2024-03-29T09:33:39Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1150
2019-09-28T04:29:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3130
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3430
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1150/
Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties
Langlais, Eric
K10 - General
K41 - Litigation Process
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K40 - General
K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information
on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we
study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and
characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation
round. Then, we focuse on the comparative statics of the model and
analyse the role of the choice of a cost allocation rule. Finally, we
discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the
informed party, the influence of the assumption on the representation
of preferences, and the role of self-serving bias.
2005-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1150/1/MPRA_paper_1150.pdf
Langlais, Eric (2005): Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2632
2019-09-26T21:35:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3332
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3239
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2632/
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE AND CULTURE: CHALLENGES FOR RISK REGULATION
Marquez, Pablo
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K29 - Other
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
The author studies three aspects of human live valuation and its relation with cost benefit analysis and regulation. More precisely the author addresses the problem of valuation of a statistical human life and its relation with cost benefit analysis in mortality risk reduction. First, studies the debate about Valuation of a Statistical Human Life (VSL) and Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in mortality risks regulation; second, deals with two challenges to CBA and VSL, these are (a) the problem of discount rates and the problem of (dis)counting of future human lives, and (b), tests if culture (represented as a set of values) has an incidence in risk preferences and therefore, in willingness to pay for life in different countries.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2632/1/MPRA_paper_2632.pdf
Marquez, Pablo (2006): COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS, VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE AND CULTURE: CHALLENGES FOR RISK REGULATION.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4846
2019-09-26T19:14:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3336
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3430
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4846/
Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits
Deffains, Bruno
Langlais, Eric
K41 - Litigation Process
K36 - Family and Personal Law
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K0 - General
K40 - General
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
When several plaintiffs file individually a lawsuit against the same
tortfeasor, the resolution of the various cases through repeated trials
produces positive informational externalities, which benefit to the later
plaintiffs (since there exist precedents, jurisprudence...). Thus, the first
filers may have an incentive to initiate a class action as far as it enables
the various plaintiffs to share their information. This feature has not been
stressed in the literature, and in contrast strategic uses of class actions
have been studied in more details (Che (1996), Marceau and Mongrain (2003)).
In this paper, we elaborate on a basic strategic model of litigation
settlement, focusing on the interactions between the characteristics of the
discovery process (as a general technology of production of evidences) in
mass tort litigation, those of the compensation rules set by Courts, and the
structure of litigation costs, in order to study when a class action fails
to occur, and when sequential trials are more likely.
We consider the case of a perfect discovery process. We provide sufficient
conditions under which a class action is formed. We show that when victims
have heterogeneous claims, the compensatory damages rule awarded by Courts
is of major importance for the formation of the class action, whatever the
degree of heterogeneity: all else equal, there always exists a degree of
\textit{damage averaging} under which the class action occurs. We also show
that when contingent fees are used to reward attorneys' services, plaintiffs
become neutral to the arrival of new information on their case.
2007-09-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4846/1/MPRA_paper_4846.pdf
Deffains, Bruno and Langlais, Eric (2007): Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5774
2019-10-07T16:28:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5774/
Electoral Economics: Proposition 209 and the Public Concensus
Hartogh, Matthew
K2 - Regulation and Business Law
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Abstract:
The question posed is whether proposition 209 unconstitutionally bars a remedy to discrimination against a specified group "women and minorities", and thereby denies equal protection of the laws to a targeted group. The partial template for this problem is provided by the Supreme Court’s disposition of Romer v. Evans.
The conclusion of my analysis here is that it does not. My analysis relies on two theories, one formal and one political. The formal proposition is this: a remedy is only meaningful as a response to an injury. In equal protection and discrimination jurisprudence, the Federal courts have imposed, and the Supreme Court has upheld, quotas, busing, and other affirmative measures against discrimination where there has been a judicial finding of past discrimination. There has been no such finding against the University of California or any of the contracting agencies of the state of California. Further, each time such a remedy to a demonstrated injury has been imposed, the Court has demanded that the remedy conform to a tight fit to the demonstrated injury. No injury has been demonstrated here, therefore no remedy exists, and to quote Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch vs. Maryland "what does not exist can not be taken away."
2007-01-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5774/1/MPRA_paper_5774.pdf
Hartogh, Matthew (2007): Electoral Economics: Proposition 209 and the Public Concensus.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9418
2019-10-01T00:32:56Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9418/
Social wealth and optimal care
Darri-Mattiacci, Giuseppe
Langlais, Eric
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Many accidents result in losses that cannot be perfectly compensated by a monetary payment. Moreover, often injurers control the magnitude rather than the probability of accidents. We study the characteristics of optimal levels of care and distribution of risk under these circumstances
and show that care depends on the aggregate wealth of society but does not depend on wealth distribution. We then examine whether ordinary liability rules, regulation, insurance, taxes and subsidies can be used to implement the first-best outcome. Finally, our results are discussed in the light of fairness considerations (second best).
