Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium

Penta, Antonio (2007): Collective Bargaining and Walrasian Equilibrium.

Abstract

This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con- straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub- game Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian al- locations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The main novelty of the result is twofold: (1) it holds for any number of agents; (2) it is robust to di¤erent speci�cations of the bargaining process.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: strategic bargaining; Walrasian Equilibrium
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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