2024-03-28T13:52:23Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:179
2019-09-29T04:31:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/179/
Competition Policy in Turkey
Kulaksizoglu, Tamer
L40 - General
This paper evaluates the current competition policy framework in Turkey.
A brief history of competition policy is presented. An account of the Law
on the Protection of Competition, the main law on competition in Turkey,
is given. The structure of the Competition Authority, the body responsi-
ble for applying the Law, and the way the enforcement system works are
explained. Detailed statistics are given about all the cases submitted to
the Competition Authority by 2002. Accounts of some selected cases are
reported and a general assessment of the implementation of competition
policy is offered. The main finding of the paper is that, although there is
a movement in the right direction, competition policy implementation in
Turkey still needs to be developed and strengthened.
2004-11-26
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/179/1/MPRA_paper_179.pdf
Kulaksizoglu, Tamer (2004): Competition Policy in Turkey.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:198
2019-09-26T16:23:09Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/198/
Competition Policy in Turkey
Mumcu, Ayşe
Zenginobuz, Unal
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
L40 - General
K21 - Antitrust Law
We review the enforcement of competition policy and the activities of Turkish Competition Authority during 1997-2000. Descriptive statistics are provided on the caseload handled, such as types of anti-competitive behavior investigated, breakdown of investigations by industry, violations found, and penalties imposed. Competition Authority has been stretched in terms of manpower as it has faced a flood of applications in addition to having to develop the necessary secondary legislation. The most salient cases handled concerned infringement of competition, while a rather lenient position was taken in authorizing mergers and acquisitions. The silence of the Turkish Competition Law regarding public undertakings is a potential source of problem for aligning competition policies with those of EU.
2001-11-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/198/1/MPRA_paper_198.pdf
Mumcu, Ayşe and Zenginobuz, Unal (2001): Competition Policy in Turkey. Published in: Conference Proceedings, ERF Eighth Annual Conference, Cairo, Egypt (January 2002)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:357
2019-10-08T04:39:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3631
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/357/
Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition Policy: Evidence from the Turkish Cement Industry
Kulaksizoglu, Tamer
L61 - Metals and Metal Products ; Cement ; Glass ; Ceramics
L40 - General
In this paper, I develop a new method to test whether the introduction of competition policy in an industry has had any effects on its market performance. The method is based on the new empirical industrial organization methodology. I apply the method to the Turkish cement industry, which has been heavily investigated by the Turkish Competition Authority. The results show that the introduction of competition policy has had no effect in the market performance of the industry.
2004-07-28
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/357/1/MPRA_paper_357.pdf
Kulaksizoglu, Tamer (2004): Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition Policy: Evidence from the Turkish Cement Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:376
2019-09-27T08:26:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483434
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/376/
Competition between regulated and non-regulated generators on electric power networks
Mumcu, Ayşe
Oğur, Serhan
Zenginobuz, Unal
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
The ongoing restructuring of the electricity sectors in many countries raises the policy question of to what extent the public generating assets should be privatized and what the objective function of any remaining public generation companies should be. We analyze the optimal regulatory policy in the context of a mixed wholesale electricity market in which a private and a public generator engage in Cournot competition. In a standard industry without externalities, instructing the public firm to maximize profits instead of total social surplus in similar settings may turn out to be welfare improving. In an electricity market, however, the possibility of congestion in the transmission network and externalities between generators stemming from loop flows change the nature of equilibria and the optimal regulatory policy dramatically. Not only that instruction of pure welfare maximization is not a part of optimal regulatory policy in many instances, instruction of profit maximization is not a part of optimal regulatory policy, except in one case, either. We also extend the literature by allowing the public firm to maximize not only its profits or social welfare, but any convex combination of the two, as well as considering cost asymmetries and shadow cost of public funds. Furthermore, our framework also applies to a wholesale power industry where regulated private firms and unregulated private firms are competing, rather than public and private firms.
2001-04-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/376/1/MPRA_paper_376.pdf
Mumcu, Ayşe and Oğur, Serhan and Zenginobuz, Unal (2001): Competition between regulated and non-regulated generators on electric power networks.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:381
2019-09-26T14:12:47Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463135
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/381/
Customs Union with EU and the Impact of Foreign Competition on the Structure and Performance of Turkish Manufacturing Industry
Erzan, Refik
Filiztekin, Alpay
Zenginobuz, Unal
L10 - General
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
F15 - Economic Integration
L40 - General
Using industry level panel data, we study how increasing openness to international markets, including the customs union with EU, have affected the structure and performance of Turkish manufacturing industries over the 1980-1999 period, with special emphasis on the market disciplining role of imports. We find that changes import penetration did not reduce (output-) concentration in concentrated industries, while for the less concentrated industries it had a mildly significant negative impact. It was also observed that changes in import penetration had a significant positive, rather than negative, effect on price-cost margins (PCM) with a one-year lag in high PCM industries; while for the low PCM industries current changes in import penetration had again a significant positive impact on profit margins. Thus, imports do not seem to provide discipline for either the low or high PCM industries.
2003-04-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/381/1/MPRA_paper_381.pdf
Erzan, Refik and Filiztekin, Alpay and Zenginobuz, Unal (2003): Customs Union with EU and the Impact of Foreign Competition on the Structure and Performance of Turkish Manufacturing Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:575
2019-10-01T00:27:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/575/
An Experimental Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees
Datta, Shakun
Offenberg, Jennifer
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference. Lesser use of guarantees, combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level, suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior.
2003-08-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/575/1/MPRA_paper_575.pdf
Datta, Shakun and Offenberg, Jennifer (2003): An Experimental Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1092
2019-10-03T18:02:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3631
7375626A656374733D43:4333:433332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1092/
Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition Policy: Evidence from the Turkish Cement Industry
Kulaksizoglu, Tamer
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L61 - Metals and Metal Products ; Cement ; Glass ; Ceramics
C32 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes ; State Space Models
L40 - General
In this paper, I develop a new method to test whether the introduction of competition policy in an industry has had any effects on its market performance. The method is based on the new empirical industrial organization methodology. I apply the method to the Turkish cement industry, which has been heavily investigated by the Turkish Competition Authority. The results show that the introduction of competition policy has had no effect in the market performance of the industry.
2004-03-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1092/1/MPRA_paper_1092.pdf
Kulaksizoglu, Tamer (2004): Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition Policy: Evidence from the Turkish Cement Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:1426
2019-09-27T14:01:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1426/
Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs
Morita, Hodaka
Waldman, Michael
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Significant attention has been paid to why a durable-goods producer with little or no market power would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product. This paper provides an explanation for this practice that is based on consumer switching costs and the choice of consumers between maintaining and replacing used units. In our explanation, if a firm does not monopolize the maintenance market for its own product, then consumers sometimes maintain used units when it would be efficient for the units to be replaced. In turn, the return to monopolizing the maintenance market is that the practice allows the firm to avoid this inefficiency. An interesting aspect of our analysis that has significant public-policy implications is that, in contrast to most previous explanations for why a durable-goods producer with little or no market power would monopolize the maintenance market for its own product, in our explanation the practice increases rather than decreases both social welfare and consumer welfare.
2006-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1426/1/MPRA_paper_1426.pdf
Morita, Hodaka and Waldman, Michael (2006): Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2265
2019-09-28T23:22:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4330
7375626A656374733D47:4733
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2265/
The Italian Chamber of Lords Sits on Listed Company Boards: An Empirical Analysis of Italian Listed Company Boards from 1998 to 2006
Santella, Paolo
Drago, Carlo
Polo, Andrea
C0 - General
G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
M2 - Business Economics
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
The purpose of the present paper is to contribute to the literature on country interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships in the Italian listed companies from 1998 to 2006. We find that over the entire period a high percentage of the Italian listed companies are connected with each other through a very small minority of directors. Such group of interlocking (overwhelmingly male) directors shows a remarkable stability over time with very few entrants and very few exits mainly related to the passing away of the director. We define them for brevity the Lords of the Italian stockmarket. Lords tend to belong to families of directors, with the first five families having more than 100 directorships in nine years. The highest level of connectivity concerns those companies that belong to the MIB 30/S&P-MIB 40 index, the Italian Blue Chips. In particular, practically all the financial Blue Chips are connected with each other through a web of directors continuously from 1998 to 2006. The extent, depth, and stability of the connections among the Italian listed companies, and in particular the main Italian financial companies, raise doubts on the extent of their competitive behaviour.
2007-11-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2265/1/MPRA_paper_2265.pdf
Santella, Paolo and Drago, Carlo and Polo, Andrea (2007): The Italian Chamber of Lords Sits on Listed Company Boards: An Empirical Analysis of Italian Listed Company Boards from 1998 to 2006.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2344
2019-10-07T11:18:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2344/
Mobile call termination in the UK
Armstrong, Mark
Wright, Julian
L96 - Telecommunications
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
We discuss policy towards mobile call termination, illustrated by the 2002 Competition Commission enquiry into the UK mobile market. We present a model of the mobile market which includes both fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile call termination. In broad terms, the former service is likely to involve monopoly pricing if left unchecked, while the latter service---if the termination charge is jointly chosen by networks---may provide the mobile sector with the means by which to relax competition. Competition is often relaxed by choosing a low mobile-to-mobile termination charge. If feasible, then, unregulated networks often wish to set different termination charges depending on whether traffic originates on the fixed or mobile network. By contrast, social optimality often requires that uniform termination charges be imposed.
2007-03-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2344/1/MPRA_paper_2344.pdf
Armstrong, Mark and Wright, Julian (2007): Mobile call termination in the UK.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2384
2019-09-26T10:16:37Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice (in long run) or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract (in short run e.g. one of year). It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/1/MPRA_paper_2384.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 43-57.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2385
2019-09-30T12:59:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
D40 - General
For methods of the profit division in the bilateral monopoly of the mine and the power station sug-gested in the first part of this paper the formulae for lignite price and shares in the joint profit of the mine and the power station are calculated. The proposed profit division contain: the egalitarian, normal and asymmetrical Nash solution, the proportional division, assuring equal and proportional profit margins division (in it calculated only on the basis of prime costs) and Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with individual utility functions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2385/1/MPRA_paper_2385.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 59-68.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2388
2019-09-30T08:16:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443839
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/
Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych.
Jurdziak, Leszek
L0 - General
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
D89 - Other
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C71 - Cooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
Q42 - Alternative Energy Sources
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L10 - General
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
For the hypothetical deposit with parameters similar to KWB “Konin” S.A. conditions; lignite prices and proposed divisions are calculated and results were discussed under the angle of the fairness (equity) of the division and the possibility of their approval by both sides. A sensitivity analysis of shares of the mine in joint profits, the level of border prices outlining break-even points, lignite prices, the total profit and the profit of the mine for the price change of the energy, costs of the mine and the power station was carried. Results were discussed under the angle of correction of the division in the next period with taking into consideration the inflation, changes in prices of the energy and level of total costs of the mine and the power station and of the potential temptation of the change in the proportion of shares by increasing expenses. Lignite mines and power stations cooperating with them were invited for discussion about proposed divisions.
2006-11-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2388/1/MPRA_paper_2388.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 69-80.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2440
2019-10-04T19:23:36Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2440/
An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling
Baranes, Edmond
Bourreau, Marc
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L96 - Telecommunications
This guide provides a critical review of the economics literature on the
desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop. Firstly, we discuss recent
contributions, which aim to quantify the effect of unbundling regulations on the
development of broadband services. Secondly, we review the literature on the potential
impact of unbundling on investment and innovation incentives. Finally, we conclude this
paper by offering some suggestions for further research.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2440/1/MPRA_paper_2440.pdf
Baranes, Edmond and Bourreau, Marc (2005): An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling. Published in: Internationall journal of digital economic No. 57 (March 2005): pp. 13-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2441
2019-09-27T10:04:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2441/
Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges
de Bijl, Paul W.J.