2008-06-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9418/1/MPRA_paper_9418.pdf
Darri-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Langlais, Eric (2008): Social wealth and optimal care.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12536
2019-09-28T04:50:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12536/
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation
Schmitz, Patrick W.
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K10 - General
The efficiency of two different means of controlling hazardous economic activities, namely ex post liability for harm done and ex ante safety regulation, is re-examined. Some researchers have stressed that the complementary use of these two instruments can be socially advantageous. Here it is argued that the models which have been built in order to support this view crucially depend on the assumption that there are persistent enforcement errors. It is demonstrated that such a rather unsatisfactory assumption is not needed if wealth varies among injurers.
2000
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12536/1/MPRA_paper_12536.pdf
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13453
2019-10-01T13:55:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413132
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13453/
Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation
Landeo, Claudia M.
C9 - Design of Experiments
K0 - General
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
K41 - Litigation Process
We experimentally study the effects of the split-award tort reform, where the state takes a share of the plaintiff's punitive damage award, on litigants' beliefs and bargaining outcomes. In addition, we study the formation of litigants' beliefs in a strategic environment. Our results provide support for coherence-based reasoning theories: coherence shifts in litigants' background beliefs (elicited before a role is assigned and after commitment to a choice at the pretrial bargaining stage) suggest bi-directionality between choices and beliefs. Our findings also suggest role-specific bias in the updating of plaintiffs' beliefs about firm's negligence. Finally, our findings indicate that split-awards affect plaintiffs' beliefs about fairness and lower out-of-court settlement amounts.
2009-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13453/1/MPRA_paper_13453.pdf
Landeo, Claudia M. (2009): Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14369
2019-09-28T04:29:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14369/
Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?
Langlais, Eric
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability.
2008-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14369/1/MPRA_paper_14369.pdf
Langlais, Eric (2008): Deterrence of a criminal team: how to rely on its members' shortcomings?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22031
2019-09-28T09:34:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22031/
Ex ante Investment, Ex post Remedy, and Product Liability
Chen, Yongmin
Hua, Xinyu
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
Low-quality products may cause consumer harm. A firm can reduce the probability of low quality through ex ante investment before sales, and can take remedy actions such as product recalls if it learns after sales that product quality is low. An increase in the firm's product liability increases its incentive for ex post remedy; more ex post remedy, however, may reduce the firm's ex ante quality investment. On the other hand, higher product liability increases consumer demand for the product, resulting in high output and hence greater return to ex ante investment. The trade-off between these two effects, the "substitution effect" and the "output effect", can lead to an inverted U-shaped relationship between ex ante investment and product liability. We find that the firm always prefers full liability whereas consumers might be better off with less than full liability. Full product liability tends to be socially optimal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is sufficiently high; otherwise partial liability can be socially optimal.
2010-04-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22031/1/MPRA_paper_22031.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Hua, Xinyu (2010): Ex ante Investment, Ex post Remedy, and Product Liability.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22291
2019-09-30T03:46:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22291/
An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs
Langlais, Eric
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K41 - Litigation Process
K31 - Labor Law
C72 - Noncooperative Games
For psychologists, bounded rationality reflects the presence of cognitive dissonance and/or inconsistency, revealing that people use heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) rather than sophisticated processes for the assessment of their beliefs. Recent research analyzing litigations and pretrial negotiations also focused on boundedly rational litigants (Bar-Gill (2005), Farmer and Peccorino (2002)) relying on a naïve modelling of the self-serving bias. Our paper in contrast introduces the case for disappointment averse litigants, relying on the axiomatic of Gull (1991). We show that this leads to a richer analysis in comparative statics; at the same time, this proves to be … disappointing: for the purposes of public policies in favour of the access to justice, recommendations are quite ambiguous.
2010-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22291/1/MPRA_paper_22291.pdf
Langlais, Eric (2010): An analysis of bounded rationality in judicial litigations: the case with loss/disappointment averses plaintiffs.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22381
2019-09-26T22:57:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22381/
Ex ante Investment, Ex post Remedy, and Product Liability
Chen, Yongmin
Hua, Xinyu
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
Low-quality products may cause consumer harm. A firm can reduce the probability of low quality through ex ante investment before sales, and can take remedy actions such as product recalls if it learns after sales that product quality is low. An increase in the firm's product liability increases its incentive for ex post remedy; more ex post remedy, however, may reduce the firm's ex ante quality investment. On the other hand, higher product liability increases consumer demand for the product, resulting in high output and hence greater return to ex ante investment. The trade-off between these two effects, the "substitution effect" and the "output effect", can lead to an inverted U-shaped relationship between ex ante investment and product liability. We find that the firm always prefers full liability whereas consumers might be better off with less than full liability. Full product liability tends to be socially optimal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is sufficiently high; otherwise partial liability can be socially optimal.
