accounts
E27 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
H31 - Household
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
J01 - Labor Economics: General
I21 - Analysis of Education
C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Abstract German (English abstract is added below)
Arbeitslosigkeit gilt als eines der schwerwiegendsten gesellschaftlichen Probleme unserer Zeit. Doch welche Gründe liegen, trotz der über die Jahre eingeleiteten Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit, für die anhaltende Beschäftigungskrise vor? Und in welchem Umfang hat das deutsche Sozial- und Wohlfahrtssystem zu der anhaltenden Misere beigetragen?
Insbesondere der Arbeitslosenversicherung wird vorgeworfen, einer der Hauptverursacher der Probleme auf dem Arbeitsmarkt zu sein. Um Deutschland wettbewerbsfähig zu halten, versuchen die politischen Gruppierungen durch Reformen das Land im globalen Umfeld zu positionieren und so optimale Lebens- wie Investitionsbedingungen zu schaffen. Doch wie effizient sind diese Reformen und wie wirken sie auf den Arbeitsmarkt? Welche Rolle spielen dabei die Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung und wie wirken sich diese aus?
Dass eine Arbeitslosenversicherung in einem Wirtschaftssystem wünschenswert und auch notwendig ist, lässt sich mit dem Argument der sozialen Sicherheit begründen. Allerdings muss die Aufgabe einer Arbeitslosenversicherung die soziale Absicherung im Falle einer möglichen, temporären Arbeitslosigkeit sein. Der Betroffene ist für die Dauer der Suche nach einer neuen Arbeit, die bestmöglich der Qualifikation des Einzelnen entspricht, finanziell abgesichert. Ein Absinken unter die Armutsgrenze wird verhindert. Die Steuerung des Arbeitsangebotsverhaltens des Einzelnen ist jedoch ein Nebeneffekt der Arbeitslosenversicherung, den es zu untersuchen gilt. Das die Arbeitslosenversicherung Einfluss auf das Arbeitsangebotsverhalten der Arbeitnehmer hat und welche weiteren Effekte aus der im Sozialsystem eingebetteten Arbeitslosenversicherung entstehen, soll diese Arbeit zeigen.
Zur Strukturierung der genannten Fragen nimmt diese Arbeit eine Dreiteilung vor. Analysen der wirtschaftlichen Situation Deutschlands und die Identifikation von Problemgruppen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt sollen die Wirkungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung kausal darstellen. Konjunkturbedingte Veränderungen von Arbeitslosenzahlen sollen weitestgehend als exogene Größe betrachtet werden und nicht in die Bewertung der Arbeitslosenversicherung einfließen. Durch die Parallelität der Ereignisse lassen sich die tatsächlichen Auswirkungen arbeitsmarktpolitischer Maßnahmen jedoch oft schwer selektieren. Um Effekte zuordnen zu können, wird ein historischer Abriss der Entwicklung des Systems der Arbeitslosenversicherung gegeben. Ein internationaler Vergleich dient der Standortbestimmung des deutschen Systems.
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit den Einflüssen der Arbeitslosenversicherung in verschiedenen Modellansätzen. Durch die Betrachtung der prognostizierten Effekte wird ein Abgleich der Theorie mit der Praxis erfolgen. Sowohl die Anreizwirkungen auf individueller Ebene im Arbeitsangebots- und Suchverhalten werden modelltheoretisch aufgezeigt, als auch der Einfluss auf das Kalkül im optimalen Verhalten von Gruppen und Kollektiven. Der Abgleich der Modelle mit der Empirie zeigt verschiedene Anreizverzerrungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung. Auffallend ist, dass insbesondere die Bezugsdauer der Unterstützung Einfluss auf den Zugang in, den Abgang aus und die daraus resultierende Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit hat. Die vom Alt-Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder einstmals angestoßene Diskussion um die Mitnahme-Mentalität der Deutschen findet im Sozialsystem Argumente und Fundierung.
Die Implikationen der Hartz-Reformen sind vielfältig. Die positiven Aspekte werden im dritten Teil aufgezeigt und mögliche Verbesserungen vorgeschlagen. Trotz der Forderung nach mehr Eigenverantwortung der Transfer-Bezieher und weitreichenden Änderungen zur Verschlankung des administrativen Aufwandes ist der Erfolg des Hartz-Konzeptes zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt noch nicht bewertbar. Besonders kritisch sind die Lohnabstände bei Geringverdienern, wodurch zielgerichtete Nachbesserungen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit notwendig scheinen. Dazu werden Vorschläge zu Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung diskutiert. Ziel der Reformen sollte eine zeitgemäße Anpassung der Arbeitslosenversicherung an gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen sein.
This work analyzes the effects of the German unemployment insurance system on the unemployment rate and the individual job-seeking behavior. The duration of the unemployment benefits affects the time spend in unemployment. Another effect is the span between available jobs and the level of the payments. At the same time, a longer duration of unemployment benefits protects the individual of social catastrophies and provied the job seeker with adequate time to find the job that fits best. The GDP can be higher in a society with social security systems compared to other economies by providing each individual the perfect job. Finally, each individual has a higher productivity by a better usage of skills.
facts:
- the history of the German unemployment system
- the effects of the economical cycle on the unemployment rate
- a comparison of the German unemployment system compared to other countries
- the effects of the span between the high level of unemployment benefit payments compared to the wage earned in available jobs
- labour supply and matching
- a theoretical approach to analyze the effects of the German unemployment insurance
- the reality in Germany compared to the theory
- an evaluation of the German system
- reform proposition
2006-09-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20999/1/MPRA_paper_20999.pdf
Breiding, Torsten (2006): Die Arbeitslosenversicherung in Deutschland – Beitrag zur Bekämpfung oder Ursache von Arbeitslosigkeit.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22440
2019-09-27T03:38:16Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22440/
Democracy and politics: Romanian mechanisms, realities and electoral developments
Matei, Lucica
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper approaches the relations and connections between democracy and politics, from the perspective of the Romanian electoral mechanisms and processes. Essentially, it concerns the manner how the electoral life has determined irreversible processes in Romania after 1989. As country aspiring and acquiring the values of the European democracy, Romania had a similar evolution related to other Central and Eastern European countries. In this context, the analysis emphasises various stages, well shaped, overlapping the electoral cycles. The most debated themes refer to Romanian political arena, as well as the political developments in the last decade and a half. The aspects concerning electoral cyclic feature, alternation to governance and accessibility to legislative power, political stability/instability dominate the first part of the analysis. The second part analyses quantitatively and qualitatively the results of presidential, parliamentary and local elections, revealing the most important changes and transformations of the Romanian political spectrum. The electoral management and its legislative base represent also important issues
2007-02-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22440/1/MPRA_paper_22440.pdf
Matei, Lucica (2007): Democracy and politics: Romanian mechanisms, realities and electoral developments. Published in: Verejna Sprava a Spolocnost,FVS UPJS No. 1&2 (December 2009)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22496
2019-09-26T15:40:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483530
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22496/
Exploring Convergence in some OECD Public Social Expenditure Trends
De Simone, Elina
Gaeta, Giuseppe Lucio
Ercolano, Salvatore
H50 - General
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Triggered by the phenomenon of globalisation, during recent years there has been a process of State policy rationalisation in the social expenditure domain; hence the debate over the present role and dimension of welfare state has intensified.
Following on the extensive multidisciplinary literature on this issue, the purpose of this paper is two-fold 1) to apply a more traditional analysis of convergence (sigma and beta convergence) in public social expenditures and 2) to analyse public social expenditure allocation expressed as a % of GDP and derive a possible classification of the countries by means of a multivariate approach. We conclude by explaining some similarities in the expenditure behaviour of certain countries in terms of the policy transfer process. Our results can be interpreted as a further contribution to the literature on contemporary public policy evaluation in the welfare domain.
2010-04-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22496/1/MPRA_paper_22496.pdf
De Simone, Elina and Gaeta, Giuseppe Lucio and Ercolano, Salvatore (2010): Exploring Convergence in some OECD Public Social Expenditure Trends.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23011
2019-09-27T16:42:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513338
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513238
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523539
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23011/
Cities in Germany and their climate commitments: More hype than substance?
