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Economic Growth and Population Transition in China and India 1990-2018

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Abstract

This paper analyses the trend in economic growth and population transition in China and India during 1990-2018 through a comparative perspective. The analysis follows a decomposition framework which argues that economic growth has a pure demographic component and a pure economic component and it is the latter which actually contributes to improving the standard of living. Using the data available through the World Bank, United Nations Population Division and International Labour Organization, the paper reveals that most of the economic growth in China during 1990-2018 has contributed to improving the standard of living. By contrast, a substantial proportion of economic growth in India has been the result of the demographic factors that contribute little to improve the quality of life of the people. The paper concludes that China needs to explore possibilities of productive utilisation of the old people to sustain economic growth whereas India requires reinvigorating the economic system and accelerating population transition to improve the quality of life of its people.

Key Words

Economic growth, population transition, China, India, standard of living

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Introduction

China and India are the only two billion plus countries in the world. According to the latest estimates prepared by the United Nations Population Division, the two countries account for 2.7803 billion or almost 36 per cent of the world population in 2020 (United Nations, 2019). The two countries, however, differ radically in terms of population transition and economic growth. China has already reached an advanced stage of population transition with an estimated average annual population growth rate of 0.456 per cent per year during the period 2015-2020 and total fertility rate well below the replacement level (1.69 births per woman of reproductive age). India, on the other hand, is still stuck-up in the middle of the population transition path with an average annual population growth rate of 1.039 per cent per year during the period 2015-2020 and fertility still above the replacement level (2.24 births per woman of reproductive age) according to estimates prepared by the United Nations Population Division (United Nations, 2019). It is projected that India is the most likely to surpass the population of China by the year 2027 to become the most populous country of the world (United Nations, 2019).

The two countries have also been the most rapidly growing economies of the world since 1990 but the growth of Chinese economy has been substantially faster than that of India during 1990-2018. According to the estimates prepared by the World Bank, the real total output of China's economy increased at an average annual rate of more than 9 per cent per year during the period 1990-2018. By comparison, India's economy grew at an average annual rate of around 6 per cent per year during the same period. In 2018, the total output of China was estimated to be more than 10797 billion 2010 US \$ compared to India's output of around 2842 billion. In 1990, the labour productivity, measured in terms of real total output per labour force, in China was lower than the labour productivity in India. However, by the year 2018, the labour productivity in China became more than 2.5 times higher than that in India.

In both countries, economic and population factors have contributed to the growth of the economy. Piketty (2014, pp72) has argued that the output of the economy can be decomposed into two components - a pure demographic component and a pure economic component - and it is only the latter that allows for improvement in the standard of living of the people. The demographic component is determined by the population stock - the size and the age composition of the population. The economic component, on the other hand, is determined by the labour productivity and the participation opportunity. The growth in the output of the economy should, therefore, be analysed in terms of population growth; transition in population age composition; change in the labour productivity; and change in the participation opportunity. Such an analysis helps in understanding the relative contribution of population and economic factors to economic growth and how the relative contribution of these factors have changed over time.

In this paper, we analyse population transition and economic growth in China and India during 1990-2018 through a comparative perspective. By population transition, we mean the change in the population stock - the size and the age composition of the population. It is well-known that population transition leads to the increase in the size and ageing of the population. The implications of the increase in population size for economic growth have been debated for decades (Birdsall, Kelly, Sinding, 2001; Bloom, Canning, Sevilla, 2001, Heady and Hodge, 2009). This debate can be synthesised in terms of three alternative positions - population growth restricts, promotes, or is independent of economic growth. Proponents of each position have empirical evidence to support their case. The issue is, however, complicated as the relationship between population growth and economic growth is found to be different in the developing as compared to the developed countries (Kelly, 2001).

On the other hand, ageing of the population associated with population transition also impacts economic growth because the economic behaviour of the people varies by age. Population with high proportion of child population requires high investment on children which tends to depress economic growth. On the other hand, if a large proportion of the population is concentrated in working ages, then the added productivity of the working population can produce a demographic dividend that can accelerate economic growth (Bloom, Canning, Sevilla, 2001). Bloom and Williamson (1998) were the first to demonstrate the key role played by the transition in the population age composition in accelerating economic growth in selected East Asian countries. Subsequently, many studies have been carried out globally to highlight the contribution of the transition in the age composition of the population to the economic growth (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2008; 2011; Golley, 2017; Joe, 2011; Mason, 2008; Prskawetz, 2007; Ranganathan, 2017; Wang, 2013).

The demographic dividend resulting from the transition in the age composition of the population has been further classified as the first and the second demographic dividend. (Lee, Mason, Miller, 2000; Mason, 2005; Lee and Mason, 2006). The first demographic dividend occurs when the working age population raises relatively fewer number of children so that increased resources are available for investment in the economy. This increased investment spurs economic growth. This dividend is essentially transitory in nature. It turns negative at the latter stages of population transition because of the decrease in the working age population and rapid increase in the old age population. The second demographic dividend, on the other hand, is the result of the tendency of the people to create assets and accumulate wealth as they get older. Asset creation and wealth accumulation also leads to increased investment in the economy and spurring economic growth. The second dividend depends upon the first and begins somewhat later than the first. However, it is not transitory in nature and can continue indefinitely.

There are many studies that have analysed population and economy of China and India through a comparative perspective (Wolf et al, 2011; Golley and Tyres, 2013; Choudhry and Elhorst, 2010; Bloom et al, 2006). In this paper, we explore the simultaneous effect of the change in the four factors of economic growth - population size; population age composition; labour productivity; and participation opportunity - on economic growth of the two countries. We

decompose the growth in the output of the economy into the growth attributed to the change in population size; transition in the age composition of the population; increase in the labour productivity; and the change in the participation opportunity. The framework helps in understanding how demographic and economic factors have contributed in shaping the growth of the economy of the two countries during 1990 through 2018. The paper follows the arguments put forward by Piketty (2014) to analyse the contribution of demographic and economic factors in the expansion of the economy of the two countries.

The paper is organised as follows. The next section of the paper outlines the analytical framework used in the present analysis which is essentially the factor decomposition approach. Section three describes the data that constitute the basis for the analysis. Section four describes, briefly, the growth in the output of the economy of the two countries along with the transition in the factors that determine the size and growth of the output for the period 1990 through 2018. Section six presents and discusses results of the decomposition exercise. The last section of the paper discusses the demographic imperatives for India and states/Union Territories in the context of economic growth.

Analytical Framework

Let Y denotes the gross domestic product (GDP) at constant prices and P denotes the population. Then, Y is the product of the population (P) and the per capita real GDP or the output.

$$Y = P * \frac{Y}{P} \quad (1)$$

The per capita output may further be written as

$$\frac{Y}{P} = \frac{Y}{L} * \frac{L}{W} * \frac{W}{P} \quad (2)$$

Here, L is the labour force or the number of people engaged in productive activities and W is the working age (15-59 years) population. Combining equations (1) and (2), we get

$$Y = P * \frac{Y}{L} * \frac{L}{W} * \frac{W}{P} \quad (3)$$

$$Y = \left(P * \frac{W}{P} \right) * \left(\frac{Y}{L} * \frac{L}{W} \right)$$

The first term on the right of equation (3) reflects the demographic component of the output of the economy while the second reflects the economic component. The economic component comprises of two factors - labour productivity (Y/L) and participation opportunity (L/W). Both these factors are influenced by the state of the social and economic production system. On the other hand, the demographic component also comprises of two factors - population size (P) and the ratio of the working age population to the total population (W/P). Both these factors reflect the stage of population transition.

Based on equation (3), the growth in the output of the economy may be measured in both relative and absolute terms. Let $D=(W/P)$, $I=(Y/L)$ and $E=(L/W)$, then, the relative growth in the output of the economy may be decomposed as

$$(Y_2/Y_1) = (P_2/P_1)*(D_2/D_1)*(I_2/I_1)*(O_2/O_1) \quad (4)$$

or

$$\ln(Y_2/Y_1) = \ln(P_2/P_1)+\ln(D_2/D_1)+\ln(I_2/I_1)+\ln(O_2/O_1) \quad (5)$$

or

$$r_Y = r_P + r_D + r_I + r_O \quad (6)$$

where

$$r_Y = \ln\left(\frac{Y_2}{Y_1}\right), \text{ etc.}$$

denotes the relative growth of the real total output of the economy between two points in time.