2010-04-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22381/1/MPRA_paper_22381.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Hua, Xinyu (2010): Ex ante Investment, Ex post Remedy, and Product Liability.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23016
2019-09-29T04:52:36Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3332
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3230
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3232
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23016/
Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations
Deffains, Bruno
Langlais, Eric
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
K20 - General
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K22 - Business and Securities Law
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K21 - Antitrust Law
K41 - Litigation Process
This paper elaborates on a basic model of mass tort litigation, highlighting the existence of positive informational externalities afforded by the discovery process (as a general technology of production of evidences) in order to study when a class action is formed, or when a sequence of individual trials is more likely. We illustrate the argument that when several plaintiffs file individually a lawsuit against the same tortfeasor, the resolution of the various cases through repeated trials produces positive informational externalities. When class actions are forbidden, these externalities only benefit to the later plaintiffs (through precedents, jurisprudence...). When they are allowed, the first filers may have an incentive to initiate a class action as far as it enables him to benefit from these externalities, through the sharing of information with later filers. We provide sufficient conditions under which a class action is formed, assuming a perfect discovery process. We also show that when contingent fees are used to reward attorneys' services, plaintiffs become neutral to the arrival of new information on their case.
2010-05-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23016/1/MPRA_paper_23016.pdf
Deffains, Bruno and Langlais, Eric (2010): Informational Externalities and Settlements in Mass Tort Litigations. Forthcoming in: European Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. 30, No. 2&3 (October 2010)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25710
2019-10-01T08:53:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25710/
Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents
Langlais, Eric
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
We study the characteristics of optimal levels of care and distribution of risk in a extended unilateral accident model, where 1/ parties are Rank Dependant Expected Utility maximizers, which allows us to capture two important behavioral characteristics in risk, both pessimism (probability transformation) and risk aversion; 2/ there exists an aggregate/uninsurable risk in case of accident ; 3/ tortfeasors have the opportunity to invest in damages reduction activities having a monetary cost of effort. Important results show that the optimal care is larger than under the risk neutral/small risks case, it depends on the aggregate wealth of society but does not depend on wealth distribution. We then examine whether ordinary liability rules, with or without insurance, can be used to implement the first-best outcome.
2010-09-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25710/1/MPRA_paper_25710.pdf
Langlais, Eric (2010): Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25801
2019-09-27T00:02:53Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3833
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25801/
Washington "Redskins" - Disparaging Term or Valuable Tradition?: Legal and Economic Issues Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.
Mark, Nagel
Daniel, Rascher
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L83 - Sports ; Gambling ; Restaurants ; Recreation ; Tourism
K11 - Property Law
On October 1, 2003, Judge Colleen Koller-Kotellay issued a ruling finding there was insufficient evidence to decisively conclude that the name “Redskins” was disparaging to “American Indians” (Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 2003). This judgment overturned a 1999 United States Patent and Trademark Office decision that had revoked the National Football League’s Washington Redskins’ exclusive right to the use of the term “Redskins,” trademarked by the team in 1967. The 1999 Patent and Trademark Office decision did not prevent the Washington football club from using their six different registered trademarks, but removed their protection from competitors also using the registered trademarks. The pivotal issue, according to Koller-Kotellay, was the amount of time that had intervened between the granting of the trademark in 1967 and the plaintiff’s initial lawsuit in 1992.
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. raises many questions that will be the basis for the research: a) In light of Harjo, what is the legal threshold for determining legitimate contempt and/or disrepute? b) Under the Theory of Latches when is it too late to file a trademark infringement complaint? c) What are the stakes in this case, from both financial and policy perspectives?
This paper investigates the legal, policy, and financial considerations surrounding the Harjo decision, and more generally, the use of trademarks to generate licensed revenues.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25801/1/MPRA_paper_25801.pdf
Mark, Nagel and Daniel, Rascher (2007): Washington "Redskins" - Disparaging Term or Valuable Tradition?: Legal and Economic Issues Concerning Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. Published in: Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and Entertainment Law Journal , Vol. 17, No. 3 (2007): pp. 789-804.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28607
2019-10-01T22:52:59Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3134
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28607/
The Dynamics of Gang Criminality and Corruption in Nigeria Universities: A Time Series Analysis
Kingston, Kato Gogo
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
K14 - Criminal Law
K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
This study contributes to the understanding of the causal relationship between gang culture, criminality and corruption in Nigeria universities where both criminality and corruption are very high complementary variables. Writers on gang culture in Nigeria universities have largely omitted the empirical evaluation of the causal relationship between gang criminality and corruption. This study adopts the time-series models of Granger (1969) to investigate and explain the causality relationship of the variables. Using five years data (2005-2009) from 37 Universities across 36 States of Nigeria and Abuja, the federal capital territory; the results suggest that there is existence of reciprocal relationship between university gang culture, criminality and corruption. The results suggest that there is bi-directional causality relationship flowing between gang criminality and corruption in the universities.
2010-10-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28607/1/MPRA_paper_28607.pdf
Kingston, Kato Gogo (2010): The Dynamics of Gang Criminality and Corruption in Nigeria Universities: A Time Series Analysis. Published in: African Journal of Law and Criminology , Vol. 1, No. 1 (2 February 2011): pp. 52-63.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28608
2019-09-30T01:22:03Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3132
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3134
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3131
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3332
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3333
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3232
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28608/
Shell Oil Company in Nigeria: Impediment or Catalyst of Socio-Economic Development?
