2024-03-29T10:49:35Z
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/cgi/oai2
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:340
2019-10-03T04:58:14Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/340/
Teacher Incentives
Jaag, Christian
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
I21 - Analysis of Education
This paper considers hidden teacher effort in educational production and discusses the implications of multiple teacher effort dimensions on optimum incentive contracts in a theoretical framework. The analysis of educational production in a multitask framework is a new and unique contribution of this paper to the economics of education. We first characterize the first-best and second-best outcomes. The model is extended to address specific questions concerning teacher incentive schemes: We compare input- to output-based accountability measures and study the implication of the level of aggregation in performance measures. Against the background of the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of teacher incentives, we argue that performance measures should be as broad as possible. Further, we present the optimum contract for motivated teachers. Finally, if education is produced in teacher teams, we establish the conditions for optimum team-based and individual incentives: The larger the spillover effects across teacher efforts and the better the measurability of educational achievement, the stronger the case for team-based incentives.
2006
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/340/1/MPRA_paper_340.pdf
Jaag, Christian (2006): Teacher Incentives.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:2469
2019-09-26T23:21:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2469/
Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies
Thiele, Veikko
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper elaborates on the improvement of the agent's performance evaluation through the costly acquisition of additional performance measures aimed at inducing the agent to implement a more efficient effort allocation across tasks. It contrasts two alternatives for the principal: (i) to centrally invest in the information acquisition; or (ii), to delegate this task to a supervisor. This paper demonstrates that the principal generally favors delegation for a sufficiently incongruent measurement of the agent's performance, and a centralized investment, otherwise.
2007-03-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2469/1/MPRA_paper_2469.pdf
Thiele, Veikko (2007): Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:4456
2019-10-01T14:12:20Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3230
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4456/
The Effect of External Incentives on Profits and Firm-Provided Incentives Strategy
Azar, Ofer H.
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
L20 - General
J30 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M20 - General
The article examines the firm's choice of incentives when workers face additional incentives (“external incentives”) to those provided by the firm, such as building reputation that improves the workers' prospects with other employers, or satisfaction from working well. Surprisingly, the firm might find it optimal to increase the incentives it provides following an increase in external incentives. Even if the firm reduces its incentives, however, total incentives unambiguously increase, leading to higher effort and profits. This implies that firms should try to increase the external incentives that their workers face; I suggest several ways firms can do so.
2003
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4456/1/MPRA_paper_4456.pdf
Azar, Ofer H. (2003): The Effect of External Incentives on Profits and Firm-Provided Incentives Strategy. Forthcoming in: Journal of Socio-Economics
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5719
2017-12-21T09:12:27Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5748
2017-12-21T09:14:24Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:5850
2019-09-29T04:37:44Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5850/
Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
M41 - Accounting
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
Residual income as commonly described in academic papers and in real-life applications may be formally described as a function of three variables: (i) the capital invested, (ii) the rate of return, (iii) the opportunity cost of capital. This paper shows that a different paradigm of residual income is generated if a fourth element is added: (iv) the capital that investors lose if they infuse their funds into
the firm (or project). The lost-capital paradigm has various interesting economic, nancial, accounting interpretations and bears intriguing formal and conceptual relations to the standard paradigm. It may be soundly employed in real-life applications as a tool for rewarding managers as well as for appraising firms. Firm value is shown to be a function of total abnormal earnings and independent of time, if the new paradigm is used: what matters is only the book value and the sum of total expected residual incomes, not the periods in which they are generated. This aggregation property is particular important for highlighting the link between accounting values and market values. A numerical example illustrates the practical implementation of the new paradigm to the Economic Value Added and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model; also, a model is presented which has the nice property of being aligned in sign with the Net Present Value: this makes it a good candidate for use in value-based management.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5850/2/MPRA_paper_5850.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6309
2017-12-22T03:27:02Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6766
2017-12-22T03:41:43Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6778
2019-10-01T07:49:57Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D42:4235:423532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473238
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6778/
Extending the managerial power theory of executive pay: A cross national test
Otten, Jordan J.A.
Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R
B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M10 - General
Contextual factors are typically neglected in both theorizing and empirical tests on
executive pay. The fast majority of empirical investigations use data from U.S. based
firms. Theoretical implications are typically developed, understood and tested on the
basis of the U.S. context. However, the U.S. case is not the world wide standard. Pay
in other countries is on average considerably lower and have a different pay mix. The
puzzle that from the typical use of agency theory can’t be explained is the variance of
pay practices that exist not only within countries but also across countries. This paper
extends scholars renewed attention to managerial power theory on executive pay. It
sets out how and why institutional theory must be included in explanations of
executive pay. On the basis of a sample of executive pay packages from 17 different
countries we test the theoretical extensions. Results indicate that institutions interact
with firm level determinants of executive pay. Explanations for executive pay should
therefore account for the variance of pay practices within and across countries.
Highlighting that the institutional embeddedness of pay practices play an important
role in finding conclusive explanations of current pay practices.
2007-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6778/1/MPRA_paper_6778.pdf
Otten, Jordan J.A. and Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R (2007): Extending the managerial power theory of executive pay: A cross national test. Published in: ERIM Report Series Research in Management No. ERS-2007-090-ORG (December 2007): pp. 1-70.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6783
2019-09-28T04:46:28Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6783/
Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
D40 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G0 - General
M21 - Business Economics
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income,
originally introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to the capital lost by investors. The lost capital may be viewed as (a) the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital of a shadow project, (d) the claimholders' credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the classical standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which a property of earnings aggregation. Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as
economic theory, management accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O'Hanlon and Peasnell's (2002) unrecovered capital and Excess Value Created; Ohlson's (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O'Byrne's (1997) EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani's (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Keynes's (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler's (2000) Net Economic Income,
Fernandez's (2002) Created Shareholder Value, Anthony's (1975) profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach a good candidate for firm valuation, incentive compensation, capital budgeting decision-making
2007-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6783/1/MPRA_paper_6783.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:6873
2017-12-22T03:46:04Z
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7158
2019-09-27T09:39:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7158/
Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
M41 - Accounting
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
Residual income is an important notion for constructing incentive plans for managers, as well as for valuing firms.
In academic papers and in real-life applications this notion is a function of three variables: (i) the capital invested, (ii) the rate of return, (iii) the opportunity cost of capital. This paper shows that a different paradigm of residual income is generated if a fourth element is added: (iv) the capital that investors lose if they infuse their funds in the firm (or project). The lost-capital paradigm has various interesting economic, financial, accounting
interpretations and bears intriguing formal and conceptual relations to the standard paradigm. It may
be soundly employed in real-life applications as a tool for rewarding managers as well as for appraising
firms. Firm value is shown to be independent of time, if the new paradigm is used: what matters is only the book value and the sum of total expected residual incomes, not the
periods in which they are generated. A numerical example illustrates the practical implementation of the new paradigm to the Economic Value Added and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model; also, a model is presented which has the nice property of being aligned in sign with the Net Present Value: this makes it a good candidate for use in value-based management.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7158/1/MPRA_paper_7158.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7335
2019-10-02T17:14:18Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7335/
Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
D40 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G0 - General
M21 - Business Economics
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income,
originally introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to the capital lost by investors. The lost capital may be viewed as (a) the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital of a shadow project, (d) the claimholders' credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the classical standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which a property of earnings aggregation. Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as
economic theory, management accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O'Hanlon and Peasnell's (2002) unrecovered capital and Excess Value Created; Ohlson's (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O'Byrne's (1997) EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani's (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Keynes's (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler's (2000) Net Economic Income,
Fernandez's (2002) Created Shareholder Value, Anthony's (1975) profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach a good candidate for firm valuation, incentive compensation, capital budgeting decision-making
2007-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7335/3/MPRA_paper_7335.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7425
2019-10-01T12:20:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7425/
Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
D40 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G0 - General
M21 - Business Economics
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income,
originally introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to the capital lost by investors. The lost capital may be viewed as (a) the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital of a shadow project, (d) the claimholders' credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the classical standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which a property of earnings aggregation. Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as
economic theory, management accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O'Hanlon and Peasnell's (2002) unrecovered capital and Excess Value Created; Ohlson's (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O'Byrne's (1997) EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani's (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Keynes's (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler's (2000) Net Economic Income,
Fernandez's (2002) Created Shareholder Value, Anthony's (1975) profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach a good candidate for firm valuation, incentive compensation, capital budgeting decision-making
2007-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7425/1/MPRA_paper_7425.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7761
2019-09-27T12:19:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3535
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7761/
IDE et retards d'investissement de l'entreprise domestique au Sénégal : une solution par la gouvernance d'entreprise
SENE, Serigne Moustapha
O55 - Africa
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper focuses on agency theory to explain investment behavior difference between private domestic and foreign in Senegalese industry. We put domestic companies into two groups with regard to managerial ownership and institutional ownership. An augmented accelerator model with demand uncertainty is used for that purpose. Empirical checkings have been performed using in panel of 187 firms. The results reveal that investment sensibility to uncertainty, sales and free cash flow is higher in foreign firms. Considering the efforts made by these firms in developing countries to meet international standards, our second area of research proposes managerial ownership to mitigate investment delays of domestic firms. It is showed that domestic firms can benefit from a high sensibility to uncertainty, be less financially constrained and less subject to underinvestment (due to manager extraction funds). A reduction of behavioral delays could be reached via optimal managerial ownership (within 5%-25%); none institutional ownership also improve domestic firms investment.
