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Environmental fiscal reform and the possibility of triple dividend in European and non-European countries: evidence from a meta-regression analysis

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Environmental fiscal reform and the possibility of triple dividend in European and non-European countries: evidence from a meta-regression analysis

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Abstract

We present a synthesis of simulation studies concerning green tax reform (GTR) in European and non-European countries. The GTR performance is analysed in a triple dividend (TD) context including the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions (first dividend), increased GDP (second dividend), and higher employment (third dividend). Our findings are fourfold: (i) there is high TD potential, with stronger evidence for second and third dividends in European countries; (ii) a reduction in labour tax is the most potent GTR policy measure to entail TD; (iii) TD evidence is stronger when mixed tax and tax recycle policies are employed; (iv) taxes based on CO₂ emissions exhibit the highest TD potential.

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Keywords: Green tax reform, Triple dividend, Meta-analysis

JEL classifications: H23, O44, Q58

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1. Introduction

The double dividend (DD) prospect of environmental tax reform (ETR), also known as green tax reform (GTR), is a well-researched topic (see Patuelli et al., 2005, Anger et al., 2010, Maxim et al., 2019). GTR is referred to as a tax reform that proposes a reduction in the tax burden on factors of production, at the cost of new or higher taxes on environmental polluters. The DD hypothesis stems from the notion that a GTR can not only deliver environmental dividends but can also include economic benefits. The environmental dividend is achieved through a reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), as is widely accepted in contemporary literature (Aldy and Stavins, 2012). Albeit, an initial concern related to GTR was that lower energy consumption may lead to lower production, and that the environmental benefit may come at the cost of economic growth. However, we now know that GTR can spur innovation in energy efficiency and in the sector of renewable energy (RE), which can address economic concerns and deter loss of economic growth (Stern and Stern, 2007). In addition, recycling of tax revenue raised through GTR can entail further economic benefits, depending on the particular revenue recycle policy. This has been the mainstay of the DD hypothesis (Tullock, 1967), and numerous types of revenue recycle schemes, and various forms of economic dividends of GTR have been studied over the past few decades in this regard (see Pearce, 1991, Morris et al., 1999, Garbaccio et al., 1999, Jorgenson and Wilcoxon, 1993).

Further evolution of the DD prospect of GTR includes the potential for generating triple dividend (TD). The commonly used parametric definition of DD has been linked to the environmental benefits arising from lower emissions and further welfare benefits, driven by revenue recycle schemes (Giménez and Rodríguez, 2010). However, there is no structured definition for TD; to date, it has been measured in numerous ways by different researchers. Pereira and Pereira (2014) measured TD as an improvement in employment and GDP, along with a reduction in GHGs emissions. Van Heerden et al. (2006) defined the third dividend as poverty reduction, alongside increased GDP and reduced emissions. Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1998) took a similar approach, where employment and an increase in income were considered as the second and third dividends, respectively.

The literature on GTR-driven DD is relatively rich, but existing research on TD is scarce. In this meta-regression paper, we attempted to address this gap by presenting a holistic overview of the existing research findings, in order to measure the possibility of yielding a GTR-led TD. In our paper, we used the definition of TD provided by Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996), where a cleaner environment (reduction in emissions), a rise in overall consumption (increased GDP), and growth in private (employment growth) are defined as the three possible dividends of GTR. In this paper, we label these as the first (reduction of CO₂), second (GDP), and third (employment) dividends of GTR, respectively. Furthermore, we also categorise our database between European and non-European countries. The purpose of doing so was to observe whether there was any noticeable difference between the two regions in terms of responding to policy measures.