Peitz, Martin
L50 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
O52 - Europe
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L96 - Telecommunications
This paper discusses the development of local loop unbundling in
telecommunications markets throughout the European Union. It elaborates on the
regulatory framework in Europe and provides an overview of recent experiences in
Europe. Different types of unbundling, allowing for different types of entry and services
provided by entrants, are discussed. This paper also explores the challenges for policy
and regulation that arise because of unbundling and recent, related technological
developments in the markets for fixed voice telephony and broadband internet access,
particularly the emergence of packet-switched telephony such as VoIP.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2441/1/MPRA_paper_2441.pdf
de Bijl, Paul W.J. and Peitz, Martin (2005): Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 57 (March 2005): pp. 33-57.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2442
2019-09-26T09:07:29Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2442/
International Broadband Deployment: The Impact of Unbundling
Garcia-Murillo, Martha
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L96 - Telecommunications
This paper shows that unbundling an incumbent's infrastructure only results in a
substantial improvement in broadband deployment for middle-income countries, but not
for their high income counterparts. Our statistical analysis of approximately 100 countries
showed that GDP per capita, population, competition and unbundling are all factors that
can lead a carrier to provide broadband services in a country. The logit models show that
unbundling has a significant positive impact on the availability of broadband services. The
OLS analysis indicates that GDP per capita, population size, price, competition, the
percentage of dial-up Internet users, and hosts all have positive effects on the number of
subscribers. One implication of these results is that if a policy is to be implemented to
promote broadband, it should either foster competition through unbundling and/or reduced
prices. Efforts to develop local content can also improve broadband adoption.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2442/1/MPRA_paper_2442.pdf
Garcia-Murillo, Martha (2005): International Broadband Deployment: The Impact of Unbundling. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 57 (March 2005): pp. 83-105.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2443
2019-10-03T01:18:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2443/
Telecommunications Technologies: Deployment in Developing Countries
Gasmi, Farid
Recuero Virto, Laura
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
This paper examines some policies pursued in developing countries for the
provision of telecommunications services in rural areas. These policies significantly differ
from those typically implemented in developed countries in their fundamental objectives,
the technological strategies deployed and the market and institutional environments they
rest on. A review of some representative experiences suggests that thinking about public
utility reforms in this part of the world is quite a challenging exercise. We point out some
economic and institutional characteristics of these countries that we believe normative
analysis of the reforms should explicitly take into account
2005-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2443/1/MPRA_paper_2443.pdf
Gasmi, Farid and Recuero Virto, Laura (2005): Telecommunications Technologies: Deployment in Developing Countries. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 58 (June 2005): pp. 19-41.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2461
2019-09-28T04:41:25Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2461/
Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis
Bougette, Patrice
Turolla, Stéphane
L40 - General
K21 - Antitrust Law
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229 merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process between 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms' characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require conditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First, we explore determinant factors of the Commission's decisions with a neural network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit models. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy, transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behavioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti's policy appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2461/1/MPRA_paper_2461.pdf
Bougette, Patrice and Turolla, Stéphane (2006): Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2466
2019-09-26T22:14:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/
Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant
Jurdziak, Leszek
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L94 - Electric Utilities
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
The newest outcome of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant analysis have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution maximising joint profits not only in quantity of lignite - the size and shape of the ultimate pit (characteristic to classical solution) but also in its price has been stressed. It is proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a cooperative, two-stage, two-person, non zero-sum game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM should be chosen and in the second one, during bargaining, the split of profit ought to be decided together with choosing the transfer price of lignite. The level of lignite prices has been presented in the time of their control and confirmation (1996-2003) as well as their new profit sharing role in the period of their freely negotiation. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM due to its rational conditions. The application of this solution on example from the “Szczerców” deposit has been presented.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2466/1/MPRA_paper_2466.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES’06 (20 September 2006): pp. 32-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2467
2019-10-03T14:29:40Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433731
7375626A656374733D43:4337
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/
Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation
Jurdziak, Leszek
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
L10 - General
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L0 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
L94 - Electric Utilities
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C71 - Cooperative Games
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
Lignite mine and power plant can operate as two separate entities, two entities in one holding or joint venture and as the one vertically integrated energy producer. Each of these solutions has the influence on operation of this tandem including realization of its individual and joint objectives, price negotiation, transactional costs, irreversible investments (sunk costs), different access to information (asymmetric information), cooperation or rivalry, possibility of opportunistic behaviour and other threats, which can be used against the second side. An attempt has been made to show these problems from the point of view of economic effectiveness based on a bilateral monopoly (BM) model and game theory approach with usage of pit optimisation methods. Advantages and disadvantages of different solutions have been presented as well as rational incentives to vertical integration due to inherent conflict of individual and group rationality in BM. This conflict of interest can lead to Pareto sub optimal solution in case of lack of cooperation between both sides. Concentration on lignite price can lead to waste of potential profit and decrease of mineable reserves - excavation of smaller pit, which is optimal only to the mine but not to the whole BM.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2467/1/MPRA_paper_2467.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES/06 (20 September 2006): pp. 26-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2492
2019-09-27T07:49:18Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D46:4632:463231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2492/
Communications Networks and Foreign Direct: Investment in Developing Countries
Lydon, Reamonn
Williams, Mark
F21 - International Investment ; Long-Term Capital Movements
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights
L96 - Telecommunications
It is widely accepted that investment is essential for the long-term economic
growth of developing countries. There is some evidence that Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) in developing countries provides spill-over benefits through technology and skills
transfer. Understanding the determinants of FDI inflows into developing countries is
therefore an important policy objective. This paper shows that average FDI inflows into
developing countries are greater in countries that have better telecommunications
networks. In more recent years, this relationship can also be detected between FDI and
mobile networks. The analysis has been refined to take account of countries' endowment
of natural resources and the an attempt has been made to deal with the problem of
endogeneity.
2005-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2492/1/MPRA_paper_2492.pdf
Lydon, Reamonn and Williams, Mark (2005): Communications Networks and Foreign Direct: Investment in Developing Countries. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 58 (June 2005): pp. 43-60.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2501
2019-10-03T04:48:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2501/
P2P: From File Sharing to Meta-information Pooling
Dagiral, Eric
Dauphin, Florian
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K21 - Antitrust Law
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
P2P networks have mainly been used for downloading cultural goods. This sociological research focuses on the practices and norms of users and designers. Drawing on a qualitative survey, it explores the many ways sharing takes place. It looks at P2P networks as file sharing communities and probes the underpinnings of such file sharing. This article particularly scrutinizes the way in which users are brought together in communities founded on exploration and discovery. The latest developments seem to point towards a type of community chiefly based on exchanging meta-information.
2005-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2501/1/MPRA_paper_2501.pdf
Dagiral, Eric and Dauphin, Florian (2005): P2P: From File Sharing to Meta-information Pooling. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 59 (September 2005): pp. 35-51.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2503
2019-10-05T05:18:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2503/
Investing in a Website: A Top Dog or a Resource-Based Strategy for Firms?
Martin, Ludivine
Penard, Thierry
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
L10 - General
This article is aimed at analyzing the motivations on the part of firms to invest in
websites. What are the drivers behind such investments? In order to address this issue,
we have considered two alternative theoretical frameworks. The first relies upon resourcebased theory; the approach herein states that firms with greater resources and competencies are expected to invest more heavily in Internet technologies, especially those firms present in rent-yielding markets (concentrated markets with strong entry barriers). The theory of industrial organization constitutes a second framework and leads
to the alternative conjecture that firms should have more incentive to invest in a website
when they are in highly-competitive markets. A website can indeed serve as a strategic
means for creating artificial entry barriers and eliminating rivals. We have tested these two hypotheses using a French database and found the resource-based approach to be more
relevant in explaining the drivers of website investment. In particular, firms tend to invest more in websites when markets are highly concentrated and little exposed to international trade.
2005-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2503/1/MPRA_paper_2503.pdf
Martin, Ludivine and Penard, Thierry (2005): Investing in a Website: A Top Dog or a Resource-Based Strategy for Firms? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 59 (September 2005): pp. 77-98.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2510
2019-09-27T01:50:31Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3935
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3332
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2510/
An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling
Baranes, Edmond
Bourreau, Marc
L95 - Gas Utilities ; Pipelines ; Water Utilities
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
L51 - Economics of Regulation
This guide provides a critical review of the economics literature on the desirability and the effects of unbundling the local loop. Firstly, we discuss recent contributions, which aim to quantify the effect of unbundling regulations on the development of broadband services. Secondly, we review the literature on the potential impact of unbundling on investment and innovation incentives. Finally, we conclude this paper by offering some suggestions for further research.
2005-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2510/1/MPRA_paper_2510.pdf
Baranes, Edmond and Bourreau, Marc (2005): An Economist's Guide to Local Loop Unbundling. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 57 (June 2005): pp. 13-31.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2511
2019-09-27T06:53:27Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2511/
Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges
de Bijl, Paul W.J.
Peitz, Martin
L50 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L96 - Telecommunications
This paper discusses the development of local loop unbundling in telecommunications markets throughout the European Union. It elaborates on the regulatory framework in Europe and provides an overview of recent experiences in Europe. Different types of unbundling, allowing for different types of entry and services provided by entrants, are discussed. This paper also explores the challenges for policy and regulation that arise because of unbundling and recent, related technological developments in the markets for fixed voice telephony and broadband internet access, particularly the emergence of packet-switched telephony such as VoIP.
2005-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2511/1/MPRA_paper_2511.pdf
de Bijl, Paul W.J. and Peitz, Martin (2005): Local Loop Unbundling in Europe: Experience, Prospects and Policy Challenges. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 57 (March 2005): pp. 33-57.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2513
2019-10-01T00:33:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2513/
Inter-Modal Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States
Shelanski, Howard A.
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K21 - Antitrust Law
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
This article discusses changes in the U.S. telecommunications market over the last decade and argues that increasing competitive substitution from wireless and internetbased communications has undermined the rationale for conventional monopoly regulation of incumbent local telephone carriers. The article suggests that the time is right to shift from a regime of a priori rules governing incumbent-form conduct to a regime of ex post competition enforcement.
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2513/1/MPRA_paper_2513.pdf
Shelanski, Howard A. (2005): Inter-Modal Competition and Telecommunications Policy in the United States. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 15-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2514
2019-10-02T09:40:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2514/
Is the U.S. Dancing to a Different Drummer?
Marcus, J. Scott
H41 - Public Goods
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
Is the United States in full retreat from internationally recognized regulatory best practice? Or is it instead headed toward some different destination – "dancing to the beat of a different drummer"? Where is this likely to lead?
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2514/1/MPRA_paper_2514.pdf
Marcus, J. Scott (2005): Is the U.S. Dancing to a Different Drummer? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 39-58.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2515
2019-09-27T01:37:56Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2515/
Bundling, Differentiation, Alliances and Mergers: Convergence Strategies in U.S. Communication Markets
Bauer, Johannes M.
L90 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
Convergence is a multi-facetted phenomenon affecting the technological basis of information and communication industries, the boundaries of existing and new markets, and the organization of service providers. Convergence in substitutes will tend to increase the intensity of competition but convergence in complements may have the opposite effect. Given the economics of advanced communication industries, convergence necessitates strategies to overcome the risk of commodification at the level of networks, applications, and services. The paper examines bundling, differentiation, alliances, and merger strategies adopted by North American service providers in response to convergence. Service providers'opportunities and risks in the emerging environment differ considerably, with cable and telephone service providers presently in stronger positions than wireless service providers, broadcasters, and satellite service providers. New entrants such as Vonage, Skype, Google, and Yahoo have high disruptive potential but remain disadvantaged without their own access networks.
