2024-03-29T05:41:43Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23
2019-09-27T03:52:33Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837
7375626A656374733D48:4831
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3031
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35
7375626A656374733D48:4833
7375626A656374733D48:4834
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483732
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3530
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23/
Unemployment and Clientelism: The Piqueteros of Argentina
Ponce, Aldo Fernando
H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations
H1 - Structure and Scope of Government
J01 - Labor Economics: General
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
H41 - Public Goods
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
J50 - General
This paper sheds light on possible explanations for the success and sustainability of the piqueteros social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective based on Latin America. I show which institutional arrangements, political actors, and configurations of power contributed to the success of the piqueteros. Applying the basic principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success of the piqueteros movement was produced by the current political division in the ruling party (the Peronist party), by the over-regulated Argentine labor market, and by the impact of the Argentine economic crisis through the unemployment rates.
2006-09-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23/1/MPRA_paper_23.pdf
Ponce, Aldo Fernando (2006): Unemployment and Clientelism: The Piqueteros of Argentina.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:132
2019-09-29T09:15:46Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/132/
Subscription equilibria with public production: Existence and regularity
Villanacci, Antonio
Zenginobuz, Unal
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
H41 - Public Goods
We revisit the analysis of subscription equilibria in a full fledged general equilibrium model with public goods. We study the case of a nonprofit, or public, firm that produces the public good using private goods as inputs, which are to be financed by voluntary contributions (subscriptions) of households. We prove existence and generic regularity of subscription equilibria.
2005-05-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/132/1/MPRA_paper_132.pdf
Villanacci, Antonio and Zenginobuz, Unal (2005): Subscription equilibria with public production: Existence and regularity. Forthcoming in: Research in Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:183
2019-09-27T21:34:27Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/183/
Pareto improving interventions in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public goods
Villanacci, Antonio
Zenginobuz, Unal
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
H41 - Public Goods
Most of the literature on government intervention in models of voluntary public goods supply focuses on interventions that increase the total level of a public good, which is considered to be typically underprovided. However, an intervention that is successful in increasing the public good level need not benefit everyone. In this paper we take a direct approach to welfare properties of voluntary provision equilibria in a full blown general equilibrium model with public goods and study interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving on the voluntary provision outcome. Towards this end, we study a model with many private goods and nonlinear production technology for the public good, and hence allow for relative price effects to serve as a powerful channel of intervention. In this setup we show that Pareto improving interventions generally do exist. In particular, direct government provision financed by “small”, or “local”, lump-sum taxes can be used generically to Pareto improve upon the voluntary provision outcome.
2004-12-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/183/1/MPRA_paper_183.pdf
Villanacci, Antonio and Zenginobuz, Unal (2004): Pareto improving interventions in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public goods. Forthcoming in: Review of Economic Design
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:186
2019-09-26T18:11:55Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/186/
The Effect of Spillovers on the Provision of Local Public Goods
Bloch, Francis
Zenginobuz, Unal
H41 - Public Goods
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods with positive spillovers across jurisdictions. If spillovers are symmetric, the noncooperative game played by jurisdictions admits a unique equilibrium, and an increase in spillovers reduces the total provision of public goods. Smaller jurisdictions always reduce their contribution, but larger jurisdictions can increase their contribution. When spillovers are asymmetric,
equilibrium is unique if spillovers are low, while multiple equilibria exist for high spillover values. In the case of two jurisdictions, an increase in the flow of spillovers to one jurisdiction benefits agents from that jurisdiction but harms agents in the other jurisdiction. Beyond the case of two jurisdictions, the effect of changes in spillovers cannot be signed. An increase in the spillovers flowing to a jurisdiction can actually result in an increase in the supply of public goods by that jurisdiction and harm agents residing in it, while benefiting agents in the other jurisdictions. The results of the paper reveal the complexity of interactions that will plague the design of institutions for multijurisdictional local public good economies with spillovers.
2004-12-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/186/1/MPRA_paper_186.pdf
Bloch, Francis and Zenginobuz, Unal (2004): The Effect of Spillovers on the Provision of Local Public Goods. Forthcoming in: Review of Economic Design
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:190
2019-09-28T16:41:12Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443531
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/190/
On the neutrality of redistribution in a general equilibrium model with public goods
Villanacci, Antonio
Zenginobuz, Unal
D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
H41 - Public Goods
Models on private provision of public goods typically involve a single private good and linear production technology for the public good. We study a model with several private goods and non-linear (strictly concave) production technology. We revisit the question of “neutrality” of government interventions on equilibrium outcomes and show that relative
price effects that are absent with a single private good and linear production technology become a powerful channel of redistribution in this case. Contrary to previous results, redistributing endowments in favor of contributors is shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient for increasing the equilibrium level of public good.
2001-05-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/190/1/MPRA_paper_190.pdf
Villanacci, Antonio and Zenginobuz, Unal (2001): On the neutrality of redistribution in a general equilibrium model with public goods. Forthcoming in: Journal of Public Economic Theory
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:388
2019-09-27T14:47:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/388/
Concern for relative position, rank-order contests, and contributions to public goods
Zenginobuz, Unal
H41 - Public Goods
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
We study the consequences of concern for relative position and status in a public good economy. We consider a group of agents who are engaged in a contest for position whereby a set of rewards are distributed according to relative status. The extent of concern for rewards, together with the relative magnitude of rewards, will have an impact on agents’ willingness to contribute to public goods. Depending on the nature of prizes, i.e. whether higher private good consumption is rewarded or punished, the contest for relative position will either exacerbate or ameliorate the free-riding problem inherent in public good environments. In addition to examining the implications of concern for relative position, we also consider how an appropriate scheme of rewards might be designed to induce more efficient levels of public good.
1996-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/388/1/MPRA_paper_388.pdf
Zenginobuz, Unal (1996): Concern for relative position, rank-order contests, and contributions to public goods.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2037
2019-09-29T02:05:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2037/
When in Rome, do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment, conformist learning, and cooperation
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos
Rowthorn, Robert
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
H41 - Public Goods
Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology
We model the coevolution of behavioral strategies and social learning rules in the context of a cooperative dilemma, a situation in which individuals must decide whether or not to subordinate their own interests to those of the group. There are two learning rules in our model, conformism and payoff-dependent imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and cooperate plus punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the prevailing learning rules. Group and individual level selective pressures drive evolution.
We also simulate our model for conditions that approximate those in which early hominids lived. We find that conformism can evolve when the only problem that individuals face is a cooperative dilemma, in which prosocial behavior is always costly to the individual. Furthermore, the presence of conformists dramatically increases the group size for which cooperation can be sustained. The results of our model are robust: they hold even when migration rates are high, and when conflict among groups is infrequent.
2006-04-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2037/1/MPRA_paper_2037.pdf
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés and Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos and Rowthorn, Robert (2006): When in Rome, do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment, conformist learning, and cooperation. Published in: Evolution and Human Behavior , Vol. 28, No. 2 (March 2007): pp. 112-117.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2081
2019-09-26T12:53:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2081/
Corruption and regulatory burden
Dzhumashev, Ratbek
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
L51 - Economics of Regulation
H41 - Public Goods
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
It is known that government has discretionary power in providing public
goods and regulating the economy. Corrupt bureaucracy with discretionary
power creates and extracts rents by manipulating with the public good
supply and regulations: i) by attaching excessive red tape to the public
good they are providing; ii) or by making the regulations di±cult for the
private agents to comply with. The former type of corruption results in
less public input being provided at higher cost to the private agents. The
latter increases non-compliance, which then breeds bribery. Consequently,
the overall public sector burden is higher in the environment with corrupt
bureaucracy. We show this outcome using a simple theoretical model, and
then confront it with empirical evidence.
2008-05-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2081/1/MPRA_paper_2081.pdf
Dzhumashev, Ratbek (2008): Corruption and regulatory burden.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2223
2019-09-26T22:37:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5034:503438
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2223/
Comparative urban institutions and intertemporal externality: a revisit of the Coase conjecture
Deng, Feng
P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies
H41 - Public Goods
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
R52 - Land Use and Other Regulations
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
Coase originally formulated his conjecture about intertemporal price competition in the context of a land market, but it has been applied almost exclusively to non-spatial markets. This paper revisits the Coase Conjecture in the context of land development and urban institutions. I compare four institutional arrangements based on the combination of land tenure options and local governance forms: private/rental, public/rental, private/owner and public/owner. The two-period model developed in this paper shows that homeownership may result in more land development than leasehold. Numeric examples suggest (1) public/owner, i.e., the common form of government providing collective goods, may be efficient for more uniform distribution of consumer; (2) rentals can be desirable for “poor” communities; (3) private/owner, such as CID (Common Interest Development) and condominium, is more efficient for “rich” communities; (4) restrictive zoning reduces social surplus, and “rich” community may adopt more restrictive measures. These results may help explain why public institutions are dominant in urban setting and why most private communities are small and located in the suburbs.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2223/1/MPRA_paper_2223.pdf
Deng, Feng (2003): Comparative urban institutions and intertemporal externality: a revisit of the Coase conjecture.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2302
2019-09-26T15:03:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493233
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2302/
Organes de gouvernance et paradoxe démocratique: Le cas des conseils d’administration d’université
Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
I23 - Higher Education ; Research Institutions
H41 - Public Goods
The aims of this article is to propose a preliminary step for a university governance framework. The second step will to produce an empirical study. We will discuss about the peculiar context of the French university organizations. The contract theory framework and the organizational architecture theory could lead us in this discussion, talking about opportunistic stakeholder's behaviour. In this peculiar frame, university is just an application of the corporate governance theory. And the developpment and improvement of european higer education policies in the Lisbon declaration context makes it more topical.
2006-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2302/1/MPRA_paper_2302.pdf
Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume (2006): Organes de gouvernance et paradoxe démocratique: Le cas des conseils d’administration d’université.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2514
2019-10-02T09:40:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2514/
Is the U.S. Dancing to a Different Drummer?
Marcus, J. Scott
H41 - Public Goods
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
Is the United States in full retreat from internationally recognized regulatory best practice? Or is it instead headed toward some different destination – "dancing to the beat of a different drummer"? Where is this likely to lead?
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2514/1/MPRA_paper_2514.pdf
Marcus, J. Scott (2005): Is the U.S. Dancing to a Different Drummer? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 39-58.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2958
2019-10-03T07:42:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2958/
An experimental analysis of moral hazard in team
Costa, Francisco
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M54 - Labor Management
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
This paper reports 5 laboratory sessions that analyze the effects of group sizes in the voluntary contribution mechanism, when contribution level is either complementary or substitute. The theorical argument is that each production function provides different incentives for the agent along scale changes. When contribution levels are substitutes, bigger groups provide more incentives for free-riders, thus reducing the contribution level, because of decreasing marginal contribution - the 1/N problem -, Kandel and Lazear (1992). On the other hand, if marginal contribution is independent of the group size, as the case where contributions are complementary, the public good provision may increase together with the group size, as in Adams (2002). Our experiment results show that for both production functions bigger groups reduce contribution level and that, when efforts are substitutes, the contribution level is significantly higher. (JEL: H41 J33 C92)
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2958/1/MPRA_paper_2958.pdf
Costa, Francisco (2005): An experimental analysis of moral hazard in team.
pt
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3250
2019-09-26T11:02:13Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3333
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3334
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3838
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3250/
Media industry facing biggest upheaval since Gutenberg. Media consumers morphing into media makers
Heng, Stefan
O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences ; Diffusion Processes
O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
O14 - Industrialization ; Manufacturing and Service Industries ; Choice of Technology
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L88 - Government Policy
H41 - Public Goods
The advance of innovative information and communication technologies has triggered a fundamental upheaval in the media industry. The technology is reforming the conventional media model. The media mix will become more varied; interactive and personalised offers are taking root and finding their ideal milieu on the web. Newspapers, radio stations and TV broadcasters will have to reposition themselves if they want to remain attractive in the media industry with the arrival of the Web 2.0. This will include seeking new distribution channels and considering e.g. pay-per-view programming and innovative forms of advertising.
2006-10-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3250/1/MPRA_paper_3250.pdf
Heng, Stefan (2006): Media industry facing biggest upheaval since Gutenberg. Media consumers morphing into media makers. Published in: E-conomics No. 59 (16 October 2006)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3550
2019-09-28T01:28:53Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3838
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3550/
Bundles and Range Strategies: The Case of Telecom Operators
Pernet, Sophie
O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences ; Diffusion Processes
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
O14 - Industrialization ; Manufacturing and Service Industries ; Choice of Technology
L88 - Government Policy
H41 - Public Goods
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L90 - General
L96 - Telecommunications
Against a background of competition and the generalisation of IP that characterises the field of electronic communications, the concept of the "bundle" has resulted in the emergence of "triple play", and even "quadruple play." This paper offers an overview of the growth of this phenomenon by introducing a distinction between the basic components of multiplay strategies and the diverse range of functions that can be linked to these strategies.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3550/1/MPRA_paper_3550.pdf
Pernet, Sophie (2006): Bundles and Range Strategies: The Case of Telecom Operators. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 63 (September 2006): pp. 19-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3552
2019-10-07T20:22:03Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3838
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3552/
Triple Play Time
Hollander, Claude
Hollander, Abraham
O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences ; Diffusion Processes
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
O14 - Industrialization ; Manufacturing and Service Industries ; Choice of Technology
L88 - Government Policy
H41 - Public Goods
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
Abstract: Digital convergence thrusts telephony, television and the internet into the socalled 'triple play' offerings, creating new forms of rivalry between cable operators and
telephone companies. Markets participants feel compelled to enter new industries to survive, even though their core competencies are limited to their primary market. The outcome of triple play competition is likely to depend on the speed of the development of new technologies and the adaptation of the regulatory environment. In the short run, telephone companies will enjoy an advantage attributable to switching costs. However, this advantage will erode as younger subscribers switch to telephony on the internet.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3552/1/MPRA_paper_3552.pdf
Hollander, Claude and Hollander, Abraham (2006): Triple Play Time. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 63 (September 2006): pp. 51-71.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3716
2019-09-28T10:26:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453230
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3136
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3431
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443932
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453630
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483236
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3716/
Corruption, uncertainty and growth
Djumashev, R
E20 - General
O16 - Financial Markets ; Saving and Capital Investment ; Corporate Finance and Governance
O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E60 - General
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
H41 - Public Goods
Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.