2008-01-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7761/1/MPRA_paper_7761.pdf
SENE, Serigne Moustapha (2008): IDE et retards d'investissement de l'entreprise domestique au Sénégal : une solution par la gouvernance d'entreprise.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:7764
2019-09-28T04:35:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7764/
Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
D40 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G0 - General
M21 - Business Economics
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income,
originally introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to the capital lost by investors. The lost capital may be viewed as (a) the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital of a shadow project, (d) the claimholders' credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the classical standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which a property of earnings aggregation. Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as
economic theory, management accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O'Hanlon and Peasnell's (2002) unrecovered capital and Excess Value Created; Ohlson's (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O'Byrne's (1997) EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani's (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Keynes's (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler's (2000) Net Economic Income,
Fernandez's (2002) Created Shareholder Value, Anthony's (1975) profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach a good candidate for firm valuation, incentive compensation, capital budgeting decision-making
2007-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7764/1/MPRA_paper_7764.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8387
2019-09-27T04:59:52Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8387/
Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
M40 - General
G30 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
M41 - Accounting
Residual income as commonly described in academic papers and in real-life applications may be formally described as a function of three variables: (i) the capital invested, (ii) the rate of return, (iii) the opportunity cost of capital. This paper shows that a different paradigm of residual income is generated if a fourth element is added: (iv) the capital that investors lose if they infuse their funds into
the firm (or project). The lost-capital paradigm has various interesting economic, nancial, accounting interpretations and bears intriguing formal and conceptual relations to the standard paradigm. It may be soundly employed in real-life applications as a tool for rewarding managers as well as for appraising firms. Firm value is shown to be a function of total abnormal earnings and independent of time, if the new paradigm is used: what matters is only the book value and the sum of total expected residual incomes, not the periods in which they are generated. This aggregation property is particular important for highlighting the link between accounting values and market values. A numerical example illustrates the practical implementation of the new paradigm to the Economic Value Added and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model; also, a model is presented which has the nice property of being aligned in sign with the Net Present Value: this makes it a good candidate for use in value-based management.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8387/1/MPRA_paper_8387.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8598
2019-10-03T03:38:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3535
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8598/
IDE et retards d'investissement de l'entreprise domestique au Sénégal : une solution par la gouvernance d'entreprise
SENE, Serigne Moustapha
O55 - Africa
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper focuses on agency theory to explain investment behavior difference between private domestic and foreign in Senegalese industry. We put domestic companies into two groups with regard to managerial ownership and institutional ownership. An augmented accelerator model with demand uncertainty is used for that purpose. Empirical checkings have been performed using in panel of 187 firms. The results reveal that investment sensibility to uncertainty, sales and free cash flow is higher in foreign firms. Considering the efforts made by these firms in developing countries to meet international standards, our second area of research proposes managerial ownership to mitigate investment delays of domestic firms. It is showed that domestic firms can benefit from a high sensibility to uncertainty, be less financially constrained and less subject to underinvestment (due to manager extraction funds). A reduction of behavioral delays could be reached via optimal managerial ownership (within 5%-25%); none institutional ownership also improve domestic firms investment.
2008-01-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8598/1/MPRA_paper_8598.pdf
SENE, Serigne Moustapha (2008): IDE et retards d'investissement de l'entreprise domestique au Sénégal : une solution par la gouvernance d'entreprise.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8935
2019-10-03T16:27:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8935/
Scomposizione di sovraprofitti: Economic Value Added e Valore Aggiunto Sistemico
Magni, Carlo Alberto
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
G30 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M21 - Business Economics
The Economic Value Added formally translates the theoretical notion of excess profit (also known as residual income). Its use is so firmly entrenched in applied corporate finance and management accounting that its name is often used as a noun for denoting the concept of excess profit itself. This paper investigates the conceptual properties of such a notion and, in particular, it studies the relations between the excess profit generated in a period and the excess profit generated in the following period, showing that the classical approach forgets the past story of the project and the evolution of the capital invested. On the basis of this analysis, a new approach to residual income is offered, called Systemic Value Added (SVA). The latter takes account of the dynamic system governing the evolution of the capital invested, and is coherently additive in that the uncompounded sum of the SVAs leads to the Net Final Value. Interesting relations between the classical approach and the new approach are provided, and a final conventionalist position is endorsed: the excess profit is not an unambiguous concept and the choice between either approaches depends on the pieces of information one is willing to retrieve.
2000
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8935/1/MPRA_paper_8935.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2000): Scomposizione di sovraprofitti: Economic Value Added e Valore Aggiunto Sistemico. Published in: Finanza Marketing e Produzione , Vol. 4, No. 19 (December 2001): pp. 94-119.
it
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:8939
2019-09-29T19:22:01Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8939/
Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
M40 - General
G30 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
M41 - Accounting
Residual income as commonly described in academic papers and in real-life applications may be formally described as a function of three variables: (i) the capital invested, (ii) the rate of return, (iii) the opportunity cost of capital. This paper shows that a different paradigm of residual income is generated if a fourth element is added: (iv) the capital that investors lose if they infuse their funds into
the firm (or project). The lost-capital paradigm has various interesting economic, nancial, accounting interpretations and bears intriguing formal and conceptual relations to the standard paradigm. It may be soundly employed in real-life applications as a tool for rewarding managers as well as for appraising firms. Firm value is shown to be a function of total abnormal earnings and independent of time, if the new paradigm is used: what matters is only the book value and the sum of total expected residual incomes, not the periods in which they are generated. This aggregation property is particular important for highlighting the link between accounting values and market values. A numerical example illustrates the practical implementation of the new paradigm to the Economic Value Added and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model; also, a model is presented which has the nice property of being aligned in sign with the Net Present Value: this makes it a good candidate for use in value-based management.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8939/1/MPRA_paper_8939.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Measuring performance and valuing firms: In search of the lost capital.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9043
2019-10-04T18:09:51Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9043/
Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
D40 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G0 - General
M21 - Business Economics
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income,
originally introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2001b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to the capital lost by investors. The lost capital may be viewed as (a) the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital of a \emph{shadow project}, (d) the claimholders' credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the
classical standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which a property of earnings aggregation. Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as economic theory, management accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O'Hanlon and Peasnell's (2002) unrecovered capital and
Excess Value Created; Ohlson's (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O'Byrne's (1997) EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani's (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Keynes's (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler's (2000) Net Economic Income, Fern\'{a}ndez's (2002) Created Shareholder Value, Anthony's (1975) profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach a good candidate for firm valuation, incentive compensation, capital budgeting decision-making.
2007-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9043/1/MPRA_paper_9043.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:9742
2019-09-30T18:13:54Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9742/
Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
D40 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G0 - General
M21 - Business Economics
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income,
originally introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to the capital lost by investors. The lost capital may be viewed as (a) the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital of a shadow project, (d) the claimholders' credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the classical standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which a property of earnings aggregation. Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as
economic theory, management accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O'Hanlon and Peasnell's (2002) unrecovered capital and Excess Value Created; Ohlson's (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O'Byrne's (1997) EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani's (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Young and O'Byrne's (2001) Adjusted EVA; Keynes's (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler's (2000) Net Economic Income,
Fernandez's (2002) Created Shareholder Value, Anthony's (1975) profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach a good candidate for firm valuation, incentive compensation, capital budgeting decision-making
2007-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9742/1/MPRA_paper_9742.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:11649
2019-10-09T16:42:55Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11649/
Is Cross-listing Associated with Stronger Executive Incentives? Evidence from China
Chi, Wei
Zhang, Haiyan
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent governance rules and a better investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong local firms in adopting strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that top executive compensation of cross-listed firms is more sensitive to sales growth than mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to that of Hong Kong firms, executive pay of cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further study shows that it is necessary to differentiate state and non-state companies among the cross-listed firms, as they exhibit different patterns of executive incentives.
