2024-03-29T04:38:50Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24
2019-09-30T18:58:28Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24/
Il diverso modo in cui le piccole imprese misurano il loro successo
Tattara, Giuseppe
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
The study begins with a discussion of the thesis that Italy, in respect to other countries with similar growth, has a relatively large number of small companies. This is often considered the cause of modest performance of the Italian economic system in terms of growth and efficiency. The paper explains that small companies should not be considered as isolated, but as part of a complex network strategy. In this context, small company performance should be evaluated as a joint product which includes the results attained by the remaining part of the network. An illustrative example of this evolution regarding the clothing sector in Veneto, explains the relationship between small subcontractors and larger end product companies. The extension of the network outside national borders raises some problems about the role played by Italian districts, especially with reference to their social milieu.
2005-02-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24/1/MPRA_paper_24.pdf
Tattara, Giuseppe (2005): Il diverso modo in cui le piccole imprese misurano il loro successo. Published in: Economia e società regionale , Vol. 92, No. 4.2005 (19 January 2006): pp. 30-57.
it
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:124
2019-09-28T04:51:03Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/124/
Reductions in Real versus Tariff Barriers: The Effects on Industry Concentration
Schröder, Philipp J.H.
Jørgensen, Jan G.
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
F15 - Economic Integration
F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies ; Fragmentation
Economic integration in Europe has had ambiguous effects on industry concentration. The literature has proposed various explanations of the empirical findings. The present paper provides an additional theoretical argument. We show that in a world of monopolistic competition, integration in it self (modelled as a reduction of trade barriers) generates opposing effects on industry concentration, depending on wether the barrier is a real (frictional) or a tariff cost. In particular, the Herfindahl index of industry concentration falls for a reduction in real costs, but rises for a reduction in tariff costs. The reason is that real barriers burn up resources, such that industry profitability is reduced, reducing entry, and resulting in fewer firms and higher concentration. Under a tariff barrier, the redistributed tariff revenue stabilises industry profitability, resulting in more firms and lower concentration.
2001
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/124/1/MPRA_paper_124.pdf
Schröder, Philipp J.H. and Jørgensen, Jan G. (2001): Reductions in Real versus Tariff Barriers: The Effects on Industry Concentration. Published in: Journal of Industry Competition and Trade , Vol. 3, No. 4 (2003): pp. 251-268.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:473
2019-09-27T11:52:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/473/
Electricity prices and cross-border trade: volume and strategy effects
Parisio, Lucia
Bosco, Bruno
L94 - Electric Utilities
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D44 - Auctions
In this paper we derive equilibrium bid functions in isolated domestic electricity markets and then analyse their modifications when cross-border trade among them is managed using the implicit auction method. We show that cross-border trade can induce price convergence across countries and thereby reallocate gains and losses as a result of two concomitant effects: a “volume” effect due to the mere increase/decrease of demand and supply in each market and a “bid effect” due to the modifications of bid functions brought about by interconnection. The latter effect can either contrast or reinforce the former. We derive conditions affecting the net result.
2006-10-16
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/473/1/MPRA_paper_473.pdf
Parisio, Lucia and Bosco, Bruno (2006): Electricity prices and cross-border trade: volume and strategy effects.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:529
2019-09-29T16:55:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/529/
Analiza wrażliwości wielkości i parametrów wyrobiska docelowego kopalni węgla brunatnego na zmianę ceny bazowej węgla
Jurdziak, Leszek
Kawalec, Witold
L71 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
Sensitivity analysis of lignite ultimate pit size and its parameters on change of lignite base price
The influence of lignite base price on the size of ultimate pit (lignite supply) and decrease of lignite quality (decrease of calorific value and increase of sulphur and ash content) has been analyzed. The consequence of these changes is the relative decrease of real price of averaged lignite and changes of non-discounted pit cash flows. The influence of lignite base price on strip ratio has also been calculated. The ultimate pit from Lerchs-Grossmann optimization as well as phases from parameterization process conducted in NPVScheduler program has bee used for calculations. The base of analysis was the quality model of “Szczerców” deposit used for creation of value model with usage of price formula taking into account lignite quality parameters.
2006-10-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/529/1/MPRA_paper_529.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek and Kawalec, Witold (2006): Analiza wrażliwości wielkości i parametrów wyrobiska docelowego kopalni węgla brunatnego na zmianę ceny bazowej węgla. Published in: Gornictwo i Geologia VII , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Gornictwa Politechniki Wroclawskiej Nr 106 (2004)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:530
2019-10-06T11:59:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/530/
Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym
Jurdziak, Leszek
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Opencast lignite mine and power plant as a bilateral monopoly in classical solution
Based on example of opencast lignite mine and power plant operating on liberalized energy market the classical solution maximizing joint profits of bilateral monopoly has been presented. The graphic solution of finding the optimal quantity of coal production and contract curve has been presented based on demand, marginal revenue and cost curves. The advantage of vertical integration has been shown as well as alternative possibility of finding optimal solution using formula price contracts with agreed profit division. The need of further adaptation of presented classical bilateral model and its solution has been stressed in order to take into account restrictions imposed by the fact that one side of bilateral monopoly is an opencast mine exploiting unique lignite deposit. Usage of mining optimization programs has been proposed to determine supply of coal and cost curves.
2006-10-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/530/1/MPRA_paper_530.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym. Published in: Górnictwo i Geologia VII , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 106 (2004)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:534
2019-09-27T02:13:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/
Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L94 - Electric Utilities
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation ; Collective Bargaining
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Is vertical integration of mines and power plants profitable and for whom?
Based on outcomes from the research of bilateral relation between lignite mines and power plant author describes several benefits from vertical integration including strategic benefits described by Porter and benefits from reduction of transactional costs described by Williamson. Additional benefits can be attained by application of open pit optimisation which leads to the solution of modified bilateral monopoly of lignite mine and power plant. Cooperation can assure joint profits maximisation and rivalry leads to suboptimal solution in Pareto sense. Due to asymmetry of information about the deposit the mine has information advantage and can apply its predominant solution maximising only their own profits in long run.
2005-03-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/534/1/MPRA_paper_534.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2005): Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo? Published in: Biuletyn URE No. Nr 2 (February 2005)
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:646
2019-10-05T16:39:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3535
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3739
7375626A656374733D46:4630:463031
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3131
7375626A656374733D43:4334:433434
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3231
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3139
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513133
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3234
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513137
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433232
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453330
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/646/
Causality and Efficiency in the Coffee Futures Market
Kebede, Yohannes
O55 - Africa
L79 - Other
F01 - Global Outlook
O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
C44 - Operations Research ; Statistical Decision Theory
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
O21 - Planning Models ; Planning Policy
O19 - International Linkages to Development ; Role of International Organizations
Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness
M31 - Marketing
D41 - Perfect Competition
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
O24 - Trade Policy ; Factor Movement Policy ; Foreign Exchange Policy
Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
C22 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes
F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
D40 - General
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
E30 - General
O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products
L78 - Government Policy
Tests for causality and rationality in the coffee futures market were carried out using data from the New York Market. Tests of causality indicated that futures prices strongly influence variations in spot price eight weeks or more to maturity. However, beginning seven weeks to maturity there seems to be a strong causal relationship going from futures to spot and from spot to futures. Risk constancy or neutrality, equality of risk premium and spot price, and efficiency were rejected for the period 18, 51, and 33 weeks or more to maturity. However, simultaneity of risk neutrality and efficiency was accepted for contracts with 55-77 weeks to maturity. The general conclusion from this study is that coffee futures market can be used as an indicator of spot market prices for contracts with 55-77 weeks to maturity. While benefits can be obtained through short term adjustment of available stock and making use of quality storage facilities, planning longer term planting and marketing decisions (e.g., ≥ 77 weeks) on the basis of futures market price can result in misallocation of resources and welfare loss.
1992-03-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/646/1/MPRA_paper_646.pdf
Kebede, Yohannes (1992): Causality and Efficiency in the Coffee Futures Market. Published in: Journal of International Food & Agribusiness Marketing , Vol. 5, No. 1 (1993): pp. 55-71.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1046
2019-09-27T13:27:19Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4E:4E31
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D4E:4E38
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1046/
The Real Thing: Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886–1959
Levy, Daniel
Young, Andrew
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
L10 - General
N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics ; Industrial Structure ; Growth ; Fluctuations
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
N8 - Micro-Business History
M31 - Marketing
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
M10 - General
D40 - General
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
We report that the price of a 6.5oz Coke was 5¢ from 1886 until 1959. Thus, we are documenting a nominal price rigidity that lasted more than 70 years! The case of Coca-Cola is particularly interesting because during the 70-year period there were substantial changes in the soft drink industry as well as two World Wars, the Great Depression, and numerous regulatory interventions and lawsuits, which led to substantial changes in the Coca-Cola market conditions. The nickel price of Coke, nevertheless, remained unchanged. We find that this unusual rigidity is best explained by (1) a contract between the Company and its parent bottlers that encouraged retail price maintenance, (2) a single-coin vending machine technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to limited availability and unreliability of the existing flexible price adjustment technologies, and (3) a single-coin monetary transaction technology, which limited the Company’s price adjustment options due to the customer “inconvenience cost.” We show that these price adjustment costs are of a different nature than the standard menu cost, and their estimates exceed the existing estimates by an order of magnitude. A possible broader relevance of the nickel Coke phenomenon is discussed in the context of Nickel and Dime Stores, which were popular in the US in the late 1800s and the early 1900s.
2004-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1046/1/MPRA_paper_1046.pdf
Levy, Daniel and Young, Andrew (2004): The Real Thing: Nominal Price Rigidity of the Nickel Coke, 1886–1959. Published in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking , Vol. Volume, No. Issue No. 4 (August 2004): pp. 765-799.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1097
2019-10-02T04:47:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1097/
Asymmetric Price Adjustment in the Small
Levy, Daniel
Chen, Haipeng (Allan)
Ray, Sourav
Bergen, Mark
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
M31 - Marketing
D80 - General
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
Analyzing a large weekly retail transaction price dataset, we uncover a surprising regularity—small price increases occur more frequently than small price decreases for price changes of up to about 10 cents, while there is no such asymmetry for larger price changes. The asymmetry holds for the entire sample and for individual categories. We find that while inflation can explain some of the asymmetry, inflation is not the whole story as the asymmetry holds even after excluding inflationary periods from the data, and even for products whose price had not increased over the eight-year period. The findings hold for different measures of inflation and also after allowing for lagged price adjustments. We offer a consumer-based explanation for these findings.
2006-11-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1097/1/MPRA_paper_1097.pdf
Levy, Daniel and Chen, Haipeng (Allan) and Ray, Sourav and Bergen, Mark (2006): Asymmetric Price Adjustment in the Small.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1106
2019-09-28T04:49:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1106/
Credence Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Experts
Liu, Ting
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
I study credence goods markets when there are both selfish and conscientious experts. The selfish expert is a profit maximizer. The conscientious expert wants to maximize profit and repair the consumer's problem. There are two classes of equilibria: uniform-price equilibria and nonuniform-price equilibria. A consumer cannot infer the expert's type from his price list in a uniform-price equilibrium but can do that in a nonuniform-price equilibrium. When the fraction of the conscientious expert is small, the selfish expert will be honest about the severity of the consumer's problem. When the fraction of the conscientious expert is large, the selfish expert will cheat the consumer; overcharging the consumer whenever he offers to repair the problem. Finally, more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss. When the fraction of the conscientious expert is close to one of the two extremes, 0 and 1, more conscientious experts will result in smaller social loss. When the fraction of the conscientious expert is in a middle range, more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss.
2006-12-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1106/1/MPRA_paper_1106.pdf
Liu, Ting (2006): Credence Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Experts.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1144
2019-10-01T14:33:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433533
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D43:4333:433332
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1144/
A structural model for corporate profit in the U.S. industry
Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo
C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods
D41 - Perfect Competition
C32 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes ; State Space Models
C51 - Model Construction and Estimation
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
I estimate a theoretically and statistically satisfying model to account for corporate profit represented by Net Rental Income (NRI) for one of the largest Real Estate Investment Trust companies (REIT) in the U.S. I claim that I have found an accurate method to forecasts the direction and dollar amount of corporate profit in the apartment industry in The U.S. that can be extended to the remaining branches of the U.S. industry. The variables that together account for ninety seven percent of the variation in NRI for this apartment company are, one-period time lag of lease renewals, the Federal Funds interest rate end of month, total gross potential of the company, total concessions, two-period time lag of move-ins, the ratio between total non-farm employment and total construction permits authorized, the inventory of houses in the U.S, one-period time lag of move-outs and this REIT apartment units occupied.
2006-05-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1144/1/MPRA_paper_1144.pdf
Gomez-Sorzano, Gustavo (2006): A structural model for corporate profit in the U.S. industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1158
2019-09-26T22:26:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3230
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3831
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1158/
When Little Things Mean a Lot: On the Inefficiency of Item Pricing Laws
Bergen, Mark
Levy, Daniel
Ray, Sourav
Rubin, Paul
Zeliger, Ben
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
K20 - General
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
Item pricing laws (IPLs) require a price tag on every item sold by a retailer. We study IPLs and assess their efficiency by quantifying their costs and comparing them to previously documented benefits. On the cost side, we posit that IPLs should lead to higher prices because they increase the cost of pricing as well as the cost of price adjustment. We test this prediction using data collected from large supermarket chains in the Tri-State area of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, which offer a unique setting because these states vary in their use of IPLs, but otherwise offer geographical proximity with each other and similar markets, supermarket chains, and socioeconomic environments. We find that IPL store prices are higher by about 20¢–25¢ or 8.0%–9.6% per item on average, in comparison to non-IPL stores. As a control, we use data from stores that are exempt from IPL requirements (because they use electronic shelf labels), and find that their prices fall between IPL and non-IPL store prices. To assess the efficiency of IPLs, we compare these costs to existing measures of the benefits of IPLs which are based on measurements of the frequency and the magnitude of pricing errors the IPLs are supposed to prevent. We find that the costs of IPLs are an order of magnitude higher than the upper bound of these estimate benefits.