Our findings can aid policy makers in optimizing the GTR policies by making them suitable for the country in question based on its location. A number of noticeable differences between European and non-European studies have already been reported in a double dividend context (see Maxim and Zander, 2019, Maxim et al., 2019), and the present study was conducted with the aim of discovering whether such differences also exist for TDs. In addition, the existing literature of meta-analyses on GTR (see Patuelli et al., 2005, Maxim et al., 2019) is primarily focused on the third dividend (employment). The dataset of Patuelli et al. (2005) includes studies prior to the year 2000. Most of the non-European studies are published after the year 2000 and follow in the footsteps of European studies. Our updated dataset includes all those relevant simulations. On the other hand, both the works of Maxim et al. (2019) and Maxim and Zander (2019) primarily focus on employment, and only in a very limited way on CO₂ emissions. The novelties in our study are the inclusion of a third dividend (GDP) and a statistical analysis that includes all three dividends (employment, GDP and CO₂ reductions). In our study, we used a multivariate analysis to include all three dividends

² A rise in employment level generates a first-order effect on private welfare because change in employment is a short run phenomenon and real wage is rigid in the short run. Real wage stringencies cause a gap between the actual wage and the reservation wage which yields the private welfare and it increases when employment level goes up.

as separate dependent variables. Hence, this is the first meta-regression paper of its kind to quantify the impact of GTR in a TD context. Additionally, in this paper, we critically analyse the performance of the second dividend (GDP) across European and non-European countries. Our initial hypothesis was that there would be differences across regional groups, as the economy and environmental policies in European countries are more coherent, this due to the strong presence of both the European Union (EU) and the European Environment Agency (EEA).

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the database summary and an overall survey of the dataset applied in this study. Section 3 exhibits all the statistical analyses we conducted to perform the meta-analysis and reports the results. Section 4 provides concluding remarks and summarises the key findings.

2. Database summary and exploration

2.1 The available data

Our database comprised 152 economic simulation results taken from 34 different studies. We used the same database as in Maxim et al. (2019), with the inclusion of six additional simulation results from Pereira et al. (2016)³. All simulation results were categorised between European and non-European countries, based on the region of study. This is referred to as the ‘country variable’ throughout this paper. Furthermore, simulation results are also categorised between simulation characteristics such as tax type, model type, recycling method, and time period of the study. Tax type is categorised as: (i) CO₂: tax based on the emissions of CO₂ gases; (ii) EC tax: tax proposed by the European community; (iii) energy tax: tax based on the use of energy products; (iv) other taxes, which predominantly include mixed taxes. Model types are segregated as: (i) GE: general equilibrium model; (ii) M: macroeconomic model; (iii) I/O: input-output model. Under time period, simulations of 10 years or less are considered short-term, while the rest are classified as long-term studies. Finally, recycling tax revenue methods are categorised as: (i) SSC: a reduction in employer’s social security contribution, payroll taxes, or any other form of labour tax; (ii) LSTH:

³ Full database in Appendix A1.

lump-sum transfer to household/industry; (iii) PIT: personal income tax; (iv) CT: capital tax; (v) VAT: value added tax; (vi) other recycles. To ensure the authenticity of our data, we only used simulation results published in peer-reviewed journal articles, indexed in the SCOPUS database.

2.2 Descriptive statistics and subgroup comparisons

Table 1 presents the average of GDP, employment, and CO₂ emissions data, divided between European and non-European countries compared to the baseline scenario. The data shows triple dividend potential for both European and non-European countries, as the simulation results exhibit an average increase in GDP and employment, along with CO₂ emissions reduction. However, the overall increase of GDP and employment in European countries are noticeably larger than for non-European countries. The opposite is true for the environmental dividend of GTR, where non-European countries outperformed their European counterparts.

Table 1: Average of GDP, employment, and CO₂ emissions data across European and non-European countries compared to the baseline scenario.

| Dividends of GTR | N | European countries (Mean ± SD) | N | Non-European countries (Mean ± SD) | N | All regions combined (Mean ± SD) |
|------------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| | | | | | | |

⁴ GDP refers to the real GDP.

⁵ Exchange rate or consumer price index is used as numerarie in most CGE models.

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----|------------------|----|------------------|-----|-----------------|
| GDP | 77 | 0.1395 ± 1.1545 | 49 | 0.0940 ± 0.6526 | 126 | 0.1218 ± 0.9871 |
| Employment | 103 | 0.6036 ± 1.3887 | 49 | 0.1752 ± 0.8293 | 152 | 0.4655 ± 1.2496 |
| CO ₂ emissions | 81 | -4.8156 ± 4.9705 | 20 | -6.2720 ± 7.0937 | 101 | -5.10 ± 5.4466 |

SD: Standard deviation

Among 126 simulation results that reported percentage change of GDP, 63.49% show positive change. The results suggest that GTR in European countries give rise to greater consumption. The breakdown of GDP performance is further elaborated in Figure 1, which shows that 70.12% of the simulation results indicate an increment of GDP in European countries, compared to only 53.06% in non-European countries.