2008-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11649/1/MPRA_paper_11649.pdf
Chi, Wei and Zhang, Haiyan (2008): Is Cross-listing Associated with Stronger Executive Incentives? Evidence from China.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:12173
2019-10-05T09:37:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4F:4F35:4F3535
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473332
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12173/
IDE et retards d'investissement de l'entreprise domestique au Sénégal : une solution par la gouvernance d'entreprise
Sene, Serigne Moustapha
O55 - Africa
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper focuses on agency theory to explain investment behavior difference between private domestic and foreign in Senegalese industry. We put domestic companies into two groups with regard to managerial ownership and institutional ownership. An augmented accelerator model with demand uncertainty is used for that purpose. Empirical checkings have been performed using in panel of 187 firms. The results reveal that investment sensibility to uncertainty, sales and free cash flow is higher in foreign firms. Considering the efforts made by these firms in developing countries to meet international standards, our second area of research proposes managerial ownership to mitigate investment delays of domestic firms. It is showed that domestic firms can benefit from a high sensibility to uncertainty, be less financially constrained and less subject to underinvestment (due to manager extraction funds). A reduction of behavioral delays could be reached via optimal managerial ownership (within 5%-25%); none institutional ownership also improve domestic firms investment.
2008-01-30
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12173/1/MPRA_paper_12173.pdf
Sene, Serigne Moustapha (2008): IDE et retards d'investissement de l'entreprise domestique au Sénégal : une solution par la gouvernance d'entreprise.
fr
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14167
2019-09-30T10:44:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433134
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14167/
Rewarding Carrots & Crippling Sticks: Eliciting Employee Preferences for the Optimal Incentive Mix in Europe
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
Theodossiou, Ioannis
C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
M54 - Labor Management
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
A ranking of a variety of incentive devices used by firms according to their perceived effectiveness by employees is identified. The determinants of employee incentive preferences are also investigated, suggesting a ‘menu’ of conditions under which an organization’s personnel policies will have maximum motivational impact on its workforce. Based on the beliefs of a unique sample of workers from seven European countries, the results suggest that (a) the primary determinant of the level of employee effort is the amount of discretion offered at work; (b) pay incentives and ‘gift exchanges’ are the most important motivators; (c) the use of monitoring and Taylor-type assembly lines are the least effective incentives; and (d) the optimal design of incentive strategies by firms is strongly shaped by a host of contextual factors. The expressed desire for autonomy, and distaste for control, by employees gives credibility to the “participative” management approach.
2009-03-19
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14167/1/MPRA_paper_14167.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos and Theodossiou, Ioannis (2009): Rewarding Carrots & Crippling Sticks: Eliciting Employee Preferences for the Optimal Incentive Mix in Europe.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:14570
2019-09-27T06:49:09Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443430
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443436
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D47:4730
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3231
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14570/
Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
D40 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
D46 - Value Theory
M41 - Accounting
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
G0 - General
M21 - Business Economics
This paper presents a new way of measuring residual income,
originally introduced by Magni (2000a, 2000b, 2003). Contrary to the standard residual income, the capital charge is equal to the capital lost by investors. The lost capital may be viewed as (a) the foregone capital, (b) the capital implicitly infused into the business, (c) the outstanding capital of a shadow project, (d) the claimholders' credit. Relations of the lost capital with book values and market values are studied, as well as relations of the lost-capital residual income with the classical standard paradigm; many appealing properties are derived, among which a property of earnings aggregation. Different concepts and results, provided by different authors in such different fields as
economic theory, management accounting and corporate finance, are considered: O'Hanlon and Peasnell's (2002) unrecovered capital and Excess Value Created; Ohlson's (2005) Abnormal Earnings Growth; O'Byrne's (1997) EVA improvement; Miller and Modigliani's (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation; Young and O'Byrne's (2001) Adjusted EVA; Keynes's (1936) user cost; Drukarczyk and Schueler's (2000) Net Economic Income,
Fernandez's (2002) Created Shareholder Value, Anthony's (1975) profit. They are all conveniently reinterpreted within the theoretical domain of the lost-capital paradigm and conjoined in a unified view. The results found make this new theoretical approach a good candidate for firm valuation, incentive compensation, capital budgeting decision-making
2007-11-13
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14570/1/MPRA_paper_14570.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:15041
2019-09-26T23:10:13Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3133
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15041/
Self-Interest, Incentives and the Decision-Making
Steinbacher, Matjaz
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Z13 - Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology ; Social and Economic Stratification
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
Paper analyzes the impact of incentives and disincentives on the decision-making of individuals. Their role in the decision-making processes is huge, as they affect the cost-benefit analysis of investment projects of scarce resources. They both are subject of huge negative effects. A hidden trap of providing incentives is represented by costs any such activity involves, with coercive subsidies having socialized costs for the benefits of individuals. This makes them very dangerous and controversial.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15041/1/MPRA_paper_15041.pdf
Steinbacher, Matjaz (2009): Self-Interest, Incentives and the Decision-Making.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17417
2019-10-02T09:36:19Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17417/
In search of the "lost capital". A theory for valuation, investment decisions, performance measurement
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
M40 - General
G30 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
M41 - Accounting
This paper presents a theoretical framework for valuation, investment decisions, and performance measurement
based on a nonstandard theory of residual income. It is derived from the notion of "unrecovered" capital, which is here named "lost" capital because it represents the capital foregone by the investors. Its theoretical strength and meaningfulness is shown by deriving it from four main perspectives: financial, microeconomic, axiomatic, accounting. Implications for asset valuation, capital budgeting and performance measurement are investigated. In particular: an aggregation property is shown, which makes
the simple average residual income play a major role in valuation; a dual relation between the standard
theory and the lost-capital theory is proved, clarifying the way periodic performance is computed in the
two paradigms and the rationale for measuring performance with either paradigm; the average accounting rate of return is shown to be more reliable than the internal rate of return as a capital budgeting criterion, and maximization of the average residual income is shown to be equivalent to maximization of Net Present Value (NPV). Two metrics are also presented: one enjoys the nice property of robust goal
congruence irrespective of the sign of the cash flows; the other one enjoys periodic consistency in the
sense of Egginton (1995). The results obtained suggest that this theory might prove useful for real-life applications in firm valuation, capital budgeting decision-making, ex ante and ex post performance measurement, incentive compensation. A numerical example illustrates the implementation of the paradigm to the EVA model and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17417/2/MPRA_paper_17417.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): In search of the "lost capital". A theory for valuation, investment decisions, performance measurement.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:17538
2019-09-26T16:36:03Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473131
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473331
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4731:473132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17538/
In search of the "lost capital". A theory for valuation, investment decisions, performance measurement
Magni, Carlo Alberto
G11 - Portfolio Choice ; Investment Decisions
G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
M40 - General
G30 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G12 - Asset Pricing ; Trading Volume ; Bond Interest Rates
M41 - Accounting
This paper presents a theoretical framework for valuation, investment decisions, and performance measurement
based on a nonstandard theory of residual income. It is derived from the notion of "unrecovered" capital, which is here named "lost" capital because it represents the capital foregone by the investors. Its theoretical strength and meaningfulness is shown by deriving it from four main perspectives: financial, microeconomic, axiomatic, accounting. Implications for asset valuation, capital budgeting and performance measurement are investigated. In particular: an aggregation property is shown, which makes
the simple average residual income play a major role in valuation; a dual relation between the standard
theory and the lost-capital theory is proved, clarifying the way periodic performance is computed in the
two paradigms and the rationale for measuring performance with either paradigm; the average accounting rate of return is shown to be more reliable than the internal rate of return as a capital budgeting criterion, and maximization of the average residual income is shown to be equivalent to maximization of Net Present Value (NPV). Two metrics are also presented: one enjoys the nice property of robust goal
congruence irrespective of the sign of the cash flows; the other one enjoys periodic consistency in the
sense of Egginton (1995). The results obtained suggest that this theory might prove useful for real-life applications in firm valuation, capital budgeting decision-making, ex ante and ex post performance measurement, incentive compensation. A numerical example illustrates the implementation of the paradigm to the EVA model and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model.
2007-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17538/1/MPRA_paper_17538.pdf
Magni, Carlo Alberto (2007): In search of the "lost capital". A theory for valuation, investment decisions, performance measurement.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:18759
2019-09-27T16:28:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3134
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3531
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18759/
"Endogenous" Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers' Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm
Ramalingam, Abhijit
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rational status concerns on a firm's profits. We find that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns, able to transfer surplus from the the rm to themselves. Further, relative concerns are shaped by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the workers in the firm. Finally, a firm's profit is reduced (relative to the benchmark moral-hazard model) by workers who exhibit such "endogenous" relative concerns.
2009-04
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18759/1/MPRA_paper_18759.pdf
Ramalingam, Abhijit (2009): "Endogenous" Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers' Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:19241
2019-09-26T23:37:11Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19241/
Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-listing? Evidence from China
Chi, Wei
Zhang, Haiyan
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to Hong Kong firms, cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further, this study shows that it is necessary to differentiate between state-owned companies and private companies, as cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state-owned companies than it does in private companies.
2008-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19241/1/MPRA_paper_19241.pdf
Chi, Wei and Zhang, Haiyan (2008): Are Stronger Executive Incentives Associated with Cross-listing? Evidence from China.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20073
2019-09-26T11:26:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3133
7375626A656374733D44:4437:443738
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20073/
Manipulation in oligopoly
Corchon, Luis
Silva, Jose Luis
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
The purpose of this paper is to generalize the results obtained by Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) allowing for non-linear demand functions, many players and general attitudes to the risk by the players. We also generalize their set-up by introducing a more general measure of th aggresivity of players in the second stage of the game.
