2024-03-28T23:53:26Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:21
2019-09-29T07:37:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21/
Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study
Wu, Steven
Roe, Brian
Sporleder, Thomas
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Experimental economics is used to investigate two important hypotheses proposed in the economics literature on tournaments. Specifically, we test for a hypothesized “disincentives effect” which can occur in tournaments with mixed ability agents. We also test the well known hypothesis that, when common shocks are an important source of risk, tournaments can filter out this common shock and reduce earnings risk to workers. We find that disincentive effects arose in our tournament experiments, although these effects are not as strong as we predicted in our theoretical model and simulations. We also find that tournaments can be very effective at reducing earnings variation when common shocks are important. Taken together, these results suggest that the benefits of risk reduction from eliminating common shocks might outweigh the disincentive effects arising from mixed tournaments. We also find that the difference in average earnings between low and high ability agents is greater under tournaments than under absolute performance contracts.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21/1/MPRA_paper_21.pdf
Wu, Steven and Roe, Brian and Sporleder, Thomas (2006): Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25
2019-10-03T17:29:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38:4A3831
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25/
Minimum wages in Australia: an analysis of the impact on small and medium sized businesses
Harding, Don
Harding, Glenys
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J81 - Working Conditions
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J8 - Labor Standards: National and International
J38 - Public Policy
A survey of 1800 small and medium sized businesses is used to shed light on the number of workers covered by minimum wage legislation in Australia. Estimates are obtained and reported of the employment effects of changing the way in which minimum wages are set in Australia.
2004-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25/1/MPRA_paper_25.pdf
Harding, Don and Harding, Glenys (2004): Minimum wages in Australia: an analysis of the impact on small and medium sized businesses.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1619
2019-09-30T22:10:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1619/
Performance Related Pay Coverage in the UK
Cowling, Marc
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
A simple model of the firms’ decision to pay workers performance related pay (PRP) is tested using company level data for 1,001 UK private sector businesses. From the basic sample statistics we observe that, on average, 26.5% of workers are covered by PRP systems. Yet this hides the fact that only 50.5% of businesses have any workers at all covered by PRP. Our empirical analysis offers support for the key hypotheses drawn from Lazear type PRP models, which emphasise the relations between firm size and implementation costs, and ease of measurement, as medium and large firms are more likely to have PRP systems. However, these results are over-turned when we consider the extent of workers covered by firm level PRP systems if they are in place. Here we observe that more workers are covered by PRP in micro and small firms.
2007-01-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1619/1/MPRA_paper_1619.pdf
Cowling, Marc (2007): Performance Related Pay Coverage in the UK.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1629
2019-10-26T05:52:56Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2958
2019-10-03T07:42:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2958/
An experimental analysis of moral hazard in team
Costa, Francisco
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M54 - Labor Management
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
This paper reports 5 laboratory sessions that analyze the effects of group sizes in the voluntary contribution mechanism, when contribution level is either complementary or substitute. The theorical argument is that each production function provides different incentives for the agent along scale changes. When contribution levels are substitutes, bigger groups provide more incentives for free-riders, thus reducing the contribution level, because of decreasing marginal contribution - the 1/N problem -, Kandel and Lazear (1992). On the other hand, if marginal contribution is independent of the group size, as the case where contributions are complementary, the public good provision may increase together with the group size, as in Adams (2002). Our experiment results show that for both production functions bigger groups reduce contribution level and that, when efforts are substitutes, the contribution level is significantly higher. (JEL: H41 J33 C92)
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2958/1/MPRA_paper_2958.pdf
Costa, Francisco (2005): An experimental analysis of moral hazard in team.
pt
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4710
2019-09-27T17:23:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483235
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4710/
What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
Cole, Rebel
Mehran, Hamid
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that: (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has almost exclusively focused; (ii) executives at C-corporations are paid significantly more than executives at S-corporations; (iii) executive pay is inversely related to CEO ownership; (iv) executive pay is inversely related to leverage; and (v) executive pay is related to a number of CEO characteristics, including age, education and gender. Executive pay is inversely related to CEO age and positively related to educational attainment. Finally, female executives are paid significantly less than their male counterparts.
2007-08-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4710/1/MPRA_paper_4710.pdf
Cole, Rebel and Mehran, Hamid (2007): What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10031
2019-09-27T08:20:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10031/
Pay enough, don’t pay too much or don’t pay at all? An empirical study of the non-monotonic impact of incentives on job satisfaction
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper attempts to test the non-monotonic effect of monetary incentives on job satisfaction. Specifically, 8 waves (1998-2005) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) are used to investigate the ceteris paribus association between the intensity of bonus/profit-sharing payments and the utility derived from work. After controlling for individual heterogeneity biases, it is shown that relatively ‘small’ bonuses exert a significant negative effect on worker satisfaction. In contrast, job utility is found to rise only in response to ‘large’ bonus payments, primarily in skilled, non-unionized private sector jobs. The empirical evidence of the paper is therefore consistent with a ‘V-effect’ of incentives, suggesting that employers wishing to motivate their staff should indeed “pay enough or don’t pay at all”.
2008-08-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10031/2/MPRA_paper_10031.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos (2008): Pay enough, don’t pay too much or don’t pay at all? An empirical study of the non-monotonic impact of incentives on job satisfaction.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10906
2019-10-01T21:12:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10906/
Efficient Contests
Riis, Christian
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
In their seminal contribution Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same e¢ cient e¤ort as incentive-based reward schemes.
They also show that this equivalence result is not robust towards heterogeneity in worker ability, as long as ability is private information, as it is not possible to structure contests to simultaneously satisfy self-selection constraints and first best incentives.
This paper demonstrates that efficiency is achievable by a simple modification of the prize scheme in a mixed (heterogenous) contest. In the L&R contest, the winner's prize as well as the loser's prize are fixed in advance.
In this paper I demonstrate that efficiency is restored by a modification of contest design, in which contestants choose from a menu of prizes.
2008-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10906/1/MPRA_paper_10906.pdf
Riis, Christian (2008): Efficient Contests.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11649
2019-10-09T16:42:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11649/
Is Cross-listing Associated with Stronger Executive Incentives? Evidence from China
Chi, Wei
Zhang, Haiyan
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent governance rules and a better investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong local firms in adopting strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that top executive compensation of cross-listed firms is more sensitive to sales growth than mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to that of Hong Kong firms, executive pay of cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further study shows that it is necessary to differentiate state and non-state companies among the cross-listed firms, as they exhibit different patterns of executive incentives.
2008-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11649/1/MPRA_paper_11649.pdf
Chi, Wei and Zhang, Haiyan (2008): Is Cross-listing Associated with Stronger Executive Incentives? Evidence from China.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12156
2019-10-01T07:48:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12156/
Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence
Freeman, Richard B.
Gelber, Alexander M.
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper examines behavior in a tournament in which we vary the tournament prize structure and the information available about participants' skill at the task of solving mazes. The number of solved mazes is lowest when payments are independent of performance; higher when a single, large prize is given; and highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given. This result is strongest when we inform participants about the number of mazes they and others solved in a pre-tournament round. Some participants reported that they solved more mazes than they actually solved, and this misreporting also peaked with multiple differentiated prizes.
2008-12-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12156/1/MPRA_paper_12156.pdf
Freeman, Richard B. and Gelber, Alexander M. (2008): Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13449
2019-09-28T00:01:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13449/
Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation, and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence
Choe, Chongwoo
Tian, Gloria
Yin, Xiangkang
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
G30 - General
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
We study theoretically and empirically the relation among CEO power, CEO pay and
firm performance. Our theoretical model follows the rent extraction view of CEO compensation
put forward by the managerial power theory. We test our theoretical findings
using the sample of S&P1500 firms. The predicted relation between power and pay is
largely supported. However, the relation between power and firm performance has mixed
support, suggesting that, while the managerial power theory has relevance in explaining
the relation between power and pay, the scope of power needs to be broadened for better
understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance.
2009-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13449/1/MPRA_paper_13449.pdf
Choe, Chongwoo and Tian, Gloria and Yin, Xiangkang (2009): Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation, and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13760
2019-09-28T12:26:36Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13760/
Should executive stock options be abandoned?
Choe, Chongwoo
Yin, Xiangkang
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
G30 - General
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Recent corporate scandals around the world have led many to single out executive stock options as one of the main culprits. More corporations are abandoning stock options and
reverting to restricted stock. This paper argues that such a change is not entirely justifiable. We first provide a critical review of the pros and cons of executive stock
options. We then compare option-based contracts with stock-based contracts using a simple principal-agent model with moral-hazard. In a general environment without restrictions on preferences or technologies, option-based contracts are shown to weakly dominate stock-based contracts. The weak dominance relation becomes strict if the manager is risk neutral. Numerical examples are provided to show that, even if the manager is risk averse, strict dominance is more likely the case.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13760/1/MPRA_paper_13760.pdf
Choe, Chongwoo and Yin, Xiangkang (2006): Should executive stock options be abandoned? Published in: Australian Journal of Management , Vol. 31, No. 2 : pp. 163-179.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13792
2019-10-12T04:57:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D42:4232:423231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13792/
choice of remuneration regime in fisheries: the case of Hawaii’s longline fisheries
Nguyen, Quang
B21 - Microeconomics
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
C21 - Cross-Sectional Models ; Spatial Models ; Treatment Effect Models ; Quantile Regressions
One of the most prominent features of remuneration in the Hawaii’s longline fisheries industry has been the norm of share contract regimes. This paper investigates whether the use of share contract regime is positively correlated to increased economic returns. The principal-agent framework is applied to develop a theoretical model for the
remuneration choice. Empirical estimation is conducted using a switching regression model that accounts for certain vessel characteristics effects on revenue, depending on remuneration regime used (i.e., share contract or flat wage), as well as the potential selection bias in the vessels’ contractual choice. Key findings from counterfactual simulations indicate: (1) a negative selection into choosing share contracts, and (2) that
flat wage vessels would experience significantly higher revenues if they switch to share contracts. Thus, even though the labor market in Hawaii’s longline fisheries relies upon foreign crew members, the results suggest that it would benefit owners of flat wage vessels to apply share contracts to increase their revenues.
2009-03-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13792/1/MPRA_paper_13792.pdf
Nguyen, Quang (2009): choice of remuneration regime in fisheries: the case of Hawaii’s longline fisheries.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14149
2019-10-25T18:08:35Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14165
2013-02-11T14:29:43Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14167
2019-09-30T10:44:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14167/
Rewarding Carrots & Crippling Sticks: Eliciting Employee Preferences for the Optimal Incentive Mix in Europe
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
Theodossiou, Ioannis
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
M54 - Labor Management
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
A ranking of a variety of incentive devices used by firms according to their perceived effectiveness by employees is identified. The determinants of employee incentive preferences are also investigated, suggesting a ‘menu’ of conditions under which an organization’s personnel policies will have maximum motivational impact on its workforce. Based on the beliefs of a unique sample of workers from seven European countries, the results suggest that (a) the primary determinant of the level of employee effort is the amount of discretion offered at work; (b) pay incentives and ‘gift exchanges’ are the most important motivators; (c) the use of monitoring and Taylor-type assembly lines are the least effective incentives; and (d) the optimal design of incentive strategies by firms is strongly shaped by a host of contextual factors. The expressed desire for autonomy, and distaste for control, by employees gives credibility to the “participative” management approach.
2009-03-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14167/1/MPRA_paper_14167.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Theodossiou, Ioannis (2009): Rewarding Carrots & Crippling Sticks: Eliciting Employee Preferences for the Optimal Incentive Mix in Europe.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14243
2019-09-30T06:35:28Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14243/
Some are Punished and Some are Rewarded: A Study of the Impact of Performance Pay on Job Satisfaction
McCausland, David
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
Theodossiou, Ioannis
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Using an econometric procedure that corrects for both self-selection of individuals into their preferred compensation scheme and wage endogeneity, this study investigates whether significant differences exist in the job satisfaction of individuals receiving performance-related pay (PRP) compared to those on alternative compensation plans. Using data from four waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), it is found that PRP exerts a positive effect on the mean job satisfaction of (very) high-paid workers only. A potential explanation for this pattern could be that for lower-paid employees PRP is perceived to be controlling, whereas higher-paid workers derive a utility benefit from what they regard as supportive reward schemes. Using PRP as an incentive device in the UK could therefore be counterproductive in the long run for certain low-paid occupations.
