Generosity during Covid-19 the effect of social distancing and framing on donations in dictator games

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4 August 2020

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Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of prolonged social distancing on generosity by analyzing the responses of 1255 US citizens to dictator games spread out over eight weeks of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the isolation and the negative effects on employment and household finances, individuals became more generous over this time period. There is significant heterogeneity in the effect of additional regressors, such as perceived contagion risk, on the likelihood and amount donated to strangers, family members, or the government. At the same time, significant effects of the position of games with respect to the others highlight the significant role of framing on generous behaviours.

Keywords: Generosity, Dictator Game, Social Preferences, Framing, Altruism, Covid-19

JEL Codes: C71, D63, D64, D71, D91, I14

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1 Introduction

During the Second World-War, dozens of thousands of citizens protected the Jewish from the Holocaust: the so-called "Righteous Among the Nations" bravely put their and their families' lives at risk, and thanks to their altruist neighbours, friends as well as perfect strangers were saved from an atrocious destiny.

In fact, many other circumstances in history have shown how altruism and generosity flourish during hard times, providing strong evidence of the existence of social preferences. According to de Waal (2008), these mechanisms could date back even 60 million years, and they are likely to be linked with empathy feelings in seeing others in difficulty. Story et al. (2015) is also investigating the role of empathy: participants show similar altruistic behaviours in dividing money and pain (electric shocks) with receivers, even if, in the latter case, a larger share of individuals allocate more painful stimuli to themselves. Such altruistic behaviours could also be related to the so-called "warm-glow" effect (Andreoni, 1989) and its feeling of reward in helping others, and with sentiments of fairness and justice.

This paper analyses how generosity has changed during the US lock-down, disentangling altruistic behaviours towards relatives, neighbours, anonymous, and the government (to support social services). In an online experiment, participants from California, New York, and Washington states played four dictator games, each for the type of receiver considered. Results from 8 weeks of lock-down show how generosity towards each category evolved: a positive effect of self-reported concern for the pandemic on amount and likelihood of donations, with an increasingly positive effect of time spent in lock-down as well. The findings of this research are particularly interesting if we consider the simultaneous drop in employment rate and financial resources recorded in the US, on top of the other well known and devastating effects of the pandemic.

Positive effects of the pandemic-related regressors on the likelihood and amount of donations to strangers, family members, or the government are not homogeneous.

Understanding generosity is far from straight forward. As many studies have demonstrated,

individuals behave very differently depending on context (Laury and Taylor, (2008)), their gender (Heinz, (2011)), social distance with others (Bohnet and Frey (1999)) or whether the resources to donate were earned with effort (Cherry (2002)). Leider (2009) focuses on directed altruism in social networks, demonstrating that the former is stronger than rational calculations which take into account reciprocity in future interactions; moreover, in this paper baseline altruism is disentangled from the one directed to friends, highlighting a significant increase in donations in the latter. Our network is made of connections of different intensity with other individuals, such as strangers, neighbours, and relatives: Guala and Filippin (2017) focus on group identity, and how this is a driver in shaping individuals' social preferences.

Generosity and altruism could significantly differ depending on the relationship we have with the receiver, and these behaviours could not exhibit similar dynamics when exposed to exogenous shocks. When facing difficult situations, our generosity could change over time, and in different ways considering the receiver of our altruistic behaviours: this would allow for a dynamically variable concept of generosity, in place of a static vision.

COVID-19 pandemic has been a unique event in recent human history, bringing most countries to adopt lock-down policies and abruptly forcing billions into isolation. The risk of infecting and getting infected increased social distance and possibly the fear of others, many lost their lives, relatives, and friends. The pandemic also dramatically affected the economy of countries, with an unprecedented increase in unemployment rates and shrinking GDP level. This prolonged isolation, and its direct consequences, could have affected social preferences; a situation like a lock-down could indirectly link money and pain, unifying two aspects already investigated by Story et al. (2015). While the media have very frequently reported altruistic behaviours (large donations for hospitals and ventilators, shopping for neighbours in categories at risk), some other events such as stockpiling of goods or examples of little care in preserving the health of the community (not complying to lock-down regulation) could anticipate increasing self-oriented preferences.

Regardless the between-subject nature of this experiment, as in many other papers on generosity participants were required to perform multiple tasks: in line with the rest of the literature (Andreoni and Miller (2002), Guala and Filippin (2017)), the different games have been randomized in order. However, the design of this research is an opportunity to investigate the role of framing on altruistic behaviours. More specifically, perfectly rational answers on the four games should not depend on their order; otherwise, it would mean that some decisions could create a reference point for the other ones. The significant role of framing on attitudes towards monetary allocations is showed in Guala and Filippin (2017).

As second objective, in this paper I am analysing the effect of the different order in which games are played on donations; moreover, I expect that responding to the dictator game on a relative as first sets a reference point for all the following tasks, negatively affecting those donations. This is because, on average, donations towards relatives are much higher than any other category considered.

As an example, let us imagine that a respondent needs to divide funds with an anonymous as first game, and the choice would be a number between 0 and 1000 dollars; in theory, the same range of options would be available in the case the participant played the game towards a relative as first and to an anonymous receiver as second, however, my prior is that in the latter case the range would be reduced from zero up to the donation to the relative, which then becomes a reference point and could negatively impact the donation towards the anonymous receiver. If this is the case, framing would have another significant effect on the investigated altruistic behaviours.

To conclude, the analysis considers the role of some variables reviewed in the literature, such as gender and other demographics, and explores the effect of anxiety on generosity.

The next sections of the paper are organized as follows: Method summarizes the design of the experiment, sampling methods, participants' characteristics, procedure, and a description of the main variables of interest. Results are divided into descriptive and inferential statistics, and the main findings and concluding remarks and possible future developments

are then presented in the Discussion.

2 Methodology

1355 subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk for an online experiment. Each participant was paid .30 dollars, and recruitment has been run between Monday and Wednesday for eight weeks starting on the 30th of March. To best observe how individuals with similar backgrounds were reacting to COVID-19 pandemic across the weeks, the recruitment was focused on three states in the United States: New York, Washington, and California. These three states also had very different pandemic situations in terms of magnitude and trends.