On the other hand, following Ang (2016), the absolute growth in the real output of the economy may be decomposed as

$$\nabla Y = Y_2 - Y_1 = \frac{(Y_2 - Y_1)}{(\ln(Y_2) - \ln(Y_1))} * (\ln(Y_2) - \ln(Y_1)) \quad (7)$$

But,

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(Y_2) - \ln(Y_1) &= \ln(P_2 * D_2 * I_2 * O_2) - \ln(P_1 * D_1 * I_1 * O_1), \\ &= \ln(P_2 - P_1) + \ln(D_2 - D_1) + \ln(I_2 - I_1) + \ln(O_2 - O_1) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

substituting from (5) in (4), we get

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla Y = Y_2 - Y_1 &= \frac{(Y_2 - Y_1)}{(\ln(Y_2) - \ln(Y_1))} * (\ln(P_2) - \ln(P_1)) + \\ &+ \frac{(Y_2 - Y_1)}{(\ln(Y_2) - \ln(Y_1))} * (\ln(D_2) - \ln(D_1)) + \\ &+ \frac{(Y_2 - Y_1)}{(\ln(Y_2) - \ln(Y_1))} * (\ln(I_2) - \ln(I_1)) + \\ &+ \frac{(Y_2 - Y_1)}{(\ln(Y_2) - \ln(Y_1))} * (\ln(E_2) - \ln(E_1)) \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

or

$$\nabla Y = \partial P + \partial D + \partial I + \partial E \quad (10)$$

The growth in the real output of the economy attributed to the factor D , ∂D , in equation (10) is popularly known as the demographic dividend. The demographic component (DC) of the growth in the total output of the economy of any country may now be estimated as

$$DC = \partial P + \partial D \quad (11)$$

whereas the economic component (EC) may be estimated as

$$EC = \bar{A} + \bar{E} \quad (12)$$

Arguing in a similar manner, if Y_C denotes the total output of China and Y_I denotes the total output of India, then the relative difference in the rate of growth in the real total output of the economy between the two countries can be decomposed as

$$\frac{Y_{C_2} / Y_{C_1}}{Y_{I_2} / Y_{I_1}} = \frac{P_{C_2} / P_{C_1}}{P_{I_2} / P_{I_1}} \times \frac{D_{C_2} / D_{C_1}}{D_{I_2} / D_{I_1}} \times \frac{I_{C_2} / I_{C_1}}{I_{I_2} / I_{I_1}} \times \frac{O_{C_2} / O_{C_1}}{O_{I_2} / O_{I_1}} \quad (13)$$

or

$$\nabla r_Y = \nabla r_P + \nabla r_D + \nabla r_I + \nabla r_O \quad (14)$$

where

$$\nabla r_Y = \ln \left(\frac{Y_{C_2} / Y_{C_1}}{Y_{I_2} / Y_{I_1}} \right) \quad (15)$$

is the difference between the rate of growth of the real total output of the two countries.

On the other hand, the absolute difference in the total output of the economy of the two countries can be decomposed as

$$\begin{aligned} \nabla Y = Y_C - Y_I &= \frac{Y_C - Y_I}{(\ln(Y_C) - \ln(Y_I))} \times (\ln(P_C) - \ln(P_I)) + \\ &+ \frac{Y_C - Y_I}{(\ln(Y_C) - \ln(Y_I))} \times (\ln(D_C) - \ln(D_I)) + \\ &+ \frac{Y_C - Y_I}{(\ln(Y_C) - \ln(Y_I))} \times (\ln(I_C) - \ln(I_I)) + \\ &+ \frac{Y_C - Y_I}{(\ln(Y_C) - \ln(Y_I))} \times (\ln(O_C) - \ln(O_I)) \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

Where the term $[(Y_C - Y_I) / (\ln(Y_C) - \ln(Y_I))]$ is defined as the logarithmic mean of the real total output of the two countries.

Data Source

The data for the present analysis have been taken from three sources. Estimates of the total output of the economy (Y) at constant 2010 US \$ for different years of the period 1990 through 2018 are taken from the database maintained by the World Bank. On the other hand, annual estimates of the total population (P) and the working age population (population aged 15-59 years) (W) are taken from the latest population estimates and projections prepared by the United Nations Population Division for different countries of the world (United Nations, 2019). Finally, estimates of the size of the labour force (L) in the two countries are taken from the database maintained by the International Labour Organization and are

available annually since 1990 onwards. Annual estimates of the size of the labour force prepared by the International Labour Organization are actually modelled estimates. The details of the methodology adopted by the International Labour Organization for preparing these estimates are given elsewhere (ILO, 2020). Official estimates of the total output of the economy of the two countries as well as official estimates of the population size, working age population and labour force have not been used in the present analysis because of the problems in the comparability of the estimates of the two countries. Another problem is that estimates of the population size and the working age population may not be available on an annual basis as required in the present analysis.

Economic Growth in China and India

According to the estimates of the real total output of the economy prepared by the World Bank, economic growth in China has been significantly more rapid than that of India during the period under reference. The real total output of China's economy, at constant 2010 US \$, increased from almost 828 billion in 1990 to more than 10797 billion in 2018 at an average annual growth rate of more than 9 per cent per year over a period of 28 years. By contrast, the real total output of India's economy increased from around 508 billion constant 2010 US \$ in 1990 to 2842 billion constant 2010 US \$ in 2018 at an average annual growth rate of around 6 per cent per year. As the result of the differing pace of growth, the gap in the size of the two economies increased from 320 billion constant 2010 US \$ in 1990 to 7956 billion constant 2010 US \$ in 2018. In 1990, China's economy was around 1.6 times larger than the Indian economy but, by 2013, China's economy became more than 3.9 times larger than the Indian economy. After 2013, the expansion of India's economy has been relatively faster than the Chinese economy so that the gap between the size of the two economies decreased marginally. However, in 2018, China's economy was estimated to be around 3.8 times larger than the Indian economy.

In both countries, the annual percentage growth in the real total output of the economy fluctuated sharply during the period under reference. This implies that external factors that influence the output of the economy varied frequently in both countries. More specifically, during the 28 years between 1990 and 2018, the annual percentage growth in the real total output of China's economy was never less than 6 per cent but more than 13 per cent in 1992 and again in 2007. Moreover, China's economy recorded double-digit growth in 8 of the 28 years under reference. However, the annual percentage growth in the real output of the economy of the country started decreasing since 2010 and the annual percentage growth in the real output of China's economy during 2017-2018 has been estimated to be the slowest of the 28 years between 1990 and 2018.

By comparison, the annual percentage growth in the real output of India's economy has always been less than 10 per cent during the 28 years under reference. The expansion of India's economy was the most rapid during 1999 and again during 2010 when the real total output of the economy of the country increased by more than 8 per cent. By contrast, the economy of the country grew very slowly during 1991 when the real total output of the economy of the country increased by just

around 1 per cent. In 6 of the 28 years under reference, the annual percentage growth in the real total output of India's economy was estimated to be less than 5 per cent. The period 2003 through 2007 appears to be the golden-era for the Indian economy as the annual percentage growth in the real total output of the economy of the country was consistently more than 7.5 per cent during this period. After 2011 also, the annual percentage growth in the real output of India's economy accelerated consistently till 2016 but, after 2016, it again showed a decreasing trend.

The annual percentage growth in the real total output of China's economy has, however, not always been higher than the annual percentage growth in the real total output of India's economy during the 28 years between 1990 and 2018. The annual percentage growth in the real total output of India's economy was estimated to be higher than the annual percentage growth in the real total output of China's economy in 1999. More importantly, after 2013, the annual percentage growth in the real output of India's economy has consistently been higher than the annual percentage growth in the economy of China, although the difference between the two fluctuated. The annual percentage growth in the real output of the economy of China was, however, very high compared to the average annual percentage growth in the real total output of the economy of India during the period 1991-93 with the gap between the two being the widest in 1993 when the annual percentage growth in the real output of China's economy was almost 13 per cent whereas the average percentage growth in the real output of India's economy was estimated to be less than 5 per cent.