Sippel, Maike
Q38 - Government Policy
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
Q28 - Government Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
R59 - Other
While nation states debate climate policy at an international scale, on a local level, cities across the globe have committed to emission targets and mitigation activities. This study analyses the actual performance of municipal climate action against their targets. Official information material from large cities in Germany was collected and complemented with questionnaires from officials in 40 municipalities.
While 77% of cities have adopted emission targets in a voluntary act, and 80% of these cities are engaged in at least basic emission reporting, only a quarter of them are on course to reach their targets. All of these ‘successful’ cities are situated in Eastern Germany – and their emission reductions can mainly be explained by the industrial decline in the 1990s after the German Reunification. Not a single city in Western Germany is on course to reach its reduction commitment. Cities average mitigation performance is slightly worse than the German average, and the effect of city networks on cities is not very clear. It can be concluded that cities are currently not living up to their ambitions. The practice of urban emission reporting does in many cases not allow for proper quality management of greenhouse gas policies.
For a more meaningful contribution to the battle against climate change, cities could follow a double strategy: Firstly they could report emissions regularly and adopt realistic and city-specific targets and action plans based on their emission patterns. Secondly, they could complement their targets with a visionary approach: This would include pilot projects that demonstrate how low carbon cities could look like, as well as a more ambitious target which they would be able to reach – provided that optimal framework conditions for local mitigation activities would be put in place by other policy levels.
2010-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23011/1/MPRA_paper_23011.pdf
Sippel, Maike (2010): Cities in Germany and their climate commitments: More hype than substance?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23647
2019-10-01T04:42:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513530
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23647/
The Porter Hypothesis and Hyperbolic Discounting
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
Q50 - General
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D42 - Monopoly
We examine pollution-reducing R&D by a monopoly firm producing a dirty product. In a dynamic framework with hyperbolic discounting, we establish conditions under which the Porter hypothesis goes through, i.e. environmental regulation increases R&D, thus reducing pollution, as well as increasing firm profits. This is likely to hold whenever R&D costs are at an intermediate level, and the planning horizon of the firms is large.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23647/1/MPRA_paper_23647.pdf
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2010): The Porter Hypothesis and Hyperbolic Discounting.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24686
2019-09-28T04:49:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24686/
Voting and Information Aggregation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies
Izmirlioglu, Yusuf
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
This paper investigates legislation in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies where the legislature and the president have formal role in legislation. A proposed law is first voted in the legislature and if it passes, comes to the consideration of the president. I study two prevalent legislative procedures: (i) Single-round legislation where the president's action is final, (ii) Two-round legislation the president's approval enacts the law but after his veto proposal returns to the legislature for rediscussion. In this setup I examine power balance and the efficiency of information aggregation. For this I build a model of strategic voting with incomplete information and analyze different ideological profiles of the president and the homogenous legislature. The president seems powerless in two-round legislation but in equilibrium there are instances he can change the legislation result. Power struggle arises only when the legislature is modernist and the president is conservative. If the legislature is conservative and the president is modernist, the president has no impact on the outcome, but adversely affects informational efficiency. If they have the same ideological bias, the presidential institution is beneficial and the president's existence provides full information aggregation with finite legislature size in single-round legislation. Above results can be generalized to heterogeneous legislature with two types, except full information aggregation is never achieved.
2010-02-18
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24686/1/MPRA_paper_24686.pdf
Izmirlioglu, Yusuf (2010): Voting and Information Aggregation in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Democracies.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24776
2019-10-01T12:05:35Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3938
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24776/
Voting on traffic congestion policy with two levels of government
Russo, Antonio
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
L98 - Government Policy
I study how the political decision process affects urban traffic congestion policy. First, I look at the case of a single government deciding, through majority voting, on a monetary charge to be paid to drive to a city's Central Business District (CBD): if the majority of individuals prefers to drive more (resp. less) than the average, a voting equilibrium with lower (higher) charge emerges. Next, I consider the case of two government levels involved in traffic policy: parking charges in (resp. cordon tolls around) a city's CBD and capacity investments are chosen by a local (resp. regional) government, through a majority voting process. While tax exporting motives and the imperfect coordination among the two governments may lead to higher overall charges than in the case of a single government, strong preferences for driving across the population can still bring to an equilibiurm with suboptimal total charges.
2010-11-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24776/1/MPRA_paper_24776.pdf
Russo, Antonio (2010): Voting on traffic congestion policy with two levels of government.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25018
2019-10-02T20:07:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D41:4132:413233
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25018/
La competitivite du service d'education en Roumanie dans le contexte de la crise mandiale
Grigorescu, Adriana
Leoveanu, Constantin Andy
A23 - Graduate
I21 - Analysis of Education
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D40 - General
By starting with the statement of Alfred Marshall: "The most valuable of all capital is invested in being human" we can consider the quality of human resources in general and quality of educational resources, especially as a decisive factor for economic growth together. The specialists appreciate that there is a very close relationship between technological progress and investment in education with involvement in all areas of life: economic, political, social and cultural.
In terms of the current global financial crisis, when the pressure is on the level of education of human resources and their degree of competitiveness, we need an act of high educational quality and more efficiency. After defining the terms in which it operates - competitiveness, quality, efficiency, educational act - it is, in part, a description of the state of the Romanian educational system and causes that have generated the current situation. The aim of the paper is devoted to exploring the effects of an educational point of view of low competitive and to continue with a short general diagnosis of the latter. At the end of the paper we will try to find some concrete measures to increase the competitiveness of the Romanian educational act. These comments will obviously be accompanied by a series of point solutions to adjust - together - the offer of the Romanian education with the demand that exists on the labor market, in terms of the current crisis.
2009-05-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25018/2/MPRA_paper_25018.pdf
Grigorescu, Adriana and Leoveanu, Constantin Andy (2009): La competitivite du service d'education en Roumanie dans le contexte de la crise mandiale. Published in: Annales de L’Universite Valahia de Targoviste, Section Science Economique , Vol. VIV-em, No. No.24/2009 (2009)
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25110
2019-09-30T17:16:03Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453636
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453233
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25110/
Industry structure analysis. A case of Romania
Bob, Constantin
Grigorescu, Adriana
E66 - General Outlook and Conditions
E23 - Production
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
The last years reflect, in term of macroeconomic development, the continuing advances in market-oriented reforms in the most countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Transition in this economic area includes the restructuring of politic, economic and social systems in accordance with the European Integration Directives and local industry policy, with the movements of the economic environment. Our proposed model tries to define the structure of the basic industry components, the stability degree and the intensity of the measures to be use for restructuring the industrial offer and Romanian regional structure (existing and estimated). This model is design as a link between the Pareto’s model and the Markov’s Chains transitions. The target of industrial policy is to obtain an economic environment that characterizes a stable market economy.
2006-09-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25110/1/MPRA_paper_25110.pdf
Bob, Constantin and Grigorescu, Adriana (2006): Industry structure analysis. A case of Romania. Published in: Conference proceedings No. ISBN 86-83803-21-X (2006)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26099
2019-09-30T14:21:08Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483534
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26099/
The broken trailer fallacy: seeing the unseen effects of government policies in post-Katrina New Orleans
Stringham, Edward
Snow, Nicholas
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
H54 - Infrastructures ; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze some of the unseen negative effects of the post-Katrina government policies dealing with housing in New Orleans.
Design/methodology/approach – Since Hurricane Katrina, the government, along with private for profit and not-for-profit organizations, has worked to rebuild the city of New Orleans. This effort is most evident in the response to the housing crisis that followed the storm. The government has spent billions of dollars and brought thousands of people in to rebuild homes and other infrastructure in the long run and to provide stopgap measures in the short run. The approximately 120,000 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailers in the region are one of the most visible examples of government efforts.