Kingston, Kato Gogo
K2 - Regulation and Business Law
K12 - Contract Law
K21 - Antitrust Law
K14 - Criminal Law
K11 - Property Law
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
K33 - International Law
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K22 - Business and Securities Law
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K1 - Basic Areas of Law
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the She oil company, through investment and crude oil exploration, benefits socio-economic growth in Nigeria in general and in the Niger Delta of Nigeria in particular. In 1998, the United Nations Special Rapporteur's report on Nigeria accused Nigeria and Shell of violating human rights and failing to protect the environment, and called for an investigation into Shell activities in Nigeria. The report condemned Shell for arming the security forces which it regularly deploy to use lethal force civilians that protest against the oil firm.” The paper explores the matrix within which the socio-economic rights (human rights, development rights and environment rights) have been significantly marginalised and the implications of the lack corporate social responsibility and the lack of accountability of Shell to the inhabitants of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. With respect to environmental obligations, the paper discusses how environmental degradation in the Niger Delta has infringed on human rights thereby impeding growth and economic development. The paper suggests possible future directions and initiatives for civil society in making corporations more accountable to states, citizens and the planet.
2010-10-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28608/1/MPRA_paper_28608.pdf
Kingston, Kato Gogo (2010): Shell Oil Company in Nigeria: Impediment or Catalyst of Socio-Economic Development? Published in: African Journal of Social Sciences , Vol. 1, No. 1 (1 February 2011): pp. 14-34.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28844
2019-09-27T15:15:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3332
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28844/
Анализ некоторых аспектов реформы технического регулирования
Veselovsky, Alexander
K2 - Regulation and Business Law
K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Paper provides analysis of Russian technical regulation reform. Several questions of reform realization, which on our opinion, are of the primary importance, are taken within the focus of research. These are: national standards of old system (GOSTs) and international standards, involvement in reform of production companies, potential gains due to reduction of trade costs.
2009-06-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28844/1/MPRA_paper_28844.pdf
Veselovsky, Alexander (2009): Анализ некоторых аспектов реформы технического регулирования. Published in: Upravlenie kachestvom , Vol. 1, No. 6 (7 June 2007): pp. 51-52.
ru
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:38884
2013-02-11T12:41:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3139
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3334
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38884/
The inefficiency of decoupling
baffi, enrico
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
K19 - Other
K34 - Tax Law
The scope of this paper is to demonstrate that only in case of unilateral accident a party will take efficient level of activity. In all cases of bilateral accidents there will be aòwaus a party that will take a too high level of activity. But the reason that I try to demonstrate in this work is not that one party does not consider the expected damage, but instead the also the party that has an interest to consider the expected damage will take a too high level of activity (i.e. even if the expected damage is part of her private costs). The reason why that happens is that, in case of strict liability for the injurer with a defence he will not take account of the precaution costs of the victim, and in any case of a regime of negligence the victim will not consider in her cost-benefit analysis the precaution costs of the injurer. The consequence of that is a level of activity which is inefficient for a different reason with respect to that well known: that is the fact that a party does not bear the expected damage. I accept this known solution but I underpin another problem. The conclusion is that also decoupling does not produce an efficient consequence and that the search of tort efficient rules is still more difficult.
2012-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38884/1/MPRA_paper_38884.pdf
baffi, enrico (2012): The inefficiency of decoupling.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:39536
2019-10-09T20:11:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3139
7375626A656374733D4B:4B33:4B3334
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39536/
The Inefficiency of Decoupling Liability
baffi, enrico
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
K19 - Other
K34 - Tax Law
The scope of this paper is to demonstrate that only in case of unilateral accident a party will take efficient level of activity. In all cases of bilateral accidents there will be aòwaus a party that will take a too high level of activity. But the reason that I try to demonstrate in this work is not that one party does not consider the expected damage, but instead the also the party that has an interest to consider the expected damage will take a too high level of activity (i.e. even if the expected damage is part of her private costs). The reason why that happens is that, in case of strict liability for the injurer with a defence he will not take account of the precaution costs of the victim, and in any case of a regime of negligence the victim will not consider in her cost-benefit analysis the precaution costs of the injurer. The consequence of that is a level of activity which is inefficient for a different reason with respect to that well known: that is the fact that a party does not bear the expected damage. I accept this known solution but I underpin another problem. The conclusion is that also decoupling does not produce an efficient consequence and that the search of tort efficient rules is still more difficult.
2012-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39536/1/MPRA_paper_39536.pdf
baffi, enrico (2012): The Inefficiency of Decoupling Liability.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:40491
2019-09-28T04:50:09Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40491/
Marketing and the law: defending single color trademarks
Keating, Byron W.