2007-06-26
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3716/1/MPRA_paper_3716.pdf
Djumashev, R (2007): Corruption, uncertainty and growth.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4256
2019-09-27T15:59:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4256/
The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection
Osmani, Dritan
Tol, Richard
C72 - Noncooperative Games
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
H41 - Public Goods
Abstract
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. Extending a model of Barrett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equality
2006-05-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4256/1/MPRA_paper_4256.pdf
Osmani, Dritan and Tol, Richard (2006): The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4372
2019-09-27T03:15:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493238
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4372/
Investing in Indonesia’s Education: Allocation, Equity, and Efficiency of Public Expenditures
Arze del Granado, Javier
Fengler, Wolfgang
Ragatz, Andrew
Yavuz, Elif
H41 - Public Goods
I28 - Government Policy
I22 - Educational Finance ; Financial Aid
What is the current level and main characteristics of public education spending in Indonesia? Is education spending insufficient? Is education spending efficient and equitable? This study reports the first account of Indonesia’s aggregated (national and sub-national) spending on education, as well as the economic and sub-functional (by programs) composition of education expenditures. It presents estimations of the expected (average) level of education spending for a country with similar economic and social characteristics. It sheds light on efficiency and equity of education spending by presenting social rates of return by level of education, an assessment of the adequacy of current teacher earnings relative to other paid workers, the distribution of teachers across urban, rural, and remote regions, and the determinants of education enrollment. It concludes that the current challenges in Indonesia are not anymore defined by the need to increase spending on the supply side, but rather to improve the quality of education services, and to improve the efficiency of education expenditures by re-allocating teachers to undersupplied regions and re-adjusting the spending mix within and between education programs of future additional spending in the sector. The study finds that poverty and student-aged labor are also significant constraints to education enrollment, stressing the importance of policies aimed to address demand-side factors affecting education access in Indonesia.
2007-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4372/1/MPRA_paper_4372.pdf
Arze del Granado, Javier and Fengler, Wolfgang and Ragatz, Andrew and Yavuz, Elif (2007): Investing in Indonesia’s Education: Allocation, Equity, and Efficiency of Public Expenditures.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4475
2019-09-27T03:52:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4833
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3031
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3530
7375626A656374733D48:4831
7375626A656374733D48:4837
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35
7375626A656374733D48:4834
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4475/
Unemployment and Clientelism: The Piqueteros of Argentina
Ponce, Aldo Fernando
H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
J01 - Labor Economics: General
J50 - General
H1 - Structure and Scope of Government
H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations
H41 - Public Goods
H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
This paper sheds light on possible explanations for the growth and endurance of the
piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective
based on Latin America. I show which institutional arrangements, political actors, and
configurations of power contributed to the success of the piqueteros. Applying the basic
principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success of the piquetero
movement was produced by the current political division in the ruling party (the
Peronist party), by the over-regulated Argentine labor market, and by the impact of the
Argentine economic crisis through the unemployment rates.
2006-09-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4475/1/MPRA_paper_4475.pdf
Ponce, Aldo Fernando (2006): Unemployment and Clientelism: The Piqueteros of Argentina.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6549
2019-10-01T00:42:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6549/
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information
Schmitz, Patrick W.
H41 - Public Goods
This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can provide an indivisible and excludable public good to a group of n potential consumers, whose valuations are private information. The analysis takes distribution costs and congestion effects into account. The second-best allocation rule, which is welfare-maximizing under the constraint of non-negative profits, is characterized. Properties of the optimal mechanism in the case of many potential consumers are analyzed and it is shown that in this case the monopolist can use simple posted-price contracts. Finally, implications for public intervention are discussed.
1997
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6549/1/MPRA_paper_6549.pdf
Schmitz, Patrick W. (1997): Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information. Published in: Public Finance/Finances Publiques , Vol. 1, No. 52 (1997): pp. 89-101.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6592
2019-09-26T12:09:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483235
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3139
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6592/
Partidos políticos y financiamiento político
Mauro, Raul
H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H41 - Public Goods
Z19 - Other
Should goverment finance political parties? According to this paper, yes. Specially in peruvian case where social conflict is frequent because this is a more efficient way to put an issue in public agenda instead of building a political party. A formal model of cost benefit is presented to analyze this interesting idea.
2006-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6592/1/MPRA_paper_6592.pdf
Mauro, Raul (2006): Partidos políticos y financiamiento político. Published in: Economía y Bienestar , Vol. 2, No. 10 (October 2006): pp. 9-13.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7880
2019-10-04T10:10:09Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3431
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7880/
Effects of social interactions on scientists' productivity
Carillo, Maria Rosaria
Papagni, Erasmo
Capitanio, Fabian
O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
H41 - Public Goods
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
Recent economic research has focused on the economic effects of the social
environment. In the economic literature, important phenomena are considered,
at least in part, as results of the individual's social environment. There
is a similar revival of interest among economists who analyse the world of
science and basic research. In this case as well, the environment plays a
key role in the agent's behaviour. This paper makes an an empirical analysis
of the influence of social interactions on scientists' productivity. In the
econometric analysis we investigate the aggregate importance of this
phenomenon through the analysis of data on publications in four scientific
fields of seven advanced countries. We find that social interactions among
researchers have positive effects on a scientist's productivity and that
there is a U-shaped relation between the size of a scientific network and
individual productivity. We interpret this result as providing evidence for
threshold externalities and increasing returns to scale.
2007-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7880/1/MPRA_paper_7880.pdf
Carillo, Maria Rosaria and Papagni, Erasmo and Capitanio, Fabian (2007): Effects of social interactions on scientists' productivity. Forthcoming in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7883
2019-10-05T03:40:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7883/
Interior Collective Optimum in a Volontary Contribution to a Public-Goods Game : An Experimental Approach
Hichri, Walid
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
C72 - Noncooperative Games
We run a public good experiment with four different treatments. The payoff function is chosen such that the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the collective optimum (CO) are both in the interior of the strategy space. We try to test the effect of varying the level of the collective optimum, which changes the "social dilemma", involved in the decision as to how much to contribute to the public good . Our results show that contributions increase with the level of the interior CO. There is overcontribution in comparison to the NE and under contribution in comparison to the CO. But contributions are as far from the CO as the level of this former gets high. An overcontribution index that takes into account the effective contribution relative to both, the NE and the CO, shows that subjects adopt a constant behavior while passing from one treatment to another: they contribute a constant share of the CO.
2004
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7883/1/MPRA_paper_7883.pdf
Hichri, Walid (2004): Interior Collective Optimum in a Volontary Contribution to a Public-Goods Game : An Experimental Approach. Published in: Applied Economics Letters , Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004): pp. 135-140.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7884
2019-10-03T07:38:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7884/
An auction mechanism for public goods provision: an experimental study
Hichri, Pavel
Hichri, Walid
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individuals can contribute several times; at any moment they can see the
total amount collected; at the end of the period, the public good is provided if the amount covers the cost. We find that the ability of the mechanism to provide efficiently the public good decreases with the amount of the provision cost.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7884/1/MPRA_paper_7884.pdf
Hichri, Pavel and Hichri, Walid (2008): An auction mechanism for public goods provision: an experimental study.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8260
2019-09-29T08:53:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8260/
Status Effects, Public Goods Provision, and the Excess Burden
Wendner, Ronald
Goulder, Lawrence H.
D62 - Externalities
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Most studies of the optimal provision of public goods or the excess burden
from taxation assume that individual utility is independent of other
individuals' consumption. This paper investigates public good provision and
excess burden in a model that allows for interdependence in consumption in
the form of status (relative consumption) effects. In the presence of such
effects, consumption and labor taxes no longer are pure distortionary taxes
but have a corrective tax element that addresses an externality from
consumption. As a result, the marginal excess burden of consumption taxes is
lower than in the absence of status effects, and will be negative if the
consumption tax rate is below the "Pigouvian" rate. Correspondingly, when
consumption or labor tax rates are below the Pigouvian rate, the second-best
level of public goods provision is above the first-best level, contrary to
findings from models without status effects. For plausible functional forms
and parameters relating to status effects, the marginal excess burden from
existing U.S. labor taxes is substantially lower than in most prior studies,
and is negative in some cases.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8260/1/MPRA_paper_8260.pdf
Wendner, Ronald and Goulder, Lawrence H. (2008): Status Effects, Public Goods Provision, and the Excess Burden.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8515
2019-09-26T16:10:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8515/
The Disadvantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures
Uppal, Yogesh
H41 - Public Goods
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper estimates the effect of a candidate’s incumbency status
on his or her chances of winning using a large dataset on state legislative
elections in India during 1975-2003. I use an innovative research
design, called Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), that provides
unbiased estimate of the effect due to incumbency by comparing the
candidates in closely fought elections, and find that incumbency has
a significant negative effect on the fortunes of incumbent candidates in India and the incumbency effect has decreased further in the last
decade. Also, the variation in the incumbency effects across Indian
states depends on the differences in levels of public good provision
such as the health facilities, rates of employment and poverty, and
state per capita income.
2007-12-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8515/1/MPRA_paper_8515.pdf
Uppal, Yogesh (2007): The Disadvantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8540
2019-09-28T23:59:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8540/
Consumption Externalities and Pigouvian Ranking -- A Generalized Cobb-Douglas Example
Wendner, Ronald
D62 - Externalities
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper analyzes the impact of consumption externalities on the ``Pigouvian ranking,'' according to which the second-best level of public good provision is \emph{smaller} than the first-best level. Consumption externalities introduce exceptions to the Pigouvian ranking. Two necessary and sufficient conditions for reversal of the Pigouvian ranking are identified, when preferences for private goods (Cobb-Douglas) and the public good are weakly separable: (i) consumption generates a \emph{negative} externality, (ii) utility is not too concave in the subutility of private goods. If preferences are \emph{strongly} separable in the public good, the Pigouvian ranking is reversed if and only if the second-best consumption price is lower than the corrective (Pigouvian) consumption price.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8540/1/MPRA_paper_8540.pdf
Wendner, Ronald (2008): Consumption Externalities and Pigouvian Ranking -- A Generalized Cobb-Douglas Example.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8748
2019-09-26T15:19:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493330
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503330
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483430
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3130
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3030
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8748/
EMERGENCE, ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS, AND DECLINE OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION
PONCE, ALDO
I30 - General
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
H41 - Public Goods
P32 - Collectives ; Communes ; Agriculture
J30 - General
P30 - General
H40 - General
J10 - General
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
J00 - General
D60 - General
P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights
This paper offers an institutional explanation for the growth, organizational transformations, and decline of the piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective based on Latin America. I analyze which institutional arrangements, political actors, and configurations of power contributed to the success and decline of the piqueteros. Applying the basic principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success, decline, and transformation of the organizational structures of the piquetero movement were mainly produced by a political cycle of deep political division within the ruling party (the Peronist party). Other socio-economic explanatory factors were the over-regulated Argentine labor market, and the exogenous impact of the Argentine economic crisis through relatively high unemployment rates.
2008-03-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8748/1/MPRA_paper_8748.pdf
PONCE, ALDO (2008): EMERGENCE, ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS, AND DECLINE OF THE PIQUETERO MOVEMENT: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8888
2019-09-27T16:54:33Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443731
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3331
7375626A656374733D52:5235:523532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8888/
What Is “Open”? An Economic Analysis of Open Institutions
Deng, Feng
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
H41 - Public Goods
L31 - Nonprofit Institutions ; NGOs ; Social Entrepreneurship
R52 - Land Use and Other Regulations
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
By examining several different types of open institutions including open source software, open science, open square and (open) urban planning, this paper presents a general analysis of open institutional structure that is complementary to traditional proprietary mode. We argue that open institutions, in whatever forms, are essentially about decentralized production of a collective good (or “commons”) that relies on voluntary collaboration of highly variable human-related input. In addition to providing a general definition of open institutional structure, we submit there are two necessary conditions for open institutions. The first is the integration of consumers into production. The second condition is that the efficiency gain from “production” commons is the objective and the tragedy of anticommons becomes a serious problem. In this sense, open institutions represent a positive approach toward externality and uncertainty.