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2515/1/MPRA_paper_2515.pdf
Bauer, Johannes M. (2005): Bundling, Differentiation, Alliances and Mergers: Convergence Strategies in U.S. Communication Markets. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 : pp. 59-83.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2516
2019-09-27T08:32:32Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2516/
A New View of Scale and Scope in the Telecommunications Industry: Implications for Competition and Innovation
Bourdeau de Fontenay, Alain
Liebenau, Jonathan
Savin, Brian
L90 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
Telecommunication economic analysis has largely relied upon a conventional economic framework that has its roots in neoclassical analysis that emerged almost a hundred years ago, and has contributed to reshaping the direction of economic policies by attacking the premises of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and providing far greater leeway to incumbents, as well as challenging the economic efficiency of new entrants. Common approaches based upon a large number of simplifying assumptions that include,for instance, the idea that the technology is exogenous. Such hypotheses make little sense at a conceptual level. In addition, this idea is largely contradicted by the short period during which the sector achieved some level of competition around the 1900's and 2000. Not only have economists not thought about any number of such hypotheses, but they have also failed to consider how they might have an impact on their analysis.
Evaluating a number of such issues in this paper, we are able to show how conventional economic analysis, uncritically applied to the sector, contributed to the undoing of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and of much of the competition it helped facilitate.
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2516/1/MPRA_paper_2516.pdf
Bourdeau de Fontenay, Alain and Liebenau, Jonathan and Savin, Brian (2005): A New View of Scale and Scope in the Telecommunications Industry: Implications for Competition and Innovation. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 85-103.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2517
2019-09-26T21:29:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2517/
Regulatory Failure: Time for a New Policy Paradigm
Alleman, James
Rappoport, Paul
L90 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
Regulation is presumed to be designed to avoid (potential) market failures,usually because of firms' market power, the consequence of which leads to a decrease in economic welfare. However, the cost of regulation may outweigh any effects policy makers have on the firm due to administrative costs, regulatory capture and other effects that have been addressed by others. More importantly, policy makers have been using the wrong models to guide their decisions, with a major impact on the investment incentives of firms, a misallocation of resources and a lowering of social welfare. As policy makers misread economic theory, they produce results worse than those they are attempting to correct. Thus, these distorting effects are equally as bad, or worse than, the market failure regulators hoped to ameliorate. However, this need not be the case. By concentration on
dynamic models, rather than the simple static models on which policy makers have focused, it is possible to improve economics welfare and obtain results that at least are better than the costs associated with current regulatory practices. Ofcom appears to be moving in this direction. Will other policy makers learn from Ofcom? This paper shows some of the failures of the current model and sets forth some of the necessary steps to make improvements. However, it is unclear whether the institutional structures will allow for such a departure from the current paradigm.
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2517/1/MPRA_paper_2517.pdf
Alleman, James and Rappoport, Paul (2005): Regulatory Failure: Time for a New Policy Paradigm. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 105-120.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2518
2019-09-27T01:57:35Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2518/
A Regulatory Framework for New and Emerging Markets
Baake, Pio
Kamecke, Ulrich
Wey, Christian
L90 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
The future of the information society crucially depends on investments in upgrading existing infrastructures and building new networks. Traditional cost-based regulation, which focuses on issues of static efficiency and service-based competition necessarily has negative effects on innovation incentives and the emergence of infrastructure-based competition in the highly dynamic telecommunications industry. This paper presents a regulatory framework for new infrastructures, which makes ex ante regulation contingent to the tendency towards effective competitive structures. Unlike the standard Significant Market Power-test (SMP), this approach takes a longer term perspective and therefore secures operators' investment incentives. The proposal has several desirable incentive effects. Firstly, it counters incentives to free-ride on investments by potential competitors, and secondly, it makes preemptive and other predatory practices by the investing firm less attractive. As a result, our proposal of contingent regulation in emerging markets promotes infrastructure-based competition in telecommunications.
2005-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2518/1/MPRA_paper_2518.pdf
Baake, Pio and Kamecke, Ulrich and Wey, Christian (2005): A Regulatory Framework for New and Emerging Markets. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 60 (December 2005): pp. 123-146.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3242
2019-09-29T04:30:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3242/
Spacial Predation in the UK Newspaper Industry
Behringer, Stefan
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper investigates the alleged predatory behaviour in the UK quality newspaper industry in the 1990s using a horizontal differentiation model and industry data.
2007-08-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3242/1/MPRA_paper_3242.pdf
Behringer, Stefan (2007): Spacial Predation in the UK Newspaper Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3514
2019-09-28T04:42:17Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3514/
Spectrum Management and Broadcasting: Current Issues
Cave, Martin
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
Broadcasting policy has traditionally been supported by a 'command-and-control' system of assigning frequencies for terrestrial transmission, but this link is being eroded by the emergence of other technologies – cable, satellite, IPTV, mobile broadcasting - and by the emergence of multi-channel television, which is facilitated by digital terrestrial television. The switch off of analogue terrestrial transmission is being achieved through significant government intervention, but with diverse intentions relating to the use of the freed spectrum. It is argued, however, that the trend to liberalise spectrum policy is strong, and that this will promote the liberalisation of broadcasting.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3514/1/MPRA_paper_3514.pdf
Cave, Martin (2006): Spectrum Management and Broadcasting: Current Issues. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 62 (June 2006): pp. 19-34.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3517
2019-10-02T09:43:50Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3517/
Traditional paradigms for new services? : The Commission Proposal for a 'Audiovisual Media Services Directive'
SCHEUER, Alexander
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
L51 - Economics of Regulation
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
For over 10 years the European Community has strived to develop suitable and proportionate answers to the phenomenon of convergence in its audiovisual regulatory policy. This article outlines the regulatory process at an EU level since the early 1980s as far as media, telecommunications and Information Society services are concerned, and analyses some of the most relevant policy papers specifically related to the adoption of the EC legal framework for the media in the digital age, before focusing on the preparatory phase leading up to the adoption of the Commission proposal for a Directive on "Audiovisual Media Services", issued in December 2005. In addition, the core of this proposal for a revised "Television without Frontiers" Directive, i.e. the extension of its scope to cover new media services provided in a non-linear manner and the introduction of a graduated regime of regulation with a lighter-touch approach in view of such services, is presented along with the main lines of debate among stakeholders.
2006-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3517/1/MPRA_paper_3517.pdf
SCHEUER, Alexander (2006): Traditional paradigms for new services? : The Commission Proposal for a 'Audiovisual Media Services Directive'. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 62 : pp. 71-91.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3553
2019-09-27T07:22:31Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443435
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3553/
Service Bundling and the Role of Access Charge in the Broadband Internet Service Market
SHIM, Sunghee
OH, Jungsuk
D45 - Rationing ; Licensing
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
K21 - Antitrust Law
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
D42 - Monopoly
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Using the classical Hotelling model, this paper analyzes the incentive for a CATV service provider to bundle broadband internet services when entering the broadband internet services market. In addition, the effect of such service bundling by an entrant on the market incumbent with ownership over existing bottleneck facilities is analyzed. Furthermore, an access charge that maximizes social welfare is explored and determined. Two cases are considered: in the first case, the market is fully covered; and in the second case, the market is not fully covered. With full market coverage, an entrant has an incentive for service bundling if there is sufficient service differentiation. The entrant's bundling strategy reduces the incumbent's profit. In this case, the total social welfare is independent of the level of the access charge and only has an effect of redistributing the net surplus between consumers and the incumbent. With partial market coverage, the entrant has an incentive for service bundling at a low access charge. The incumbent's profit increases if the access charge is higher than the cost of access provisioning. In this case, the total social welfare is dependent on the level of access charge and the welfare maximizing access charge is less than the unit cost of providing access.
2006-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3553/1/MPRA_paper_3553.pdf
SHIM, Sunghee and OH, Jungsuk (2006): Service Bundling and the Role of Access Charge in the Broadband Internet Service Market. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 63 (September 2006): pp. 73-91.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3567
2019-10-02T04:45:00Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3333
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3567/
Competition in European Telecom Markets
Bismut, Sophie
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L40 - General
L50 - General
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions ; Privatization ; Contracting Out
L94 - Electric Utilities
In recent years, the European telecommunications market has witnessed major developments, with rapid expansion in access to telecommunications networks and a surge in the number of available services and applications. While many factors have contributed to the transformation of the telecommunications industry, competition has played a key role in driving telecom players to invest in new technologies, to innovate and to offer new services. Increased competitive pressure is being felt across all market segments, even though significant differences remain across services and countries. Broadband roll-out has allowed operators to offer multiple-play services, thereby transforming traditional segment boundaries and competitive market structures.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3567/1/MPRA_paper_3567.pdf
Bismut, Sophie (2006): Competition in European Telecom Markets. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 64 (December 2006): pp. 17-28.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3568
2019-10-01T04:50:53Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3937
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
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7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443734
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
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7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3568/
e-Communications: Investment and the Regulatory Framework
Jones, Siôn
Jones, Pau
L97 - Utilities: General
L50 - General
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
K29 - Other
L51 - Economics of Regulation
D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L90 - General
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
The EU regulatory framework for e-communications was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2002, and became applicable from 2003. It has three primary objectives: (1) to promote competition; (2) to develop the single market; and (3) to promote citizens' rights. The European Commission's DG Information Society commissioned London Economics to estimate the level of e-communications investment in the EU and to examine its main drivers as part of a contributio to the Commission's 2006 review of the e-communications framework. This paper outlines some of the findings of that study. The paper provides a description of the process of collecting data on investment in physical infrastructure in the e-communciations sector by country and by sub-sector. It also presents the collected data, showing a decline in overall investment between 2001 and 2003 and a subsequent upturn in 2004. An econometric analysis of the drivers of investment over the period is undertaken, which suggests that better performing regulatory regimes, as measured by an OECD regulatory index, can contribute to higher levels of investment in the sector.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3568/1/MPRA_paper_3568.pdf
Jones, Siôn and Jones, Pau (2006): e-Communications: Investment and the Regulatory Framework. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 64 (November 2006): pp. 29-39.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3571
2019-09-28T23:11:10Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3571/
Infrastructure-Based Versus Service-Based : Competition In Telecommunications
Lundborg, Jörg
Lundborg, Martin
Lundborg, Ernst-Olav
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Unbundling of the local loop (ULL) has seen quite different "success stories" in the various countries across Europe. Although the obligation for the provision of ULL was implemented in the regulatory framework early and mostly parallel to other means of liberalisation, national implementation has been rather heterogeneous. One question of decisive importance for national regulatory authorities (NRAs) was whether to foster service-based competition in the first phase of liberalisation or to focus on infrastructurebased competition. The different NRAs chose to head down different roads. This paper analyses whether the strategy of NRAs has had any mid-term effect on the economic welfare created in the communications markets. It indicates that infrastructure-based competition has a positive effect on innovation. Moreover, infrastructure-based competition appears to be more important for business customers than for residential clients. On the other hand, service-based competition lowers call prices and appears to be more important to residential markets. The results of this study point out the importance of a balanced approach to both types of policies.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3571/1/MPRA_paper_3571.pdf
Lundborg, Jörg and Lundborg, Martin and Lundborg, Ernst-Olav (2006): Infrastructure-Based Versus Service-Based : Competition In Telecommunications. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 64 (December 2007): pp. 67-87.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3572
2019-09-26T08:07:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3572/
Six Degrees of Separation : Operational Separation as a Remedy in European Telecommunications Regulation
Cave, Martin
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Numerous proposals have been made for separation in the telecommunications sector, some of which have been implemented, including the break-up of the Bell system in the 1980s and the widespread implementation of accounting separation. In recent years, attention has been focussed on operational separation. This paper identifies the problem that this is intended to tackle, lists a number of possible variants and discusses experiences in the UK. Having specified the circumstances under which operational separation may be justified, it suggests how provisions for such separation could be made in European legislation.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3572/1/MPRA_paper_3572.pdf
Cave, Martin (2006): Six Degrees of Separation : Operational Separation as a Remedy in European Telecommunications Regulation. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 64 (December 2006): pp. 89-103.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:3573
2019-09-29T04:29:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3573/
Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future?
