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# Generosity and stability of social preferences: the effects of negative socioeconomic shocks and framing

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## Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of a negative socioeconomic shock on generosity by analysing the responses of 1255 US citizens to dictator games spread out over eight weeks of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each respondent plays four dictator games corresponding to four different recipients: relatives, neighbours, strangers, and the state. Despite the worsening of the pandemic and hence a high cost of donating, individuals perceive increasing marginal benefits of donating and thus become more generous over this timeframe. There is significant heterogeneity in the effects of additional regressors, such as perceived contagion risk, on the likelihood and amount donated to strangers, family members, or the government. At the same time, significant effects of framing bring new evidence regarding the stability of social preferences.

**Keywords:** Generosity, Dictator Game, Social Preferences, Framing, Altruism, Socioeconomic Shock, COVID-19

**JEL Codes:** C71, D63, D64, D71, D91, I14

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# 1 Introduction

During the Second World War, dozens of thousands of citizens protected Jewish people from the Holocaust. The “Righteous Among the Nations” bravely put their lives and their families’ lives at risk, saving neighbours, friends, as well as perfect strangers from an atrocious destiny through acts of pure altruism. Although such generous acts are generally overshadowed by the grave crimes against humanity during the war, indeed many other circumstances in history have shown how altruism and generosity flourish during hard times. This provides strong evidence for the proliferation – in some capacity – of positive social preferences amidst a negative socioeconomic shock.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a unique event in modern times which presents a natural experiment for investigating social preferences. This paper analyses altruism during the COVID-19 pandemic in the US – one of the worst-hit countries. The rapid spread of the novel coronavirus left the US no choice but to adopt lockdown policies, abruptly forcing millions into isolation. The pandemic also drastically affected the US economy, with an unprecedented increase in unemployment rates and shrinking GDP.

Thus, the study regards the first lockdown containment measures as a large negative socioeconomic shock, analysing individuals’ generosity as well as the stability of social preferences. In particular, altruistic behaviours towards relatives, neighbours, strangers, and the government (to support social services) are examined in an online experiment: participants from the states of California, New York, and Washington play four dictator games, each for the four types of recipients considered. Given that when exposed to negative exogenous shocks altruistic behaviours are not likely to remain constant, and instead generosity could change over time, results of the experiment are from a period of eight weeks of data collection. This allows for a dynamically variable concept of generosity, in place of a static vision.

Prolonged isolation and its direct economic consequences, along with fear inflicted through unrelenting media coverage of increasing deaths likely affected social preferences in different ways. In fact, mixed outcomes have been witnessed; whilst positive altruistic behaviours

were rife (large donations for hospitals and ventilators, shopping for neighbours in high-risk categories), other events such as stockpiling of goods or not complying with lockdown regulations were displays of self-oriented preferences.

Results from the experiment show how generosity towards each category evolves: there is an increasingly positive effect of time spent in lockdown on the amount and likelihood of donations in all categories, with self-reported concern for the pandemic playing a positive and significant role as well. These findings are remarkable, as one might expect generosity to fall as a consequence of the high price of donating (in the context of the drop in employment rates and financial resources recorded in the US in that period). In fact, even though the recorded negative economic circumstances do play a role (for example, results show low mean donations towards anonymous recipients compared to the rest of the literature <sup>1</sup>), the overall situation appears to increase the perceived marginal benefit of donating i.e. there is a stronger warm-glow effect (Andreoni, 1989).

Of course, positive effects on donations to different recipients are not homogeneous – for instance, being concerned by COVID-19 has a stronger effect on generosity towards familiar recipients.

As a second objective, this paper analyses the stability of social preferences. Specifically, the design of the study provides a comparative advantage which allows for an investigation of the effect of framing on the stability of social preferences.

Perfectly rational answers on the four games should not depend on their order <sup>2</sup>. Otherwise, it would mean that some decisions could become a reference point for the other ones. Since donations towards relatives are the highest on average, one would expect that if the dictator game with a relative is played first, this would set a reference point for all the following tasks, negatively affecting donations in the remaining games. Indeed, the results capture this framing effect, and lower donation amounts are recorded when a relatives' game is played first.

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<sup>1</sup>See more for a comparison with the rest of the literature (Engel, 2011) in the Discussion section

<sup>2</sup>The games were administered in random order

The results also detect another framing effect: the order in which the dictator games are played has a significant influence on the donations towards anonymous recipients. This suggests that when a direct bond between the agents is lacking, social preferences are more unstable.