The original intention was, for the desired power of .80, being able to detect effects between .30 and .35 SDs, in line with other dictator game experiments (Engel (2011)): Across the eight weeks, a total of 2000 participants were recruited, which decreased to 1255 after the cleaning process. The final sample corresponds to 156 observations per week on average, in line with the initial target.

Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the sample investigated: compared to the population of reference from the three states considered, age categories 25-34 and 35-44 are over-represented, while lower percentages of individuals above 65 years old participated in the experiment [1] (as it frequently happens with M Turk data collections (McDuffie, 2019). In terms of educational attainments, the share of the population without a high-school diploma is under-represented as more than 70 percent of the sample holds at least a bachelor's degree. To conclude, evaluating differences between the employment status when completing the test and one month before there is a 4.7 percentage points net shift from working to unemployment positions, in line with the drastic increase in unemployment recorded during COVID-19 pandemic.

Beyond the information related to participants, this research focuses on the three states, Cal-

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[1]The age category "Over 75", four participants, has been merged with the larger one "65-74" years old.

ifornia New York and Washington: additional tables and figures in the Appendix describe the evolution of employment (and related benefits) and the pandemic, between the end of March and end of May.

As a first task, participants were required to complete four dictator games, administered in random order; each game had a similar wording: "Imagine that today you have been given 1000 dollars. How much of this amount are you willing to give to [...]".

However, the four games differed in the hypothetical receiver: an anonymous person X, the current government ("to support public services"), one of the relatives, or one neighbor. These four decisions were all independent, and an integer number between 0 and 1000 could be typed as an answer.

After the dictator games, participants were required to fill in a questionnaire on socio-demographics and attitudes and feelings. In particular information on gender, age, current and previous (one month before) employment status, education, marital status was collected; in the second part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about their feelings in the previous week, towards COVID-19, the current government and daily tasks (related to the ability to manage workload and home duties).

To conclude, the dataset obtained online was enriched with state-specific information on COVID-19 (number of total deaths and cases, and their percentage increase from the previous day [2]) and unemployment (unemployment insurance weekly claims and insured unemployment rates [3]).

The following results section is based on two dependent variables: the amount donated for each dictator game, continuous variables with a range of 0 to 1000 (dollars), and the probability of donating; in this latter case, the dependent variable is a dummy which equals to one for a positive donation. Furthermore, several regressors will be considered to infer the

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[2]Information was obtained by the official websites of each state:
Washington https://www.coronavirus.wa.gov/ ,
California https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/Immunization/ncov2019.aspx,
New York State https://coronavirus.health.ny.gov/home
[3]UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Employment Training Administration https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp

dynamic effect of the pandemic on generosity: total number and daily percentage changes in deaths and cases, as well as the week in which the test was completed and the state of residence. On this note, percentage change variables take into account the time of the daily announcement for a certain state: this is because doing the experiment before or after a certain announcement (a positive or negative change of the situation) could impact the respondents' answers. The state-specific unemployment rate and amount of individuals receiving benefits, together with answers on financial security and employment (current and one month before) will be considered as independent variables; moreover, the information collected in the questionnaire will be used to investigate the role of the concern towards coronavirus, trust in the government, moods, and demographics (gender, age, marital status, and education).

To conclude the description of the variables, the regressions will take into account when a certain dictator game was completed compared to the other three, and a dummy variable to consider the cases in which the game on relatives was played first.

3   Results

Descriptive Statistics

Data collected across the eight weeks show how participants exhibited diverse generosity behaviours towards each of the receivers: Figure 1 summarizes mean donations in the four different dictator games.

As expected, given a stronger emotional bond, donations to relatives are strikingly higher than any other dictator game considered: on average, participants are willing to give them almost one-third of the total amount received. The other three dictator games exhibit average donations closer to each other, with anonymous receivers getting the least amount, then neighbours and financing public services through the government being the second-highest category. How participants discriminated between receivers is also reflected in the cumu-

lative donations, showed in Figure 2: while around 10 percent of the sample donated 0 to relatives, increasing up to 1000 dollars, around half did not share anything with anonymous and 40 percent towards neighbours and government (which exhibit similar patterns).

Respondents from the three states gave different answers (Figure 3), with New York donations to anonymous receivers as the lowest average overall, Washington residents particularly generous towards neighbours (higher average than the ones for the government) and relatives, and California more supportive with anonymous and the government (compared to the other two states).

Considering demographic information, women appeared to donate less than men on average, in all dictator games except the one on relatives: Figure 4 shows the discrepancy in donations by gender, which will be further discussed in the inferential statistics section.

To conclude descriptive statistics, it is crucial to focus on the dynamics of donations across the eight weeks of investigation: while the time passed, the coronavirus pandemic was becoming more burdensome in the US, and citizens were in lock-down for an increasing amount of time. Figure 5 shows how donations changed over time, providing preliminary insights into the researcher's hypotheses.

Overall, all four mean donations increased between the first and the eight weeks, following similar patterns even if with different gradients: while donations increase has been flatter for relatives, dollars corresponded to anonymous more than doubled in two months, and doubled in case of dictator games on neighbours and government.

Inferential Statistics

In this section, results from regressions will be grouped considering the four dictator games, each in a different subsection: The main tables will contain the independent variables relevant to evaluate my hypotheses, however, a brief final subsection will describe the main findings on the other regressors.

To analyse results from the different experiments, a robust heteroskedastic OLS regression is run for measuring the impact of the independent variables on the amount donated. List

(2007) allows for dictators to take money from receivers, demonstrating that fewer agents are willing to donate in this case than the standard case: for this reason, I also run Tobit regressions to consider the possibility of censored negative replies from participants.

Figure 2 also showed that answers from the experiments are in line with findings in the rest of the literature on dictator games, with a large share of participant giving zero to the receiver: for this reason, a quantile regression has been performed, and the following tables report effects of the first (only for relatives, there is no variation in the other games), second and third quartiles. To conclude, the last row of the results tables shows the average marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of donating (logit).

Dictator Game towards Anonymous Receiver

Table 2 summarizes the main findings from the dictator game with an anonymous receiver. The ordinal variable on being concerned from Covid-19 has no significant effects, as well as the daily percentage change in deaths. At the same time, there is a significant positive effect of the weeks following the first one on the amount donated: in both OLS and Tobit regressions there is a positive trend in the increase in donation, reaching its peak on the last week (an increase of 105 dollars on average, according to OLS results). None of the variables related to which measure the "Covid-19" effect has an impact on the probability of donating towards anonymous receivers.