2006-10-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1158/1/MPRA_paper_1158.pdf
Bergen, Mark and Levy, Daniel and Ray, Sourav and Rubin, Paul and Zeliger, Ben (2006): When Little Things Mean a Lot: On the Inefficiency of Item Pricing Laws.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1468
2019-09-29T12:41:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D43:4335:433532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1468/
Non-linearities in mark-up on costs
Wlazlowski, Szymon
Binner, Jane
Giulietti, Monica
Joseph, Nathan
Q40 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D40 - General
C52 - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
Abstract
This study employs an error-correction SETAR model to analyse the non-linearities in the behaviour of the mark-up on costs charged by the filling stations in the New York metropolitan area. While usual price transmission gained significant attention in the literature, the mark-up portion of the price has not been analysed to date. The results indicate that the adjustment to mark-ups to their long run values is non-linear, but the speeds with they adjust to their long-run values are equal across regimes for two out of three series analysed. For one of the series the adjustment is beneficial for the end consumers such that prices fall faster than they rise. The findings are somewhat surprising, indicating that there is no need for government intervention in the NY petroleum market.
2006-11-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1468/1/MPRA_paper_1468.pdf
Wlazlowski, Szymon and Binner, Jane and Giulietti, Monica and Joseph, Nathan (2006): Non-linearities in mark-up on costs. Published in: Aston Working Papers No. 2006 (2006): pp. 1-21.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1600
2019-09-26T11:19:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/
Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
C71 - Cooperative Games
L94 - Electric Utilities
Based on the simple model of the deposit the methodology of finding the optimal solution for bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite mine and power plant is shown taking into account pit optimisation. It is proposed to treat lignite price negotiation as a kind of game. In the first stage (cooperative) both sides should select the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM and in the second one (competitive) the agreement should be achieved regarding profit division. This can be realised through side payments or by establishing the lignite transfer price. Lack of cooperation and opportunism can lead to the suboptimal solution – excavation of the smaller pit. Due to information asymmetry realisation of the optimal solution is more probably in vertically integrated firms. Dynamic adjustments of LOM BM plan to short-term changes of energy market using optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search.
2006-09-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1600/1/MPRA_paper_1600.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Published in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium Continuous Surface Mining , Vol. ISBN 3, No. Department of Mining Engineering III, RWTH Aachen University (24 September 2006): pp. 469-476.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1859
2019-10-02T04:45:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3630
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1859/
Lower bounds of concentration in a small open economy
Ilmakunnas, Pekka
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L60 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
We examine how Sutton’s “bounds” approach works in a small country where industries
have relatively high export and import intensities. Import competition is used as an
indicator for the degree of competition in the low sunk cost industries. The bounds are
estimated as stochastic frontiers, where observable industry characteristics, export
intensity and entry barriers, are allowed to affect the mean and variance of the deviations from the frontier. In accordance with the theory, high R&D intensity industries have a lower bound for concentration, which is higher than that for low sunk cost intensity industries. For high advertising industries the theory does not hold as well. High import competition leads to a higher bound in the low sunk cost industries.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1859/1/MPRA_paper_1859.pdf
Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2006): Lower bounds of concentration in a small open economy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2134
2019-10-01T03:33:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2134/
Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders
Masili, Gustavo
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D44 - Auctions
The paper compares different auction formats for sale of a single patented innovation for budget constrained bidders. This unit decreases the marginal cost of production in the aftermarket for its owner by an amount which depends on the money invested on the development of this technology. As the bidders have a fixed budget that must be used to pay the final auction price and also to develop the new technology, the winner has incentives to pay a low amount for his unit to increase the amount available to invest in cost reduction. Conversely the loser has incentives to induce induce a higher price to be paid by the winner in order to increase aftermarket profits. This conflict of interest generates the willingness to pay (WTP) for the patent through an endogenous process, which may end up by stablishing a higher WTP for the lowest financed firm. Given this background, the case in which the players have different initial budgets may generate multiple equilibria for all studied auction mechanisms. These equilibria produce di¤erent consumer surplus and, thus, a central government with an unti-trust behavior is able to choose the auction that generates the re�ned equilibrium leading to the highest consumer surplus.
2006-07-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2134/1/MPRA_paper_2134.pdf
Masili, Gustavo (2006): Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2180
2019-09-26T13:29:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2180/
Understanding the Internet's relevance to media ownership policy: a model of too many choices
Nagler, Matthew
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
Does the Internet provide a failsafe against media consolidation in the wake of an
easing of media ownership rules? This paper posits a model of news outlet selection on the
Internet in which consumers experience cognitive costs that increase with the number of
options faced. Consistent with psychological evidence, these costs may be reduced by
constraining one’s choice set to “safe bets” familiar from offline (e.g., CNN.com). It is
shown that, as the number of outlets grows, dispersion of consumer visitation across outlets inevitably declines. Consequently, independent Internet outlets may fail to mitigate lost outlet independence on other media.
2006-12-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2180/1/MPRA_paper_2180.pdf
Nagler, Matthew (2006): Understanding the Internet's relevance to media ownership policy: a model of too many choices.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2761
2019-09-27T18:21:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2761/
Price Rigidity and Flexibility: Recent Theoretical Developments
Levy, Daniel
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
E50 - General
M30 - General
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D40 - General
M20 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
E52 - Monetary Policy
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
The price system, the adjustment of prices to changes in market conditions, is the primary mechanism by which markets function and by which the three most basic questions get answered: what to produce, how much to produce and for whom to produce. To the behaviour of price and price system, therefore, have fundamental implications for many key issues in microeconomics and industrial organization, as well as in macroeconomics and monetary economics. In microeconomics, managerial economics, and industrial organization, economists focus on the price system efficiency. In macroeconomics and monetary economics, economists focus on the extent to which nominal prices fail to adjust to changes in market conditions. Nominal price rigidities play particularly important role in modern monetary economics and in the conduct of monetary policy because of their ability to explain short-run monetary non-neutrality. The behaviour of prices, and in particular the extent of their rigidity and flexibility, therefore, is of central importance in economics. This introductory essay briefly summarizes the eight studies of price rigidity that are included in this special issue.
2007-04-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2761/1/MPRA_paper_2761.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2007): Price Rigidity and Flexibility: Recent Theoretical Developments.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2762
2019-09-27T14:55:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453538
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2762/
Price Rigidity and Flexibility: New Empirical Evidence
Levy, Daniel
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
E50 - General
M30 - General
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D40 - General
M20 - General
E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
E52 - Monetary Policy
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
The marketplace, along with its price system, is the single most important institution in a western-style free enterprise economy. The ability of prices to adjust to changes in supply and demand conditions enables the market to function efficiently and lies behind the magical invisible hand mechanism. To the behaviour of prices and in particular to the ability of prices to adjust to changes in market conditions, therefore, have fundamental implications for many key issues in many areas of both microeconomics as well as macroeconomics. It is, therefore, critical to study and understand whether there are barriers to price adjustments, what are the nature of these barriers, how the barriers lead to price rigidity, what are possible implications of these rigidities, etc. This introductory essay briefly summarizes the fourteen empirical studies of price rigidity that are included in this special issue.
2007-04-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2762/1/MPRA_paper_2762.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2007): Price Rigidity and Flexibility: New Empirical Evidence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2871
2019-10-03T20:20:31Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2871/
Does Openness Promote Competition? A Case Study of Indian Manufacturing
Pant, Manoj
Pattanayak, Manoranjan
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
This paper uses firm level data for the period 1989-2001 to analyse the working of competition in India’s manufacturing sector. It examines the impact of greater competition on profit mark-up over the last decade. The econometric analysis of the factors determining markup indicates that, contrary to received wisdom, trade openness by itself does not act to reduce the profit mark-up. The paper also investigates the degree of competitiveness defined as the Lerner price-cost margin. The analysis indicates that the estimated margins are in general high over the 1990s across all industries and in most of the industries considered these margins have been increasing over the second-half of the 1990s. The market by itself does not bring about competitive outcomes. The regulatory agencies probably have a crucial role to ensure a level playing field.
2005-09-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2871/1/MPRA_paper_2871.pdf
Pant, Manoj and Pattanayak, Manoranjan (2005): Does Openness Promote Competition? A Case Study of Indian Manufacturing. Published in: Economic and Political Weekly No. Sept, 24 (24 September 2005): pp. 4226-4231.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3048
2019-10-05T16:15:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433830
7375626A656374733D43:4338:433831
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3230
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3048/
Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence," by Fabiani, S., et al. (2004)
Levy, Daniel
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
D42 - Monopoly
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C80 - General
C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data ; Data Access
L20 - General
M21 - Business Economics
M31 - Marketing
M10 - General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence" by S. Fabiani, M. Druant, I. Hernando, C. Kwapil, B. Landau, C. Loupias, F. Martins, T. Mathä, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl, and A. Stockman (2004); Presented at the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) Conference on "Inflation Persistence in the Euro Area," European Central Bank, Frankfurt, December 10-11, 2004.
2004-12-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3048/1/MPRA_paper_3048.pdf
Levy, Daniel (2004): Discussion of "The Pricing Behavior of Firms in the Euro Area: New Survey Evidence," by Fabiani, S., et al. (2004).
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3751
2019-09-26T14:34:13Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4634
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38
7375626A656374733D46:4634:463433
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3751/
Dynamic effects of European services liberalisation: more to be gained
Kox, Henk L.M.
Lejour, Arjan
F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
L8 - Industry Studies: Services
F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies
F15 - Economic Integration
O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
Europe’s market for services is fragmented by many regulatory barriers. The Services directive proposed by the European Commission aims to integrate national services markets by reducing these barriers. Several studies indicate that bilateral trade and foreign direct investment in services could boost substantially. GDP and consumption could increase by 0.5% to about 1% on average in Europe. The effects for the Member States vary depending on the size of the barriers in their services markets and specialization. These results take account of scale effects, and forward and backward linkages in the economy, but ignore the effects of more competition on productivity and innovation in the long term. This paper assesses the channels though which an integrated European services market may generate these dynamic gains. Improved market access will stimulate competitive selection and productivity growth. Through trade and investment, knowledge spillovers will increase and innovation will be fostered. These channels are illustrated with quantitative evidence.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3751/1/MPRA_paper_3751.pdf
Kox, Henk L.M. and Lejour, Arjan (2006): Dynamic effects of European services liberalisation: more to be gained. Published in: Globalisation Challenges for Europe, Secretariat of the Economic Council, Prime Minister's Office, Helsinki , Vol. Vol. 1, (September 2006)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4028
2019-09-28T12:46:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4028/
How Does Income Inequality Affect Market Outcomes in Vertically Differentiated Markets?
Yurko, Anna
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on his income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a general specification of consumers' income distribution to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. This is due to the elasticity of consumer demand for quality being higher in more inegalitarian economies. More intense quality competition among firms causes them to locate their products in higher ranges of the quality spectrum, closer to each other, decreasing the degree of product differentiation. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market, and the low price elasticity of demand of these consumers allows him to charge a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.
2006-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4028/1/MPRA_paper_4028.pdf
Yurko, Anna (2006): How Does Income Inequality Affect Market Outcomes in Vertically Differentiated Markets?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4322
2019-09-28T16:32:08Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3831
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4322/
Buy it now: A hybrid market institution
Anderson, Steven
Friedman, Daniel
Milam, Garrett
Singh, Nirvikar
M0 - General
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
This paper analyzes seller choices and outcomes in approximately 700 Internet auctions of a relatively homogeneous good. The ‘Buy it Now’ option allows the seller to convert the auction into a posted price market. We use a structural model to control for the conduct of the auction as well as product and seller characteristics. In explaining seller choices, we find that the ‘Buy it Now’ option was used more often by sellers with higher ratings and offering fewer units; and posted prices were more prevalent for used items. In explaining auction outcomes, we find that auctions with a ‘Buy it Now’ price had higher winning bids, ceteris paribus, whether or not the auction ended with the ‘Buy it Now’ offer being accepted, possibly reflecting signaling or bounded rationality. We also find that posting prices, by combining ‘Buy it Now’ and an equal starting price, was an effective strategy for sellers in the sample.
2007-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4322/1/MPRA_paper_4322.pdf
Anderson, Steven and Friedman, Daniel and Milam, Garrett and Singh, Nirvikar (2007): Buy it now: A hybrid market institution. Forthcoming in: Journal of Electronic Commerce Research No. unknown
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4324
2019-09-28T07:38:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3831
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4324/
Seller strategies on eBay: Does size matter?
Anderson, Steven
Friedman, Daniel
Milam, Garrett
Singh, Nirvikar
M0 - General
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
We examine seller strategies in 1177 Internet auctions on eBay, to understand the diversity of strategies used, and their impacts. Dimensions of strategic choice include the use of a ‘Buy it Now’ option, the level of the starting price, and the use of a secret reserve price. A major focus of our analysis is on differences across sellers with different volumes of sales. The largest volume sellers (termed “retailers”) in our sample employ uniform selling strategies, but lower volume sellers exhibit a wide variety of strategic choices. While some components of sellers’ strategies appear important in raising seller revenue, including starting the auction with a ‘Buy it Now’ offer, the overall impact of seller strategy choices on the outcome appears to be quite small. We interpret this as evidence for the competitiveness of the online auction market for frequently traded items with conventional retail alternatives. An exception is provided by the use of a secret reserve price, which raises the winning bid conditional on a sale, but reduces the probability of a sale. Depending on sellers’ risk aversion and impatience, this may also be an efficient outcome.
