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Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah and Abdul Karim, Noor Al-Huda (2008): Constraining the spending behavior of subnational governments through borrowing limitation: The case of Malaysia. Published in: The IUP Journal of Public Finance , Vol. 4, No. 3 (2008): pp. 7-28.
Aczél, Ákos and Homolya, Dániel (2012): Risks of the indebtedness of the Hungarian local government sector from a financial stability point of view. Published in: Crisis Aftermath: Economic policy changes in the EU and its Member States, Conference Proceedings, Szeged, University of Szeged , Vol. ISBN 9, (2012): pp. 157-169.
Baskaran, Thushyanthan (2011): Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: Evidence from the German States, 1975-2005. Forthcoming in: Journal of Urban Economics
Baskaran, Thushyanthan (2011): Tax decentralization and public deficits in OECD countries. Forthcoming in: Publius: The Journal of Federalism
Foremny, Dirk (2011): Vertical aspects of sub-national deficits: the impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy in European countries.
Giuriato, Luisa and Gastaldi, Francesca (2009): The domestic stability pact in Italy: a rule for discipline?
Holian, Matthew and Joffe, Marc (2013): Assessing Municipal Bond Default Probabilities.
Mayanja, Abubaker and Mayengo, Israel (2007): Municipal Bonds for Financing Development of infrastructure: A way forward for KCC and Local Governments in Uganda.
Melecky, Martin (2009): The Effect of Institutions, Geography, Development Assistance and Debt Crises on Public-Debt Management.
Pica, Federico and Villani, Salvatore (2012): Debito, Mezzogiorno e sviluppo. A trivial exercise. Forthcoming in: Rivista economica del Mezzogiorno , Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (31. September 2012): -.
Spahn, Paul Bernd (2001): Institutional Arrangements for Coordination Among Governments in Germany. Published in: Frankfurter Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge No. 106 (2001)
Wolff, Guntram B (2007): Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat: Zur Rolle des Moral Hazard.