Samà, Danilo (2014): Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange.
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Abstract
In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipulation and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s law, otherwise known as First-digit law, which has been successfully employed to discover the “Libor scandal” much time before the opening of the cartel settlement procedure. Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to apply a such useful instrument to track the price of the aluminium traded on the London Metal Exchange, following the allegations according to which there would be an aluminium cartel behind. As a result, quick tests such as Benford’s law can only be helpful to inspect markets where price patterns show signs of collusion. Given the budget constraints to which antitrust watchdogs are commonly subject to, a such price screen could be set up, just exploiting the data available, as warning system to identify cases that require further investigations.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Benford’s law, cartel detection, collusion screening, competition authorities, data manipulation, monopolization, oligopolistic markets, price fixing, variance screen |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C10 - General D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Item ID: | 103087 |
Depositing User: | Dr Danilo Samà |
Date Deposited: | 30 Sep 2020 13:21 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2020 13:21 |
References: | Abrantes-Metz, R.M., Judge, G., Villas-Boas, S. (2011), Tracking the Libor Rate, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 10, Issue 10, Taylor & Francis Journals, London, United Kingdom, pp. 893-899. Benford, F. (1938), The Law of Anomalous Numbers, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 78, No. 4, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, United States, pp. 551-572. Brähler, G., Engel, S., G¨ottsche, M., Rauch, B. (2011), Fact and Fiction in EU-Governmental Economic Data, German Economic Review, Vol. 12, Issue 3, John Wiley & Sons, New York, United States, pp. 243-255. Commission Decision of 4 December 2013, Euro Interest Rate Derivatives, Case AT.39914. Commission Decision of 4 December 2013, Yen Interest Rate Derivatives, Case AT.39861. European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines banks ¿ 1.71 billion for participating in cartels in the interest rate derivatives industry, Press Release, IP/13/1208, 4 December 2013, Brussels, Belgium. Hotter, A., Shumsky. T. (2011), Wall Street Gets Eyed in Metal Squeeze. Some Say Warehousing Inflates Prices, The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2001, New York, United States. Master Screens Inc., et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., et al., Case No. 13-CV-00431, United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. Newcomb, S. (1881), Note on the Frequency of Use of the Different Digits in Natural Numbers, American Journal of Mathematics, Vol. 4, No. 1, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, United States, pp. 39-40. Nigrini, M.J. (1999), I’ve Got Your Number: How a Mathematical Phenomenon Can Help CPAs Uncover Fraud and Other Irregularities, Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 187, Issue 5, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, New York, United States, pp. 15-27. River Parish Contractors Inc., et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., et al., Case No. 13-CV-05267, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division. Superior Extrusion Inc., et al. v. Goldman Sachs Group Inc., et al., Case No. 13-CV-13315, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Detroit Division. Varian, H.R. (1972), Benford’s Law (Letters to the Editor), The American Statistician, Vol. 26, Issue 3, Taylor & Francis Journals, London, United Kingdom, pp. 62-65. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/103087 |
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Cartel Detection and Collusion Screening: An Empirical Analysis of the London Metal Exchange. (deposited 17 Apr 2014 05:49)
- Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange. (deposited 30 Sep 2020 13:21) [Currently Displayed]