Findings – The paper finds that while the trailers did provide benefits to those who received them, it could be argued that the government’s policies aimed toward solving the housing crisis suffer from Fre´de´ric Bastiat’s broken window fallacy. FEMA trailers and the multitude of workers brought in are examples of what is seen, and, as Bastiat showed, we must also look at what is unseen.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26099/1/MPRA_paper_26099.pdf
Stringham, Edward and Snow, Nicholas (2008): The broken trailer fallacy: seeing the unseen effects of government policies in post-Katrina New Orleans. Published in: International Journal of Social Economics , Vol. 35, No. 7 (2008): pp. 480-489.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26405
2019-10-06T16:31:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433930
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433139
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443835
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483730
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433635
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D48:4838:483833
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26405/
Some Inquiries to Spontaneous Opinions: A case with Twitter in Indonesia
Maulana, Ardian
Situngkir, Hokky
C90 - General
C19 - Other
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
H70 - General
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
C02 - Mathematical Methods
H83 - Public Administration ; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
A14 - Sociology of Economics
The paper discusses opportunities to utilize the series of micro-blogs as provided by the Twitter in observation of opinion dynamics. The spontaneity of tweets is more, as the service is attached more to the mobile communications. The extraction of information in the series of tweets is demonstrated as in conceptual map and mention map. From the latter, the social network stylized properties, i.e.: power law distribution is shown. The exemplification of the methodology is on the 82nd commemoration of Indonesian Youth Pledge and the participatory movement of Indonesian capitol city, Jakarta.
2010-10-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26405/1/MPRA_paper_26405.pdf
Maulana, Ardian and Situngkir, Hokky (2010): Some Inquiries to Spontaneous Opinions: A case with Twitter in Indonesia. Published in: BFI Working Paper Series No. WP-10-2010 (2 November 2010)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27444
2019-10-18T16:41:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27444/
Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?
Breitmoser, Yves
Tan, Jonathan H.W.
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Are "generous" bargaining offers made out of fairness or in fear of rejection? We disentangle risk and social references by analyzing experimental behavior in three majority bargaining games: (1) a random-proposer game with infinite time horizon; 2) a one round proposer game with disagreement payoffs equal to the infinite horizon continuation payoffs; and, (3) a demand commitment game. Inequity aversion predicts very differently across these games, but risk aversion does not. Observed strategies violate neither stationarity nor truncation consistency. This allows us to use structural models of bargaining behavior to estimate the latent type shares of subjects with CES, inequity averse, and Prospect theoretic preferences. The Prospect theoretic, i.e. reference-dependent, model of utility explains the observations far better than any mixture of alternative models.
2010-12-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27444/1/MPRA_paper_27444.pdf
Breitmoser, Yves and Tan, Jonathan H.W. (2010): Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27703
2019-09-28T06:25:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443739
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27703/
Public policy, trust and growth: disclosure of government information in Japan.
Yamamura, Eiji
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
D79 - Other
Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998–2004 to examine how this enactment affected economic growth. Furthermore, this paper explores how generalized trust is associated with the effect of information disclosure on economic growth. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture specific effects and endogenous bias. The major findings are: (1) disclosure of government information has a positive effect on GDP growth; and (2) generalized trust enhances this effect on GDP growth. This implies that social trust has a critical influence on the effectiveness of policy.
2010-12-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27703/1/MPRA_paper_27703.pdf
Yamamura, Eiji (2010): Public policy, trust and growth: disclosure of government information in Japan.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27780
2019-09-27T00:18:30Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27780/
Public Sector Modernization Trends of the Member States of European Union: Trajectories of Reforms in Italy and Romania
Meneguzzo, Marco
Fiorani, Gloria
Mititelu, Cristina
Matei, Lucica
Matei, Ani
Cipolleta, Germano
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Research on administrative reform in Europe has demonstrated a significant variation among countries in how they choose reform strategy. We know very little about what explains the variation with regard to the extent with which the countries conduct the reforms and how they effectively influenced modernization process. Since 1980s, reactions of countries have been to maintain, modernise, marketise or minimise their public sector (Pollitt, Bouckaert 2004).
The paper investigates the markedly features of reform trends, similarities and differences in design and implementation, taking into consideration the effects of Europeanization and the multi-level governance of Public Management reforms; identifies conditions for lasting success of local governments reforms and the reasons for lack of success of different trends of modernisation and proposes a new perspective on the trajectories of modernization in public sector, through a comparative analyses between one of the founder member of EU (Italy) and a new EU member country (Romania).
Therefore, the paper will: undertake an in-depth evaluation of public management modernization trends in both countries explaining the significant variation in the objectives and ‘trajectories' of reforms on the basis of historical-institutional context dependency variable, contents and scope of reforms; perform an analysis of experiences of implementing policies and projects of modernization through programmers and common initiatives mostly carried out by the central government. The rewarding initiative '100 Projects' both in Romania and Italy sets an example of cooperation regarding the implementation of activities within the scope of the national programs for modernization and innovation of the public sector.
2010-12-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27780/1/MPRA_paper_27780.pdf
Meneguzzo, Marco and Fiorani, Gloria and Mititelu, Cristina and Matei, Lucica and Matei, Ani and Cipolleta, Germano (2010): Public Sector Modernization Trends of the Member States of European Union: Trajectories of Reforms in Italy and Romania. Forthcoming in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27805
2019-09-27T00:19:16Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27805/
Public sector modernization trends of the member states of European Union: Trajectories of reforms in Italy and Romania
Meneguzzo, Marco
Fiorani, Gloria
Mititelu, Cristina
Matei, Lucica
Matei, Ani
Cipolleta, Germano
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Research on administrative reform in Europe has demonstrated a significant variation among countries in how they choose reform strategy. We know very little about what explains the variation with regard to the extent with which the countries conduct the reforms and how they effectively influenced modernization process. Since 1980s, reactions of countries have been to maintain, modernise, marketise or minimise their public sector (Pollitt, Bouckaert 2004).
The paper investigates the markedly features of reform trends, similarities and differences in design and implementation, taking into consideration the effects of Europeanization and the multi-level governance of Public Management reforms; identifies conditions for lasting success of local governments reforms and the reasons for lack of success of different trends of modernisation and proposes a new perspective on the trajectories of modernization in public sector, through a comparative analyses between one of the founder member of EU (Italy) and a new EU member country (Romania).
Therefore, the paper will: undertake an in-depth evaluation of public management modernization trends in both countries explaining the significant variation in the objectives and ‘trajectories' of reforms on the basis of historical-institutional context dependency variable, contents and scope of reforms; perform an analysis of experiences of implementing policies and projects of modernization through programmers and common initiatives mostly carried out by the central government. The rewarding initiative '100 Projects' both in Romania and Italy sets an example of cooperation regarding the implementation of activities within the scope of the national programs for modernization and innovation of the public sector.
2010-12-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27805/1/MPRA_paper_27805.pdf
Meneguzzo, Marco and Fiorani, Gloria and Mititelu, Cristina and Matei, Lucica and Matei, Ani and Cipolleta, Germano (2010): Public sector modernization trends of the member states of European Union: Trajectories of reforms in Italy and Romania. Forthcoming in: Conference on “Reforming the Public Sector: How to Make the Difference, December 2-3, 2010”
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28571
2019-09-27T00:39:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433130
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483530
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483230
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3533
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28571/
What is Hidden, in the Hidden Economy of Pakistan? Size, Causes, Issues and Implications
Gulzar, Ahmed
Junaid, Novaira
Haider, Adnan
C10 - General
H50 - General
H20 - General
O53 - Asia including Middle East
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E26 - Informal Economy ; Underground Economy
There is a worldwide contemporary debate about the role of the hidden economy in achieving the goal of sustained and inclusive economic growth and development, especially in the context of its spillover effects on the formal economy. For this purpose, policy makers and academicians have made concerted efforts to estimate the size of the hidden economy and to analyze its causes, issues and implications on key macroeconomic variables. However, there is a consensus among the policy makers that a better macroeconomic policy formulation and its true implementation are subject to the proper management of the associated issues of the hidden economy with suitable policy measures. In Pakistan, it is generally assumed that the hidden economy contributes about 30% to 50% to the overall GDP. The purpose of this paper is to estimate more precisely the size of the hidden economy with the determination of its potential causes and implications. Five statistical and structural modeling approaches namely; simple monetary approach, modified monetary approach using dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS), multiple-indicators multiple-causes (MIMIC) approach, electricity consumption approach and labor market survey based approach are used to estimate the size of the hidden economy and to analyze the characteristic nature of its growth over the period. The study also investigates the potential determinants of the hidden economy and various interrelated socio-economic issues in perspective of achieving national goal of inclusive growth and development. Finally, policy implications are provided consistent with pervading facts of the hidden economy in Pakistan especially in the context of the 18th Amendment and the 7th NFC Award.