2005-05-22
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14243/1/MPRA_paper_14243.pdf
McCausland, David and Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Theodossiou, Ioannis (2005): Some are Punished and Some are Rewarded: A Study of the Impact of Performance Pay on Job Satisfaction. Published in: International Journal of Manpower , Vol. 7, No. 26 (2005): pp. 636-659.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14244
2019-10-01T01:09:40Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14244/
Confronting Objections to Performance Pay: A Study of the Impact of Individual and Gain-sharing Incentives on the Job Satisfaction of British Employees
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
Theodossiou, Ioannis
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
The increasing use of incentive pay schemes in recent years has raised concerns about their potential detrimental effect on intrinsic job satisfaction (JS), job security and employee morale. This study explores the impact of pay incentives on the overall job satisfaction of workers in the UK and their satisfaction with various facets of jobs. Using data from eight waves (1998-2005) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and a uniquely-designed well-being dataset (EPICURUS), a significant positive impact on job satisfaction is only found for those receiving fixed-period bonuses. These conclusions are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, and are shown to depend on a number of job-quality characteristics that have not been controlled for in previous studies.
2009-03-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14244/1/MPRA_paper_14244.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Theodossiou, Ioannis (2009): Confronting Objections to Performance Pay: A Study of the Impact of Individual and Gain-sharing Incentives on the Job Satisfaction of British Employees. Forthcoming in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy (2009)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15061
2019-10-02T04:48:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15061/
Micro-level Rigidity vs. Macro-level Flexibility: Lessons from Finland
Böckerman, Petri
Laaksonen, Seppo
Vainiomäki, Jari
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J30 - General
This paper explores the wage flexibility in Finland. The study covers the private sector workers by using three data sets from the payroll records of employers’ associations. The data span the period 1985-2001. The results reveal that there has been macroeconomic flexibility in the labour market. Average real wages declined during the early 1990’s depression and a large proportion of workers experienced real wage cuts. However, the evidence based on individual-level wage change distributions shows that especially real wages are rigid. In particular, individual-level wage changes have regained the high levels of real rigidity during the late 1990s that prevailed in the 1980s, despite the continued high (but declining) level of unemployment.
2009-05-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15061/1/MPRA_paper_15061.pdf
Böckerman, Petri and Laaksonen, Seppo and Vainiomäki, Jari (2009): Micro-level Rigidity vs. Macro-level Flexibility: Lessons from Finland.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15847
2019-10-01T04:05:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15847/
High Wages - An instrument inducing workers to work more?
Honekamp, Ivonne
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Wages and their effect on labour supply are not only an important subject for labour economists who aim at measuring substitution and income effects. Additionally, the government is interested in the impact of policy changes on the labour market and companies would like to know if it is possible to increase labour supply and especially productivity by increasing the wage rate. This paper introduces a dynamic version of the traditional model of labour supply and presents model extensions and the underlying behavioural assumptions arising from empirical findings, psychology and neuroscience. It evaluates findings and behavioural assumptions derived so far.
None of the contributions investigated in this work is entirely free from criticism. The problem of analysing a comprehensive model of labour supply on the one hand, is the scarcity of suitable subjects to investigate and on the other hand, the individuality of each subject observed. With this work a critical analysis of existing research on labour supply decisions is provided. This shall contribute to motivate and ease future research in this area which has to take these problems into account.
2007-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15847/1/MPRA_paper_15847.pdf
Honekamp, Ivonne (2007): High Wages - An instrument inducing workers to work more?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17604
2019-09-27T14:28:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483231
7375626A656374733D48:4832
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17604/
Trends in High Incomes and Behavioral Responses to Taxation: Evidence from Executive Compensation and Statistics of Income Data
Nada, Eissa
Giertz, Seth
H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation
H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper examines income trends from 1992 to 2004 and the responsiveness of different income measures to tax changes for corporate executives and for the very highest income U.S. taxpayers. We detail the growth in executive compensation and break down the components of that growth by sources, such as the value of options and stock grants, as well as bonus income. We then examine income trends at various points in the income distribution for executives and for all taxpayers. An empirical strategy similar to that employed by Goolsbee (2000) is then used to examine the responsiveness to tax rates of broad measures as well as individual sources of executive compensation. Additionally, we investigate the impact of marginal tax rates applying to corporate income, personal income, and capital gains on the composition of executive compensation.
Consistent with other studies, we find that most of the growth and volatility in incomes has been concentrated within the top one percent of taxpayers, for whom income grew sharply between 1992 and 2000, and then declined sharply from 2000 to 2002. Below the top one percent, income patterns are much more stable. Income patterns for executives are similar to, but more volatile than, those for the very highest income taxpayers. Salary income of executives has been relatively stable, while the value of their stock options, stock grants, and bonuses has grown tremendously.
We use data from two sources: a panel of executives and IRS tax returns from the Statistics of Income. Our elasticity estimates based on the panel of executives may be more reliable than those based on the tax panel because the regressions include firm-specific information that helps to explain changes in income. For executives, our permanent earned income elasticity estimate for the early 1990s is 0.19 (with substantial transitory shifting of income into the year prior to the 1993 tax increase). There is also evidence of substantial transitory income shifting around the time of the 2001 Economic Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA), but the overall estimated elasticity is negative. The results are not definitive, however. Our results are sensitive to many factors, such as the time-period examined, the data set used, and the econometric specification. That inconsistency reflects the complexities inherent in estimating high-income behavioral responses to taxation. The fact that the elasticity estimates differ greatly across time-periods and across the two datasets suggests that non-tax factors are extremely important. That observation is consistent with several other papers (Slemrod 1996, Saez 2004, Kopczuk 2005, Giertz 2006) that all show a great deal of sensitivity surrounding taxable income elasticity estimates.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17604/1/MPRA_paper_17604.pdf
Nada, Eissa and Giertz, Seth (2006): Trends in High Incomes and Behavioral Responses to Taxation: Evidence from Executive Compensation and Statistics of Income Data.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18238
2019-09-27T13:06:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18238/
Performance Pay as an Incentive for Lower Absence Rates in Britain
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
C21 - Cross-Sectional Models ; Spatial Models ; Treatment Effect Models ; Quantile Regressions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Using two cross-sections of a representative dataset of British establishments, the effect of various forms of incentive pay (e.g. performance-related pay (PRP), profit-sharing, share ownership, cash bonuses) on the absence rates of firms is investigated. Incentives that are tightly linked to individual or group merit are found to be significantly related to lower absenteeism. Important disparities in the effect of PRP on absenteeism are detected, which depend on the extent of monitoring, private-public status, teamwork, and other organizational changes. The findings are robust to the potential endogenous relation between monitoring, PRP and absenteeism, and have important implications for the design of optimal compensation policies by firms.
2009-10-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18238/1/MPRA_paper_18238.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos (2009): Performance Pay as an Incentive for Lower Absence Rates in Britain.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18820
2019-09-29T09:28:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18820/
Variety of Performance Pay and Firm Performance: Effect of Financial Incentives on Worker Absence and Productivity
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
C21 - Cross-Sectional Models ; Spatial Models ; Treatment Effect Models ; Quantile Regressions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Using two cross-sections of a representative dataset of British establishments, the effect of various forms of performance-related pay (objective/subjective, individual/group/collective) on the absence rates and productivity of firms is investigated. Incentives that are tied to the subjective evaluation of individual merit are found to be significantly related to lower absenteeism, but have no effect on labour productivity. In contrast, PRP that is objectively conditioned on outputs has a beneficial effect on workers’ productivity, albeit with no effect on absence rates. The findings therefore suggest that firms are likely to use objective and subjective PRP schemes in tandem in order to counteract any possible dysfunctional responses on behalf of their workforce (e.g. intertemporal allocation of effort). It is also found that public sector firms and those which have interdependent production should be wary of using PRP as an absence control tool.
2009-11-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18820/4/MPRA_paper_18820.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos (2009): Variety of Performance Pay and Firm Performance: Effect of Financial Incentives on Worker Absence and Productivity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19241
2019-09-26T23:37:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19241/
Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-listing? Evidence from China
Chi, Wei
Zhang, Haiyan
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to Hong Kong firms, cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further, this study shows that it is necessary to differentiate between state-owned companies and private companies, as cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state-owned companies than it does in private companies.
2008-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19241/1/MPRA_paper_19241.pdf
Chi, Wei and Zhang, Haiyan (2008): Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-listing? Evidence from China.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19304
2019-09-28T04:52:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19304/
Confronting Objections to Performance Pay: A Study of the Impact of Individual and Gain-sharing Incentives on the Job Satisfaction of British Employees
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
Theodossiou, Ioannis
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
The increasing use of incentive pay schemes in recent years has raised concerns about their potential detrimental effect on intrinsic job satisfaction (JS), job security and employee morale. This study explores the impact of pay incentives on the overall job satisfaction of workers in the UK and their satisfaction with various facets of jobs. Using data from eight waves (1998-2005) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and a uniquely-designed well-being dataset (EPICURUS), a significant positive impact on job satisfaction is only found for those receiving fixed-period bonuses. These conclusions are robust to unobserved heterogeneity, and are shown to depend on a number of job-quality characteristics that have not been controlled for in previous studies.
2009-03-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19304/1/MPRA_paper_19304.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Theodossiou, Ioannis (2009): Confronting Objections to Performance Pay: A Study of the Impact of Individual and Gain-sharing Incentives on the Job Satisfaction of British Employees. Published in: Scottish Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 56, No. 5 (2009): pp. 662-684.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20155
2019-09-26T11:04:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20155/
Pay enough, don’t pay too much or don’t pay at all? The impact of bonus intensity on job satisfaction
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
M54 - Labor Management
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Using ten waves (1998-2007) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), this paper investigates the ceteris paribus association between the intensity of incentive pay, the dynamic change in bonus status and the utility derived from work. After controlling for individual heterogeneity biases, it is shown that job utility rises only in response to ‘generous’ bonus payments, primarily in skilled, non-unionized, private sector jobs. Revoking a bonus from one year to the next is found to have a detrimental impact on employee utility, while job satisfaction tends to diminish over time as employees potentially adapt to bonuses. The findings are therefore consistent with previous experimental evidence, suggesting that employers wishing to motivate their staff should indeed “pay enough or don’t pay at all”.
2008-08-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20155/2/MPRA_paper_20155.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos (2008): Pay enough, don’t pay too much or don’t pay at all? The impact of bonus intensity on job satisfaction.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20218
2019-09-27T00:21:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3435
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3434
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38:4A3838
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7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20218/
Job Satisfaction for Employees: Evidence from Karachi Electric Supply Corporation
Frukh, Nousjheen
Herani, Gobind M.
Mohammad, Mahmud
Mohammad, Tariq
J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
J44 - Professional Labor Markets ; Occupational Licensing
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
J88 - Public Policy
J83 - Workers' Rights
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J30 - General
Research has been conducted in order to critically evaluate and examine the level of employees’ satisfaction as well as the factors of dissatisfaction among the employees of Karachi Electric supply Corporation (KESC). The purpose of this study is also to observe and analyze the factors which create job dissatisfaction especially among the hardworking managers, and to find out the reasons which make them realize that they don not have a clear career path along working with KESC. The primary data for this study was compiled through questionnaire filled in on a one-to-one basis by 60 respondents from a representative sample of employees of (KESC) in Karachi district in the last quarter of 2008. The results have shown that Working Environment, Total Compensation, Growth Opportunities and Training & Development are significant factor and these four are affecting Job Satisfaction and correlated with each others. The study was faced by certain limitations and those limitations included time constraints and resources constraints, which limited this research to only the Karachi Head office of the KESC organization. According to a number of literatures studied, lack of job satisfaction is a serious issue in various organizations and job dissatisfaction has become a major obstacle in employees’ productivity and company’s growth. There are numbers of factors which can create job dissatisfaction among employees but in this study the very critical factors are discussed upon which KESC management should really work on.
2009-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20218/1/MPRA_paper_20218.pdf
Frukh, Nousjheen and Herani, Gobind M. and Mohammad, Mahmud and Mohammad, Tariq (2009): Job Satisfaction for Employees: Evidence from Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. Published in: KASBIT Business Journal , Vol. 2, No. 1 (31 December 2009): pp. 95-104.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20999
2019-09-27T08:55:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
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74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20999/
Die Arbeitslosenversicherung in Deutschland – Beitrag zur Bekämpfung oder Ursache von Arbeitslosigkeit
Breiding, Torsten
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
J38 - Public Policy
J65 - Unemployment Insurance ; Severance Pay ; Plant Closings
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
J30 - General
J11 - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
J08 - Labor Economics Policies
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity
J00 - General
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
J68 - Public Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J0 - General
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
C13 - Estimation: General
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
C01 - Econometrics
D33 - Factor Income Distribution
E01 - Measurement and Data on National Income and Product Accounts and Wealth ; Environmental Accounts
E27 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
H31 - Household
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
J01 - Labor Economics: General
I21 - Analysis of Education
C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Abstract German (English abstract is added below)
Arbeitslosigkeit gilt als eines der schwerwiegendsten gesellschaftlichen Probleme unserer Zeit. Doch welche Gründe liegen, trotz der über die Jahre eingeleiteten Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit, für die anhaltende Beschäftigungskrise vor? Und in welchem Umfang hat das deutsche Sozial- und Wohlfahrtssystem zu der anhaltenden Misere beigetragen?