2008-01-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8888/1/MPRA_paper_8888.pdf
Deng, Feng (2008): What Is “Open”? An Economic Analysis of Open Institutions.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9420
2019-09-27T21:46:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3338
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9420/
Evaluating EU policies on public services: a citizens´ perspective
Clifton, Judith
Díaz-Fuentes, Daniel
L96 - Telecommunications
L38 - Public Policy
H41 - Public Goods
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
L94 - Electric Utilities
This article evaluates EU policies on public services – particularly public network services - from the citizens´ point of view. It is first argued that citizens´ perceptions about these services are important because they are essential for quality of life, but also because they exhibit economic characteristics such as asymmetrical information, adverse selection and positive externalities. Changing EU policy on public services is synthesised and classified into two main phases in section two. Citizen satisfaction with public services as revealed through surveys from 1997 to 2007 is explored in the third section. In the discussion, the prospects for EU policy on public services are considered and, it is argued that, from the perspectives of subsidiarity and proportionality, policy towards strengthening the common market is being increasingly uploaded to the supranational level in the form of directives, whilst cohesion and redistribution policies are being downloaded to the national level or dealt with at the supranational level by “soft” instruments.
2008-07-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9420/1/MPRA_paper_9420.pdf
Clifton, Judith and Díaz-Fuentes, Daniel (2008): Evaluating EU policies on public services: a citizens´ perspective.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10249
2019-09-26T14:43:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10249/
LEARNING EFFECT AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: A CASE STUDY OF NATURAL DISASTER FROM JAPAN
yamamura, eiji
H41 - Public Goods
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
P16 - Political Economy
Using Japanese prefecture level data for the years between 1988 and 2001, this paper explores how and the extent to which social capital has an effect on the damage resulting from natural disasters. It also examines whether the experience of a natural disaster affects individual and collective protection against future disasters. Using regression analysis and controlling for various factors such as the proportion of poor people, per capita income, and the number of natural disasters, there are three major findings. (1) Social capital reduces the damage caused by natural disasters. (2) The risk of a natural disaster makes people more apt to cooperate and therefore social capital is more effective to prevent disasters. (3) Economic conditions such as the level of income distinctly affect any damage, but hardly influence it when the scale of a disaster is small.
2008-04-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10249/1/MPRA_paper_10249.pdf
yamamura, eiji (2008): LEARNING EFFECT AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: A CASE STUDY OF NATURAL DISASTER FROM JAPAN.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10581
2019-09-26T10:43:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10581/
State of Elementary Education in Public Schools of Gujarat: A Study of Schools Run by the Bharuch Municipality
Raj, Madhusudan
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
H41 - Public Goods
I21 - Analysis of Education
H52 - Government Expenditures and Education
In India the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments have given powers and responsibility of achieving the goal of Universal Elementary Education (UEE) to the local body governments. The present study has examined the situation of elementary schools run by Bharuch municipality. The evidence show that the situation of elementary education is unsatisfactory and in bad shape. The number of schools has declined rapidly, the learning levels of students are miserable, community participation is almost non-existent, private cost of so called free municipality education is high; and the state of the mid-day meal scheme looks very grim. Municipality schools are loosing ground in Bharuch city.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10581/1/MPRA_paper_10581.pdf
Raj, Madhusudan (2008): State of Elementary Education in Public Schools of Gujarat: A Study of Schools Run by the Bharuch Municipality.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11464
2019-09-26T09:56:58Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11464/
Environmental economic impact assessment in China: Problems and prospects
Lindhjem, Henrik
Hu, Tao
Ma, Zhong
Skjelvik, John Magne
Song, Guojun
Vennemo, Haakon
Wu, Jian
Zhang, Shiqiu
D62 - Externalities
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
The use of economic valuation methods to assess environmental impacts of projects and policies has grown considerably in recent years. However, environmental valuation appears to have developed independently of regulations and practice of environmental impact assessment (EIA), despite its potential benefits to the EIA process. Environmental valuation may be useful in judging significance of impacts, determining mitigation level, comparing alternatives and generally enabling a more objective analysis of tradeoffs. In China, laws and regulations require the use of environmental valuation in EIA, but current practice lags far behind. This paper assesses the problems and prospects of introducing environmental valuation into the EIA process in China. We conduct four case studies of environmental economic impact
assessment (EEIA), three of which are based on environmental impact statements of construction projects (a
power plant, a wastewater treatment plant and a road construction project) and one for a regional pollution problem (wastewater irrigation). The paper demonstrates the potential usefulness of environmental valuation but also discusses several challenges to the introduction and wider use of EEIA, many of which are likely to be of relevance far beyond the Chinese context. The paper closes with suggesting some initial core elements of an EEIA guideline
2006-06-18
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11464/1/MPRA_paper_11464.pdf
Lindhjem, Henrik and Hu, Tao and Ma, Zhong and Skjelvik, John Magne and Song, Guojun and Vennemo, Haakon and Wu, Jian and Zhang, Shiqiu (2006): Environmental economic impact assessment in China: Problems and prospects. Published in: Environmental Impact Assessment Review , Vol. 1, No. 27 (2007): pp. 1-25.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11467
2019-09-27T11:22:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513236
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11467/
20 years of stated preference valuation of non-timber benefits from Fennoscandian forests: A meta-analysis
Lindhjem, Henrik
Q23 - Forestry
Q26 - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Stated preference (SP) surveys have been conducted to value non-timber benefits (NTBs) from forests in Norway, Sweden and Finland for about 20 years. The paper first reviews
the literature and summarises methodological traditions in SP research in the three countries. Second, a meta-regression analysis is conducted explaining systematic variation in Willingness-to-Pay (WTP). Two important conclusions emerge, with relevance for future research: (1) WTP is found to be insensitive to the size of the forest, casting doubt on the use of simplified WTP/area measures for complex environmental goods; and (2) WTP tends to be
higher if people are asked as individuals rather than on behalf of their household.
2006-09-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11467/1/MPRA_paper_11467.pdf
Lindhjem, Henrik (2006): 20 years of stated preference valuation of non-timber benefits from Fennoscandian forests: A meta-analysis. Published in: Journal of Forest Economics , Vol. 4, No. 12 (January 2007): pp. 251-277.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11469
2019-10-04T00:27:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513537
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11469/
Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods? Implication for aggregate welfare measures
Lindhjem, Henrik
Navrud, Ståle
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services ; Biodiversity Conservation ; Bioeconomics ; Industrial Ecology
The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be much higher if the same elicited mean willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over individuals rather than households. A trivial fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households it becomes almost impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit. The literature is mostly silent about which response unit to use in WTP questions and in some CV studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied. We test for differences between individual and household WTP in a novel, web-administered, split-sample CV survey asking WTP for preserving biodiversity in old-growth coniferous forests in Norway. Two samples are asked both types of questions, but in reverse order, followed by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why WTP may differ. We find in a between-sample test that the WTP respondents state on behalf of their households is not significantly different from their individual WTP. However, within the same sample, household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP; in particular if respondents are asked to state individual before household WTP. Our results suggest that using individual WTP as the response unit would overestimate aggregate WTP, and thus bias welfare estimates in benefit-cost analyses. Thus, the choice of response format needs to be explicitly and carefully addressed in CV questionnaire design in order to avoid the risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit-cost test
2008-01-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11469/1/MPRA_paper_11469.pdf
Lindhjem, Henrik and Navrud, Ståle (2008): Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods? Implication for aggregate welfare measures.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11470
2019-10-01T07:10:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513236
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513537
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11470/
Meta-analysis of nature conservation values in Asia & Oceania: Data heterogeneity and benefit transfer issues
Tuan, Tran Hu
Lindhjem, Henrik
Q26 - Recreational Aspects of Natural Resources
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services ; Biodiversity Conservation ; Bioeconomics ; Industrial Ecology
We conduct a meta-analysis (MA) of around 100 studies valuing nature conservation in Asia and Oceania. Dividing our dataset into two levels of heterogeneity in terms of good characteristics (endangered species vs. nature conservation more generally) and valuation methods, we show that the degree of regularity and conformity with theory and empirical expectations is higher for the more homogenous dataset of contingent valuation of endangered species. For example, we find that willingness to pay (WTP) for preservation of mammals tends to be higher than other species and that WTP for species preservation increases with income. Increasing the degree of heterogeneity in the valuation data, however, preserves much of the regularity, and the explanatory power of some of our models is in the range of other MA studies of goods typically assumed to be more homogenous (such as water quality). Subjecting our best MA models to a simple test forecasting values for out-of-sample observations, shows median (mean) forecasting errors of 24 (46) percent for endangered species and 46 (89) percent for nature conservation more generally, approaching levels that may be acceptable in benefit transfer for policy use. We recommend that the most prudent MA practice is to control for heterogeneity in regressions and sensitivity analysis, rather than to limit datasets by non-transparent criteria to a level of heterogeneity deemed acceptable to the individual analyst. However, the trade-off will always be present and the issue of acceptable level of heterogeneity in MA is far from settled
2008-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11470/1/MPRA_paper_11470.pdf
Tuan, Tran Hu and Lindhjem, Henrik (2008): Meta-analysis of nature conservation values in Asia & Oceania: Data heterogeneity and benefit transfer issues.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11471
2019-09-26T18:35:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11471/
Internet CV surveys – a cheap, fast way to get large samples of biased values?
Lindhjem, Henrik
Navrud, Ståle
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
With the current growth in broadband penetration, Internet is likely to be the data collection mode of choice for contingent valuation (CV) and stated preference research in the not so distant future. However, little is known about how this survey mode may influence data quality and welfare estimates. In a controlled field experiment as part of a large national CV survey estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for biodiversity protection plans, we assign two groups sampled from the same panel of respondents, either to an Internet or in-person interview mode. Our design is better able than previous mode comparison studies to isolate measurement effects from sample composition effects. Looking in particular for indications of social desirability bias and satisficing (shortcutting the response process) we find little evidence in our data. We find that the extent of “don’t know”, zeros and protest responses to the WTP question (with a payment card) is very similar between modes. Mean WTP is somewhat higher in the interview sample, though we cannot reject equality on the 10 percent level. We also consider equivalence, i.e. whether the WTP difference is larger than a practically trivial predetermined bound. We can reject that the difference is larger than 30 percent, but fail to reject an equivalency bound of 20 percent on the 10 percent level. Results are quite encouraging for the use of Internet as values do not seem to be significantly different or substantially biased compared to in-person interviews.
2008-04-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11471/1/MPRA_paper_11471.pdf
Lindhjem, Henrik and Navrud, Ståle (2008): Internet CV surveys – a cheap, fast way to get large samples of biased values?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11483
2019-09-27T10:03:02Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11483/
Valuing forest recreation on the national level in a transition economy: The case of Poland
Bartczak, Anna
Lindhjem, Henrik
Navrud, Ståle
Zandersen, Marianne
Zylicz, Tomasz
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Recreation benefits constitute a substantial part of the total economic value of forests, and are important for the choice of multi-functional forest policies. The application of methods valuing such benefits is in its infancy in transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), so value estimates for policy use are sometimes transferred from Western Europe proportionally scaled down by GDP. However, little is known about how recreation values vary with income, and one risks underestimating benefits in CEE.
This paper reports the findings of the first comprehensive, national-level study in any CEE country estimating annual and per trip forest recreation values in Poland using the
Travel Cost (TC) and Contingent Valuation (CV) methods. Two in-person interview surveys of forest recreation behaviour were carried out. The first was administered onsite
in ten representative forest areas, and the other in the homes of a national sample of adult Poles. Results show that forest recreation is highly valued in Poland, at Euros 0.64 – 6.93 per trip per person, depending on the valuation method. Both trip frequency and per trip values are higher than the average in Western Europe, despite a lower income
level. Thus, a simple GDP-adjusted transfer from Western Europe would substantially undervalue forest recreation in Poland. Further, a comparison of TC consumer surplus
estimates and GDP/capita in Europe shows no clear relationship, indicating that a range of cultural, institutional and other factors may be important
2008-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11483/1/MPRA_paper_11483.pdf
Bartczak, Anna and Lindhjem, Henrik and Navrud, Ståle and Zandersen, Marianne and Zylicz, Tomasz (2008): Valuing forest recreation on the national level in a transition economy: The case of Poland. Published in: Forest Policy and Economics , Vol. 7-8, No. 10 : pp. 467-472.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11484
2019-09-26T16:12:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11484/
How Reliable are Meta-Analyses for International Benefit Transfers?
Lindhjem, Henrik
Navrud, Ståle
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Meta-analysis has increasingly been used to synthesise the environmental valuation literature, but only a few test the use of these analyses for benefit transfer. These are typically based on national studies only. However, meta-analyses of valuation studies across countries are a potentially powerful tool for benefit transfer, especially for environmental goods where the domestic literature is scarce. We test the reliability of such international meta-analytic transfers, and find that even under conditions of homogeneity in valuation methods, cultural and institutional conditions across countries, and a meta-analysis with large explanatory power, the transfer errors could still be large. Further, international meta-analytic transfers do not on average perform better than simple value transfers averaging over domestic studies. Thus, we question whether the use of meta-analysis for practical benefit transfer achieves reliability gains justifying the increased effort. However, more meta-analytic benefit transfer tests should be performed for other environmental goods and other countries before discarding international meta-analysis as a tool for benefit transfer.