Coltman, Tim
M31 - Marketing
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Most international jurisdictions have sought to broaden their definition of a trade mark following the Qualitex v Jacobson Products (Qualitex Case)2. In Australia, the Trade Marks Act (Cth) 1995 was introduced to recognise that colors, scents, shapes and sounds could be registered as a trade mark provided the mark was capable of distinguishing, in the course of trade, the proprietor’s goods or services from the goods or services of others. However, to date, it has proven extremely difficult to defend the registration of a single color trade mark in Australia.
2008-03-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40491/1/MPRA_paper_40491.pdf
Keating, Byron W. and Coltman, Tim (2008): Marketing and the law: defending single color trademarks. Published in: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science , Vol. 37, No. 3 (2009): pp. 375-380.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:42242
2013-02-11T12:59:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483230
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42242/
The Failure of Decoupling Liability and Other Mistakes in Tort Law
baffi, enrico
D62 - Externalities
H20 - General
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
In this paper I want to demonstrate that it is not possible, with traditional liability rules, to have one party that takes an efficient level of precaution. Both parties, whaever is the rule, take an excessive level of precaution. The problem is that, when we try to calculate the costs of an activity, we dconsider also the cost of precaution of the other party, but this is not usually done. Also the introduction of a tax (the solution called as "decoupling liability") does not solve the problem because the party who pays the tax does not consider the cost of precaution of the other party. This way of reasoning is instead wrog in unilateral accident where a party does not take precautions. In this case an efficient level of activity is reached. Due to these considerations some traditional conclusions about tort liabiity should be reconsidered
2012
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42242/1/MPRA_paper_42242.pdf
baffi, enrico (2012): The Failure of Decoupling Liability and Other Mistakes in Tort Law.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:45949
2019-09-26T09:11:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443632
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3130
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3131
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3132
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45949/
Understanding "The Problem of Social Cost"
baffi, enrico
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D62 - Externalities
K10 - General
K11 - Property Law
K12 - Contract Law
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects (externalities). Assessing their two most important works, it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for an evaluation of total efficiency, while Pigou, with some exceptions, is convinced that it is almost always socially desirable to reach marginal efficiency through taxes or liability. It is interesting that the economist of Chicago, who has elaborated on the renowned theorem, thinks that is not desirable to reach efficiency at the margin every time, and that it is often preferable to evaluate the total, which indicates the solution that is more welfare enhancing. A certain confusion in the work of Coase is noticeable. On one hand he criticizes Pigou for statements regarding the social desirability of relocating some industries away from the towns, and on the other hand, he suggests solutions that give an absolute right for an activity that is incompatible with the activity of another subject. In this way he eliminates the possibility of having a solution that is in accordance with Coase’s idea, which stresses that any external effect is reciprocal. The adjective “reciprocal” means that damage to Y is the consequence of limiting the activity of Y in order to allow for the activity of X. The opposite is also true: A benefit for Y causes damage to X.
Beyond this criticism, Coase’s arguments against Pigou’s tools are represented by the famous theorem, according to which a public intervention is not necessary in order to obtain efficiency when transaction costs are low. However, the theorem is not an idea that can be used to say that Pigou’s methods are useless when transaction costs are high. Indeed, when transaction costs are high, efficiency cannot be reached through negotiations. Coase, nonetheless, rejects Pigou’s tools for every situation. Through a deep examination of the paragraphs of “The Problem of Social Costs,” it is understandable why Coase opposes Pigou’s tools. First of all, he considers that the remedy consisting in the compensation of the victim. To Pigou’s way of thinking, this is a strict liability rule. Coase states that the damage is caused by both parties, and, moreover, the amount of the damage depends on both parties. He understands that the compensation method described by Pigou can bring about moral hazards and, therefore, brings about new social costs.
Since the article was written in 1960, Coase’s theory has been developed and has become a pillar of tort law and economics.
Pigou proposed a tax as an alternative remedy for external effects, which does not bring about a behavior of moral hazard, because the victim bears the expected costs. However, Coase is diffident in regard to the tax. His idea was not developed by other scholars in the subsequent years. Coase understands that efficiency should require a tax on the victim, so that the victim considers the increase of the costs of precaution for the injurer due to creating the nuisance. In other words, Coase understands that the tax does not produce the socially optimal activity level of the parties if the costs of precaution of the other party are not considered as a component of the tax. Therefore, Coase‘s belief is that the tools of Pigou create so many problems as to make them inefficient.
2013
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45949/1/MPRA_paper_45949.pdf
baffi, enrico (2013): Understanding "The Problem of Social Cost".
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:46953
2019-10-01T05:03:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513534
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46953/
Curbing emissions through (efficient) carbon liabilities: A note from a climate skeptic's perspective
Billette de Villemeur, Etienne
Leroux, Justin
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming
We propose a new climate policy that is efficient, robust, and asks for payments proportional to realized climate damage. In each period, countries are made liable for their share of the responsibility in the current damage. Efficiency follows from countries' anticipations of climate change, hence of future payments. Robustness is achieved thanks to the introduction of a market for carbon liabilities. Rather than being based on the expected discounted sum of future marginal damage (as with a carbon tax or tradable emission permits) our proposal relies only on observed realized damage and on the well-documented emission history of countries.