Figure 1: The impact of GTR on GDP.

When it comes to employment, we see a similar pattern. 73.73% of the simulation results for European countries show positive employment changes, which is only 55.10% for non-European countries (see Figure 2). The employment and GDP data both show similar performance across the two country groups, with European countries being the dominant performers. GTR entailing higher consumption and inducing greater employment demonstrates the nexus between real GDP and employment, which has been presented in the literature in a variety of ways (see Sawtelle, 2007, Shin, 1999).




Figure 2: The impact of GTR on employment.

Regarding the environmental dividend of GTR that arises in the form of lower CO₂ emissions (see Fig.3), however, non-European countries outperformed their European counterparts in terms of emissions reduction. The average emissions reduction in non-European countries was 1.46% higher than in European countries. This negative relationship between the environmental dividend and other non-environmental economic dividends supports results presented in Anger et al. (2010).




Figure 3: The impact of GTR on CO₂ emissions.

We further decompose the simulation results according to the economic models that were used to generate them. This allow us to understand the role of the economic models and whether they had caused any bias in the results.

Table 2: Simulation results of second and third dividends according to different economic models

| Model type | Second dividend (GDP) | | | Third dividend (Employment) | | |
|------------|-----------------------|--------|------------|-----------------------------|--------|------------|
| | Highest | Lowest | Mean±SD | Highest | Lowest | Mean±SD |
| GE | 7.65 | -1.71 | 0.08±1.13 | 5.97 | -2.44 | 0.41±1.30 |
| M | 1.40 | -2.87 | 0.21±0.69 | 3.19 | -3.39 | 0.63±1.15 |
| I/O | 0.18 | 0.07 | 0.12±0.055 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.053±0.03 |

SD: Standard deviation

Table 2 shows that macroeconomic models generated higher means for both second and third dividends. However, the volatility of GE models was the highest; particularly, the higher estimates of some of the results generated from GE models standout uniquely in the dataset. The results driven from I/O models were the least volatile.

3. Statistical analysis

In this section, we conducted three separate statistical analyses to test the following:

1. An ordinary least square (OLS) regression with GDP as the only dependent variable to observe the impact of various simulation characteristics, including the country variable, on simulation results.
2. A multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) with employment and GDP as the dependent variables, to test the impact of various simulation characteristics, including the country variable, on simulation results.
3. MANOVA test with employment, GDP, and CO₂ reductions as dependent variables, to test the impact of various simulation characteristics, excluding the country variable, on simulation results. Country variable was excluded due to a lack of non-European simulation results on CO₂ emissions.

3.1 GDP as the second dividend

The purpose of this analysis was to break down the second dividend of GTR and analyse its overall performance across country groups. The impact of the country variable and other simulation characteristics on the third dividend (employment) has already been tested by Maxim et al. (2019); however, no such analysis is present in the literature concerning GDP. According to Patuelli et al. (2005), the performance of GDP as a second dividend is vague and inconclusive. A survey paper by Bosquet (2000) reports the positive relationship between a reduction in employers' social security contributions (SSC) and an increment of overall consumption caused by GTR. However, there is no statistical analysis for observing the impact of country group on simulation results, or a meta-regression analysis that quantifies the impact of various simulation characteristics on deviation of GDP from the baseline.

We found equal variances when assessing GDP across two country groups (Levene's test significance 0.436), suggesting GDP, which was the dependent variable in this analysis, to be homoscedastic. Since all our moderator variables (simulation characteristics), along with the country variable were binary, we employed OLS to construct our initial model. The basic meta-regression model is as follows:

$$Y_j = \varphi + \sum_{k=1}^N \beta_k Z_{jk} + \sum_{k=1}^N \sum_{l=1}^N \beta_{kl} Z_{jk} Z_{jl} + \varepsilon_j$$

Here, Y is the vector of effect-size (second dividend), φ denotes the average GDP variation for average study characteristics, β_k is the meta-regression coefficient incorporating the main effect of k th study characteristic Z_k , β_{kl} is the meta-regression coefficient for interaction terms between the generic variables Z_k and Z_l , and ε_j reflects the disturbance term.