Dictator Game towards a Neighbour Receiver

In Table 3, results from regressions show the effects of independent variables on the amount donated, and the probability of donating, to a neighbor receiver. Considering the statement "Covid-19 is concerning", compared to "Strongly Disagree" the other answers do not bring significant changes in the amount donated; however, logit regression shows a significant increase in the probability of donating, in all categories.

This effect is particularly strong for those who selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree", with a (1%) significant increase in the probability of 48 and 55 percentage points.

At the same time, playing in the weeks after the first one significantly increases the amount

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donated: this is showed by both OLS and Tobit regressions, with all weeks significantly higher than the first one. The amount donated increases across the period of analysis, even if not always in a monotonic way: in fact, in both regressions there is a small drop in the increase in week 7. From the fourth week onwards, the positive effect is also significant at .5 and .75 quantiles, with the latter showing larger effects. Probability of donating also increased compared to the first week: from 19 percentage points more in week two, up to 35 in week 8.

Dictator Game towards a Relative Receiver

The main results on donations towards a relative receiver are summarized in Table 4. Also in this case, self-reporting being concerned of COVID-19 increase the amount donated (both OLS and Tobit have significant results for "Agree" and "Strongly Agree"), and considering quantile regressions it seems this effect is concentrated in the high end of the distribution of the donations (.75 quantile is significant for both the options highlighted before).

One finding which is uncommon to the other dictator games is the effect of the percentage change in deaths on the amount donated: for high amounts (Q.75), a positive change significantly increases donations by around 3 dollars, on average.

Considering the week after the first one, for small donations, week 3 has a significant positive effect, while for large donations the last week has it; in this latter case, also the probability of donating has a 23 percentage points increase.

Dictator Game towards the Government as Receiver

Considering the dictator game towards the government (to support public services), Table 5 shows how being concerned about COVID-19 is scarcely affecting the dependent variables: selecting "Strongly Agree" is the only option which (5%) significantly increases the amount donated (only according to the Tobit regression). It also enhances the likelihood of responding with a positive donation (43 percentage points increase, 5% significant).

The percentage change in deaths does not bring significant effects, which instead remains for the weeks following the first one: in this case, for OLS regression, the third, fifth and eight

have an increase in donations, and Tobit counts the fourth and seventh as well among the significant ones.

As for quantile regressions, for the second quartile weeks, sixth and eight show a positive effect in donations, and considering the logit fourth and eight have a significant impact on rising the likelihood of donating.

Game Ordering

Focusing on the effect of the position in which a dictator game is played compared to the others, Table 2 considers donations to anonymous: playing the version on relatives first does not significantly affect quantity nor probability of donating, instead not responding on the anonymous game first significantly reduces the amount donated to this category of receivers. In particular, playing this game as second brings the lowest amount donated, as well as a significant reduction in the probability of donating.

Similar conclusions can be made when considering a neighbour as receivers: Table 3 shows how playing the dictator on relatives as first significantly reduced the amount donated to a neighbour, both according to the OLS (-29.09 dollars) and the Tobit; at the same time, different positions of this game does not significantly change the amount donated (except for playing this as third compared to first, significantly positive in the Tobit regression); however, second and third positions significantly increase the likelihood of a positive donation by nine percentage points (compared to playing it first).

To conclude, Tables 4 and 5 highlight the differences of the games towards a relative and the government compared to the first two discussed: in both cases, the ordering does not bring significant effects, and the same is true for having a relative receiver in the first game.

Other Regressors

Tables 6 and 7 contain the effects of the other regressors on the dependent variables, on which the literature on dictator games is widely focusing on.

Considering gender, the different regressions show no differences in the probability of donating; however, there is a significant reduction in the amount corresponded to the receiver in

case of female respondents; this is shown in the OLS, but only for anonymous, government and neighbor games (not significant effects of gender in the treatment about relatives). This result is confirmed by Tobit regression only for the dictator towards the government.

Compared to single respondents, who are married or in a domestic relationship donated more to anonymous and neighbor, and in the latter case, the likelihood of donating increases as well.

A variable that has a strong significant effect across different games and regressions was the extent to which the respondents agreed to the statement: "The current government is credible."

Compared to who selected the option "Strongly Disagree," agreeing or strongly agreeing to increase the amount OLS, Tobit, and quantile regressions) and the probability of donating not only towards the government but to anonymous and a neighbour as well. At the opposite, the answers on the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family" does not bring significant effects on the outcome variables, except for a decrease in the probability of donating to a neighbour if the answer was "Strongly Agree."

Living in different states brings some significant effects: donations from Washington are significantly higher if towards a neighbour (OLS, Tobit, quantile .5 and .75) and government (Tobit), while for small amounts being from New York State has a significant and negative effect. For the probability of donating, being from Washington significantly enhances the likelihood in all except neighbour dictator games.

Age also has an impact: compared to the category 18-24, 35 to 44 and 45 to 54 bring a reduction in the amount donated towards anonymous and the government (OLS and Tobit, for the latter also the quantile .5), while for the neighbour game only the first of these two categories has an impact. "45-54" category also reduces the likelihood of donating towards the government and its public services.

Among the employment and financial-related variables, higher unemployment rates bring a (small, compared to the effects discussed for the Covid-19 related regressors) significant

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reduction in donations towards neighbours (OLS, Tobit, and .75 quantile).

A broad effect of self-reported anxiety is visible across the inferential results: strongly agreeing on "Overall, in the last week I felt anxious" significantly increases amounts donated to anonymous, and also the lower categories have a positive effect on other dictator games (neighbour and government). Second and third quartile regressions also show significant increases in donations, as well as there is a positive effect on the probability of donating to anonymous, relatives, and government.

Overall, regressors show significant effects on donations towards a relative very rarely (none of them in OLS and Tobit, considering the variables mentioned in this sub-section).

4 Discussion

The results of this paper show how COVID-19 and related lock-down have a broad, significant effect on generous behaviours; self-reported concern for the pandemic has a positive impact on amount and likelihood of donations, and across the eight weeks of lock-down investigated there is an even more substantial and increasingly positive effect.