Flacher, David
Jennequin, Hugues
Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé
L50 - General
L52 - Industrial Policy ; Sectoral Planning Methods
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L51 - Economics of Regulation
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
This paper addresses the question of what options are available to regulate the sector in the near future. In order to answer this question, the paper focuses on the problem of investment and innovation in an ex ante regulated sector. Relying on existing literature, we argue that ex ante regulation could represent a danger for the long-term development of the sector by delaying or cancelling investment projects, especially (but not only) concerning the construction of new infrastructures. We also argue that ex ante regulation is distorting investment itself: incremental investment is privileged as opposed to radical investment. In this context, we identify three possible options for regulation in the near future: 1) continuing ex ante regulation, 2) substituting ex post regulation for ex ante regulation and 3) implementing an industrial policy for macro-strategic reasons. After describing a few major mutations in the sector that must be taken into account by regulators and presenting the major dilemmas that the latter are facing, we propose two possible solutions inspired by foreign policy. The first solution consists of offering investors regulation holidays, with regular reviews to deem whether these holidays should be prolonged or not. The second solution consists of implementing an industrial policy that could take the form of a contract negotiated between the regulator and operators. This would guarantee the absence of ex ante regulation if the conditions of the contract (in terms of regional planning, price, quality of service, types of investment…) are met.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3573/1/MPRA_paper_3573.pdf
Flacher, David and Jennequin, Hugues and Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé (2006): Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future? Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 64 (December 2006): pp. 105-123.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4163
2019-10-03T14:29:39Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D51:5134:513431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C37:4C3732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D51:5134
7375626A656374733D44:4434
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7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D51:5133:513332
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7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3934
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/
Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych
Jurdziak, Leszek
Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
Q4 - Energy
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
C02 - Mathematical Methods
L10 - General
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L0 - General
C71 - Cooperative Games
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
L94 - Electric Utilities
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation have been presented. The novel approach is the creation of lignite price contours on the mine and power plant profit distribution chart. It shows the inherent contradiction between individual and group rationality in bilateral monopoly (BM) and the reduction of incentive to opportunism together with the increase of lignite price. The opportunism due to asymmetry of information and possession of dominant strategy of mine (optimization of ultimate pit) creates a real threat to cooperation between both sides of BM. The full confidence in joint profit maximization and full control of accepted profit sharing without increase of transactional costs is possible only in vertically integrated energy producer offering equal access to information for both sides. As it was shown in [4] such solution does not create any threat for energy market efficiency – on the contrary it can allow on better level of deposit recovery through excavation of the greater ultimate pit. The interesting proposal is the treatment of pit optimization as a real option of mine size change. Presented methods, tools and solutions should help both firms in real negotiation in finding their strategic positions and avoiding potential threats. But eventually from negotiating sides it depends if they will choose the cooperation or competition, rational arguments or rational threats, maximization of joint profits or only their own.
2006-01-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4163/1/MPRA_paper_4163.pdf
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. XLIX, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 81-88.
pl
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4578
2019-09-26T09:29:29Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4578/
What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software
O'Reilly, Tim
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K41 - Litigation Process
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L90 - General
This paper was the first initiative to try to define Web2.0 and understand its implications for the next generation of software, looking at both design patterns and business modes. Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices; Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more people use it, consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while providing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects through an "architecture of participation," and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich user experiences.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4578/1/MPRA_paper_4578.pdf
O'Reilly, Tim (2007): What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 17-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4579
2019-09-27T21:06:08Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4579/
User Generated Content: Web 2.0 Taking the Video Sector by Storm
Mabillot, David
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K41 - Litigation Process
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
L96 - Telecommunications
L90 - General
This article examines the communities involved in the distribution and sharing of videos on the internet. Firstly, we study the practices connected with user generated content and describe the appearance of new players (YouTube, Dailymotion, Google Video, Zudeo, etc.) in the audiovisual landscape. We then discuss regulation of the new community model of digital content distribution before moving on to underline the need for the film and audiovisual industries to socially construct new cultural and commercial experiences with film fans.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4579/1/MPRA_paper_4579.pdf
Mabillot, David (2007): User Generated Content: Web 2.0 Taking the Video Sector by Storm. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 39-49.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4580
2019-09-26T09:10:25Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3930
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4B:4B34:4B3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4580/
What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software
O'Reilly, Tim
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L96 - Telecommunications
L90 - General
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K41 - Litigation Process
This paper was the first initiative to try to define Web2.0 and understand its implications for the next generation of software, looking at both design patterns and business modes. Web 2.0 is the network as platform, spanning all connected devices; Web 2.0 applications are those that make the most of the intrinsic advantages of that platform: delivering software as a continually-updated service that gets better the more people use it, consuming and remixing data from multiple sources, including individual users, while providing their own data and services in a form that allows remixing by others, creating network effects through an "architecture of participation," and going beyond the page metaphor of Web 1.0 to deliver rich user experiences.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4580/1/MPRA_paper_4580.pdf
O'Reilly, Tim (2007): What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 17-37.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4584
2019-10-21T07:12:15Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433738
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4584/
Product Development 2.0
Hinchcliffe, Dion
H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
L96 - Telecommunications
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Web 2.0 principles will not only revolutionize the web experience, the design pattern and the business models of software companies. They can indeed be applied to a lot of industries for new approaches to product development. The web can be used to put users in control and co-create better and richer products in a reduced timeframe.
2007-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4584/1/MPRA_paper_4584.pdf
Hinchcliffe, Dion (2007): Product Development 2.0. Published in: International Journal of Digital Economics No. 65 (March 2007): pp. 105-111.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5382
2019-09-26T21:58:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3833
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5382/
Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues
Pelnar, Gregory
L83 - Sports ; Gambling ; Restaurants ; Recreation ; Tourism
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
I present an overview of the antitrust literature on sports leagues, with particular emphasis on the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football League, Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League, as well as on sanctioning organizations such as NASCAR. I review the major antitrust court decisions, the commentaries of the leading antitrust experts on these decisions, and the extensive sports economics literature touching on issues raised in these cases, particularly empirical studies assessing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of various league rules and policies. I also review the broader industrial organization literature on issues such as factors affecting the stability of joint ventures. I conclude with a summary of proposals for addressing the monopoly power of sports leagues.
2007-10-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5382/1/MPRA_paper_5382.pdf
Pelnar, Gregory (2007): Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5460
2019-09-26T17:17:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D42:4230:423030
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30:4B3030
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5460/
Regime Shift in Antitrust
Ghosal, Vivek
L40 - General
B00 - General
K00 - General
M20 - General
This paper empirically models the longer-run deep-seated shift in intellectual thinking that followed the Chicago School’s criticism of the older antitrust doctrine, the shorter-run driving forces related to switches of the political party in power, merger waves, changes in economic activity and the level of funding and quantifies their impact on enforcement by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice over the period 1958-2002. The key findings are: (1) a distinct regime-shift in antitrust enforcement during the 1970s and, post-regime-shift, there has been a marked compositional change with a quantitatively large increase (decrease) in criminal (civil) antitrust court cases initiated; (2) post-regime-shift, there appears to be a change in the role played by politics with Republicans initiating more (less) criminal (civil) court cases than Democrats and the estimated quantitative effects are large; (3) disaggregating the total number of court cases into the main categories under which they are initiated (price-fixing, mergers, monopolization and restraints-of-trade) shows that individual types of cases have widely differing responses to changes in the driving forces; and (4) in a horse-race between the regime-shift and political effect on one side and the remaining variables on the other, the former forces win hands-down in explaining broad shifts in enforcement. Modeling the longer-run shift and disaggregating the court cases emerge as crucial to gaining insights into the intertemporal shifts in enforcement. The paper elaborates on the causes for the shift in enforcement and on the effectiveness of antitrust.
2007-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5460/1/MPRA_paper_5460.pdf
Ghosal, Vivek (2007): Regime Shift in Antitrust.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5461
2019-09-26T22:08:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473130
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3330
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443830
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5461/
Small is Beautiful but Size Matters: The Asymmetric Impact of Uncertainty and Sunk Costs on Small and Large Businesses
Ghosal, Vivek
L40 - General
G10 - General
O30 - General
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
D80 - General
Against the backdrop of the theories developed in the real options and financing constraints literatures, this paper examines the impact of profit uncertainty and sunk costs on firms’ entry and exit decisions. For our empirical analysis, we compile an extensive dataset containing information on 267 U.S. manufacturing industries over a 30-year period containing industry-specific information on the number of firms and establishments, the size distribution of establishments, measures of sunk capital costs and profit uncertainty, among others. Our dynamic panel data estimates show that greater uncertainty about profits, especially in conjunction with higher sunk costs, results in (1) a marked decrease in the number of small firms and establishments; (2) a less skewed size distribution of firms and establishments; and (3) a marginal increase in industry output concentration. In sharp contrast, large establishments seem virtually unaffected. The results point to uncertainty in conjunction with sunk costs fundamentally affecting firms’ decision-making and altering the structure of industries by putting smaller businesses at a disadvantage.
2007-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5461/1/MPRA_paper_5461.pdf
Ghosal, Vivek (2007): Small is Beautiful but Size Matters: The Asymmetric Impact of Uncertainty and Sunk Costs on Small and Large Businesses.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5499
2019-09-28T20:48:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30:4C3030
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D42:4230:423030
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5499/
Discovering Cartels: Dynamic Interrelationships between Civil and Criminal Antitrust Investigations
Ghosal, Vivek
L00 - General
L40 - General
B00 - General
K21 - Antitrust Law
M20 - General
This paper focuses on the genesis, taxonomy and timeline of U.S. criminal antitrust investigations, and uses time-series data on enforcement to examine the interrelationships between the various criminal enforcement variables as well as the linkages between criminal and civil enforcement. The key findings are: (1) there appears to be considerable dynamic interplay between the criminal variables. For example, an increase in grand jury investigations or criminal cases initiated or the number of individuals or firms convicted generates increases in most of these (endogenous) variables in future periods. A broad conclusion that can be drawn is that information unearthed during a given criminal investigation and prosecution often reveals information about other conspiracies leading to future investigations and prosecutions; (2) an increase in civil enforcement leads to future increases in the criminal cases and firms and individuals convicted. This suggests that information gleaned during civil investigations, such as mergers or monopolization cases, may reveal information about collusive behavior in markets leading to criminal investigations and prosecutions; and (3) criminal enforcement follows a counter-cyclical pattern with the number of criminal cases prosecuted increasing following an economic downturn. We relate this to the literature which points to cartel instability during economic downturns. Overall, our results point to complementarities in the investigative process within different facets of criminal investigations as well as between criminal and civil investigations.