Insbesondere der Arbeitslosenversicherung wird vorgeworfen, einer der Hauptverursacher der Probleme auf dem Arbeitsmarkt zu sein. Um Deutschland wettbewerbsfähig zu halten, versuchen die politischen Gruppierungen durch Reformen das Land im globalen Umfeld zu positionieren und so optimale Lebens- wie Investitionsbedingungen zu schaffen. Doch wie effizient sind diese Reformen und wie wirken sie auf den Arbeitsmarkt? Welche Rolle spielen dabei die Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung und wie wirken sich diese aus?
Dass eine Arbeitslosenversicherung in einem Wirtschaftssystem wünschenswert und auch notwendig ist, lässt sich mit dem Argument der sozialen Sicherheit begründen. Allerdings muss die Aufgabe einer Arbeitslosenversicherung die soziale Absicherung im Falle einer möglichen, temporären Arbeitslosigkeit sein. Der Betroffene ist für die Dauer der Suche nach einer neuen Arbeit, die bestmöglich der Qualifikation des Einzelnen entspricht, finanziell abgesichert. Ein Absinken unter die Armutsgrenze wird verhindert. Die Steuerung des Arbeitsangebotsverhaltens des Einzelnen ist jedoch ein Nebeneffekt der Arbeitslosenversicherung, den es zu untersuchen gilt. Das die Arbeitslosenversicherung Einfluss auf das Arbeitsangebotsverhalten der Arbeitnehmer hat und welche weiteren Effekte aus der im Sozialsystem eingebetteten Arbeitslosenversicherung entstehen, soll diese Arbeit zeigen.
Zur Strukturierung der genannten Fragen nimmt diese Arbeit eine Dreiteilung vor. Analysen der wirtschaftlichen Situation Deutschlands und die Identifikation von Problemgruppen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt sollen die Wirkungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung kausal darstellen. Konjunkturbedingte Veränderungen von Arbeitslosenzahlen sollen weitestgehend als exogene Größe betrachtet werden und nicht in die Bewertung der Arbeitslosenversicherung einfließen. Durch die Parallelität der Ereignisse lassen sich die tatsächlichen Auswirkungen arbeitsmarktpolitischer Maßnahmen jedoch oft schwer selektieren. Um Effekte zuordnen zu können, wird ein historischer Abriss der Entwicklung des Systems der Arbeitslosenversicherung gegeben. Ein internationaler Vergleich dient der Standortbestimmung des deutschen Systems.
Der zweite Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit den Einflüssen der Arbeitslosenversicherung in verschiedenen Modellansätzen. Durch die Betrachtung der prognostizierten Effekte wird ein Abgleich der Theorie mit der Praxis erfolgen. Sowohl die Anreizwirkungen auf individueller Ebene im Arbeitsangebots- und Suchverhalten werden modelltheoretisch aufgezeigt, als auch der Einfluss auf das Kalkül im optimalen Verhalten von Gruppen und Kollektiven. Der Abgleich der Modelle mit der Empirie zeigt verschiedene Anreizverzerrungen der Arbeitslosenversicherung. Auffallend ist, dass insbesondere die Bezugsdauer der Unterstützung Einfluss auf den Zugang in, den Abgang aus und die daraus resultierende Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit hat. Die vom Alt-Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder einstmals angestoßene Diskussion um die Mitnahme-Mentalität der Deutschen findet im Sozialsystem Argumente und Fundierung.
Die Implikationen der Hartz-Reformen sind vielfältig. Die positiven Aspekte werden im dritten Teil aufgezeigt und mögliche Verbesserungen vorgeschlagen. Trotz der Forderung nach mehr Eigenverantwortung der Transfer-Bezieher und weitreichenden Änderungen zur Verschlankung des administrativen Aufwandes ist der Erfolg des Hartz-Konzeptes zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt noch nicht bewertbar. Besonders kritisch sind die Lohnabstände bei Geringverdienern, wodurch zielgerichtete Nachbesserungen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit notwendig scheinen. Dazu werden Vorschläge zu Reformen der Arbeitslosenversicherung diskutiert. Ziel der Reformen sollte eine zeitgemäße Anpassung der Arbeitslosenversicherung an gesamtwirtschaftliche Entwicklungen sein.
This work analyzes the effects of the German unemployment insurance system on the unemployment rate and the individual job-seeking behavior. The duration of the unemployment benefits affects the time spend in unemployment. Another effect is the span between available jobs and the level of the payments. At the same time, a longer duration of unemployment benefits protects the individual of social catastrophies and provied the job seeker with adequate time to find the job that fits best. The GDP can be higher in a society with social security systems compared to other economies by providing each individual the perfect job. Finally, each individual has a higher productivity by a better usage of skills.
facts:
- the history of the German unemployment system
- the effects of the economical cycle on the unemployment rate
- a comparison of the German unemployment system compared to other countries
- the effects of the span between the high level of unemployment benefit payments compared to the wage earned in available jobs
- labour supply and matching
- a theoretical approach to analyze the effects of the German unemployment insurance
- the reality in Germany compared to the theory
- an evaluation of the German system
- reform proposition
2006-09-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20999/1/MPRA_paper_20999.pdf
Breiding, Torsten (2006): Die Arbeitslosenversicherung in Deutschland – Beitrag zur Bekämpfung oder Ursache von Arbeitslosigkeit.
de
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:21322
2019-10-06T04:31:48Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21322/
Fairness and Desert in Tournaments
Gill, David
Stone, Rebecca
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
We model the behavior of agents who care about receiving what they feel they deserve in a two-player rank-order tournament. Perceived entitlements are sensitive to how hard an agent has worked relative to her rival, and agents are loss averse around their meritocratically determined endogenous reference points. In a fair tournament sufficiently large desert concerns drive identical agents to push their effort levels apart in order to end up closer to their reference points on average. In an unfair tournament, where one agent is advantaged, the equilibrium is symmetric in the absence of desert, but asymmetric in the presence of desert. We find that desert concerns can undermine the standard conclusion that competition for a fixed supply of status is socially wasteful and explain why, when the distribution of output noise is fat-tailed, an employer might use a rank-order incentive scheme.
2010-01-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21322/1/MPRA_paper_21322.pdf
Gill, David and Stone, Rebecca (2010): Fairness and Desert in Tournaments. Forthcoming in: Games and Economic Behavior
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22946
2019-10-05T05:16:59Z
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7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22946/
Study on Agrarian Contracts in Bulgaria
Bachev, Hrabrin
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
J54 - Producer Cooperatives ; Labor Managed Firms ; Employee Ownership
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
M31 - Marketing
D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness
L23 - Organization of Production
Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure ; Land Reform ; Land Use ; Irrigation ; Agriculture and Environment
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
K12 - Contract Law
Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
J43 - Agricultural Labor Markets
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts and investigates the contractual structure in transitional Bulgarian agriculture. Firstly, it incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and describes major mechanisms of governance of agrarian activity – institutional environment, market competition, private, collective and public order; and defines features of agrarian sale-purchase, lease, employment, service, loan, insurance and coalition contracts; and identifies technological, institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and transaction costs factors for contractual choice and specifies effective modes for contractual arrangements in agriculture; and determines the effective boundaries and sustainability of farm and agrarian organizations. Secondly, it analyzes the post-communist institutional and organizational modernization of Bulgarian agriculture, and assesses the efficiency of various modes for governing of land supply, and labor supply, and service supply, and inputs supply, and finance supply, and insurance supply, and marketing of output in different type of farms.
2010-05-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22946/1/MPRA_paper_22946.pdf
Bachev, Hrabrin (2010): Study on Agrarian Contracts in Bulgaria.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24668
2019-09-27T21:17:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483235
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3236
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24668/
What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
Cole, Rebel
Mehran, Hamid
H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
L26 - Entrepreneurship
M13 - New Firms ; Startups
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This study examines executive compensation using data from two nationally representative samples of privately held U.S. corporations conducted ten years apart—in 1993 and 2003—and uses these data to test a number of hypotheses. We find that: (i) the level of executive pay at privately held firms is higher at larger firms and varies widely by industry, consistent with stylized facts about executive pay at public companies; (ii) inflation-adjusted executive pay has fallen at privately held companies, in contrast with the widely documented run-up in executive pay at large public companies; (iii) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has almost exclusively focused; (iv) executive pay is higher at more complex organizations; (v) organizational form affects taxation, which, in turn, affects executive pay, with executives at C-corporations being paid significantly more than executives at S-corporations; (vi) executive pay is inversely related to CEO ownership; (vii) executive pay is inversely related to financial risk; and (viii) executive pay is related to a number of CEO characteristics, including age, education and gender: executive pay has a quadratic relation with CEO age, a positive relation with educational, and is significantly lower for female executives.
2010-02-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24668/1/MPRA_paper_24668.pdf
Cole, Rebel and Mehran, Hamid (2010): What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:27191
2019-09-28T04:30:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3539
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3530
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27191/
Analysis of employment protection legislation: a model with endogenous labour productivity
Lisi, Domenico
L59 - Other
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J50 - General
This paper analyzes the effects of the different Employment Protection Legislation on the workers choices on effort. The different EPL are modelled through an easy theoretical pattern, characterized by endogenous labour productivity. In particular, it is analyzed how the labour productivity is influenced by the incentives that the different EPL give workers. The model outcomes highlight that the recent reforms produce only a positive temporary effect on the unemployment level, as emphasized by the empirical evidence. Finally, this paper analyzes a new contractual regime in order to see if it could offer in theory a better solution in term of structural employment respect to known standard regimes.
2008-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27191/1/MPRA_paper_27191.pdf
Lisi, Domenico (2008): Analysis of employment protection legislation: a model with endogenous labour productivity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28711
2019-10-03T18:22:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3530
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28711/
Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
Böckerman, Petri
Bryson, Alex
Ilmakunnas, Pekka
M53 - Training
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M54 - Labor Management
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M50 - General
Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more likely to enter HIM jobs. The wage premium falls substantially having accounted for employees’ work histories suggesting that existing studies’ estimates are upwardly biased due to positive selection into HIM. Results do not differ significantly when using propensity score matching as opposed to standard regression techniques. The premium rises with the number of HIM practices and differs markedly across different types of HIM practice.
2011-02-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28711/1/MPRA_paper_28711.pdf
Böckerman, Petri and Bryson, Alex and Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2011): Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28712
2019-09-27T16:33:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4E:4E33:4E3334
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28712/
Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation
Rei, Claudia
N34 - Europe: 1913-
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
The different organizational structure of the Portuguese and Dutch merchant empires affected their ability to monitor workers. I test the theoretical implications of these differences using micro data of overseas workers' compensation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The two merchant empires used significantly different compensation structures: working for the king of Portugal corresponded to a higher bonus share of compensation on average than that of the Dutch East India Company. These results are consistent with theoretical implications and provide additional support to the historical evidence we have on the organizational structure of merchant empires.
2011-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28712/1/MPRA_paper_28712.pdf
Rei, Claudia (2011): Incentives in Merchant Empires: Portuguese and Dutch Labor Compensation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28823
2019-09-26T23:33:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28823/
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality
Ohlendorf, Susanne
Schmitz, Patrick W.
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first-period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified."
2011-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28823/1/MPRA_paper_28823.pdf
Ohlendorf, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011): Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:29183
2019-09-28T01:29:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483235
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3236
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29183/
What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
Cole, Rebel
Mehran, Hamid
H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
L26 - Entrepreneurship
M13 - New Firms ; Startups
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This study examines executive compensation using data from two nationally representative samples of privately held U.S. corporations conducted ten years apart—in 1993 and 2003—and uses these data to test a number of hypotheses. We find that: (i) the level of executive pay at privately held firms is higher at larger firms and varies widely by industry, consistent with stylized facts about executive pay at public companies; (ii) inflation-adjusted executive pay has fallen at privately held companies, in contrast with the widely documented run-up in executive pay at large public companies; (iii) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has almost exclusively focused; (iv) executive pay is higher at more complex organizations; (v) organizational form affects taxation, which, in turn, affects executive pay, with executives at C-corporations being paid significantly more than executives at S-corporations; (vi) executive pay is inversely related to CEO ownership; (vii) executive pay is inversely related to financial risk; and (viii) executive pay is related to a number of CEO characteristics, including age, education and gender: executive pay has a quadratic relation with CEO age, a positive relation with educational, and is significantly lower for female executives.
2010-02-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29183/2/MPRA_paper_29183.pdf
Cole, Rebel and Mehran, Hamid (2010): What can we learn from privately held firms about executive compensation?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:29403
2019-10-06T13:28:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493132
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3338
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443132
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29403/
Performance Pay and Information: Reducing Child Malnutrition in Urban Slums
Singh, Prakarsh
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
I12 - Health Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
L38 - Public Policy
D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper provides evidence for the effectiveness of performance pay to government workers and how performance pay interacts with demand-side information. In an experiment covering 145 child day-care centres, I implement three separate treatments. First, I engineer an exogenous change in compensation for childcare workers from fixed wages to performance pay. Second, I only provide mothers with information without incentivizing the workers. Third, I combine the first two treatments. This helps us identify if performance pay and public information are complements or substitutes in reducing child malnutrition. I find that combining incentives to workers and information to mothers reduces weight-for-age malnutrition by 4.2% in 3 months, although individually the effects are negligible. This complementarity is shown to be driven by better mother-worker communication and the mother feeding more calorific food at home. There is also a sustained long-run positive impact of the combined treatment after the experiment concluded.