Our results show that country group had no effect on simulation results concerning GDP, and as such, there were no significant differences between European and non-European studies. The results also suggest that, with the exception of the tax recycling method, none of the moderator variables had any significant effect on GDP (see Table 3).

Table 3: Parameter estimates of OLS.

| Variable | β | T | P-value |
|------------------------|---------|------------------------|---------|
| Constant | -.071 | -0.630 | 0.530 |
| Recycling type: SSC | 0.230 | 2.635 | 0.009 |
| Number of observations | | 126 | |
| Goodness of fit | | R ² = 0.053 | |

3.2 Testing for triple dividend with country variable as a moderator

In this part, we analyse the triple dividend potential of GTR. Due to a very limited number of simulation results concerning the first (environmental) dividend from non-European countries, we excluded CO₂ emissions data from this analysis. Nevertheless, the assumption here is that the first dividend of GTR is a stylised fact, as this association has been proven numerous times in the literature (see Bosquet, 2000, Patuelli et al., 2005, Anger et al., 2010).

With two continuous dependent variables and multiple categorical independent variables, we adopted MANOVA to test whether mean differences among simulation characteristics were significant for GDP and employment. In our database, 152 simulation results showed a percentage change in GDP or employment, or both, compared to the baseline scenario. Based on the size of this sample, we excluded all independent variables with less than 20 observations to maintain robustness⁶ (Mertler and Reinhart, 2016). We also included the interaction terms between country variable and all tax type and tax recycle type variables. We then tested the dependent variables for normality. Table 4 shows the results of a Shapiro-Wilk test, while Figure 4 and Figure 5 present the histogram for both GDP and employment, respectively. The results show that both employment and GDP were non-parametric. This was expected for our meta-regression analysis, as all these simulation results were derived from different studies, with different model parameters and assumptions. This violated one of the assumptions of MANOVA, and as a result, we used Pillai's trace to interpret the multivariate results (Mertler and Reinhart, 2016).

Table 4: Test for normality, employment, and GDP.

| Shapiro-Wilk | | | Shapiro-Wilk | | |
|--------------|-----|------|--------------|-----|------|
| Statistic | df | Sig. | Statistic | Df | Sig. |
| .835 | 152 | .000 | .725 | 126 | .000 |

⁶ See Appendix A2.




Figure 4: Frequency distribution of GDP.




Figure 5: Frequency distribution of employment.

Next, we tested the correlation for multicollinearity, and found no multicollinearity between GDP and employment (see Table 5), as the correlation between our two dependent variables was reasonably low, and the variation inflation factor (VIF) was only 1.00.

Table 5: Correlation coefficient matrix for GDP and employment.

| | | Employment | GDP |
|------------|---------------------|------------|------|
| Employment | Pearson correlation | 1 | .563 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | .000 |
| | N | 152 | 126 |
| GDP | Pearson correlation | .563 | 1 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | .000 | |
| | N | 126 | 126 |

The MANOVA results show that model type: GE model (Pillai's trace = 0.068, $F(2, 109) = 3.965$, $p = 0.02$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.068$), model type: M model (Pillai's trace = 0.104, $F(2, 109) = 6.357$, $p = 0.002$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.104$), recycle type: SSC (Pillai's trace = 0.143, $F(2, 109) = 9.078$, $p = 0.000$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.143$), and tax type: other taxes (Pillai's trace = 0.138, $F(2, 109) = 8.747$, $p = 0.000$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.138$), had a significant impact on the combined dependent variable of GDP and employment. Country variable, or any of the interactions between country with tax type or tax recycle type, was non-significant.