Population Transition in China and India

The population stock of China increased by more than 250 million between 1990 and 2018 at an average annual rate of increase of 0.69 per cent per year according to the estimates prepared by the United Nations Population Division. By comparison, India's population increased by close to 480 million at an average annual rate of increase of more than 1.56 per cent per year. During the period under reference, China was able to achieve an advanced stage of population transition whereas India continues to stuck up in the middle of the population transition path. During 2017-17, China's population is estimated to have increased by less than 0.5 per cent thanks to its very stringent population control policy popularly known as the one-child policy. By comparison, the population growth during 2017-18 in India was estimated to more than twice as rapid as than in China. During 2017-18, less than 7 million people were estimated to have been added to the population of China. This number was almost 16 million during 1990-91 which suggests that China has been able to cut rapidly the net annual addition to the population during the period under reference. In India, by contrast, almost 14 million people were added to country's population during 2017-18 as compared to more than 18 million during 1990-91 which indicates that the reduction in the annual net addition to the population in India has not been very significant during the period under reference.

The change in the population age composition in China during the period under reference has been very marked as compared to the change in population age composition in India. The proportion of the working age (15-59 years) population to the total population in China increased from almost 63 per cent in 1990 to an all

time high of almost 70 per cent in 2007 but then decreased to less than 66 per cent in 2018. This indicates that the demographic dividend resulting from the change in population age composition fuelled economic growth in the country up to the year 2007 but turned negative after 2007. In India, the proportion of working age population to total population increased consistently from almost 56 per cent in 1990 to slightly more than 63 per cent in 2018 indicating that the demographic dividend resulting from the change in the population age composition in India always contributed to accelerating economic growth but the magnitude of the contribution has always been very small. The proportion of working age population to total population in India in 2018 was almost the same as the proportion in China way back in 1990 which indicates that India lagged behind China in population transition during the period under reference. If the increase in the proportion of working age population to the total population in India during 1990 through 2018 is any indication, then, there is little possibility of any substantial increase in the demographic dividend in the country. The demographic dividend in India will remain small in terms of magnitude, although the period of demographic dividend in India may last longer than that in China.

Productivity of Economic System in China and India

In 1990, the labour productivity, measured as the ratio of real total output to the total labour force was higher in India as compared to China (Figure 3). However, during the period under reference, labour productivity increased very rapidly in China from just 1245 2010 US \$ per labour in 1990 to more than 13445 2010 US \$ per labour in 2018 which implies that the labour productivity in the countries increased by around 11 times in the country during the period under reference. This rapid increase in the labour productivity in China indicates that the country has been able to modernise its social and economic production system in a big way during the period under reference through capital investment and technology up-gradation and innovation. By comparison, the process of modernisation of the social and economic system in India has been relatively slow as the labour productivity in India could increase from around 1603 2010 US \$ per labour in 1990 to only 5827 2010 US \$ per labour in 2018 which means that the labour productivity in India increased by only around 4 times only during the period under reference. It appears that India could not modernise its social and economic production system in the similar manner as China was able to do during the period under reference. If the labour productivity reflects the modernisation of the social and economic production system, then it is obvious from figure 3 that India lagged behind China substantially in terms of capita investment and technology up-gradation and innovation of the social and economic production system during the period under reference.

At the same time, there has also been a big difference between the two countries in terms of the opportunities of participation in the social and economic production system for the working age population. In China, the labour force constituted almost 90 per cent of the working age population in 1990 compared to less than 65 per cent in India. In both countries, however, the ratio of the labour force to the working age population decreased during the period under reference.

However, the decrease in this ratio has been more rapid in India as compared to that in China. The ratio of labour force to the working age population in India decreased by 8 percentage points, from almost 65 per cent in 1990 to less than 57 per cent in 2018 over a period of 28 years as compared to the decrease of only 4 percentage points in China. In other words, China was able to generate additional participation opportunities in its social and economic production system so that there has been only a marginal decrease in the ratio of the labour force to the working age population of the country. In India, additional participation opportunities created in the social and economic production system appear to have fallen significantly short of the demand for participation so that the participation opportunities in the social and economic production system of the country decreased substantially. It appears that because of relatively slow modernisation, the social and economic production system in India could generate only limited additional opportunities for the participation of ever increasing working age population in the social and economic production system of the country. India, thus, lagged behind China in terms of both productivity of the labour force as well as the opportunities of participation for the working age population in the social and economic production system.

Decomposition Analysis

The rapid expansion of the economy of China during 1990-2018, as reflected by the rapid growth of the real total output, has primarily been the result of the rapid increase in the labour productivity in the country. The increase in the labour productivity in China during the period under reference accounted for almost 93 per cent of the increase in the real total output of the country. By comparison, the increase in population accounted for only about 7.5 per cent of the increase, the change in the ratio of the working age population to the total population accounted for just 1.7 per cent of the growth in the real total output during the period under reference. On the other hand, the decrease in the ration of the labour force to the working age population or the participation opportunity during the period under reference resulted in a decrease of around 1.9 per cent in the growth of the real total output of the country during the period under reference. The decomposition analysis suggests that the labour productivity has been the sole driver of the expansion and growth of China's economy since 1990.

The relative contribution of the increase in population, demographic dividend, increase in labour productivity and change in participation opportunity to the growth of the real total output in India has been different in India. The increase in labour productivity in India accounted for only about three-fourth of the growth in the real total output of the country during the period under reference; another one fourth of the growth in the real total output was accounted by the increase in population while the contribution of the demographic dividend was around 7 per cent only. Finally, the decrease in the opportunity of participation in the social and economic production system over time contributed a decrease of around 7 per cent in real total output of the country. In other words, the demographic component of the growth of economy has been quite substantial in India but only marginal in China during the period under reference.

In absolute terms, China's economy expanded by more than 9969 billion 2010 US \$ between 1990 and 2018. The increase in the population resulted in an increase of almost 750 billion 2010 US \$ while the transition in the age composition of the population resulted in an increase of almost 170 billion 2010 US \$. On the other hand, the increase in labour productivity led to an increase of almost 9238 billion 2010 US \$ while the decrease in the participation opportunity accounted for a decrease of almost 188 billion 2010 US \$ to the economy of the country during 1990 through 2018. India's economy, by contrast, expanded by only around 2334 billion 2010 US \$ during this period as the result of an increase of almost 593 billion 2010 US \$ due to the growth of the population; an increase of around 168 billion 2010 US \$ as the result of the demographic dividend; an increase of almost 1749 billion as the result of the increase in labour productivity; and a decrease of around 176 billion 2010 US \$ as the result of the decrease in the participation opportunity. This means that the demographic component accounted for only around 920 billion of the 9969 billion 2010 US \$ growth (9 per cent) of China's economy during 1990-2018. By comparison, the demographic component accounted for around 761 billion of the 2334 billion 2010 US \$ (33 per cent) growth of India's economy. This implies that more than 90 per cent of the economic growth in China during 1990-2018 contributed to improving the standard of living of Chinese people whereas only about two-third of the economic growth in India contributed to improving the standard of living of the Indian people during this period. The impact of the economic growth on the quality of the life of the people of India has been significantly smaller than the impact of the economic growth on the quality of life of the people of China because the main drivers of economic growth in China and India, during the period under reference, have essentially been different.

In both countries, the relative contribution of the four factors to the growth of the economy has been different in different years of the reference period. The contribution of the demographic component has always been smaller than that of the economic component in China. The demographic dividend, resulting from the increase in the ratio of the working age population to the total population contributed very substantially to the growth of the economy in China during the period 2000 through 2004. However, after 2007, this ratio started decreasing so that the demographic dividend in the country turned negative. The increase in the ratio of the working age population to the total population in the country during 2000-2004 was, however, associated with a decrease in the ratio of the labour force to the working age population. As a result, the positive contribution of the change in the population age composition to the growth of the economy was largely compensated by the negative contribution of the decrease in participation opportunity of the working age population.