2010-11-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28571/1/MPRA_paper_28571.pdf
Gulzar, Ahmed and Junaid, Novaira and Haider, Adnan (2010): What is Hidden, in the Hidden Economy of Pakistan? Size, Causes, Issues and Implications.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28679
2019-09-28T19:45:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463233
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3630
7375626A656374733D46:4634:463432
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3332
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463138
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463533
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463231
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28679/
The Italian Position in the Energy and Climate Change Negotiations
Viviani, Carlo
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
D62 - Externalities
F23 - Multinational Firms ; International Business
D44 - Auctions
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
L60 - General
F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
F18 - Trade and Environment
F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations
F21 - International Investment ; Long-Term Capital Movements
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
O52 - Europe
Climate change, security and cost of energy supplies, and the competitiveness of firms and economies have been focal points of the general political and economic policy debate in recent years.
This article examines the choices in this field made at global level with the Kyoto Protocol and in Europe with the more recent “20-20-20” package from the standpoints of the Italian national interests and the negotiating stance adopted by our Government in European and international forums.
The European negotiations on renewable energy sources, the reduction of emissions in the sectors with and without emissions trading schemes, automobile emissions, the auctioning of emission rights, and the identification of industries exposed to the risk of delocalization (carbon leakage) are described in detail, including background data not previously available, and the reasons for Italy’s positions set forth.
The principle guiding Italian negotiators has been to balance the various policy aims, in an effort to ensure that the necessary action against climate change does not have excessive repercussions on growth and employment. The principle is all the more valid in the global talks on the regime that will succeed the Kyoto Protocol when it expires on 1 January 2013.
Without a credible global agreement entailing an equivalent commitment, or sectoral agreements, instruments will be needed to prevent Europe’s climate commitment from producing an unfair competitive disadvantage, with potentially serious social and economic consequences but no appreciable environmental advantage.
2010-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28679/1/MPRA_paper_28679.pdf
Viviani, Carlo (2010): The Italian Position in the Energy and Climate Change Negotiations. Published in: Review of Economic Conditions in Italy , Vol. 2010, No. 2 (January 2011): pp. 231-278.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:29197
2019-09-28T18:43:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29197/
Words or deeds – what matters? Experience of recentralization in Russian security agencies
Libman, Alexander
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights
Although decentralization is often modeled as an outcome of bargaining over rents and poli-cies, intuitively it seems possible that public statements, symbols and status often have a great impact on this process. The paper studies the relative importance of the “real” political actions versus the changes of symbolic nature in the bargaining over devolution and secession, using the unique laboratory of the personnel recentralization in the Russian security agencies in 2000-2007. While in the 1990s regional branches of federal ministries were mostly captured by regional governors, in 2000s Putin replaced the heads of agencies by new bureaucrats, cut-ting the connections to the region. The paper finds a robust influence of symbolic gestures made by regional governments in the earlier bargaining process on appointments, even if the actual devolution policies did not matter. Symbolic actions seem to play a crucial role in the decisions in this highly sensitive area.
2011-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29197/1/MPRA_paper_29197.pdf
Libman, Alexander (2011): Words or deeds – what matters? Experience of recentralization in Russian security agencies.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:29689
2019-09-27T16:27:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483739
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29689/
Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004
Yamamura, Eiji
Kondoh, Haruo
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
H79 - Other
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998?2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is consistent with public choice theory.
2011-03-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29689/1/MPRA_paper_29689.pdf
Yamamura, Eiji and Kondoh, Haruo (2011): Government transparency and expenditure in the rent-seeking industry: the case of Japan for 1998-2004.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:30002
2019-10-01T05:21:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30002/
Articulation of Plural Values in Deliberative Monetary Valuation: Beyond Preference Economisation and Moralisation
Lo, Alex Y.
Spash, Clive L.
D46 - Value Theory
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
The use of deliberative methods to assess environmental values in monetary terms has been motivated by the potential for small group discussion to help with preference formation and the inclusion of non-economic values. In this review, two broad approaches are identified: preference economisation and preference moralisation. The former is analytical, concentrates upon issues of poor respondent cognition and produces a narrow conception of value linked to utilitarianism. The latter emphasises political legitimacy, appeals to community values and tends to privilege arguments made in the public interest. Both approaches are shown to embrace forms of value convergence which undermine the prospects for value pluralism. As a result exclusion and predefinition of values dominates current practice. In order to maintain democratic credentials, the importance attributed to monetary value needs to be left as an open question to be addressed as part of a process determining an ‘agreement to pay’. To this end we identify a discourse-based approach as a third way consistent with the democratic and value plural potential of deliberative monetary valuation.
2011-03-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30002/1/MPRA_paper_30002.pdf
Lo, Alex Y. and Spash, Clive L. (2011): Articulation of Plural Values in Deliberative Monetary Valuation: Beyond Preference Economisation and Moralisation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:31471
2019-09-26T14:01:36Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493238
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31471/
Instruments of policy analysis. the impact assessment development by public authorities in Romania. Case study
Matei, Ani
Dogaru, Tatiana-Camelia
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
I28 - Government Policy
The public authorities are facing real challenges due to the complexity and dynamics of economic and social issues. They must daily assess the available resources and answer to questions such as „is the citizens’ welfare good enough, can it be improved?” „there are the initiatives for the environmental protection adequate?”, „is there a coherent employment system for integrating the graduates on labour market?”, „are the charges pertinent means for improving the social actors’ behaviour?”. These issues as well as many others represent only a part of the problems that must be solved through public intervention.
The economic difficulties often represent the strongest key factor for non-transforming a social issue into the object of a public policy. They are also responsible for imposing to the decision-maker the compulsoriness of choosing to solve certain problems. This choice is never easy and it haggles always a pit of doubt inside the heart of the decision-maker: „is this decision the best choice?”, or „is the selected alternative the best for action?”. Diminishing this dilemma, as well as supporting the decision-maker in order to improve the decision-making process have found their expression in the theorists and practitioners’ efforts to develop the states’ capacity for public policy analysis. There are quite many definitions for public policy analysis in the field literature; they support its duality, namely the public policy analysis represents an approach as well as a methodology for developing and investigating public policy alternatives. Among the well-know instruments of policy analysis, we enumerate the cost-effectiveness analysis, the cost-benefit analysis, and the impact assessment.
In this paper the attention is focusing on impact assessments. Therefore, the objectives of the paper refer to (a) a brief overview on the instruments of policy analysis with a particular focus on the impact assessment and (b) an investigation of the national practice on the development of the impact assessment. In this paper, we shall analyze how the public institutions are using the impact assessment in view to improve the quality and coherence of the policy development process. Therefore, in order to attain our aims, the paper will comprise a theoretical part based on the study of the field literature and European and domestic regulation concerning the impact assessment and an empirical part, related to the analysis of some impact assessments from educational and regional development areas, drawn up by Romanian public authorities during the public policy process.
The conclusions will reveal the progresses made by Romania to use the impact assessments and the possible inconsistencies between the national model and that proposed by the European Commission. As research methodology for achieving the aims, we shall use the following: researching the bibliographical sources, comparative analysis between the European and the domestic legislation regarding the impact assessment, analysis and evaluation of the public policy proposals and other important documents.