Understanding generosity is far from straightforward. Whilst economic models view social preferences as a composition of a wide array of motivations such as reciprocity, efficiency concerns (Charness and Rabin, 2002), trust (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995), cold prickles effects (Korenok, Millner and Razzolini, 2014) etc., in the particular case of a crisis or perceiving another in pain or difficulty, social preferences are likely to be linked to feelings of empathy and compassion (Waal (2008), Story et al. (2015)). For example, when investigating the role of empathy, Story et al. (2015) find that participants respond with stronger altruism towards those clearly in distress: when asked to divide money versus dividing pain (electric shocks) with recipients, a larger share of individuals allocate more painful stimuli to themselves. Baseline altruism displayed towards anyone in pain – irrespective of one’s relationship to the recipient – could also be related to the “warm-glow” effect (Andreoni, 1989) and its feeling of reward in helping others, as well as pure distributive concerns fueled by sentiments of fairness and justice (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).

In reality, generosity could significantly differ depending on the nature of the relationship one has with the recipient. Leider (2009) demonstrates that in the case of directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, the former is stronger than baseline altruism. Moreover, directed altruism is stronger even in the case where the individual takes into account possible reciprocity in future interactions.

Similarly, expanding on the role of relationships in altruism, it is important to consider the effect of group identity: Guala and Filippin (2017) find group identity – the part of an individual’s self-concept derived from the affiliation with a social group – can significantly influence people’s attitudes towards monetary allocations. As many studies have demonstrated, individuals also behave very differently depending on context (Laury and Taylor,

2008), their gender (Heinz, 2011), social distance with others (Bohnet and Frey, 1999) or whether the resources to donate are earned with effort (Cherry, 2002).

Aside from the between-subject component of this experiment, the design of this research is an opportunity to investigate the role of framing on altruistic behaviours. Dreber et al. (2013) and other studies investigate the assumption of preference stability by exploiting social framing effects. In fact, it appears that details like the name given to a game or the order of the tasks can affect behaviours, even if Dreber et al. (2013) find that dictator games are not that sensitive to social framing effects. The significant role of framing on attitudes towards monetary allocations is also showed in Guala and Filippin (2017). Thus, in line with the rest of the literature (Andreoni and Miller (2002), Guala and Filippin (2017)), the four different dictator games are presented to participants in randomised order.

To conclude, the analysis considers the role of other variables reviewed in the literature, such as gender and other demographics, and explores the effect of anxiety on generosity. The next sections of the paper are organised as follows: the Methodology summarises the design of the experiment, sampling methods, participants' characteristics, procedure, and a description of the main variables of interest; Results are divided into descriptive and inferential statistics, and the concluding remarks and possible future developments are then presented in the Discussion.

## 2 Methodology

1255 subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk for an online experiment. Each participant was paid .30 dollars, and recruitment was run between Monday and Wednesday for eight weeks starting on the 30th of March. To best observe how individuals with similar backgrounds reacted to varying COVID-19 pandemic intensities across the weeks, the recruitment was focused on three states in the United States: New York, Washington, and California. These three states were chosen on the basis that they experienced different

pandemic situations in terms of magnitude and trends.

The original intention was, for the desired power of .80, to be able to detect effects between .30 and .35 standard deviations, in line with other dictator game experiments (Engel, 2011). Across the eight weeks, a total of 1255 participants were recruited, which corresponds to 156 observations per week on average, in line with the initial target.

Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the sample investigated: compared to the population of reference from the three states considered, age categories 25-34 and 35-44 are over-represented, while lower percentages of individuals above 65 years old participated in the experiment <sup>3</sup> (as it frequently happens with M Turk data collections (McDuffie, 2019)). In terms of educational attainments, the share of the population without a high-school diploma is under-represented as more than 70 percent of the sample holds at least a bachelor’s degree. Finally, when evaluating differences between the employment status when completing the test and one month before, there is a 4.7 percentage points net shift from working to unemployment positions, in line with the drastic increase in unemployment recorded during COVID-19 pandemic.

Regarding the games, as a first task, participants were required to complete four dictator games, administered in random order; each game had similar wording: “Imagine that today you have been given 1000 dollars. How much of this amount are you willing to give to [...]”. However, the four games differed in the hypothetical recipient: an anonymous person X, the current government (“to support public services”), a relative, or one neighbour. These four decisions were all independent, and an integer number between 0 and 1000 could be typed as an answer.

After the dictator games, participants were required to fill in a questionnaire on socio-demographics, attitudes and feelings. In particular, information was collected on information on gender, age, current and previous (one month before) employment status, education, marital status. In the second part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about their

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<sup>3</sup>Four participants from the age category “Over 75” were merged with the larger “65-74” years old category.

feelings in the previous week, including their considerations towards COVID-19, on the current government the ability to complete daily tasks (related to the ability to manage workload and home duties), and on their financial security.

To conclude, the dataset obtained online was enriched with state-specific information on COVID-19 (number of total deaths and cases, and their percentage increase from the previous day <sup>4</sup>) and unemployment (unemployment insurance weekly claims and insured unemployment rates <sup>5</sup>).