In India, on the other hand, demographic factors have been more dominant in shaping the growth of the economy than China. Unlike China, the share of the demographic component has been larger than the share of the economic component in the growth of India's economy during the years 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2008. During the year 2000 and again during the year 2008, the demographic component accounted for more than 63 per cent of the growth in the economy of the country. The share of the demographic component in economic growth during the year 2000 was larger than the share of the economic component primarily because of very

large demographic dividend. By contrast, the share of the demographic component was larger than the share of the economic component in the growth of the economy during the year 2008 primarily because a very substantial decrease in the opportunity of participation of the working age population in the productive activities.

Finally, the difference in the rate of growth in the real output between the two countries can be decomposed into the difference in the population growth rate, difference in the demographic dividend, difference in the rate of increase in the labour productivity and the difference in the rate of change in the participation opportunity. Between 1990 and 2018, the real output of China increased at an average annual rate of 9.173 per cent per year whereas India's real output increased at an average annual rate of 6.152 per cent per year. This difference in the rate of growth of the two economies has been the result of the difference in population growth rate (-0.873 per cent per year), the difference in the demographic dividend (-0.287 per cent per year), the difference in the rate of increase in labour productivity (3.891 per cent per year), and the difference in the rate of change in participation opportunity (0.290 per cent per year). In other words, the economic component contributed to an increase the disparity in the growth of the economy of the two countries whereas the demographic component contributed to the decrease in the disparity in economic growth between the two countries. The primary driver of increasing disparity in economic growth between the two countries has however been the increasing disparity in the labour productivity. Moreover, the disparity in the annual growth of the economy of the two countries varied widely in different years of the period under reference. Since 2014, the annual growth of India's economy has been faster than the annual growth of China's economy mainly because of relatively faster growth of the demographic component of the economy in India as compared to China. At the same time, the difference in the growth of the economic component between the two countries narrowed down after 2014. The increase in labour productivity in China was slower than that in India during 2015-16 whereas the difference in the annual increase in the participation opportunity also narrowed down.

The increase in the disparity in the size of the economy of the two countries during the period under reference has, however, been more consistent. In 1990, the demographic component of the economy accounted for 85 per cent of the difference in the size of the economy of the two countries. By contrast, in 2018, the demographic component accounted for only 7 per cent of the difference in the size of the economy of the two countries. More specifically, the contribution of the difference in the population size decreased from 61 per cent in 1990 to only 4 per cent in 2018 because the difference in the population of the two countries narrowed down during the period under reference because population of China increased slowly compared to the increase in population of India. At the same time, the contribution of the difference in the ratio of the working age population to the total population decreased from 24 per cent to only 3 per cent during this period. On the other hand, the labour productivity in India was higher than that of China during 1990-1992 but, by 2018, the difference in the labour productivity between the two countries accounted for 63 per cent of the difference in the size of the economy of the two countries. Finally, the contribution of the difference in the participation

opportunity decreased from 63 per cent in 1990 to 31 per cent in 2018. In 1990, the difference in the size of the economy of the two countries was almost entirely because of the demographic differences but by 2018, the difference in the size of the two economies was almost entirely because of the difference in the economic component.

Discussions and Conclusions

The analysis presented in the foregoing pages suggests that around one third of the economic growth in India during 1990-2018 may be attributed to demographic factors and, therefore, contributes little to improving the quality of life of the Indian people. This has not been the case in China where, more than 90 per cent of the growth in the economy during the period under reference was due to economic factors - labour productivity and opportunity of participation of the working age population in productive activities. This implies that the impact of the economic growth on the quality of life of the people has been substantially stronger in China than in India. In other words, the composition of economic growth or the relative contribution of demographic and economic factors to economic growth has also contributed to increasing the disparities in the standard of living or quality of life of the people of the two countries. China has been able to increase the labour productivity very significantly through investment in human development. In terms of the human development index (HDI), China ranks 85 among the 189 countries of the world with an HDI of 0.758 whereas India ranks a poor 129 with an HDI of 0.647 (United Nations, 2019a). The expectation of life at birth in China is almost 77 years compared to less than 70 years in India. The expected years of schooling in China is almost 14 years compared to less than 12 years in India. Similarly, the mean years of schooling in China is almost 8 years compared to less than 7 years in India according to the latest Human Development Report prepared by the United Nations. India lags way behind China in terms of human development and this disparity in human development between the two countries has reflection in the disparity in labour productivity.

China has also been able to create near sufficient opportunities for participation of the working age population in productive activities and one factor in high participation opportunity in China has been the advanced stage of population transition that the country has achieved. The proportion of the working age population to the total population is decreasing in China for quite some times so that the number of person seeking participation in productive activities has decreased. In India, by contrast, the demand for participation in productive activities is increasing as the proportion of working age population to the total population continues to increase in the country. However, the social and economic production system of the country has been able to provide opportunities of participation to only a proportion of the ever increasing working age population and this proportion is decreasing at a faster rate as compared to the decrease in China. The decrease in the participation opportunity in either China or India is actually a reflection of the capital oriented, technology driven approach to modernising the social and economic production system that currently rules the world. However, compared to China, the decrease in the opportunity of participation in the social and

economic production system in India, as measured through the ratio of the labour force to the working age population appears alarming in the context of both economic growth and standard of living. Reversing the decreasing trend in the participation opportunity in India may contribute significantly towards accelerating economic growth in the country. This is possible through restructuring the social and economic production system of the country.

It is also evident from the present analysis that economic growth in China has now become virtually independent of demographic factors and is driven primarily by economic factors - labour productivity and participation opportunity. The key to economic progress in China, therefore, lies in continued increase in labour productivity and identifying new avenues of participation in social and economic production system. China is now at an advanced stage of demographic transition and the demographic dividend has turned negative. The level of fertility in the country continues to be well below the replacement level and the average life of a Chinese national is nearing 80 years. As a result, the proportion of the old population in China is bound to increase rapidly in the coming years. In such a scenario, the country must explore possibilities of productive utilisation of the old population to sustain economic growth. Productive utilisation of the old population is essential for China to reverse the decreasing trend in the growth of the economy that the country has witnessed in the recent past. Productive utilisation of the old people roles may also be a crucial factor for improved health and well-being of the old people (Rowe and Kahn, 1997; Morrow-Howell et al, 2005; Hinterlong, 2008).

In India, the challenge of economic growth essentially lies in its economic system as economic growth that actually contributes to improving the standard of living remains low. India needs to take immediate steps to halt the rapid decrease in opportunities of participation in the social and economic production system by creating new avenues of participation within the economy. The rapid decrease in the participation opportunities suggests that country's economy remains traditional and not in sync with other dimensions of development. For example, in the rural economy of the country, there is little opportunity of participation for educated females as there is little productive activity in villages other than agriculture (Chaurasia, 2020; pp 217). Promotion of home-based productive activities in villages may facilitate participation of literate females in productive processes (Sanghi et al, 2015) and contribute to increasing the labour productivity which is low compared to China. India also needs to reinvigorate its population transition efforts so as to lessen the dependence of economic growth on demographic factors which, essentially, do not contribute to improving the quality of life of the people. The country is yet to achieve the replacement fertility and, even if the replacement fertility is achieved, the population of the country will continue to increase for at least 30-40 years because of the momentum for growth built-in in the age structure of the population. This increase in population will fuel economic growth but such a growth will hardly contribute to improving the standard of living. Moreover, the growth in population will put additional pressure on the economy to create additional opportunities of participation for the increasing working age population. There is, unfortunately, no way of curtailing population growth attributed to the momentum built-in in the age structure of the population as this momentum is the result of the past trends in fertility and mortality.