This finding shows the dynamic variation of generous behaviours, and it is particularly interesting considering the simultaneous decrease in employment and financial resources recorded in the three states analysed.

The effects of the main regressors are not homogeneous across the various dictator games: concern for COVID-19 is not significant for donations towards anonymous but instead has an effect on the amount directed to relatives and the government, as well as increases the probability of donating to a neighbour and the government. Considering the weeks, the results are more similar across games, and in some cases, monotonic increases are observable. Findings of the game towards a relative are especially important since regressions show that almost all the other independent variables, in this case, are not significant; donations towards relatives probably depend on much deeper social dynamics, built across years of relation-

ship, and these aspects are probably not captured by the regressors considered. Regressors on COVID-19 show positive effects on donations, however, with differences to the other games.

For instance, the percentage change in deaths is not a significant regressor in general, with one interesting exception: for high donations towards relatives, it has a positive effect on the amount donated. High donations could indicate a positive bond with relatives, and intuitively a negative context in terms of deaths could trigger empathy sentiments and the need to protect who is part of the family.

Overall, the three variables used to capture the effects of pandemic highlight the positive role it has on generosity, even if further research would be needed to understand the mechanism behind this effect. While the self-reported level of concern could relate to the sentiment of empathy described in de Waal (2008), it is more complex to infer how a prolonged lock-down could gradually enhance donations. In a sense, policies adopted during the pandemic are a different form of social distancing as intended in the dictator game literature so far (Hoffman et al. (1996), Bohnet and Frey (1999); in this research, it appears that the dispositional knowledge on altruism and social preferences do not decrease with the increasing length (and strength, in case of more severe lock-down rules applied over time) of social distance. This result is not in line with Hoffman et al.

Considering the relative position of games, and the role of donating towards a relative before other categories, results show significant results. Not playing the game towards an anonymous receiver as first reduces the amount and probability of donating, and if a neighbour is considered after a relative, there is a negative effect on the average donation. This finding demonstrates how individuals could end up creating reference points depending on how tasks are framed, which would challenge hypotheses of perfectly rational and consistent social preferences.

The relation between anxiety and generosity is not widely investigated in the literature; however, this paper shows a strong positive role of this regressor across the four dictator

games. At the same time, findings on gender show higher altruism from men (but not in the case of a relative receiver), which is not in line with Heinz (2011) and Selten and Ockenfels (1996). A possible explanation could be provided by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), which show how men are more generous when this has cheap consequences. With respect to age, it is possible that the two categories "34-44" and "45-54" are consistently donating less than the others because they have family members (children) financially relying on them.

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Tables and Figures

Variables	Percentage	Variables	Percentage
Gender		Age	
Males	50.62%	18-24	14.84%
Females	48.27%	25-34	42.19%
Non-Binary	1.05%	35-44	19.40%
Other	0.07%	45-54	12.30%
		55-64	8.98%
		65-74	2.02%
Education		75+	0.26%
Some high school no diploma	0.58%		
Trade/technical/vocational	2.66%		
High-school graduate diploma	7.66%		
Some college credit no degree	13.26%		
Professional degree	1.62%		
Degree level	74.20%		
Employment		Employment 1 month before	
Employed	57.13%	Employed	61.37%
Self-employed	16.61%	Self-employed	17.07%
Homemaker	4.36%	Homemaker	4.36%
Student	6.91%	Student	7.17%
Out of work (looking for)	8.93%	Out of work (looking for)	5.73%
Out of work (not looking for)	3.32%	Out of work (not looking for)	1.95%
Unable to work	2.02%	Unable to work	1.63%
Military Retired	0.20%	Military Retired	0.20%
Other (please specify)	0.52%	Other (please specify)	0.52%

Notes: Number of observations 1355

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
Concerned by Covid-19					
Disagree	82.43	125.50	28.12	101.66	.11
	(53.63)	(101.74)	(53.18)	(95.34)	(.25)
Neither Agree nor Disagree	21.75	32.84	9.21	71.77	-.06
	(41.76)	(95.33)	(37.93)	(71.80)	(.25)
Agree	12.38	39.07	11.96	14.72	.05
	(38.91)	(92.97)	(37.03)	(66.59)	(.24)
Strongly Agree	9.38	43.83	13.88	12.15	.07
	(39.32)	(93.76)	(38.31)	(67.07)	(.25)
Percentage Change Deaths	-0.13	-0.78	-.10	-0.52	-.00
	(0.44)	(0.93)	(.18)	(.39)	(.00)
Week					
2nd	41.58	64.63	-1.06	22.05	.09
	(23.98)	(42.58)	(8.91)	(27.00)	(.08)
3rd	53.9*	59.62	-.38	19.28	.03
	(27.40)	(48.55)	(9.29)	(24.10)	(.09)
4th	71.51*	105.58*	6.11	38.82	.13
	(34.80)	(59.93)	(10.62)	(48.44)	(.12)
5th	85.66**	106.94*	4.19	47.61	.07
	(33.41)	(57.90)	(11.66)	(32.16)	(.11)
6th	78.78**	124.78**	9.43	49.14	.16
	(37.24)	(62.99)	(11.41)	(45.65)	(.12)
7th	67.99*	95.96	8.18	60.95	.11
	(31.72)	(55.95)	(12.17)	(37.15)	(.11)
8th	105.12*	149.21**	10.11	47.78	.16
	(38.42)	(63.26)	(14.88)	(47.77)	(.12)
Relatives Game First	-5.67	-3.71	1.33	-3.10	.02
	(9.95)	(15.87)	(3.53)	(12.71)	(.03)
Game Position					
2nd	-31.79*	-59.7**	-8.68	-36.62	-.11**
	(14.17)	(21.44)	(5.90)	(24.68)	(.04)
3rd	-30.84*	-44.12**	-5.76	-34.50	-.04
	(13.56)	(19.97)	(4.92)	(21.05)	(.04)
4th	-25.55	-39.81*	-4.25	-25.07	.06
	(14.50)	(21.44)	(7.16)	(21.10)	(.04)

Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family ", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: ∗: 5%; ∗∗: 1%. Observations: 1245.