2007-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11484/1/MPRA_paper_11484.pdf
Lindhjem, Henrik and Navrud, Ståle (2007): How Reliable are Meta-Analyses for International Benefit Transfers? Published in: Ecological Economics , Vol. 2-3, No. 66 : pp. 425-435.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11536
2019-09-29T04:18:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11536/
Does Public Good Provision Determine Incumbent’s Fate? Evidence from India
Paul, Saumik
Denzau, Arthur
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H41 - Public Goods
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
In this paper we empirically examine whether public facilities like providing primary school, medical clinics, electricity etc help incumbents to stay in power. Specifically, we analyze the parliamentary election outcomes in 483 constituents in rural India from 1971 to 1991. This study is based on a simple voter model where the voter looks at the supply of public goods provided by the incumbent and then decides whether to re-elect the incumbent. We find empirical evidence that voters do significantly care about educational, electricity and communication facilities, whereas incumbents face defeat if they provide more medical or safe drinking water facilities.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11536/1/MPRA_paper_11536.pdf
Paul, Saumik and Denzau, Arthur (2006): Does Public Good Provision Determine Incumbent’s Fate? Evidence from India.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11588
2019-09-26T13:17:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513530
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11588/
More information isn’t always better: the case of voluntary provision of environmental quality
Owen, Ann L.
Videras, Julio
Wu, Stephen
Q50 - General
H41 - Public Goods
This paper adds to the literature on the voluntary provision of public goods by showing that the warm glow that individuals gain depends on the perceived relative effectiveness of contributions. We use a new survey on pro-environment behaviors, attitudes, and knowledge and find that individuals act in accordance with their beliefs, regardless of whether or not these beliefs are accurate, and engage more frequently in activities that have a higher perceived impact on environmental quality. We find that low provision of the public good is greater among people who believe they cannot do much for the environment and do not consider themselves environmentalists.
2008-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11588/1/MPRA_paper_11588.pdf
Owen, Ann L. and Videras, Julio and Wu, Stephen (2008): More information isn’t always better: the case of voluntary provision of environmental quality.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11796
2019-09-29T15:56:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D42:4232:423231
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11796/
The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents
Behringer, Stefan
B21 - Microeconomics
H41 - Public Goods
H30 - General
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.
2008-09-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11796/1/MPRA_paper_11796.pdf
Behringer, Stefan (2008): The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11967
2019-09-28T04:19:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463539
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463533
7375626A656374733D46:4633:463333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11967/
Regional vs. Global Public Goods: The Case of Post-Communist Transition
Dabrowski, Marek
Radziwill, Artur
F15 - Economic Integration
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
F59 - Other
H41 - Public Goods
F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations
F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
The paper discusses the role of regional public goods vs. global goods in influencing postcommunist transition in Central and Eastern Europe and former USSR with special attention given to three particular factors: (i) external anchoring of national reform process; (ii) international trade arrangements and (iii) international financial stability.
Our main finding is that that the EU, through the Eastern enlargement process, acted as the very effective regional public (club) good provider, whose influence across time and countries was correlated with better transition outcomes. In particular, the consolidation phase in democratization, institution building and structural transformation was successful in countries reforming under EU accession conditionality, but not under other forms of conditionality provided, for example, by the Bretton Woods institutions. In the area of trade, gains from WTO accession were dwarfed by the impact of the opening of the EU trading block for accession countries. Finally, countries participating in EU integration showed more discipline in maintaining macroeconomic stability, while IMF programs were less effective in inducing stability in the absence of the European factor.
This the main reason why CIS countries which got neither the EU accession perspective, nor even trade liberalization offer on the EU lag behind Central European, Baltic and Balkan countries in terms of democratization, rule of law, institutional stability and market-oriented economic reforms. However, due to observed 'enlargement fatigue' in the incumbent EU, the future attractiveness of the EU integration perspective and strength of the accession associated incentive system (in respect to countries of Western Balkans, CIS and Turkey) comes under question. There is also unclear whether European experience in providing regional public goods can be easily repeated in other geographic regions and to which extended can be used by the providers of global public goods.
2007-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11967/1/MPRA_paper_11967.pdf
Dabrowski, Marek and Radziwill, Artur (2007): Regional vs. Global Public Goods: The Case of Post-Communist Transition. Published in: CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 336 (February 2007)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12029
2019-09-26T21:06:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12029/
Do threshold patterns matter in public good provision?
Ye, Maoliang
Nikolov, Plamen
Casaburi, Lorenzo
Asher, Sam
G14 - Information and Market Efficiency ; Event Studies ; Insider Trading
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an experiment to explore how varying patterns of thresholds affect the willingness of subjects to contribute to a public good. We had subjects play a multi-period game where each subject was allocated an initial point endowment and told a threshold for the group had to choose how much to contribute to the common pot. Each period is identical, except for the possibility of having a different threshold, which is always stated before the players make their contributions. We found that while contributions are similar for the increasing and decreasing threshold group types when thresholds were low, a sizeable gap opens up around the average threshold size. We found that for nearly every threshold, it is more profitable to be in an increasing than in a decreasing threshold group type. Early cooperation seems to facilitate the achievement of harder-to-reach thresholds, which require considerable contributions from all members of the group. These findings are also very robust in the regression specifications. Our findings shed light on the role of past cooperative success and threshold patterns on subsequent willingness to cooperate.
2008-12-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12029/1/MPRA_paper_12029.pdf
Ye, Maoliang and Nikolov, Plamen and Casaburi, Lorenzo and Asher, Sam (2008): Do threshold patterns matter in public good provision?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12194
2019-10-01T13:32:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3931
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12194/
Infraestructuras: ¿Qué podemos decir los economistas?
de Rus, Gines
H41 - Public Goods
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L91 - Transportation: General
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Infrastructures have been traditionally built, maintained and operated by the public sector. Road and railway networks, energy, electricity and water were traditionally designed in public sector headquarters in many countries until the eighties. Since then, and due to fiscal crisis and public sector inefficiencies, among other factors, privatization is a key ingredient of the industrial policy all over the world.
Technological change and the analysis of economists have modified the conventional view which assimilated infrastructure and public monopoly. Technological developments explain part of the change in the telecommunication markets. Moreover, the economic analysis showed that the electricity sector, railways or ports had several activities which could be unbundled as a way to introduce competition.
One of the field which has attracted the attention of economic research in the last two decades is the contribution of public infrastructure to economic growth, though economists had been investigating long time before how to assess investment projects in public infrastructure, or how should prices be set in the context of long live assets, sunk costs, congestion and externalities
This paper provides a broad overview of the economics of infrastructure.
2000
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12194/1/MPRA_paper_12194.pdf
de Rus, Gines (2000): Infraestructuras: ¿Qué podemos decir los economistas? Published in: La investigación económica en España: 1990-2000. Una década de cambios. (2001)
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12275
2019-09-28T05:43:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12275/
One Step at a Time: Do threshold patterns matter in public good provision?
Ye, Maoliang
Nikolov, Plamen
Casaburi, Lorenzo
Asher, Sam
G14 - Information and Market Efficiency ; Event Studies ; Insider Trading
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an experiment to explore how varying patterns of thresholds affect the willingness of subjects to contribute to a public good. We had subjects play a multi-period game where each subject was allocated an initial point endowment, told a threshold for the group and had to choose how much to contribute to the common pot. Each period is identical, except for the possibility of having a different threshold, which is always stated before the players make their contributions. We found that while contributions are similar for the increasing and decreasing threshold group types when thresholds were low, a sizeable gap opens up around the average threshold size. We found that for nearly every threshold, it is more profitable to be in an increasing than in a decreasing threshold group type. Early cooperation seems to facilitate the achievement of harder-to-reach thresholds, which require considerable contributions from all members of the group. These findings are also very robust in the regression specifications. Our findings shed light on the role of past cooperative success and threshold patterns on subsequent willingness to cooperate.
2008-12-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12275/1/MPRA_paper_12275.pdf
Ye, Maoliang and Nikolov, Plamen and Casaburi, Lorenzo and Asher, Sam (2008): One Step at a Time: Do threshold patterns matter in public good provision?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12496
2019-10-24T17:10:25Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12514
2019-10-29T18:46:42Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12561
2013-04-15T03:16:25Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12574
2019-09-26T10:12:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12574/
Theories of the evolution of cooperative behaviour: A critical survey plus some new results
Rowthorn, Robert E.
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos
H41 - Public Goods
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
Gratuitous cooperation (in favour of non-relatives and without repeated interaction) eludes traditional evolutionary explanations. In this paper we survey the various theories of cooperative behaviour, and we describe our own effort to integrate these theories into a self-contained framework. Our main conclusions are as follows. First: altruistic punishment, conformism and gratuitous cooperation co-evolve, and group selection is a necessary ingredient for the co-evolution to take place. Second: people do not cooperate by mistake, as most theories imply; on the contrary, people knowingly sacrifice themselves for others. Third: in cooperative dilemmas conformism is an expression of preference, not a learning rule. Fourth, group-mutations (e.g., the rare emergence of a charismatic leader that brings order to the group) are necessary to sustain cooperation in the long run.
2009-01-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12574/1/MPRA_paper_12574.pdf
Rowthorn, Robert E. and Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés and Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos (2009): Theories of the evolution of cooperative behaviour: A critical survey plus some new results.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13024
2019-10-02T02:42:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513530
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13024/
Green goods: are they good or bad news for the environment? Evidence from a laboratory experiment on impure public goods
Munro, Alistair
Valente, Marieta
Q50 - General
H41 - Public Goods
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
An impure public good is a commodity that combines public and private characteristics in fixed proportions. Green goods such as dolphin-friendly tuna or green electricity programs provide increasings popular examples of impure goods. We design an experiment to test how the presence of impure public goods affects pro-social behaviour. We set parameters, such that from a theoretical point of view the presence of the impure public good is behaviorally irrelevant. In a baseline setting, where the impure public good provides only small contributions to the public good. We observe that on aggregate pro-social behaviour, defined as total contributions to the public good, is lower in the presence of the impure good. Some individuals do not alter their decisions, but roughly two fifths of subjects make a lower contribution to the public good in the presence of the impure public good. On the contrary, in the case where the impure public good favours the public good component at the expense of private earnings, individuals are unaffected in their behaviour. We conclude that the presence of green goods which have only a small environmental component may reduce pro-environmental behaviour.
2008-10-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13024/1/MPRA_paper_13024.pdf
Munro, Alistair and Valente, Marieta (2008): Green goods: are they good or bad news for the environment? Evidence from a laboratory experiment on impure public goods.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13236
2019-09-28T11:42:59Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D46:4635
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D42:4235:423532
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13236/
Destructive power, enforcement and institutional change
Vahabi, Mehrdad
O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
K0 - General
F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary
H41 - Public Goods
E11 - Marxian ; Sraffian ; Kaleckian
Institutions are usually defined as rules of the game. But if rules are dead letters without being enforced, then what is the role of destructive power in the genesis of institutions? This is the first question which will be addressed in the present paper. While the importance of incremental or evolutionary changes in informal rules is undeniable, what is the role of destructive power or revolution in politics with regard to institutional change? To what extent is destructive power involved in the change of rules? This is the second question that will be tackled in the present paper. The purpose of this paper is to answer these two questions focusing on a point that current scholarship regarding institutions usually fail to notice, with an emphasis on rules and laws: the power that enforces those rules and laws. The analysis of different forms of power will demonstrate the fact that the capacity to destroy as well as the capacity to produce plays a role in generating and maintaining institutions. I will try to show that the recognition of destructive power sheds new light on at least three major issues: i) the relationship between property rights and sovereignty, ii) the importance of revolution as well as evolution in social change, iii) the emergence of various means of collective expression such as Luddism, universal suffrage, and association.
2005-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13236/1/MPRA_paper_13236.pdf
Vahabi, Mehrdad (2005): Destructive power, enforcement and institutional change. Published in: Journal of Economics and Business , Vol. 9, No. 1 (March 2006): pp. 59-89.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14929
2019-10-08T21:03:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433730
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14929/
Choosing and Sharing
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy
Leroux, Justin
H41 - Public Goods
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
C70 - General
Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste
disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to
the host is often problematic. In practice, revelation issues and
redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable
agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to
implement the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) and share the
exact cost while retaining total control over realized transfers. Our
mechanism is simple and in the vein of the well-known Divide and Choose
procedure. The unique Nash equilibrium outcome of our mechanism coincides
with truthtelling, is budget-balanced, individually rational and immune to
coalitional deviations. More generally, our mechanism can also handle the
symmetric case of positive local externalities (e.g., Olympic Games) and
even more complex situations where the usefulness of the
project---regardless of its location---is not unanimous.
2009-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14929/1/MPRA_paper_14929.pdf
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy and Leroux, Justin (2009): Choosing and Sharing.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14930
2019-09-27T10:01:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14930/
Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy
Leroux, Justin
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H41 - Public Goods
The siting of public facilities, such as prisons, airports or
incinerators for hazardous waste typically faces social rejection by local
populations (the "NIMBY" syndrome, for Not In My BackYard). These
public goods exhibit a private bad aspect which creates an asymmetry:
all involved communities benet from their existence, but only one (the
host community) bears the local negative externality. We view the siting
problem as a cost sharing issue and provide an axiomatic foundation
for Lindahl pricing in this context. The set of axioms we introduce are
specically designed to overcome the asymmetry of the problem.