The following results section is based on two dependent variables: the amount donated for each dictator game (continuous variable with a range of 0 to 1000 (dollars)), and the probability of donating; in this latter case, the dependent variable is a dummy which equals to one for a positive donation. Furthermore to infer the dynamic effect of the pandemic on generosity, several regressors are considered: total number and daily percentage changes in deaths and cases, the week in which the experiment is completed, and the state of residence. On this note, percentage change variables take into account the time of the daily announcement for a certain state: this is because doing the experiment before or after a certain announcement (a positive or negative change of the situation) could impact the respondents' answers. The state-specific unemployment rate and amount of individuals receiving benefits, together with answers on financial security and employment (current and one month before) are considered as independent variables; moreover, the information collected in the questionnaire will be used to investigate the role of the concern towards coronavirus, trust in the government, moods (including anxiety), and demographics (gender, age, marital status, and education).

To conclude the description of the variables, given the order of the different games were randomised for each respondent, the regressions will take into account when a certain dic-

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<sup>4</sup>Information was obtained by the official websites of each state:  
Washington <https://www.coronavirus.wa.gov/> ,  
California <https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/Immunization/ncov2019.aspx>,  
New York State <https://coronavirus.health.ny.gov/home>

<sup>5</sup>United States Department of Labor Employment Training Administration  
<https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp>

tator game was completed compared to the other three, and a dummy variable to consider the cases in which the game on relatives was played first. To see why this is important for capturing possible framing effects (which, in theory, should not affect our preferences and decisions), consider the following example. Let us imagine that a respondent needs to divide funds with an anonymous as first game, and the choice would be a number between 0 and 1000 dollars; in theory, the same range of options would be available in the case the participant played this game as second and the one towards a relative (or another closer recipient) as first. However, my prior is that in the latter case the range of possible donations towards the anonymous recipient that the participant unconsciously perceives would be reduced from zero up to the donation to the relative, recalibrating the donations because of what was previously given to a closer recipient: the first game then becomes a reference point and could negatively impact the donation towards the anonymous recipient.

If this is the case, framing would have another significant effect on the investigated altruistic behaviours, compromising the stability of social preferences.

### 3 Results

#### *Descriptive Statistics*

Data collected across the eight weeks show how participants exhibit diverse generosity behaviours towards each of the recipients: Figure 1 summarises mean donations in the four different dictator games.

As expected, given a stronger emotional bond, donations to relatives are strikingly higher than any other dictator game considered: on average, participants are willing to give relatives almost one-third of the total amount received.

The other three dictator games exhibit average donations closer to each other, with anonymous recipients receiving the least amount, then neighbours, followed by the government through donations to finance public services being the third-highest category. How partici-

pants' self-regarding and other-regarding preferences discriminate between recipients is also reflected in the cumulative donations, shown in Figure 2: while around 10 percent of the sample donate 0 to relatives, increasing up to 1000 dollars, around half do not share anything with anonymous recipients, and 40 percent do not donate to neighbours and government (donations to these two recipients exhibit similar patterns).

Respondents from the three states give different answers (Figure 3), with New York donations to anonymous recipients being the lowest average overall, Washington residents particularly generous towards neighbours (higher average than for the government) and relatives, and California more altruistic towards anonymous and the government (compared to the other two states).

Considering demographic information, women appear to donate less than men on average, in all dictator games except on relatives: Figure 4 shows the discrepancy in donations by gender, which will be further discussed in the inferential statistics section.

To conclude descriptive statistics, it is crucial to focus on the dynamics of donations across the eight weeks of investigation: as time passes during this period, the coronavirus pandemic is becoming more burdensome in the US, and citizens are in lockdown for an increasing amount of time. Figure 5 shows how donations change over time, providing preliminary insights into my hypotheses.

Overall, all four mean donations increase between the first and the eighth week, following similar patterns even if with different gradients: while donation increases are flatter for relatives, dollars corresponding to anonymous more than double in two months, and double in the case of dictator games on neighbours and government.

### ***Inferential Statistics***

In this section, results from regressions are grouped considering each of the four dictator games as a different subsection: The main tables contain the independent variables relevant to evaluate my hypotheses, however, a brief final subsection describes the main findings on the other regressors.

To analyse results from the different experiments, a robust heteroskedastic OLS regression is run for measuring the impact of the independent variables on the amount donated. List (2007) allows for dictators to take money from recipients, demonstrating that fewer agents are willing to donate in this case than the standard case: for this reason, I also run Tobit regressions to consider the possibility of censored negative replies from participants.

As shown in Figure 2, answers from the experiments are in line with findings in the rest of the literature on dictator games, with a large share of participant giving zero to the recipient. For this reason, a quantile regression is performed, and the following tables report effects of the first (only for relatives, there is no variation in the other games), second and third quartiles. The last column of the results tables shows the average marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of donating (logit regression).

#### *Dictator Game towards an Anonymous Recipient*

Table 2 summarises the main findings from the dictator game with an anonymous recipient. The ordinal variable on being concerned with COVID-19, as well as the daily percentage change in deaths, have no significant effects. At the same time, there is a significant positive effect of the weeks following the first one on the amount donated: in both OLS and Tobit regressions there is a positive trend with donations reaching a peak in the last week (an increase of 105 dollars on average, according to OLS results).