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Table 1

Total output, population, working age population and labour force in China and India, 1990-2018

| Year | Total output (Billion 2010 US \$) | | Population (Million) | | Working age population (15-59 years) (Million) | | Labour force (Million) | |
|------|--------------------------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|
| | China | India | China | India | China | India | China | India |
| 1990 | 827.732 | 507.565 | 1176.884 | 873.278 | 740.48 | 488.398 | 665.09 | 316.561 |
| 1991 | 904.662 | 512.929 | 1192.897 | 891.273 | 749.857 | 499.647 | 673.818 | 323.814 |
| 1992 | 1033.271 | 541.050 | 1206.711 | 909.307 | 760.872 | 511.204 | 684.458 | 331.388 |
| 1993 | 1176.560 | 566.754 | 1218.817 | 927.404 | 772.255 | 523.149 | 695.649 | 339.358 |
| 1994 | 1330.127 | 604.494 | 1230.020 | 945.602 | 782.307 | 535.628 | 705.468 | 347.851 |
| 1995 | 1475.765 | 650.281 | 1240.921 | 963.923 | 790.531 | 548.688 | 713.152 | 355.752 |
| 1996 | 1622.285 | 699.374 | 1251.636 | 982.365 | 803.668 | 561.477 | 724.750 | 363.470 |
| 1997 | 1772.034 | 727.698 | 1261.996 | 1000.9 | 812.309 | 574.796 | 731.828 | 371.462 |
| 1998 | 1910.919 | 772.701 | 1271.982 | 1019.484 | 819.187 | 588.597 | 736.673 | 379.712 |
| 1999 | 2057.439 | 841.053 | 1281.515 | 1038.058 | 828.267 | 602.794 | 742.621 | 388.183 |
| 2000 | 2232.146 | 873.357 | 1290.551 | 1056.576 | 841.179 | 617.293 | 751.011 | 396.839 |
| 2001 | 2418.305 | 915.488 | 1299.130 | 1075.000 | 852.850 | 631.125 | 754.720 | 406.742 |
| 2002 | 2639.112 | 950.313 | 1307.352 | 1093.317 | 868.789 | 645.331 | 760.789 | 416.973 |
| 2003 | 2903.963 | 1025.011 | 1315.304 | 1111.523 | 886.923 | 659.783 | 768.073 | 427.475 |
| 2004 | 3197.589 | 1106.222 | 1323.085 | 1129.623 | 903.527 | 674.338 | 774.598 | 438.182 |
| 2005 | 3561.979 | 1193.873 | 1330.776 | 1147.610 | 916.568 | 688.895 | 779.562 | 449.054 |
| 2006 | 4015.045 | 1290.108 | 1338.409 | 1165.486 | 927.461 | 702.846 | 784.130 | 451.551 |
| 2007 | 4586.441 | 1388.940 | 1345.994 | 1183.209 | 935.372 | 716.833 | 787.819 | 454.038 |

| Year | Total output (Billion 2010 US \$) | | Population (Million) | | Working age population (15-59 years) (Million) | | Labour force (Million) | |
|------|--------------------------------------|----------|-------------------------|----------|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|
| | China | India | China | India | China | India | China | India |
| 2008 | 5029.229 | 1431.813 | 1353.569 | 1200.670 | 940.536 | 730.735 | 790.497 | 456.497 |
| 2009 | 5501.968 | 1544.380 | 1361.169 | 1217.726 | 944.010 | 744.481 | 792.343 | 458.947 |
| 2010 | 6087.165 | 1675.615 | 1368.811 | 1234.281 | 946.390 | 758.033 | 793.375 | 461.401 |
| 2011 | 6668.544 | 1763.440 | 1376.498 | 1250.288 | 946.975 | 770.622 | 796.628 | 462.069 |
| 2012 | 7192.667 | 1859.660 | 1384.206 | 1265.780 | 946.225 | 783.289 | 799.638 | 462.943 |
| 2013 | 7751.438 | 1978.420 | 1391.883 | 1280.842 | 944.656 | 795.958 | 802.102 | 467.577 |
| 2014 | 8317.255 | 2125.025 | 1399.454 | 1295.601 | 942.932 | 808.475 | 803.897 | 472.075 |
| 2015 | 8891.588 | 2294.947 | 1406.848 | 1310.152 | 941.492 | 820.757 | 804.985 | 476.338 |
| 2016 | 9490.586 | 2482.434 | 1414.049 | 1324.517 | 940.143 | 833.2 | 805.101 | 480.526 |
| 2017 | 10131.865 | 2660.372 | 1421.022 | 1338.677 | 939.287 | 844.996 | 804.439 | 484.234 |
| 2018 | 10797.222 | 2841.58 | 1427.648 | 1352.642 | 938.47 | 856.41 | 803.071 | 487.636 |

Source: Estimates of the total output have been taken from the World Bank database.
Estimates of population and working age population are taken from United Nations (2019).
Estimates of labour force are model estimates prepared by International Labour Organization.

Table 2

Ratio of working age population to total population, labour productivity and ratio of labour force to working age population in China and India, 1990-2018.

| Year | Ratio of working age population to total population | | Labour productivity (Output per labour) | | Ratio of labour force to working age population | |
|------|---|--------|---|-------|---|--------|
| | China | India | China | India | China | India |
| 1990 | 0.6292 | 0.5593 | 1245 | 1603 | 0.8982 | 0.6482 |
| 1991 | 0.6286 | 0.5606 | 1343 | 1584 | 0.8986 | 0.6481 |
| 1992 | 0.6305 | 0.5622 | 1510 | 1633 | 0.8996 | 0.6483 |
| 1993 | 0.6336 | 0.5641 | 1691 | 1670 | 0.9008 | 0.6487 |
| 1994 | 0.6360 | 0.5664 | 1885 | 1738 | 0.9018 | 0.6494 |
| 1995 | 0.6371 | 0.5692 | 2069 | 1828 | 0.9021 | 0.6484 |
| 1996 | 0.6421 | 0.5716 | 2238 | 1924 | 0.9018 | 0.6473 |
| 1997 | 0.6437 | 0.5743 | 2421 | 1959 | 0.9009 | 0.6463 |
| 1998 | 0.6440 | 0.5773 | 2594 | 2035 | 0.8993 | 0.6451 |
| 1999 | 0.6463 | 0.5807 | 2771 | 2167 | 0.8966 | 0.644 |
| 2000 | 0.6518 | 0.5842 | 2972 | 2201 | 0.8928 | 0.6429 |
| 2001 | 0.6565 | 0.5871 | 3204 | 2251 | 0.8849 | 0.6445 |
| 2002 | 0.6645 | 0.5903 | 3469 | 2279 | 0.8757 | 0.6461 |
| 2003 | 0.6743 | 0.5936 | 3781 | 2398 | 0.8660 | 0.6479 |
| 2004 | 0.6829 | 0.5970 | 4128 | 2525 | 0.8573 | 0.6498 |
| 2005 | 0.6887 | 0.6003 | 4569 | 2659 | 0.8505 | 0.6518 |
| 2006 | 0.6930 | 0.6030 | 5120 | 2857 | 0.8455 | 0.6425 |
| 2007 | 0.6949 | 0.6058 | 5822 | 3059 | 0.8423 | 0.6334 |

| Year | Ratio of working age population to total population | | Labour productivity (Output per labour) | | Ratio of labour force to working age population | |
|------|---|--------|---|-------|---|--------|
| | China | India | China | India | China | India |
| 2008 | 0.6949 | 0.6086 | 6362 | 3137 | 0.8405 | 0.6247 |
| 2009 | 0.6935 | 0.6114 | 6944 | 3365 | 0.8393 | 0.6165 |
| 2010 | 0.6914 | 0.6141 | 7672 | 3632 | 0.8383 | 0.6087 |
| 2011 | 0.6880 | 0.6164 | 8371 | 3816 | 0.8412 | 0.5996 |
| 2012 | 0.6836 | 0.6188 | 8995 | 4017 | 0.8451 | 0.5910 |
| 2013 | 0.6787 | 0.6214 | 9664 | 4231 | 0.8491 | 0.5874 |
| 2014 | 0.6738 | 0.6240 | 10346 | 4501 | 0.8526 | 0.5839 |
| 2015 | 0.6692 | 0.6265 | 11046 | 4818 | 0.8550 | 0.5804 |
| 2016 | 0.6649 | 0.6291 | 11788 | 5166 | 0.8564 | 0.5767 |
| 2017 | 0.6610 | 0.6312 | 12595 | 5494 | 0.8564 | 0.5731 |
| 2018 | 0.6574 | 0.6331 | 13445 | 5827 | 0.8557 | 0.5694 |

Source: Author's calculations based on table 1.