2011-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29403/1/MPRA_paper_29403.pdf
Singh, Prakarsh (2011): Performance Pay and Information: Reducing Child Malnutrition in Urban Slums.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:30164
2019-09-30T17:50:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3031
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30164/
Comment on: "Centralized Bargaining and Reorganized Work: Are they Compatible?"
Ludsteck, Johannes
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
J01 - Labor Economics: General
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Assar Lindbeck and Denis Snower investigate the effects of multitasking and teamwork on the viability of centralised bargaining. They emphasize that workers likely have private
information concerning their task mix when multitasking plays a significant role in the production process. They try to show in a formal model that only a complex remuneration scheme provides incentives
for workers to choose an optimal task mix and suggest that
centralized wage setting cannot tackle this complexity.
We show that their remuneraton scheme is either not necessary to solve the considered information problem or not implementable.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30164/1/MPRA_paper_30164.pdf
Ludsteck, Johannes (2003): Comment on: "Centralized Bargaining and Reorganized Work: Are they Compatible?".
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:32071
2019-09-29T12:00:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32071/
Disinvestment, lending relationships and executive compensation: Evidence from the Indian experience
Ghosh, Saibal
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
The analysis employs data on federal Government-owned public enterprises (PSEs) since the 1980s that encompasses the partial privatization program to examine the likelihood of privatization. The results indicate that employment-intensive, high-paying but less profitable firms are more likely to be privatized. In terms of lending relationships, the analysis indicates that private banks are the main bank for small firms and foreign banks are the main bank for large, established firms. State-owned banks are more likely to be associated with leveraged PSEs as compared to other bank groups. In terms of compensation policies in PSEs, the evidence testifies that bigger, established and leveraged PSE firms pay higher salaries.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32071/1/MPRA_paper_32071.pdf
Ghosh, Saibal (2010): Disinvestment, lending relationships and executive compensation: Evidence from the Indian experience. Published in: Global Business Review , Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2011): pp. 213-235.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33785
2019-10-07T12:11:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463136
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3433
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433635
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513137
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463132
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33785/
Special Economic Zones and Agriculture with Increasing Returns
Mukherjee, Soumyatanu
F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
J43 - Agricultural Labor Markets
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
C65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies ; Fragmentation
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper has made an attempt to show that in a developing economy, agriculture and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) can go simultaneously without affecting one another if appropriate subsidy policy is designed by the government. We have considered increasing returns brought about by external economies of scale in the SEZ-led industrial sector with the help of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type of production function where resource used to produce each variety of the SEZ-good is itself produced using constant returns to scale (CRS) technology and CRS is also present in the agricultural sector.
2011-09-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33785/2/MPRA_paper_33785.pdf
Mukherjee, Soumyatanu (2011): Special Economic Zones and Agriculture with Increasing Returns.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35550
2019-09-30T18:19:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35550/
Commitment and optimal incentive
Liu, Taoxiong
Zhou, Bihua
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
We propose an extended principal-agent model considering employee commitment and describe how to motivate committed agent, who not only shows regard for his own income but also cares the organizational benefit. The principal also would like to provide support to such an agent and his utility depends on both the final profit and the payoff to the agent. There are some interesting insights into the characteristic of optimal contracts: First, commitment is an effective motivator and committed employee needs less monetary inducement to perform his job well than one who not. More specifically, undifferentiated pay is sufficient in incentivizing committed agent to implement high effort in some cases. Second, commitment and wage differential are substitutable to each other in the optimal incentive compensation design. Third, commitment is not always good for organizational efficiency when the increase in employee commitment relies on the principal’s support. Our model's finding is consistent with employee incentive in some organizations, and also help to incentive mechanism design under wages differential constraints and understanding excessive compensation.
2011-12-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35550/2/MPRA_paper_35550.pdf
Liu, Taoxiong and Zhou, Bihua (2011): Commitment and optimal incentive.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35979
2019-09-26T13:23:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35979/
The Masquerade Ball of the CEOs and the Mask of Excessive Risk
Citci, Haluk
Inci, Eren
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
We analyze the effects of CEOs' layoff risk on their risk choice while overseeing a firm. A CEO, whose managerial ability is unknown, is fired if her expected ability is below average. Her risk choice changes the informativeness of output and market's belief about her ability. She can decrease her layoff risk by taking excessive risk and trade off current compensation for layoff risk. The firm may voluntarily or involuntarily allow excessive risk taking even under optimal linear compensation contracts. Above-average CEOs always keep their jobs, but among below-average CEOs, a higher-ability one is more likely to be fired.
2012
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35979/1/MPRA_paper_35979.pdf
Citci, Haluk and Inci, Eren (2012): The Masquerade Ball of the CEOs and the Mask of Excessive Risk.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:36650
2019-09-27T05:32:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36650/
Are CEO's paid their marginal product? An empirical analysis of executive compensation and corporate performance.
Klinedinst, Mark
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
J30 - General
The theory and reality of chief executive compensation is explored in this paper. The study here uses a panel of data on 143 executives from America’s largest corporations. The results suggest that earlier theoretical expectations and empirical findings of compressed wage scales may not hold when top-level managers are included.
1991-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36650/1/MPRA_paper_36650.pdf
Klinedinst, Mark (1991): Are CEO's paid their marginal product? An empirical analysis of executive compensation and corporate performance. Published in: Australian Bulletin of Labor , Vol. 17, No. No. 2 (June 1991): pp. 118-131.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:36864
2019-09-29T05:07:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36864/
Desert and inequity aversion in teams
David, Gill
Rebecca, Stone
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which effort choices affect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share team output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation.
2012-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36864/1/MPRA_paper_36864.pdf
David, Gill and Rebecca, Stone (2012): Desert and inequity aversion in teams.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:37839
2019-09-30T01:22:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443733
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3431
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37839/
Steal If You Need. Capitulation Wages with Endogenous Monitoring
Wadho, Waqar Ahmed
D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption
J41 - Labor Contracts
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
The importance of high salaries to circumvent bureaucratic corruption has been widely recognized in the policy debate. Yet, there appears to be much reluctance when it comes to the implementation. In this paper, we argue that deterring corruption through wage incentives may become prohibitively expensive that the government finds it optimal to accept higher net revenues at the expense of honesty. Deviating from the existing literature, where monitoring is exogenous, which curtails government's anti-corruption policy options; we set an endogenous monitoring technology that allows us to capture the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives to deter bribery. Furthermore, besides the efficiency wage and the outside option, the government could pay a wage below the outside option, which attracts only dishonest agents to public office - capitulation wage. We find that when it is costly to monitor tax inspectors, the government is better-off offering capitulation wages and accepting corruption. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through efficiency wages or monitoring. The role of efficiency wages decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty.
2009-10-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37839/1/MPRA_paper_37839.pdf
Wadho, Waqar Ahmed (2009): Steal If You Need. Capitulation Wages with Endogenous Monitoring.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38220
2019-10-01T16:42:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38220/
Gender differences and dynamics in competition: the role of luck
Gill, David
Prowse, Victoria
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
In a real effort experiment with repeated competition we find striking
differences in how the work effort of men and women responds to previous wins
and losses. For women losing per se is detrimental to productivity, but for
men a loss impacts negatively on productivity only when the prize at stake is
big enough. Responses to luck are more persistent and explain more of the
variation in behavior for women, and account for about half of the gender
performance gap in our experiment. Our findings shed new light on why women
may be less inclined to pursue competition-intensive careers.
2012-01-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38220/1/MPRA_paper_38220.pdf
Gill, David and Prowse, Victoria (2012): Gender differences and dynamics in competition: the role of luck.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38257
2019-10-02T04:51:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443633
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38257/
Desert and inequity aversion in teams
Gill, David
Stone, Rebecca
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members find it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which effort choices affect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of effort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share team output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation.
2012-04-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38257/1/MPRA_paper_38257.pdf
Gill, David and Stone, Rebecca (2012): Desert and inequity aversion in teams.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:39788
2019-10-01T04:45:11Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3334
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39788/
Backdating, tax evasion, and the unintended consequences of Canadian tax reform
Compton, Ryan
Sandler, Daniel
Tedds, Lindsay M.
K34 - Tax Law
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
In 1984 and 2000, significant changes were made to the tax treatment of employee stock options in Canada. Although designed to increase the use of stock options as a compensation vehicle (1984) and decease the loss of knowledge workers (2000), we argue that these tax changes were largely ineffective and perhaps unneeded. Further we demonstrate the negative unintended consequences of these actions, specifically that they reward the backdating of employee stock options and promote tax evasion, and discuss the policy implications of these unintended consequences.
2010
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39788/1/MPRA_paper_39788.pdf
Compton, Ryan and Sandler, Daniel and Tedds, Lindsay M. (2010): Backdating, tax evasion, and the unintended consequences of Canadian tax reform. Published in: Tax Notes International , Vol. 59, No. 9 (2010): p. 671.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:39789
2019-11-12T14:45:55Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3334
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483236
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39789/
Quantifying the Personal Income Tax Benefits of Backdating: A Canada - US Comparison
Compton, Ryan
Nicholls, Christopher C.
Sandler, Daniel
Tedds, Lindsay
J38 - Public Policy
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
K34 - Tax Law
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
This paper examines the pre- and post-tax returns to Canadian and US executives who receive backdated stock options (that appear to be at-the-money options) compared to currently-dated in-the-money options. We begin by comparing the Black-Scholes value of backdated at-the-money options to currently-dated in-the-money options (with the same strike price as the back-dated options). We then contrast the pre- and post-tax returns of such options on the assumption that the options are eventually exercised at a time when the options are in-the-money and the shares sold (either immediately or later) at a profit. We demonstrate that a Canadian executive can earn a significantly larger after-tax return from backdated options compared to a US executive due to the favourable Canadian tax treatment of executive options relative to their treatment in the United States. The comparison suggests that the personal tax regime may have had an impact on the desire to receive backdated options in lieu of other forms of compensation in Canada but not so in the United States.
2011
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39789/1/MPRA_paper_39781.pdf
Compton, Ryan and Nicholls, Christopher C. and Sandler, Daniel and Tedds, Lindsay (2011): Quantifying the Personal Income Tax Benefits of Backdating: A Canada - US Comparison. Published in: Columbia Journal of Tax Law , Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010): p. 145.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:39791
2019-09-28T03:31:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39791/
Insider reporting obligations and options backdating
Compton, Ryan
Sandler, Daniel
NIcholls, Christopher
Tedds, Lindsay M.
G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
J38 - Public Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
In April 2010, new rules governing the reporting of securities trades by insiders of reporting issuers came into effect in Canada. These new rules were embodied in National Instrument 55-104, and in contemporaneous harmonized changes to Ontario’s Securities Act. Under the new regime, the deadline for filing insider reports has been shortened, from ten calendar days to five calendar days following a purchase or sale. When a draft of National Instrument 55-104 was first published for comment, the Canadian Securities Administrators linked this proposed timing change, among other things, to the practice of improper stock options backdating. The suggestion that insider reporting obligations might deter the practice of options backdating is intriguing. Insider reporting rules have historically been regarded primarily as a regulatory tool to detect or prevent the improper use of inside information by insiders of reporting issuers. For these requirements to perform an effective secondary role in combating improper options backdating, clear rules on the timing of reporting obligations and rigorous enforcement would be required. It is not clear that the administration and enforcement of current Canadian insider reporting rules, crafted with very different objectives in mind, provide an effective deterrent to improper options backdating. A review of the current rules and the mechanisms for their enforcement, together with a comparison with insider reporting regimes in other selected jurisdictions, reveals weaknesses in the Canadian approach and suggests ways in which the Canadian regime could be enhanced to deter or detect options backdating.
2011
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39791/1/MPRA_paper_39791.pdf
Compton, Ryan and Sandler, Daniel and NIcholls, Christopher and Tedds, Lindsay M. (2011): Insider reporting obligations and options backdating. Published in: Banking and Finance Law Review , Vol. 25, No. 3 (2011)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:43892
2019-09-30T09:44:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43892/
Teacher Behavior under Performance Pay Incentives
Jones, Michael D.