2009-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14930/1/MPRA_paper_14930.pdf
Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy and Leroux, Justin (2009): Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15220
2019-10-01T18:16:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15220/
Analysis of Risk Behavior of Households: Evidence from Gender Sensitive JFM Programme in West Bengal
Das, Nimai
Sarker, Debnarayan
Q23 - Forestry
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
H41 - Public Goods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
In an attempt to examine the extent of risk faced by households under gender sensitive JFM programme in West Bengal, this study suggests that JFM programme could reduce more risk related hardship for JFM households by their increase (decrease) in time and income on forest (non-forest) related works which non-JFM households fail to receive. Within JFM villages, female FPC-households not only yield higher per capita net real income but also contribute female’s higher share of their family income, which they only receive from forest source, than their men’s after JFM situation indicating higher diversification of forest works in female FPC-villages.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15220/1/MPRA_paper_15220.pdf
Das, Nimai and Sarker, Debnarayan (2008): Analysis of Risk Behavior of Households: Evidence from Gender Sensitive JFM Programme in West Bengal.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15328
2019-09-26T16:21:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443133
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443132
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513238
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15328/
Study on Forest Dependent Households under a Household Model Framework
Das, Nimai
Sarker, Debnarayan
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Q23 - Forestry
D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Q28 - Government Policy
H41 - Public Goods
This study suggests that JFM households receive higher economic benefit after JFM: the physical increase of forest related works has a positive impact on the prices of the same influencing higher hours (time) of work which help them increase higher annual per capita net real income. The poorer the households are according to their economic status, greater is the dependence on forest and so greater is the extent of involvement in low return forest activities (NTFPs) and forest wage work. It might indicate that JFM plays a positive role for economic security of the forest fringe households.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15328/1/MPRA_paper_15328.pdf
Das, Nimai and Sarker, Debnarayan (2008): Study on Forest Dependent Households under a Household Model Framework.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15330
2019-10-05T16:36:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15330/
Distributional Aspect of Forest Income: A Study on JFM and non-JFM Forest Dependent Households
Das, Nimai
Sarker, Debnarayan
Q23 - Forestry
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H41 - Public Goods
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
This study suggests that there is a narrower scope to expand inequality with the increase in forest sources of income to total income relative to non-forest income irrespective of the type of villages and types of FPCs. The addition of forest income in the JFM households after JFM reduces measured income inequality by about twelve percent, all else equal. But no such perceptible decrease has been found after JFM situation for non-JFM households. Categorically, forest income plays the dominant role in reducing measured income inequality for poor households who are relatively asset poor and that also live below poverty line. But this study also lends credence to the fact that the non-involvement in the JFM programme by the non-JFM households might bring about a major environmental shirking, because illegal timber income constitutes the major part of all sources of income for non-JFM households even after JFM situation.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15330/1/MPRA_paper_15330.pdf
Das, Nimai and Sarker, Debnarayan (2008): Distributional Aspect of Forest Income: A Study on JFM and non-JFM Forest Dependent Households.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15423
2019-09-27T10:32:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513533
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483736
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513235
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513537
7375626A656374733D4E:4E35:4E3536
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15423/
Water management strategies in urban Mexico: Limitations of the privatization debate
Barkin, David
Klooster, Daniel
H41 - Public Goods
Q53 - Air Pollution ; Water Pollution ; Noise ; Hazardous Waste ; Solid Waste ; Recycling
H76 - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
Q25 - Water
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services ; Biodiversity Conservation ; Bioeconomics ; Industrial Ecology
N56 - Latin America ; Caribbean
Water management provides a critical lens onto the development process. For the last several centuries, improvements in clean water and sanitation have contributed to better health and increased life expectancies. Currently, however, developing countries seem unable to make much progress in bringing these benefits of development to significant sectors of their citizens. Water coverage is incomplete and water is of uneven quality. Just as serious, however, are the environmental impacts of water extraction, untreated sewage disposal, and the depletion of water sources through excessive withdrawals and pollution. In this research report, we present a framework for the analysis of the social appropriation of water based upon the concept of the New Culture of Water. Using that framework, we review the Mexican water sector in light of a set of original case studies. Although privatization might have some role to play in improving the performance of certain functions of water management agencies, it has clearly not proved superior to the public agencies we review. More importantly, however, the privatization solution has proved incapable of tackling the very serious problems of environmental destruction and the over-exploitation of finite water sources that plague the country. Our review of water management in Mexico, therefore, sheds light on some of the contradictions of a development process that is far from sustainable.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15423/1/MPRA_paper_15423.pdf
Barkin, David and Klooster, Daniel (2006): Water management strategies in urban Mexico: Limitations of the privatization debate.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15492
2019-09-26T22:25:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513238
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513537
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513338
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3332
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513133
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513135
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30:4B3030
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3133
7375626A656374733D51:5130:513031
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503238
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513132
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513138
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513334
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3137
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513536
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513237
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15492/
Governing of Agro-Ecosystem Services
Bachev, Hrabrin
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Q28 - Government Policy
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services ; Biodiversity Conservation ; Bioeconomics ; Industrial Ecology
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Q38 - Government Policy
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness
Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure ; Land Reform ; Land Use ; Irrigation ; Agriculture and Environment
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
K00 - General
O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products
Q01 - Sustainable Development
P28 - Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment
Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Q18 - Agricultural Policy ; Food Policy
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
Q34 - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
Q56 - Environment and Development ; Environment and Trade ; Sustainability ; Environmental Accounts and Accounting ; Environmental Equity ; Population Growth
Q27 - Issues in International Trade
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance of agro-ecosystem services. Firstly, we present a new approach for analysis and improvement of governance of agro-ecosystem services. It takes into account the role of specific institutional environment (formal and informal rules, distribution of rights, systems of enforcement); and behavioral characteristics of individual agents (preferences, bounded rationality, opportunism, risk aversion, trust); and transactions costs associated with ecosystem services and their critical factors (uncertainty, frequency, asset specificity, appropriability); and comparative efficiency of market, private, public and hybrid modes of governance. Secondly, we identify spectrum of market and private forms of governance of agro-ecosystem services (voluntary initiatives; market trade with eco-products and services; special contractual arrangements; collective actions; vertical integration), and evaluate their efficiency and potential. Next, we identify needs for public involvement in the governance of agro-ecosystem services, and assess comparative efficiency of alternative modes of public interventions (assistance, regulations, funding, taxing, provision, partnership, property right modernization).
Finally, we analyze structure and efficiency of governance of agro-ecosystems services in Zapadna Stara Planina – a mountainous region in North-West Bulgaria. Post-communist transition and EU integration has brought about significant changes in the state and governance of agro-ecosystems services. Newly evolved market, private and public governance has led to significant improvement of part of agro-ecosystems services introducing modern eco-standards and public support, enhancing environmental stewardship, desintensifying production, recovering landscape and traditional productions, diversifying quality, products, and services. At the same time, novel governance is associated with some new challenges such as unsustainable exploitation, lost biodiversity, land degradation, water and air contamination. What is more, implementation of EU common policies would have no desired impact on agro-ecosystem services unless special measures are taken to improve management of public programs, and extend public support to dominating small-scale and subsistence farms.
2009-05-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15492/1/MPRA_paper_15492.pdf
Bachev, Hrabrin (2009): Governing of Agro-Ecosystem Services.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16107
2019-09-27T12:06:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16107/
Why do parents socialize their children to behave pro-socially? An information-based theory
Adriani, Fabrizio
Sonderegger, Silvia
H41 - Public Goods
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
We present a model of intergenerational transmission of pro-social values in which parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly available to their children. Differently from existing models of cultural transmission of values (such as Bisin and Verdier, 2001, and Tabellini, 2008) we assume that parents are exclusively concerned with their children's material welfare. If parents coordinate their educational choices, a child would look at her system of values to predict the values of her contemporaries, with whom she may interact. A parent may thus choose to instil pro-social values into his child in order to signal to her that others can generally be trusted. This implies that parents may optimally decide to endow their children with values that stand in contrast with maximization of material welfare, even if their children's material welfare is all they care about.
2009-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16107/1/MPRA_paper_16107.pdf
Adriani, Fabrizio and Sonderegger, Silvia (2009): Why do parents socialize their children to behave pro-socially? An information-based theory.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16223
2019-10-10T11:51:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16223/
Effects of interactions among social capital, income, and learning from experiences of natural disasters: A case study from Japan
yamamura, eiji
H41 - Public Goods
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
P16 - Political Economy
This paper explores how and the extent to which social capital has an effect on the damage resulting from natural disasters. It also examines whether the experience of a natural disaster affects individual and collective protection against future disasters. There are three major findings. (1) Social capital reduces the damage caused by natural disasters. (2) The risk of a natural disaster makes people more apt to cooperate and therefore social capital is more effective to prevent disasters. (3) Income is an important factor for reducing damage, but hardly influences it when the scale of a disaster is small.
2009-07-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16223/2/MPRA_paper_16223.pdf
yamamura, eiji (2009): Effects of interactions among social capital, income, and learning from experiences of natural disasters: A case study from Japan.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16523
2019-09-28T05:35:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16523/
Sorting with shame in the laboratory
Ong, David
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
H41 - Public Goods
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Trust is indispensable to fiduciary fields (e.g., credit rating), where experts exercise wide discretion on others behalf. Can the shame from scandal sort trustworthy people out of a fiduciary field? I tested for the possibility in a charitable contribution game where subjects could be "ungenerous" when unobserved. After establishing that "generosity" required a contribution of more than $6, subjects were given the choice of contributing either $5 publicly or $0-$10 privately. Almost all control subjects chose to contribute privately less than $2. The majority of treatment subjects, after being told the prediction that they were unlikely to contribute more than $2, if they contributed privately, contributed $5 publicly. This suggests that the mere belief that a subject would exploit the greater discretion and unobservability of a fiduciary-like position can deter entry into such a position. Thus, scandals that create such a belief could repel shame-sensitive people from that field -- possibly to the detriment of the field and the economy as a whole. The shame externality of a scandals on private judgments may also been seen in politically correct speech after demonstrated racial prejudice of others.
2008-10-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16523/1/MPRA_paper_16523.pdf
Ong, David (2008): Sorting with shame in the laboratory.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16923
2019-09-27T16:07:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433930
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16923/
Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach
Wolff, Irenaeus
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
H41 - Public Goods
C90 - General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Evolutionary game theory has shown that in environments characterised by a social-dilemma situation punishment may be an adaptive behaviour. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this finding but yields contradictory results on the cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment if players are allowed to retaliate against their punishers. The present study sets out to examine the question of whether cooperation will still be part of an evolutionary stable strategy if we allow for counterpunishment opportunities in a theoretic model and tries to reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings from the laboratory. We find that the apparent contradictions can be explained by a difference in the number of retaliation stages employed (one vs many) and even small differences in the degree of retaliativeness.
2009-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16923/1/MPRA_paper_16923.pdf
Wolff, Irenaeus (2009): Counterpunishment revisited: an evolutionary approach.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17111
2019-09-28T04:37:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483736
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17111/
Decentralization and local public goods: getting the incentives right
Roumasset, James
E62 - Fiscal Policy
H41 - Public Goods
H76 - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
J18 - Public Policy
The paper addresses the nature and locus of appropriate government control in the provision of collective services. It suggests some useful principles for determining organizational structures with the appropriate degree and form of decentralization, which is seen to be an important part of incentive compatibility. In the case of low-income housing it cites the privatization of sites and services and devolution of upgrading as two promising models of decentralization.
1989-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17111/5/MPRA_paper_17111.pdf
Roumasset, James (1989): Decentralization and local public goods: getting the incentives right. Published in: Philippine Review of Economics and Business , Vol. 26, No. 1 (June 1989): pp. 1-13.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17569
2019-09-27T16:49:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493132
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483531
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17569/
Partnerships for Women's Health - Striving for Best Practice within the UN Global Compact / United Nations University Research Brief 1/2009 (www.unu.edu)
Timmermann, Martina
Kruesmann, Monika
I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
I12 - Health Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
Every minute, at least one woman dies from pregnancy and childbirth complications; a further 20 suffer injury, infection or disease. Despite medical advances, and years of policy declarations, this tragic situation remains particularly severe in developing countries, violating a fundamental human right. Is a new approach possible, one that looks beyond common project paradigms and standards? What could such an approach look like, how might it operate, and what might be its effect?
The Women’s Health Initiative, an innovative public private partnership that drew reference from the UN Global Compact, provides a possible model.
2009-09-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17569/1/MPRA_paper_17569.pdf
Timmermann, Martina and Kruesmann, Monika (2009): Partnerships for Women's Health - Striving for Best Practice within the UN Global Compact / United Nations University Research Brief 1/2009 (www.unu.edu). Published in: UNU Research Brief No. 1/2009 : pp. 1-12.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18562
2019-10-05T08:01:03Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18562/
Mixed Feelings: Theories of and Evidence on Giving
Konow, James
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H41 - Public Goods
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
This paper examines possible motives and institutional factors that impact giving. Specifically, I consider alternative theories parallel to dictator experiments that generate evidence on both allocation decisions and their effect on feelings. A number of new empirical findings as well as new interpretations for previously reported findings result. A novel test distinguishes warm glow from impure altruism and rules out the former as the sole motive for giving. Very generous donations to charities that aid the needy (with modal gifts of the entire dictator’s stakes) cannot be attributed to familiarity with the charities. A charity that offers a matching grant increases its revenues by drawing donors and donations away from one that does not, although aggregate charitable donations do not rise. Additional results on emotions paint a picture of “mixed feelings:” generosity creates good feelings when the recipients are charities and bad feelings when they are fellow students. No group of dictators, however, feels better, on average, than a control group that is given no opportunity to donate. I propose a simple model that accounts for these results on allocation behavior and feelings by incorporating elements of two approaches, unconditional altruism and social preference theories, that to date have mostly evolved independently. A critical feature of this model is the social norm, and the results of the experiments corroborate the theory in the context of two norms of distributive justice that are important to real world giving: equity and need.