Table 3

Decomposition of the annual growth of the real output of the economy of China, 1990-2018

| Period | Growth of total output (Per cent) | Population growth rate (Per cent) | Change in the ratio of working age population to total population (Per cent) | Increase in labour productivity (Per cent) | Rate of change in participation opportunity (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in demographic component (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in economic component (Per cent) |
|-----------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
| 1990-91 | 8.887 | 1.352 | -0.093 | 7.583 | 0.045 | 1.258 | 7.629 |
| 1991-92 | 13.292 | 1.151 | 0.307 | 11.726 | 0.108 | 1.458 | 11.834 |
| 1992-93 | 12.987 | 0.998 | 0.487 | 11.365 | 0.137 | 1.485 | 11.502 |
| 1993-94 | 12.268 | 0.915 | 0.378 | 10.866 | 0.108 | 1.293 | 10.975 |
| 1994-95 | 10.390 | 0.882 | 0.163 | 9.307 | 0.038 | 1.046 | 9.345 |
| 1995-96 | 9.466 | 0.860 | 0.788 | 7.853 | -0.035 | 1.648 | 7.818 |
| 1996-97 | 8.829 | 0.824 | 0.245 | 7.857 | -0.098 | 1.069 | 7.760 |
| 1997-98 | 7.546 | 0.788 | 0.055 | 6.886 | -0.183 | 0.843 | 6.702 |
| 1998-99 | 7.388 | 0.747 | 0.356 | 6.584 | -0.298 | 1.102 | 6.285 |
| 1999-2000 | 8.150 | 0.703 | 0.844 | 7.027 | -0.423 | 1.547 | 6.603 |
| 2000-01 | 8.010 | 0.663 | 0.715 | 7.518 | -0.885 | 1.378 | 6.632 |
| 2001-02 | 8.738 | 0.631 | 1.221 | 7.937 | -1.051 | 1.852 | 6.886 |
| 2002-03 | 9.563 | 0.606 | 1.459 | 8.611 | -1.113 | 2.066 | 7.498 |
| 2003-04 | 9.632 | 0.590 | 1.265 | 8.786 | -1.009 | 1.855 | 7.777 |
| 2004-05 | 10.792 | 0.580 | 0.853 | 10.153 | -0.794 | 1.433 | 9.359 |
| 2005-06 | 11.973 | 0.572 | 0.610 | 11.389 | -0.597 | 1.181 | 10.792 |

| Period | Growth of total output (Per cent) | Population growth rate (Per cent) | Change in the ratio of working age population to total population (Per cent) | Increase in labour productivity (Per cent) | Rate of change in participation opportunity (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in demographic component (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in economic component (Per cent) |
|------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
| 2006-07 | 13.306 | 0.565 | 0.284 | 12.836 | -0.380 | 0.849 | 12.456 |
| 2007-08 | 9.216 | 0.561 | -0.011 | 8.877 | -0.211 | 0.551 | 8.666 |
| 2008-09 | 8.984 | 0.560 | -0.191 | 8.751 | -0.135 | 0.369 | 8.615 |
| 2009-10 | 10.108 | 0.560 | -0.308 | 9.978 | -0.122 | 0.252 | 9.856 |
| 2010-11 | 9.122 | 0.560 | -0.498 | 8.713 | 0.347 | 0.062 | 9.060 |
| 2011-12 | 7.566 | 0.558 | -0.638 | 7.189 | 0.456 | -0.079 | 7.645 |
| 2012-13 | 7.482 | 0.553 | -0.719 | 7.174 | 0.474 | -0.166 | 7.648 |
| 2013-14 | 7.045 | 0.542 | -0.725 | 6.822 | 0.406 | -0.183 | 7.228 |
| 2014-15 | 6.677 | 0.527 | -0.680 | 6.542 | 0.288 | -0.153 | 6.830 |
| 2015-16 | 6.519 | 0.511 | -0.654 | 6.505 | 0.158 | -0.143 | 6.663 |
| 2016-17 | 6.539 | 0.492 | -0.583 | 6.621 | 0.009 | -0.091 | 6.630 |
| 2017-18 | 6.360 | 0.465 | -0.552 | 6.531 | -0.083 | -0.087 | 6.447 |
| 1990-2018* | 9.173 | 0.69 | 0.156 | 8.499 | -0.173 | 0.846 | 8.326 |

Source: Author's calculations

Remarks: * Average annual growth rate during the period

Table 4

Decomposition of the annual growth of the real output of the economy of India, 1990-2018

| Period | Growth of total output (Per cent) | Population growth rate (Per cent) | Change in the ratio of working age population to total population (Per cent) | Increase in labour productivity (Per cent) | Rate of change in participation opportunity (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in demographic component (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in economic component (Per cent) |
|-----------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
| 1990-91 | 1.051 | 2.040 | 0.237 | -1.214 | -0.012 | 2.277 | -1.226 |
| 1991-92 | 5.337 | 2.003 | 0.284 | 3.025 | 0.025 | 2.287 | 3.051 |
| 1992-93 | 4.641 | 1.971 | 0.339 | 2.265 | 0.067 | 2.310 | 2.331 |
| 1993-94 | 6.447 | 1.943 | 0.414 | 3.975 | 0.115 | 2.357 | 4.089 |
| 1994-95 | 7.301 | 1.919 | 0.490 | 5.055 | -0.163 | 2.409 | 4.892 |
| 1995-96 | 7.278 | 1.895 | 0.409 | 5.132 | -0.158 | 2.304 | 4.974 |
| 1996-97 | 3.970 | 1.869 | 0.475 | 1.795 | -0.169 | 2.344 | 1.626 |
| 1997-98 | 6.001 | 1.840 | 0.533 | 3.804 | -0.176 | 2.373 | 3.628 |
| 1998-99 | 8.476 | 1.806 | 0.578 | 6.270 | -0.177 | 2.383 | 6.093 |
| 1999-2000 | 3.769 | 1.768 | 0.609 | 1.564 | -0.171 | 2.377 | 1.392 |
| 2000-01 | 4.711 | 1.729 | 0.487 | 2.246 | 0.249 | 2.216 | 2.495 |
| 2001-02 | 3.733 | 1.690 | 0.536 | 1.249 | 0.258 | 2.226 | 1.507 |
| 2002-03 | 7.567 | 1.651 | 0.563 | 5.079 | 0.273 | 2.215 | 5.352 |
| 2003-04 | 7.625 | 1.615 | 0.567 | 5.151 | 0.292 | 2.182 | 5.443 |
| 2004-05 | 7.625 | 1.580 | 0.556 | 5.174 | 0.315 | 2.136 | 5.489 |
| 2005-06 | 7.752 | 1.546 | 0.459 | 7.198 | -1.450 | 2.005 | 5.747 |

| Period | Growth of total output (Per cent) | Population growth rate (Per cent) | Change in the ratio of working age population to total population (Per cent) | Increase in labour productivity (Per cent) | Rate of change in participation opportunity (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in demographic component (Per cent) | Growth of total output attributed to change in economic component (Per cent) |
|------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
| 2006-07 | 7.382 | 1.509 | 0.461 | 6.832 | -1.421 | 1.970 | 5.411 |
| 2007-08 | 3.040 | 1.465 | 0.456 | 2.500 | -1.381 | 1.921 | 1.119 |
| 2008-09 | 7.568 | 1.411 | 0.453 | 7.033 | -1.328 | 1.864 | 5.705 |
| 2009-10 | 8.156 | 1.350 | 0.454 | 7.623 | -1.271 | 1.804 | 6.352 |
| 2010-11 | 5.109 | 1.289 | 0.359 | 4.964 | -1.502 | 1.647 | 3.462 |
| 2011-12 | 5.313 | 1.231 | 0.399 | 5.124 | -1.441 | 1.630 | 3.682 |
| 2012-13 | 6.190 | 1.183 | 0.421 | 5.194 | -0.608 | 1.604 | 4.586 |
| 2013-14 | 7.149 | 1.146 | 0.415 | 6.191 | -0.603 | 1.560 | 5.588 |
| 2014-15 | 7.693 | 1.117 | 0.391 | 6.794 | -0.609 | 1.508 | 6.185 |
| 2015-16 | 7.853 | 1.090 | 0.414 | 6.978 | -0.629 | 1.505 | 6.348 |
| 2016-17 | 6.923 | 1.063 | 0.343 | 6.154 | -0.637 | 1.406 | 5.517 |
| 2017-18 | 6.589 | 1.038 | 0.304 | 5.889 | -0.642 | 1.342 | 5.248 |
| 1990-2018* | 6.152 | 1.563 | 0.443 | 4.609 | -0.463 | 2.006 | 4.146 |

Source: Author's calculations

Remarks: * Average annual growth rate during the period.