2011-04-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31471/1/MPRA_paper_31471.pdf
Matei, Ani and Dogaru, Tatiana-Camelia (2011): Instruments of policy analysis. the impact assessment development by public authorities in Romania. Case study. Published in: , Vol. The 19, (15 July 2011)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:31756
2019-09-27T23:53:31Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3236
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31756/
Kierunki ewolucji polityki Unii Europejskiej na rzecz małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw i przedsiębiorczości
Wach, Krzysztof
F15 - Economic Integration
L26 - Entrepreneurship
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
M13 - New Firms ; Startups
The aim of the article is the presentation as well as the analysis of the most important directions of the European Union activities in favour of entrepreneurship, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The historical outline of SMEs’ community policy shaping was introduced. Analysing the importance and the role of SME sector in each economy as well as the community policy in favour of entrepreneurship, the craft as well as microenterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises over the period of several decades, the evolution of the policy was noticed and the approach to problems of economic development was changed. Policy makers stopped focusing on large-sized enterprises (LSEs) and great projects, economic decision-makers uncovered the importance of SMEs for assurance of long-term economic dynamics. At present special attention are paid to innovativeness of enterprises, while the beginnings of SMEs’ community policy was dedicated mainly for the craft sector
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31756/1/MPRA_paper_31756.pdf
Wach, Krzysztof (2010): Kierunki ewolucji polityki Unii Europejskiej na rzecz małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw i przedsiębiorczości. Published in: Horyzonty Polityki (ISSN 2082-5897) , Vol. 2, No. 2 (2011): pp. 195-213.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:32112
2019-09-27T03:02:34Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32112/
Quel rôle pour les scénarios Facteur 4 dans la construction de la décision publique ?
Mathy, Sandrine
Fink, Meike
Bibas, Ruben
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Seven long-term prospective studies representing the energy trajectories consistent with a Factor Four, i.e. a 75% reduction of greenhouse gases emissions in 2050 in France have been identified. We analyze their methodology and the high dispersion of results. Then we discuss the role of scenario-making. Among them, only one of the scenarios achieves the Factor Four, thereby showing the limitations of these studies. On the methodological side, the
engineering models used appear as black boxes, each using their own technological hypotheses and not readily understandable by the non-specialist. Therefore, exchanges between modelers, economists, technologists, sociologists and representatives of the civil society are a key factor
for these scenario elaboration as their legitimacy stems from social and politic appropriation of scientific results.
2011
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32112/1/MPRA_paper_32112.pdf
Mathy, Sandrine and Fink, Meike and Bibas, Ruben (2011): Quel rôle pour les scénarios Facteur 4 dans la construction de la décision publique ? Published in: Développement durable et territoires , Vol. 2, No. 1 (2011)
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:32271
2019-09-28T05:16:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3533
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453635
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4E:4E34:4E3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32271/
The Colonization of Hong Kong: Establishing the Pearl of Britain-China Trade
Palivos, Theodore
Wang, Ping
Yip, Chong
O53 - Asia including Middle East
E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
N40 - General, International, or Comparative
We construct a staged development framework with multi-period discrete choices to study the colonization of Hong Kong, which facilitated the trade of several agricultural
and manufactured products, including opium, between Britain and China. The model is particularly designed based on historical data and documentation collected from various sources. We show theoretically how institutions changed in response to the underlying key primitives and lead to the transition from the pre-Opium War era, to the post-Opium War era and then to the post-opium trade era, which span the period 1773-1933. Finally, we support our theoretical findings with historical evidence.
2011-07-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32271/1/MPRA_paper_32271.pdf
Palivos, Theodore and Wang, Ping and Yip, Chong (2011): The Colonization of Hong Kong: Establishing the Pearl of Britain-China Trade.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33096
2019-09-27T16:42:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483235
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33096/
Viewing tax policy through party-colored glasses: What German politicians believe
Janeba, Eckhard
Heinemann, Friedrich
H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Abstract: The process of globalization has an important impact on national tax policies. Most
of the literature does not focus directly on the political decision making process and assumes
that the desired tax policy is responding to objective underlying tradeoffs. Based on an original
survey of members of German national parliament (Bundestag) in 2006/7 we document a
strong ideological bias among policy makers with respect to the perceived mobility of international
tax bases (real capital and paper profits). Ideology influences also directly and indirectly
the perceived national autonomy in tax setting and preferences for a EU minimum tax
for companies. There seems little consensus as to what the efficiency costs of capital taxation
in open economies are, even though our survey falls in a period of extensive debate about and
actual adoption of a company tax reform bill in Germany.
2011-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33096/1/MPRA_paper_33096.pdf
Janeba, Eckhard and Heinemann, Friedrich (2011): Viewing tax policy through party-colored glasses: What German politicians believe. Published in: German Economic Review , Vol. 12, No. 3 (August 2011): pp. 286-311.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33421
2019-10-10T13:03:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483732
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33421/
Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy
Russo, Giuseppe
Senatore, Luigi
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
H41 - Public Goods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
According to the Lisbon Treaty the increasing cost of enforcing the European border against immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is rather vague with respect to the "appropriate measures" to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a contribution game where a northern government and a southern government minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that the
contribution of both governments is positive when their immigration targets are not too different. We show that total contribution is higher when decisions are simultaneous, but the conditions for both contributions to
be positive are less restrictive in the sequential framework.
2011-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33421/1/MPRA_paper_33421.pdf
Russo, Giuseppe and Senatore, Luigi (2011): Who Contributes? A Strategic Approach to a European Immigration Policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33978
2019-09-28T04:56:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523538
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4438
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33978/
Knowledge cluster formation as a science policy: lessons learned
Evers, Hans-Dieter
J38 - Public Policy
R58 - Regional Development Planning and Policy
O1 - Economic Development
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights
A14 - Sociology of Economics
Regional science policy aims at the creation of productive knowledge clusters, which are central places within an epistemic landscape of knowledge production and dissemination, K-clusters are said to have the organisational capability to drive innovations and create new industries. The following paper will look at Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam and their path towards a Knowledge-based economy. All governments have used cluster formation as one of their development strategies. Some evidence on the current state of knowledge cluster formation is provided. If the formation of a knowledge cluster has been the government policy, what has been the result? Is there an epistemic landscape of knowledge clusters? Has the main knowledge cluster really materialised? Data collected from websites, directories, government publications and expert interviews have enabled us to construct the epistemic landscape of Peninsular Malaysia and the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. Several knowledge clusters of a high density of knowledge producing institutions and their knowledge workers have been identified and described. An analysis of the knowledge output, measured in terms of scientific publications, patents and trademarks show that knowledge clusters have, indeed, been productive as predicted by cluster theory, though the internal working of clusters require further explanation.
2011-09-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33978/1/MPRA_paper_33978.pdf
Evers, Hans-Dieter (2011): Knowledge cluster formation as a science policy: lessons learned.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33981
2019-09-27T13:23:53Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443834
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33981/
The Simonian bounded rationality hypothesis and the expectation formation mechanism
Kowalski, Tadeusz
D84 - Expectations ; Speculations
H30 - General
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E00 - General
Abstract. In the 1980s and at beginning of the 1990s the debate on expectation formation mechanism was dominated by the rational expectation hypothesis. Later on, more interest
was directed towards alternative approaches to expectations analysis, mainly based on the bounded rationality paradigm introduced earlier by Herbert A. Simon. The bounded
rationality approach is used here to describe the way expectations might be formed by different agents. Furthermore, three main hypotheses, namely adaptive, rational and bounded ones are being compared and used to indicate why time lags in economic policy prevail
and are variable.
JEL Codes: D78, D84, H30, E00.
2002
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33981/1/MPRA_paper_33981.pdf
Kowalski, Tadeusz (2002): The Simonian bounded rationality hypothesis and the expectation formation mechanism. Published in: Poznan Unversity of Economics Review , Vol. Volume, No. Number 1, 2002 (2002): pp. 5-24.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:34491
2019-10-08T16:30:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443730
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443834
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473230
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34491/
The Institutional Framework and Decision Making in Sudan
Mohamed, Issam A.W.
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D70 - General
D84 - Expectations ; Speculations
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D80 - General
G20 - General
The study here reviews the institutional structure of the Sudanese government. Truly, though it is stigmatized as totalitarian, the structure is phenotypically perfect. Ministry of Ministries council is supposed to cater for analyzing data concerning ministries performance, drawing strategic planning, executing them through ministries and conduct the follow-ups. Department of decision-making was created and packages for data collection and analyses were improvised. However, all these structures seem skeletal as the final decisions structurally seem to be lost between the Presidency Institution and the executive institutions. An introduced flowing chart indicates that the cycle of all decisions end up at the president's hand and approval. That is evidence of concentration of powers within one hand and oligarchic structure of governance.