2009-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18562/3/MPRA_paper_18562.pdf
Konow, James (2009): Mixed Feelings: Theories of and Evidence on Giving. Published in: Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 94, No. 3-4 (April 2010): pp. 279-297.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18801
2019-09-26T16:20:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3338
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483536
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18801/
On the Growth and Welfare Effects of Defense R&D
Chu, Angus C.
Lai, Ching-Chong
O38 - Government Policy
H41 - Public Goods
H56 - National Security and War
In the US, defense R&D share of GDP has decreased significantly since 1960. To analyze the implications on growth and welfare, we develop an R&D-based growth model that features the crowding-out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D. The model also captures the effects of defense technology on (i) national security resembling consumption-type public goods and (ii) aggregate productivity via the spin-off effect resembling productive public goods. In this framework, economic growth is driven by market-based civilian R&D as in standard R&D-based growth models and government-financed public goods (i.e., defense R&D) as in Barro (1990). We find that defense R&D has an inverted-U effect on growth, and the growth-maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in the spillover and spin-off effects. As for the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D, it is increasing in the security-enhancing effect of defense technology, and there exists a critical degree of this security-enhancing effect below (above) which the welfare-maximizing level is below (above) the growth-maximizing level.
2009-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18801/1/MPRA_paper_18801.pdf
Chu, Angus C. and Lai, Ching-Chong (2009): On the Growth and Welfare Effects of Defense R&D.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19637
2019-10-05T18:56:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19637/
Sorting with shame in the laboratory
Ong, David
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
H41 - Public Goods
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Trust is indispensable to fiduciary fields (e.g., credit rating), where experts exercise wide discretion on behalf of others. Can the shame from a scandal sort trustworthy people out of a fiduciary field? I tested for the possibility that a shame externality can sort in a charitable contribution game where subjects could be "ungenerous" when unobserved. After establishing that "generosity" required a contribution of more than $6, subjects were given the choice of contributing either $5 publicly or $0-$10 privately. 20/22 control subjects chose to contribute privately less than $2. 10/26 treatment subjects, after being told the prediction that they were unlikely to contribute more than $2, if they contributed privately, contributed $5 publicly. (This group also showed higher shame sensitivity.) This suggests that the mere belief that a subject would exploit the greater discretion and unobservability of a fiduciary-like position can deter entry into such a position. Thus, scandals that create such a belief could repel shame-sensitive people from that field -- possibly to the detriment of the field and the economy as a whole.
2008-10-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19637/1/MPRA_paper_19637.pdf
Ong, David (2008): Sorting with shame in the laboratory.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20186
2019-10-01T04:36:32Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20186/
Environmental tax competition among jurisdictions
Caminada, Koen
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
The use of environmental taxes for pollution problems without spillovers is studied in a multi-jurisdictional setting. The problem is studied using the standard Mintz & Tulkens (1986) model for interjurisdictional tax competition. This is a model with 2 regions, two tradeable private goods: labour and a private consumption good which can be taxed at the production level and one non tradeable local public good.
It is demonstrated that the tax competition literature results can not be translated to the environmental tax competition problem for externalities linked to production.
1992
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20186/1/MPRA_paper_20186.pdf
Caminada, Koen (1992): Environmental tax competition among jurisdictions. Published in: Department of Economics Research Memorandum No. 92.14 (1992): pp. 1-27.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:21132
2019-10-11T05:41:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D42:4234
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
7375626A656374733D51:5132
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513537
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21132/
Wildlife Conservation
Spash, Clive L.
Aldred, Jonathan
H41 - Public Goods
B4 - Economic Methodology
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation
Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services ; Biodiversity Conservation ; Bioeconomics ; Industrial Ecology
In this paper we consider how conservation has arisen as a key aspect of the reaction to human-initiated degradation and disappearance of ecosystems, wild lands. and wildlife. Concern over species extinction is given an historical perspective which shows the way in which pressure on wild and natural aspects of global ecology have changed in recent centuries. The role of conservation in the struggle to protect the environment is then analysed using underlying ethical arguments behind the economic, ecological and rights based justifications given for conservation. The moral considerability of species and individuals is reviewed and different positions contrasted, most importantly utilitarianism versus rights. A central argument with primary influence over economics is the utilitarian justification for action and this is explored with reflection upon the use of monetary valuation. Rights are then explored and the use of consequentialism in adjudicating different rights claims introduced. Human preferences can be seen as practically powerful in justifying conservation policy decisions. even when an animal-centred ethic has been adopted. Yet ecological and non-consequentialist expressions of concern characterise the entire problem in fundamentally different ways, e.g. biodiversity and ecosystems maintenance versus marginal species loss, designation of wilderness areas versus management of parklands. Leaving the wild in wilderness and the natural in Nature cannot then be reduced to preference utilitarianism as in the economic calculus.
1998
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21132/1/MPRA_paper_21132.pdf
Spash, Clive L. and Aldred, Jonathan (1998): Wildlife Conservation. Published in: Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics , Vol. 4, (1998)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:21356
2019-10-10T13:02:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21356/
Ramsey, Pigou, and a Consumption Externality
Wendner, Ronald
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
D62 - Externalities
H41 - Public Goods
This paper analyzes the effects of consumption externalities on optimal taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. If public and private goods are Hicksian complements and no lump sum taxes are available, the second-best level of public good provision can exceed the first-best level. In contrast to economies without externalities, this result even holds for Cobb-Douglas economies with homogeneous agents. Heterogeneity of agents raises the second-best commodity tax rate due to equity considerations, but lowers the tax rate due to the concern for externality-correction.
2010-03-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21356/1/MPRA_paper_21356.pdf
Wendner, Ronald (2010): Ramsey, Pigou, and a Consumption Externality.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22001
2019-10-01T17:21:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4334:433434
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22001/
Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent
Tan, Jonathan H.W.
Breitmoser, Yves
Bolle, Friedel
C71 - Cooperative Games
C44 - Operations Research ; Statistical Decision Theory
H41 - Public Goods
We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is found. In consent games contributions start at zero and can be increased by consent, and in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased by dissent. Equilibrium analysis predicts free riding in consent games but, in contrast, as much as socially efficient outcomes in dissent games. In our experiment, inexperienced subjects contribute high in consent games and low in dissent games, but behavior converges toward equilibrium predictions over time and eventually experienced subjects contribute as predicted: low in consent games and high in dissent games. Observed deviations from equilibrium in consent games are best explained by level-k reasoning, and those in dissent games are best explained by hierarchical reasoning formalized as nested logit equilibrium.
2010-04-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22001/1/MPRA_paper_22001.pdf
Tan, Jonathan H.W. and Breitmoser, Yves and Bolle, Friedel (2010): Voluntary Contributions by Consent or Dissent.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22076
2019-09-27T05:05:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483535
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453635
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22076/
Towards Social Security Systems in Japan Lessons for India
Sib Ranjan, Misra
Jaydev, Misra
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
H41 - Public Goods
E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
Japan has to restructure its social security systems fromtime to time for different reasons like a far more rapid aging of population , the slow down of long term economic growth and deteriorating equity in the inter-generational transfer of welfare .But even then, the basic elements remain the same .It si pertinent to see how and to whar extent japan’s social security systems could be translated in the case of India. As apreliminary analysis ,in section One, attempt has been made to summarize the distinctive features of social security systems in Japan.Section Two dwells upon the nature and problems of the social security systems in India. An endeavour has been made in Section three to articulate on the lessons for India. Final Section Four concludes and summarizes the main findings.It has ben observed that there are certain experiences that India can learn ,amongothers, the careful application of universal social security systems, the role of insurance policies,private-public synergies ,the role of the government and governance, the importance attached to social capital.
2009-07-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22076/1/MPRA_paper_22076.pdf
Sib Ranjan, Misra and Jaydev, Misra (2009): Towards Social Security Systems in Japan Lessons for India. Published in: Reitaku International Journal of Economic Studies , Vol. Vo - 1, No. Sptember, 2009 (September 2009): pp. 147-166.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22097
2019-10-02T16:48:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22097/
The effects of punishment in dynamic public-good games
Guererk, Oezguer
Rockenbach, Bettina
Wolff, Irenaeus
H41 - Public Goods
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoffs below the non-cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In an environment where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities, this could be devastating. Groups could fall prey to a poverty trap or, to avoid this, abstain from punishment altogether. We show that neither is the case generally. By continuously contributing larger fractions of their wealth, groups with punishment possibilities exhibit increasing wealth increments, while increments fall when punishment possibilities are absent. Nonetheless, single groups do succumb to the above-mentioned hazards.
2010-03-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22097/1/MPRA_paper_22097.pdf
Guererk, Oezguer and Rockenbach, Bettina and Wolff, Irenaeus (2010): The effects of punishment in dynamic public-good games.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22331
2019-10-03T04:41:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22331/
The effects of punishment in dynamic public-good games
Gürerk, Özgür
Rockenbach, Bettina
Wolff, Irenaeus
H41 - Public Goods
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoffs below the non-cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In an environment where past payoffs determine present contribution capabilities, this could be devastating. Groups could fall prey to a poverty trap or, to avoid this, abstain from punishment altogether. We show that neither is the case generally. By continuously contributing larger fractions of their wealth, groups with punishment possibilities exhibit increasing wealth increments, while increments fall when punishment possibilities are absent. Nonetheless, single groups do succumb to the above-mentioned hazards.
2010-03-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22331/1/MPRA_paper_22331.pdf
Gürerk, Özgür and Rockenbach, Bettina and Wolff, Irenaeus (2010): The effects of punishment in dynamic public-good games.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22401
2019-09-26T12:36:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22401/
Money Talks? An Experimental Study of Rebate in Reputation System Design
Li, Lingfang (Ivy)
Xiao, Erte
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
H41 - Public Goods
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions for helping sustain trust in markets, while feedback information is usually considered a public good. We apply both theoretical models and experiments to study how raters' feedback behavior responds to different reporting costs and how to improve market efficiency by introducing a pre-commitment device for sellers in reputation systems. In particular, the pre-commitment device we study here allows sellers to provide rebates to cover buyers' reporting costs before buyers make purchasing decisions. Using a buyer-seller trust game with a unilateral feedback scheme, we find that a buyer’s propensity to leave feedback is more sensitive to reporting costs when the seller cooperates than when the seller defects. The seller’s decision on whether to provide a rebate significantly affects the buyer’s decision to leave feedback by compensating for the feedback costs. More importantly, the rebate decision has a significant impact on the buyer's purchasing decision via signaling the seller's cooperative type. The experimental results show that the rebate mechanism improves the market efficiency.
2010-04-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22401/1/MPRA_paper_22401.pdf
Li, Lingfang (Ivy) and Xiao, Erte (2010): Money Talks? An Experimental Study of Rebate in Reputation System Design.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22468
2019-09-27T17:48:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22468/
Testing Kahneman's Attitudinal WTP Hypothesis
Ryan, Anthony M.
Spash, Clive L.
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
A psychological interpretation of willingness to pay (WTP) bids arising from the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) claims they represent a general contribution towards environmental causes rather than a personal economic valuation. Yet the evidence supporting this contribution model has been criticised for using group mean correlations to draw conclusions about individual motives. This paper avoids this problem by examining motives at an individual level. Evidence reported shows the need to qualify the role of the attitudinal explanation. Some, but not all, positive WTP bids are found to be based on contributory rather than economic motives, while the decision to bid zero or positive appears to represent a general psychological appraisal rather than being purely related to attitudes.
2010-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22468/1/MPRA_paper_22468.pdf
Ryan, Anthony M. and Spash, Clive L. (2010): Testing Kahneman's Attitudinal WTP Hypothesis.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23115
2019-09-28T04:36:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23115/
Social identity, group composition and public good provision: an experimental study
Chakravarty, Surajeet
Fonseca, Miguel A.
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
H41 - Public Goods
Social fragmentation has been identified as a potential cause for the under-provision of public goods in developing nations, as well as in urban communities in developed countries such as the U.S. We study the effect of social fragmentation on public good provision using laboratory experiments. We create two artificial social groups in the lab and we assign subjects belonging to both groups to a public good game. The treatment variable is the relative size of each social group, which is a proxy for social fragmentation. We find that while higher social fragmentation leads to lower public good provision, this effect is short-lived. Furthermore, social homogeneity does not lead to higher levels of contributions.
2010-06-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23115/1/MPRA_paper_23115.pdf
Chakravarty, Surajeet and Fonseca, Miguel A. (2010): Social identity, group composition and public good provision: an experimental study.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23877
2019-09-28T22:50:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23877/
Aid, social capital and village public goods: after the tsunami.
Freire, Tiago
Henderson, J. Vernon
Kuncoro, Ari
H41 - Public Goods
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Using survey data on fishermen and fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia from 2005 and 2007, this paper examines the effect of the December 2004 tsunami and resulting massive aid effort on local public good provision, in particular on public labor inputs, but also public capital choices. Also analyzed are the roles of and changes in local social and political institutions and participation in political and social activities. Such an examination informs not only our understanding of the impacts of aid on villages, but also our understanding of how villages allocate resources to public goods. For public labor inputs, volunteerism is lower in villages with more aid projects, but that is offset if the dominant donor mitigates agency problems by doing its own implementation. Volunteerism is lower in villages with more 'democratic' activity such as elections, although that effect is mitigated in villages with higher levels of social capital pre-tsunami. Evidence suggests volunteerism is lower not because of changes in types of leaders with village elections per se, but rather due to heightened internal divisions associated with elections. Correspondingly for public capital, villages with more democratic activity combined with more aid projects tend to emphasize garnering private aid (e.g., houses) at the expense of public aid (e.g., public buildings).