I21 - Analysis of Education
I28 - Government Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Over the last decade many districts have implemented performance pay incentives to reward teachers for improving student test scores. Economic theory suggests that these programs could alter teacher work effort, cooperation, and retention. Because teachers can choose to work in a performance pay district that has characteristics correlated with teacher behavior, I use the distance between a teacher’s undergraduate institution and the nearest performance pay district as an instrumental variable. Using data from the 2003 and 2007 waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), I find that teachers respond to performance pay incentives by working fewer hours per week at school. Performance pay also decreases participation in unpaid cooperative school activities, while there is suggestive evidence that teacher turnover decreases. The treatment effects are heterogeneous; male teachers respond more positively to performance pay than female teachers. In Florida, which restricts state performance pay funding to individual teachers or teams, I find that work effort and teacher turnover increase.
2012-04-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43892/1/MPRA_paper_43892.pdf
Jones, Michael D. (2012): Teacher Behavior under Performance Pay Incentives.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:44603
2019-09-27T16:30:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44603/
Tournaments in religious organizations with investment in religious human capital: choosing the pope
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares
Netto, Giácomo Balbinotto
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M5 - Personnel Economics
The objective of this manuscript is to explain how tournaments can be used in order to select the best candidates to fulfill the highest posts in religious organizations. With this purpose, in this working paper, we seek to show an model, modified from the original one, where the psychic income differential has been included, as a fundamental stimulus factor, for the candidates of a religious tournament, with the purpose of obtaining their maximum effort.
2013-02-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44603/1/MPRA_paper_44603.pdf
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares and Netto, Giácomo Balbinotto (2013): Tournaments in religious organizations with investment in religious human capital: choosing the pope.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:44606
2019-10-19T04:29:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44606/
Tournaments in religious organizations with investment in religious human capital: choosing the pope
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares de
Netto, Giácomo Balbinotto
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M5 - Personnel Economics
The objective of this manuscript is to explain how tournaments can be used in order to select the best candidates to fulfill the highest posts in religious organizations. With this purpose, in this working paper, we seek to show an model, modified from the original one, where the psychic income differential has been included, as a fundamental stimulus factor, for the candidates of a religious tournament, with the purpose of obtaining their maximum effort.
2013-02-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44606/1/MPRA_paper_44603.pdf
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares de and Netto, Giácomo Balbinotto (2013): Tournaments in religious organizations with investment in religious human capital: choosing the pope.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:44610
2019-09-28T05:19:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44610/
The problem of the principal-agent and promotion tournaments in religious organizations: choosing the next pope
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares de
Neto, Giácomo Balbinotto
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper shows an application of Promotion Tournaments to religious organizations, which is appropriate, especially in the case of highly ranked institutions such as the Catholic Church. With this objective, we seek to verify the suitability of the use Tournaments in religious organizations, regarding the optimal structure of contracts in order to select, as well as, to promote clerics. Two models are addressed, modified from the originals, through the inclusion of psychic income, both with two clerics with homogeneous skills. Finally, we discuss the advantages and limitations of the Tournaments applied to religious organizations, including its risks and distortions therein.
2013-02-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44610/1/MPRA_paper_44609.pdf
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares de and Neto, Giácomo Balbinotto (2013): The problem of the principal-agent and promotion tournaments in religious organizations: choosing the next pope.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:44679
2019-09-29T23:54:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44679/
The problem of the principal-agent and promotion tournaments in religious organizations: choosing the next pope
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares de
Neto, Giácomo Balbinotto
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper shows an application of Promotion Tournaments to religious organizations, which is appropriate, especially in the case of highly ranked institutions such as the Catholic Church. With this objective, we seek to verify the suitability of the use Tournaments in religious organizations, regarding the optimal structure of contracts in order to select, as well as, to promote clerics. Two models are addressed, modified from the originals, through the inclusion of psychic income, both with two clerics with homogeneous skills. Finally, we discuss the advantages and limitations of the Tournaments applied to religious organizations, including its risks and distortions therein.
2013-02-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44679/1/MPRA_paper_44679.pdf
Oliveira, Livio Luiz Soares de and Neto, Giácomo Balbinotto (2013): The problem of the principal-agent and promotion tournaments in religious organizations: choosing the next pope.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:44769
2019-09-26T23:20:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44769/
Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace
Donze, Jocelyn
Gunnes, Trude
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M5 - Personnel Economics
This paper studies how a firm fosters formal and informal interactions among its employees to create a collective identity and positively influence effort. We develop a model where employees have both a personal and a social ideal for effort, and where the firm can make its workforce more sensitive to this social ideal by allocating part of the work time to social interactions. We show that by investing in social capital, the firm can increase the power of peer pressure, make screening among heterogeneous employees less costly and, finally, augment the effectiveness of
monetary incentives.
2013-03-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44769/1/MPRA_paper_44769.pdf
Donze, Jocelyn and Gunnes, Trude (2013): Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:44795
2019-10-02T22:50:36Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3530
7375626A656374733D4A:4A37:4A3731
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44795/
A More Proactive Approach to Addressing Gender-related Employment Disparities in the United States
Graham, Mary E.
Hotchkiss, Julie L.
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J50 - General
J71 - Discrimination
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to propose a proactive public policy approach to complement
relatively reactive existing policies addressing gender-related employment disparities in the USA, and
to provide an initial empirical illustration of the proposal.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a conceptual application of theories of total
quality management (TQM) to the topic of gender-related employment disparities, followed by an
empirical illustration using US Current Population Survey data and a gender equal employment
opportunity (EEO) scorecard.
Findings – Using the TQM framework, company outliers were conceptualized on the EEO scorecard
as “special” causes of economy-wide equal employment variation and the industries in which
companies are situated as “common” causes. The paper identifies two underperforming industries on
gender-related employment outcomes: Mining and Construction, and Transportation, Communication
and Utilities.
Research limitations/implications – Further conceptual work on the application of TQM to
gender disparities in employment is recommended. Also, the study considered broad industry
categories; future research should refine these categories further.
Practical implications – It is recommended that US enforcement agencies incorporate industry
considerations more explicitly into their activities. Employer insights may be beneficial to improving
equal employment opportunity performance at the industry level.
Originality/value – The application of TQM theory to the topic of gender-related employment
disparities is a novel approach that may motivate new public policies.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44795/1/MPRA_paper_44795.pdf
Graham, Mary E. and Hotchkiss, Julie L. (2009): A More Proactive Approach to Addressing Gender-related Employment Disparities in the United States. Published in: Gender in Management: an International Journal , Vol. 24, No. 8 (2009): pp. 577-595.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:44936
2019-09-27T08:24:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3339
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44936/
Social Network and Job Quality: Evidence from Cameroon
Yogo, Urbain Thierry
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits ; Retirement Plans ; Private Pensions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J39 - Other
Using Cameroonian data, this paper investigates the effects of social network on job quality. Social network is measured in terms of using friends and relatives while looking for a job. As regards to job quality, two aspects have been taken into consideration: monetary job quality which is captured by wage and non monetary job quality which
is captured by a combination of social protection and job security. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of social
network as regard to job quality, we make use of both Heckman selection model and Ordered Logit model. Our findings contrast with previous studies. Job seekers who make use of social network do not necessarily get a good
job. More precisely, while the users of social networks exhibit a wage premium, they also exhibit a low job quality
in terms of social protection and job security. We also find that social network contributes to explain job quality
differential according to gender and institutional sectors (formal versus informal).
2011-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44936/1/MPRA_paper_44936.pdf
Yogo, Urbain Thierry (2011): Social Network and Job Quality: Evidence from Cameroon.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:45576
2019-10-09T16:53:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45576/
Market-based incentives
Grochulski, Borys
Zhang, Yuzhe
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's quitting forces the principal to give the agent a raise. The prospect of obtaining this raise gives the agent an incentive to exert effort, which reduces the need for standard incentives, like bonuses. In fact, whenever the agent's option to quit is close to being ``in the money,'' the market-induced incentive completely eliminates the need for standard incentives.
2013-03-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45576/1/MPRA_paper_45576.pdf
Grochulski, Borys and Zhang, Yuzhe (2013): Market-based incentives.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:46163
2019-09-28T08:18:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3530
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46163/
Entrepreneurs’ education and different variable pay schemes in Italian firms
Damiani, Mirella
Ricci, Andrea
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J50 - General
In this paper, we investigate the influence of the education of entrepreneurs, which we hypothesise to be a signal of talent, on the adoption of variable pay (VP) schemes in the Italian economy.
We estimate to what extent differences in the diffusion of VP between Italian firms reflect differences in the quality of entrepreneurs. Our estimates, which we obtained by taking both endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity into account, validate hypotheses about the direct positive effects of entrepreneurs’ education on the adoption of VP schemes. Furthermore, we ascertain the role of entrepreneurs’ education by examining its influence on the choice between different types of VP bonuses at the individual, group, or establishment levels. Our results suggest that highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to use individual or collective forms of VP schemes at the establishment level rather than team VP incentives.
2013-04-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46163/1/MPRA_paper_46163.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2013): Entrepreneurs’ education and different variable pay schemes in Italian firms.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:49886
2019-10-08T11:03:12Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49886/
Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study
Cason, Timothy
Masters, William
Sheremeta, Roman
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes elicit more entry and more total achievement than the winner-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants discourages weaker entrants, without altering the performance of stronger entrants. These findings could inform the design of contests for technological and other improvements, which are widely used by governments and philanthropic donors to elicit more effort on targeted economic and technological development activities.
2010-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49886/1/MPRA_paper_49886.pdf
Cason, Timothy and Masters, William and Sheremeta, Roman (2010): Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study. Published in: Journal of Public Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:50166
2019-09-26T08:25:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50166/
Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity
Gill, David
Prowse, Victoria
Vlassopoulos, Michael
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme based on random bonuses makes them cheat more but has no effect on their productivity. We also find that more productive workers behave more dishonestly. These results are consistent with workers’ cheating behavior responding to the perceived fairness of their employer’s compensation scheme.
2013-07-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50166/1/MPRA_paper_50166.pdf
Gill, David and Prowse, Victoria and Vlassopoulos, Michael (2013): Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:50521
2019-09-28T04:51:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50521/
The Dynamics of Low Pay Employment in Australia
Cai, Lixin
J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Using the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, this study shows that the largest proportion of low pay spells originated from higher pay; only a small proportion were from non-employment or recent graduates. While the majority of low pay spells transitioned to higher pay, a significant proportion ended up with non-employment. The multivariate analysis shows that workers who entered low pay from higher pay also have a higher hazard rate of transitioning to higher pay; and those who entered low pay from non-employment are more likely to return to non-employment. Union members, public sector jobs and working in medium to large size firms increase the hazard rate of transitioning to higher pay, while immigrants from non-English speaking countries and workers with health problems have a lower hazard rate of moving into higher pay. There is some evidence that the longer a worker is in low paid employment, the less likely they are to transition to higher pay.
2013
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50521/1/MPRA_paper_50521.pdf
Cai, Lixin (2013): The Dynamics of Low Pay Employment in Australia.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:52126
2019-09-27T10:21:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52126/
Wages and Labour Productivity: the role of Performance-Related Pay in Italian firms
Damiani, Mirella
Pompei, Fabrizio
Ricci, Andrea
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
This paper analyses the role of Performance Related Pay (PRP) agreements on labour productivity and wages. Its main contribution is thus to investigate the effects of PRP on both dimensions, i.e. productivity and distribution, whereas most of the studies of related literature are restricted to one of those aspects.
All estimates are performed for a large sample of manufacturing and service Italian firms with more than five employees and a restricted sample including only unionised firms. It allows us to focus on a relevant feature of industrial relations represented by worker representation and its role in local wage setting in the Italian economy.
The expected positive link between PRP and firm performance has been confirmed in all estimates, also controlling for a rich set of covariates. Furthermore, the comparison of productivity estimates with those for wages allows us to ascertain that payments by results might be not only rent-sharing devices, but schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These findings have been validated by a number of robustness checks, also taking into account endogeneity by using instrumental variables and the treatments of 3SLS.
The paper argues that well designed policies, that circumvent the limited implementation of PRP practices, would guarantee productivity improvement. The real effectiveness of these measures would not be weakened under union governance.
2013-12-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52126/1/MPRA_paper_52126.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea (2013): Wages and Labour Productivity: the role of Performance-Related Pay in Italian firms.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:53341
2019-09-28T15:44:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53341/
Performance related pay, productivity and wages in Italy: a quantile regression approach
Damiani, Mirella
Pompei, Fabrizio
Ricci, Andrea
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
The authors analyzed the role of Performance Related Pay (PRP) in a sample of Italian manufacturing and service firms and presented standard quantile estimates to investigate heterogeneity in pay-performance impacts on labor productivity and wages. In a second stage, the endogeneity of PRP was taken into account by using instrumental variable quantile regression techniques. They find considerable heterogeneity across the distribution of labor productivity and wages, with the highest role of PRP obtained at the lowest and highest quantiles. However, for all quantiles, the comparison of productivity and wage estimates suggests that PRP might not only be rent-sharing devices, but also incentive schemes that substantially lead to efficiency enhancements. These findings are confirmed for firms under union governance and suggest that well designed policies, that circumvent the limited implementation of PRP practices, would guarantee productivity improvement.