2010-10-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34491/1/MPRA_paper_34491.pdf
Mohamed, Issam A.W. (2010): The Institutional Framework and Decision Making in Sudan.
ar
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:34672
2019-09-26T14:35:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453032
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34672/
Intended and Unintended Results of the Proposed Volcker Rule
Skold, Alida S.
E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
L50 - General
Regulation is written with the intent of protecting the vulnerable. However, it can cause an undesirable result if written without understanding how the positive intent can have a negative impact. In its present form, the proposed Volcker Rule has the potential of expanding the liquidity crisis that devastated the housing market into the capital markets. Risk will be transferred to less regulated entities. Banks conducting business in the U.S. or with U.S. “residents” will be at a competitive disadvantage.
2011-11-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34672/1/MPRA_paper_34672.pdf
Skold, Alida S. (2011): Intended and Unintended Results of the Proposed Volcker Rule.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:34845
2019-09-26T20:56:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483732
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34845/
Does gender matter for public spending? Empirical evidence from Italian municipalities.
Rigon, Massimiliano
Tanzi, Giulia M.
H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
This paper studies whether municipal expenditure in Italy is influenced by female representation in city councils. To correctly capture the causal relation we use the instrumental variable technique. Our instrument is based on a temporary change in the Italian normative occurred between 1993 and 1995 that reserved a gender quota in party lists for municipal elections, causing an exogenous change in the number of women elected in city councils. We take
advantage of the fact that not all the municipalities have been treated by the law, due to its short period of enforcement. Despite the existence of gender specific preferences in the society, we find no evidence that the allocation of resources among different spending categories is affected by the gender of politicians. Our results are consistent with the Median voter theorem. Alternatively, they may suggest that the gender is not a determinant of politicians’ voting behaviour, implying that the preferences of the women involved in political activities are close to those of their male colleagues.
2011-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34845/1/MPRA_paper_34845.pdf
Rigon, Massimiliano and Tanzi, Giulia M. (2011): Does gender matter for public spending? Empirical evidence from Italian municipalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35621
2019-10-09T04:11:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453032
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473234
7375626A656374733D47:4732
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D45:4535
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35621/
Intended and Unintended Results of the Proposed Volcker Rule
Skold, Alida S.
E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
L50 - General
G24 - Investment Banking ; Venture Capital ; Brokerage ; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
The intention of regulation is to protect the vulnerable. However, unintended results of regulation can cause the opposite occur. In its present form, the proposed Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading and has the potential of continuing the liquidity crisis that aided in the degradation of the housing market into decreased liquidity in the capital markets. The rule also prohibits the owning, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with hedge funds beyond three percent by the covered banking entities. Risk is transferring to less regulated financial institutions as new hedge funds are opened. The risk can have a profound impact on the retirement community through underfunded pension funds searching for absolute returns. Another unintended result of the proposed Volcker Rule is banks conducting business in the United States or with United States “residents” will be at a competitive disadvantage due to lost revenues and the high cost of compliance. The rule has the potential to cause United States companies to be at a competitive disadvantage in global markets.
2011-11-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35621/1/MPRA_paper_35621.pdf
Skold, Alida S. (2011): Intended and Unintended Results of the Proposed Volcker Rule.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35711
2019-09-28T00:40:12Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443835
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443834
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443837
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483236
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D49:4930
7375626A656374733D41:4132:413233
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453236
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413130
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433635
7375626A656374733D48:4838:483837
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483733
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35711/
Trafficking in drugs and economic theory
Pandey, S.S.D.
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
D84 - Expectations ; Speculations
C02 - Mathematical Methods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
D87 - Neuroeconomics
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
I0 - General
A23 - Graduate
E26 - Informal Economy ; Underground Economy
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
A10 - General
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; International Public Goods
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
B41 - Economic Methodology
The focus of this study is on black markets which provide an important segment of the parallel economy. These markets operate in disequilibrium,search and information costs become very important.Trafficking in drugs taken as case, to explore both theoretically and empirically. The problem, studied some twenty years back has been accentuating gradually world over. It is still a pressing problem of our civilization which needs to be tackled immediately and this requires a clear understanding of the problem and based on that,effective policy formulation and enforcement.We find that psycho-physiological dependence in abusers make their economic budget constraint 'redundant' thereby leading to completely inelastic demand schedules.Increasing cost of Police surveillance yields diminishing returns in terms of deterrence.There are secondary crimes as a result.By using developments in other human sciences, study opens the road leading to more realistic economic theory.
1991-03-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35711/3/MPRA_paper_35711.pdf
Pandey, S.S.D. (1991): Trafficking in drugs and economic theory. Published in: ISBN 81-85694-10-9 (1 May 1994): pp. 74-160.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35725
2019-09-27T05:47:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483232
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513438
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35725/
Energy populism and household welfare
Cont, Walter
Hancevic, Pedro
Navajas, Fernando H.
H22 - Incidence
Q48 - Government Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
We study a cycle of subsidized energy prices and estimate its welfare impact on households in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region. A simple framework explains its emergence in terms of the preference of a median household (voter) for receiving transfer gains followed by a future flow of transfer losses. We evaluate actual transfers and welfare effects that a departure of prices of natural gas and electricity generation from opportunity costs since 2003 had on households and explore the impact of a way back to opportunity cost pricing.
2011-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35725/1/MPRA_paper_35725.pdf
Cont, Walter and Hancevic, Pedro and Navajas, Fernando H. (2011): Energy populism and household welfare.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35820
2019-09-27T19:33:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453032
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3338
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3433
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433532
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3135
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3538
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35820/
Minimum Wage Legislation and Economic Growth: Channels and Effects
Mo, Pak Hung
E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
O38 - Government Policy
O43 - Institutions and Growth
C52 - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
O15 - Human Resources ; Human Development ; Income Distribution ; Migration
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J58 - Public Policy
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Despite decades of experience and research, the effects of minimum wage legislation (MWL) on long-run economic performance have rarely been studied since Stigler’s (1946) classic exposition about the shortcomings of MWL. In this study, we use a novel method to estimate the magnitude
and transmission channels by which MWL affect productivity and GDP growth. Our results suggest that countries with MWL have a growth rate of about 20 to 30 percent lower than the
sample mean. Although the initial impacts are small, in the ‘steady state’ where the marginal effect of the legislation years equals zero, a country will have a growth rate of about 30 to 38 percent lower than the average.
2011-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35820/1/MPRA_paper_35820.pdf
Mo, Pak Hung (2011): Minimum Wage Legislation and Economic Growth: Channels and Effects.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35967
2019-09-29T00:34:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453032
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473234
7375626A656374733D47:4732
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D45:4535
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35967/
Intended and Unintended Results of the Proposed Volcker Rule
Skold, Alida S.
E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
L50 - General
G24 - Investment Banking ; Venture Capital ; Brokerage ; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
The intention of regulation is to protect the vulnerable. However, unintended results of regulation can cause the opposite occur. In its present form, the proposed Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading and has the potential of continuing the liquidity crisis that aided in the degradation of the housing market into decreased liquidity in the capital markets. The rule also prohibits the owning, sponsoring, or having certain relationships with hedge funds beyond three percent by the covered banking entities. Risk is transferring to less regulated financial institutions as new hedge funds are opened. The risk can have a profound impact on the retirement community through underfunded pension funds searching for absolute returns. Another unintended result of the proposed Volcker Rule is how banks conducting business in the United States or with United States “residents” will be at a competitive disadvantage due to lost revenues and the high cost of compliance. The rule has the potential to cause United States companies to be at a competitive disadvantage in global markets.