2007-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4324/1/MPRA_paper_4324.pdf
Anderson, Steven and Friedman, Daniel and Milam, Garrett and Singh, Nirvikar (2007): Seller strategies on eBay: Does size matter?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4575
2019-09-30T16:37:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4575/
Can Price Discrimination be Bad for Firms and Good for All Consumers? A Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Market Price Constraints with Entry and Product Differentiation
Azar, Ofer H.
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L50 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
The article examines a differentiated-products duopoly model where the firms make entry decisions to two markets and then choose prices. The effects of product differentiation and entry costs are analyzed in two games: with and without price discrimination between the markets. Allowing price discrimination encourages more entry and tends to reduce prices and profits and to increase consumer welfare in both markets. The model suggests that firms might be better off if they agree not to price discriminate between different markets. It also suggests that when the market is not a natural monopoly, regulators should consider the effects of universal service requirements on entry before adopting them, because entry might be discouraged by such requirements, leading to less competitive markets.
2002
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4575/1/MPRA_paper_4575.pdf
Azar, Ofer H. (2002): Can Price Discrimination be Bad for Firms and Good for All Consumers? A Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Market Price Constraints with Entry and Product Differentiation. Published in: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 1, No. 3
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5395
2019-10-01T05:19:28Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5395/
Some Aspects of Aggregate Concentration in the Israeli Economy, 1964-1986
Rowley, Robin
Bichler, Shimshon
Nitzan, Jonathan
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
P16 - Political Economy
This essay examines the Israeli market structure from the perspective of ownership. We distinguish between the several corporate holding-groups that dominate the ‘Big Economy’ and the multitude of smaller, largely independent, business entities of the ‘Small Economy’. Although the two “sectors” operate under the same macroeconomic conditions, the analysis reveals marked differences in their business performance. These differences were reflected in an upward trend of aggregate concentration through the 1964-1968 period. Until the early 1970s the upward trend was moderate and was largely due to the different expansion paces of the two “sectors”. Since then, however, the trend intensified as the ‘Small Economy’ stagnated while profits in the ‘Big Economy’ continued to grow.
1988
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5395/1/MPRA_paper_5395.pdf
Rowley, Robin and Bichler, Shimshon and Nitzan, Jonathan (1988): Some Aspects of Aggregate Concentration in the Israeli Economy, 1964-1986. Published in: Working Papers , Vol. 88, No. 7 (1988): pp. 1-64.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5461
2019-09-26T22:08:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473130
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3330
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5461/
Small is Beautiful but Size Matters: The Asymmetric Impact of Uncertainty and Sunk Costs on Small and Large Businesses
Ghosal, Vivek
L40 - General
G10 - General
O30 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D80 - General
Against the backdrop of the theories developed in the real options and financing constraints literatures, this paper examines the impact of profit uncertainty and sunk costs on firms’ entry and exit decisions. For our empirical analysis, we compile an extensive dataset containing information on 267 U.S. manufacturing industries over a 30-year period containing industry-specific information on the number of firms and establishments, the size distribution of establishments, measures of sunk capital costs and profit uncertainty, among others. Our dynamic panel data estimates show that greater uncertainty about profits, especially in conjunction with higher sunk costs, results in (1) a marked decrease in the number of small firms and establishments; (2) a less skewed size distribution of firms and establishments; and (3) a marginal increase in industry output concentration. In sharp contrast, large establishments seem virtually unaffected. The results point to uncertainty in conjunction with sunk costs fundamentally affecting firms’ decision-making and altering the structure of industries by putting smaller businesses at a disadvantage.
2007-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5461/1/MPRA_paper_5461.pdf
Ghosal, Vivek (2007): Small is Beautiful but Size Matters: The Asymmetric Impact of Uncertainty and Sunk Costs on Small and Large Businesses.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5578
2019-09-27T12:41:12Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463231
7375626A656374733D50:5031
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D46:4635
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
7375626A656374733D46:4635:463534
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5578/
New imperialism or new capitalism?
Nitzan, Jonathan
Bichler, Shimshon
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
F21 - International Investment ; Long-Term Capital Movements
P1 - Capitalist Systems
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
F23 - Multinational Firms ; International Business
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
P16 - Political Economy
F54 - Colonialism ; Imperialism ; Postcolonialism
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
Over the past century, the institution of capital and the process of its accumulation have been fundamentally transformed. By contrast, the theories that explain this institution and process have remained largely unchanged. The purpose of this paper is to address this mismatch. Using a broad brush, we outline a new, power theory of capital and accumulation. We use this theory to assess the changing meaning of the corporation and the capitalist state, the new ways in which capital gets accumulated and the specific historical trajectory of twentieth-century capitalism up to the present.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5578/1/MPRA_paper_5578.pdf
Nitzan, Jonathan and Bichler, Shimshon (2006): New imperialism or new capitalism? Published in: Review , Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (April 2006): pp. 1-86.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5624
2019-10-01T05:10:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503136
7375626A656374733D42:4234:423431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453332
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D42:4231:423135
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D42:4235:423532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5624/
Inflation as restructuring. A theoretical and empirical account of the U.S. experience
Nitzan, Jonathan
P16 - Political Economy
B41 - Economic Methodology
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
P12 - Capitalist Enterprises
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
E32 - Business Fluctuations ; Cycles
O51 - U.S. ; Canada
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
B15 - Historical ; Institutional ; Evolutionary
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary
This work is a PhD dissertation, written at the Department of Economics, McGill University. The thesis offers a new framework for inflation as a process of restructuring. Contrary to existing theories of inflation, which tend to take structure and institutions as given for the purpose of analysis, we argue that inflation could be understood only in terms of ongoing structural and institutional change. In the modern context of large-scale business enterprise, inflationary restructuring arises as an integral part of capital accumulation. On the aggregate level, inflation appears as stagflation, with the expansion of pecuniary values in the 'business' sphere depending on the strategic limitation of productive activity in the 'industrial' realm. This stagflationary interaction between 'business' and 'industry' is, in turn, linked (on the disaggregate level) to the dynamic formation and reformation of 'distributional coalitions' and the process of aggregate concentration. An empirical analysis of the U.S. experience between the early 1950s and the late 1980s reveals two regimes of inflationary restructuring: the first, which lasted until 1970, involved rapid increases in aggregate concentration with relatively modest stagflation, whereas the second, post-1970 regime consisted of stable (or even declining) concentration amidst severe stagflation.
1992-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5624/1/MPRA_paper_5624.pdf
Nitzan, Jonathan (1992): Inflation as restructuring. A theoretical and empirical account of the U.S. experience.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5693
2019-10-05T01:53:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5693/
Cost Hetrogeneity and Strategic Divisionalization
Kazumichi, Iwasa
Toru, Kikuchi
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
In this note, we consider a simple duopoly environment in which
two parent firms compete in a market. We assume that there are
cost differentials between these two parent firms. The parent firms'
choices of divisionalization are modeled as a two-stage game. It will
be shown that the number of divisions of a parent firm with a cost
advantage (i.e., lower marginal costs) is relatively large. The results
imply that the cost advantage of one parent firm will be magnified
through divisionalization decisions.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5693/1/MPRA_paper_5693.pdf
Kazumichi, Iwasa and Toru, Kikuchi (2007): Cost Hetrogeneity and Strategic Divisionalization.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5779
2019-09-26T18:50:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443630
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5779/
Changing Income Structure, Ownership and Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector
Umakrishnan, K U
Bandyopadhyay, Arindam
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
D60 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
This paper investigates the relationship between the changing patterns of bank’s source of income and risk adjusted performance. A database of 77 banks over the period of 1999 to 2004 is constructed for the 27 public sector banks, 22 private banks, 25 foreign banks and 3 cooperative banks to compare their change in income composition. Bank’s performance is measured by risk adjusted return on BIS risk allocated capital (RARORAC). To examine the relationship between ownership pattern and performance, we compare the difference between new generation private sector banks and foreign banks with their public sector and cooperative banks counterparts. We argue that in a competitive financial market in order to change the profitability drivers in banking, Indian banks need to improve their non-interest income and also augment risk adjusted interest income through better risk based pricing.
2005-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5779/1/MPRA_paper_5779.pdf
Umakrishnan, K U and Bandyopadhyay, Arindam (2005): Changing Income Structure, Ownership and Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Indian Banking Sector.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5861
2019-09-28T15:18:49Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3935
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5861/
Take or Pay Contracts and Market Segmentation
Scarpa, Carlo
Polo, Michele
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L95 - Gas Utilities ; Pipelines ; Water Utilities
This paper examines competition in the liberalized natural gas market. Each .firm has zero marginal cost core capacity, due to long term contracts with take or pay obligations, and additional capacity at higher marginal costs. The market is decentralized and the firms decide which customers to serve, competing then in prices. In equilibrium each .firm approaches a different segment of the market and sets the monopoly price, i.e. market segmentation. Antitrust ceilings do not prevent such an outcome while the separation of wholesale and retail activities and the creation of a wholesale market induces generalized competition and low margins in the retail segment.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5861/1/MPRA_paper_5861.pdf
Scarpa, Carlo and Polo, Michele (2007): Take or Pay Contracts and Market Segmentation. Published in: IEFE Working Paper Series , Vol. IEFE W, No. ISSN 1973-0381 (2007)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5873
2019-09-26T14:49:32Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5132:513233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3733
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3639
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513137
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3533
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5873/
Atlas of wooden furniture industry in Jepara, Indonesia
Roda, Jean-Marc
Cadène, Philippe
Guizol, Philippe
Santoso, Levania
Uzair Fauzan, Achmad
Q23 - Forestry
L73 - Forest Products
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L69 - Other
Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
O53 - Asia including Middle East
L23 - Organization of Production
F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
In this document, we study the industrial district of Jepara, Indonesia. It is specialised in furniture production, for the Indonesian consumption, as well as for worldwide exports. We summarize the main features of the dynamics of the firms involved in the Jepara industrial complex with a quantitative analysis of flows among them,
and between them and markets elsewhere. A specific method of spatial analysis has been designed, and merged with other existing methods for the analysis of forest production networks and social networks. This method allows to take in account and to accurately assess the number of very small workshops that can not be evaluated by classical methods. We demonstrate that the extent of wood industry and activities is considerably underestimated by both the official statistics and the existing literature about Jepara. We present the results through synthesis maps. A total of 15 271 units of production have been identified, employing approximately 170 000 workers in Jepara. The activity generates creates a considerable revenue: between 11 900 to 12 300 billions Rp/year of added value (about 1 billion Euros/year), that is to say between 70 to 78 million Rp/worker/year. The district of Jepara consumes between 1.5 to 2.2 millions m3/year or round wood, and in other words, we found that the use of around 9 m3 of round wood, sustain 1 fulltime employee per year. The organisation of the production is typical of an industrial district, with a high level of intertwined relationships and sub-contracting between the production unites, a high specialisation of them, and a prevalence of the small and very small units in various steps of the production, compared to the bigger integrated units.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5873/1/MPRA_paper_5873.pdf
Roda, Jean-Marc and Cadène, Philippe and Guizol, Philippe and Santoso, Levania and Uzair Fauzan, Achmad (2007): Atlas of wooden furniture industry in Jepara, Indonesia. Published in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6137
2019-09-26T22:33:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6137/
Market structure, productivity and scale in European business services
Kox, Henk L.M.
Leeuwen, George van
Wiel, Henry van der
L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D2 - Production and Organizations
L8 - Industry Studies: Services
Using data from 11 EU countries, the paper investigates the impact of scale economies on labour productivity in European business services. Moreover, it analyses whether the incidence of scale sub-optimality is related to characteristics of the market or to national regulation characteristics. The econometric analysis is based on a production function model in combination with a distance-to-the-frontier model. We find evidence for the
existence of increasing returns to scale in business services firms. A result is that throughout the EU, business-services firms with less than 20 employed persons have a significantly lower level of labour productivity than the rest of the business-services industry. Two factors explain the scale inefficiencies. The first is the level of policy-caused firm-entry costs; higher start-up costs for new firms go along with more scale inefficiency. Secondly, business-services markets tend to be segmented by firm size: firms tend to compete predominantly with firms in their own size segment of the markets. Scale-related inefficiencies are to some extent compensated by more competition within a firm's own size segment. If a
firm operates in a more “crowded” segment this has a significant and positive impact on its labour productivity. We derive some policy implications from our findings.
2007-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6137/1/MPRA_paper_6137.pdf
Kox, Henk L.M. and Leeuwen, George van and Wiel, Henry van der (2007): Market structure, productivity and scale in European business services.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6459
2019-09-27T10:46:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4333:433335
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6459/
Estimating Demand for Cellular Phone Service under Nonlinear Pricing
Huang, Ching-I
L96 - Telecommunications
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models ; Discrete Regressors ; Proportions
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
Cellular phone carriers typically offer complicated nonlinear tariffs. Consumers make a discrete choice among several rate plans. Each plan has a nonlinear price schedule, and price is
usually lower for in-network calls. I present an empirical framework to estimate demand under such nonlinear pricing schemes by using parsimonious data and apply the estimation method to analyze the cellular phone service market in Taiwan. Based on the estimated model, I evaluate the impacts of termination-based pricing schemes on the market structure. While the existence of in-network discounts causes considerable tipping effects on market shares, the effects come primarily from reducing the average prices, not from the difference between in-network and off-network prices. There is no evidence showing that termination-based pricing by itself has significant effects on market structure.
2007-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6459/1/MPRA_paper_6459.pdf
Huang, Ching-I (2007): Estimating Demand for Cellular Phone Service under Nonlinear Pricing.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6657
2019-09-27T13:19:08Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483531
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493132
7375626A656374733D48:4835:483533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6657/
Recent Trends and Economic Issues in the WIC Infant Formula Rebate Program
Oliveira, Victor
Davis, David E.