3.3 Test for triple dividend excluding country variable

In the third analysis, we tested for the triple dividend, and included all three dividends in our model as dependent variables. However, we excluded the country variable as a moderator, as well as all its interaction terms from this analysis, due to insufficient data on CO₂ emissions across the two country groups. The test of normality showed that CO₂ emissions data was non-parametric (Shapiro-Wilk $df = 101$, $p = 0.000$), as was the case for the other two dependent variables, which was expected. The correlation coefficient matrix is presented in Table 6. The correlations between the variables show no risk of multicollinearity. We also tested the VIF, which was 1.00, between CO₂ and the other two dependent variables.

Table 6: Correlation coefficient matrix for GDP and employment and CO₂ emissions.

| | | GDP | Employment | CO ₂ emissions |
|---------------------------|---------------------|-------|------------|---------------------------|
| GDP | Pearson correlation | 1 | .563 | -.172 |
| | Sig. (2-tailed) | | .000 | .134 |
| | N | 126 | 126 | 77 |
| Employment | Pearson correlation | .563 | 1 | -.137 |
| | Sig. (two-tailed) | .000 | | .171 |
| | N | 126 | 152 | 101 |
| CO ₂ emissions | Pearson correlation | -.172 | -.137 | 1 |
| | Sig. (two-tailed) | .134 | .171 | |
| | N | 77 | 101 | 101 |

According to our results, recycle: other recycles (Pillai's trace = 0.160, F (3, 67) = 4.266, p = 0.008, partial η^2 = 0.160), recycle: SSC (Pillai's trace = 0.428, F (3, 67) = 16.687, p = 0.000, partial η^2 = 0.428), tax type: CO₂ (Pillai's trace = 0.210, F (3, 67) = 5.94, p = 0.001, partial η^2 = 0.210), and tax type: other taxes (Pillai's trace = 0.218, F (3, 67) = 6.232, p = 0.001, partial η^2 = 0.218), had significant impacts on the composite variable of GDP, employment, and CO₂ emissions.

4. Conclusions

Our findings reveal that region of study is not a significant factor when it comes to the performance of GTR in a triple dividend context. We also found no significance for the country variable when testing solely for the impact of various simulation characteristics on GDP.

According to the three different analyses we conducted, SSC as a tax recycling method is indicated as being the most effective tool for generating favourable outcomes from a GTR. Our results suggest that a reduction in employers' social security contributions, or any form of labour tax cut, will not only positively induce GDP, but will also have a profound impact on the triple dividend context, irrespective of the region of study. Therefore, this policy can be equally effective in both European and non-European countries. We also found other recycling methods to have a significant impact on the combined effect of GDP and employment. Other recycles primarily comprised a reduction in food tax and a combination of various tax recycle policies. A blend of several recycling policies will therefore be more effective, compared to a single tax recycle policy for the second and third dividends.

The results also suggest that the use of a macroeconomic model along with a GE model can significantly influence the outcome of simulation results when measuring the effect on GDP and employment simultaneously. Our results conform to those of Patuelli et al. (2005) in this regard. We also observed significantly higher volatility in simulation results coming from GE models in our initial survey. The reason for this is the fact that GE models are exceptionally sensitive to the assumptions made by the modeller. Assumptions about variables, such as elasticity, time period and the relationship between different economic agents, vastly influence the results generated by the models. Future modellers should be aware of this fact and may wish to consider designing further tests to improve the robustness of simulation results.

When it comes to tax policy, other taxes, which represents predominantly mixed taxes, had a significant effect on the composite variable of GDP and employment. We also

found other taxes to be significant in the third scenario, where CO₂ emissions was included in the multivariate analysis as a dependent variable. Our findings suggest that, similar to a mixed recycle policy approach, employing mixed taxes will be more conducive to giving rise to triple dividends. Additionally, we also found CO₂-based taxes to be more effective in the case of energy taxes for triple dividends when CO₂ emissions data was included in the multivariate analysis.