None of the variables which measure the “concerned by COVID-19” effect have an impact on the probability of donating towards anonymous recipients.

#### *Dictator Game towards a Neighbour Recipient*

In Table 3, results from regressions show the effects of independent variables on the amount donated, and the probability of donating, to a neighbor recipient. Considering the statement “COVID-19 is concerning”, compared to “Strongly Disagree” the other answers do not bring significant changes in the amount donated. However, the logit regression shows a significant increase in the probability of donating in all categories of the ordinal variable.

This effect is particularly strong for those who select “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”, with a

significant increase (at the 1% significance level) in the probability by 48 and 55 percentage points respectively.

At the same time, playing in the weeks after the first one significantly increases the amount donated: this is shown by both OLS and Tobit regressions, with all weeks significantly higher than the first one. The amount donated increases across the period of analysis, even if not always in a monotonic way: in fact, in both regressions there is a small drop in the increase in week seven. From the fourth week onward, the positive effect is also significant for .5 and .75 quantiles, with the latter showing larger effects. The probability of donating also increases compared to the first week: from 19 percentage points more in week two, up to 35 in week eight.

#### *Dictator Game towards a Relative Recipient*

The main results on donations towards a relative recipient are summarised in Table 4. In this case as with the neighbours' case, self-reported concern for COVID-19 increases the amount donated (both OLS and Tobit have significant results for "Agree" and "Strongly Agree"). Considering the quantile regressions it seems this effect is concentrated at the high end of the distribution of the donations (.75 quantile is significant for both options highlighted before). The finding which is uncommon to the other dictator games is the effect of the percentage change in deaths on the amount donated: for high amounts (Q.75), a positive change significantly increases donations by around 3 dollars, on average.

Considering the weeks after the first one, for small (Q.25) donations, week three has a significant positive effect, while for large (Q.75) donations the last week sees a significant positive effect. In this latter case, the probability of donating also has a 23 percentage point increase.

#### *Dictator Game towards the Government as Recipient*

Considering the dictator game towards the government (to support public services), Table 5 shows how being concerned by COVID-19 scarcely affects the dependent variables: selecting "Strongly Agree" is the only option which significantly increases the amount donated (at the

5% significance level, only according to the Tobit regression). It also enhances the likelihood of responding with a positive donation (43 percentage points increase, 5% significant).

The percentage change in deaths does not bring significant effects, which instead remains for the weeks following the first one: in this case, for OLS regression, the third, fifth and eighth have an increase in donations, and Tobit counts the fourth and seventh as well among the significant ones.

As for quantile regressions, for the second quartile weeks, sixth and eighth show a positive effect in donations, and considering the logit fourth and eighth have a significant impact on rising the likelihood of donating.

### *Game Ordering*

Focusing on the effect of the position in which a dictator game is played compared to the others, Table 2 considers donations to anonymous: playing the version on relatives first does not significantly affect quantity nor probability of donating. Instead, not responding on the anonymous game first significantly reduces the amount donated to this category of recipients. In particular, playing this game second brings the lowest amount donated, as well as a significant reduction in the probability of donating.

Similar conclusions can be made when considering a neighbour as recipients: Table 3 shows how playing the dictator on relatives first significantly reduces the amount donated to a neighbour, both according to the OLS (-29.09 dollars) and the Tobit. At the same time, different positions of this game do not significantly change the amount donated (except for the case of playing this third compared to first, which has a significantly positive effect in the Tobit regression). However, second and third positions significantly increase the likelihood of a positive donation by nine percentage points (compared to playing it first).

To conclude, Tables 4 and 5 highlight the differences of the games towards a relative and the government compared to the first two discussed: in both cases, the ordering does not bring significant effects, and the same is true for having a relative recipient in the first game.

### *Other Regressors*

Tables 6 and 7 report the effects of the other regressors – carefully chosen given their prominence in the wider literature on dictator games – on the dependent variables.

Considering gender, the different regressions show no differences in the probability of donating. However, there is a significant reduction in the amount donated to the recipient in the case of female respondents; this is shown in the OLS regression, with significant effects only seen in anonymous, government and neighbor games (no significant effects of gender in the treatment with relatives). This result is also confirmed by Tobit regression, but only for the dictator towards the government.

Compared to single respondents, those who are married or in a domestic relationship donate more to anonymous and neighbor, and in the latter case, the likelihood of donating increases as well.

A variable that has a strong significant effect across different games and regressions is the extent to which the respondents agree to the statement: “The current government is credible.” Compared to those who select the option “Strongly Disagree,” those agreeing or strongly agreeing appear to increase the amount donated in the OLS and Tobit regressions. There is also an increase in the probability of donating not only towards the government but also to anonymous and neighbour recipients as well. In contrast, the answers on the statement “COVID-19 could harm my family” do not bring significant effects on the outcome variables, except for a decrease in the probability of donating to a neighbour if the answer is “Strongly Agree.”