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
I12 - Health Behavior
H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Over half of all infant formula sold in the United States is purchased through the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Typically, WIC State agencies obtain substantial discounts in the form
of rebates from infant formula manufacturers for each can of formula purchased through the program. The cost to WIC for each can of formula provided through the program has two components: (1) net wholesale price, which is
equal to the wholesale price of formula minus the amount of the rebate; and (2) retail markup, which is equal to the retail price minus the wholesale price. This analysis suggests that retail markup accounts for most of the cost to WIC of infant formula in most States. However, both cost components have increased over time. The recent increase in both net wholesale price and retail markup coincides with the introduction of higher priced supplemented infant formulas. Conditions may change after the market adjusts to these new formulas.
2006-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6657/1/MPRA_paper_6657.pdf
Oliveira, Victor and Davis, David E. (2006): Recent Trends and Economic Issues in the WIC Infant Formula Rebate Program. Published in: Economic Research Report No. 22 (August 2006)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7682
2019-10-01T15:54:21Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7682/
Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
Tarasov, Alexander
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper explores how income distribution influences market structure and affects the economic well-being of different groups. It shows that inequality may be good for the poor via a trickle-down effect operating through entry. I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with free entry, heterogenous firms and consumers that share identical but non-homothetic preferences. The general model is solved. The case of two types of consumers, rich and poor, is considered in detail. I show that higher income inequality in the economy can benefit the poor. An increase in the personal income of the rich raises welfare of the poor, while an increase in the fraction of the rich has an ambiguous impact on the poor: welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of the fraction of the rich. At the same time, an increase in the personal income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich keeping the aggregate income in the economy fixed raises the well-being of the poor. I also analyze the effect of changes in market size and entry cost. I show that the rich gain more from an increase in market size and lose more from an increase in the cost of entry than the poor.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7682/1/MPRA_paper_7682.pdf
Tarasov, Alexander (2007): Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7970
2019-09-29T12:09:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3831
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7970/
Price Dispersion and Accessibility: A Case study of Fast Food
Stewart, Hayden
Davis, David E.
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This study examines spatial variation in the price and accessibility of fast food across a major
urban area. We use novel data on the price of a representative fast food meal and the location of
fast food restaurants belonging to one of three major chains in the District of Columbia and its
surrounding suburbs. These data are used to test a structural model of spatial competition. The
results of this study are easily interpreted and compared with a past analysis. We find that spatial
differences in costs and demand conditions drive variation in the number of firms operating in a
market, which in turn affects prices.
2005-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7970/1/MPRA_paper_7970.pdf
Stewart, Hayden and Davis, David E. (2005): Price Dispersion and Accessibility: A Case study of Fast Food. Published in: Southern Economic Journal , Vol. 71, No. 4 (April 2005): pp. 784-799.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8250
2019-09-28T06:09:35Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8250/
Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
Tarasov, Alexander
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper explores how income distribution influences market structure and affects the economic well-being of different groups. It shows that inequality may be good for the poor via a trickle-down effect operating through entry. I consider a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition with free entry, heterogenous firms and consumers that share identical but non-homothetic preferences. The general model is solved. The case of two types of consumers, rich and poor, is considered in detail. I show that higher income inequality in the economy can benefit the poor. An increase in personal income of the rich raises welfare of the poor, while an increase in the fraction of the rich has an ambiguous impact on the poor: welfare of the poor has an inverted U shape as a function of the fraction of the rich. At the same time, an increase in the personal income of the rich together with a decrease in the fraction of the rich, keeping the aggregate income in the economy fixed, raises the well-being of the poor. I also analyze the effect of changes in market size and entry cost. I show that the rich gain more from an increase in market size and lose more from an increase in the cost of entry than the poor.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8250/2/MPRA_paper_8250.pdf
Tarasov, Alexander (2007): Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8847
2019-09-30T06:45:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4336:433631
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8847/
How Does Income Inequality Affect Market Outcomes in Vertically Differentiated Markets?
Yurko, Anna
C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on his income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a general specification of consumers' income distribution to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. This is due to the elasticity of consumer demand for quality being higher in more inegalitarian economies. More intense quality competition among firms causes them to locate their products in higher ranges of the quality spectrum, closer to each other, decreasing the degree of product differentiation. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market, and the low price elasticity of demand of these consumers allows him to charge a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.
2008-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8847/1/MPRA_paper_8847.pdf
Yurko, Anna (2008): How Does Income Inequality Affect Market Outcomes in Vertically Differentiated Markets?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9746
2019-09-30T19:44:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9746/
Negative Network Externalities in Two-Sided Markets: A Competition Approach
Kurucu, Gokce
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D42 - Monopoly
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
Consider a firm advertising in a job matching agency with the aim of employing the most
qualified workers. Its chances of success would be higher for a smaller number of competitor firms
advertising in the same job matching agency, i.e. careerbuilder.com. How would the resulting
competitive behavior among the firms which are advertising to this job matching agency affect
the agency’s optimal pricing behavior?
I analyze the optimal market structures and pricing strategies of a monopolist platform
in a two-sided market setup in which the agents on each side prefer the platform to be less
competitive on their side; that is, a market with negative intra-group network externalities. I
find that the equilibrium market structure varies with the extent of negative externalities. If the
market’s negative network externalities are substantial, that is, if an agent’s disutility given the
size of the agent pool on his side is high (enough), then the profit-maximizing strategy for the
matchmaker will be to match the highest types of one side with all of the agents on the other
side, by charging a relatively high price from the former side and allowing free entrance for the
agents of the latter side. However, if the network externalities on one side are not substantial,
then the matchmaker will maximize profits by matching an equal number of agents from each
side. This paper thus provides an explanation of the asymmetric pricing schedules in two-sided
markets where the matchmaker uses a one-program pricing schedule.
2007-08-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9746/1/MPRA_paper_9746.pdf
Kurucu, Gokce (2007): Negative Network Externalities in Two-Sided Markets: A Competition Approach.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9854
2019-10-04T14:25:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9854/
Dynamic Price Dispersion in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model
Sun, Ching-jen
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper considers a dynamic model of price competition in which sellers are endowed with one unit of the good and compete by posting prices in every period. Buyers each demand one unit of the good and have a common reservation price. They have full information regarding the prices posted by each firm in the market; hence, search is costless. The number of buyers coming to the market in each period is random. We characterize the dynamics of market prices and show that price dispersion persists over time.
2005-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9854/1/MPRA_paper_9854.pdf
Sun, Ching-jen (2005): Dynamic Price Dispersion in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9855
2019-09-28T16:52:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9855/
Dynamic Price Discrimination and Quality Provision Based on Purchase History
Sun, Ching-jen
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D42 - Monopoly
This paper develops a general two-period model of product line pricing with customer recognition. Specifically, we consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, the monopolist can condition the price-quality offers on the observed purchasing behavior in the first period. In this setup, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers not only by quality, but also by purchase history. Several interesting results are derived. First, we fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when there are two types of consumers, and a simple condition is given to determine whether the monopolist will price discriminate by quality in the first period. We compare it to the case when there is no customer recognition or the firm is able to commit to its future actions. When the type space is a continuum, we show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partitional PBE.
2007-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9855/1/MPRA_paper_9855.pdf
Sun, Ching-jen (2007): Dynamic Price Discrimination and Quality Provision Based on Purchase History.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10450
2019-10-23T05:00:07Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10594
2019-09-27T01:35:27Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3230
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10594/
Testing Gibrat’s law: empirical evidence from panel unit root tests of turkish firms
Aslan, Alper
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L20 - General
The purpose of this paper is to use panel unit root tests to see if Gibrat’s law holds in Turkey. Gibrat's Law establishes that firm growth is a random walk, it means that the probability of a given proportional change in size during a specified period is the same for all firms in a given industry. In this paper, it is examined Gibrat law in Turkey empirically by using Chen & Lu (2003) methodology and use the panel unit root method to investigate the relation between firm size and firm growth. Since it has been observed that many panel unit root tests are invalid when cross-section correlation problem and also finds that conclusion is not the same.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10594/1/MPRA_paper_10594.pdf
Aslan, Alper (2008): Testing Gibrat’s law: empirical evidence from panel unit root tests of turkish firms. Published in: International Research Journal of Finance and Economics , Vol. June, No. 16 (June 2008)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10606
2019-09-26T13:52:43Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10606/
Türkiye İmalat Sanayinde Fiyat-Maliyet Marjları: Dönemler ve Sektörler İtibariyle Karsılastırmalı Bir Analiz
Aslan, Alper
Kula, Ferit
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopolistik yapıdaki yerel endüstriler, uluslar arası rekabetle karsılastığında daha rekabetçi
davranmaya zorlanır. Bu süreç ise fiyat-maliyet marjlarının düsmesine ve çıktı seviyesinin artmasına
neden olarak, yerel firmaların piyasa gücünü azaltacaktır. Bu makalede, iki haneli Türkiye imalat
sanayi verileri ile panel veri ekonometrik teknikleri kullanılarak disipline edici ithalat hipotezi kamu
ve özel sektör ayrımı ile test edilmis ve ithalat penetrasyonunun Türkiye imalat sanayi iki haneli kamu
alt sektörlerinde 1966-2001 döneminde, piyasayı disipline etmede önemli bir rolü olduğu sonucuna
varılırken, özel sektörde bu etki reddedilirken, özel sektörde ithalatın piyasası disipline etme hipotezi
kabul edilmemistir
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10606/1/MPRA_paper_10606.pdf
Aslan, Alper and Kula, Ferit (2008): Türkiye İmalat Sanayinde Fiyat-Maliyet Marjları: Dönemler ve Sektörler İtibariyle Karsılastırmalı Bir Analiz. Forthcoming in: İSTANBUL TİCARET ÜNİVERSİTESİ SBE DERGİSİ , Vol. Bahar, No. 13 (2008)
tr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10824
2019-09-28T15:15:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3639
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10824/
Australian residential telecommunications consumption and substitution patterns
Madden, Gary G
Coble-Neal, Grant
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L69 - Other
D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Better telecommunications pricing decisions are able to be made when more complete information concerning relationships among services is available. This study
analyses residential fixed-line and mobile telephony, and Internet access and usage demands in an encompassing framework. The discrete-continuous framework allows for
service interaction within and between service portfolios. Model estimation is based on the examination of data collected from a country-wide survey of Australian households. In particular, observed service portfolios (household consumption patterns at prevailing
access prices and estimated average service usage prices), income and demographic characteristic data are collected. These data also allow the modelling to potentially identify
market segments based on income and other household characteristics.
2005
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10824/1/MPRA_paper_10824.pdf
Madden, Gary G and Coble-Neal, Grant (2005): Australian residential telecommunications consumption and substitution patterns. Published in: Review of Industrial Organization No. 26 (2005): pp. 325-347.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10861
2019-09-30T06:54:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10861/
Provision of operating reserve capacity: Principles and practices on the Nordic Electricity Market
Amundsen, Eirik S.
Bergman, Lars
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L10 - General
L94 - Electric Utilities
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
System reliability is a key aspect of electricity supply, and the ability to maintain system reliability this is an important aspect of a liberalised electricity market. But system reliability can be ensured only if there is sufficient operating reserve capacity at all times. In a liberalised electricity market the provision of operating reserve capacity is a matter of incentives that should be formulated on basic principles of economic behaviour. The Nordic electricity market, comprising the integrated Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish electricity markets, has worked well from a system reliability point of view. A key factor behind this favourable outcome is that the incentives for keeping sufficient operating reserve capacity have been strong enough. The reason for this is an adequate institutional design. More precisely the set of markets that is commonly called “the electricity market” includes both regulation and capacity markets, and rules and regulations are such that these markets are well-functioning.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10861/1/MPRA_paper_10861.pdf
Amundsen, Eirik S. and Bergman, Lars (2007): Provision of operating reserve capacity: Principles and practices on the Nordic Electricity Market. Published in: Competition and Regulation in Network Industries (Intersentia) , Vol. Vol. 2, No. 1 (2007): pp. 73-98.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10876
2019-09-27T08:06:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4E:4E36:4E3633
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3637
7375626A656374733D4E:4E39:4E3933
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463134
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10876/
The anti-red shift – to the 'Dark Side': Colour changes in Flemish luxury woollens, 1300 - 1550
Munro, John H.
N63 - Europe: Pre-1913
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L67 - Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment
N93 - Europe: Pre-1913
F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
M30 - General
O52 - Europe
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
This study documents, though it cannot fully explain, the striking shift in the spectrum of colour patterns in woollen textiles, from those of the Black Death era in the mid to late fourteenth century to those of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth century, in the southern Low Countries: a radical shift from bright red and vivid colours, especially scarlet, or mixed colours (in medley and striped woollens) to much darker, blue-based colours, ending up with overwhelmingly black colours. The evidence is taken from the annual purchases of high-grade luxury quality woollen textiles for the upper echelons of the civic governments of Bruges (from 1302 to 1496) and of Mechelen (1361-1415, and 1471 - 1550): for the burgermasters or mayors, the aldermen (schepenen), and the upper clerks. Thus, in the Mechelen civic accounts, 75 percent of the woollens purchased for these civic leaders, from 1471 to 1550, were black, uniformly dark black. In the first half of the sixteenth century, from 1501 to 1550, 98 percent of those woollens were black. While other colours – reds, greens, blues, browns – can also be found, they were purchased only for the lesser officials. Clearly the civic leaders, the urban ‘patriciate’ had acquired a decisive preference for black woollens, one also shown by the nobility.