2006-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5499/1/MPRA_paper_5499.pdf
Ghosal, Vivek (2006): Discovering Cartels: Dynamic Interrelationships between Civil and Criminal Antitrust Investigations.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5649
2017-12-21T09:10:27Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7251
2019-10-03T03:06:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7251/
Expertise and Bias in Decision Making
Bourjade, Sylvain
Jullien, Bruno
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
L40 - General
In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain information. The expert is biased toward some favoured decision but cares also about its reputation on the market for experts. We then analyse the corresponding decision game depending on the nature of the informational linkage with the market. In the case where the expert is biased in favour of the status quo, the final decision is always biased in the same direction. Moreover, it is better to rely on experts biased against the status quo. We also show that it is optimal to publically disclose the expert report. Finally, we prove that the intuitive results that hiring an honest inside expert raises the outside expert's incentives to report truthfully holds when reports are public but not when they are secret.
2004-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7251/1/MPRA_paper_7251.pdf
Bourjade, Sylvain and Jullien, Bruno (2004): Expertise and Bias in Decision Making.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7954
2019-09-28T09:03:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7954/
Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry
Chandra, Ambarish
Collard-Wexler, Allan
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
In this paper we study mergers in two-sided industries. While mergers have been studied extensively in traditional industries, and there is a large and rapidly evolving literature on two-sided markets, there has been little work empirically examining mergers in these markets. We present a model that shows that mergers in two-sided markets may not necessarily lead to higher prices for either side of the market. We test our conclusions by examining a spate of mergers in the Canadian newspaper industry in the late 1990s. Specifically, we analyze prices for both circulation and advertising to try to understand the impact that these mergers had on consumer welfare. We find that greater concentration did not lead to higher prices for either newspaper subscribers or advertisers.
2008-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7954/1/MPRA_paper_7954.pdf
Chandra, Ambarish and Collard-Wexler, Allan (2008): Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8619
2019-09-27T16:28:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3832
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8619/
Collection sales: good or bad for journals?
Armstrong, Mark
L0 - General
L82 - Entertainment ; Media
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
This note discusses the impact of collection sales (i.e., the bundling of several journals for sale by publishers to libraries) on journals. The advent of electronic journal distribution implies that bundling is an efficient sales strategy, and can act to extend the reach of a journal. Current arrangements are discussed and shown to lead to tensions between commercial publishers and non-profit journals. The note argues that non-profit journals should not abandon their participation in collection sales programmes. Rather, non-profit journals may benefit from withdrawing from commercial publishers which distribute their own for-profit journals, and from joining together to be distributed by less commercial publishers who set relatively low prices for their collections.
2008-05-06
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8619/1/MPRA_paper_8619.pdf
Armstrong, Mark (2008): Collection sales: good or bad for journals?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8885
2019-10-03T13:21:42Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8885/
Is Google the next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search
Pollock, Rufus
L10 - General
L50 - General
L40 - General
Internet search (or perhaps more accurately `web-search') has grown exponentially over the last decade at an even more rapid rate than the Internet itself. Starting from nothing in the 1990s, today search is a multi-billion dollar business. Search engine providers such as Google and Yahoo! have become household names, and the use of a search engine, like use of the Web, is now a part of everyday life. The rapid growth of online search and its growing centrality to the ecology of the Internet raise a variety of questions for economists to answer. Why is the search engine market so concentrated and will it evolve towards monopoly? What are the implications of this concentration for different `participants' (consumers, search engines, advertisers)? Does the fact that search engines act as `information gatekeepers', determining, in effect, what can be found on the web, mean that search deserves particularly close attention from policy-makers? This paper supplies empirical and theoretical material with which to examine many of these questions. In particular, we (a) show that the already large levels of concentration are likely to continue (b) identify the consequences, negative and positive, of this outcome (c) discuss the possible regulatory interventions that policy-makers could utilize to address these.
2008-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8885/1/MPRA_paper_8885.pdf
Pollock, Rufus (2008): Is Google the next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8963
2019-09-28T20:16:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8963/
A model of delegated project choice
Armstrong, Mark
Vickers, John
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects are available to the agent. Two frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, and (ii) a dynamic setting in which the agent searches for projects.
2008-06-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8963/1/MPRA_paper_8963.pdf
Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2008): A model of delegated project choice.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9143
2019-09-30T16:36:45Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D43:4339
7375626A656374733D4C:4C30
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D44:4434
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9143/
Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
Landeo, Claudia M.
Spier, Kathryn E.
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
C9 - Design of Experiments
L0 - General
K0 - General
K21 - Antitrust Law
D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
C72 - Noncooperative Games
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller. When discrimination and communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given. Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.
2007-12-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9143/1/MPRA_paper_9143.pdf
Landeo, Claudia M. and Spier, Kathryn E. (2007): Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9454
2019-10-03T11:50:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9454/
Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property
Rey, Patrick
Salant, David
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L40 - General
Patent thickets, layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer
products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms, and licensing
policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers. Patent thickets
involve complementary products, which gives rise to double marginalization
-- the so-called royalty stacking problem -- and has the potential to retard
diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare.
This paper examines the impact of licensing policies of one or more upstream owners essential} intellectual property (IP) on the downstream
firms that require access to that IP. The terms under which downstream firms
can access this IP affects entry decisions, product diversity, prices and
welfare. We consider both the case in which a single party controls the
essential IP and the case in which different parties control complementary
pieces of essential IP. We compare the outcome of several alternative
standard licensing arrangements, such as flat rate access fees, royalty
percentages, per unit fees, patent pools and cross-licensing arrangements,
with or without vertical integration.
We first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of
essential IP. Increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety,
which creates added value, but it also intensifies downstream competition,
which dissipates profits. We derive conditions under which the upstream IP
monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of
licenses, relative to the number that maximizes consumer surplus or social
welfare.
When there are multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking can reduce
the number of the downstream licensees, but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face. The paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society.
Finally, the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies.
With fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price,
an upstream IP owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition. In contrast, volume-based license fees (i.e., per-unit access fees), do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration. The paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when IP owners charge fixed or volume-based access fees.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9454/1/MPRA_paper_9454.pdf
Rey, Patrick and Salant, David (2008): Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9700
2019-09-30T14:01:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9700/
A Case for Affirmative Action in Competition Policy
Villeneuve, Bertrand
Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L40 - General
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These two distinct dimensions of policy illustrate the importance of a dynamic theory in which firms may differ in several respects. Though equalization of endowments and rights is theoretically optimal, realistic constraints force competition authorities to adopt second-best solutions. Affirmative action here appears to explain why helping the disadvantaged contributes maximally to social surplus.
2008-07-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9700/1/MPRA_paper_9700.pdf
Villeneuve, Bertrand and Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua (2008): A Case for Affirmative Action in Competition Policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:10369
2019-09-27T13:11:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3130
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3530
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10369/
Is Google the next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search
Pollock, Rufus
L10 - General
L50 - General
L40 - General
Internet search (or perhaps more accurately `web-search') has grown exponentially over the last decade at an even more rapid rate than the Internet itself. Starting from nothing in the 1990s, today search is a multi-billion dollar business. Search engine providers such as Google and Yahoo! have become household names, and the use of a search engine, like use of the Web, is now a part of everyday life. The rapid growth of online search and its growing centrality to the ecology of the Internet raise a variety of questions for economists to answer. Why is the search engine market so concentrated and will it evolve towards monopoly? What are the implications of this concentration for different `participants' (consumers, search engines, advertisers)? Does the fact that search engines act as `information gatekeepers', determining, in effect, what can be found on the web, mean that search deserves particularly close attention from policy-makers? This paper supplies empirical and theoretical material with which to examine many of these questions. In particular, we (a) show that the already large levels of concentration are likely to continue (b) identify the consequences, negative and positive, of this outcome (c) discuss the possible regulatory interventions that policy-makers could utilize to address these.
2008-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10369/2/MPRA_paper_10369.pdf
Pollock, Rufus (2008): Is Google the next Microsoft? Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Internet Search.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11044
2019-09-27T14:01:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11044/
Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry
Miklos-Thal, Jeanine
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
C72 - Noncooperative Games
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion because a more efficient firm has both more to gain from a deviation and less to fear from retaliation than less efficient firms. Our paper reexamines this conventional wisdom and characterizes optimal collusion without any prior restriction on the class of strategies. We first stress that firms can credibly agree on retaliation schemes that maximally punish even the most efficient firm. This implies that whenever collusion is sustainable under cost symmetry, some collusion is also sustainable under cost asymmetry; efficient collusion, however, remains more di¢ cult to sustain when costs are asymmetric. Finally, we show that, in the presence of side payments, cost asymmetry
generally facilitates collusion.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11044/1/MPRA_paper_11044.pdf
Miklos-Thal, Jeanine (2008): Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11795
2019-10-03T05:36:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11795/
Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications
Behringer, Stefan
L96 - Telecommunications
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
D40 - General
This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level.
2008-11-27
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11795/1/MPRA_paper_11795.pdf
Behringer, Stefan (2008): Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12962
2019-10-08T20:36:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D52:5234:523431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12962/
Déréglementation, sécurité et prévision d’accidents extrêmes: le cas du fret ferroviaire français
Bonache, Adrien
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
R41 - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion ; Travel Time ; Safety and Accidents ; Transportation Noise
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
The freight rail deregulation have been considered, for long time, as a factor of security and safety reduction. This article means to show that, for the moment, we can't consider french freight rail deregulation have a significative impact on security and safety. So, I look if it's possible that extreme accidents occur in this sector. Finally, I evaluate the extreme accidents periodicity in freight rail.
2008-11-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12962/1/MPRA_paper_12962.pdf
Bonache, Adrien (2008): Déréglementation, sécurité et prévision d’accidents extrêmes: le cas du fret ferroviaire français.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13450
2019-09-29T04:38:50Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13450/
Compulsory or Voluntary Pre-merger Notification? Theory and Some Evidence
Chongwoo, Choe
Shekhar, Chander
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
K21 - Antitrust Law
L40 - General
We compare the prevailing system of compulsory pre-merger notification with the Australian system of voluntary pre-merger notification. It is shown that, for a non-trivial set of parameter values, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists in mixed strategies in which the regulator investigates un-notified mergers with probability
less than one and the parties choose notification with probability less than one. Thanks to the signaling opportunity that arises when notification is voluntary,
voluntary notification leads to lower enforcement costs for the regulator and lower notification costs for the merging parties. Some of the theoretical predictions are supported by exploratory empirical tests using merger data from Australia. Overall, our results suggest that voluntary merger notification may achieve objectives similar to those achieved by compulsory systems at lower costs to the merging
parties as well as to the regulator.
2009-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13450/1/MPRA_paper_13450.pdf
Chongwoo, Choe and Shekhar, Chander (2009): Compulsory or Voluntary Pre-merger Notification? Theory and Some Evidence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13523
2019-09-27T22:56:15Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13523/
Tying, Compatibility and Planned Obsolescence
Miao, Chun-Hui
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
L40 - General
According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist without commitment power has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete, and this reduces its overall profitability. In this paper, I reconsider the above hypothesis by examining the role of competition in a monopolist's upgrade decision. I find that, when a system add-on is competitively supplied, a monopolist chooses to tie the add-on to a new system that is only backward compatible, even if a commitment of not introducing the new system is available and socially optimal. Tying facilitates a price squeeze.
