Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Risco moral e seleção adversa na intermediação financeira no mercado de crédito.

ALFAZEMA, ANTONIO and FILIPPI, Eduardo (2020): Risco moral e seleção adversa na intermediação financeira no mercado de crédito.

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Abstract

Abstract The purpose of the article is to discuss moral hazard and adverse selection in financial intermediation in the credit market. Moral risk and adverse selection are fundamental concepts for understanding the operation of the financial intermediation process in the credit market, which is very important for a country's financial system. With the advent of globalization, markets are showing an increase in capital flows, providing more efficient allocations, through better intermediation, restructuring the forms of transactions with more security and transparency. It is important to note that technological and financial system development are mutually stimulating, thereby avoiding moral hazard and consequently adverse selection. The study finds that credit risk stems from a debtor's lack of performance, which may be the result of his own disability or unwillingness. The quality of information assumes a prominent place in the economic and financial analysis of the client company.

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