But at Bruges, in the four decades of the mid fourteenth century, from the 1340s (just before the Black Death) to the 1370s, the bright, vivid, red or scarlet, and multi-coloured textiles clearly predominated: varying from 72.4 to 81.7 percent by number purchased, and from 77.25 to 86.19 per cent by value. The differences in percentages by number and value is explained by the decisive prominence of the most costly and luxurious of all medieval woollens: the scarlets, dyed in the extremely costly brilliant red dye kermes (extracted from Mediterranean insects). Scarlets often accounted for over a third of the textiles so purchased in the 14th century, but their number fell sharply in the 15th century, along with the radical shift in the colour spectrum to much darker blue and then black textiles. This study explains the differences in the production costs and values of scarlets and of other dyed woollen broadcloths, while demonstrating with comparative price and wage analyses (i.e., the purchasing power of industrial wages) that only the very rich could afford to buy these textiles: that the principal markets were the nobility, the upper mercantile bourgeoisie, and political leaders. Indeed, a master mason would have to spend more than a year’s income to buy a scarlet.
The famed Johan Huizinga (Autumn of the Middle Ages) had indeed commented on this predilection for dark and especially black (with purples) colours in the dress of the mid-fifteenth-century Burgundian court; but he was mistaken in his supposition that by the end of this century, clothing fashions had gone more toward blues, in light of the evidence from the Mechelen accounts. Huizinga and others have suggested various theories for this shift in the colour spectrum for textiles and for the later preference for the ‘dark side’, but none – including any that I can offer – is convincing.
Economic historians, however, must not be so supply-side oriented that they ignore the vital question of colours and thus fashions in textiles, in creating market demand. For the subsequent victory of the New Draperies, over the costly, heavy-weight woollens of the Old Draperies, in producing lighter, cheaper, but also more brightly dyed textiles, in more vivid colours, a transformation followed by the massive influx of Asian printed calicoes (with radical floral and geometric designs), helped to create the market conditions for the 18th-century Industrial Revolution, in both geographic range and income distributions.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10876/1/MPRA_paper_10876.pdf
Munro, John H. (2006): The anti-red shift – to the 'Dark Side': Colour changes in Flemish luxury woollens, 1300 - 1550. Published in: Medieval Clothing and Textiles , Vol. 3, No. 1 (2007): pp. 55-98.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11266
2019-09-30T17:07:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3637
7375626A656374733D4E:4E39:4E3933
7375626A656374733D4E:4E31:4E3133
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463134
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11266/
The symbiosis of towns and textiles: urban institutions and the changing fortunes of cloth manufacturing in the Low Countries and England, 1270 - 1570
Munro, John H.
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L67 - Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment
N93 - Europe: Pre-1913
N13 - Europe: Pre-1913
F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J40 - General
M30 - General
E50 - General
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
O52 - Europe
This article, a contribution to the ‘proto-industrialisation’ debate, examines the relative advantages of urban and rural locations for cloth manufacturing in later-medieval England and the Low Countries. From the 11th to the mid-14th century, when the English cloth trade began its seemingly inexorable expansion, the Low Countries had enjoyed a virtual supremacy in international cloth markets, then chiefly located in the Mediterranean basin. The traditional view has attributed the ultimate English victory to the advantages of a rural location, using cheap labour and water-powered fulling. The proponents of this view further contend that in late thirteenth-century England a new rural industry had displaced a centuries-old ‘traditional’ urban cloth industry through such superior cost advantages. To challenge that view, this paper puts forth the following propositions: (1) that England’s traditional urban industry had declined, abruptly from the 1290s, chiefly because of steeply rising, war-induced, transaction costs in Mediterranean markets for its chief products: i.e. cheap and light fabrics, which they had sold as price-takers; (2) that the Flemish/Brabantine cloth industries, having had a similar industrial-commercial orientation, suffered from the same industrial crisis; and it more quickly responded by reorienting production, as price-makers, to very high-priced luxury woollens; (3) that rural locations were not always more advantageous, in lower labour and other costs; (4) that urban locations offered important benefits for the luxury-cloth production: a more highly skilled, productive, better regulated labour force; urban and guild institutions to enforce necessary quality controls and promote international reputations for high quality; (5) that England’s cloth industry, when it revived from the 1360s, followed suit in shifting to more luxury-oriented exports, while gaining its chief advantages from the fiscal burdens imposed on high-quality wool exports to its overseas competitors; (6) that English export-oriented cloth production also remained more urban than rural until the late fifteenth century (for many complex reasons explored in this paper).
1998-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11266/1/MPRA_paper_11266.pdf
Munro, John H. (1998): The symbiosis of towns and textiles: urban institutions and the changing fortunes of cloth manufacturing in the Low Countries and England, 1270 - 1570. Published in: The Journal of Early Modern History: Contacts, Comparisons, Contrasts , Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1999): pp. 1-74.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12335
2019-09-27T00:00:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3334
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12335/
New Policy Regime and Small Pharmaceutical Firms in India
Pradhan, Jaya Prakash
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
Small firms dominate the Indian pharmaceutical industry with significant contribution to the national drug production and employment. They had played an important role in enhancing domestic technological capabilities in drugs production and have been instrumental in keeping drugs prices affordable for the Indian populace in remote rural areas. This rise of small firms in this sector has been facilitated by a set of strategic government polices implemented in the past decades like adoption of a process patent regime, relaxation granted from price control and industrial licensing requirement, reservation of items for exclusive production and preference in government procurement, etc. Since 1990s the regulatory regime for small firms underwent dramatic changes with withdrawal of most of the favoruable policies and implementation of regulations like a long‐term product patent regime, withdrawal of exemption from price controls, implementation of good manufacturing practices, etc. These new policies have a number of implications for the survival and growth of small pharmaceutical firms today.
2007-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12335/1/MPRA_paper_12335.pdf
Pradhan, Jaya Prakash (2007): New Policy Regime and Small Pharmaceutical Firms in India.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13013
2019-09-26T08:44:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13013/
Sustainability in a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market
Iehlé, Vincent
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C71 - Cooperative Games
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules
in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable
market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed
by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Our results suggest that the existence results
of the extant literature admit analogues even in an environment where rivals have enlarged possibilities
to enter the market and where demands react to prices. The approach makes use of
cooperative games to deduce the main results under conditions of fair sharing cost, threshold in
the consumption and regularity of the profit function.
2008-10-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13013/1/MPRA_paper_13013.pdf
Iehlé, Vincent (2008): Sustainability in a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13095
2019-10-06T20:57:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D45:4531:453132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D45:4533:453331
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453532
7375626A656374733D45:4535:453530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13095/
Holiday Price Rigidity and Cost of Price Adjustment
Levy, Daniel
Müller, Georg
Chen, Haipeng (Allan)
Bergen, Mark
Dutta, Shantanu
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
M31 - Marketing
E12 - Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
E31 - Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation
E52 - Monetary Policy
E50 - General
M21 - Business Economics
The Thanksgiving-Christmas holiday period is a major sales period for US retailers. Due to higher store traffic, tasks such as restocking shelves, handling customers’ questions and inquiries, running cash registers, cleaning, and bagging, become more urgent during holidays. As a result, the holiday-period opportunity cost of price adjustment may increase dramatically for retail stores, which should lead to greater price rigidity during holidays. We test this prediction using weekly retail scanner price data from a major Midwestern supermarket chain. We find that indeed, prices are more rigid during holiday periods than non-holiday periods. For example, the econometric model we estimate suggests that the probability of a price change is lower during holiday periods, even after accounting for cost changes. Moreover, we find that the probability of a price change increases with the size of the cost change, during both, the holiday as well as non-holiday periods. We argue that these findings are best explained by higher price adjustment costs (menu cost) the retailers face during the holiday periods. Our data provides a natural experiment for studying variation in price rigidity because most aspects of market environment such as market structure, industry concentration, the nature of long-term relationships, contractual arrangements, etc., do not vary between holiday and nonholiday periods. We, therefore, are able to rule out these commonly used alternative explanations for the price rigidity, and conclude that the menu cost theory offers the best explanation for the holiday period price rigidity.
2008-05-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13095/1/MPRA_paper_13095.pdf
Levy, Daniel and Müller, Georg and Chen, Haipeng (Allan) and Bergen, Mark and Dutta, Shantanu (2008): Holiday Price Rigidity and Cost of Price Adjustment.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13407
2019-09-28T04:49:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443132
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3633
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13407/
The Effects of Product Ageing on Demand: The Case of Digital Cameras
Lou, Weifang
Prentice, David
Yin, Xiangkang
L0 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L63 - Microelectronics ; Computers ; Communications Equipment
The static differentiated product demand model when applied to products with rapid product turnover and declining prices, yields implausible results. One response is to explicitly model the inter-temporal choices of consumers but computational demands require restrictive assumptions on consumer heterogeneity and limits on the characteristics included in the model. We propose, instead, to supplement the static model with a control for the age that each product has been in the market. This approach is applied to the US digital camera market and we find we obtain more plausible estimates. Our results are consistent with inter-temporal price discrimination by firms. Furthermore, our results suggest that ignoring the effects of product ageing may result in substantially overestimated price elasticities and technological progress and underestimated price-cost markups.
2008-11-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13407/1/MPRA_paper_13407.pdf
Lou, Weifang and Prentice, David and Yin, Xiangkang (2008): The Effects of Product Ageing on Demand: The Case of Digital Cameras.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13445
2019-09-29T11:02:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3632
7375626A656374733D44:4438
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
7375626A656374733D44:4434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13445/
When does variety increase with quality?
Basov, Suren
Danilkina, Svetlana
Prentice, David
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L62 - Automobiles ; Other Transportation Equipment ; Related Parts and Equipment
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
Casual empiricism suggests higher quality is associated with greater variety. However, recent theoretical and empirical research has either not considered this link, or has been unable to establish unambiguous predictions about the relationship between quality and variety. In this paper we develop a simple model, which predicts that for low qualities variety should be positively correlated with quality and we establish conditions under which variety will
either increase or decrease with quality at higher quality levels. The monopolist uses variety to increase the profitability of price discrimination across product lines of different qualities, by increasing the likelihood consumers choose high price products among products yielding the same utility. We show that the number of varieties offered by the monopolist is greater than
the social optimum. The predictions of the model are supported by an analysis of the market for cars. A wide range of car manufacturers are found to offer a hump-shaped distribution of varieties.
2009-02-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13445/1/MPRA_paper_13445.pdf
Basov, Suren and Danilkina, Svetlana and Prentice, David (2009): When does variety increase with quality?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13463
2019-09-28T04:45:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3437
7375626A656374733D50:5034:503432
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13463/
Evolución de la Eficiencia Productiva de una empresa privatizada: El Caso del Grupo Telefónica de España
Massón-Guerra, José Luis
L96 - Telecommunications
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth ; Aggregate Productivity ; Cross-Country Output Convergence
P42 - Productive Enterprises ; Factor and Product Markets ; Prices ; Population
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
P23 - Factor and Product Markets ; Industry Studies ; Population
Este trabajo trata de comprobar si la eficiencia productiva del Grupo Telefónica S.A. de España ha mejorado luego de ser privatizada. Se ha utilizado este caso por ser una empresa representativa en la industria de las telecomunicaciones globales. La evidencia empírica indica que las empresas de este sector y que fueron públicas, suelen presentar índices de productividad más altos cuando pasan a ser privadas, en un contexto de competencia y liberalización. Esta investigación busca demostrar si esta afirmación se cumple en este caso. Para este fin, se hace un análisis que cubre dos décadas, utilizando la técnica de evaluación y comparación de períodos previos y posteriores a la privatización. Se utilizan los indicadores de Productividad Global (IPG), Productividad Parcial del Trabajo (IPAT) y del Capital (IPAC), además de los indicadores financieros ROA, ROE, ROI y margen de explotación. Los resultados sugieren que el Grupo Telefónica, luego de su privatización, ha seguido un patrón similar al de sus pares de otros países, al mostrar aumentos en sus índices de productividad y en algunos de los índi-ces financieros. Este documento describe además, las principales aportaciones teóricas y empíricas de la eficiencia productiva de empresas de telecomunicaciones privatizadas en todo el mundo.
2007-03-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13463/1/MPRA_paper_13463.pdf
Massón-Guerra, José Luis (2007): Evolución de la Eficiencia Productiva de una empresa privatizada: El Caso del Grupo Telefónica de España.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13593
2013-02-11T10:31:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3437
7375626A656374733D50:5034:503432
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D50:5032:503233
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13593/
Evolución de la Eficiencia Productiva de una empresa privatizada: El Caso del Grupo Telefónica de España
Massón-Guerra, José Luis
L96 - Telecommunications
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth ; Aggregate Productivity ; Cross-Country Output Convergence
P42 - Productive Enterprises ; Factor and Product Markets ; Prices ; Population
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
P23 - Factor and Product Markets ; Industry Studies ; Population
This work shows if the productive efficiency of the Group Telefónica S.A. of Spain it has improved after being privatized. This case has been used to be a representative company in the industry of the global telecommunications. The empiric evidence indicates that the companies of this sector and that they were public, they usually present higher indexes of productivity when they become private, in a competition context and liberalization. This investigation looks for to demonstrate if this statement is completed in this case. For this objective, an analysis is made that covers two decades, using the evaluation technique and comparison of previous and later periods to the privatization. The indicators of Global Productivity (IPG), Partial Labor Productivity and the Capital Productivity (IPAC) are used. The results suggest that the Group Telefónica, after their privatization, a similar pattern has continued that of their couples of other countries, when showing increases in their indexes of productivity and in some of the financial indexes. This document also describes, the theoretical and empiric main contributions of the productive efficiency of companies of telecommunications privatized in the entire world.
2005-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13593/1/MPRA_paper_13593.pdf
Massón-Guerra, José Luis (2005): Evolución de la Eficiencia Productiva de una empresa privatizada: El Caso del Grupo Telefónica de España.
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13721
2019-09-28T16:36:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3137
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13721/
What is the best firm size to invest?
Kitov, Ivan
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L17 - Open Source Products and Markets
G10 - General
Significant differences in the evolution of firm size distribution for various industries in the United States have been revealed and documented. For theoretical considerations, this finding puts major constraints on the modelling of firm growth. For practical purposes, the observed differences create a solid basis for selective investment strategies.