2011-11-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35967/1/MPRA_paper_35967.pdf
Skold, Alida S. (2011): Intended and Unintended Results of the Proposed Volcker Rule.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:36951
2019-09-26T21:33:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463530
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433032
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413130
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36951/
Ranking policy and political economic journals
Halkos, George
Tzeremes, Nickolaos
F50 - General
C02 - Mathematical Methods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
A10 - General
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
The purpose of this paper is to rank economic journals in the broader field of policy and political science. By using one composite input and one composite output the paper ranks 52 journals in a linear programming setting using data for the time period of 1996-2010. In addition for the first time three different quality ranking reports have been incorporated into a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) modelling problem in order to classify these journals into four categories (‘A’ to ‘D’). The rankings suggest that the journals with the highest rankings are American Political Science Review, Research Policy, The China Quarterly, Public Choice and Journal of Conflict Resolution.
2012-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36951/1/MPRA_paper_36951.pdf
Halkos, George and Tzeremes, Nickolaos (2012): Ranking policy and political economic journals.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37322
2019-09-26T10:32:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37322/
The Economics of doping
Berentsen, Aleksander
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper considers a strategic game in which two players, with unequal prospects of winning the game, decide simultaneously and secretly to use performance-enhancing drugs before they compete. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the favorite player is more likely to take these drugs than is the underdog, yet, for some parameter values, he is less likely to win the game with doping opportunities than without. The paper then analyzes the anti-doping regulations adopted by the International Olympic Committee, comparing its rules with a ranking-based sanction scheme. Two results emerge from this comparison: First, while IOC regulations cannot satisfy participation and incentive compatibility constraints and implement the no-doping equilibrium in all circumstances, a more effective ranking-based sanction scheme with these properties exists. Second, ranking-based punishment schemes are less costly to implement than are IOC regulations because fewer tests are needed to attain the no-doping equilibrium.
2002
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37322/1/MPRA_paper_37322.pdf
Berentsen, Aleksander (2002): The Economics of doping. Published in: European Journal od Political Economy , Vol. 1, No. 18 : pp. 109-127.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38494
2019-09-26T22:47:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38494/
Empirical determinants of in-kind redistribution: Partisan biases and the role of inflation
Hessami, Zohal
Silke, Uebelmesser
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
There is a dearth of research on the determinants of in-kind redistribution. Using dynamic panel data estimations for 32 OECD countries, we show that the in-kind share of social benefits is lower under left-wing governments. This effect is weakened when left-wing governments respond to inflation by increasing the share of in-kind transfers.
2012-03-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38494/1/MPRA_paper_38494.pdf
Hessami, Zohal and Silke, Uebelmesser (2012): Empirical determinants of in-kind redistribution: Partisan biases and the role of inflation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38497
2019-10-03T17:53:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463232
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483430
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4830:483030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38497/
Electoral systems and immigration
Russo, Giuseppe
Salsano, Francesco
F22 - International Migration
H40 - General
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H00 - General
We study the effect of electoral systems on openness to immigration. According to the literature, in our model plurality systems induce a rent-seeking policymaker to get re-election through locally provided public goods rather than through transfers, whereas the opposite occurs under proportional representation. In both systems policymakers can use immigration to enlarge the tax base and retrieve increased rents after compensating the decisive majority. However, this mechanism is more effective when the increased tax base does not flow to non-voting immigrants through transfers. Therefore, plurality electoral systems generate more openness to immigration. We find support for this result on a cross-section of 34 OECD countries. In addition, we show that mass immigration \ might incentivize policymakers to get re-election throug public goods rather than transfers also in proportional electoral systems.
2012-05-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38497/1/MPRA_paper_38497.pdf
Russo, Giuseppe and Salsano, Francesco (2012): Electoral systems and immigration.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:39998
2019-09-27T16:19:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513137
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513135
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453635
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513138
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39998/
"Agro, Ingreso Seguro" en perspectiva: Un análisis de políticas públicas
Mejía Cubillos, Javier
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure ; Land Reform ; Land Use ; Irrigation ; Agriculture and Environment
E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
Q18 - Agricultural Policy ; Food Policy
This paper aims to analyze, through the public policy approach, "Agro, Ingreso Seguro" -AIS-, key component of the Colombian agricultural policy of the late 2000s. Through this approach it is seen that AIS responded to real social problems and it was based on a set of guidelines used worldwide. Although the design and implementation of the program suffered from certain problems, the result indicators point it out as a relative success. AIS generated positive impacts on the competitiveness of the agricultural sector; no further progress in terms of employment and rural development were found.
2012-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39998/2/MPRA_paper_39998.pdf
Mejía Cubillos, Javier (2012): "Agro, Ingreso Seguro" en perspectiva: Un análisis de políticas públicas.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:41366
2019-09-26T21:56:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493230
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41366/
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
Dur, Umut
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
I20 - General
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Abstract This paper characterizes the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem. Schools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. For each school a strict priority ordering of students is determined by the school district. Each student has strict preference over the schools. We first define weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the unique Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies the weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. To our knowledge this is the first axiomatic approach to the top trading cycles mechanism in the school choice problem where schools have a capacity greater than one.
2012-09-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41366/1/MPRA_paper_41366.pdf
Dur, Umut (2012): A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:42374
2019-09-27T08:32:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3535
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3136
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42374/
Uganda's microfinance policy regime: An exploratio through a political-economy framework
Schmidt, Oliver
O55 - Africa
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
O16 - Financial Markets ; Saving and Capital Investment ; Corporate Finance and Governance
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
In 2005, Uganda’ government fundamentally shifted the direction of its microfinance (MF) policy. Hitherto it had focused on integrating MF institutions into the financial sector, allowing them to take deposits. Since 2005, it focuses on savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs); with government funding of and ostensibly interfering in the SACCOs’ operations.
This paper explores the reversal of policy direction, drawing on public choice theory. It finds that the shift of policy direction served the objectives of Uganda’s politicians to maintain political power, as it offered them an avenue to create loyalty through patronage. MF special interest groups – particularly development agencies – had chosen a strategy based on information and financial contributions that failed to incite politicians and to maintain univocal support from technocrats and MF practitioners.
2012-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42374/1/MPRA_paper_42374.pdf
Schmidt, Oliver (2012): Uganda's microfinance policy regime: An exploratio through a political-economy framework.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:42604
2019-09-27T08:37:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483530
7375626A656374733D52:5231
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443330
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4830:483030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42604/
Inter-jurisdictional migration and the size of government
Giuranno, Michele G.
Rongili, Biswas
H50 - General
R1 - General Regional Economics
D30 - General
H41 - Public Goods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H00 - General
This paper develops a model of centralized public spending where decision-makers are the regional median voters instead of the national median voter of the received literature. Regional representatives decide the level of public spending by bargaining in the central legislature. We study how exogenous changes in the composition of the regional electorate either deteriorate or mitigate inter-jurisdictional redistributive conflicts and how these, in turn, influence the size of the government. We find the conditions under which migration-induced inter-regional income convergence (divergence) leads either to a bigger or a smaller government. Finally, the relationship between migration and efficiency is explored within the present framework.
2012-10-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42604/3/MPRA_paper_42604.pdf
Giuranno, Michele G. and Rongili, Biswas (2012): Inter-jurisdictional migration and the size of government.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:45271
2019-09-27T20:19:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45271/
Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
Liang, Pinghan
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when the intermediary is moderately biased. Otherwise, as responses to the distortion caused by a biased intermediary, the optimal delegation set may involve a hole. Thus, multi-interval delegation set would arise when subordinates have opposing biases. This result sheds some light on policy threshold effects: "slight" changes in the underlying state cause a jump in the policy responses.
2013
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45271/1/MPRA_paper_45271.pdf
Liang, Pinghan (2013): Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:48113
2019-09-28T03:55:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48113/
Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal
Steven, Brams
Marc, Kilgour
C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and (ii) men and women. In the case of the latter, it produces either one or two stable matches whereby no man and woman would prefer to be matched with each other rather than with their present partners. But stable matches can give one or both players in a pair their worst match, whereas the minimax algorithm that we propose, which finds all assignments that minimize the maximum rank of players in matches, avoids such assignments. Although minimax matches may not be stable, at least one is always Pareto-optimal: No other matching is at least as good for all the players and better for one or more. If there are multiple minimax matches, we propose criteria for choosing the most desirable among them and also discuss the settings in which minimax matches seem more compelling than deferred-acceptance matches when they differ. Finally, we calculate the probability that minimax matches differ from deferred-acceptance matches in a simple case.