2013-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46953/1/MPRA_paper_46953.pdf
Billette de Villemeur, Etienne and Leroux, Justin (2013): Curbing emissions through (efficient) carbon liabilities: A note from a climate skeptic's perspective.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:53601
2019-10-10T04:31:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D51:5135:513534
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53601/
Curbing Emissions through a Carbon Liabilities Market: A note from a climate skeptic's perspective
Billette de Villemeur, Etienne
Leroux, Justin
H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming
We argue for the creation of a carbon liabilities market to address climate change. Each period, countries would be made liable for their share of responsibility in current climate damage. Because liabilities could be traded like financial debt, robustness to strategic manipulations and
e¢ ciency ensue. Moreover, this decentralizes the choice of the rate by which countries discount future beneÖts and damage. Rather than being based on an expected discounted sum of future marginal damage (as with a carbon tax or tradable emission permits) our proposal relies only on observed realized damage and on the well-documented emission history of countries.
2014-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53601/9/MPRA_paper_53601.pdf
Billette de Villemeur, Etienne and Leroux, Justin (2014): Curbing Emissions through a Carbon Liabilities Market: A note from a climate skeptic's perspective.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:66281
2019-09-29T21:14:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3130
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66281/
Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records
Guerra, Alice
Hlobil, Tobias M.
K10 - General
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Traditional economic models of accident law are static and assume homogeneous individuals under perfect information. This paper relaxes these assumptions and presents a dynamic unilateral accident model in which potential injurers differ in their probability of accident. Information about individual risk-type is hidden from the social planner and from each potential injurer. We ask how negligence standards should be optimally tailored to individual risk-type when this is imperfectly observable. We argue that information about past accident experiences helps to efficiently define negligence standards, narrowing the distance between first-best standards perfectly tailored to individual risk-type and third-best averaged standards. We finally show that negligence standards refined on the basis of past accident experiences and of individual risk-type do not undermine private incentives to undertake due care.
2015-08-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66281/1/MPRA_paper_66281.pdf
Guerra, Alice and Hlobil, Tobias M. (2015): Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Records. Published in: Journal of Legal Studies , Vol. 47, No. 2 (June 2018): pp. 325-348.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:66450
2019-09-28T15:19:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66450/
Competition, product safety, and product liability
Chen, Yongmin
Hua, Xinyu
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
A firm's incentive to invest in product safety is affected by both the market environment and the liability when its product causes consumer harm. A long-standing question in law and economics is whether competition can (partially) substitute for product liability in motivating firms to improve product safety. We investigate this issue in a spatial model of oligopoly with product differentiation, where reputation provides a market incentive for product safety and higher product liability may distort consumers' incentive for proper product care. We find that partial liability, together with reputation concerns, can motivate firms to make socially desirable safety investment. Increased competition due to less product differentiation lowers equilibrium market price, which diminishes a firm's gain from maintaining reputation and raises the socially desirable product liability. On the other hand, an increase in the number of competitors reduces both the benefit from maintaining reputation and the potential cost savings from cutting back safety investment; consequently, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors in the market. In general, therefore, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle, depending on how competition is measured.
2015-09-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66450/1/MPRA_paper_66450.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Hua, Xinyu (2015): Competition, product safety, and product liability.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:80206
2019-09-30T07:03:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80206/
Liability in Markets for Credence Goods
Chen, Yongmin
Li, Jianpei
Zhang, Jin
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L23 - Organization of Production
We study the role of liability in disciplining an expert's behavior in a credence good market. The expert, who can provide two potential treatments for a consumer's problem, may misbehave in two ways: prescribing the "wrong" treatment
given his private information, or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose the problem. We show that under a range of liability rules, the expert will choose the efficient treatment based on his information if the price margins
for the two treatments are close enough. Moreover, a well-designed liability rule can motivate the expert to choose efficiently both the treatment and the diagnosis effort. This efficiency result continues to hold when the expert's diagnosis effort generates only a noisy signal about the nature of the consumer's problem, provided the signal is sufficiently informative.
2017-07-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80206/1/MPRA_paper_80206.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Li, Jianpei and Zhang, Jin (2017): Liability in Markets for Credence Goods.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:87317
2019-09-27T03:19:31Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87317/
Efficient Liability in Expert Markets
Chen, Yongmin
Li, Jianpei
Zhang, Jin
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L23 - Organization of Production
We study the design of efficient liability in expert markets. An expert may misbehave in two ways: prescribing the "wrong" treatment for a consumer's problem, or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose the problem. We show
that under a range of liabilities, the expert will choose the efficient treatment based on his information if the price margins for alternative treatments are close enough. Moreover, a well-designed liability rule motivates the expert to also exert diagnosis effort efficiently. The
efficient liability is facilitated by certain restriction on equilibrium prices; unfettered competition between experts, while maximizing consumer surplus, may undermine efficiency.