Table 2: Anonymous Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Table 3, Neighbour: Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating					
Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
Concerned by Covid-19					
Disagree	83.16	251.54	44.62	177.59	.41*
	(60.06)	(149.95)	(90.68)	(108.65)	(.71)
Neither Agree nor Disagree	71.30	238.77	63.09	149.05	.39**
	(53.33)	(145.83)	(57.09)	(104.08)	(.15)
Agree	63.21	244.41	51.03	106.00	.48**
	(51.17)	(144.61)	(54.17)	(109.23)	(.15)
Strongly Agree	65.29	258.67	65.21	104.32	.55**
	(52.17)	(144.90)	(52.28)	(105.43)	(.15)
Percentage Change Deaths	.75	.60	-.03	.40	.00
	(.49)	(.85)	(.35)	(.43)	(.00)
Week					
2nd	79.14**	128.82**	36.13	53.98	.19**
	(25.65)	(40.89)	(18.94)	(28.35)	(.08)
3rd	95.00**	135.9**	40.38	52.62	.18*
	(29.54)	(46.54)	(21.30)	(30.62)	(.08)
4th	126.09**	193.45**	53.57*	87.00*	.28**
	(39.99)	(60.00)	(25.80)	(38.30)	(.10)
5th	135.43**	198.90**	69.38**	108.05**	.26**
	(37.00)	(56.55)	(23.70)	(36.39)	(.10)
6th	139.58**	221.07**	64.48*	119.76**	.33**
	(41.21)	(61.72)	(25.42)	(37.46)	(.10)
7th	109.50**	158.81**	54.30*	70.8*	.21*
	(34.11)	(53.52)	(21.77)	(29.87)	(.10)
8th	161.34**	243.88**	68.60**	122.64**	.35**
	(40.97)	(60.50)	(26.45)	(38.22)	(.10)
Relatives Game First	-29.09**	-42.54**	-7.41	-24.88	-.04
	(11.50)	(16.21)	(9.24)	(16.91)	(.30)
Game Position					
2nd	14.83	32.88	9.26	20.94	.09*
	(13.38)	(19.62)	(8.80)	(20.98)	(.40)
3rd	27.31	49.02*	9.75	14.34	.09*
	(14.37)	(20.30)	(7.03)	(16.22)	(.37)
4th	12.52	25.87	-2.38	6.04	.06
	(14.09)	(20.13)	(10.63)	(20.84)	(.04)

Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family ", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: *: 5%; **: 1%. Observations: 1245.

Table 3: Neighbour Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.25)	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
Concerned by Covid-19						
Disagree	146.28	251.64	47.16	93.18	236.00	.24
	(87.34)	(142.22)	(68.95)	(123.59)	(150.91)	(.24)
Neither Agree nor Disagree	140.87	235.49	21.02	112.13	258.47	.15
	(81.73)	(138.17)	(61.67)	(128.84)	(136.69)	(.23)
Agree	167.70*	281.32*	55.38	143.44	270.65*	.28
	(77.58)	(134.87)	(59.38)	(116.55)	(115.14)	(.23)
Strongly Agree	233.87**	357.64**	94.74	201.36	350.89**	.33
	(78.73)	(135.61)	(60.09)	(114.18)	(119.39)	(.23)
Percentage Change Deaths	1.17	1.19	.16	.91	3.05*	.00
	(.98)	(1.09)	(.81)	(1.55)	(1.43)	(.00)
Week						
2nd	36.16	51.32	48.53	45.87	123.60	.13
	(51.67)	(57.61)	(32.40)	(41.34)	(79.45)	(.10)
3rd	72.66	91.01	80.57**	68.06	164.11	.15
	(58.30)	(64.69)	(31.81)	(61.56)	(90.05)	(.10)
4th	102.58	133.59	99.51	122.18	193.65	.22
	(74.87)	(81.56)	(55.75)	(87.54)	(110.40)	(.12)
5th	82.49	107.57	81.02	105.76	168.71	.20
	(70.71)	(77.85)	(53.47)	(86.36)	(89.06)	(.12)
6th	81.89	112.03	69.27	113.66	168.04	.22
	(74.99)	(82.46)	(59.50)	(92.37)	(104.50)	(.12)
7th	46.92	56.44	52.57	82.73	87.32	.11
	(69.98)	(77.48)	(52.27)	(76.63)	(116.76)	(.12)
8th	115.98	145.34	83.27	110.48	235.66*	.23*
	(73.85)	(80.99)	(51.40)	(81.12)	(109.17)	(.12)
Game Position						
2nd	-2.27	3.24	1.05	-10.09	-18.65	.04
	(21.79)	(23.62)	(17.12)	(27.31)	(47.54)	(.03)
3rd	-5.05	1.58	9.17	-11.12	5.00	.04
	(22.99)	(24.78)	(14.80)	(23.50)	(52.39)	(.25)
4th	-5.30	-2.06	21.07	-3.74	-16.03	.03
	(20.81)	(22.59)	(9.40)	(30.74)	(32.76)	(.02)

*Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family ", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: *: 5%; **: 1%. Observations: 1245.*

Table 4: Relative Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
Concerned by Covid-19					
Disagree	129.62	241.66	5.99	170.57	.20
	(72.48)	(134.27)	(94.43)	(125.14)	(.22)
Neither Agree nor Disagree	114.36	236.05	21.39	114.74	.22
	(58.48)	(125.42)	(94.61)	(119.32)	(.20)
Agree	103.61	235.81	28.11	84.09	.32
	(54.63)	(122.84)	(86.62)	(105.29)	(.20)
Strongly Agree	107.55	265.14*	45.21	83.66	0.43*
	(55.49)	(123.13)	(88.83)	(106.74)	(.20)
Percentage Change Deaths	-.07	-.14	.04	-.78	.00
	(.62)	(1.01)	(.46)	(1.13)	(.00)
Week					
2nd	40.70	79.31	43.23	38.09	.14
	(29.63)	(45.96)	(22.95)	(41.62)	(.08)
3rd	68.64*	107.31*	45.63	54.35	.13
	(33.95)	(52.90)	(25.18)	(37.29)	(.09)
4th	84.68	150.07*	56.43	40.36	0.23*
	(46.84)	(68.54)	(36.05)	(46.53)	(.11)
5th	101.4*	155.16*	53.35	87.02	.18
	(42.66)	(64.45)	(34.92)	(47.60)	(.11)
6th	74.67	133.74	59.26*	63.24	.21
	(46.71)	(69.36)	(29.94)	(55.16)	(.11)
7th	69.52	120.16*	47.33	56.48	.16
	(40.07)	(61.75)	(29.59)	(48.00)	(.10)
8th	124.35**	200.18**	77.09*	80.68	.28**
	(45.02)	(66.83)	(34.89)	(52.90)	(.10)
Relatives Game First	-19.25	-25.30	-4.23	1.60	-.02
	(12.20)	(17.56)	(9.31)	(21.65)	(.03)
Game Position					
2nd	-1.26	-4.30	-5.37	3.01	-.01
	(16.14)	(22.28)	(13.30)	(22.33)	(.04)
3rd	-12.27	-18.56	-10.01	-11.01	.00
	(16.00)	(21.77)	(10.60)	(23.90)	(.04)
4th	14.38	18.11	-3.46	12.63	.00
	(17.31)	(23.60)	(11.05)	(32.44)	(.04)

Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: ∗: 5%; ∗∗: 1%. Observations: 1245.

Table 5: Government Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Variables	Anonymous			Neighbour			Relative			Government		
	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit
Weekly benefits	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Unemp. Rate	-2.78	-4.61	.00	-4.11*	-6.46**	.00	-2.95	-3.90	.00	-.74	-1.65	.00
	(1.58)	(2.52)	(.56)	(1.81)	(2.58)	(.00)	(2.89)	(3.07)	(.00)	(2.15)	(2.92)	(.00)
Employment												
Self-Employed	47.89	64.68	.05	-7.36	-6.50	-.01	-2.44	-1.85	.02	30.21	36.40	.13
	(35.38)	(42.67)	(.06)	(33.82)	(40.31)	(.32)	(38.90)	(41.38)	(.05)	(32.94)	(39.48)	(.35)
Looking for Work	33.48	44.83	.01	14.45	26.02	.24	116.34**	130.63**	.08*	-1.25	2.70	.13
	(33.41)	(45.87)	(.07)	(26.10)	(37.26)	(.34)	(40.37)	(42.70)	(.04)	(26.76)	(37.43)	(.33)
Out of Work	-30.80	-36.30	.00	-43.41	-73.21	-.44	-23.34	-14.11	.05	-38.60	-56.32	-.17
	(23.06)	(46.32)	(.09)	(26.39)	(49.03)	(.45)	(54.51)	(57.82)	(.05)	(32.89)	(57.25)	(.50)
Homemaker	-64.39	-211.17**	-.56**	-95.62*	-239.28**	-16.44**	-43.68	-92.75	-.35	-74.11	-158.08	-2.38
	(45.47)	(80.99)	(.02)	(40.40)	(77.10)	(1.06)	(62.60)	(78.17)	(.24)	(57.10)	(95.51)	(1.52)
Student	51.09	113.33*	.25**	46.24	73.09	.79	135.27**	162.66**	.13**	7.17	38.15	1.14
	(34.25)	(54.53)	(.07)	(34.50)	(51.81)	(.59)	(50.29)	(54.58)	(.03)	(40.01)	(60.87)	(.62)
Military Retired	-97.85**	-	-	-51.22	-42.17	.24	90.05	108.43	-	51.16	29.88	-.57
	(28.78)	-	-	(35.83)	(86.00)	(1.23)	(94.52)	(91.22)	-	(117.48)	(217.04)	(1.32)
Other	-29.81	-50.43	.08	-75.69	-108.09	-.62	-19.74	-27.03	-.02	-87.57*	-107.13	-.56
	(33.88)	(57.37)	(.11)	(46.53)	(66.71)	(.54)	(67.48)	(74.98)	(.08)	(35.45)	(63.39)	(.74)
Empl. 1 month												
Self-Employed	-20.04	-16.78	.04	39.64	52.75	.39	34.08	34.20	-.01	28.87	35.60	.19
	(33.97)	(41.20)	(.05)	(32.71)	(38.84)	(.31)	(37.82)	(40.01)	(.05)	(32.76)	(32.29)	(.34)
Looking for Work	-57.01	-112.41*	-.14	-39.34	-81.20	-.71	-86.06	-108.26*	-.19	-35.70	-95.44*	-.93*
	(33.38)	(50.70)	(.08)	(30.42)	(46.11)	(.40)	(48.59)	(53.87)	(.10)	(30.74)	(46.54)	(.39)
Out of Work	9.40	-19.70	.10	-2.04	-33.05	-.57	-45.45	-74.36	-.17	31.28	36.97	.00
	(29.63)	(61.26)	(.13)	(26.66)	(56.61)	(.57)	(70.60)	(79.66)	(.10)	(48.73)	(74.31)	(.04)
Homemaker	26.46	115.39	.39**	66.64	176.15*	15.81**	66.25	95.94	.06	47.17	108.53	1.98
	(49.33)	(82.11)	(.02)	(43.14)	(77.01)	(1.09)	(63.93)	(77.90)	(.05)	(57.51)	(91.54)	(1.50)
Student	-68.63*	-141.43**	-.31**	-77.69*	-124.88**	-1.04	-77.60	-91.80	-.19	-41.74	-87.27	-1.30*
	(31.92)	(52.53)	(.09)	(31.80)	(48.88)	(.57)	(45.30)	(50.03)	(.15)	(39.19)	(60.92)	(.60)
Military Retired	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	100.12*	138.68*	.12	145.36*	192.28**	.98	189.94*	203.30*	.03	182.39**	221.33**	.93
	(50.29)	(69.17)	(.11)	(59.84)	(72.60)	(.70)	(83.17)	(89.55)	(.06)	(50.04)	(70.72)	(.90)
Anxiety												
2.00	9.79	40.54	.10	37.81	58.84	.06*	23.00	28.62	.04	37.39	80.72*	.16*
	(21.61)	(37.17)	(.65)	(23.06)	(35.44)	(.06)	(40.06)	(45.59)	(.05)	(25.28)	(40.43)	(.07)