Living in different states brings some significant effects: donations from Washington are significantly higher if towards a neighbour (OLS, Tobit) and government (Tobit). For the probability of donating, being from Washington significantly enhances the likelihood in all except neighbour dictator games.

Age also has an impact: compared to the category 18-24, 35-44 and 45-54 see a reduction in the amount donated towards anonymous and the government (OLS and Tobit), while for the neighbour game only the first of these two categories has a significantly negative impact.

The 45-54 category also reduces the likelihood of donating towards the government and its public services.

Among the employment and financial-related variables, higher unemployment rates bring a (small, compared to the effects discussed for the COVID-19 related regressors) significant reduction in donations towards neighbours (OLS, Tobit).

A broad effect of self-reported anxiety is visible across the inferential results: strongly agreeing on the statement that “Overall, in the last week I felt anxious” significantly increases amounts donated to anonymous, and also the lower categories have a positive effect on other dictator games (neighbour and government). There is also a positive effect on the probability of donating to anonymous, relatives, and government.

Overall, regressors show significant effects on donations towards a relative very rarely (none of them in OLS and Tobit, considering the variables mentioned in this sub-section).

## 4 Discussion

The results of this experiment show that a negative socioeconomic shock such as COVID-19 and its associated lockdown measures evoke a largely positive change of altruistic behaviours. In a sense, policies adopted during the pandemic can be viewed as a different form of social distancing depicted in the dictator game literature so far (Hoffman et al. (1996), Bohnet and Frey (1999)). In Hoffman’s research, however, “isolation” of the donor through single and double blinded dictator games results in data to support the hypothesis that as social isolation increases, there is a further shift toward lower offers. Given that this is not in line with the current study, a closer look at the regressors is warranted.

When considering the regressors capturing negative sentiment around the health aspects of the pandemic (anxiety; concerned by COVID-19), positive effects on donations are strongest in the anonymous dictator games. Similarly, regressors capturing negative economic impacts (unemployment rate; employment status before and after experiment; financial status), have

the strongest positive effect on donations and likelihood of donations in the anonymous and government dictator games. A likely explanation here is that the increase in overall economic and health fallout from the pandemic increases the perceived marginal benefit of donating i.e. there is a stronger warm-glow effect. This effect is stronger towards anonymous recipients for whom we have the least amount of direct information about, and where perceptions are instead fed by media, thus evoking sentiments of empathy described in de Waal (2008). However, regressors which help to explain the phenomenon of increasing donations during lockdown do not have homogeneous effects across the different dictator games. For instance, the percentage change in deaths is not a significant regressor in general, with one interesting exception: for high donations towards relatives, it has a positive effect on the amount donated. High donations could indicate a positive bond with relatives, and intuitively a negative context in terms of deaths could trigger empathy sentiments and the need to protect whoever is part of the family. Furthermore, almost all the other independent variables in the relative’s dictator game are not significant. Donations towards relatives probably depend on much deeper social dynamics, built across years of relationship – these aspects are probably not captured by the regressors considered. For example, direct lines of communication (not recorded in this dataset) would have a strong effect in bridging perceptions to reality.

Overall, given the negative socioeconomic shock, the price of donating at the onset of the pandemic is higher than other dictator game experiments, and hence would explain why donations towards anonymous recipients are lower than the ones documented in the literature (Engel (2011) calculates an average of 28% of the available sum donated). Another explanation for lower overall donations could come from Güth et al. (2007), who describe internet users as more self-regarding. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the sample shows high absolute levels of unemployment, financial insecurity and negative feelings remain more or less constant across time, suggesting the price of donating does not increase over the eight weeks.

Considering the answers on self-reported financial security, a decrease in price of donations

due to forced savings should be also excluded.

On the stability of social preferences, the results bring further evidence: Dreber (2013) finds them “less sensitive” to framing than the previous literature thought, however I show that this is not homogeneous across recipients. In particular, playing towards an anonymous recipient not as the first game reduces the amount and probability of donating towards that category, and if a neighbour is considered after a relative, there is a negative effect on the average donation. These findings demonstrate how individuals could end up creating reference points depending on how tasks are framed, showing that framing can affect the stability of social preferences if there is not a strong bond between the players.

At the same time, findings on gender show higher altruism in men (but not in the case of a relative recipient), which is not in line with Heinz (2011) and Selten and Ockenfels (1996). On this note, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) show how men are more generous when this has cheap consequences. However, it could be argued that the price of generosity in our experiment is higher than average (considering the negative socioeconomic shock and related consequences), de facto suggesting that gendered differentials could be mostly due to the relationship between dictator and receiver than the price of donating.

