Is there evidence of strategic corporate tax interaction among EU countries?

Ruiz, Fernando and Gerard, Marcel (2008): Is there evidence of strategic corporate tax interaction among EU countries?

Abstract

In this paper we empirically investigate whether EU countries set their corporate tax interdependently and, at the same time, we examine which space may be relevant in the construction of this association. Our findings indicate the presence of tax interdependency among the EU-15 in statutory and effective corporate taxes based on the tax codes. Moreover, corporate taxes in the EU-15 seem to suffer from common external shocks.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Tax mimicking; tax competition; spatial panel
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H70 - General; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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