2018-06-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87317/1/MPRA_paper_87317.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Li, Jianpei and Zhang, Jin (2018): Efficient Liability in Expert Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:92820
2019-10-03T22:37:15Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92820/
Установяване на качество на стокa в производството по предявена рекламация
Andreeva, Andriyana
Danev, Vladimir
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
Резюме. В доклада се разглежда проблематика, свързана с установяване на качество на стока в производство при предявена рекламация. На база актуален анализ на нормативната уредба и съвременните фактори влияещи върху правото на потребителя на предяви рекламация при установено от него несъответствие на качеството на стоката, се правят изводи и препоръки с практическа насоченост.
Abstract: The report examines the problems, related to the establishment of the quality of merchandise in the procedure of claimed reclamation. On basis of the actual analysis of the legal regulation and the contemporary factors, influencing the right of the consumer of claimed reclamation in case of discrepancy in the quality of the merchandise, determined by him, the authors make conclusions and recommendations.
2018
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92820/1/MPRA_paper_92820.pdf
Andreeva, Andriyana and Danev, Vladimir (2018): Установяване на качество на стокa в производството по предявена рекламация. Published in: Качество на стоките и защита на потребителите (2018): pp. 199-210.
bg
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:97078
2019-11-27T13:22:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97078/
Product Liability, Multidimensional R&D and Innovation
Lin, Ping
Zhang, Tianle
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
We study the effect of product liability on the incentives of product and safety innovation. We first develop a monopoly model in which a firm chooses both product novelty and safety in an innovation stage followed by a production stage. A greater product liability directly increases the marginal benefit of producing a safer product and thus increases product safety. However, as product liability increases, product novelty may increase or decrease, depending on the relative strengths of demand-shifting and cross-R&D effects identified in the model. Consequently, a greater product liability may decrease consumer welfare and thus total welfare. We extend the results to an oligopoly model with differentiated products and study the effects of competition measured by the number of firms and the degree of product substitutability. We find that equilibrium product novelty and safety decrease with the number of firms but exhibit non-monotonic relationships with the degree of product substitutability.
2019-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97078/1/MPRA_paper_97078.pdf
Lin, Ping and Zhang, Tianle (2019): Product Liability, Multidimensional R&D and Innovation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:104090
2020-11-12T14:24:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104090/
Efficient Liability in Expert Markets
Chen, Yongmin
Li, Jianpei
Zhang, Jin
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L23 - Organization of Production
When providing professional services, an expert may misbehave by either prescribing the "wrong" treatment for a consumer's problem or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose it. We show that under a range of liabilities the expert will recommend the appropriate treatment based on his private information if price margins for alternative treatments are close enough; however, a well-designed liability rule is essential for also motivating efficient diagnosis effort. We further demonstrate that unfettered price competition between experts may undermine the efficient role of liability, whereas either a minimum-price constraint or an obligation-to-serve requirement can restore it.
2017-07-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104090/19/MPRA_paper_104090.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Li, Jianpei and Zhang, Jin (2017): Efficient Liability in Expert Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:104326
2020-12-05T07:03:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104326/
Efficient Liability in Expert Markets
Chen, Yongmin
Li, Jianpei
Zhang, Jin
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L23 - Organization of Production
When providing professional services, an expert may misbehave by either prescribing the "wrong" treatment for a consumer's problem or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose it. We show that under a range of liabilities the expert will recommend the appropriate treatment based on his private information if price margins for alternative treatments are close enough; however, a well-designed liability rule is essential for also motivating efficient diagnosis effort. We further demonstrate that unfettered price competition between experts may undermine the efficient role of liability, whereas either a minimum-price constraint or an obligation-to-serve requirement can restore it.
2018-06-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104326/10/MPRA_paper_104326.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Li, Jianpei and Zhang, Jin (2018): Efficient Liability in Expert Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:110276
2021-10-22T15:35:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493132
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110276/
Optimal mixed payment system and medical liability. A laboratory study
Finocchiaro Castro, Massimo
Ferrara, Paolo Lorenzo
Guccio, Calogero
Lisi, Domenico
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
I12 - Health Behavior
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
In a controlled laboratory environment, we test the role of medical malpractice liability on physicians’ service provision under fee-for-service, capitation, and mixed payment. We find that the introduction of medical liability causes a significant deviation from patient-optimal treatment that it is not mitigated by the use of a standard mixed payment system. Specifically, we find that the presence of medical liability pressure involves a proper optimal calibration of mixed payment system. Our findings have relevant policy implications for the correct calibration and implementation of the mixed payment system.