3.00	23.43	62.95	.16**	44.53	68.98*	.11**	8.30	17.85	.07	58.7*	108.32**	.20**
	(22.35)	(37.39)	(.06)	(23.28)	(35.16)	(.06)	(39.22)	(44.38)	(.05)	(27.32)	(42.04)	(.07)
4.00	39.78	80.45*	.15**	60.58*	88.16	.11**	21.13	31.91	.08	60.44*	106.65**	.18**
	(22.72)	(37.32)	(.06)	(24.13)	(35.74)	(.06)	(38.96)	(44.07)	(.04)	(26.85)	(41.38)	(.06)
5.00	54.70*	94.75*	.13*	77.98**	105.76*	.09*	36.51	52.03	.10*	96.57**	155.13**	.20**
	(26.05)	(41.71)	(.67)	(26.88)	(39.50)	(.07)	(42.99)	(48.38)	(.05)	(30.22)	(45.21)	(.07)
Financial Security												
2.00	-9.40	-8.92	.03	-15.62	8.42	.12*	-46.82	-43.83	.03	-17.66	-4.21	.05
	(27.73)	(45.40)	(.07)	(32.92)	(48.53)	(.08)	(50.17)	(55.34)	(.05)	(34.20)	(51.71)	(.07)
3.00	-9.30	8.74	.11	-17.99	14.92	.19*	-75.90	-74.49	.03	5.12	28.90	.12
	(27.83)	(44.37)	(.07)	(32.35)	(47.21)	(.07)	(49.49)	(54.52)	(.05)	(34.89)	(51.26)	(.07)
4.00	-5.43	3.63	.08	-21.46	-4.58	.12*	-75.94	-77.61	.01	2.99	20.07	.08
	(27.43)	(43.49)	(.07)	(31.88)	(46.53)	(.07)	(48.15)	(52.77)	(.05)	(33.83)	(49.98)	(.07)
5.00	-.66	5.21	.05	-12.29	7.03	.11*	-76.70	-83.72	-.02	-7.45	-1.00	.04
	(31.80)	(48.95)	(.07)	(35.80)	(51.00)	(.07)	(51.30)	(56.01)	(.05)	(37.72)	(54.77)	(.07)
Gov. Credible												
2.00	-4.66	-8.57	-.02	-15.37	-24.39	-.03	-33.94	-32.64	.00	-12.51	-10.56	.01
	(14.80)	(25.21)	(.05)	(17.09)	(25.13)	(.04)	(27.61)	(29.87)	(.03)	(15.51)	(24.95)	(.04)
3.00	-11.80	-4.12	.05	-21.72	-16.51	.05*	-36.48	-30.33	.03	12.93	35.19	.08
	(14.29)	(23.93)	(.05)	(16.39)	(24.00)	(.05)	(28.62)	(31.11)	(.03)	(16.90)	(25.81)	(.05)
4.00	49.59**	103.01**	.24**	46.50**	84.04**	.21	-.12	18.77	.11**	83.23**	143.97**	.27**
	(15.49)	(24.03)	(.05)	(17.16)	(23.63)	(.04)	(28.03)	(29.92)	(.03)	(18.29)	(25.95)	(.04)
5.00	77.63**	133.38**	.23**	57.68*	98.05**	.22	-18.16	-.32	.11**	102.70**	164.58**	.28**
	(27.26)	(37.02)	(.06)	(26.01)	(32.98)	(.05)	(37.52)	(39.80)	(.04)	(31.64)	(38.02)	(.05)
Relatives Harmed												
2.00	12.68	-.09	-.06	-21.69	-60.31	-.18	10.89	34.64	.03	-41.37	-74.78	-.13
	(39.96)	(69.91)	(.20)	(48.42)	(72.82)	(.13)	(65.18)	(88.04)	(.13)	(63.99)	(83.91)	(.12)
3.00	55.62	65.11	.02	27.08	5.04	-.11	61.70	100.59	.11	5.68	-10.00	-.04
	(38.26)	(67.79)	(.20)	(46.66)	(70.56)	(.12)	(64.62)	(87.37)	(.12)	(60.77)	(79.79)	(.12)
4.00	23.34	17.05	-.04	-9.66	-50.22	-.20	52.34	83.81	.06	-45.30	-86.76	-.16
	(36.09)	(65.85)	(.19)	(45.23)	(69.32)	(.12)	(61.62)	(84.88)	(.12)	(59.03)	(78.56)	(.11)
5.00	28.74	11.85	-.08	-9.11	-62.86	-.26	40.10	67.55	.02	-39.07	-89.97	-.22
	(36.14)	(66.33)	(.20)	(46.03)	(70.18)	(.12)	(63.32)	(86.18)	(.12)	(59.23)	(78.76)	(.12)
Washington	32.67	71.64*	.17**	70.95**	129.83**	.31	42.47	62.69	.12*	42.68	81.33*	.16*
	(24.58)	(36.65)	(.07)	(26.95)	(36.81)	(.07)	(39.94)	(43.05)	(.05)	(27.44)	(38.17)	(.07)
New York	2.89	5.39	.01	12.50	21.18	.05*	-13.97	-17.24	.00	18.97	25.26	.02
	(14.58)	(22.66)	(.04)	(15.76)	(22.61)	(.04)	(25.53)	(27.73)	(.03)	(17.92)	(25.50)	(.04)

Table 6: Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating. Other controls