2014-01-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53341/1/MPRA_paper_53341.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea (2014): Performance related pay, productivity and wages in Italy: a quantile regression approach.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:55189
2019-09-27T13:48:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55189/
EXECUTIVE PAY AND PERFORMANCE IN PORTUGUESE LISTED COMPANIES
Alves, Paulo
Couto, Eduardo
Francisco, Paulo
G30 - General
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This essay analyses the relationship between corporate governance practices and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) wages from a sample of Portuguese listed companies over the period from 2002-2011. The relationship between CEO total compensation and shareholders return, firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, board of directors and shareholders characteristics is analysed. It is found that firm specific factors accounts for the majority of the variance in total CEO pay, while firm performance accounts for less than 5%. It is also found that the CEO characteristics, board of directors’ structures, and shareholders features are related with the CEO pay. The policy implications of these results are then derived.
2014-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55189/1/MPRA_paper_55189.pdf
Alves, Paulo and Couto, Eduardo and Francisco, Paulo (2014): EXECUTIVE PAY AND PERFORMANCE IN PORTUGUESE LISTED COMPANIES.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:55766
2019-10-19T03:49:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55766/
Acquisition Premiums of Executive Compensation in China: a Matching View
Kang, Lili
Peng, Fei
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
More aggressive acquiring firms paid higher executive compensation than non or less aggressive acquiring firms. This paper applies the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology to estimate the relationship between a firm’s acquisition and its executive compensation. Allowing for continuous treatment, that is, different levels of the firms’ acquisition activities, we apply the GPS method on a panel data set of Chinese Public Listed Companies (PLCs) and find that there is a causal effect of firms’ acquisition activities on executive compensation. However, there is a divergent interests between the board directors and executive managers which may bring serious agency problem in the acquisition decision. The self-selection effect plays a dominant role in the acquisition premiums of top 3 board directors, while the learning-by-acquiring effect on compensation is more prominent for executive managers than board directors. As the executive managers as a whole, can benefit more executive management positions as well as higher growth of executive compensation from aggressive acquisition than board directors and top 3 executive managers.
2014-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55766/1/MPRA_paper_55766.pdf
Kang, Lili and Peng, Fei (2014): Acquisition Premiums of Executive Compensation in China: a Matching View.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:56072
2019-09-27T01:29:55Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D52:5232:523239
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56072/
An Evaluation of Financial Inclusion through Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme
Kundu, AMIT
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
R29 - Other
The government of India had initiated bank payments of wages under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (MGNREGP). This initiative is undoubtedly a big financial inclusion drive particularly among the rural poor of India. This paper has tried to evaluate this financial inclusion drive through MGNREGP in Mandir Bazar block of South 24 Parganas district of West Bengal on the basis of field survey. The picture came out from field research is very encouraging. It is established that a large section of rural poor now have a bank account which they can operate individually without taking much assistance from local panchayat officials or bank officials or any middleman. It is also identified that the women job card holders of the households are deprived to become literate about banking services. This initiative of the government also encourages few participating households to initiate some savings of their wage income.
2013-08-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56072/2/MPRA_paper_56072.pdf
Kundu, AMIT (2013): An Evaluation of Financial Inclusion through Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme. Published in: Prajnan , Vol. XLII, No. No.4, 2013-14 (15 May 2014): pp. 319-330.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:56122
2019-10-04T11:15:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56122/
Effects of non-pecuniary rewards on employee delight
Gulzar, Saba
E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
O15 - Human Resources ; Human Development ; Income Distribution ; Migration
This study is aims to understand that what makes an employee delighted within an organization? What are the needs and desires of employees related to workplace ergonomics? This needs to be studied that monetary benefits, being researched by various researchers have shown a significant impact on delighting employees and these non- pecuniary act strongly in gratified employees from their jobs. In order to find out that the non- pecuniary and their impact on employee, a sample of employees, workings at different organizations in Karachi were asked to fill a questionnaire consisting of the non-pecuniary variables that delight them the most. The survey enabled us to explore an employee delight model and its determinants, and then this employee delight model was tested on 300 employees working at different organization. The results of this research showed that the variables used in model are not necessary in delighting the employees at workplaces. The variables that effects employee delight most includes workplace ergonomics, appreciation, flexible working hours, tools and equipment ,effective Interpersonal skills and entertaining activities.
2012-07-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56122/1/MPRA_paper_56122.pdf
Gulzar, Saba (2012): Effects of non-pecuniary rewards on employee delight. Published in: KASBIT Business Research Journal , Vol. 5, No. 1 (31 December 2012): pp. 48-55.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:57589
2019-09-27T07:17:05Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3632
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3634
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57589/
Government’s Restructuring Pay Policy and Job Satisfaction: The Case of Teachers in the Ga West Municipal Assembly of Ghana.
Forson, Joseph Ato
Opoku, Rosemary Afrakomah
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
J62 - Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility
J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper examines the ‘aftermath effect’ of the new civil service pay policy on job satisfaction among teachers in Ghana. We explore an avalanche of job satisfaction theories and instruments to identify key concepts and variables in building a baseline conceptual and research model. The findings of the study suggest that income, personal growth, bonus and organizational type have both effects (direct and indirect) on job satisfaction. The two-way analysis as well as the multivariate analysis of variance also indicates that gender, age group, and educational background also play a role in determining the level of satisfaction among teachers. The high unemployment rate (11 %) and the implementation of the Single Spine Salary Structure (SSSS) for the public sector in 2010 are also contributing factors to the retention of teachers.
2014-06-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57589/1/MPRA_paper_57589.pdf
Forson, Joseph Ato and Opoku, Rosemary Afrakomah (2014): Government’s Restructuring Pay Policy and Job Satisfaction: The Case of Teachers in the Ga West Municipal Assembly of Ghana. Published in: International Journal of Management, Knowledge and Learning , Vol. 3, No. 1 (30 June 2014): pp. 79-99.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:57885
2019-09-27T17:55:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493132
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57885/
The Short-Run Impacts of Connecticut’s Paid Sick Leave Legislation
Ahn, Thomas
Yelowitz, Aaron
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
I12 - Health Behavior
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
In 2012, Connecticut became the first state to enact paid sick leave legislation. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find the law had modest but negative effects on the labor market, particularly on the likelihood of working in the past week.
2014-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/57885/1/MPRA_paper_57885.pdf
Ahn, Thomas and Yelowitz, Aaron (2014): The Short-Run Impacts of Connecticut’s Paid Sick Leave Legislation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:58670
2019-09-28T12:47:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58670/
Principles and Approach to Targeting:With Reference to the Indonesian Social Safety Net Program.
Sumarto, Sudarno
Suryahadi, Asep
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
The potential benefits of accurate targeting are substantial because public expenditures can be concentrated to the needy, thereby saving money and improving program efficiency. However, targeting also entails the administrative costs associated with identifying, reaching, and monitoring potential beneficiaries. In addition, there are also potential costs in the form of disincentive costs, stigma costs, and political economy costs. The experience of the recent Indonesian social safety net programs shows that targeting was one of the most difficult problems in the implementation of these programs. As a result, the programs were plagued by the twin problems of undercoverage and leakage.
2001-06-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58670/1/MPRA_paper_58670.pdf
Sumarto, Sudarno and Suryahadi, Asep (2001): Principles and Approach to Targeting:With Reference to the Indonesian Social Safety Net Program. Published in: (2002)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:59456
2019-10-06T23:10:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59456/
Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation
Feess, Eberhard
Wohlschlegel, Ansgar
D62 - Externalities
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Tighter capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation are among the most prominently advocated regulatory measures to reduce excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. We analyze the interplay of the two instruments in an economy with two heterogenous banks that can fund uncorrelated projects with fully diversifiable risk or correlated projects with systemic risk. If both project types are in abundant supply, we find that full mandatory deferral of compensation is beneficial as it allows for weaker capital requirements, and hence for a larger banking sector, without increasing the incentives for risk-shifting. With competition for uncorrelated projects, however, deferred compensation may misallocate correlated projects to the bank which is inferior in managing risks. Our findings challenge the current tendency to impose stricter regulations on more sophisticated institutes.
2014-07-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59456/1/MPRA_paper_59456.pdf
Feess, Eberhard and Wohlschlegel, Ansgar (2014): Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:59549
2019-09-28T11:29:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443837
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59549/
Payment Scheme Changes and Effort Provision: The Effect of Digit Ratio
Neyse, Levent
Friedl, Andreas
Schmidt, Ulrich
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D87 - Neuroeconomics
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Economic experiments report that individuals perform better under a piece rate payment scheme in comparison to a fixed payment scheme. The reason is straightforward: incentives motivate people, and without incentives they decrease their effort. Yet women are prone to choose a fixed payment over a piece rate payment scheme. We aim to find out if this gender effect is related to prenatal exposure to testosterone, which by nature is sexually dimorphic and has permanent effects on human brain development with an impact on cognitive and physical skills, as well as behavior. We investigate the effect of prenatal testosterone exposure on performance adjustment in a real effort task. Each subject is salaried under either a fixed rate or piece rate payment scheme for five periods and subsequently encounters the alternative payment method for another five periods. To observe the prenatal testosterone levels that the participants were exposed to during pregnancy, we use the so-called digit ratio as an indirect measurement method. It uses the length-ratio between the participants’ index and ring fingers to infer about their in utero testosterone exposure. Our results confirm the previous findings indicating that individuals perform better when incentivized by a piece rate payment scheme. Subjects who are paid piece rate in the first half of the experiment immediately decrease their performance at the beginning of the second half when paid under a fixed payment scheme. In contrast, subjects increase their effort if the payment method is switched from fixed rate to piece rate in the second half of the experiment. Subjects who were exposed to higher levels of prenatal testosterone provide significantly lower effort when the payment scheme is switched from piece rate to fixed rate.
2014-10-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59549/1/MPRA_paper_59549.pdf
Neyse, Levent and Friedl, Andreas and Schmidt, Ulrich (2014): Payment Scheme Changes and Effort Provision: The Effect of Digit Ratio.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:59878
2019-09-28T01:37:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59878/
Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace
Donze, Jocelyn
Gunnes, Trude
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M5 - Personnel Economics
In this article, we propose to view the firm as a locus of socialization in which employees with heterogeneous work attitudes can be motivated and coordinated through adherence to a social ideal of effort. We develop an agency model in which employees have both a personal and a social ideal of effort. The firm does not observe the personal ideals, but can make its workforce more sensitive to the social ideal by fostering interaction in the workplace. We show that there are two reasons why the firm invests in social bonding. First, it reinforces the effectiveness of monetary incentives. Second, strengthening the social ideal reduces the adverse selection problem and the need to devise distorted payment schemes. We also show that the firm allocates more time to social interaction when personal ideals of effort are low or heterogeneous.
2013-03-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59878/1/MPRA_paper_59878.pdf
Donze, Jocelyn and Gunnes, Trude (2013): Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:60380
2019-09-27T01:56:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60380/
Enterprise-level bargaining and labour productivity of Italian family firms: a quantile regression analysis
Damiani, Mirella
Pompei, Fabrizio
Ricci, Andrea
G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
We investigate the role of Italian firms to evaluate their role on labour productivity performance. We find that family owned firms are less efficient than their no-family counterparts and also that family management negatively affects labour productivity. Furthermore, we estimate the role of firm level bargaining to verify whether family controlled firms, adopting these types of agreements, may partially close their efficiency gap with respect to their competitors. We find that enterprises under family governance obtain significant efficiency gains when they adopt firm level bargaining, greater than those obtained by their no-family counterparts.
2014-12-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60380/1/MPRA_paper_60380.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea (2014): Enterprise-level bargaining and labour productivity of Italian family firms: a quantile regression analysis.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:60620
2019-09-27T19:29:24Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D45:4534:453432
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463232
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60620/
Macroeconomic Determinants of Workers’ Remittances and Compensation of Employees in Sub-Saharan Africa
Adenutsi, Deodat E.
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
E42 - Monetary Systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the Monetary System ; Payment Systems
F22 - International Migration
F24 - Remittances
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
In this paper, an attempt has been made to identify the macroeconomic determinants of migrant remittances received in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) at the disaggregated level. The underlying motivation is that, given their unique characteristics, permanent and temporary migrants are likely to respond differently to macroeconomic conditions in migrant-host countries and their native or migrant-home countries. For the empirical analysis, the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach was used to estimate a dynamic panel-data model involving 36 SSA countries over the period, 1980-2009. It was found that the inflows of compensation of employees and workers’ remittances to SSA are influenced by host-country macroeconomic conditions in a similar way, whereas these two forms of remittances are driven by contrasting home-country macroeconomic conditions. Remittances from permanent migrants are less altruistic than remittances from temporary migrants. To attract higher remittances on a more permanent basis, the implementation of stable macroeconomic and pro-growth policies are inevitable in labor-exporting SSA countries.