With respect to age, it is possible that the two categories “34-44” and “45-54” consistently donate less than the others because they have family members (children) financially relying on them. However, findings are not in line with Güth et al. (2007), which describes how older age categories care more about equality in sharing: this result could be related with the fact that those participants are the ones more at risk during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Finally, the role of reciprocity cannot be ruled out, especially in the case of government dictator games. In fact, the “anxiety” regressor effect is significant and the highest for government as a receiver. A negative socioeconomic shock which evokes anxiety across the population could raise the expectation that if donations are made to the state, there is a much greater chance of the state then reciprocating by providing safety measures such as unemployment benefits, cash handouts, or other financial relief packages. Further evidence,

such as a specific ultimatum game experiment, could clarify the mechanisms behind this last hypothesis.

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## Tables and Figures

Variables	Percentage	Variables	Percentage
<u>Gender</u>		<u>Age</u>	
Males	50.62%	18-24	14.84%
Females	48.27%	25-34	42.19%
Non-Binary	1.05%	35-44	19.40%
Other	0.07%	45-54	12.30%
		55-64	8.98%
		65-74	2.02%
		75+	0.26%
<u>Education</u>			
Some high school no diploma	0.58%		
Trade/technical/vocational	2.66%		
High-school graduate diploma	7.66%		
Some college credit no degree	13.26%		
Professional degree	1.62%		
Degree level	74.20%		
<u>Employment</u>		<u>Employment 1 month before</u>	
Employed	57.13%	Employed	61.37%
Self-employed	16.61%	Self-employed	17.07%
Homemaker	4.36%	Homemaker	4.36%
Student	6.91%	Student	7.17%
Out of work (looking for)	8.93%	Out of work (looking for)	5.73%
Out of work (not looking for)	3.32%	Out of work (not looking for)	1.95%
Unable to work	2.02%	Unable to work	1.63%
Military Retired	0.20%	Military Retired	0.20%
Other (please specify)	0.52%	Other (please specify)	0.52%
<i>Notes: Number of observations 1355</i>			

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
<u>Concerned by Covid-19</u>					
<i>Disagree</i>	82.43 (53.63)	125.50 (101.74)	28.12 (53.18)	101.66 (95.34)	.11 (.25)
<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	21.75 (41.76)	32.84 (95.33)	9.21 (37.93)	71.77 (71.80)	-.06 (.25)
<i>Agree</i>	12.38 (38.91)	39.07 (92.97)	11.96 (37.03)	14.72 (66.59)	.05 (.24)
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	9.38 (39.32)	43.83 (93.76)	13.88 (38.31)	12.15 (67.07)	.07 (.25)
<u>Percentage Change Deaths</u>	-0.13 (0.44)	-0.78 (0.93)	-.10 (.18)	-0.52 (.39)	-.00 (.00)
<u>Week</u>					
<i>2nd</i>	41.58 (23.98)	64.63 (42.58)	-1.06 (8.91)	22.05 (27.00)	.09 (.08)
<i>3rd</i>	53.9* (27.40)	59.62 (48.55)	-.38 (9.29)	19.28 (24.10)	.03 (.09)
<i>4th</i>	71.51* (34.80)	105.58* (59.93)	6.11 (10.62)	38.82 (48.44)	.13 (.12)
<i>5th</i>	85.66** (33.41)	106.94* (57.90)	4.19 (11.66)	47.61 (32.16)	.07 (.11)
<i>6th</i>	78.78** (37.24)	124.78** (62.99)	9.43 (11.41)	49.14 (45.65)	.16 (.12)
<i>7th</i>	67.99* (31.72)	95.96 (55.95)	8.18 (12.17)	60.95 (37.15)	.11 (.11)
<i>8th</i>	105.12* (38.42)	149.21** (63.26)	10.11 (14.88)	47.78 (47.77)	.16 (.12)
<u>Relatives Game First</u>	-5.67 (9.95)	-3.71 (15.87)	1.33 (3.53)	-3.10 (12.71)	.02 (.03)
<u>Game Position</u>					
<i>2nd</i>	-31.79* (14.17)	-59.7** (21.44)	-8.68 (5.90)	-36.62 (24.68)	-.11** (.04)
<i>3rd</i>	-30.84* (13.56)	-44.12** (19.97)	-5.76 (4.92)	-34.50 (21.05)	-.04 (.04)
<i>4th</i>	-25.55 (14.50)	-39.81* (21.44)	-4.25 (7.16)	-25.07 (21.10)	.06 (.04)
Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family ", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: *: 5%; **: 1%. Observations: 1245.					