1994
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20073/1/MPRA_paper_20073.pdf
Corchon, Luis and Silva, Jose Luis (1994): Manipulation in oligopoly.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:20155
2019-09-26T11:04:07Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D43:4332:433233
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20155/
Pay enough, don’t pay too much or don’t pay at all? The impact of bonus intensity on job satisfaction
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
C23 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models
M54 - Labor Management
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
Using ten waves (1998-2007) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), this paper investigates the ceteris paribus association between the intensity of incentive pay, the dynamic change in bonus status and the utility derived from work. After controlling for individual heterogeneity biases, it is shown that job utility rises only in response to ‘generous’ bonus payments, primarily in skilled, non-unionized, private sector jobs. Revoking a bonus from one year to the next is found to have a detrimental impact on employee utility, while job satisfaction tends to diminish over time as employees potentially adapt to bonuses. The findings are therefore consistent with previous experimental evidence, suggesting that employers wishing to motivate their staff should indeed “pay enough or don’t pay at all”.
2008-08-14
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20155/2/MPRA_paper_20155.pdf
Pouliakas, Konstantinos (2008): Pay enough, don’t pay too much or don’t pay at all? The impact of bonus intensity on job satisfaction.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:22425
2019-09-26T11:42:00Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3430
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22425/
Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?
Hirshleifer, David
Low, Angie
Teoh, Siew Hong
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
G30 - General
M40 - General
Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development (R&D) expenditure. Overconfident managers only achieve greater innovation than non-overconfident managers in innovative industries. Overconfidence is not associated with lower sales, ROA, or Q.
2010-04-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22425/2/MPRA_paper_22425.pdf
Hirshleifer, David and Low, Angie and Teoh, Siew Hong (2010): Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25794
2019-09-30T16:49:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25794/
The potential effects for families of introducing the French fiscal system in Germany
Honekamp, Ivonne
Schwarze, Johannes
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
In Germany 1,41 children are born per women which results in a much lower birth-rate than in France. Time and again it has been discussed if a family orientated tax- and transfer system can influence birth rates. In Germany, France is often designated as a role model. Based on a model calculation this contribution shows how disposable income of German families would change, if the French tax- and transfer system were introduced. It will be distinguished among different family and employment compositions. One of the results is that families with only one child would be financially worth of under the French system while families with more children would benefit.
2010-10-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25794/4/MPRA_paper_25794.pdf
Honekamp, Ivonne and Schwarze, Johannes (2010): The potential effects for families of introducing the French fiscal system in Germany.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25925
2019-10-02T02:14:30Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D48:4832:483234
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25925/
The potential effects for families of introducing the French fiscal system in Germany
Honekamp, Ivonne
Schwarze, Johannes
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
In Germany 1,41 children are born per women which results in a much lower birth-rate than in France. Time and again it has been discussed if a family orientated tax- and transfer system can influence birth rates. In Germany, France is often designated as a role model. Based on a model calculation this contribution shows how disposable income of German families would change, if the French tax- and transfer system were introduced. It will be distinguished among different family and employment compositions. One of the results is that families with only one child would be financially worth of under the French system while families with more children would benefit.
2010-10-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25925/1/MPRA_paper_25925.pdf
Honekamp, Ivonne and Schwarze, Johannes (2010): The potential effects for families of introducing the French fiscal system in Germany.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:25933
2019-09-28T05:23:07Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3831
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25933/
Monetary and nonmonetary incentive measures: which work better in the Czech betting firm?
Martin, Pardupa
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce
M53 - Training
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
In this paper I examine the interrelation between monetary and non monetary incentive measures and the performance of a betting firm in the Czech Republic. Previous studies have focused either solely on monetary measures in order to examine the positive and adverse monetary incentive effects or on measuring the effect of certain non monetary managerial objectives and often on the level of top managers. I argue that the monetary and non monetary incentive measures should be analyzed separately as they influence the final outcome in a methodologically different way and that the analysis on lower level of organization can bring more reliable data. The evidence from unique set of medium term data from the Czech betting firm shows the possible positive effect of increased wage variability on its performance while the effect of trainings and nonmonetary rewards were proven as insignificant.
2010-10-05
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25933/1/MPRA_paper_25933.pdf
Martin, Pardupa (2010): Monetary and nonmonetary incentive measures: which work better in the Czech betting firm? Forthcoming in: Ekonomicky Casopis No. 10/2010 (2010)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28683
2019-09-30T23:22:06Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D43:4331:433132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D43:4339:433931
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D44:4433:443331
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413133
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3531
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D41:4131:413134
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28683/
Ethnocentrism and Internal Compensation Structuring: An Experimental Examination of Point Factor Job Evaluation
Martin, Daniel
Wiley, Donna
Legree, Peter
C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
M54 - Labor Management
A14 - Sociology of Economics
“Comparable Worth” represents the concept that men, women, minorities, and whites should receive equal pay for work of equal value from their employer. Much research and many articles have been written in regards to overall pay inequities between men and women; however information regarding internal compensation strategies and perceived labor pools (percentage of minority applicants) has not been explored in depth. A total of 381 individuals participated in an experimental study that manipulated perceived labor
market composition in order to establish the relative
impact of ethnocentrism on the evaluation of compensable factors and salary. Results strongly supported the authors’ hypotheses, indicating that (a) significant discriminatory weighing of compensable factors by the perceived ethnicity and gender of labor pools occurs, (b) individual participant demographics (ethnicity and gender) contribute significantly to discrimination between perceived labor pools, and (c) participant individual differences significantly contribute to discriminatory weighting. Implications and directions for future research are considered.
2006-08-09
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28683/1/MPRA_paper_28683.pdf
Martin, Daniel and Wiley, Donna and Legree, Peter (2006): Ethnocentrism and Internal Compensation Structuring: An Experimental Examination of Point Factor Job Evaluation. Published in: Western Journal of Human Resource Management , Vol. Spring, No. 2007
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28711
2019-10-03T18:22:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3530
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28711/
Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
Böckerman, Petri
Bryson, Alex
Ilmakunnas, Pekka
M53 - Training
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M54 - Labor Management
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M50 - General
Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more likely to enter HIM jobs. The wage premium falls substantially having accounted for employees’ work histories suggesting that existing studies’ estimates are upwardly biased due to positive selection into HIM. Results do not differ significantly when using propensity score matching as opposed to standard regression techniques. The premium rises with the number of HIM practices and differs markedly across different types of HIM practice.
2011-02-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28711/1/MPRA_paper_28711.pdf
Böckerman, Petri and Bryson, Alex and Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2011): Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:28823
2019-09-26T23:33:58Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433733
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28823/
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality
Ohlendorf, Susanne
Schmitz, Patrick W.
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first-period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified."
2011-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28823/1/MPRA_paper_28823.pdf
Ohlendorf, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011): Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:29403
2019-10-06T13:28:41Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3133
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493132
7375626A656374733D48:4834:483431
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4C:4C33:4C3338
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443132
7375626A656374733D48:4837:483735
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493138
7375626A656374733D49:4933:493338
7375626A656374733D44:4436:443631
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29403/
Performance Pay and Information: Reducing Child Malnutrition in Urban Slums
Singh, Prakarsh
J13 - Fertility ; Family Planning ; Child Care ; Children ; Youth
I12 - Health Behavior
H41 - Public Goods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
L38 - Public Policy
D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions
I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health
I38 - Government Policy ; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
This paper provides evidence for the effectiveness of performance pay to government workers and how performance pay interacts with demand-side information. In an experiment covering 145 child day-care centres, I implement three separate treatments. First, I engineer an exogenous change in compensation for childcare workers from fixed wages to performance pay. Second, I only provide mothers with information without incentivizing the workers. Third, I combine the first two treatments. This helps us identify if performance pay and public information are complements or substitutes in reducing child malnutrition. I find that combining incentives to workers and information to mothers reduces weight-for-age malnutrition by 4.2% in 3 months, although individually the effects are negligible. This complementarity is shown to be driven by better mother-worker communication and the mother feeding more calorific food at home. There is also a sustained long-run positive impact of the combined treatment after the experiment concluded.
2011-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/29403/1/MPRA_paper_29403.pdf
Singh, Prakarsh (2011): Performance Pay and Information: Reducing Child Malnutrition in Urban Slums.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:33847
2019-09-28T02:48:04Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A38:4A3831
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D49:4931:493130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33847/
Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing?
Böckerman, Petri
Bryson, Alex
Ilmakunnas, Pekka
M53 - Training
J81 - Working Conditions
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
M54 - Labor Management
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
I10 - General
Employees exposed to high involvement management (HIM) practices have higher subjective wellbeing, fewer accidents but more short absence spells than “like” employees not exposed to HIM. These results are robust to extensive work, wage and sickness absence history controls. We present a model which highlights the possibility of higher short-term absence in the presence of HIM because it is more demanding than standard production and because multi-skilled HIM workers cover for one another’s short absences thus reducing the cost of replacement labour faced by the employer. We find direct empirical support for the assumptions in the model. Consistent with the model, because long-term absences entail replacement labour costs for HIM and non-HIM employers alike, long-term absences are independent of exposure to HIM.