Table 5

Decomposition of the annual increase in the real output of China, 1990-2018

| Period | Increase in total output (Billion 2010 US \$) | Increase in the total output due to | | | | | |
|-----------|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | | Population growth | Demographic dividend | Increase in labour productivity | Change in participation opportunity | Change in demographic component | Change in economic component |
| 1990-91 | 76.93 | 11.699 | -0.806 | 65.644 | 0.393 | 10.893 | 66.037 |
| 1991-92 | 128.608 | 11.140 | 2.970 | 113.451 | 1.048 | 14.109 | 114.499 |
| 1992-93 | 143.290 | 11.014 | 5.371 | 125.395 | 1.510 | 16.384 | 126.905 |
| 1993-94 | 153.566 | 11.453 | 4.735 | 136.022 | 1.356 | 16.189 | 137.378 |
| 1994-95 | 145.639 | 12.367 | 2.290 | 130.454 | 0.527 | 14.657 | 130.981 |
| 1995-96 | 146.519 | 13.309 | 12.203 | 121.548 | -0.540 | 25.511 | 121.008 |
| 1996-97 | 149.749 | 13.981 | 4.158 | 133.267 | -1.655 | 18.138 | 131.611 |
| 1997-98 | 138.885 | 14.508 | 1.012 | 126.738 | -3.373 | 15.519 | 123.366 |
| 1998-99 | 146.519 | 14.808 | 7.056 | 130.573 | -5.917 | 21.863 | 124.656 |
| 1999-2000 | 174.708 | 15.061 | 18.097 | 150.624 | -9.075 | 33.159 | 141.549 |
| 2000-01 | 186.159 | 15.398 | 16.625 | 174.710 | -20.574 | 32.022 | 154.137 |
| 2001-02 | 220.807 | 15.944 | 30.848 | 200.565 | -26.551 | 46.792 | 174.015 |
| 2002-03 | 264.851 | 16.793 | 40.418 | 238.465 | -30.825 | 57.211 | 207.640 |
| 2003-04 | 293.626 | 17.981 | 38.561 | 267.836 | -30.752 | 56.542 | 237.084 |
| 2004-05 | 364.390 | 19.572 | 28.816 | 342.820 | -26.818 | 48.388 | 316.002 |
| 2005-06 | 453.065 | 21.640 | 23.065 | 430.958 | -22.598 | 44.705 | 408.360 |
| 2006-07 | 571.397 | 24.269 | 12.203 | 551.241 | -16.317 | 36.473 | 534.924 |
| 2007-08 | 442.788 | 26.965 | -0.511 | 426.483 | -10.149 | 26.454 | 416.334 |

| Period | Increase in total output (Billion 2010 US \$) | Increase in the total output due to | | | | | |
|-----------|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | Population growth | Demographic dividend | Increase in labour productivity | Change in participation opportunity | Change in demographic component | Change in economic component |
| 2008-09 | 472.738 | 29.462 | -10.062 | 460.463 | -7.126 | 19.401 | 453.337 |
| 2009-10 | 585.197 | 32.410 | -17.835 | 577.664 | -7.042 | 14.575 | 570.622 |
| 2010-11 | 581.380 | 35.692 | -31.750 | 555.299 | 22.139 | 3.942 | 577.438 |
| 2011-12 | 524.123 | 38.687 | -44.175 | 497.998 | 31.613 | -5.489 | 529.612 |
| 2012-13 | 558.771 | 41.307 | -53.704 | 535.793 | 35.375 | -12.397 | 571.168 |
| 2013-14 | 565.818 | 43.563 | -58.233 | 547.869 | 32.618 | -14.670 | 580.487 |
| 2014-15 | 574.333 | 45.324 | -58.470 | 562.694 | 24.785 | -13.146 | 587.479 |
| 2015-16 | 598.997 | 46.911 | -60.082 | 597.674 | 14.493 | -13.170 | 612.168 |
| 2016-17 | 641.280 | 48.241 | -57.183 | 649.351 | 0.870 | -8.941 | 650.221 |
| 2017-18 | 665.357 | 48.665 | -57.759 | 683.164 | -8.712 | -9.094 | 674.451 |
| 1990-2018 | 9969.490 | 749.775 | 169.994 | 9237.718 | -187.997 | 919.769 | 9049.721 |

Source: Author's calculations

Table 6

Decomposition of the annual increase in the real output of India, 1990-2018

| Period | Increase in total output (Billion 2010 US \$) | Increase in the total output due to | | | | | |
|-----------|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | | Population growth | Demographic dividend | Increase in labour productivity | Change in participation opportunity | Change in demographic component | Change in economic component |
| 1990-91 | 5.364 | 10.408 | 1.211 | -6.196 | -0.059 | 11.619 | -6.254 |
| 1991-92 | 28.121 | 10.554 | 1.494 | 15.939 | 0.134 | 12.048 | 16.073 |
| 1992-93 | 25.704 | 10.913 | 1.879 | 12.543 | 0.369 | 12.792 | 12.912 |
| 1993-94 | 37.740 | 11.376 | 2.423 | 23.269 | 0.671 | 13.800 | 23.940 |
| 1994-95 | 45.787 | 12.034 | 3.074 | 31.702 | -1.022 | 15.108 | 30.680 |
| 1995-96 | 49.093 | 12.784 | 2.758 | 34.617 | -1.065 | 15.542 | 33.551 |
| 1996-97 | 28.323 | 13.335 | 3.390 | 12.806 | -1.208 | 16.726 | 11.598 |
| 1997-98 | 45.004 | 13.797 | 3.998 | 28.530 | -1.321 | 17.795 | 27.209 |
| 1998-99 | 68.351 | 14.560 | 4.659 | 50.558 | -1.426 | 19.219 | 49.132 |
| 1999-2000 | 32.305 | 15.155 | 5.217 | 13.402 | -1.470 | 20.372 | 11.933 |
| 2000-01 | 42.130 | 15.460 | 4.357 | 20.089 | 2.225 | 19.816 | 22.314 |
| 2001-02 | 34.825 | 15.760 | 5.004 | 11.651 | 2.410 | 20.764 | 14.061 |
| 2002-03 | 74.698 | 16.303 | 5.561 | 50.142 | 2.691 | 21.865 | 52.833 |
| 2003-04 | 81.211 | 17.205 | 6.036 | 54.861 | 3.109 | 23.241 | 57.970 |
| 2004-05 | 87.651 | 18.159 | 6.391 | 59.478 | 3.623 | 24.550 | 63.101 |
| 2005-06 | 96.235 | 19.188 | 5.700 | 89.351 | -18.004 | 24.888 | 71.347 |
| 2006-07 | 98.833 | 20.207 | 6.176 | 91.480 | -19.030 | 26.383 | 72.450 |
| 2007-08 | 42.872 | 20.659 | 6.430 | 35.254 | -19.471 | 27.089 | 15.784 |

| Period | Increase in total output (Billion 2010 US \$) | Increase in the total output due to | | | | | |
|-----------|--|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | Population growth | Demographic dividend | Increase in labour productivity | Change in participation opportunity | Change in demographic component | Change in economic component |
| 2008-09 | 112.568 | 20.981 | 6.738 | 104.608 | -19.758 | 27.719 | 84.849 |
| 2009-10 | 131.235 | 21.728 | 7.301 | 122.654 | -20.449 | 29.029 | 102.206 |
| 2010-11 | 87.825 | 22.152 | 6.164 | 85.336 | -25.827 | 28.316 | 59.509 |
| 2011-12 | 96.220 | 22.304 | 7.225 | 92.797 | -26.106 | 29.529 | 66.691 |
| 2012-13 | 118.760 | 22.693 | 8.086 | 99.652 | -11.671 | 30.779 | 87.981 |
| 2013-14 | 146.605 | 23.496 | 8.505 | 126.974 | -12.369 | 32.001 | 114.605 |
| 2014-15 | 169.922 | 24.671 | 8.632 | 150.062 | -13.443 | 33.303 | 136.619 |
| 2015-16 | 187.486 | 26.034 | 9.890 | 166.587 | -15.024 | 35.924 | 151.562 |
| 2016-17 | 177.938 | 27.332 | 8.804 | 158.183 | -16.380 | 36.136 | 141.802 |
| 2017-18 | 181.208 | 28.540 | 8.358 | 161.957 | -17.648 | 36.898 | 144.310 |
| 1990-2018 | 2334.015 | 592.906 | 168.101 | 1748.572 | -175.564 | 761.007 | 1573.008 |