Table 2: Anonymous Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
<u>Concerned by Covid-19</u>					
<i>Disagree</i>	83.16 (60.06)	251.54 (149.95)	44.62 (90.68)	177.59 (108.65)	.41* (.71)
<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	71.30 (53.33)	238.77 (145.83)	63.09 (57.09)	149.05 (104.08)	.39** (.15)
<i>Agree</i>	63.21 (51.17)	244.41 (144.61)	51.03 (54.17)	106.00 (109.23)	.48** (.15)
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	65.29 (52.17)	258.67 (144.90)	65.21 (52.28)	104.32 (105.43)	.55** (.15)
<u>Percentage Change Deaths</u>	.75 (.49)	.60 (.85)	-.03 (.35)	.40 (.43)	.00 (.00)
<u>Week</u>					
<i>2nd</i>	79.14** (25.65)	128.82** (40.89)	36.13 (18.94)	53.98 (28.35)	.19** (.08)
<i>3rd</i>	95.00** (29.54)	135.9** (46.54)	40.38 (21.30)	52.62 (30.62)	.18* (.08)
<i>4th</i>	126.09** (39.99)	193.45** (60.00)	53.57* (25.80)	87.00* (38.30)	.28** (.10)
<i>5th</i>	135.43** (37.00)	198.90** (56.55)	69.38** (23.70)	108.05** (36.39)	.26** (.10)
<i>6th</i>	139.58** (41.21)	221.07** (61.72)	64.48* (25.42)	119.76** (37.46)	.33** (.10)
<i>7th</i>	109.50** (34.11)	158.81** (53.52)	54.30* (21.77)	70.8* (29.87)	.21* (.10)
<i>8th</i>	161.34** (40.97)	243.88** (60.50)	68.60** (26.45)	122.64** (38.22)	.35** (.10)
<u>Relatives Game First</u>	-29.09** (11.50)	-42.54** (16.21)	-7.41 (9.24)	-24.88 (16.91)	-.04 (.30)
<u>Game Position</u>					
<i>2nd</i>	14.83 (13.38)	32.88 (19.62)	9.26 (8.80)	20.94 (20.98)	.09* (.40)
<i>3rd</i>	27.31 (14.37)	49.02* (20.30)	9.75 (7.03)	14.34 (16.22)	.09* (.37)
<i>4th</i>	12.52 (14.09)	25.87 (20.13)	-2.38 (10.63)	6.04 (20.84)	.06 (.04)
Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family ", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: *: 5%; **: 1%. Observations: 1245.					

Table 3: Neighbour Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.25)	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
<i>Concerned by Covid-19</i>						
<i>Disagree</i>	146.28 (87.34)	251.64 (142.22)	47.16 (68.95)	93.18 (123.59)	236.00 (150.91)	.24 (.24)
<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	140.87 (81.73)	235.49 (138.17)	21.02 (61.67)	112.13 (128.84)	258.47 (136.69)	.15 (.23)
<i>Agree</i>	167.70* (77.58)	281.32* (134.87)	55.38 (59.38)	143.44 (116.55)	270.65* (115.14)	.28 (.23)
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	233.87** (78.73)	357.64** (135.61)	94.74 (60.09)	201.36 (114.18)	350.89** (119.39)	.33 (.23)
<i>Percentage Change Deaths</i>	1.17 (.98)	1.19 (1.09)	.16 (.81)	.91 (1.55)	3.05* (1.43)	.00 (.00)
<i>Week</i>						
<i>2nd</i>	36.16 (51.67)	51.32 (57.61)	48.53 (32.40)	45.87 (41.34)	123.60 (79.45)	.13 (.10)
<i>3rd</i>	72.66 (58.30)	91.01 (64.69)	80.57** (31.81)	68.06 (61.56)	164.11 (90.05)	.15 (.10)
<i>4th</i>	102.58 (74.87)	133.59 (81.56)	99.51 (55.75)	122.18 (87.54)	193.65 (110.40)	.22 (.12)
<i>5th</i>	82.49 (70.71)	107.57 (77.85)	81.02 (53.47)	105.76 (86.36)	168.71 (89.06)	.20 (.12)
<i>6th</i>	81.89 (74.99)	112.03 (82.46)	69.27 (59.50)	113.66 (92.37)	168.04 (104.50)	.22 (.12)
<i>7th</i>	46.92 (69.98)	56.44 (77.48)	52.57 (52.27)	82.73 (76.63)	87.32 (116.76)	.11 (.12)
<i>8th</i>	115.98 (73.85)	145.34 (80.99)	83.27 (51.40)	110.48 (81.12)	235.66* (109.17)	.23* (.12)
<i>Game Position</i>						
<i>2nd</i>	-2.27 (21.79)	3.24 (23.62)	1.05 (17.12)	-10.09 (27.31)	-18.65 (47.54)	.04 (.03)
<i>3rd</i>	-5.05 (22.99)	1.58 (24.78)	9.17 (14.80)	-11.12 (23.50)	5.00 (52.39)	.04 (.25)
<i>4th</i>	-5.30 (20.81)	-2.06 (22.59)	21.07 (9.40)	-3.74 (30.74)	-16.03 (32.76)	.03 (.02)
Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family ", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: *: 5%; **: 1%. Observations: 1245.						