2011-10-03
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33847/1/MPRA_paper_33847.pdf
Böckerman, Petri and Bryson, Alex and Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2011): Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:35364
2019-09-29T04:47:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3332
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35364/
Importance of the management incentives for the improvement of company’s activities
Slavica, Stevanovic
Ivana, Simeunovic
J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits ; Retirement Plans ; Private Pensions
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
In this paper we have emphasized on the importance of the management incentives and their impact on company’s efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance. Company owners, who regard managerial incentives as an investment rather than as a financial outlay, could expect a commitment of the managers to the interests of the company, achievement of desired results and business prosperity. At the same time, the potential conflict of interests between company’s shareholders and management could be solved by allocation of appropriate management incentives. As the effectiveness of management incentives depends on their good evaluation, it is important to identify potential indicators and to measure their consistency with the value created to business owners. Moreover we have identified financial measures for manager’s contribution to the company operations, used as a criterion for entitlement to managers’ incentives. Paper ends by assessing the need to adjust the company to changing global financial environment, with a special reference to the changes of incentives’ policy in Serbian companies, and the most important motivational factors affecting Romanian employees during the current period of global financial crisis.
2011-10-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35364/1/MPRA_paper_35364.pdf
Slavica, Stevanovic and Ivana, Simeunovic (2011): Importance of the management incentives for the improvement of company’s activities. Published in: Research Monograph on The role of labour markets and human capital in the unstable environment
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:39787
2019-10-05T19:09:48Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3338
7375626A656374733D4E:4E32:4E3232
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39787/
Options backdating: a Canadian perspective
Compton, Ryan
Sandler, Daniel
Tedds, Lindsay M.
J38 - Public Policy
N22 - U.S. ; Canada: 1913-
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This paper provides an overview of (1) the basics of employee stock option backdating; (2) why firms and individuals may engage in backdating; (3) the difficulties in examining option backdating in Canada as well as a Canadian case study of option backdating; (4) implications of backdating; and (5) suggestions for curbing the potential to backdate in Canada.
2010-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39787/1/MPRA_paper_39787.pdf
Compton, Ryan and Sandler, Daniel and Tedds, Lindsay M. (2010): Options backdating: a Canadian perspective. Published in: Canadian Business Law Journal , Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010): pp. 329-362.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:43892
2019-09-30T09:44:59Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493238
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43892/
Teacher Behavior under Performance Pay Incentives
Jones, Michael D.
I21 - Analysis of Education
I28 - Government Policy
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Over the last decade many districts have implemented performance pay incentives to reward teachers for improving student test scores. Economic theory suggests that these programs could alter teacher work effort, cooperation, and retention. Because teachers can choose to work in a performance pay district that has characteristics correlated with teacher behavior, I use the distance between a teacher’s undergraduate institution and the nearest performance pay district as an instrumental variable. Using data from the 2003 and 2007 waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), I find that teachers respond to performance pay incentives by working fewer hours per week at school. Performance pay also decreases participation in unpaid cooperative school activities, while there is suggestive evidence that teacher turnover decreases. The treatment effects are heterogeneous; male teachers respond more positively to performance pay than female teachers. In Florida, which restricts state performance pay funding to individual teachers or teams, I find that work effort and teacher turnover increase.
2012-04-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43892/1/MPRA_paper_43892.pdf
Jones, Michael D. (2012): Teacher Behavior under Performance Pay Incentives.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:43893
2019-09-27T15:12:26Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3232
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493231
7375626A656374733D49:4932:493238
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43893/
How do Teachers Respond to Tenure?
Jones, Michael D.
J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
I21 - Analysis of Education
I28 - Government Policy
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
In most states, K-12 teachers receive tenure after serving a probationary period of several years. Teachers with tenure, or a continuing contract, are guaranteed due process before they can be dismissed from their job. I use a restricted use version of the 2007 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) to estimate the effect of tenure on teacher behavior and time allocation at school and outside of school. Estimates are obtained by exploiting the cross-state variation in the probationary period length of novice teachers within a difference-in-difference framework. I find that in the year that teachers are evaluated for tenure, they spend significantly more of their own money on classroom materials. Relative to the tenure evaluation year, once teachers receive tenure, they communicate less with students and parents outside of class and participate less in school and district committees. In those districts where at least one probationary teacher is fired, I find that teachers reallocate their teaching time. Immediately after receiving tenure, they spend less time teaching math and more time teaching English.
2012-06-24
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43893/1/MPRA_paper_43893.pdf
Jones, Michael D. (2012): How do Teachers Respond to Tenure?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:45576
2019-10-09T16:53:49Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3331
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45576/
Market-based incentives
Grochulski, Borys
Zhang, Yuzhe
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's quitting forces the principal to give the agent a raise. The prospect of obtaining this raise gives the agent an incentive to exert effort, which reduces the need for standard incentives, like bonuses. In fact, whenever the agent's option to quit is close to being ``in the money,'' the market-induced incentive completely eliminates the need for standard incentives.
2013-03-25
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45576/1/MPRA_paper_45576.pdf
Grochulski, Borys and Zhang, Yuzhe (2013): Market-based incentives.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:50254
2019-09-27T21:25:44Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50254/
A Romanian approach of the program "Employee of the month"
Armean, Bianca
Baleanu, Virginia
Irimie, Sabin Ioan
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Work motivation was and remained a "hot topic" for management and organizational behavior studies, as well as a major concern for practice of Human Resource Management. While such studies have evidenced a lot of factors of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation having different influences on different people, the motivating practices within organizations were long time focused on common extrinsic motivators such as usual rewards (in the form of money or promotion to higher grades/functions) and threat of punishment. However, during the past few decades more and more organizations worldwide became interested to use some forms and tools of intrinsic motivation for their employees, including recognition programs. Our paper aims to present and discuss how a Romanian organization developed and implemented such a program, based on the popular U.S. organizational practices of contests type "Employee of the Month". Particularly, the study focuses on the specificity of this approach which combines elements of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and also attempts to sketch a "profile of the winner employee", based on statistical analysis of data for people who benefited the awards through the program application during 2008-2011.
2012-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50254/1/MPRA_paper_50254.pdf
Armean, Bianca and Baleanu, Virginia and Irimie, Sabin Ioan (2012): A Romanian approach of the program "Employee of the month". Published in: Proceedings of the 6th International Management Conference "Approaches in Organisational Management", ASE Bucuresti (15 November 2012): pp. 231-239.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:53295
2019-10-04T02:42:05Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53295/
Personnel Economics essay: Issues in Human Capital Theory, training and earnings of workers
Josheski, Dushko
M50 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
In this paper the issues from the personnel economics has been investigated. The issues such as training of workers from Becker’s human capital theory and their association with the workers’ productivity. In the second part of the paper the issue of grooming has been investigated in relation with earnings for which there exist and it is presented empirical evidence. In the equation as regressors are also present Mincerian variables: age, marital status and others. Also the four puzzles in the empirical literature about the determinants of earnings has been investigated. And how the empirical literature helps in resolving them.
2014-01-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53295/1/MPRA_paper_53295.pdf
Josheski, Dushko (2014): Personnel Economics essay: Issues in Human Capital Theory, training and earnings of workers. Forthcoming in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:53343
2019-09-26T22:14:58Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3535
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53343/
Essential themes in Personnel economics
Josheski, Dushko
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
In this paper are presented essential themes in the subject of personnel economics. In the first part analysis has been conducted on the impact of peer pressure on workplace behaviour. Then again models for compensation structures within firms, and their influence on the utility of work by employees. In the final section of the paper the productivity spillover effect has been analyzed, and the causes of existence of spillovers and their impact on workers’ productivity
2014-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53343/1/MPRA_paper_53343.pdf
Josheski, Dushko (2014): Essential themes in Personnel economics. Forthcoming in:
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:53364
2019-09-27T01:08:22Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53364/
Evaluation of Principal Performance in Public and Private Sector Schools
Akhtar, Iram
Cheema, Khaliq Ur Rehman
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
The purpose of this study is to analyze the performance in context of student learning of principals in public sector and private sector schools. For this purpose five main domains were used as variables are: 1) teaching, learning and professional growth, 2) Inter-personal and inter-professional relationship and collaboration, 3) Parent and faculty involvement in decision making, 4) Vision and values, 5) Innovation and change. The population for this study was selected randomly. The target sample was belonged to post-primary and secondary schools. Thus the results summarized different findings. Principals perform more effectively in private sector schools as compare to public schools.
2013
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53364/1/MPRA_paper_53364.pdf
Akhtar, Iram and Cheema, Khaliq Ur Rehman (2013): Evaluation of Principal Performance in Public and Private Sector Schools. Published in: International Journal of Management & Organizational Studies , Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 2013): pp. 23-30.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:54431
2019-09-26T10:03:31Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54431/
A study measuring the effect of pay, promotion and training on job satisfaction in pakistani service industry
Butt, Babar Zaheer
Rehman, Kashif Ur
Safwan, Nadeem
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Job satisfaction has long been an important and interesting area in organizational research.
