Alternative vs Traditional Corporate Governance Systems in Italy: An Empirical Analysis

Bellavite Pellegrini, Carlo and Pellegrini, Laura and Sironi, Emiliano (2010): Alternative vs Traditional Corporate Governance Systems in Italy: An Empirical Analysis. Published in: Problems and Perspectives in Management , Vol. 8, No. 3 (2010): pp. 4-15.

Abstract

The 2003 Italian Corporate Law Reform, establishing one-tier vs. two-tier board for listed and unlisted joint stock companies, introduced alternative corporate governance systems. This study implements probit regressions in order to compare 548 unlisted firms: corporations with best performances in sales and capital structure, as well as those under “control and coordination”, maintain a traditional system. Conversely, firms with a high proportion of individual shareholders adopt alternative systems. For alternative system firms, split between one-tier and two-tier boards, companies under “control and coordination” action tend to implement a one-tier system, same as firms with a higher proportion of individual shareholders.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corporate governance, one-tier board, two-tier board
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance

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