2009-03-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13721/1/MPRA_paper_13721.pdf
Kitov, Ivan (2009): What is the best firm size to invest?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13731
2019-09-26T18:31:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3136
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13731/
An empirical investigation of the effects of concentration on profitability among US banks
Fiona, Tregenna
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L10 - General
O16 - Financial Markets ; Saving and Capital Investment ; Corporate Finance and Governance
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
D40 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
This paper analyses the effects of concentration on profitability in the US banking sector from 1994-2005, using bank-level panel data. A new index of concentration is proposed, which reflects the depth and intensity of concentration. The econometric specification facilitates the simultaneous testing of the four main hypotheses in the literature concerning the relationship between concentration and profitability. Strong support is found for the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis, as well as some support for the Relative Market Power hypothesis. The results are robust to alternative econometric techniques and specifications, and to various measures of profitability and of concentration. Further analysis sheds light on the nature and possible channels of the concentration-profitability relationship. A positive relationship is found between concentration and profitability even when the largest banks are excluded from the sample, suggesting that the relationship between concentration and profitability may act in a generalised structural way. In addition to very large banks, large banks and small banks also appear to benefit from concentration, but with no clear advantages to lower-middle-sized banks. Analysis of the effects of concentration on the components of profitability suggests that concentration may raise both interest and non-interest revenue, and reduce both interest and non-interest costs. Furthermore, concentration appears to depress bank deposit interest rates and raise both lending rates and the interest rate spread. This suggests that bank concentration might have negative effects on savings, investment, and growth.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13731/1/MPRA_paper_13731.pdf
Fiona, Tregenna (2006): An empirical investigation of the effects of concentration on profitability among US banks.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13947
2019-10-26T18:27:36Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14040
2019-09-27T16:13:35Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14040/
The joint estimation of bank-level market power and efficiency
Delis, Manthos D
Tsionas, Efthymios
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
The aim of this study is to provide a methodology for the joint estimation of efficiency and market power of individual banks. The proposed method utilizes the separate implications of the new empirical industrial organization and the stochastic frontier literatures and suggests identification using the local maximum likelihood (LML) technique. Through LML, estimation of market power of individual banks becomes feasible, while a number of restrictive theoretical and empirical assumptions are relaxed. The empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of EMU and US bank data and the results suggest small differences in the market power and efficiency levels of banks between the two samples. Market power estimates indicate fairly competitive conduct in general; however, heterogeneity in market power estimates is substantial across banks within each sample. The latter result suggests that while the banking industries examined are fairly competitive in general, the practice of some banks deviates from the average behavior, and this finding has important policy implications. Finally, efficiency and market power present a negative relationship, which is in line with the so-called “quiet life hypothesis”.
2009-01-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14040/1/MPRA_paper_14040.pdf
Delis, Manthos D and Tsionas, Efthymios (2009): The joint estimation of bank-level market power and efficiency.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14075
2019-10-02T16:42:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3131
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14075/
BPR in an Institute of Excellence in South India : A Study
Kannan, Srinivasan
N, Sudha
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
M11 - Production Management
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
Business Process Reengineering is a common topic in the field of Manufacturing and Production Engineering. There are few efforts in the area of Service industry using this framework. The present study is an effort to use the framework for improving efficiency in an Institute of Excellence in South India. The study addresses two of the line functions viz. Course Development and Organization of Events and one staff function, purchase of materials in administration. It is an attempt to put the operations in an educational setup in a business process framework and suggest modification in the lines of Business Process Reengineering or Management. In the present study the findings suggest that by eliminating some of the activities which were of least important with new modifications will reduce the time and cost tremendously. As per the prescription, the time taken for the course development has reduced from 30 days for each course to 11 days for all courses. This is only based on a rough estimation. In reality it may even be lesser if adapt the system in long run. It is important to note that as defined by the Hammer and Champy, a radical redesign can bring a reduction in number of days required and the cost associated with time for a course. The study also addresses the reduction in time for organizing academic events and purchase process.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14075/1/MPRA_paper_14075.pdf
Kannan, Srinivasan and N, Sudha (2007): BPR in an Institute of Excellence in South India : A Study.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14389
2019-10-03T15:03:20Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14389/
Accounting for Incomplete Pass-Through
Nakamura, Emi
Zerom, Dawit
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
F10 - General
Recent theoretical work has suggested a number of potentially important factors in causing
incomplete pass-through of exchange rates to prices, including markup adjustment, local costs
and barriers to price adjustment. We empirically analyze the determinants of incomplete passthrough
in the coee industry. The observed pass-through in this industry replicates key features
of pass-through documented in aggregate data: prices respond sluggishly and incompletely to
changes in costs. We use microdata on sales and prices to uncover the role of markup adjustment,
local costs, and barriers to price adjustment in determining incomplete pass-through using a
structural oligopoly model that nests all three potential factors. The implied pricing model
explains the main dynamic features of short and long-run pass-through. Local costs reduce
long-run pass-through by a factor of 59% relative to a CES benchmark. Markup adjustment
reduces pass-through by an additional factor of 33%, where the extent of markup adjustment
depends on the estimated \super-elasticity" of demand. The estimated menu costs are small
(0:23% of revenue) and have a negligible eect on long-run pass-through, but are quantitatively
successful in explaining the delayed response of prices to costs. We nd that delayed passthrough
in the coee industry occurs almost entirely at the wholesale rather than the retail
level.
2008-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14389/1/MPRA_paper_14389.pdf
Nakamura, Emi and Zerom, Dawit (2008): Accounting for Incomplete Pass-Through.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14899
2019-09-30T23:48:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14899/
Outsourcing induced by strategic competition
Chen, Yutian
Dubey, Pradeep
Sen, Debapriya
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on
the "outside" (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that "inside" firms, by accepting such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.
2009-04-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14899/1/MPRA_paper_14899.pdf
Chen, Yutian and Dubey, Pradeep and Sen, Debapriya (2009): Outsourcing induced by strategic competition.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15252
2019-09-26T12:48:51Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15252/
Factors Explaining the Interest Margin in the Banking Sectors of the European Union
Maudos, Joaquin
Fernandez de Guevara, Juan
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
This study analyses the interest margin in the principal European banking sectors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) in the period 1993-2000 using a panel of 15,888 observations, identifying the fundamental elements affecting this margin. Our starting point is the methodology developed in the original study by Ho and Saunders (1981) and later extensions, but widened to take banks’ operating costs explicitly into account. Also, unlike the usual practice in the literature, a direct measure of the degree of competition (Lerner index) in the different markets is used. The results show that the fall of margins in the European banking system is compatible with a relaxation of the competitive conditions (increase in market power and concentration), as this effect has been counteracted by a reduction of interest rate risk, credit risk, and operating costs.
2003-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15252/1/MPRA_paper_15252.pdf
Maudos, Joaquin and Fernandez de Guevara, Juan (2003): Factors Explaining the Interest Margin in the Banking Sectors of the European Union. Published in: Documentos de Trabajo, Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorros (2003)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15254
2019-09-29T23:51:42Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15254/
Banking competition, financial dependence and economic growth
Maudos, Joaquin
Fernandez de Guevara, Juan
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D40 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of financial development and banking competition on economic growth using both structural measures of competition (market concentration) and measures based on the new empirical industrial organization perspective (Panzar and Rosse`s test and the Lerner index). The evidence obtained in the period 1993-2003 for a sample of 53 sectors in 21 countries indicates that financial development and the exercise of bank market power promote economic growth. The latter result is consistent with the literature on relationship lending which argues that bank competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for companies that are informationally more opaque. The results cast doubt on the use of market concentration measures as indicators of competition.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15254/1/MPRA_paper_15254.pdf
Maudos, Joaquin and Fernandez de Guevara, Juan (2006): Banking competition, financial dependence and economic growth. Published in: Documentos de Trabajo, Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorros (2006)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15255
2019-09-28T17:28:30Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15255/
Regional financial development and bank competition: effects on economic growth
Fernandez de Guevara, Juan
Maudos, Joaquin
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D40 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
Many studies have analysed the effect of financial development and bank competition on economic growth from a cross-country perspective. However, to our knowledge, no paper has analysed the effect of these two financial variables on growth at regional level. This paper examines the case of the Spanish regions in an attempt to fill this gap. Our results show that firms in industries with a greater dependence on external finance grow faster in more developed financial regions. The results also show that bank monopoly power has an inverted-U effect on economic growth, suggesting that market power has its highest effect at intermediate values. The effect is heterogeneous among firms according to the financial dependence of the industry they belong to. This result is consistent with the literature on relationship banking which argues that bank competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for more informationally opaque firms.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15255/1/MPRA_paper_15255.pdf
Fernandez de Guevara, Juan and Maudos, Joaquin (2007): Regional financial development and bank competition: effects on economic growth. Published in: Documento de Trabajo, Fundación BBVA (2007)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15256
2019-09-26T18:02:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15256/
Regional Financial Development and Bank Competition: Effects on Firms' Growth
Fernandez de Guevara, Juan
Maudos, Joaquin
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D40 - General
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
This paper analyzes the effect of regional financial development and bank competition on firms’ growth using the Spanish provinces as a testing ground. Our results show that firms in industries with a greater dependence on external finance grow faster in more financially developed provinces. The results also show that bank monopoly power has an inverted-U effect on firms’ growth, suggesting that market power has its highest effect at intermediate values. The effect is heterogeneous among firms according to the financial dependence of the industry they belong to. This result is consistent with the literature on relationship banking which argues that bank competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for more informationally opaque firms.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15256/1/MPRA_paper_15256.pdf
Fernandez de Guevara, Juan and Maudos, Joaquin (2009): Regional Financial Development and Bank Competition: Effects on Firms' Growth. Published in: Regional Studies , Vol. 43, No. 2 (2009): pp. 211-228.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15315
2019-09-28T16:41:32Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15315/
Searching for the Concentration-Price Effect in the German Movie Theater Industry
Böhme, Enrico
Müller, Christopher
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
This paper investigates whether a price-concentration relationship can be found on local cinema markets in Germany. First, we test a model of monopolistic pricing using a new set of German micro data and find no significant difference in admission prices on monopoly and oligopoly markets. In a next step, we test whether this can be explained by the existence of local monopolies, but find no hint of that. Implicit or explicit collusion among cinema operators might explain our observations.
2009-05-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15315/1/MPRA_paper_15315.pdf
Böhme, Enrico and Müller, Christopher (2009): Searching for the Concentration-Price Effect in the German Movie Theater Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15357
2019-09-26T11:59:33Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15357/
Natural Selection, Irrationality and Monopolistic Competition
Luo, Guo Ying
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper builds an evolutionary model of an industry where firms produce differentiated products. Firms have different average cost functions and different demand functions. Firms are assumed to be totally irrational in the sense that firms enter the industry regardless of the existence of profits; firms' outputs are randomly determined rather than generated from profit maximization problems; and firms exit the industry if their wealth is negative. It shows that without purposive profit maximization assumption, monopolistic competition still evolves in the long run. The only long run survivors are those that possess the most efficient technology, face the most favorable market conditions and produce at their profit maximizing outputs. This paper modifies and supports the classic argument for the derivation of monopolistic competition.
2009-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15357/1/MPRA_paper_15357.pdf
Luo, Guo Ying (2009): Natural Selection, Irrationality and Monopolistic Competition.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15457
2019-09-26T16:37:35Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15457/
On Quantity Competition With Switching Costs
Langus, Gregor
Lipatov, Vilen
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
We build a simple model of quantity competition to
analyze the effect of switching costs on equilibrium behavior of duopolists. We characterize the industry structure as a function of
initial sales of two firms. Contrary to the literature, initial
asymmetries persist in our model even though the firms are
identical. When the disparity between initial sales is large, the
smaller firm may become very aggressive and get more than half of
the market in equilibrium. When the firms have similar initial
positions, they tend to be locked in them.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15457/1/MPRA_paper_15457.pdf
Langus, Gregor and Lipatov, Vilen (2008): On Quantity Competition With Switching Costs.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15522
2019-09-27T00:00:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15522/
Externally-oriented Small and Medium Enterprises: Predicament and Possibilities
Das, Keshab
Pradhan, Jaya Prakash
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
F10 - General
This paper addresses emerging issues concerning externally-oriented SMEs in India and the nature of important business risks faced by them during the period of global financial crisis. The unimpressive export performance of SMEs during the period of reforms is also a reflection of the limitations of the institutional support as also weak forms of production organization. The state needs to play a proactive role in contributing to enhancing SME competitiveness. Whereas financially well protected Indian SMEs are likely to be more competitive and efficient, a greater recognition of the potential of domestic market and provision of business-facilitating infrastructure holds the key for success of SMEs across board.
2009-03-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15522/1/MPRA_paper_15522.pdf
Das, Keshab and Pradhan, Jaya Prakash (2009): Externally-oriented Small and Medium Enterprises: Predicament and Possibilities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15673
2019-10-01T05:19:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15673/
Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg
Pierce, Andrea
Sen, Debapriya
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper considers a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both A and $B$ can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). First we show that an outsourcing order acts as a credible commitment on part of A to maintain a certain market share in the final good market. This generates an indirect Stackelberg leadership effect, which is absent in a technology transfer contract. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts, there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. Finally, it is shown that whenever both firms prefer one of the two contracts, all consumers prefer the other contract.