More recently, considerable attention has been focused on the concept of job satisfaction
and factors that affect it. A major reason for the tremendous interest in this work attitude is
that it has been consistently found to be related to important employee behaviors, such as
turnover, absenteeism, and job performance. The objective of this study is to analyze the
effect of human resource practices such as pay, promotion and training on job satisfaction.
The sample of this study consisted of 150 employees of both private and public sector
service organizations in the vicinity of twin cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. A
questionnaire was used to gather data regarding above mentioned variables and
demographic characteristics of the respondents. Data then analyzed with the help of SPSS
using regression analysis and Independent Sample T Test. A positive and significant
relationship was found between job satisfaction and factors like compensation, training and
promotion. The study can be helpful for the employers to design their human resource
strategies according to the changing socio-economic environment in the country.
2007-03-23
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54431/1/MPRA_paper_54431.pdf
Butt, Babar Zaheer and Rehman, Kashif Ur and Safwan, Nadeem (2007): A study measuring the effect of pay, promotion and training on job satisfaction in pakistani service industry. Published in: European Journal of Social Sciences , Vol. 5, No. 3 (5 October 2007): pp. 36-44.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:58493
2019-09-28T22:54:27Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30:4D3030
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3134
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58493/
The Moderating Effect of Environmental Turbulence in the Relationship between Entrepreneurial Management and Firm Performance
Pratono, Aluisius Hery
Mahmood, Rosli
M0 - General
M00 - General
M1 - Business Administration
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M14 - Corporate Culture ; Diversity ; Social Responsibility
M2 - Business Economics
M5 - Personnel Economics
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Contingency theory points out the adaptive management is crucial point to sustainable firm performance. This research aims to determine the relative importance of a set of variables comprising the four entrepreneurial management variables, i.e. strategic orientation, organization culture, organization structure, and reward system, and a set of environmental turbulence variables in predicting firm performance. This research uses firm-level data with observed population of this research is SMEs in Surabaya, Indonesia. Through adopting hierarchical regression approach and partial least square method, this study indicates that moderating effect of environmental turbulence changes the direction of relationship between entrepreneurial management and firm performance. During low environmental turbulence, entrepreneurial management has positive impact on firm performance, but the direction changes. Entrepreneurial management has negative impact on firm performance during high environmental turbulence.
2014
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58493/1/UJM4-12102569.pdf
Pratono, Aluisius Hery and Mahmood, Rosli (2014): The Moderating Effect of Environmental Turbulence in the Relationship between Entrepreneurial Management and Firm Performance. Published in: Universal Journal of Management , Vol. 7, No. 2 (2014): pp. 285-292.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:67679
2019-09-28T21:43:58Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30:4D3030
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67679/
Challenges Faced by Expatriate Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries
Naithani, Pranav
Jha, A.N.
M0 - General
M00 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Over the last six decades, the reliance of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries’ economy on expatriate workforce has increased incessantly. The majority of the private sector workforce in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are expatriates. Recent attempts by governments in the GCC countries to localise the workforce, through their workforce nationalisation programmes, have offered limited results. Thus, dependence on expatriate workforce will continue in the near future and GCC countries, short of professionally and technically qualified local workers will need to employ a large number of expatriates to support their economic and social development plans. This calls for a systematic approach to understand the specific challenges faced by expatriates of different nationalities in the GCC countries, so that these challenges can be addressed to enable the GCC countries to become a preferred destination for technically and professionally qualified expatriate workers. This paper presents an overview of the GCC countries; the reasons for their dependence on expatriate workforce; key current challenges faced by expatriates in the GCC countries and suggestions for facilitating adjustment of expatriate workers in the GCC countries.
2009
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67679/1/MPRA_paper_67679.pdf
Naithani, Pranav and Jha, A.N. (2009): Challenges Faced by Expatriate Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries. Published in: International Journal of Business and Management , Vol. 5, No. 1 (2010): pp. 98-104.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:68646
2019-09-27T02:31:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68646/
Employee Turnover in MFIs: Reasons & Remedies
Sk. Mahmudul Alam, Mahmud
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
At present day’s employee turnover is one of the challenging issues in microfinance sector of Bangladesh. Excessive turnover is not only pricey, but it can create a bad reputation in the MFI sector and among the job seekers. Excessive turnover may be harmful to an MFI's productivity if experienced and efficient employees are often departing and the employee encompasses a high percentage of beginners. The impact of turnover has received substantial attention by the senior management and human resources professionals of the sector. So it is time demand to know the reasons those influence employee turnover and also know the remedies how we can reduce the rate of employee turnover rate. So an attempt was taken by this study to know the reasons and remedies of employee turnover in microfinance sector of Bangladesh. The study found that the average turnover rate of permanent employees in nine reputed MFIs in 2012, 2013 and 2014 were respectively 13.79%, 12.74% and 10.96% and the average turnover rate of contractual employees in seven MFIs in 2012, 2013 and 2014 were respectively 25.43%, 21.92% and 15.93%. The major reasons for employee turnover are: salary and other financial benefit are comparatively less than other MFIs; terminated for corruption or fraudulent; terminated for violation of service rules; no overtime financial benefit; excessive working load; transfer to distant district from home district; for family reason; not having promotion after being deserve it etc. The key remedies for reducing employee turnover are: should fix up a competitive salary and other financial benefit harmonizing with the other competitor MFIs; promotion and salary increment policy should be transparent; should have provision of proper reward for good work and proper punishment for ill work in MFIs; should have financial benefit for overtime work; having automation and online network facilities in all branches; to provide necessary job related training to a new recruited employee; having facility of leave encashment; having provision of financial support or loan for employee at the time of his emergency, transfer to nearest district from home district etc.
2015-10-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68646/1/MPRA_paper_68646.pdf
Sk. Mahmudul Alam, Mahmud (2015): Employee Turnover in MFIs: Reasons & Remedies.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:69713
2019-09-26T15:28:57Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D41:4131
7375626A656374733D44:4430
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443030
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443031
7375626A656374733D44:4430:443032
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443230
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443231
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443232
7375626A656374733D44:4432:443233
7375626A656374733D44:4435:443530
7375626A656374733D45:4530:453030
7375626A656374733D48:4830
7375626A656374733D48:4830:483030
7375626A656374733D49:4930
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30:4D3030
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3531
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D50:5031
7375626A656374733D50:5031:503130
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31:5A3130
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69713/
Sustainable Intrapreneurship - The GSI Concept and Strategy - Unfolding Competitive Advantage via Fair Entrepreneurship
Anton, Roman
A1 - General Economics
D0 - General
D00 - General
D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
D20 - General
D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
D50 - General
E00 - General
H0 - General
H00 - General
I0 - General
M0 - General
M00 - General
M10 - General
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M2 - Business Economics
M5 - Personnel Economics
M50 - General
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M54 - Labor Management
P1 - Capitalist Systems
P10 - General
Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology
Z10 - General
Entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship are among the most important prerequisites and concepts of modern economics and free market theory. Intrapreneurship is defined here in its broadest definition, as grades of entrepreneurship within a given system or entity, such as a company, organization, sector, cluster, national or even global economy. Hereby, intrapreneuring is more than only providing some opportunity to some employees. The wider definition rather unfolds intrapreneuring into a new universal concept of economics, efficiency, and effectiveness, which helps to solve some key dilemmas including the principal-agent-problem (PAP). This study reviews intrapreneuring in the public and private sector based on major empirical research. To optimally manage intrapreneuring, a set of sound goals and incentives, contextual, structural, behavioral, and legal-contractual measures are needed, as well as fair chances and a fair bargain for all. Free markets require internal opportunity and frameworks of fair competition. On this account, sustainable intrapreneurial modules could give rise to industry5.0. Intrapreneuring is proposed to reflect all grades of entrepreneurship that are itemized into its key dimensions independence, opportunity risk, and reward. Balanced dimensions of the right level assure graded sustainable intrapreneuring (GSI) for optimal output. Due to the universality of this concept, it applies for all work systems and sectors, public or private, micro- and macroeconomically, together with other 3D-concepts of economics. Social intrapreneurship, 3BL-GSI, or shared value strategies, could solve most societal problems if financed via QE in a GSI-conform digital full-reserve economy.
2014-10-31
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69713/1/MPRA_paper_69713.pdf
Anton, Roman (2014): Sustainable Intrapreneurship - The GSI Concept and Strategy - Unfolding Competitive Advantage via Fair Entrepreneurship. Forthcoming in: Open Science , Vol. 2, No. 1 (1 March 2016): pp. 1-46.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:72138
2019-09-27T00:28:12Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72138/
Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining
Damiani, Mirella
Ricci, Andrea
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
Abstract
The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other.
Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20
2016-06-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72138/1/MPRA_paper_72138.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2016): Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:72209
2024-03-29T07:18:39Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3333
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72209/
Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining
Damiani, Mirella
Ricci, Andrea
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
Abstract
The double aim of this paper is to investigate the link between firm training behaviour and the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) and to verify how the quality of management contributes to explaining the strength of this link. Using Ordinary Least Squares Estimates and Fixed Effect Estimates for a sample of Italian firms, we find that training is a significant determinant of firm level bargaining on PRP. Furthermore, we find that managerial quality plays a significant positive role and suggest that this is because managerial quality favours the evolution of social norms based on wage bonuses that enhance trust, sustain collaborative relationships and motivate co-workers to train each other.
Jel Classifications: M53; M52; J50; I20
2016-06-21
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72209/1/MPRA_paper_72138.pdf
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72209/8/MPRA_paper_72209.pdf
Damiani, Mirella and Ricci, Andrea (2016): Training, quality of management and firm level bargaining.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:74271
2019-09-26T14:47:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D41:4132:413232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3234
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3235
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3836
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3135
7375626A656374733D4D:4D34:4D3431
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74271/
The Balanced Scorecard and Beyond – Applying Theories of Performance Measurement, Employment and Rewards in Management Accounting Education
Eisenberg, Paul
A22 - Undergraduate
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
L86 - Information and Internet Services ; Computer Software
M10 - General
M15 - IT Management
M41 - Accounting
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
M54 - Labor Management
This study applies the prevailing scholarly theories of strategic management, employment decisions, cost accounting and share reward schemes to a panel of questions raised by Colin Drury (2012) in the case study of the fictitious company Integrated Technology Services (UK) Ltd., ITS (UK). The paper provides model answers which can be used when working with the case study at institutions of higher education. The merit of the work lies in three areas. First, it provides an overview of theories accepted by the academia that can be utilized for further research. Second, it contrasts pro and contra arguments. Thus it shows the limitations of the very theories when applied to scenarios inspired by practical problems. Third, it develops an innovative Balanced Scorecard for ITS (UK). The scorecard can be used as an example when working with Drury’s case study. But it is also suitable for real life situations of business entities faced with oppressive overheads and deteriorating net margins, building on highly skilled workforce and trying to preserve its differentiated profile.
2016-06-17
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74271/1/MPRA_paper_74271.pdf
Eisenberg, Paul (2016): The Balanced Scorecard and Beyond – Applying Theories of Performance Measurement, Employment and Rewards in Management Accounting Education. Published in: International Research Journal of Management Sciences , Vol. 4, No. 7 (28 September 2016): pp. 483-491.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:75644
2019-09-28T09:03:10Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C38:4C3833
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D5A:5A31
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75644/
Does diversity in the payroll affect soccer teams’ performance? Evidence from the Italian Serie A
Caruso, Raul
Carlo, Bellavite Pellegrini
Marco, Di Domizio
L83 - Sports ; Gambling ; Restaurants ; Recreation ; Tourism
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology
This paper empirically investigates the impact of diversity in wage levels of players on seasonal performances of teams in the top Italian soccer league, namely the Serie A . We explore the payroll of 32 professional football teams in the Italian Serie A to compute three measures of diversity and concentration in wage levels, namely the Gini, the Shannon and the Simpson indexes from season 2007/08 to 2015/16. We use the percentage of points achieved by teams as dependent variable, and then we employ panel data techniques estimating random and fixed effect models. We find that only the Simpson index is significantly associated with sport performance. In particular, it appears that sport performance improves as diversity in payroll decreases.
2016-12
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75644/1/MPRA_paper_75644.pdf
Caruso, Raul and Carlo, Bellavite Pellegrini and Marco, Di Domizio (2016): Does diversity in the payroll affect soccer teams’ performance? Evidence from the Italian Serie A.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:79674
2019-09-26T09:13:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79674/
An empirical study of Job satisfaction of university staff
Ahmed Azumah, Ayisha
Mohammed, Safura
Tetteh, Rebecca
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M54 - Labor Management
The paper examined university staff overall job satisfaction in Sunyani Technical University in a survey of 100 respondents in a cross-sectional study and a quantitative design. Using standard ordinary least square (OLS) method the findings of the study show that employees are satisfied with overall job satisfaction, and satisfied with the elements of satisfaction identified in the survey, with salary and workload been the most satisfied elements. The findings of the research in addition, indicate that elements of job satisfaction influence overall job satisfaction. Management of higher institutions should take into account the findings of the current study in motivating employees for enhance performance resulting from better service and quality service, since university workers are the first members of the community in dealing with students who are junior members of the community.
2017-05-20
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/79674/1/MPRA_paper_79674.pdf
Ahmed Azumah, Ayisha and Mohammed, Safura and Tetteh, Rebecca (2017): An empirical study of Job satisfaction of university staff.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:81249
2019-09-28T01:37:29Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D47:4732:473231
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473334
7375626A656374733D47:4733:473335
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81249/
Average Pay in Banks: Do Agency Problems and Bank Performance Matter?
Harkin, Sean M.
Mare, Davide S.
Crook, Jonathan N.
G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages
G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance
G35 - Payout Policy
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
We study the determinants of average pay across all levels of staff seniority for UK banks between 2003 and 2012. We show that pay is affected by agency problems but not by bank operating performance. Average pay does not depend on accounting outcomes at the bank level. By contrast, average pay is positively affected by the presence of a Remuneration Committee and the proportion of Non-Executives on the Board. These findings indicate that bank pay is determined by agency issues, not bank accounting performance. Our results have practical implications for bank shareholders and regulators, suggesting the need for greater transparency in governance of bank pay.
2017-09-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81249/1/MPRA_paper_81249.pdf
Harkin, Sean M. and Mare, Davide S. and Crook, Jonathan N. (2017): Average Pay in Banks: Do Agency Problems and Bank Performance Matter?
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:81471
2019-09-27T08:45:40Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A31:4A3130
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3234
7375626A656374733D4A:4A32:4A3238
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3531
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81471/
An Empirical study of the Role of Demographics in Job Satisfaction of Sunyani Technical University staff
Mohammed, Safura
Ahmed Azumah, Ayisha
Tetteh, Rebecca
J10 - General
J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity
J28 - Safety ; Job Satisfaction ; Related Public Policy
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M54 - Labor Management
The paper analyses the effects of demographic variables on overall job satisfaction and satisfaction elements for Sunyani Technical University using standard Ordinary Least Square method (OLS). The estimates of the regression analysis indicate that demographic variables have insignificant positive and negative effect on overall job satisfaction. However, the estimates show significant positive and negative effect of demographic variables on some elements of job satisfaction. Managements of academic institutions should take into account the findings of the study to ensure that workers are well satisfied with their job so that productivity will not be affected. Future study should replicate the current study in a comparative study of private and public academic institutions.
2017-06-15
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81471/1/MPRA_paper_81471.pdf
Mohammed, Safura and Ahmed Azumah, Ayisha and Tetteh, Rebecca (2017): An Empirical study of the Role of Demographics in Job Satisfaction of Sunyani Technical University staff.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:83909
2019-09-27T04:45:27Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3130
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3531
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83909/
Employee coverage of high-performance work systems in Spain: a comparative analysis before and during economic retrenchment
Pruneda, Gabriel
M10 - General
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M5 - Personnel Economics
M50 - General
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
M54 - Labor Management
The aim of this paper is to provide the first comprehensive study of high-performance work systems (HPWS) in the Spanish private sector. Based on a representative sample at national level of 9,086 salaried employees, drawn from the Quality of Life at Work Survey, we build three HRM bundles following the ability-motivation-opportunity framework. Results derived from performing logit regressions allow establishing that the size of the organisation has a positive effect on the probability of workers being affected by HPWS. Regarding the activity sector, the positive association is found for the manufacturing and services industries. As for the job and personal characteristics, HPWS primarily affect highly qualified workers and holders of well-paid, high quality jobs. Additionally, we find that, while lower quality jobs are being massively destroyed during the economic crisis, higher quality jobs under HPWS are being created throughout the period 2006-2010.
2014-07
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83909/1/MPRA_paper_83909.pdf
Pruneda, Gabriel (2014): Employee coverage of high-performance work systems in Spain: a comparative analysis before and during economic retrenchment.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:84133
2019-09-26T14:26:16Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D43:4337:433732
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443832
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443833
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84133/
Dynamic Evaluation Design
Smolin, Alex
C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
A principal owns a firm, hires an agent of uncertain productivity, and designs a dynamic policy for evaluating his performance. The agent observes ongoing evaluations and decides when to quit. While not quitting, the agent is paid a wage proportional to his perceived productivity; the principal claims the residual performance. After quitting, the agent secures a fixed safe payoff. I show that equilibrium evaluation policies are Pareto efficient and leave no rents to the agent. In a minimally informative equilibrium, for a broad class of performance technologies, the agent’s wage deterministically grows with tenure.