	Anonymous			Neighbour			Relative			Government		
Variables	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit
Marital Status												
Married	29.30**	42.30**	.05	31.28**	45.76*	.07**	-11.04	-11.14	.00	23.73	28.53	.04
	(10.78)	(16.28)	(.03)	(11.19)	(15.72)	(.03)	(18.09)	(19.46)	(.02)	(12.89)	(17.97)	(.03)
Widowed	109.48	76.94	-.33	102.65	61.14	-.42	9.51	-59.11	-.34	70.07	24.60	-.32
	(162.57)	(228.93)	(.18)	(167.88)	(234.42)	(.21)	(175.57)	(225.31)	(.19)	(173.00)	(250.96)	(.20)
Divorced	26.44	31.34	-.01	25.48	31.93	.02	-12.50	-33.50	-.12*	13.74	19.19	.02
	(24.50)	(41.38)	(.08)	(26.95)	(38.93)	(.07)	(53.38)	(59.88)	(.06)	(25.75)	(39.99)	(.07)
Separated	35.30	9.33	-.04	29.61	23.05	.00	33.08	62.06	-	20.62	86.37	.25**
	(33.59)	(75.69)	(.14)	(31.54)	(60.70)	(.12)	(66.57)	(65.18)	-	(27.36)	(51.50)	(.08)
Gender												
Female	-19.61*	-11.81	.03	-22.85*	-16.35	.03*	22.19	28.11	.03	-34.37**	-42.22**	-.02
	(9.56)	(14.56)	(.03)	(10.23)	(14.31)	(.03)	(16.54)	(17.82)	(.02)	(11.58)	(16.17)	(.03)
Non-Binary	-29.12	-90.98	-.29*	-72.52	-94.01	-.15	-32.82	-46.47	-.10	-80.22**	-99.55	-.06
	(46.34)	(101.78)	(.14)	(47.11)	(79.58)	(.15)	(96.67)	(104.45)	(.14)	(28.95)	(59.19)	(.14)
Age												
25-34	-17.43	-16.68	.03	-14.02	-20.73	-.02	-21.39	-29.27	-.04	-19.92	-32.81	-.03
	(16.38)	(26.17)	(.05)	(16.24)	(24.60)	(.04)	(16.54)	(31.72)	(.03)	(19.50)	(28.35)	(.04)
35-44	-45.6*	-59.67*	.00	-37.75*	-47.60	-.01	-33.50	-36.25	-.02	-50.73*	-67.17*	-.03
	(18.55)	(29.18)	(.05)	(18.28)	(27.12)	(.05)	(32.32)	(34.59)	(.04)	(21.45)	(31.15)	(.05)
45-54	-46.58*	-71.03*	-.07	-25.74	-35.81	-.05	-51.67	-62.33	-.06	-67.82**	-100.54**	-0.12*
	(21.54)	(34.73)	(.06)	(22.58)	(32.52)	(.06)	(36.59)	(39.75)	(.04)	(24.14)	(36.13)	(.06)
55-65	-24.24	-21.23	.02	-16.54	7.79	.13**	-21.39	-23.42	-.02	-49.95	-63.05	-.04
	(22.38)	(34.45)	(.06)	(21.80)	(30.60)	(.06)	(39.76)	(42.55)	(.04)	(26.83)	(37.26)	(.06)
65+	-19.28	-27.08	.02	-40.85	-56.79	-.01	-79.26	-82.25	.00	-38.73	-40.37	.02
	(40.83)	(57.06)	(.11)	(36.38)	(50.06)	(.10)	(59.50)	(63.86)	(.05)	(38.11)	(53.45)	(.10)
Education												
Graduate	-78.07	-183.55*	-	-10.36	-104.57	-	83.14	60.38	-	-26.06	-110.28	.06
	(95.66)	(87.48)	-	(64.22)	(71.32)	-	(99.97)	(98.66)	-	(90.13)	(91.85)	(.72)
College no Degree	-77.57	-171.14*	.96	-4.41	-87.02	-1.21	76.33	56.96	-.67	-28.79	-98.73	.29
	(94.74)	(85.34)	(.79)	(63.66)	(69.67)	(.74)	(98.99)	(97.39)	(.44)	(88.88)	(90.20)	(.70)
Vocational	-38.30	-104.33	-73.00	9.27	-70.91	-.90	169.62	163.27	-.71	-.64	-107.38	-.53
	(99.13)	(96.75)	(.78)	(67.05)	(79.10)	(.72)	(111.91)	(111.97)	(.39)	(96.35)	(107.78)	(.79)
Associate Degree	-71.08	-158.47	-.53	-5.15	-83.46	-1.01	106.67	94.97	.01	4.32	-49.19	.42
	(96.97)	(89.59)	(.87)	(66.72)	(74.33)	(.80)	(102.29)	(100.84)	(.27)	(92.55)	(95.56)	(.74)
Bachelor's Degree	-48.46	-127.05	-.80	22.27	-40.00	-.91	95.46	80.53	-.25	11.79	-41.61	.64
	(94.43)	(86.39)	(.80)	(62.38)	(66.68)	(.74)	(96.18)	(93.92)	(.51)	(88.56)	(88.19)	(.68)
Master's Degree	-53.08	-127.72	-.49	36.38	-23.27	-.42	131.77	122.72	-.35	22.30	-20.54	.88
	(94.56)	(84.35)	(.76)	(63.07)	(68.09)	(.69)	(97.75)	(95.79)	(.29)	(88.82)	(89.04)	(.69)
Professional	-13.01	-68.72	.44	68.76	43.49	-.42	213.25	219.93	-	18.77	-58.23	.03
	(103.63)	(101.70)	(.76)	(76.88)	(83.53)	(.70)	(124.49)	(122.47)	-	(96.11)	(105.28)	(.79)
PhD Degree	-82.34	-135.38	-.18	-48.42	-104.75	.71	195.83	205.06	-	-65.48	-155.86	-
	(98.31)	(99.49)	(.90)	(69.70)	(86.26)	(.90)	(137.77)	(136.43)	-	(94.12)	(114.16)	-

Notes: Other states compare with California, Employment with "Employed", Mariatl Status with "Single", Education with "Some High-school", Age with "18-24". For Self-reported variables: 2="Disagree", 3="Neither Agree nor Disagree" 4="Agree", 5="Strongly Agree", all compared to "Strongly Disagree". In Logit regressions, all coefficients are from average marginal effects, except for present and previous employment, and education. Other controls: Relative Game First, Game Position, Week, Concerned About Covid, Percentage Change in Deaths. Significance levels: ∗: 5%; ∗∗: 1%. Observations: 1245.

Table 7: Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating. Other controls

Figure 1: Mean Donations, by Dictator Game


Figure 2: Cumulative Donations, by Receiver

Figure 3: Average Donations by State: Anonymous, Neighbours, Government and Relatives (clockwise, starting from top-left)


Figure 4: Donations, by Gender

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
Figure 5: Average Donations, by Week

Appendix

Figure 6: Total Covid-19 Deaths, by State

Figure 7: Total Covid-19 Cases, by State

Figure 8: Percentage Change in Covid-19 Deaths, by State

Figure 9: Percentage Change in Covid-19 Cases, by State