2013-02-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60620/1/MPRA_paper_60620.pdf
Adenutsi, Deodat E. (2013): Macroeconomic Determinants of Workers’ Remittances and Compensation of Employees in Sub-Saharan Africa. Published in: Journal of Developing Areas , Vol. 48, No. 1 (2014): pp. 337-360.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:61429
2019-09-28T21:55:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3136
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61429/
Gender earnings differentials and pay structure of Italian family managers
Damiani, Mirella
Ricci, Andrea
J16 - Economics of Gender ; Non-labor Discrimination
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper analyses a dimension of the gender pay gap that has received so far a limited attention and that concerns not the level but the form of pay. The econometric analysis we performed has considered a fairly homogenous type of occupation represented by family management and with a great bargaining power in setting their rewards. With this strategy we aim at estimating gender disparities not driven by sex segregation by positions in firm hierarchy, but disparities more likely linked to preferences and identity. Probit models have been estimated to test whether or not the difference between women and men in pay structure of family managers (fixed salary or variable earnings) is statistically significant. We obtain that the female presence in top executive jobs, even after controlling for a large set of firm and workplace characteristics, is associated with a substantial lower incidence of the variable payment component. These gender differences in the structure of compensation packages are confirmed by IV Probit estimates that address potential omitted variables and endogeneity biases. We conclude that human capital factors, sectoral segregation or differences between firms are not the only drivers of gender differentials in the form of pay. We also suggest that lower representation of women in variable earning schemes might be an indicator of their minor attitudes toward competition.
2015-01-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61429/1/MPRA_paper_61251.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2015): Gender earnings differentials and pay structure of Italian family managers.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:62096
2019-10-01T07:28:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4833
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30
7375626A656374733D4A:4A30:4A3038
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3138
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3432
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62096/
Unintended Consequences of Childcare Regulation in Chile: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design
Villena, Mauricio G.
Sanchez, Rafael
Rojas, Eugenio
H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
H32 - Firm
J0 - General
J08 - Labor Economics Policies
J1 - Demographic Economics
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
J18 - Public Policy
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J4 - Particular Labor Markets
J42 - Monopsony ; Segmented Labor Markets
J8 - Labor Standards: National and International
In several countries governments fund childcare provision, but in many others it is privately funded as labour regulation mandates that firms have to provide childcare services. For this latter case, there is no empirical evidence on the effects generated by the financial burden of childcare provision. In particular,
there is no evidence about who effectively pays (i.e. firms or employees) and how it pays (i.e. via wages and/or employment). This study is the first one to provide such evidence. Our hypothesis is that, in imperfect labour markets (e.g. oligopsonistic), firms will transfer childcare cost on to their workers. To
analyze this, we exploit a discontinuity on childcare provision mandated by Chilean labour regulation. Our results suggest that firms transfer entirely the cost of childcare (nearly 100%) to their workers via lower wages (not only to female but also to male workers) and not through the alteration of the share of male workers within the firm. This is consistent with our finding that firms do not manipulate the threshold (number of female workers) because they avoid the burden by transfering the cost to their employees.
2011-11-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62096/1/MPRA_paper_62096.pdf
Villena, Mauricio G. and Sanchez, Rafael and Rojas, Eugenio (2011): Unintended Consequences of Childcare Regulation in Chile: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:66857
2019-09-26T12:44:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3436
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66857/
Is There an Informal Employment Wage Penalty in Egypt?
Tansel, Aysit
Keskin, Halil Ibrahim
Ozdemir, Zeynel Abidin
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J46 - Informal Labor Markets
This paper considers the private sector wage earners in Egypt and examine their wage distribution during 1998-2012 using Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey. We first estimate Mincer wage equations both at the mean and at different quantiles of the wage distribution taking into account observable characteristics. Then we make use of the panel feature of the data and estimate models taking into account unobservable characteristics. We also consider the possibility of nonlinearity in covariate effects and estimate a variant of matching models. In all cases we find a persistent informal wage penalty in the face of extensive sensitivity checks. It is smaller when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account and larger at the top than at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution. We also examine the informal wage penalty over time during the study period and in different groups according to experience and education. The informal wage penalty has increased recently over time and is larger for the better educated but smaller for the more experienced.
2015-09-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66857/1/MPRA_paper_66857.pdf
Tansel, Aysit and Keskin, Halil Ibrahim and Ozdemir, Zeynel Abidin (2015): Is There an Informal Employment Wage Penalty in Egypt?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:67150
2019-09-28T18:20:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443033
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473232
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483230
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67150/
Nudging Life Insurance Holdings in the Workplace
Harris, Timothy
Yelowitz, Aaron
D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
G22 - Insurance ; Insurance Companies ; Actuarial Studies
H20 - General
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits ; Retirement Plans ; Private Pensions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
Using administrative data from a large public university, we analyze a policy designed to increase employer-sponsored life insurance. The University always had a supplemental life insurance plan available for its workers. In 2008, it increased its provision of basic coverage from a $10,000 to 1x salary. Workers initially paying for supplemental life insurance were in a position to completely undo the increase in basic coverage by scaling back supplemental elections, yet their default choice in 2008 was to continue at their existing level from 2007. The increased provision of basic coverage therefore represents a nudge for employees to increase life insurance. The nudge increased life insurance holdings one-for-one, both in the short and long-run, even for workers who actively made changes to other fringe benefits. New hires, who had to make an active choice, elected less supplemental coverage after 2008 relative to earlier cohorts of new hires, providing additional evidence of a significant degree of inertia among existing workers. Additionally, we find evidence of inertia for high earners constrained by the maximum limits. Data from a national sample of job changers show minimal crowd-out of individual market coverage from increased employer- sponsored life insurance. Further, we discuss the desirability of the nudge and find that the increase in basic coverage decreased life insurance dis- parities for two-thirds of employees
2015-10-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67150/1/MPRA_paper_67150.pdf
Harris, Timothy and Yelowitz, Aaron (2015): Nudging Life Insurance Holdings in the Workplace.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:67758
2019-10-02T11:40:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473230
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67758/
Rules of remuneration of material risk takers and their implementation in the European Banks
Tóth, József
G20 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
According to the new rules to be applied in the European Union, data on compensation of material risk takers are to be disclosed from year 2014. This paper overviews the different expectations regarding remuneration of bank managers highlighting the requirements of European Parliament and Council. Furthermore, it analyses data of 18 European banks disclosed based on the new lawful requirements. Based on empirical study it proves there is correlation between number of material risk takers and value of total assets.
2015-11-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67758/1/MPRA_paper_67758.pdf
Tóth, József (2015): Rules of remuneration of material risk takers and their implementation in the European Banks.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:70334
2019-10-03T16:24:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473232
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70334/
Life Insurance Holdings and Well-Being of Surviving Spouses
Harris, Timothy
Yelowitz, Aaron
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
G22 - Insurance ; Insurance Companies ; Actuarial Studies
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits ; Retirement Plans ; Private Pensions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
Premature death of a breadwinner can have devastating financial consequences on surviving dependents. This study investigates the role of life insurance in mitigating the long-run �financial consequences of spousal mortality. Using the Health and Retirement Study, we examine individuals whose spouses died during or soon after his or her peak earnings years. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that lump-sum life insurance payouts do not significantly influence spousal well-being.
2016-03-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70334/1/MPRA_paper_70334.pdf
Harris, Timothy and Yelowitz, Aaron (2016): Life Insurance Holdings and Well-Being of Surviving Spouses.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:72138
2019-09-27T00:28:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72138/
Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining
Damiani, Mirella
Ricci, Andrea
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
Abstract
The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other.
Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20
2016-06-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72138/1/MPRA_paper_72138.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2016): Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:72209
2024-03-28T11:14:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72209/
Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining
Damiani, Mirella
Ricci, Andrea
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
Abstract
The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other.
Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20
2016-06-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72209/1/MPRA_paper_72138.pdf
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72209/8/MPRA_paper_72209.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2016): Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:79223
2019-09-26T23:59:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493236
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79223/
Education as Protection? The Effect of Schooling on Non-Wage Compensation in a Developing Country
Dang, Thang
I26 - Returns to Education
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits ; Retirement Plans ; Private Pensions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This is the first paper identifying the causal effect of schooling on non-wage compensation using data from Vietnam. The paper takes an advantage of the establishment of the compulsory primary schooling reform that was introduced in Vietnam in 1991 to instrument for exogenous variations in years of schooling to surmount the endogeneity problem as a primary threat to idenfication facing the causal effect estimation. The paper finds that education is positively associated with non-wage benefits. In particular, the baseline 2SLS estimates indicates that one additional year of schooling is causally linked to a 6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of receiving monetary payments for public holidays, a 4.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of receiving monetary employee benefits, a 7.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having annual paid leave and a 6.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having firm-provided social insurance. The baseline estimates are strongly robust to the estimates from some robustness checks. The paper also inspects that the causal associations between schooling and formal employment, skilled occupation and employee-friendly firm are three potential mechanisms through which schooling causally affects non-wage compensation.
2017-05-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79223/1/MPRA_paper_79223.pdf
Dang, Thang (2017): Education as Protection? The Effect of Schooling on Non-Wage Compensation in a Developing Country.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:79959
2019-10-02T04:51:04Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4439:443930
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79959/
A Simple Model of Managerial Incentives and Portfolio-Investment Decision
Deng, Binbin
D90 - General
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
What is the optimal portfolio allocation when a manager is investing both for his firm and for
himself? I address this question by solving a manager’s decision problem under a specific executive compensation
structure. I study how flat wage and stock compensation affect the manager’s investment decision. I show that the
allocation is the same regardless of whether the manager is prohibited from trading the public shares of his own
firm. Results from calibration show that the manager invests less in firm-specific technology and more in the
aggregate stock market as the risk of the firm’s project increases. More stock compensation discourages him from
investing in the firm’s risky technology, but encourages more risk-taking in terms of personal investment. In
addition, I prove that flat wage, effectively as a riskless bond, hedges risk and leads to more risk-taking behavior
both in firm investment and personal investment.
2016
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79959/1/MPRA_paper_79959.pdf
Deng, Binbin (2016): A Simple Model of Managerial Incentives and Portfolio-Investment Decision. Published in: Journal of Business and Economics , Vol. 7, No. 7 (2016): pp. 1059-1076.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:84246
2019-09-26T23:33:57Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443732
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84246/
Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results
Cason, Timothy
Masters, William
Sheremeta, Roman
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This study provides a unified framework to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in proportion to performance. We derive equilibria and observe outcomes from each contest in a laboratory experiment. Equilibrium and observed efforts are highest in winner-take-all contests. Lotteries and proportional-prize contests have the same Nash equilibrium, but empirically, lotteries induce higher efforts and lower, more unequal payoffs. Behavioral deviations from theoretical benchmarks in different contests are caused by the same underlying attributes, such as risk-aversion and the utility of winning. Finally, we find that subjects exhibit consistent behavior across different types of contests, with subjects exerting higher effort in one contest also exerting higher effort in another contest.
2018-01-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84246/1/MPRA_paper_84246.pdf
Cason, Timothy and Masters, William and Sheremeta, Roman (2018): Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:87007
2019-09-28T06:43:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87007/
CEO Compensation, Pay Inequality, and the Gender Diversity of Bank Board of Directors
Owen, Ann L.
Temesvary, Judit
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Greater gender diversity on bank board of directors is associated with higher compensation inequality because CEOs at these banks have higher base salary. This effect disappears during the financial crisis, largely due to adjustment of non-salary compensation.
2018-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87007/1/MPRA_paper_87007.pdf
Owen, Ann L. and Temesvary, Judit (2018): CEO Compensation, Pay Inequality, and the Gender Diversity of Bank Board of Directors.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:91301
2019-10-01T05:16:26Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91301/
Family firms, performance-related pay and the great crisis: evidence from the Italian case
Pompei, Fabrizio
Damiani, Mirella
Andrea, Ricci
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This article analyses how Italian family firms (FFs) have acted during the global great crisis in comparison to their nonfamily counterparts using a sample of almost 4500 firms for 2007 and 2010. We study whether family control affects labor productivity, labor costs, and competitiveness and how family and nonfamily firm (NFFs) have responded to the great crisis. Furthermore, we test whether the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) for employees offers an efficacious strategy to mitigate the effects of the crisis. Quantile regression techniques have been used to test the heterogeneous role of PRP, and its possible endogeneity has been taken into account in the empirical investigation. After the outbreak of the crisis, the distance in terms of the competitiveness of FFs in relation to their nonfamily counterparts increased. However, we also find that FFs may take advantage of the adoption of incentive schemes, such as PRP, to encourage commitment and motivation from their employees more than NFFs do. The positive role of PRP on labor productivity, coupled with a moderate influence of these schemes on wage premiums, enables them to regain competitiveness. In addition, for FFs located in industrial districts in which social rules prevail on formal rules, the adoption of PRP has exerted additional positive effects under hostile pressures, such as those characterizing the strong global crisis.