2021-10-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/110276/1/MPRA_paper_110276.pdf
Finocchiaro Castro, Massimo and Ferrara, Paolo Lorenzo and Guccio, Calogero and Lisi, Domenico (2021): Optimal mixed payment system and medical liability. A laboratory study.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:112187
2022-03-08T03:26:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/112187/
Efficient Liability in Expert Markets
Chen, Yongmin
Li, Jianpei
Zhang, Jin
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
L23 - Organization of Production
When providing professional services, an expert may misbehave by either prescribing ``wrong'' treatment for consumer's problem or failing to exert proper effort to diagnose it. We show that under a range of liabilities the expert will recommend the appropriate treatment based on his private information if markups for alternative treatments are close enough; however, a well-designed liability rule is essential for also motivating efficient diagnosis effort. We further demonstrate that unfettered price competition between experts may undermine the efficient role of liability, whereas either a minimum-price constraint or an obligation-to-serve requirement can restore it.
2018-06-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/112187/19/MPRA_paper_112187.pdf
Chen, Yongmin and Li, Jianpei and Zhang, Jin (2018): Efficient Liability in Expert Markets.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:113328
2022-06-15T13:17:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493131
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/113328/
Market for Artificial Intelligence in Health Care and Compensation for Medical Errors
Chopard, Bertrand
Musy, Olivier
I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K41 - Litigation Process
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
We study the market for AI systems that are used to help to diagnose and treat diseases, reducing the risk of medical error. Based on a two-firm vertical product differentiation model, we examine how, in the event of patient harm, the amount of the compensation payment, and the division of this compensation between physicians and AI system producers affects both price competition between firms, and the quality (accuracy) of AI systems. One producer sells products with the best-available accuracy. The second sells a system with strictly lower accuracy at a lower price. Specifically, we show that both producers enjoy a positive market share, so long as some patients are diagnosed by physicians who do not use an AI system. The quality of the system is independent of how any compensation payment to the patient is divided between physicians and producers. However, the magnitude of the compensation payment impacts price competition. Increased malpractice pressure leads to lower vertical differentiation, thus encouraging price competition. We also explore the effect of compensation on firms’ profits at equilibrium. We conclude by discussing our results with respect to the evolution of the civil liability regime for AI in healthcare.
2022-06-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/113328/1/MPRA_paper_113328.pdf
Chopard, Bertrand and Musy, Olivier (2022): Market for Artificial Intelligence in Health Care and Compensation for Medical Errors.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:113740
2022-07-13T00:26:22Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/113740/
Chilling Effects from Anti-SLAPP Laws
Schaufele, Brandon
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
K41 - Litigation Process
R31 - Housing Supply and Markets
Anti-SLAPP legislation has proliferated across the US and Canada. SLAPPs are strategic lawsuits against public participation, "private claims whose objective is to chill opposition by limiting parties' ability to participate in public debate. SLAPPs involve a complementarity between a private harm, typically the tort of defamation, and an extra-judicial project, often a real estate development. This paper incorporates SLAPPS into a standard model of frivolous litigation, demonstrating that the economic implications of SLAPPs are narrower than frequently portrayed. A staggered adoption difference-in-differences research design is applied to empirically estimate the chilling effects of anti-SLAPP laws on construction investment and new home starts in Canada. Results demonstrate that anti-SLAPP laws do chill construction investment by roughly $80 million per month within Canadian cities. New starts of single family homes also decline by 120 per month relative to a counterfactual scenario where anti-SLAPP laws do not exist.
2022-06-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/113740/1/MPRA_paper_113740.pdf
Schaufele, Brandon (2022): Chilling Effects from Anti-SLAPP Laws.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:118440
2023-08-31T14:10:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/118440/
Successive Joint Torts: Conditions for Efficiency
Jain, Satish
K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; Forensic Economics
This paper is concerned with the derivation of conditions for efficiency for liability rules for successive joint torts.
In a successive joint tort, in the first instance the victim suffers harm on account of interaction with a tortfeasor, which subsequently is aggravated because of interaction with another tortfeasor. There can of course be no aggravation if there is no accident in the first instance.
A liability rule for successive joint torts is a rule that determines (i) in case of first accident, the liability shares of the victim and the first injurer on the basis of the extents of negligence of the victim and the first injurer; and (ii) in case of second accident, the liability shares of the victim and the two injurers on the basis of the extents of negligence of the victim and the two injurers. It is shown in the paper that a liability rule for successive joint torts is efficient if the following condition is satisfied: if one of the victim and the first injurer is negligent and the other nonnegligent, then the entire accident loss resulting from interaction between the victim and the first injurer is to be borne by the negligent individual; and if one of the victim and the two injurers is negligent then no nonnegligent individual is to bear any part of the accident loss resulting from interaction between the victim and the second injurer. This condition has been termed in the paper as negligence liability for successive joint torts (NL-SJT).
A subclass of the class of all liability rules for successive joint torts is that of simple liability rules for successive joint torts. A simple liability rule for successive joint torts apportions the accident losses solely on the basis of negligence or otherwise of individuals; the extents of negligence are not taken into account. It turns out that a simple liability rule for successive joint torts is efficient if and only if it satisfies NL-SJT. Whether NL-SJT is necessary for efficiency of any liability rule for successive joint torts remains an open question.
2023
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/118440/1/successive.pdf
Jain, Satish (2023): Successive Joint Torts: Conditions for Efficiency.
en