The initial survey we conducted of our database containing all simulation results indicates the high triple dividend potential of GTR, as all three dividends were present in the mean of our dataset. This is also supported by the findings of Barker et al. (2016). Our statistical analyses also suggest that the use of CO₂-based taxes along with a tax reform based on the reduction of labour taxes could be an effective policy measure for TD. The underlying economic reasoning for such a nexus is quite powerful. CO₂ taxes are essentially a tax on energy and increasing them results in a higher cost for running capital goods. Simultaneously, a reduction in labour taxes causes labour to become relatively cheaper than capital. Given that there will thus be a certain degree of substitution between labour and capital, there will be a proportionally higher usage of labour compared to capital for production. The substitution between labour and capital is debatable, as certain studies suggest that labour and capital are complements (see Knoblach et al., 2019, Mućk, 2017), while some studies suggest that sectoral substitution elasticity differs and that it is therefore in certain sectors that labour and capital can substitute each other (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2017). This implies that the majority of the simulation results in our dataset come from models which employed production functions that allowed a certain degree of substitution between labour and capital.

Despite not finding the region of study to be a significant moderator in our statistical analyses, we observed a noticeable difference in the GTR performance of European and non-European countries in the triple dividend context in our initial survey. Future research should consider a further breakdown of the simulation characteristics to statistically identify the cause of differences in GTR performance between European and non-European countries.

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Appendices

Appendix A1

Table A.1.: Database summary.

| Source | Model | Region of study | Model type | Tax type | Tax Recycle type | Time period | Number of simulations |
|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| Bach et al. (1994) | DIW | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | 1 |
| Bardazzi (1996) | INTIMO | European | IO | Other taxes | SSC | Short term | 3 |
| | INTIMO | European | IO | Other taxes | SSC | Short term | |
| | INTIMO | European | IO | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| Barker et al. (1993) | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | EC tax | PIT | Short term | 12 |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | EC tax | PIT | Short term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | EC tax | VAT | Short term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | EC tax | VAT | Short term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | EC tax | PIT | Long term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | EC tax | VAT | Long term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | Other taxes | VAT | Short term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | Other taxes | VAT | Short term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | Other taxes | PIT | Short term | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|----|----------------|-----|---------------|---|
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | Other taxes | PIT | Short term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | Other taxes | VAT | Long term | |
| | HERMES/M IDAS/DRI | European | M | Other taxes | PIT | Long term | |
| Barker and Köhler (1998) | E3ME | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | 1 |
| Carraro et al. (1996) | WARM | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Long term | 6 |
| | WARM | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Long term | |
| Holmlund and Kolm (2000) | None | Non- European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | 8 |
| | None | Non- European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | None | Non- European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | None | Non- European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | None | Non- European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | None | Non- European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | None | Non- European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| Jansen and Klaassen (2000) | HERMES | European | M | EC tax | SSC | Short term | 3 |
| | E3ME | European | M | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | GEM-E3 | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------|----|-----------------|------|-----------|----|
| Kemfert and Welsch (2000) | LEAN-TMC | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Long term | 4 |
| | LEAN-TMC | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Long term | |
| | LEAN-TMC | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| | LEAN-TMC | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| Mabey and Nixon (1997) | EGEM;SLE EC; EGEME; EGEMX | European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | 6 |
| | EGEM;SLE EC; EGEME; EGEMX | European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | EGEM;SLE EC; EGEME; EGEMX | European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | EGEM;SLE EC; EGEME; EGEMX | European | M | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| | EGEM;SLE EC; EGEME; EGEMX | European | M | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| | EGEM;SLE EC; EGEME; EGEMX | European | M | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| De Mooij and Bovenberg (1998) | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | 12 |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | CT | Long term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | CT | Long term | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|--------------|----|-----------------|----------------|------------|---|
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | CT | Long term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | Mobile capital; Fixed capital | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| Roson (2003) | Dynamic general equilibrium model of Italy | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | 2 |
| | Dynamic general equilibrium model of Italy | European | GE | CO ₂ | CT | Short term | |
| Pereira and Pereira (2014) | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Long term | 4 |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | VAT | Long term | |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| Kilimani (2014) | UgAGE | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Short term | 6 |
| | UgAGE | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | UgAGE | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Short term | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------|--------------|----|-----------------|----------------|------------|---|
| | UgAGE | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Long term | |
| | UgAGE | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Long term | |
| | UgAGE | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Long term | |
| Conrad and Löschel (2005) | GEM-E3 | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | 4 |
| | GEM-E4 | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | |
| | GEM-E5 | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Short term | |
| | GEM-E6 | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Short term | |
| Bach et al. (2002) | LEAN | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | 2 |
| | PENTA-RHEI | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | |
| Pollitt et al. (2014) | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | 9 |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | |
| Bosello and Carraro (2001) | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | 8 |
| | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |

| | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|----------|----|-----------------|-----|------------|---|
| | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | |
| | WARM | European | M | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | |
| Manresa and Sancho (2005) | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | 6 |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | EC tax | SSC | Short term | |
| André et al. (2005) | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | 3 |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | CO ₂ | PIT | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | Other taxes | SSC | Short term | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----------|----|-----------------|------|------------|---|
| Saveyn et al. (2011) | GEM-E3 | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | 3 |
| | GEM-E4 | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| | GEM-E5 | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Long term | |
| Welsch and Ehrenheim (2004) | LEAN_2000 | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | 1 |
| Bossier and Bréchet (1995) | HERMES | European | M | EC tax | SSC | Short term | 1 |
| Felder and Van Nieuwkoop (1996) | Static general equilibrium model of Switzerland | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Short term | 6 |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Switzerland | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Switzerland | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Switzerland | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Switzerland | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Switzerland | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | |
| Vandyck and Van Regemorter (2014) | Dynamic regional CGE model of Belgium, based on GEM-E3 | European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Long term | 2 |
| | Dynamic regional CGE model of Belgium, | European | GE | Energy tax | LSTH | Long term | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--------------|----|-----------------|----------------|------------|---|
| | based on GEM-E4 | | | | | | |
| Markandya et al. (2013) | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | CO ₂ | LSTH | Short term | 3 |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | CO ₂ | CT | Short term | |
| | Static general equilibrium model of Spain | European | GE | CO ₂ | SSC | Short term | |
| Ciaschini et al. (2012) | Static bi-regional CGE model of Italy | European | GE | Other taxes | PIT | Short term | 4 |
| | Static bi-regional CGE model of Italy | European | GE | Other taxes | PIT | Short term | |
| | Static bi-regional CGE model of Italy | European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Static bi-regional CGE model of Italy | European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Short term | |
| Sahlén and Stage (2012) | Static CGE model of Namibia | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | VAT | Short term | 5 |
| | Static CGE model of Namibia | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | VAT | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of Namibia | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | SSC | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of Namibia | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | LSTH | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of Namibia | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | LSTH | Short term | |
| Lee et al. (2012) | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | PIT | Long term | 2 |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|----|-----------------|----------------|------------|---|
| | E3MG | Non-European | M | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Long term | |
| O'Ryan et al. (2005) ⁷ | ECOGEM-Chile | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | LSTH | Short term | 1 |
| Mirhosseini et al. (2017) | Static CGE model of Iran | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | LSTH | Short term | 3 |
| | Static CGE model of Iran | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | CT | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of Iran | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | SSC | Short term | |
| Bor and Huang (2010) | EnFore-CGE-Taiwan | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | LSTH | Short term | 5 |
| | EnFore-CGE-Taiwan | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | EnFore-CGE-Taiwan | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | EnFore-CGE-Taiwan | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | EnFore-CGE-Taiwan | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| Van Heerden et al. (2006) | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | CO ₂ | VAT | Short term | 8 |
| | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | VAT | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | Energy tax | Other recycles | Short term | |
| | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | VAT | Short term | |

⁷ Used change of utility as a proxy for employment.

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|----|-----------------|----------------|------------|---|
| | Static CGE model of South Africa | Non-European | GE | Other taxes | Other recycles | Short term | |
| Liu and Lu (2015) | CASIPM-GE | Non-European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Short term | 2 |
| | CASIPM-GE | Non-European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Short term | |
| (Pereira et al., 2016) | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Long term | 6 |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Long term | |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Long term | |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Long term | |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Long term | |
| | DGEP | European | GE | CO ₂ | Other recycles | Long term | |

Appendix A2

Table 7: Independent variables used in MANOVA.

| |
|---------------------------|
| Country |
| Time period |
| GE model |
| Macro model |
| Recycle: LSTH |
| Recycle: PIT |
| Recycle: others |
| Tax type: energy tax |
| Recycle: SSC |
| Tax type: CO ₂ |
| Tax type: other tax |