2018-12-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91301/1/MPRA_paper_91301.pdf
Pompei, Fabrizio and Damiani, Mirella and Andrea, Ricci (2018): Family firms, performance-related pay and the great crisis: evidence from the Italian case. Published in: Industrial and Corporate Change (6 December 2018)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:91302
2019-10-06T14:23:58Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91302/
Knowledge-intensive sectors and the role of collective performance-related pay
Stefania, Cardinaleschi
Mirella, Damiani
Fabrizio, Pompei
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
The main contribution of this study is showing that the efficiency effects of collective performance-related pay (CPRP) are more pronounced in knowledge-intensive service sectors (KISs) than in other sectors. The hypothesis is that human resource practices such as CPRP are particularly useful for enhancing firm performance when innovation-supporting knowledge is distributed among multiple skill sets and employee creativity, knowledge creation and knowledge sharing are key success factors for the firm. Cross-sectional estimates obtained for a national sample of approximately 3,800 Italian firms confirm this prediction. These results are validated by adopting a treatment effect approach to solve the self-selection problem.
2018-12-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91302/1/MPRA_paper_91302.pdf
Stefania, Cardinaleschi and Mirella, Damiani and Fabrizio, Pompei (2018): Knowledge-intensive sectors and the role of collective performance-related pay. Published in: Industry and Innovation (28 December 2018)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:91303
2019-09-26T12:35:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91303/
The role of employee incentive pay in the competitiveness of family and non-family firms
Damiani, Mirella
Pompei, Fabrizio
Ricci, Andrea
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Insufficient attention has been paid to the different roles of wage incentives in the competitiveness of family and non-family firms. This paper addresses this issue and uses a sample of listed and non-listed Italian firms for 2007 and 2010 to show that family firms that adopt incentive wages obtain greater gains in competitiveness with respect to non-family firms. Unlike what occurs in non-family firms, the efficiency enhancing effect of incentive wages more than compensates for the premiums paid to employees and enables family firms to achieve significant gains in terms of competitiveness.
2018-11-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91303/1/MPRA_paper_91303.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea (2018): The role of employee incentive pay in the competitiveness of family and non-family firms. Published in: Economia Politica (15 November 2018)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:93926
2019-09-26T22:34:12Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3233
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3633
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38:4A3832
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38:4A3838
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93926/
Recent Research on the Minimum Wage: Implications for Missouri
Meer, Jonathan
J23 - Labor Demand
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits ; Retirement Plans ; Private Pensions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
J63 - Turnover ; Vacancies ; Layoffs
J82 - Labor Force Composition
J88 - Public Policy
I discuss the sources of the policy disputes surrounding the mini-mum wage, both theoretical and empirical. I focus on recent research, particularly on margins other than the level of employment, and ex-amine the distributional implications of minimum wage increases. I consider the impacts of recent proposals to increase the minimum wage in the state of Missouri.
2018
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93926/1/MPRA_paper_93926.pdf
Meer, Jonathan (2018): Recent Research on the Minimum Wage: Implications for Missouri. Published in: Missouri Policy Journal No. 7 (2018): pp. 1-11.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:94324
2019-09-26T12:14:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94324/
Making Sense of the Minimum Wage: A Roadmap for Navigating Recent Research
Clemens, Jeffrey
J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
J30 - General
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
The new conventional wisdom holds that a large increase in the minimum wage would be desirable policy. Advocates for this policy dismiss the traditional concern that such an increase would lower employment for many of the low-skilled workers that the increase is intended to help. Recent economic research, they claim, demonstrates that the disemployment effects of increasing minimum wages are small or nonexistent, while there are large social benefits to raising the wage floor. This policy analysis discusses four ways in which the case for large minimum wage increases is either mistaken or overstated.
2019-05-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94324/1/MPRA_paper_94324.pdf
Clemens, Jeffrey (2019): Making Sense of the Minimum Wage: A Roadmap for Navigating Recent Research. Published in: Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 867 (14 May 2019): pp. 1-15.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:95179
2019-09-29T18:26:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3931
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95179/
Effort under alternative pay contracts in the ride-sharing industry
Belloc, Filippo
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
L91 - Transportation: General
We study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay) and profit-sharing ("pure" taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards effort of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal effort vanishes.
2019-06-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95179/1/MPRA_paper_95179.pdf
Belloc, Filippo (2019): Effort under alternative pay contracts in the ride-sharing industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:96740
2019-11-05T17:18:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D52:5232:523239
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96740/
Action economics? working with citizen groups in Revelstoke, BC to evaluate the impact of a living wage
Janmaat, Johannus
Harris, Lindsay
Carlaw, Kenneth
Evans, Mike
J30 - General
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
R29 - Other
Participatory action research has enabled communities to develop knowledge informed solutions to local challenges, challenges often involving difficult trade offs in the face of resource constraints. The challenges are typically defined by the local context, limiting both availability of data and generalizability of insights. We undertook an action economics approach with a group of Revelstoke community members deepen the collective understanding of the business impacts that may result from adoption of a living wage policy. An EXCEL™ workbook with macros enabled community members to explore possible costs and benefits. This tool clearly demonstrated the heterogeneity of business impacts and the form and scale of living wage employer benefits necessary for businesses to be no worse off. There are many context sensitive policy challenges that can benefit from an economic perspective, and therefore significant scope to share effective approaches for doing so.
2019-10-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/96740/1/MPRA_paper_96674.pdf
Janmaat, Johannus and Harris, Lindsay and Carlaw, Kenneth and Evans, Mike (2019): Action economics? working with citizen groups in Revelstoke, BC to evaluate the impact of a living wage.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:99691
2020-04-20T07:19:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493131
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493134
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493234
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A37:4A3738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99691/
India’s COVID-19 Episode: Resilience, Response, Impact and Lessons
Ganguly, Dibyasree
Misra, Sheuli
Goli, Srinivas
I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
I14 - Health and Inequality
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
I24 - Education and Inequality
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility ; Immigrant Workers
J78 - Public Policy
Despite the commonality of loss of lives, every pandemic has played a role in shaping the socio-economic and public health outcomes depending on the nature and the magnitude of the outbreak. In this study, we have attempted to make a preliminary assessment of COVID-19 impact on India and commented on the country’s resilience, response, impact and draw the lessons for the future. Although lockdown was necessary to stop the transmission, is showing and will show a greater impact on all spheres of human life considering the country’s poor resilient socio-economic institutions. Our concurrent assessment in the middle of the outbreak predicts that the socio-economic, demographic and health costs in India would be much higher than developed countries. Initiation of timely action from the very beginning (when the first case reported in Kerala) could have plummeted the potential transmission in every corner of the country to a large extent and could have avoided socio-economic crises that presently surfaced in the country. The study provides a strong message for initiating sector-specific measures alongside relief packages to reduce the damage not only for now but also to build a resilient system for socioeconomically vulnerable groups, health care services, and education infrastructure to face future pandemics. Otherwise, the pandemic like this can cost more.
2020-04-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99691/1/MPRA_paper_99691.pdf
Ganguly, Dibyasree and Misra, Sheuli and Goli, Srinivas (2020): India’s COVID-19 Episode: Resilience, Response, Impact and Lessons.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:100613
2020-05-28T14:50:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3233
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100613/
The Labor Market Effects of Expanding Overtime Coverage
Quach, Simon
J23 - Labor Demand
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J38 - Public Policy
This paper studies the employment and income effects of a federal proposal in 2016 to expand overtime coverage to additionally cover salaried workers earning between $455 and $913 per week ($23,660 and $47,476 per annum). Although the policy was unexpectedly nullified a week before its proposed effective date, using detailed administrative payroll data covering one-sixth of the U.S. workforce, I find clear evidence that firms nevertheless responded to the policy by bunching workers' earnings at the new $913 exemption threshold. On average, the base salary of directly affected workers who remain employed increased by 1.4%. Meanwhile, for every hundred workers who would have gained coverage under the policy, 10 jobs were reclassified from salaried to hourly. Preliminary analysis also suggests that there may have been negative employment effects. Examining the distribution of these margins of adjustments, I find that the positive income effect accrued entirely to workers who were bunched at the $913 threshold but would otherwise have earned between $720 and $913 per week, whereas the reclassification and negative employment effects were spread across jobs paying within the entire range of newly covered base salaries.
2020-05-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100613/1/MPRA_paper_100613.pdf
Quach, Simon (2020): The Labor Market Effects of Expanding Overtime Coverage.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:102294
2020-08-10T07:47:07Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413131
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
7375626A656374733D42:4232
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7375626A656374733D42:4232:423235
7375626A656374733D42:4234
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7375626A656374733D42:4235:423532
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7375626A656374733D45:4533
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
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7375626A656374733D45:4536:453635
7375626A656374733D46:4631
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463131
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463136
7375626A656374733D46:4634:463433
7375626A656374733D46:4636:463632
7375626A656374733D46:4636:463636
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D48:4831
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7375626A656374733D48:4831:483132
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483235
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483330
7375626A656374733D49:4933
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493331
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493332
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3332
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3431
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3438
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
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7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3538
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3638
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38:4A3831
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38:4A3833
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3630
7375626A656374733D4E:4E31:4E3137
7375626A656374733D4E:4E33
7375626A656374733D4E:4E33:4E3337
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3134
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3135
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3235
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3333
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3338
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3433
7375626A656374733D50:5031
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102294/
The Origin of Minimum Wage Determination in Australia: The Political and Legal Institutions
Bayari, Celal
A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
A14 - Sociology of Economics
B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925
B22 - Macroeconomics
B25 - Historical ; Institutional ; Evolutionary ; Austrian
B4 - Economic Methodology
B41 - Economic Methodology
B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary
E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
E64 - Incomes Policy ; Price Policy
E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
F1 - Trade
F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade
F15 - Economic Integration
F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies
F62 - Macroeconomic Impacts
F66 - Labor
G0 - General
H1 - Structure and Scope of Government
H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H12 - Crisis Management
H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H30 - General
I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits ; Retirement Plans ; Private Pensions
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J41 - Labor Contracts
J48 - Public Policy
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
J53 - Labor-Management Relations ; Industrial Jurisprudence
J58 - Public Policy
J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility ; Immigrant Workers
J68 - Public Policy
J81 - Working Conditions
J83 - Workers' Rights
K2 - Regulation and Business Law
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L60 - General
N17 - Africa ; Oceania
N3 - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy
N37 - Africa ; Oceania
O1 - Economic Development
O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O14 - Industrialization ; Manufacturing and Service Industries ; Choice of Technology
O15 - Human Resources ; Human Development ; Income Distribution ; Migration
O25 - Industrial Policy
O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences ; Diffusion Processes
O38 - Government Policy
O43 - Institutions and Growth
P1 - Capitalist Systems
P11 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
This paper discusses the establishment of the minimum wage determination process in the early twentieth century Australia, following the institutionalisation of compulsory industrial arbitration between capital and labour. This process led to the 1907 Harvester judgment whereby the Common- wealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration decision determined, for the first time, the amount of ‘fair and reasonable wage’ that the employers were required to pay. The discussion focuses on the role of the state in the labour market regulation, development of the related legislation, and the role played by Justice Henry Bourne Higgins. The paper briefly discusses the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Commonwealth), and the setting up of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. There is a comparison of the nature of minimum wage law developments in other Anglo-Saxon economies and the paper draws on the history of the state involvement in the regulation of the economy. The minimum wage became institutionalised in relation to the tariff protection of the Australian market from the twentieth century onwards, and the analysis herein includes the discussion of how tariffs contributed to the possibility of wage controls and labour market stability.
2012-03-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102294/1/MPRA_paper_102294.pdf
Bayari, Celal (2012): The Origin of Minimum Wage Determination in Australia: The Political and Legal Institutions. Published in: Journal of Global Politics , Vol. 5, No. 1 (1 December 2012): pp. 163-198.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:103642
2020-10-22T06:53:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103642/
Wealth After Job Displacement
Barnette, Justin
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
E21 - Consumption ; Saving ; Wealth
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
J63 - Turnover ; Vacancies ; Layoffs
Income drops permanently after an involuntary job displacement, but it has never been clear what happens to long-run wealth in the United States. This paper concludes that involuntary job displacement has large effects on wealth throughout a worker's lifetime. Upon displacement, wealth falls 14% relative to workers of a similar age and education from the PSID. Their wealth is still 18% lower 12 years after the event. A standard life cycle model calibrated to US data with permanent decreases in income after displacement behaves differently than these findings. The agents in the model also experience a large drop in wealth but they recover. The biggest culprit for these differences is the changes to consumption being small and statistically insignificant in the PSID whereas agents in the model decrease their consumption considerably.
2020-08-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103642/1/MPRA_paper_103642.pdf
Barnette, Justin (2020): Wealth After Job Displacement.
en
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