2017-10
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84133/1/MPRA_paper_84133.pdf
Smolin, Alex (2017): Dynamic Evaluation Design.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:91326
2019-09-28T03:01:46Z
7374617475733D756E707562
7375626A656374733D44:4431:443131
7375626A656374733D44:4434:443432
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33:4A3330
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91326/
Why Is Executive Compensation So High? A Model of Executive Compensation
Harashima, Taiji
D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
D42 - Monopoly
J30 - General
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
In this paper, I examine the mechanism of extremely high executive compensation based on the concept of ranking value and preference, and show that the origin of such extremely high compensation is economic rents. Ranking value and preference provide monopoly powers, profits, and rents to producers and generate “superstars” who are not only absolutely but, more importantly, are relatively superior to other executives. Furthermore, ranking value and preference enable a firm’s product to be differentiated and provide the firm monopoly rents (profits). Executives who contribute to differentiating the product can obtain economic rents and be compensated similar to superstars on professional sports teams. The monopoly rents owing to ranking values can be socially justified, but they may not be socially justifiable if they are solely distributed to executives.
2019-01-08
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91326/1/MPRA_paper_91326.pdf
Harashima, Taiji (2019): Why Is Executive Compensation So High? A Model of Executive Compensation.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:103683
2020-10-23T01:43:38Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4A:4A33
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3438
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3531
7375626A656374733D4A:4A35:4A3533
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3632
7375626A656374733D4A:4A36:4A3639
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31
7375626A656374733D4B:4B31:4B3132
7375626A656374733D4B:4B32:4B3233
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3135
7375626A656374733D4C:4C31:4C3136
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3231
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32:4C3232
7375626A656374733D4C:4C35:4C3531
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3632
7375626A656374733D4C:4C36:4C3633
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3131
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3136
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3531
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3533
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3534
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3535
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3539
7375626A656374733D4E:4E31:4E3137
7375626A656374733D4E:4E32:4E3237
7375626A656374733D4E:4E36:4E3637
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31
7375626A656374733D4F:4F31:4F3131
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3332
7375626A656374733D4F:4F33:4F3334
7375626A656374733D50:5035
7375626A656374733D50:5035:503531
7375626A656374733D50:5035:503532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103683/
The Japanese Management and Production System in Australia Recruitment, Training and Bonus in Japanese Hybrid Factories
Bayari, Celal
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
J4 - Particular Labor Markets
J48 - Public Policy
J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
J53 - Labor-Management Relations ; Industrial Jurisprudence
J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
J62 - Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility
J69 - Other
K1 - Basic Areas of Law
K12 - Contract Law
K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change ; Industrial Price Indices
L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L51 - Economics of Regulation
L62 - Automobiles ; Other Transportation Equipment ; Related Parts and Equipment
L63 - Microelectronics ; Computers ; Communications Equipment
M1 - Business Administration
M11 - Production Management
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M16 - International Business Administration
M2 - Business Economics
M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M53 - Training
M54 - Labor Management
M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
M59 - Other
N17 - Africa ; Oceania
N27 - Africa ; Oceania
N67 - Africa ; Oceania
O1 - Economic Development
O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
P5 - Comparative Economic Systems
P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
P52 - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
Japanese manufacturers have reconstituted the Japanese management and production system in Australia at different levels of success since the late 1960s (Hutchinson and Nicholas 1994, Nicholas and Purcell 2001, Purcell et al. 1999). Three of the essential elements of the Japanese system, recruitment, training, and bonus payments are discussed in this paper in order exhibit the structure of the labour contract within the Japanese hybrid factories. The Japanese system has been transferred to all the continents in the past three decades (Abo 2011, 2010). It has been studied in the UK (Kumon 2007, 2004a), the US (Abo 2007, Kawamura 2011), and Australia (Bayari 2011). A common characteristic of these studies is that they use 2001 data sets in their discussions. This paper uses the author’s data, also from a 2001 research, in its analysis of eighteen Japanese manufacturers in Australia. The common thread that runs through the Japanese system and work force interaction in these three Anglo-Saxon economies is the waves of labour market deregulation since the 1980s (Bayari 2011). This process has undermined the traditional union power base, and reduced the scope of the state institutions to arbitrate.
2011-06-01
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103683/5/MPRA_paper_103683.pdf
Bayari, Celal (2011): The Japanese Management and Production System in Australia Recruitment, Training and Bonus in Japanese Hybrid Factories. Published in: Annual Convention of Japanese Association of Administrative Science Proceedings. , Vol. 14, No. 14 (26 November 2011): pp. 331-336.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:107894
2021-06-15T23:46:01Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3131
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3134
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32
7375626A656374733D4D:4D32:4D3230
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3530
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
7375626A656374733D4F:4F32
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34
7375626A656374733D4F:4F34:4F3433
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/107894/
Business Excellence through the Theory of Accountability
Aithal, Sreeramana
M0 - General
M1 - Business Administration
M11 - Production Management
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M14 - Corporate Culture ; Diversity ; Social Responsibility
M2 - Business Economics
M20 - General
M5 - Personnel Economics
M50 - General
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
O2 - Development Planning and Policy
O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
O43 - Institutions and Growth
Background/Purpose: Theory of Accountability or Theory A is argued to be the best tool for enhancing organizational performance in the 21st century due to the relevance of its motivational and controlling factors with changing competitive environment of organizational business.
Objective: To find the suitability and possibility of using the Theory of Accountability to improve organizational business excellence and to know its validity and superiority over other business excellence theories.
Design/Methodology/Approach: Analysis of information collected from various scholarly articles and by using ABCD analysis framework.
Findings/Result: Based on the analysis, it is found that the Theory of Accountability plays a founding stage to assured development of an organization by means of optimum performance through enhanced productivity and highest stakeholders performance leading to achieve business excellence.
Research limitations/implications: The analysis of using Theory of Accountability principles in organizational development in the 21st century complements the objective of organizations to achieve business excellence.
Originality/Value: This paper fulfills a global need on how to achieve business excellence by implementing organizational human accountability.
Paper Type: Explorative research based analysis.
2021-05-02
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/107894/1/MPRA_paper_107894.pdf
Aithal, Sreeramana (2021): Business Excellence through the Theory of Accountability. Published in: International Journal of Case Studies in Business, IT, and Education (IJCSBE) , Vol. 5, No. 1 (21 May 2021): pp. 88-115.
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:108001
2021-05-31T08:55:54Z
7374617475733D707562
7375626A656374733D4C:4C32
7375626A656374733D4D:4D30
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3132
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108001/
Understanding the Theories and Interventions of Motivation in Organization Development
Marczak, Emily
Yawson, Robert
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
M0 - General
M1 - Business Administration
M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This article reviews theories of motivation in the workplace, what these theories look like in the modern workplace, and interventions designed to increase individual and system-wide organizational motivation. We explored a wide range of theories, including the expectancy theory, Maslow’s hierarchy, the motivation-hygiene theory, the equity theory, reward structures, cognitive evaluation theory, and feedback, to formulate conclusions about common organization development (OD) interventions that are meant to address the theories. Reviewed interventions include; organization structure design, achievement orientation, goal setting, job design, quality feedback, and empowerment programs. We followed a multidisciplinary integrated literature review approach to move beyond merely summarizing the literature but substantially contributing new and valuable knowledge to the fields of leadership and organization development. The research cements the need for understanding individuals’ needs and goals, the value of quality feedback, rewarding positive behavior, leading with fairness, and allowing space for autonomy.
2021-05-18
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108001/1/MPRA_paper_108001.pdf
Marczak, Emily and Yawson, Robert (2021): Understanding the Theories and Interventions of Motivation in Organization Development. Published in: Responsible Management: Opportunities and Challenges. Proceedings of 58th Annual Conference of the Eastern Academy of Management. (18 May 2021)
en
oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:119514
2024-01-02T13:21:58Z
7374617475733D696E7072657373
7375626A656374733D44:4438:443836
7375626A656374733D4A:4A34:4A3431
7375626A656374733D4D:4D31:4D3131
7375626A656374733D4D:4D33:4D3331
7375626A656374733D4D:4D35:4D3532
74797065733D7061706572
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/119514/
On Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations
Rodriguez, Fabrizio
D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
J41 - Labor Contracts
M11 - Production Management
M31 - Marketing
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
This study critically examines Dai and Jerath's (2013) influential paper on incentive schemes in inventory management, revealing a substantial flaw: an equilibrium fails to exist for a broad set of parameters allowed by the paper. Illustrated through a specific example, we identify fundamental economic reasons behind this issue and propose discretization as a solution. Addressing the non existence problem reshapes key findings, clarifying and correcting counterintuitive notions the author had highlighted in the paper. This resolution ensures that inventory considerations no longer impact compensation, while preserving the informational value crucial to incentive schemes.
2023-11-29
MPRA Paper
NonPeerReviewed
application/pdf
en
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/119514/1/MPRA_paper_119514.pdf
Rodriguez, Fabrizio (2023): On Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations. Forthcoming in: Journal of Management Science
en