2013-07-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48113/1/MPRA_paper_48113.pdf
Steven, Brams and Marc, Kilgour (2013): Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:48919
2019-09-27T05:38:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483236
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48919/
Fair tax evasion and majority voting over redistributive taxation
Weinreich, Daniel
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
H30 - General
We shed some light on fairness preferences regarding tax evasion. Individuals perceive income inequality which they are responsible for as fair (e.g. work effort) while inequality resulting from factors outside their reach is regarded as unfair (e.g. productivity or wage rate). This affects the incentives to hide income from tax authorities and supply labor. We set up a model where individuals simultaneously choose unreported income and work effort given a linear taxation scheme. We show the conditions for which individuals respond with lower or higher unreported income and work effort when fair tax evasion is introduced. Beyond, it can be shown that unreported income increases while work effort decreases when the tax rate is raised. Finally, we consider a majority voting over redistributive taxation. Thereby, it is shown that the median voter prefers lower (higher) taxation if she evades less (more) taxes than would be fair since raising the tax rate would enlarge (reduce) the deviation from fair tax evasion. This affects the moral cost as peceived by the individuals.
2013-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48919/1/MPRA_paper_48919.pdf
Weinreich, Daniel (2013): Fair tax evasion and majority voting over redistributive taxation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:50103
2019-10-13T17:24:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453032
7375626A656374733D47:4732
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473230
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473234
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50103/
Intended and Unintended Consequences of the Proposed Volcker Rule
Skold, Alida S.
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
G20 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
G24 - Investment Banking ; Venture Capital ; Brokerage ; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
L50 - General
Regulation is intended to protect the vulnerable. However, in its present form the unintended consequences of the proposed Volcker Rule has the potential of continuing the liquidity crisis that aided in the degradation of the housing market into decreased liquidity in the capital markets. In addition to increasing costs to the investor and decreasing market efficiency from increased bid ask price spreads, the proposed rule will transfer risk to less regulated financial institutions as new hedge funds open. The risk can have a profound impact on the retirement community through underfunded pension funds searching for absolute returns. Another unintended consequence of the proposed Volcker Rule is how the rule may place banks conducting business in the United States or with United States “residents” at a competitive disadvantage due to lost revenues combined with the high cost of compliance. The rule has the potential to cause United States banks and businesses to be at a competitive disadvantage in global markets.
2011-11-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50103/1/MPRA_paper_50103.pdf
Skold, Alida S. (2011): Intended and Unintended Consequences of the Proposed Volcker Rule.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:50529
2019-09-30T02:55:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
7375626A656374733D48:4836:483631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50529/
Roads or Schools? Political Budget Cycles with different types of voters.
Lopez Uribe, Maria del Pilar
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
E62 - Fiscal Policy
H61 - Budget ; Budget Systems
Using a new Colombian data set (1830-2000), we analyze how changes in the electoral legislation with regard to the characteristics of voters (in terms of education and income levels) has affected fiscal policy in electoral times. In line with economic theory, we show that after the law was reformed in 1936 the composition of the expenditure shifted towards social spending (like education, health, and welfare benefits) but there was decreased spending on infrastructure and investment projects (like roads). Consistent with the literature, we also find: 1.The timing and the size of the political budget cycles changed after 1936 and 2.After 1936 there was a shift in the funding mechanisms from indirect tax revenues to more debt.
2013
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50529/1/MPRA_paper_50529.pdf
Lopez Uribe, Maria del Pilar (2013): Roads or Schools? Political Budget Cycles with different types of voters.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:50995
2019-09-28T21:29:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4837
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50995/
"In consideration of the children", really? Adoption of the school-rhythm reform by French municipalities
Cassette, Aurélie
Farvaque, Etienne
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
This research looks at the determinants of the adoption of the school-rhythm reform by French municipalities. The possibility opened to mayors to adopt the reform sooner (2013) or later (2014) offers the opportunity to measure how much the interests of the children have weighted on the decision. As our results reveal strong partisan biases to be prevalent, and financial reasons to be influential, it can be affirmed that the children's interest has clearly not been the only consideration in mind.
2013
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50995/1/MPRA_paper_50995.pdf
Cassette, Aurélie and Farvaque, Etienne (2013): "In consideration of the children", really? Adoption of the school-rhythm reform by French municipalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:51015
2019-09-26T21:50:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443730
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51015/
In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity"
Cebula, Richard
Kafoglis, Milton
D70 - General
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
P16 - Political Economy
This paper formulates a simple mathematical framework for the selection of an optimum "relative unanimity” collective decision rule. The approach is first to identify the benefits of moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity. Then, the costs of moving from simple majority rule towards unanimity are identified. Finally, the issue of an optimal decision rule is mathematically solved.
1982-01-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51015/1/MPRA_paper_51015.pdf
Cebula, Richard and Kafoglis, Milton (1982): In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity". Published in: Public Choice , Vol. 40, No. 2 (28 June 1983): pp. 195-201.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:51216
2019-09-27T03:18:53Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443730
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51216/
The Buchanan-Tullock Model: Some Extensions
Kafoglis, Milton
Cebula, Richard
D70 - General
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
In their seminal work, The Calculus of Consent (1962), Buchanan and Tullock develop a decision model which embodies fundamental relationships relevant to institutional choices. However, the Buchanan-Tullock model remains "general," thus inviting others to specify details and to develop extensions. The present paper seeks to explicate this important model so as to clarify the framework in certain important ways and then to extend the model by introducing explicit considerations of such dimensions as group size and group preference heterogeneity as explicit variables.
1980-01-22
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51216/1/MPRA_paper_51216.pdf
Kafoglis, Milton and Cebula, Richard (1980): The Buchanan-Tullock Model: Some Extensions. Published in: Public Choice , Vol. 36, No. 1 (30 January 1981): pp. 179-186.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:51239
2019-10-04T11:07:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51239/
In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity": Reply
Cebula, Richard
Kafoglis, Milton
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper extends our analysis of the identification of an "optimum relative unanimity." This is done principally through clarifying certain terms and correcting a misinterpretation of why the minimum possible value for an optimum relative unanimity is a simple majority, i.e., greater than 50%.
1986-11-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51239/1/MPRA_paper_51239.pdf
Cebula, Richard and Kafoglis, Milton (1986): In Search of Optimum "Relative Unanimity": Reply. Published in: Public Choice , Vol. 54, No. 3 (24 August 1987): pp. 289-290.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:51559
2019-09-28T16:45:36Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443730
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51559/
Voting with One's Feet: A Brief Note on the Case of Public Welfare and the American Indian
Carlson, Leonard
Cebula, Richard
D70 - General
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H41 - Public Goods
This brief Note has found that the location decisions of the American Indian are influenced by geographic AFDC differentials. In particular, the American Indian population is apparently strongly attracted to high welfare areas. This finding may be interpreted as yet further support for the Tiebout hypothesis of 'voting with one's feet,' with the Indian consumer-voter in this case 'balloting' in terms of welfare services. In addition, like certain prior studies, this set of results provides additional evidence that the welfare system distorts spatial resource allocation.
1980-01-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51559/1/MPRA_paper_51559.pdf
Carlson, Leonard and Cebula, Richard (1980): Voting with One's Feet: A Brief Note on the Case of Public Welfare and the American Indian. Published in: Public Choice , Vol. 37, No. 2 (17 April 1981): pp. 321-325.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:51563
2019-09-27T10:03:29Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51563/
Potential Theft as an Indirect Tax
Cebula, Richard
Gatons, Paul
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
This theoretical model demonstrates that there is an excess burden from potential theft similar to that which results from an indirect tax with some positive probability of payment. In addition, the model shows that potential theft creates a bias for consumption to drift away from "steal-able" items to substitute items.
1973-01-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51563/1/MPRA_paper_51563.pdf
Cebula, Richard and Gatons, Paul (1973): Potential Theft as an Indirect Tax. Published in: Public Choice , Vol. 20, No. 1 (1 March 1974): pp. 109-111.
en
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