2010-06-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23877/2/MPRA_paper_23877.pdf
Freire, Tiago and Henderson, J. Vernon and Kuncoro, Ari (2010): Aid, social capital and village public goods: after the tsunami.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24069
2019-09-29T15:00:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24069/
Can cheap panel-based internet surveys substitute costly in-person interviews in CV surveys?
Lindhjem, Henrik
Navrud, Ståle
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
With the current growth in broadband penetration, Internet is likely to be the data collection mode of choice for stated preference research in the not so distant future. However, little is known about how this survey mode may influence data quality and welfare estimates. In a first controlled field experiment to date as part of a national contingent valuation (CV) survey estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for biodiversity protection plans, we assign two groups sampled from the same panel of respondents either to an Internet or in-person (in-house) interview mode. Our design is better able than previous studies to isolate measurement effects from sample composition effects. We find little evidence of social desirability bias in the in-person interview setting or satisficing (shortcutting the response process) in the Internet survey. The share of “don’t knows”, zeros and protest responses to the WTP question with a payment card is very similar between modes. Equality of mean WTP between samples cannot be rejected. Considering equivalence, we can reject that mean WTP from the in-person sample is more than 30% higher. Results are quite encouraging for the use of Internet in CV as stated preferences do not seem to be significantly different or biased compared to in-person interviews.
2010-07-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24069/1/MPRA_paper_24069.pdf
Lindhjem, Henrik and Navrud, Ståle (2010): Can cheap panel-based internet surveys substitute costly in-person interviews in CV surveys?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24070
2019-10-01T16:36:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513531
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513537
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24070/
Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods? Implication for aggregate welfare measures
Lindhjem, Henrik
Navrud, Ståle
H41 - Public Goods
Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services ; Biodiversity Conservation ; Bioeconomics ; Industrial Ecology
The aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived from a contingent valuation (CV) survey will be much higher if the same elicited mean willingness to pay (WTP) is added up over individuals rather than households. A trivial fact, however, once respondents are part of multi-person households it becomes almost impossible to elicit an “uncontaminated” WTP measure that with some degree of confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit. The literature is mostly silent about which response unit to use in WTP questions and in some CV studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied. We test for differences between individual and household WTP in a novel, web-administered, split-sample CV survey asking WTP for preserving biodiversity in old-growth coniferous forests in Norway. Two samples are asked both types of questions, but in reverse order, followed by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why WTP may differ. We find in a between-sample test that the WTP respondents state on behalf of their households is not significantly different from their individual WTP. However, within the same sample, household WTP is significantly higher than individual WTP; in particular if respondents are asked to state individual before household WTP. Our results suggest that using individual WTP as the response unit would overestimate aggregate WTP, and thus bias welfare estimates in benefit-cost analyses. Thus, the choice of response format needs to be explicitly and carefully addressed in CV questionnaire design in order to avoid the risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit-cost test
2008-01-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24070/1/MPRA_paper_24070.pdf
Lindhjem, Henrik and Navrud, Ståle (2008): Asking for Individual or Household Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods? Implication for aggregate welfare measures. Published in: Environmental and Resource Economics , Vol. 1, No. 43 (2009): pp. 11-29.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24272
2019-09-26T14:26:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D51:5130:513030
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24272/
Equity and justice in global warming policy
Kverndokk, Snorre
Rose, Adam
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D62 - Externalities
Q00 - General
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Many countries are implementing or at least considering policies to counter increasingly certain negative impacts from climate change. An increasing amount of research has been devoted to the analysis of the costs of climate change and its mitigation, as well as to the design of policies, such as the international Kyoto Protocol, post-Kyoto negotiations, regional initiatives, and unilateral actions. Although most studies on climate change policies in economics have considered efficiency aspects, there is a growing literature on equity and justice.
Climate change policy has important dimensions of distributive justice, both within and across generations, but in this paper we survey only studies on the intragenerational aspect, i.e.., within a generation. We cover several domains including the international, regional, national, sectoral and inter-personal, and examine aspects such as the distribution of burdens from climate change, climate change policy negotiations in general, implementation of climate agreements using tradable emission permits, and the uncertainty of alternatives to emission reductions.
2008-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24272/1/MPRA_paper_24272.pdf
Kverndokk, Snorre and Rose, Adam (2008): Equity and justice in global warming policy. Published in: International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics , Vol. 2, No. 2 (October 2008): pp. 135-176.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24455
2019-09-27T00:03:55Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3334
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30:4B3030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24455/
Internet access: where law, economy, culture and technology meet
Wong, Sulan
Altman, Eitan
Rojas-Mora, Julio
O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
H41 - Public Goods
K00 - General
Internet growth has allowed unprecedented widespread access to cultural creation including music and films, to knowledge, and to a wide range of consumer information. At the same time, it has become a huge source of business opportunities. Along with great benefits that this access to the Internet provides, the open and free access to the Internet has encountered large opposition based on political, economical and ethical reasons. An ongoing battle over the control on Internet access has been escalating on all these fronts. In this paper we describe first some of the ideological roots of free access to the Internet along with its main opponents. We then focus on the problem of “Internet piracy” and analyze the efficiency of efforts to reduce the availability of copyrighted creations that are available for non-authorized free download.
2010-08-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24455/1/MPRA_paper_24455.pdf
Wong, Sulan and Altman, Eitan and Rojas-Mora, Julio (2010): Internet access: where law, economy, culture and technology meet. Forthcoming in: Computer Networks
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24760
2019-09-30T08:16:43Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3334
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30:4B3030
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24760/
Internet access: where law, economy, culture and technology meet
Wong, Sulan
Altman, Eitan
Rojas-Mora, Julio
O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
H41 - Public Goods
K00 - General
Internet growth has allowed unprecedented widespread access to cultural creation including music and films, to knowledge, and to a wide range of consumer information. At the same time, it has become a huge source of business opportunities. Along with great benefits that this access to the Internet provides, the open and free access to the Internet has encountered large opposition based on political, economical and ethical reasons. An ongoing battle over the control on Internet access has been escalating on all these fronts. In this paper we describe first some of the ideological roots of free access to the Internet along with its main opponents. We then focus on the problem of “Internet piracy” and analyze the efficiency of efforts to reduce the availability of copyrighted creations that are available for non-authorized free download.
2010-08-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24760/1/MPRA_paper_24760.pdf
Wong, Sulan and Altman, Eitan and Rojas-Mora, Julio (2010): Internet access: where law, economy, culture and technology meet. Forthcoming in: Computer Networks
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24968
2019-09-28T11:15:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433933
7375626A656374733D49:4931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24968/
Do people invest in local public goods with long-term benefits: Experimental evidence from a shanty town in Peru
De Hoop, Thomas
Van Kempen, Luuk
Fort, Ricardo
H41 - Public Goods
C93 - Field Experiments
I1 - Health
This paper discusses voluntary contributions to health education in a shanty town in Peru, using a new experimental setup to identify voluntary contributions to local public goods. The experiment enables individuals to contribute to a health education meeting facilitated by an NGO, which they know will only be organised if the cumulative investment level exceeds a certain threshold value. In contrast to expectations of aid distributors, individuals contributed a substantial amount of money, despite the long-term nature of the health benefits from health education. High discount rates only seem to have had a detrimental effect on investment in a poorer subsample. Results from a complementary experiment, which identifies donations to a nutrition program, suggest that positive beliefs about short-term benefits from health education in the form of learning effects have played an important role in the investment decision. The results indicate that channelling decision-making power about public good provision to beneficiaries not necessarily implies a crowding out of investment in local public goods with long-term benefits. Hence, particular attention is given to the potential role of cash transfers in the financing of local public goods.
2010-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24968/1/MPRA_paper_24968.pdf
De Hoop, Thomas and Van Kempen, Luuk and Fort, Ricardo (2010): Do people invest in local public goods with long-term benefits: Experimental evidence from a shanty town in Peru.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25527
2019-10-14T16:22:19Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D52:5231:523130
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25527/
On the failure of European planning for less developed regions. The case of Calabria
Forte, Francesco
Magazzino, Cosimo
Mantovani, Michela
R10 - General
H41 - Public Goods
Z10 - General
This study analyzes the negative performance of Calabria’s Regional Program 2000-2006, for the enhancement of cultural goods to attract tourism, as an example of the waste of resources of EU ambitious planning for the economic convergence. The empirical analysis shows that the variables relating to cultural sites, education sites and sites with tourism or tourism potentialities had no significance or even negative influence. The significant variables were the number of non profits present in the municipalities and the criminal hubs. The presence of cultural sites is not statistically significant in the allocation of funds to the criminal hubs, After the program the number of visitors and revenues from museum and archeological sites of Calabria lower than before while on average in Italy has had a great increase. On the other hand tourism in Calabria experienced a differential increase , in spite of the waste of the funds of the European regional policy.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25527/1/MPRA_paper_25527.pdf
Forte, Francesco and Magazzino, Cosimo and Mantovani, Michela (2010): On the failure of European planning for less developed regions. The case of Calabria. Forthcoming in: European Journal of Law and Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25559
2019-09-26T18:49:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513534
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25559/
Unintended Consequences of Price Controls: An Application to Allowance Markets
Stocking, Andrew
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
H41 - Public Goods
Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Price controls established in an emissions allowance market to constrain allowance prices between a ceiling and a floor offer a mechanism to reduce cost uncertainty in a cap-and-trade program; however, they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would result in lower government revenue and greater emissions than in the absence of controls. In particular, when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market, firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price, regardless of the prevailing market price, in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances. Those purchases could either be transacted by a group of firms intending to manipulate the market or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement that causes firms to purchase allowances at the ceiling. Theory and simulations using estimates of the elasticity of allowance demand for U.S. firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper, although in practice many other conditions will determine its use.
2010-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25559/1/MPRA_paper_25559.pdf
Stocking, Andrew (2010): Unintended Consequences of Price Controls: An Application to Allowance Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25845
2019-09-26T16:46:20Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3136
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3532
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433831
7375626A656374733D44:4438
7375626A656374733D52:5231:523131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443835
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25845/
Knowledge cluster formation in Peninsular Malaysia: The emergence of an epistemic landscape
Evers, Hans-Dieter
Nordin, Ramli
Nienkemper, Pamela
H41 - Public Goods
O16 - Financial Markets ; Saving and Capital Investment ; Corporate Finance and Governance
L52 - Industrial Policy ; Sectoral Planning Methods
C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data ; Data Access
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
R11 - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Knowledge clusters are central places within an epistemic landscape, i.e. in a wider structure of knowledge production and dissemination. They have the organisational capability to drive innovations and create new industries. Examples of such organisations in knowledge clusters are universities and colleges, research institutions, think tanks, government research agencies and knowledge-intensive firms with their respective knowledge workers.
The following paper will look at Malaysia and its path towards a Knowledge-based economy. We first describe the development strategy of the Malaysian government which has emphasized cluster formation as one of its prime targets. We then provide evidence of the current state of knowledge cluster formation in Peninsular Malaysia and try to answer the following questions. If the formation of a knowledge cluster (especially in the ICT and multimedia industry) has been the government policy, what has been the result? Has Malaysia developed an epistemic landscape of knowledge clusters? Has the main knowledge cluster really materialised in and around Cyberjaya in the MSC Malaysia?
Data collected from websites, directories, government publications and expert interviews have enabled us to construct the epistemic landscape of Peninsular Malaysia. Several knowledge clusters of a high density of knowledge producing institutions and their knowledge workers have been identified and described. The analysis of the knowledge output, measured in terms of scientific publications, patents and trademarks show that existing knowledge clusters have, indeed, been productive as predicted by cluster theory. On the other hand government designed development corridors do not always coincide with the distribution of knowledge assets. The analysis of our data pertaining to Cyberjaya, the MSC Malaysia and the “corridors” needs to be developed further to produce more robust results.
Keywords:
2010-10-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25845/1/MPRA_paper_25845.pdf
Evers, Hans-Dieter and Nordin, Ramli and Nienkemper, Pamela (2010): Knowledge cluster formation in Peninsular Malaysia: The emergence of an epistemic landscape. Published in: ZEF Working Papers No. 62 (10 October 2010): pp. 1-36.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25936
2019-10-03T04:50:43Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3233
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25936/
Barriers to investment in polarized societies
marina, azzimonti
E62 - Fiscal Policy
O23 - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H41 - Public Goods
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the
composition of public spending result in implementation of short-sighted policies. The relative
price of investment to consumption is excessively large in equilibrium due to over-taxation.