Source: Author's calculations

Table 7

Decomposition of the difference in the annual growth of real output between China and India, 1990-2018.

| Period | Difference in annual growth (per cent) in total output of China and India | Difference in the total output attributed to the difference in | | | | | |
|-----------|---|--|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Population size | Demographic dividend | Labour productivity | Participation opportunity | Demographic component | Economic component |
| 1990-91 | 7.836 | -0.688 | -0.330 | 8.798 | 0.057 | -1.019 | 8.855 |
| 1991-92 | 7.955 | -0.852 | 0.023 | 8.700 | 0.083 | -0.828 | 8.783 |
| 1992-93 | 8.345 | -0.972 | 0.147 | 9.100 | 0.070 | -0.825 | 9.170 |
| 1993-94 | 5.821 | -1.028 | -0.036 | 6.892 | -0.006 | -1.064 | 6.885 |
| 1994-95 | 3.089 | -1.037 | -0.327 | 4.252 | 0.201 | -1.363 | 4.452 |
| 1995-96 | 2.188 | -1.035 | 0.379 | 2.721 | 0.123 | -0.656 | 2.844 |
| 1996-97 | 4.859 | -1.045 | -0.230 | 6.063 | 0.072 | -1.275 | 6.134 |
| 1997-98 | 1.545 | -1.051 | -0.478 | 3.082 | -0.007 | -1.530 | 3.074 |
| 1998-99 | -1.088 | -1.059 | -0.222 | 0.314 | -0.122 | -1.281 | 0.193 |
| 1999-2000 | 4.381 | -1.066 | 0.236 | 5.463 | -0.252 | -0.830 | 5.211 |
| 2000-01 | 3.299 | -1.066 | 0.228 | 5.271 | -1.134 | -0.838 | 4.137 |
| 2001-02 | 5.004 | -1.059 | 0.684 | 6.687 | -1.309 | -0.374 | 5.379 |
| 2002-03 | 1.997 | -1.045 | 0.896 | 3.531 | -1.386 | -0.149 | 2.146 |
| 2003-04 | 2.007 | -1.025 | 0.698 | 3.635 | -1.301 | -0.327 | 2.335 |
| 2004-05 | 3.167 | -1.000 | 0.297 | 4.979 | -1.109 | -0.703 | 3.869 |
| 2005-06 | 4.221 | -0.974 | 0.150 | 4.191 | 0.853 | -0.823 | 5.044 |
| 2006-07 | 5.924 | -0.944 | -0.177 | 6.004 | 1.041 | -1.121 | 7.045 |
| 2007-08 | 6.176 | -0.904 | -0.467 | 6.377 | 1.169 | -1.370 | 7.546 |

| Period | Difference in annual growth (per cent) in total output of China and India | Difference in the total output attributed to the difference in | | | | | |
|------------|---|--|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| | | Population size | Demographic dividend | Labour productivity | Participation opportunity | Demographic component | Economic component |
| 2008-09 | 1.416 | -0.851 | -0.644 | 1.718 | 1.193 | -1.495 | 2.911 |
| 2009-10 | 1.952 | -0.791 | -0.762 | 2.355 | 1.149 | -1.552 | 3.504 |
| 2010-11 | 4.013 | -0.728 | -0.857 | 3.749 | 1.850 | -1.585 | 5.599 |
| 2011-12 | 2.253 | -0.673 | -1.037 | 2.065 | 1.898 | -1.710 | 3.963 |
| 2012-13 | 1.291 | -0.630 | -1.141 | 1.980 | 1.082 | -1.770 | 3.062 |
| 2013-14 | -0.103 | -0.603 | -1.140 | 0.631 | 1.009 | -1.743 | 1.640 |
| 2014-15 | -1.015 | -0.590 | -1.071 | -0.252 | 0.897 | -1.661 | 0.645 |
| 2015-16 | -1.333 | -0.580 | -1.068 | -0.473 | 0.787 | -1.648 | 0.315 |
| 2016-17 | -0.384 | -0.571 | -0.926 | 0.467 | 0.646 | -1.497 | 1.113 |
| 2017-18 | -0.229 | -0.573 | -0.856 | 0.641 | 0.558 | -1.429 | 1.200 |
| 1990-2018* | 3.021 | -0.873 | -0.287 | 3.891 | 0.290 | -1.160 | 4.180 |

Source: Author's calculations

Remarks: * Average annual growth rate

Table 8

Decomposition of the difference in the increase in real output of China and India, 1990-2018.

| Period | Difference in the increase in total output of China and India (Billion 2010 US \$) | Difference in the increase in total output attributed to the difference in | | | | | |
|--------|--|--|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Population size | Demographic dividend | Labour productivity | Participation opportunity | Demographic component | Economic component |
| 1990 | 320 | 195 | 77 | -166 | 214 | 272 | 48 |
| 1991 | 392 | 201 | 79 | -114 | 226 | 280 | 112 |
| 1992 | 492 | 215 | 87 | -60 | 249 | 302 | 189 |
| 1993 | 610 | 228 | 97 | 11 | 274 | 325 | 285 |
| 1994 | 726 | 242 | 107 | 75 | 302 | 349 | 377 |
| 1995 | 825 | 254 | 113 | 125 | 333 | 367 | 458 |
| 1996 | 923 | 266 | 128 | 166 | 364 | 394 | 530 |
| 1997 | 1044 | 272 | 134 | 249 | 390 | 406 | 639 |
| 1998 | 1138 | 278 | 137 | 305 | 418 | 415 | 723 |
| 1999 | 1216 | 286 | 146 | 334 | 450 | 432 | 784 |
| 2000 | 1359 | 290 | 158 | 435 | 476 | 448 | 911 |
| 2001 | 1503 | 293 | 173 | 546 | 491 | 466 | 1037 |
| 2002 | 1689 | 296 | 196 | 695 | 503 | 492 | 1198 |
| 2003 | 1879 | 304 | 230 | 822 | 524 | 534 | 1346 |
| 2004 | 2091 | 311 | 265 | 969 | 546 | 576 | 1515 |
| 2005 | 2368 | 321 | 298 | 1173 | 576 | 619 | 1749 |
| 2006 | 2725 | 332 | 334 | 1400 | 659 | 666 | 2059 |
| 2007 | 3198 | 345 | 367 | 1722 | 763 | 712 | 2485 |

| Period | Difference in the increase in total output of China and India (Billion 2010 US \$) | Difference in the increase in total output attributed to the difference in | | | | | |
|--------|--|--|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| | | Population size | Demographic dividend | Labour productivity | Participation opportunity | Demographic component | Economic component |
| 2008 | 3597 | 343 | 380 | 2025 | 850 | 723 | 2875 |
| 2009 | 3958 | 347 | 393 | 2257 | 961 | 740 | 3218 |
| 2010 | 4412 | 354 | 405 | 2558 | 1095 | 759 | 3653 |
| 2011 | 4905 | 355 | 405 | 2897 | 1249 | 760 | 4146 |
| 2012 | 5333 | 353 | 392 | 3178 | 1410 | 745 | 4588 |
| 2013 | 5773 | 351 | 373 | 3492 | 1557 | 724 | 5049 |
| 2014 | 6192 | 350 | 348 | 3777 | 1718 | 698 | 5495 |
| 2015 | 6597 | 347 | 322 | 4041 | 1887 | 669 | 5928 |
| 2016 | 7008 | 342 | 289 | 4311 | 2066 | 631 | 6377 |
| 2017 | 7471 | 334 | 258 | 4635 | 2245 | 592 | 6880 |
| 2018 | 7956 | 322 | 224 | 4983 | 2428 | 546 | 7411 |

Source: Author's calculations