2009-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15673/1/MPRA_paper_15673.pdf
Pierce, Andrea and Sen, Debapriya (2009): Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15723
2019-09-27T03:35:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15723/
Is the Internet Bad News? The Online News Era and the Market for High-Quality News
Frijters, Paul
Velamuri, Malathi
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
We review and model the impact of the internet on the production and uptake of high-
quality news. Our review of trends in the market for news suggests 3 stylized facts: i) particular
quality news markets are dominated by merely a few providers, ii) demand for quality news
appears stable, but provision of news has become specialized; mainstream news is decoupled
from quality news, and iii) the dominant business model of internet news mirrors that of radio,
television, and newspapers in that costs of news production are recouped via advertising. We
build a stylized model that rationalizes these facts. Our model captures three conflicting effects:
(1) economies of scale in the production of news lead to monopolies on particular markets, (2)
easy access to information on the internet makes it cheaper to provide high-quality news and to
disseminate it via the web, which increases the production of such news; and (3) the existence
of bloggers and news aggregators who recycle the stories of news-providers reduces the effective
property rights of high-quality news producers, thus forcing the business model of the internet
to be advertising-based. For the most likely cases, our model would imply that the internet does
not constitute bad news for the provision and uptake of quality news.
2009-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15723/1/MPRA_paper_15723.pdf
Frijters, Paul and Velamuri, Malathi (2009): Is the Internet Bad News? The Online News Era and the Market for High-Quality News.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15968
2019-09-28T00:50:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3635
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3334
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3532
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15968/
Dynamic Competition in Pharmaceuticals: Patent Expiry, Generic Penetration, and Industry Structure
Magazzini, Laura
Pammolli, Fabio
Riccaboni, Massimo
L65 - Chemicals ; Rubber ; Drugs ; Biotechnology
I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
L52 - Industrial Policy ; Sectoral Planning Methods
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper investigates patterns of industrial dynamics and competition in the pharmaceutical industry, with particular reference to the consequences of patent expiry in different countries. We focus on the competition at the level of single chemical entities, distinguishing between original brands and generic products. Quarterly data, spanning from July 1987 to December 1998, on sales of pharmaceutical products in four countries (USA, UK, Germany, and France) constitute the basis of our analysis. All the products containing major molecules whose patent expiration date lies between 1986 and 1996 are included in our sample. We show how diffusion of generics is linked to the characteristics of the market and investigate how price dynamics of original products are affected by generic competition. Our empirical investigation shows that the dynamics of drug prices and the competition by generic drugs vary significantly across countries. This heterogeneity notwithstanding, a clear distinction seems to emerge. On the one hand, systems that rely on market-based competition in pharmaceuticals promote a clear distinction between firms that act as innovators and firms that act as imitators after patent expiry. Here, original products enjoy premium prices and exclusivity profits under patent protection, and face fierce price competition after patent expiry. On the other hand, in systems that rely on administered prices, penetration by generic drugs tends to be rather limited. Its descriptive and preliminary nature notwithstanding, our analysis seems to have relevant implications at different levels of generality, especially for Europe.
2004-02-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15968/1/MPRA_paper_15968.pdf
Magazzini, Laura and Pammolli, Fabio and Riccaboni, Massimo (2004): Dynamic Competition in Pharmaceuticals: Patent Expiry, Generic Penetration, and Industry Structure. Published in: The European Journal of Health Economics , Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2004): pp. 175-182.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15973
2019-09-27T00:21:36Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433031
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15973/
Econometric Issues and Methods in the Estimation of Production Functions
Aguirregabiria, Victor
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C01 - Econometrics
This paper discusses the main econometric issues in the identification and estimation of production functions, and reviews recent methods. The main emphasis of the paper is in explaining the role of different identifying assumptions used in alternative estimation methods.
2009-06-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15973/1/MPRA_paper_15973.pdf
Aguirregabiria, Victor (2009): Econometric Issues and Methods in the Estimation of Production Functions.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16041
2019-09-27T13:00:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443138
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433031
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16041/
FoolWatch: A Case study of econometric analysis and evidenced-based-policy making in the Australian Government
Harding, Don
D18 - Consumer Protection
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C22 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C01 - Econometrics
The decision to introduce a national FuelWatch scheme provides a timely case study of `evidence-based- policy' making in Australia.
The government based its decision on econometric work by the ACCC who refuse to release the data. They claim that their analysis is robust because it has been subject to scrutiny within the ACCC and by Treasury.
Experience with `evidence based policy' making in the United Kingdom (UK) raises doubts about such claims. The UK experience led to the term `policy-based-evidence' to describe the end result where government agencies filtered out information that was inconsistent with government policy.
The data used by the ACCC can be digitized from a graph in their report. I then use the data so obtained to assess the robustness of the ACCC analysis and econometrics. Since the government and their advisors did not realize that the data could be obtained in this way it provides a `natural experiment' in which their claims can be evaluated and tested.
I find that the ACCC apply the wrong tests to the wrong variable. Specifically, they study the nominal retail margin when economic theory suggests that analysis of anything but the real retail margin to producers creates a misspecified model inconsistent with the econometric assumptions used.
The econometrics in Appendix S of the ACCC report on petrol is substandard in application of techniques and in reporting of what was done. This should not be seen as an adverse reflection on the econometricians employed by the ACCC. Rather, it is a reflection on the process through which their work is incorporated into reports and used by government.
The ACCC findings are not robust. When I apply the correct version of the procedures used by the ACCC to the correct variable I find that the data does not support the original ACCC finding. Specifically, it is not possible to conclude as the ACCC did that FuelWatch did not raise petrol prices in Western Australia.
FuelWatch of itself is unimportant. The important issues here relate to the integrity of the government's `evidence-based' approach to policy. The UK experience clearly shows that relying on the untested opinion of `experts' leads to fudging' of the evidence or overstatement of the conclusions that can be supported by the data. This ultimately corrupts the evidence-based-policy approach. The FuelWatch experience shows that these dangers are present for Australian policy makers. Greater transparency by government, publication of data and analysis underpinning government decisions and independent review of econometric work are the only protections against this danger. Failure to implement these protections will invalidate claims about the evidence base of future policy decisions.
2008-07-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16041/1/MPRA_paper_16041.pdf
Harding, Don (2008): FoolWatch: A Case study of econometric analysis and evidenced-based-policy making in the Australian Government.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16048
2019-09-27T07:35:48Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443138
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D43:4330:433031
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16048/
FoolWatch - Further Discussion of Econometric Analysis Undertaken By ACCC
Harding, Don
D18 - Consumer Protection
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C22 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
C01 - Econometrics
Using data supplied by InformedSources I find additional flaws in the ACCC analysis of FuelWatch.
First, the drop in petrol prices that is so visually convincing in the ACCC chart S1 is in fact an artifact of the method of data construction and can be attributed primarily to increases in prices in Adelaide and Melbourne --- events that had nothing to do with Western Australia or FuelWatch.
Second, redoing the analysis using Sydney as the point of reference and adding prices in other cities as explanatory variables lead to results that contradict ACCC findings. First I find that the two best models that I estimate yield the conclusion that Fuelwatch either increased petrol prices in Western Australia by a small amount or had no effect.
Third, I find that the entry of Woolworths and Coles into the Western Australian market had the effect of reducing unleaded petrol prices Perth by about 2.67 per cent relative to Sydney.
2008-07-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16048/1/MPRA_paper_16048.pdf
Harding, Don (2008): FoolWatch - Further Discussion of Econometric Analysis Undertaken By ACCC.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16172
2019-09-27T03:13:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4333:433334
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16172/
Dynamics of market share in the microfinance industry in Bangladesh
Mahmoud, Chowdhury Shameem
Khalily, M. A. Baqui
Wadood, Syed Naimul
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C34 - Truncated and Censored Models ; Switching Regression Models
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
We discuss evidence that the microcredit industry in Bangladesh has seen emergence of large variations in the size of the microfinance institutions operating in the market-- on the one hand, there are large national-level MFIs, while on the other hand, small localized MFIs operating only within the confines of a small area. Data from a recent survey of Pathrail union in Tangail district, a seasoned place for microcredit, reveals that within the local market competition is becoming more and more intense over time between established national-level MFIs and newly emerging local-level MFIs for market shares in terms of loan amount as well as borrowed members. Data reveals that there is market segmentation where some borrowers and MFIs opt for a package of low interest rates tied with low amount of loan disbursed and some other borrowers and MFIs settle for a package of high interest rates tied with high amount of loan disbursed. A Tobit regression estimation of member market shares in village micro credit market shows that size of the MFI, years of operation in the village, average loan size, deposit interest rates, loan amount disbursed for unique loan purposes (i.e., housing loan) are key determinants in determining MFI shares of a village microcredit market.
2009-07-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16172/1/MPRA_paper_16172.pdf
Mahmoud, Chowdhury Shameem and Khalily, M. A. Baqui and Wadood, Syed Naimul (2009): Dynamics of market share in the microfinance industry in Bangladesh.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16707
2019-10-07T17:27:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16707/
Lending Competition and Relationship Banking: Evidence from Japan
Ogura, Yoshiaki
Yamori, Nobuyoshi
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
The question of whether more competition among banks increases relationship banking, which is predicted to improve credit availability for informationally opaque firms in theory, is a controversial issue in the banking literature. By using firm-level survey data in Japan, this paper provides evidence for the negative correlation between lending competition and the provision of relationship banking . This paper raises the question whether fierce interbank competition is always beneficial for small firms.
2009-06-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16707/1/MPRA_paper_16707.pdf
Ogura, Yoshiaki and Yamori, Nobuyoshi (2009): Lending Competition and Relationship Banking: Evidence from Japan.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16991
2019-09-27T03:38:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16991/
Oligopsony Power in the Ukrainian Milk Processing Industry: Evidence from the Regional Markets for Raw Milk
Perekhozhuk, Oleksandr
Grings, Michael
Glauben, Thomas
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Most of the studies based on the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach use the industry data to estimate the degree of market power at the national level. Yet, only a few empirical studies presented the results that measure the degree of market power at the regional level and found the existence of market power in the regional markets. While the fact is that there is an extensive evidence for the existence of potential oligopsony market power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry (price cartels and geographic market sharing among milk processing enterprises, interference of the state authorities, higher concentration on regional markets), the estimation results of the market structure model at the national level did not produce any evidence suggesting the exercise of oligopsony power (the estimated parameter of oligopsony power is close to zero and statistically insignificant). The objective of this study is to estimate the degree of oligopsony power in the regional market for raw milk. The estimation results of the market structure model at the regional level indicate the existence of oligopsony power in nine out of the twenty three regions of Ukraine.
2009-06-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16991/1/MPRA_paper_16991.pdf
Perekhozhuk, Oleksandr and Grings, Michael and Glauben, Thomas (2009): Oligopsony Power in the Ukrainian Milk Processing Industry: Evidence from the Regional Markets for Raw Milk.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17166
2019-09-27T13:59:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17166/
The Impact of Firm Size and Market Size Asymmetries on National Mergers in a Three-Country Model
Santos-Pinto, Luís
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper studies the impact of firm and market size asymmetries on merger decisions. To do that I consider a model where a small and a large country compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms
(with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country
have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in small ones.
2009-08-26
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17166/1/MPRA_paper_17166.pdf
Santos-Pinto, Luís (2009): The Impact of Firm Size and Market Size Asymmetries on National Mergers in a Three-Country Model.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17673
2019-09-30T12:59:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3933
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3539
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17673/
The Impacts of Airport Centrality in the EU Network and Inter- Airport Competition on Airport Efficiency
Malighetti, G
Martini, G
Paleari, S
Redondi, R
L93 - Air Transportation
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L59 - Other
In this paper we study the relationship between airport efficiency and two factors: an
airport’s centrality in the EU network, and the intensity of competition from alternative
airports in the same catchment area. We apply a two-stage econometric model based on the
Simar & Wilson (2007) bootstrap procedure to a balanced sample of 57 European airports.
We also design and compute our own measures of airport centrality and competition. The
results show that efficiency is positively related to centrality in the European network, as
measured by a weighted sum of minimal paths passing through the airport in question. The
intensity of competition between airports also has a positive effect on efficiency. Our
analysis suggests that air transportation policies should focus on increasing competition
within important catchment areas (e.g., by investing in infrastructure facilitating access to
alternative airports) and enhancing the connectivity of the EU network (e.g., by subsidizing
new point-to-point connections between airports with capacity to spare).
2009-01-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17673/1/MPRA_paper_17673.pdf
Malighetti, G and Martini, G and Paleari, S and Redondi, R (2009): The Impacts of Airport Centrality in the EU Network and Inter- Airport Competition on Airport Efficiency.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17787
2019-09-28T01:13:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3833
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17787/
Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices
Pelnar, Gregory
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L83 - Sports ; Gambling ; Restaurants ; Recreation ; Tourism
L40 - General
An important issue in many antitrust lawsuits involving professional sports leagues and their member teams is the extent to which franchises within the same, and across different, professional sports leagues compete with one another for fans and advertisers. Complicating the issue is the fact that some sports franchises also cooperate with other franchises in the same or different leagues by, for example, participating in a joint venture to build and operate the stadium in which they will play their games or a regional sports network joint venture to televise their games. An extreme form of cooperation is common ownership: some franchises in different sports leagues have common ownership. This study investigates the impact of competition and cooperation among the franchises of the four major professional sports leagues (i.e., the National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball) on ticket prices for the 2008 season. The regression results suggest that the existence of one or more rival sports franchises in the same metropolitan area does not have a statistically significant impact on ticket prices. On the other hand, there is at best weak evidence that cooperation between sports franchises impacts ticket prices. These findings are consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses.
2009-10-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17787/1/MPRA_paper_17787.pdf
Pelnar, Gregory (2009): Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17857
2019-09-30T16:15:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17857/
Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price
Perona, Mathieu
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
Z11 - Economics of the Arts and Literature
This paper models the book retail market as a dual market. Consumers choose between competitively retailed, well-identified blockbusters and going to a monopoly bookshop to find the best match for their tastes. I show that uncertainty about the status on a given title (will it be a blockbuster or not?) places publishers in front of a trade-off between low prices (valuable if they get a blockbuster) and high prices (in the other case). The main effect of this trade-off is that the presence of blockbusters almost never lead to bookshop foreclosure by blockbusters and that a higher number of blockbusters leads to lower price for all books and increased consumer surplus. A fixed book price mitigates the effects of blockbuster, transferring suplus from blockbuster byuers towards publishers, and leads to perfect matching between readers and tastes. When the number of titles and of blockbusters becomes largers however, the situations with and without FBP converge.