Investment rates are too low which slows down growth along the transition. In the long run,
this results in output, consumption and welfare being inefficiently low. The larger is the
degree of polarization, the greater is the inefficiency. Political stability mitigates the effects
of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by
the choice of growth-retarding policies.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25936/1/MPRA_paper_25936.pdf
marina, azzimonti (2009): Barriers to investment in polarized societies. Forthcoming in: american economic review
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25937
2019-09-27T17:25:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3233
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25937/
Political ideology as a source of business cycles
marina, azzimonti
E62 - Fiscal Policy
O23 - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H41 - Public Goods
E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination
When the government must decide not only on broad public-policy programs but also on
the provision of group-specific public goods, dynamic strategic inefficiencies arise. The struggle
between opposing groups–that disagree on the composition of expenditures and compete for
office–results in governments being endogenously short-sighted: systematic under-investment in
infrastructure and overspending on public goods arises, as resources are more valuable when
in power. This distorts allocations even under lump-sum taxation. Ideological biases create
asymmetries in the group’s relative political power generating endogenous economic cycles in
an otherwise deterministic environment. Volatility is non-monotonic in the size of the bias and
is an additional source of inefficiency.
2010-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25937/1/MPRA_paper_25937.pdf
marina, azzimonti (2010): Political ideology as a source of business cycles.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25979
2019-10-02T09:05:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3338
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513133
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513135
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D51:5130:513031
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513132
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513138
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25979/
Needs, Modes and Efficiency of Economic Organizations and Public Interventions in Agriculture
Bachev, Hrabrin
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
H41 - Public Goods
H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
L38 - Public Policy
Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness
Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure ; Land Reform ; Land Use ; Irrigation ; Agriculture and Environment
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Q01 - Sustainable Development
Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Q18 - Agricultural Policy ; Food Policy
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
There has been a fundamental development in theory and understanding of market, private, collective and public organizations in recent years. This paper incorporates achievements of the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggests a framework for assessing the needs and efficiency of economic organizations and public interventions in agriculture.
Our new approach includes: study of farm and other agrarian organizations as a governing rather than production structure; assessment of comparative efficiency of alternative market, contract, internal, and hybrid modes of governance; analysis of level of transaction costs and their institutional (distribution and enforcement of de-facto rights between individuals, groups, organizations), behavioral (agents preferences, ability, bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism, risk aversion, trust), dimensional (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of transactions), natural, and technological factors; determination of effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of farms and other agrarian organizations; specification of the economic role of government and the needs for public interventions in agrarian sector; assessment of comparative of alternative forms of public involvement in agrarian sector (partnership, regulation, taxation, assistance, provision, in house organization, fundamental property rights modernization).
The paper provides new powerful tools for understanding the agrarian organizations and their efficiency, and for improvement of public policies, collective actions, farming and business strategies, and academic analyses in that important sector of social life.
2010-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25979/1/MPRA_paper_25979.pdf
Bachev, Hrabrin (2010): Needs, Modes and Efficiency of Economic Organizations and Public Interventions in Agriculture.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26185
2019-09-28T16:45:33Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D51:5130
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513538
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26185/
Double Dipping in Environmental Markets
Woodward, Richard T
H41 - Public Goods
Q0 - General
Q58 - Government Policy
There is an increasing tendency to use markets to induce the provision of environmental services. As such markets increase in scope, potential market participants might sell multiple environmental services. The question we consider here is whether participants in such markets should be allowed to sell credits in more than one market simultaneously. Some have argued in favor of such “double dipping,” because it would make the provision of environmental services more profitable. In practice, however, most programs do not allow doubledipping. We show that if the optimal level of pollution abatement is sought, then double-dipping maximizes societal net benefits. However, if pollution policies are set in a piecemeal fashion, then the caps for each market are unlikely to be optimal and, in this second-best setting, a policy prohibiting double dipping can lead to greater social net benefits. We explore conditions under which a singlemarket
policy is preferred, or equivalently, where piecemeal policies are likely to yield particularly inefficient outcomes.
2010-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26185/1/MPRA_paper_26185.pdf
Woodward, Richard T (2010): Double Dipping in Environmental Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26490
2019-09-27T08:59:23Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D52:5231:523130
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26490/
On the failure of European planning for less developed regions. The case of Calabria
Forte, Francesco
Magazzino, Cosimo
Mantovani, Michela
R10 - General
H41 - Public Goods
Z10 - General
This study analyzes the negative performance of Calabria’s Regional Program 2000-2006, for the enhancement of cultural goods to attract tourism, as an example of the waste of resources in the regional planning under the EU-Italian complex planning procedure for economic convergence. The empirical analysis shows that the variables relating to cultural sites, education sites and sites with tourism or tourism poten-tialities had no significance or even negative influence. The most significant variable was the number of nonprofit organization present in the municipalities. A relevant part of the funds remained unspent for the purposes of the plan, and it was devoted to other destinations. After the program, the number of visitors and revenues from museum and archeological sites of Calabria is lower than before, while on average in Italy there was a great increase. On the other hand, tourism in Calabria experienced a differential increase, in spite of the waste of the funds of the European regional policy.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26490/1/MPRA_paper_26490.pdf
Forte, Francesco and Magazzino, Cosimo and Mantovani, Michela (2010): On the failure of European planning for less developed regions. The case of Calabria. Forthcoming in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27188
2019-09-30T17:13:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3330
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463533
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513534
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27188/
A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R & D.
Kratzsch, Uwe
Sieg, Gernot
Stegemann, Ulrike
O30 - General
H41 - Public Goods
F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations
Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming
If an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emis- sions are too high, strategic investments in research and development (R&D) of green technology, for example sustainable drive-trains, can pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full par- ticipation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent sustainable policies.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27188/1/MPRA_paper_27188.pdf
Kratzsch, Uwe and Sieg, Gernot and Stegemann, Ulrike (2010): A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R & D.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27248
2019-10-01T04:43:46Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27248/
Viewers like you: community norms and contributions to public broadcasting
Knack, Stephen
Kropf, Martha
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
H41 - Public Goods
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
The logic of collective action (Olson 1965) suggests that public broadcasting may be underprovided, because non-contributors are not excluded from receiving the benefits. Why do so many individuals voluntarily contribute to public television, even though they can obtain the benefits of public television without contributing? We explore the hypothesis that giving to public broadcasting is determined in part by the strength of "civic norms" that limit the opportunistic behavior of individuals in large-numbers prisoners' dilemma settings. We also explore a variety of other explanations for charitable giving and collective action, including group size, tax deductibility, crowd out, and selective incentives.
Our findings provide evidence linking civic norms and giving to public broadcasting. Education and income have indirect effects through strengthening civic norms. We find some evidence that selective incentives increase the average size of contributions among those who contribute.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27248/1/MPRA_paper_27248.pdf
Knack, Stephen and Kropf, Martha (2003): Viewers like you: community norms and contributions to public broadcasting. Published in: Political Researcg Quarterly , Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 2003): pp. 187-197.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27357
2019-09-27T16:46:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27357/
Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas
Gürerk, Özgür
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
Endogenously chosen punishment institutions perform well in increasing contributions and long-term payoffs in social dilemma situations. However, they suffer from (a) initial reluctance of subjects to join the punishment institution and (b) initial efficiency losses due to frequent punishment. Here, we investigate the effects of social learning on the acceptence and the efficiency of a peer punishment institution in a community choice experiment. Subjects choose between communities with and without the possibility to punish peers before interacting in a repeated social dilemma situation. We find that providing
participants with a social history - presenting the main results of an identical previous experiment conducted with dierent subjects - decreases the initial reluctance towards the punishment institution signicantly. Moreover, with social history, cooperative groups reach the social optimum more rapidly and there is lower efficiency loss due to reduced punishment. Our findings shed light on the importance of social learning for the acceptance of seemingly unpopular but socially desirable mechanisms.
2010-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27357/1/MPRA_paper_27357.pdf
Gürerk, Özgür (2010): Social learning increases the acceptance and the efficiency of punishment institutions in social dilemmas.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27517
2019-09-26T20:38:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4536:453632
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483331
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443931
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27517/
Endogenous growth in a model with heterogeneous agents and voting on public goods
Borissov, Kirill
Surkov, Alexander
E62 - Fiscal Policy
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H31 - Household
H41 - Public Goods
D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice ; Life Cycle Models and Saving
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
We consider a Barro-type endogenous growth model in which the government’s purchases of goods and services enter into the production function. The provision of government services is financed by flat-rate (linear) income or lump-sum taxes. It is assumed that individuals differing in their discount factors vote on the tax rates. We propose a concept of voting equilibrium leading to some versions of the median voter theorem for steady-state equilibria, fully characterize steady-state equilibria and show that if the median voter discount factor is sufficiently low, the long-run rate of growth in the case of flat-rate income taxation is higher than that in the case of lump-sum taxation.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27517/1/MPRA_paper_27517.pdf
Borissov, Kirill and Surkov, Alexander (2010): Endogenous growth in a model with heterogeneous agents and voting on public goods.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27891
2019-09-27T01:35:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5033:503336
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443730
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D48:4831:483131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27891/
It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter
P36 - Consumer Economics ; Health ; Education and Training ; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
H41 - Public Goods
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
P16 - Political Economy
D70 - General
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
We investigate the possible explanations of variations in aggregate levels of participation in large-scale political demonstrations. A simple public choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual May Day demonstrations of the Danish labour movement and socialist parties taking place in Copenhagen in the period 1980-2009. The most important explanatory variables are variations in the weather conditions. Political and socio-economic conditions exhibit few or no robust effects.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27891/1/MPRA_paper_27891.pdf
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2010): It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28812
2019-09-27T04:44:42Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463136
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3632
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443538
7375626A656374733D50:5034:503438
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3131
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483730
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3333
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483537
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3637
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3334
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3234
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463134
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463139
7375626A656374733D48:4838:483832
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7375626A656374733D46:4631:463138
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513137
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463137
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3532
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423431
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433031
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513538
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28812/
Trade sustainability impact assessment (SIA) on the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada: Final report
Kirkpatrick, Colin
Raihan, Selim
Bleser, Adam
Prud'homme, Dan
Mayrand, Karel
Morin, Jean Frederic
Pollitt, Hector
Hinojosa, Leonith
Williams, Michael
F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
L62 - Automobiles ; Other Transportation Equipment ; Related Parts and Equipment
H41 - Public Goods
K21 - Antitrust Law
D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
P48 - Political Economy ; Legal Institutions ; Property Rights ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Regional Studies
K11 - Property Law
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
F15 - Economic Integration
H70 - General
K33 - International Law
O51 - U.S. ; Canada
L8 - Industry Studies: Services
H57 - Procurement
L67 - Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment
K0 - General
O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
O24 - Trade Policy ; Factor Movement Policy ; Foreign Exchange Policy
F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
F19 - Other
H82 - Governmental Property
L69 - Other
F18 - Trade and Environment
Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
F17 - Trade Forecasting and Simulation
O52 - Europe
B41 - Economic Methodology
C01 - Econometrics
Q58 - Government Policy
Commissioned by the European Commission, the Final Report for the EU-Canada Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provides a comprehensive assessment of the potential impacts of trade liberalisation under CETA. The analysis assesses the economic, social and environmental impacts in Canada and the European Union in three main sectors, sixteen sub-sectors and across seven cross-cutting issues.
It predicts a number of macro-economic and sector-specific impacts. The macro analysis suggests the EU may see increases in real GDP of 0.02-0.03% in the long-term from CETA, whereas Canada may see increases of 0.18-0.36%. The Investment section of the report suggests these numbers could be higher when factoring in investment increases. At the sectoral level, the study predicts the greatest gains in output and trade to be stimulated by services liberalisation and by the removal of tariffs applied on sensitive agricultural products. It also suggests CETA could have a positive social impact if it includes provisions on the ILO’s Core Labour Standards and Decent Work Agenda.
The study also details a variety of impacts in various “cross-cutting” components of CETA. It finds CETA would stimulate investment in Canada, and to a lesser extent in the EU; and finds costs outweigh the benefits of including controversial NAFTA-style investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions in CETA. It predicts potentially imbalanced benefits from a government procurement (GP) chapter. The study assumes CETA will lead to an upward harmonisation in intellectual property rights (IPR) regulations, particularly in Canada, which will have a number of effects. It predicts some notable impacts in terms of competition policy, as well as trade facilitation, free circulation of goods and labour mobility.
2011-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28812/1/MPRA_paper_28812.pdf
Kirkpatrick, Colin and Raihan, Selim and Bleser, Adam and Prud'homme, Dan and Mayrand, Karel and Morin, Jean Frederic and Pollitt, Hector and Hinojosa, Leonith and Williams, Michael (2011): Trade sustainability impact assessment (SIA) on the comprehensive economic and trade agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada: Final report. Published in: European Commission Trade Assessments (September 2011)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28932
2019-10-05T16:43:35Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483534
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D52:5234:523431
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28932/
Congestion pricing, infrastructure investment and redistribution
Russo, Antonio
H54 - Infrastructures ; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H41 - Public Goods
R41 - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion ; Travel Time ; Safety and Accidents ; Transportation Noise
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
We study congestion pricing by a government that has redistributive concerns, in the presence of optimal income taxation. Individuals differ in (unobservable) earning ability and consumption technology for commodities using a congestible network (e.g. roads, Internet). We find, assuming separable preferences, that when efficiency of consumption technology is either invariant or postively correlated with earning ability, low ability individuals should face higher marginal congestion charges than high ability ones. Moreover, reducing congestion (by raising charges or expanding network capacity) enables government to increase redistribution. We also find that means tested congestion pricing may be necessary to implement the second-best allocation.
2011-02-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28932/1/MPRA_paper_28932.pdf
Russo, Antonio (2011): Congestion pricing, infrastructure investment and redistribution.
en
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