2008-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13523/1/MPRA_paper_13523.pdf
Miao, Chun-Hui (2008): Tying, Compatibility and Planned Obsolescence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13990
2019-10-02T05:05:05Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13990/
Market Share Discounts and Investment Incentives
Sloev, Igor
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
The paper investigates pro- and anticompetitive e¤ects of the use of market share discounts (MSD�s). While MSD�s can be used for exploiting a dominant position and may lead to a welfare reduction, MSD�s also can serve as an e¢ cient device for the creation of incentives. Particularly, if a �nal
demand for an upstream manufacturer�s good depends on a promotional e¤ort of a retailer, the manufacturer can e¤ectively use MSD�s to induce an optimal level of the retailer�s e¤ort. Moreover, it is possible that MSD�s
have a positive impact both on the consumers�surplus and the total industry pro�ts. Thus the use of MSD�s should not be treated as an anticompetitive practice a priori, but rather it has to be judged on a case-by-case basis.
2007
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13990/1/MPRA_paper_13990.pdf
Sloev, Igor (2007): Market Share Discounts and Investment Incentives.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14108
2019-09-28T23:23:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3938
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14108/
The role of regulation in financing transport infrastructures in Italy
Beria, Paolo
Ponti, Marco
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L98 - Government Policy
The paper discusses the present regulatory framework in Italy concerning transport infrastructures financing and provides some policy indications. The Italian situation is characterised by non homogeneity among the transport modes
and insufficient, or even perverse, incentives to efficiency. Also, the norms promote the tendency to overinvestment and “gold plating” because applied within a weak planning framework.
After a theoretical introduction to the financing mechanisms (public funding, PPP, price cap, etc.), the paper is structured by modes. For each infrastructure type (national roads, highways, railways, ports and airports), the most common funding practices are commented, underlining their characteristics, limits and implications. National roads and railways are financed by general budget on the basis of a planning activity usually carried by the agent itself.
Conversely, highways, airports and ports are partially financed by fares under conditions of legal monopoly granted by concessions. However, the formulas for fares determination are questionable and sometimes provide incentives to overinvestment.
The last section will provide recommendations for a more efficient regulation.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14108/1/MPRA_paper_14108.pdf
Beria, Paolo and Ponti, Marco (2008): The role of regulation in financing transport infrastructures in Italy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14110
2019-09-28T10:08:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D52:5234:523430
7375626A656374733D52:5234:523432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14110/
Agents’ behaviour in financing italian transport infrastructures
Beria, Paolo
R40 - General
R42 - Government and Private Investment Analysis ; Road Maintenance ; Transportation Planning
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
The aim of the paper is to critically describe the behaviour of the main Italian transport infrastructural agents (national roads and rails, highway, airports concessions) in the field of infrastructure financing. All the actors are trying to avoid the effects of regulation and, at the same time, to reinforce their dominant position and power. The thesis of the paper is that the funding and building of new infrastructures is often the pillar of this strategy, since this is the field where the legal framework is weaker.
A short review of the present normative is followed by the description of the behaviour of the main agents. Recent planning documents will be commented, pointing out the tendency of the regulated monopolists to find out new strategies to maximise their objectives. Among these, the proposal of new infrastructures is the field where monopolists are more active and where regulation should be more effective.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14110/1/MPRA_paper_14110.pdf
Beria, Paolo (2009): Agents’ behaviour in financing italian transport infrastructures.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14161
2019-09-28T04:31:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14161/
A model of delegated project choice
Armstrong, Mark
Vickers, John
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects were available to the agent. We consider situations where the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, where the principal cannot observe the agent's payoff, where the principal can pay the agent to choose a desirable project, and where the agent must invest effort to discover a project.
2009-03-18
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14161/2/MPRA_paper_14161.pdf
Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2009): A model of delegated project choice.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14442
2019-09-28T15:17:38Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443634
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14442/
Anger and Regulation
Di Tella, Rafael
Dubra, Juan
D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
We propose a model where voters experience an emotional cost when they observe a firm that has displayed insufficient concern for other people's welfare (altruism) in the process of making high profits. Even when there exist few truly altruistic firms, an equilibrium may emerge where all firms pretend to be kind, refraining from charging "abusive" prices to their customers (or "exploiting" workers). Our main result is that as competition decreases, the set of parameters for which such pooling equilibria exist is smaller and firms are more liekly to anger voters by displaying low levels of altruism. As a consequence, when firms have been shown to be unkind, the welfare of consumers will go up when these firms are punished (for example through fines), even when this does not imply a change in prices. Indeed, regulation affects welfare through three channels: First, there is the standard channel whereby a reduction in monopoly price lads to the production of units that cost less than their value to consumers. Second, regulation calms down existing consumers: a reduction in the profits of a firm viewed as excessively selfish increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger. Finally, there is a third (mixed) channel arising because individuals who were out of the market when they were excessively angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the firm is regulated, reducing the standard distortions described in the first channel.
2008-10-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14442/1/MPRA_paper_14442.pdf
Di Tella, Rafael and Dubra, Juan (2008): Anger and Regulation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14707
2019-10-04T09:53:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433932
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14707/
Entry in Collusive Markets: An Experimental Study
Goppelsroeder, Marie
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
C72 - Noncooperative Games
L40 - General
In this paper we present an experiment in which we test the effects of sequential entry on the stability of collusion in oligopoly markets. Theoretical as well as experimental research suggests that a larger number of firms in an industry makes collusion harder to sustain. In
this study, we explore to what extent collusion can be upheld with exogenous entry when groups start off small and when it is common knowledge that the entrant is informed about the history of her group prior to entry. We find that collusion is indeed easier to sustain in the
latter case than in groups starting large. We conjecture that an implicit coordination problem is resolved more easily in a smaller group and that coordination, once it has been established, can be transferred to the enlarged group by means of a common code of conduct. Moreover, the results suggest that entrants emulate the behavior of their
group upon entry.
2009-03-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14707/1/MPRA_paper_14707.pdf
Goppelsroeder, Marie (2009): Entry in Collusive Markets: An Experimental Study.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14767
2019-09-26T22:02:08Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14767/
Tying, Compatibility and Planned Obsolescence
Miao, Chun-Hui
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
L40 - General
According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist without commitment power has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete, and this reduces its overall profitability. In this paper, I reconsider the above hypothesis by examining the role of competition in a monopolist's upgrade decision. I find that, when a system add-on is competitively supplied, a monopolist chooses to tie the add-on to a new system that is only backward compatible, even if a commitment of not introducing the new system is available and socially optimal. Tying facilitates a price squeeze.
2008-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14767/2/MPRA_paper_14767.pdf
Miao, Chun-Hui (2008): Tying, Compatibility and Planned Obsolescence.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15402
2019-09-27T08:35:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443831
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15402/
Model for revelation of unfriendly information impacts in mass-media which are directed on change of public opinion
Bocharnikov, Victor
Sveshnikov, Sergey
Voznyak, Stepan
Yuzefovich, Vladimir
D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
In this article we proposes the mathematical model for revelation of deliberate unfriendly information impacts which are fulfilled by means of specially prepared information messages (news, reviews and others) in mass-media. The model calculates the quantitative measure for fact determination of purposeful information impact and evaluation of potential damage to interests of state (party, corporation) from impact fulfilment. The model use the following data: intensity and direction of information streams (publication frequency and themes of news), structure of important state and public problems, structure of social groups of a society, priorities of these social groups, mass-media popularity in social groups, priorities of a state policy. The model is the semantic network in which the relations between concepts we formalize by use of fuzzy measures by Sugeno. We have used this model for revelation of information impacts on public opinion of Russian-speaking national minority of Crimea (Ukraine) during 01.2002 - 02.2005 (final stage of presidential elections). The model also can has important implications for evaluation of election cleanness, for neutralization of dirty voting technologies, for facts determination of unfair competition, when corporations involve a public opinion into own competitive activity.
2009-05-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15402/1/MPRA_paper_15402.pdf
Bocharnikov, Victor and Sveshnikov, Sergey and Voznyak, Stepan and Yuzefovich, Vladimir (2009): Model for revelation of unfriendly information impacts in mass-media which are directed on change of public opinion.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15534
2013-04-15T08:04:09Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15608
2019-09-26T09:34:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3936
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15608/
The theory of access pricing and interconnection
Armstrong, Mark
L96 - Telecommunications
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
This paper surveys the theory of access pricing and interconnection in telecommunicatons. One-way access pricing, competition bottlenects and two-way access pricing are discussed.
2001-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15608/1/MPRA_paper_15608.pdf
Armstrong, Mark (2001): The theory of access pricing and interconnection.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16397
2019-09-27T08:33:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4330
7375626A656374733D47:4733
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
7375626A656374733D43:4331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16397/
A Comparison among the director networks in the main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Santella, Paolo
Drago, Carlo
Polo, Andrea
Gagliardi, Enrico
C0 - General
G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
M2 - Business Economics
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating
and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through directors who have no more than two board positions at the time. A case in between is represented by the US, where a high number of
companies are connected to each other just like Germany, France, and Italy. However, just like the UK, such connections are made through directors who tend to have just two board positions at the time, a sign that, differently from Italy, Germany, and France, the UK and US
networks might not be functional to systemic collusion.
2009-01-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16397/1/MPRA_paper_16397.pdf
Santella, Paolo and Drago, Carlo and Polo, Andrea and Gagliardi, Enrico (2009): A Comparison among the director networks in the main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16729
2019-10-02T13:54:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16729/
Strategic Vertical Separation
Sloev, Igor
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
The paper explores incentives for strategic vertical separation of firms in a framework of a simple duopoly model. Each firm chooses either to be a retailer of its own good (vertical integration) or to sell its good through an independent exclusive retailer (vertical separation). In the latter case a two-part tariff is applied. Retailers compete in quantities, goods are perfect substitutes and firms' cost functions are quadratic. I show that the equilibrium outcome crucially depends on the degree of (dis)economies of scale and asymmetry of costs. Two asymmetric equilibria arise, in which one firm separates while another integrates, under conditions that both firms' cost functions exhibit a sufficiently high diseconomies of scale, or extreme asymmetry of costs. Under a moderate asymmetry of costs a unique equilibrium exists in which the firm with the lower degree of diseconomies of scale separates, while its rival integrates. With the degree of diseconomies of scale low for both firms in the unique equilibrium both firms separate.
2009-08-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16729/3/MPRA_paper_16729.pdf
Sloev, Igor (2009): Strategic Vertical Separation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:16883
2019-10-03T01:48:31Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3132
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16883/
Tying, Compatibility and Planned Obsolescence
Miao, Chun-Hui
L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies
L40 - General
According to the hypothesis of planned obsolescence, a durable goods monopolist without commitment power has an excessive incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete, and this reduces its overall profitability. In this paper, I reconsider the above hypothesis by examining the role of competition in a monopolist's upgrade decision. I find that, when a system add-on is competitively supplied, a monopolist chooses to tie the add-on to a new system that is only backward compatible, even if a commitment of not introducing the new system is available and socially optimal. Tying facilitates a price squeeze.
2008-12-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16883/1/MPRA_paper_16883.pdf
Miao, Chun-Hui (2008): Tying, Compatibility and Planned Obsolescence. Forthcoming in: Journal of Industrial Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17166
2019-09-27T13:59:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483737
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D46:4631:463133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17166/
The Impact of Firm Size and Market Size Asymmetries on National Mergers in a Three-Country Model
Santos-Pinto, Luís
H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper studies the impact of firm and market size asymmetries on merger decisions. To do that I consider a model where a small and a large country compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms
(with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country
have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in small ones.
