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Fiscal policy under involuntary unemployment

Tanaka, Yasuhito (2020): Fiscal policy under involuntary unemployment.

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We show the existence of involuntary unemployment based on consumers' utility maximization and firms' profit maximization behavior under monopolistic competition with increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale technology using a three-periods overlapping generations (OLG) model with a childhood period as well as younger and older periods. We also analyze the effects of fiscal policy financed by tax and budget deficit (or seigniorage) to realize full-employment under a situation with involuntary unemployment. We show the following results. 1) In order to maintain the steady state where employment increases at some positive rate, we need a budget deficit. Therefore, we need budget deficit to realize full-employment from a state with involuntary unemployment (Proposition 1). 2) If the full-employment state is realized, we do not need budget deficit to maintain full-employment (Proposition 2). Additionally we present a game-theoretic interpretation of involuntary unemployment and full-employment.

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