2009-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17857/1/MPRA_paper_17857.pdf
Perona, Mathieu (2009): Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17862
2019-09-26T18:45:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17862/
Lending Competition and Relationship Banking: Evidence from Japanese Prefectural Level Data
Ogura, Yoshiaki
Yamori, Nobuyoshi
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
The question of whether more competition among banks increases relationship banking, which is predicted to improve credit availability for informationally opaque firms in theory, is a controversial issue in the banking literature. By using firm-level survey data in Japan, this paper provides evidence for the negative correlation between lending competition and the provision of relationship banking . This paper raises the question whether fierce interbank competition is always beneficial for small firms.
2009-08-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17862/1/MPRA_paper_17862.pdf
Ogura, Yoshiaki and Yamori, Nobuyoshi (2009): Lending Competition and Relationship Banking: Evidence from Japanese Prefectural Level Data.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18050
2019-10-06T03:25:33Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18050/
La producción de energía eléctrica en España: Análisis económico de la actividad tras la liberalización del Sector Eléctrico
Hernandez Martinez, Fernando
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D41 - Perfect Competition
L94 - Electric Utilities
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper is about the Spanish Electricity Market after liberalisation. The analysis focuses on
finding if the market has become as a Perfect Competition regimen or on the other side, he still
continues as a regimen in wich a high output supply concentration and high power market appears,
not allowing free-market prices as a consequence. In this sense, conclusions are based on Cournot-perfect competition analysis for three different electricity demand scenarios. Finally, Competence transitions costs are also especially important as responsible of voluntary actions of increasing prices by Electricity Companies with high
market power.
2006-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18050/1/MPRA_paper_18050.pdf
Hernandez Martinez, Fernando (2006): La producción de energía eléctrica en España: Análisis económico de la actividad tras la liberalización del Sector Eléctrico. Published in: FUNCAS Working Papers Series No. 84-89116-07-05 (October 2006)
es
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18534
2019-09-28T22:11:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18534/
Outsourcing and Vertical Integration in a Competitive Industry
Ciliberto, Federico
Panzar, John
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
We develop a partial equilibrium, perfectly competitive framework of a (potentially) vertically integrated industry. There are three types of firms: upstream firms that use primary factors to produce an intermediate; downstream firms that use primary factors and intermediates to produce a final good; and vertically integrated firms that do both. We establish conditions under which vertically integrated firms exist and outsource (part of) the production of the intermediate input. We study the changes in industry configurations resulting from changes in costs and demand.
2009-10-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18534/1/MPRA_paper_18534.pdf
Ciliberto, Federico and Panzar, John (2009): Outsourcing and Vertical Integration in a Competitive Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19138
2019-10-01T12:43:53Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3235
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32:4F3234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
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7375626A656374733D4C:4C30:4C3030
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
7375626A656374733D45:4532:453233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3236
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3330
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443234
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19138/
Маркетинговый аспект формирования оптимального промышленного ассортимента товара для малого бизнеса
Sidorchuk, Roman
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
O25 - Industrial Policy
O24 - Trade Policy ; Factor Movement Policy ; Foreign Exchange Policy
L10 - General
O21 - Planning Models ; Planning Policy
L00 - General
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
M31 - Marketing
L23 - Organization of Production
E23 - Production
L26 - Entrepreneurship
M30 - General
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
Article deals with matters of quantitative methods of creating the optimal range for a small manufacturing enterprise. The classical approach to the formation of an optimal production program based on mathematical methods for linear programming is viewed through the prism of consumer preferences. As a result of proposed road modernization of the classical scheme, taking into account consumer preferences on the basis of the model Fishbein. An example of the use of standard software for creating the optimal range of industrial products for small manufacturing enterprises.
2008-11-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19138/1/MPRA_paper_19138.pdf
Sidorchuk, Roman (2008): Маркетинговый аспект формирования оптимального промышленного ассортимента товара для малого бизнеса. Published in: Маркетинг в России и за рубежом (Marketing in Russia and abroad) , Vol. 1, No. 2009 (8 January 2009): pp. 72-81.
ru
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20044
2019-09-27T22:35:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20044/
Isolation or joining a mall? On the location choice of competing shops
Non, Marielle
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
I study the location choice of competing shops. A shop can either be isolated or join a mall. A fraction of consumers is uninformed about prices and incurs costs to travel between market places and to enter a shop. The equilibrium mall size is computed for several parameter values, showing that mall and isolated shops can coexist. Several effects play a role. Mall shops attract more consumers, but isolated shops set a higher maximum price. Moreover, numerical evaluations show that an increase in mall size decreases the average price level and increases the participation level of uninformed consumers.
2010-01-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20044/1/MPRA_paper_20044.pdf
Non, Marielle (2010): Isolation or joining a mall? On the location choice of competing shops.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20217
2019-09-28T20:54:57Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20217/
What Causes Herding:Information Cascade or Search Cost ?
Lin, William
Tsai, Shih-Chuan
Sun, David
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
We analyze in this study what could have caused herding in the stock market. Information cascades have often been considered as a major cause. However, we present in this study evidences inconsistent with that hypothesis. Our analysis is in support of an alternative theory based on search cost of investors. Specifically, previous works studied daily data or those with lower frequency based on a herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). We adopt instead the measure of Patterson and Sharma (2006) and argue that the search model of Vayanos and Wang (2007) characterize herding phenomenon better. Our analysis supports their hypothesis employing intraday order book data. We find that stronger order flow herding is driven by lower transactions cost. Herding tend to occur in trading of high-cap, high turnover stocks, which contradicts prediction of the information cascade hypothesis. Information cascade effect, if any, is actually stronger near market close than at open. Therefore our study suggests that herding could be related more to intrinsic search cost structure of investors rather than information related factors.
2009-02-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20217/1/MPRA_paper_20217.pdf
Lin, William and Tsai, Shih-Chuan and Sun, David (2009): What Causes Herding:Information Cascade or Search Cost ?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20248
2019-09-26T12:19:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20248/
The competitive impact of hypermarket retailers on gasoline prices
Zimmerman, Paul R.
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L71 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Hypermarkets are large retail suppliers of general merchandise or grocery items that also sell gasoline,
often at very low margins. Using panel data for 1998-2002, this paper estimates the impact of
hypermarkets on average state-level retail gasoline prices. The empirical results suggest a robust,
economically (and statistically) significant effect of increased competition from hypermarkets.
Furthermore, the results also suggest that refiners’ lower the delivered wholesale prices charged to their
affiliated lessee-dealer and open-dealer stations in response to increased hypermarket competition, which in
turn translates to lower retail (street) prices. The presence of a state motor fuel sales-below-cost (SBC) law
may lessen the price-reducing effects from hypermarket competition by 40-67 percent while independently
imparting no other offsetting price reductions. Finally, using recently published estimates of the short-run
own price elasticity of demand for gasoline, consumer welfare is estimated to have increased in the
neighborhood of $488 million over the sample period.
2009-06-18
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20248/1/MPRA_paper_20248.pdf
Zimmerman, Paul R. (2009): The competitive impact of hypermarket retailers on gasoline prices.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20264
2019-10-02T04:40:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3233
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513135
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513132
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513138
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3137
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D51:5131:513134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20264/
Framework for Analysis of Agrarian Contracts
Bachev, Hrabrin
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness
L23 - Organization of Production
Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure ; Land Reform ; Land Use ; Irrigation ; Agriculture and Environment
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
K0 - General
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Q18 - Agricultural Policy ; Food Policy
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Q14 - Agricultural Finance
This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts. First, it specifies type and importance of different mechanisms of governance of agrarian activity. Second, it defines the essence, and classifies types and features of agrarian contracts. Next, it identifies technological, institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and transaction costs factors for contractual choice, and specifies effective modes for contractual arrangements in agriculture. Finally, it determines the effective boundaries and sustainability of farm and agrarian organizations.
2010-01-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20264/1/MPRA_paper_20264.pdf
Bachev, Hrabrin (2010): Framework for Analysis of Agrarian Contracts.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20763
2019-09-27T06:28:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20763/
Strategic Outsourcing under Economies of Scale
Chen, Yutian
Sen, Debapriya
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Economies of scale in upstream production can lead both disintegrated downstream firms as well as its vertically integrated rival to outsource offshore for intermediate
goods, even if offshore production has moderate cost disadvantage compared to in-house production of the vertically integrated firm.
2010-02-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20763/1/MPRA_paper_20763.pdf
Chen, Yutian and Sen, Debapriya (2010): Strategic Outsourcing under Economies of Scale.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20951
2019-09-26T23:59:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463233
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3331
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20951/
R&D strategy of small and medium enterprises in India: Trends and determinants
Pradhan, Jaya Prakash
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
F23 - Multinational Firms ; International Business
O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
The liberalization of economic policies in the last two decades and intensifying market competition tend to be a cause of policy concern for the survival of SMEs in emerging economies like India as these firms accounts for the largest chunk of industrial units and employment. Given their limited financial and intangible resources, the promotion of R&D among SMEs has become a very important policy parameter. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on Indian R&D by analyzing the trends and patterns of R&D investment by Indian manufacturing SMEs during the period 1991−2008 and exploring various factors that determine their R&D behaviour. The results show that Indian SMEs have lowest incidence of doing in-house R&D and their R&D intensities have fallen in the last decade. A number of factors that play important role in determining SME R&D have been identified based on the three steps Censored Quantile Regression and some useful policy implications are suggested for enhancing R&D activities of small firms.
2010-02-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20951/1/MPRA_paper_20951.pdf
Pradhan, Jaya Prakash (2010): R&D strategy of small and medium enterprises in India: Trends and determinants.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:21204
2019-09-27T09:03:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21204/
What Causes Herding:Information Cascade or Search Cost ?
Lin, William
Tsai, Shih-Chuan
Sun, David
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
We analyze in this study cause of herding in a stock market. Information cascades have often been considered as a primary choice. However, we present evidences inconsistent in this study. Employing intraday order book data, our analysis supports the inclusion of of an alternative theory based on search cost of investors, in addition to the information cascade argument. Specifically, previous works studied daily data or those with lower frequency based on a herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). We adopt instead the measure of Patterson and Sharma (2006) and argue that the search model of Vayanos and Wang (2007) characterizes herding phenomenon better at market open. Our analysis is also consistent with the information competition equilibrium of Back, Cao and Willard (2000) and dynamic friction model of Hu (2006).We find that stronger order flow herding is driven by lower transactions cost and shorter time to fill an order. Herding tends to occur in trading of high-cap, high turnover stocks, which contradicts prediction of the information cascade hypothesis. Search cost effect is stronger at market open, while information cascade effect is stronger at market close. Therefore our study suggests that herding should be related both to intrinsic search cost structure of investors as well as information related factors.
2009-02-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21204/4/MPRA_paper_21204.pdf
Lin, William and Tsai, Shih-Chuan and Sun, David (2009): What Causes Herding:Information Cascade or Search Cost ?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22499
2019-09-26T16:28:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D42:4231:423132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22499/
The classical notion of competition revisited
Salvadori, Neri
Signorino, Rodolfo
B12 - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
We compare and analyse two different conceptions of market competition: the walrasian notion of perfect competition and the Classical notion of free competition: while the former may be described as an equilibrium state in which atomistic agents treat prices parametrically, the latter is a situation in which agents, endowed by market power, fix prices strategically. We show that price undercutting or outbidding are the typical phenomena that, for the Classical authors, may be observed in a market characterized by free competition. We investigate some problematic aspects of the neoclassical notion of perfect competition and we reconstruct the Classical theory of free competition, as developed, in particular, by Adam Smith and Karl Marx, in the light of the modern notion of mixed strategies equilibria.
2010-05-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22499/1/MPRA_paper_22499.pdf
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2010): The classical notion of competition revisited.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22551
2019-10-11T04:41:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22551/
Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price
Perona, Mathieu
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
Z11 - Economics of the Arts and Literature
This paper models the book retail market as a dual market. Consumers choose between competitively retailed, well-identified blockbusters, and going to a monopoly bookshop to find the best match for their tastes. I show that uncertainty about the status on a given title (will it be a blockbuster or not?) places publishers in front of a trade-off between low prices (valuable if they get a blockbuster) and high prices (in the other case). The main effect of this trade-off is a decrease of wholesale prices compared with the case of full information, thus enabling the bookshop to compete with lower-priced blockbusters. Uncertainty thus increases both industry profits and consumer surplus. A fixed book price further increases consumer surplus and profits of non-blockbuster publishers, at the expense of those who get a blockbuster.
2009-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22551/1/MPRA_paper_22551.pdf
Perona, Mathieu (2009): Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22760
2019-09-28T07:21:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D42:4231:423132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22760/
The classical notion of competition revisited
Salvadori, Neri
Signorino, Rodolfo
B12 - Classical (includes Adam Smith)
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
The paper seeks to fill a lacuna within Classical economics concerning the process of market price determination in a short-period equilibrium. To this aim, first we distinguish the Classical notion of free competition from the Walrasian notion of perfect competition and we argue that the latter is beset by some theoretical difficulties alien to the former. Second, we reconstruct in some detail Smith and Marx’s views concerning market price determination and we show that Marx’s extensive use of metaphors and numerical examples foreshadows the modern taxonomy of buyers’ market, sellers’ market and mixed strategy equilibrium in the capacity space of a standard Bertrand duopoly model. Finally, we highlight similarities and differences between the Classical notion of competition and contemporary game-theoretic oligopoly models
2010-05-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22760/1/MPRA_paper_22760.pdf
Salvadori, Neri and Signorino, Rodolfo (2010): The classical notion of competition revisited.
en
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