2009-08-26
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17166/1/MPRA_paper_17166.pdf
Santos-Pinto, Luís (2009): The Impact of Firm Size and Market Size Asymmetries on National Mergers in a Three-Country Model.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17279
2019-09-29T18:31:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17279/
Unionized Labor Market and Regulation of Monopoly
Jellal, Mohamed
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D42 - Monopoly
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
In developing countries, empirical evidence suggests that labor unions entail a positive wage gap for unionized workers, in particular in monopolistic and publicly controlled firms. In this paper, we analyze how the presence of a labor union affects the regulation of a monopoly under asymmetric information. Since part of the informational rent left to the monopolistic firm benefits to the syndicate, we prove that the regulator is induced to lower the rent when the union has a large bargaining power. The net consumers' surplus can either increase or decrease with the firm's bargaining power depending on the firm's efficiency type.
JEL
2009-09-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17279/1/MPRA_paper_17279.pdf
Jellal, Mohamed (2009): Unionized Labor Market and Regulation of Monopoly.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17787
2019-09-28T01:13:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3833
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17787/
Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices
Pelnar, Gregory
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L83 - Sports ; Gambling ; Restaurants ; Recreation ; Tourism
L40 - General
An important issue in many antitrust lawsuits involving professional sports leagues and their member teams is the extent to which franchises within the same, and across different, professional sports leagues compete with one another for fans and advertisers. Complicating the issue is the fact that some sports franchises also cooperate with other franchises in the same or different leagues by, for example, participating in a joint venture to build and operate the stadium in which they will play their games or a regional sports network joint venture to televise their games. An extreme form of cooperation is common ownership: some franchises in different sports leagues have common ownership. This study investigates the impact of competition and cooperation among the franchises of the four major professional sports leagues (i.e., the National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball) on ticket prices for the 2008 season. The regression results suggest that the existence of one or more rival sports franchises in the same metropolitan area does not have a statistically significant impact on ticket prices. On the other hand, there is at best weak evidence that cooperation between sports franchises impacts ticket prices. These findings are consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses.
2009-10-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17787/1/MPRA_paper_17787.pdf
Pelnar, Gregory (2009): Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17857
2019-09-30T16:15:17Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17857/
Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price
Perona, Mathieu
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
Z11 - Economics of the Arts and Literature
This paper models the book retail market as a dual market. Consumers choose between competitively retailed, well-identified blockbusters and going to a monopoly bookshop to find the best match for their tastes. I show that uncertainty about the status on a given title (will it be a blockbuster or not?) places publishers in front of a trade-off between low prices (valuable if they get a blockbuster) and high prices (in the other case). The main effect of this trade-off is that the presence of blockbusters almost never lead to bookshop foreclosure by blockbusters and that a higher number of blockbusters leads to lower price for all books and increased consumer surplus. A fixed book price mitigates the effects of blockbuster, transferring suplus from blockbuster byuers towards publishers, and leads to perfect matching between readers and tastes. When the number of titles and of blockbusters becomes largers however, the situations with and without FBP converge.
2009-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17857/1/MPRA_paper_17857.pdf
Perona, Mathieu (2009): Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18064
2019-09-27T14:20:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4B:4B30
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18064/
Merger Performance and Efficiencies in Horizontal Merger Policy in the US and the EU
Kamerbeek, S.P.
K0 - General
K21 - Antitrust Law
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
In current horizontal merger policy in the US and the EU an explicit efficiency defense is allowed. On both sides of the Atlantic mergers are unconditionally approved if internal efficiencies are sufficient to reverse the mergers’ potential to harm consumers in the relevant market. Current merger policy is implicitly based on the assumption that rational managers will only propose privately profitable mergers. In this thesis I will show that the empirical evidence on merger performance suggests that this assumption can’t be sustained. Managers do propose uneconomic mergers, motivated by non-wealth maximizing behavior. To tackle this problem I argue that efficiencies should not only be used as an efficiency defense, but efficiencies should work both ways. To avoid type I and type II errors the competition authorities in the US and the EU should undertake a sequential efficiency test in their assessment of specific mergers.
2009-07-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18064/1/MPRA_paper_18064.pdf
Kamerbeek, S.P. (2009): Merger Performance and Efficiencies in Horizontal Merger Policy in the US and the EU.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19278
2019-09-27T01:07:43Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D52:5233:523332
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19278/
Sequential Spatial Competition in Vertically Related industries with Different Product Varieties
Beladi, Hamid
Chakrabarti, Avik
Marjit, Sugata
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial
competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all
varieties demanded.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19278/1/MPRA_paper_19278.pdf
Beladi, Hamid and Chakrabarti, Avik and Marjit, Sugata (2009): Sequential Spatial Competition in Vertically Related industries with Different Product Varieties.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19289
2019-10-01T19:42:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3534
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19289/
Book Review of Ignacio De Leon's An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy The Latin American Experience
Rodriguez, A.E.
O54 - Latin America ; Caribbean
K21 - Antitrust Law
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
Book Review of Ignacio De Leon's "An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy The Latin American Experience" (Wolters Kluwer 2009)
Reviewed by
A.E. Rodriguez
2009-12-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19289/1/MPRA_paper_19289.pdf
Rodriguez, A.E. (2009): Book Review of Ignacio De Leon's An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy The Latin American Experience.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20127
2019-09-26T22:13:06Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3434
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3437
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3433
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20127/
Competition and Economic Growth: an Empirical Analysis for a Panel of 20 OECD Countries
Scopelliti, Alessandro Diego
L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth ; Aggregate Productivity ; Cross-Country Output Convergence
O43 - Institutions and Growth
L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
This paper aims at analyzing, from an empirical point of view, the relationship between product
market competition and economic growth, using the data on multi-factor productivity for a panel of 20
OECD countries over a period 1995-2005, and considering the role of the distance from the technological
frontier in the growth process.
Section A examines the impact of economic freedom and of the distance to frontier on the level and
on the growth rate of multi-factor productivity. The analysis distinguishes between the indicators of business
freedom and trade freedom, as proxies for the competitive pressures coming from domestic market and from
foreign market. Then, trade liberalizations are more beneficial for the countries far from the frontier, because
they can exploit the opportunities given by international trade also in order to adopt the existing technologies
developed by the advanced economies. On the other hand, business liberalizations are more advantageous for
the countries close to the frontier, because the elimination of regulatory barriers increases the possibility of
entry in the market and then rises the potential competition to the incumbent firms.
Section B studies the effect of product market regulation, employment protection legislation and of
the distance to frontier on the level and on the growth rate of multi-factor productivity. Product market
liberalization as well as labour market deregulation determine an increase of total factor productivity:
moreover, the interaction of market rigidities with the distance to the frontier mostly displays an innovationenhancing
effect, since the positive effect of market liberalizations on TFP is higher for the countries close to
the frontier, where the existing technology level would reinforce the incentive for innovation.
2009-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20127/1/MPRA_paper_20127.pdf
Scopelliti, Alessandro Diego (2009): Competition and Economic Growth: an Empirical Analysis for a Panel of 20 OECD Countries.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20249
2019-09-29T00:24:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20249/
On the sustainability of collusion in Bertrand supergames with discrete pricing and nonlinear demand
Zimmerman, Paul R.
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
In traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand supergames, the critical discount factor governing the sustainability of collusion is independent of key demand and supply parameters. Recent research has demonstrated that these counterintuitive results stem from the assumption that firms can change prices in infinitesimally small increments (i.e., continuously). This note considers the effects of demand curvature in the context of a model of collusion where, as in Gallice (2008), Bertrand competitors can deviate only by lowering prices by some small, discrete amount. Two alternative demand specifications that capture the influence of demand curvature are considered. In either case, it is shown that with discrete price changes the critical discount factor is determined by the key demand parameters, including demand curvature. However, the direct effects of increased concavity (or convexity) in market demand on the sustainability of collusion runs in opposite directions across the two models. This discrepancy is shown to arise from the way in which the respective demand curves rotate in response to a change in the demand curvature parameter. The results support the conclusion of earlier research that determining the potential for collusion in homogenous goods industries likely requires careful case-by-case investigation.
2010-01-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20249/1/MPRA_paper_20249.pdf
Zimmerman, Paul R. (2010): On the sustainability of collusion in Bertrand supergames with discrete pricing and nonlinear demand.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:21121
2019-09-26T20:26:23Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21121/
Resale price maintenance: Explaining the controversy, and small steps towards a more nuanced policy
Bennett, Matthew
Fletcher, Amelia
Giovannetti, Emanuele
Stallibrass, David
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
K21 - Antitrust Law
The paper sets out why we consider that the legal framework in the EU amplifies what are in reality relatively small differences in thinking around RPM. Primarily, this is because it asks economists, in the name of legal certainty, to draw a false dichotomy between agreements and practices which are harmful and those which are beneficial. We then provide a summary of the literature on RPM and, based on this thinking, set out a few small steps that might be taken towards a more nuanced approach to assessing RPM, within a 'presumed illegality' framework without sacrificing the beneficial legal certainty that the current approach brings.
2010-01-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21121/1/MPRA_paper_21121.pdf
Bennett, Matthew and Fletcher, Amelia and Giovannetti, Emanuele and Stallibrass, David (2010): Resale price maintenance: Explaining the controversy, and small steps towards a more nuanced policy.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:21812
2019-09-27T16:01:53Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21812/
Horizontal Mergers and Divestment Dynamics in a Sunset Industry
Nishiwaki, Masato
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
In an oligopolistic market, socially excessive entry takes place because of business-stealing effect which is a gain to the entrant but not to the industry as a whole. Similarly, in a sunset industry with declining demand, now socially excessive capacity cannnot be dissolved because everyone intends to free ride on the reduction of industry supply expected from someone else’s divestment. As a result, no firm will divest, even though divestment contributes to the saving on fixed costs. This paper highlights the role of mergers as a device for internalizing
the business-stealing effect and thereby promoting divestment, and examines if the merger-induced divestment could improve the total welfare using the case of cement mergers in Japan. A model of divestment based on the Markov perfect equilibrium framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995) is estimated by an asymptotic least squares. Then a counterfactual experiment is conducted to quantify the welfare impact of mergers, and to show that merged firms in fact divested their facilities more and contributed to the improvement of the total welfare despite the reduced consumers surplus.
2008-11-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21812/1/MPRA_paper_21812.pdf
Nishiwaki, Masato (2008): Horizontal Mergers and Divestment Dynamics in a Sunset Industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22551
2019-10-11T04:41:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3131
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22551/
Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price
Perona, Mathieu
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
Z11 - Economics of the Arts and Literature
This paper models the book retail market as a dual market. Consumers choose between competitively retailed, well-identified blockbusters, and going to a monopoly bookshop to find the best match for their tastes. I show that uncertainty about the status on a given title (will it be a blockbuster or not?) places publishers in front of a trade-off between low prices (valuable if they get a blockbuster) and high prices (in the other case). The main effect of this trade-off is a decrease of wholesale prices compared with the case of full information, thus enabling the bookshop to compete with lower-priced blockbusters. Uncertainty thus increases both industry profits and consumer surplus. A fixed book price further increases consumer surplus and profits of non-blockbuster publishers, at the expense of those who get a blockbuster.
2009-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22551/1/MPRA_paper_22551.pdf
Perona, Mathieu (2009): Bookshop, blockbusters and readers’ tastes: a new appraisal of the fixed book price.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:23182
2019-09-28T06:49:13Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23182/
Market concentration measures and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms.
Lopez-Mateo, Celina
Ruiz-Porras, Antonio
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L40 - General
L60 - General
We study how alternative measures of market concentration may explain investment decisions of Mexican manufacturing firms. The measures include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Dominance one. The first one is the traditional measure of market structure concentration. The Dominance Index is a competition measure used by Mexican regulators. The econometric assessments suggest that investment decisions of Mexican firms can be better explained by the Dominance Index measure than by the Herfindahl-Hirschman one. Thus our results suggest that the Mexican Dominance Index might be useful as a measure of market structure and competition. Such conclusion is based on several econometric assessments. In all cases we use certain characteristics of the firms (size, cash flows, investment opportunities and capital intensity) as control variables.
2010-02-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23182/1/MPRA_paper_23182.pdf
Lopez-Mateo, Celina and Ruiz-Porras, Antonio (2010): Market concentration measures and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms. Forthcoming in: Accounting and Taxation
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24305
2019-09-27T23:58:20Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31
7375626A656374733D47:4733
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24305/
Corporate Governance, Competetion, The new International Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets
Singh, Ajit
Singh, Alaka
Weisse, Bruce
O1 - Economic Development
G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
This paper examines from the developing countries perspective important analytical and policy issues arising from: a) the current international discussions about corporate governance in relation to the New International Financial Architecture; b) changes in the international competitive environment being caused by the enormous international merger movement in advanced countries.
The background to a) above is the emergence of corporate governance as a key issue in the current G7 proposals for the New International Financial Architecture. The G7 emphasis on corporate governance can be traced back to the thesis that the ‘deeper’ reasons for the Asian crisis lay in the microeconomic behaviour of corporations and businesses in the affected countries. The failings of the corporate governance mechanisms and distortions in the competitive process have received special scrutiny in such analyses.
With respect to b) above, the context is that the largest corporations in advanced countries are currently in the process of potentially cartelising the world market place through a spate of cross-border mergers and take-overs. This huge merger movement raises serious policy concerns for developing countries.
The paper's main conclusions are:
1. The thesis that the deeper causes of the Asian crisis were the flawed systems of corporate governance and a poor competitive environment in the affected countries is not supported by evidence.
2. The Anglo-Saxon model of widely held corporations with dispersed share ownership is by far the exception in developing countries and in much of continental Europe. Empirical evidence suggests that emerging markets, as well as European countries such as Italy, Sweden or Germany have successful records of fast long-term growth with different governance systems, indeed superior to those of Anglo-Saxon countries.
3. Empirical evidence does not support the view that the Asian crisis 1997 to 1999 was caused by crony capitalism.
4. Corporate financing patterns in emerging markets in the 1990s were broadly similar to those observed in the 1980s. Unlike their counterparts in advanced countries, large developing countries firms continued to rely overwhelmingly on external sources to finance their growth of total assets.
5. The analysis of this paper does not support the claim that developing country conglomerates are inefficient, financially precarious and necessarily create moral hazard. It also indicates that contrary to widely held beliefs, product market competition in emerging countries is no less intense than in advanced economies.
Acknowledgements
Please do not quote without permission from the authors. Comments are most welcome.
2002-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24305/1/MPRA_paper_24305.pdf
Singh, Ajit and Singh, Alaka and Weisse, Bruce (2002): Corporate Governance, Competetion, The new International Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets. Published in: CBR Working Paper , Vol. 250, (December 2002)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24416
2019-09-27T16:25:13Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24416/
Settlements in cartel cases
Ascione, Aurora
Motta, Massimo
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Antitrust Law
There is little doubt that the fight against cartels is one of the most important objectives of Antitrust
Authorities, and the European Commission (EC herewith) represents no exception in this regard.
While the Leniency Policy has been successful in triggering evidence by cartel participants and thus in
determining the collapse of several cartels, it has not reduced considerably the length of the cartel
proceedings, which is another potential benefit of leniency programmes.
In this paper we find that a 10% fine reduction to firms which agree to settle with the Commission may be too weak an
incentive for firms to settle. This means that the settlements
participation rate will not be high enough to effectively reduce the duration of cartel proceeding.
2008
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24416/1/MPRA_paper_24416.pdf
Ascione, Aurora and Motta, Massimo (2008): Settlements in cartel cases. Published in: In Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2008: Antitrust settlements under EC Competition Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing (2010): pp. 67-83.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24647
2019-09-28T09:33:23Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C39:4C3933
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24647/
Potere di mercato e distribuzione dei profitti nella filiera del trasporto aereo
Martini, Gianmaria
Scotti, Davide
L93 - Air Transportation
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
We analyze the air transportation vertical channel and show the existence of an asymmetric distribution of profit margins between airlines and the firms operating in
upstream stages. Higher margins are observed for leasing companies, engine manufacturers and GDS, while airlines exhibit a very low profitability. Two factors may explain
this asymmetry: (1) in some stages of the value chain some firms (e.g. airlines and handling companies) have a low countervailing power both when acting as a buyer and as a seller, and (2) the liberalization policy implemented in the air transport sector so far is incomplete. The latter has increased the intensity of competition in some stages
(e.g. airlines and handling companies), but has not faced and reduced the market power in other ones. We can draw some policy implications from this analysis. First,
horizontal mergers between airlines should be positively evaluated by competition authorities, since they increase the airlines countervailing power in the vertical channel
and this may, in turn, bring about a price reduction for consumers. Second, the degree of vertical integration in some stages should be reduced, because it is likely to
be an instrument for increasing the market power in upstream stages and not to reach a higher efficiency.
2010-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24647/1/MPRA_paper_24647.pdf
Martini, Gianmaria and Scotti, Davide (2010): Potere di mercato e distribuzione dei profitti nella filiera del trasporto aereo. Published in: Mercato Concorrenza Regole , Vol. 2010, No. 1 (April 2010): pp. 173-210.
it
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24759
2019-09-28T15:01:02Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D45:4534:453432
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24759/
The Pricing of Payments
Krueger, Malte
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
E42 - Monetary Systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the Monetary System ; Payment Systems
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
The pricing of payments has received increasing attention of regulators. In many cases, regulators are concerned that consumers do not face cost based prices. They argue that without cost based prices consumers will make inefficient choices. In this paper, it is argued that both, economics of scale and the particular laws governing pricing in two-sided markets provide a case against cost based pricing.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24759/1/MPRA_paper_24759.pdf
Krueger, Malte (2009): The Pricing of Payments.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24792
2019-10-18T03:28:36Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3630
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24792/
Market concentration measures and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms.
Ruiz-Porras, Antonio
Lopez-Mateo, Celina
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L40 - General
L60 - General
We study how different measures of market concentration may explain investment decisions of Mexican manufacturing firms. The measures include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Dominance one. The first one is the traditional measure of market structure concentration. The Dominance Index is a competition measure used by Mexican regulators. The econometric assessments suggest that investment decisions of Mexican firms can be better explained by the Dominance Index measure than by the Herfindahl-Hirschman one. Thus our results suggest that the Mexican Dominance Index might be useful as a measure of market structure and competition. They also suggest that market concentration reduces investment. Such conclusions are based on several econometric assessments. In all cases we use certain characteristics of the firms (size, cash flows, investment opportunities and capital intensity) as control variables.
2010-02-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24792/1/MPRA_paper_24792.pdf
Ruiz-Porras, Antonio and Lopez-Mateo, Celina (2010): Market concentration measures and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms. Forthcoming in: Accounting and Taxation
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:24883
2019-09-27T04:04:06Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D48:4833:483332
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24883/
Public Policy and Market Competition: How the Master Settlement Agreement Changed the Cigarette Industry
Ciliberto, Federico
Kuminoff, Nicolai
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
H32 - Firm
This paper investigates the large and unexpected increase in cigarette prices that followed the 1997 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). We integrate key features of rational addiction theory into a discrete-choice model of the demand for a differentiated product. We find that following the MSA firms set prices on a more elastic region of their demand curves. Using these estimates, we predict prices that would be charged under a variety of industry structures and pricing rules. Under the assumptions of firms’ perfect foresight and constant marginal costs, we fail to reject the hypothesis that firms collude on a dynamic pricing strategy.
2010-07-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24883/1/MPRA_paper_24883.pdf
Ciliberto, Federico and Kuminoff, Nicolai (2010): Public Policy and Market Competition: How the Master Settlement Agreement Changed the Cigarette Industry. Published in: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy [Frontiers] , Vol. 10, No. 1 (17 July 2010)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25732
2019-09-29T21:12:37Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3131
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25732/
Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities
Hattori, Keisuke
Lin, Ming Hsin
L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the joint profits from a parallel alliance between the composite goods firm and a components producer are always larger than those from a complementary alliance between components producers, through Nash bargaining, a components producer prefers the complementary (parallel) alliance when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (small). Combined with the result that a complementary alliance is socially preferable, our findings provide meaningful implications for antitrust policy.
2010-10-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25732/1/MPRA_paper_25732.pdf
Hattori, Keisuke and Lin, Ming Hsin (2010): Alliance Partner Choice in Markets with Vertical and Horizontal Externalities.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25931
2019-09-26T14:42:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25931/
Competition and cost pass-through in differentiated oligopolies
Zimmerman, Paul R.
Carlson, Julie A.
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L40 - General
The impact that competition exerts on the incentives of firms to pass through reductions in their marginal
costs is an important consideration in assessing the performance of alternate market structures. This paper
examines the role of product differentiation on firm-specific and industry-wide pass-through rates. Relying
on Shubik’s (1980) model of differentiated Cournot competition with linear demand, we show that there
exists an initial critical range over which the firm-specific cost pass-through rate decreases in the number of
firms. Beyond this range the rate continually increases – approaching 50 percent as the number of firms
goes to infinity. This contrasts with a model of differentiated Bertrand competition in which cost pass through monotonically decreases in the number of firms. The disparate effects across the Cournot and Bertrand models are shown to stem from the influence of competition and product differentiation on the respective firm reaction functions. Suggestions for future empirical work based upon the models’ predictions and implications for antitrust policy are also discussed.
2010-10-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25931/1/MPRA_paper_25931.pdf
Zimmerman, Paul R. and Carlson, Julie A. (2010): Competition and cost pass-through in differentiated oligopolies.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26713
2019-09-26T18:51:24Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3431
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3636
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26713/
An empirical analysis of the counterfactual: a merger and divestiture in the Australian cigarette industry
Pham, Vivienne
Prentice, David
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L66 - Food ; Beverages ; Cosmetics ; Tobacco ; Wine and Spirits
In this paper we empirically analyse two counterfactual situations facing an anti-trust authority following the merger of two of the largest international cigarette companies. First we estimate a nested logit model of demand for cigarettes. The implied elasticity of demand for smoking and implied marginal costs are both broadly consistent with the limited independent estimates available. We then use the model to simulate the proposed merger and the partial divestiture that was accepted by the Australian anti-trust authority. A comparison of the relative price changes predicted by the divestiture simulation with the actual post-divestiture price changes shows the model successfully anticipated the behaviour of the divested brands. This suggests structural econometric analysis using a nested logit may be usefully utilised by anti-trust authorities to assess the welfare implications of proposed mergers and partial divestitures.
2010-11-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26713/1/MPRA_paper_26713.pdf
Pham, Vivienne and Prentice, David (2010): An empirical analysis of the counterfactual: a merger and divestiture in the Australian cigarette industry.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:26782
2019-10-01T05:30:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C34:4C3432
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26782/
Bundling revisited: substitute products and inter-firm discounts
Armstrong, Mark
M31 - Marketing
L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper extends the standard model of bundling to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, firms have an incentive to introduce bundling discounts when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. Separate firms often have a unilateral incentive to offer inter-firm bundle discounts, although this depends on the detailed form of substitutability. Bundle discounts mitigate the innate substitutability of products, which can relax competition between firms and induce an integrated firm to lower all of its prices when it follows a bundling strategy.
2010-11
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26782/1/MPRA_paper_26782.pdf
Armstrong, Mark (2010): Bundling revisited: substitute products and inter-firm discounts.
en
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