Table 4: Relative Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Variables	OLS	Tobit	Quantile(.50)	Quantile(.75)	Logit
<i>Concerned by Covid-19</i>					
<i>Disagree</i>	129.62 (72.48)	241.66 (134.27)	5.99 (94.43)	170.57 (125.14)	.20 (.22)
<i>Neither Agree nor Disagree</i>	114.36 (58.48)	236.05 (125.42)	21.39 (94.61)	114.74 (119.32)	.22 (.20)
<i>Agree</i>	103.61 (54.63)	235.81 (122.84)	28.11 (86.62)	84.09 (105.29)	.32 (.20)
<i>Strongly Agree</i>	107.55 (55.49)	265.14* (123.13)	45.21 (88.83)	83.66 (106.74)	0.43* (.20)
<i>Percentage Change Deaths</i>	-.07 (.62)	-.14 (1.01)	.04 (.46)	-.78 (1.13)	.00 (.00)
<i>Week</i>					
<i>2nd</i>	40.70 (29.63)	79.31 (45.96)	43.23 (22.95)	38.09 (41.62)	.14 (.08)
<i>3rd</i>	68.64* (33.95)	107.31* (52.90)	45.63 (25.18)	54.35 (37.29)	.13 (.09)
<i>4th</i>	84.68 (46.84)	150.07* (68.54)	56.43 (36.05)	40.36 (46.53)	0.23* (.11)
<i>5th</i>	101.4* (42.66)	155.16* (64.45)	53.35 (34.92)	87.02 (47.60)	.18 (.11)
<i>6th</i>	74.67 (46.71)	133.74 (69.36)	59.26* (29.94)	63.24 (55.16)	.21 (.11)
<i>7th</i>	69.52 (40.07)	120.16* (61.75)	47.33 (29.59)	56.48 (48.00)	.16 (.10)
<i>8th</i>	124.35** (45.02)	200.18** (66.83)	77.09* (34.89)	80.68 (52.90)	.28** (.10)
<i>Relatives Game First</i>	-19.25 (12.20)	-25.30 (17.56)	-4.23 (9.31)	1.60 (21.65)	-.02 (.03)
<i>Game Position</i>					
<i>2nd</i>	-1.26 (16.14)	-4.30 (22.28)	-5.37 (13.30)	3.01 (22.33)	-.01 (.04)
<i>3rd</i>	-12.27 (16.00)	-18.56 (21.77)	-10.01 (10.60)	-11.01 (23.90)	.00 (.04)
<i>4th</i>	14.38 (17.31)	18.11 (23.60)	-3.46 (11.05)	12.63 (32.44)	.00 (.04)
Notes: "Concerned by Covid-19" comparison is with Strongly Disagree, "Week" with the first week, "Game position" with playing the game of interest first. Other controls: Education, Age, Marital Status, Gender, States dummies, agreeing with the statement "COVID-19 could harm my family ", agreeing with the statement "The current government is credible", Self-reported Anxiety in the previous week, Employment Status, Employment Status one month before, Unemployment Rate (weekly, by state of interest), New Unemployment Benefits (weekly, by state of interest). Significance levels: *: 5%; **: 1%. Observations: 1245.					

Table 5: Government Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating

Variables	Anonymous			Neighbour			Relative			Government		
	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit
<i>Weekly benefits</i>	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
<i>Unemp. Rate</i>	-2.78 (1.58)	-4.61 (2.52)	.00 (.56)	-4.11* (1.81)	-6.46** (2.58)	.00 (.00)	-2.95 (2.89)	-3.90 (3.07)	.00 (.00)	-.74 (2.15)	-1.65 (2.92)	.00 (.00)
<i>Employment</i>												
<i>Self-Employed</i>	47.89 (35.38)	64.68 (42.67)	.05 (.06)	-7.36 (33.82)	-6.50 (40.31)	-.01 (.32)	-2.44 (38.90)	-1.85 (41.38)	.02 (.05)	30.21 (32.94)	36.40 (39.48)	.13 (.35)
<i>Looking for Work</i>	33.48 (33.41)	44.83 (45.87)	.01 (.07)	14.45 (26.10)	26.02 (37.26)	.24 (.34)	116.34** (40.37)	130.63** (42.70)	.08* (.04)	-1.25 (26.76)	2.70 (37.43)	.13 (.33)
<i>Out of Work</i>	-30.80 (23.06)	-36.30 (46.32)	.00 (.09)	-43.41 (26.39)	-73.21 (49.03)	-.44 (.45)	-23.34 (54.51)	-14.11 (57.82)	.05 (.05)	-38.60 (32.89)	-56.32 (57.25)	-.17 (.50)
<i>Homemaker</i>	-64.39 (45.47)	-211.17** (80.99)	-.56** (.02)	-95.62* (40.40)	-239.28** (77.10)	-16.44** (1.06)	-43.68 (62.60)	-92.75 (78.17)	-.35 (.24)	-74.11 (57.10)	-158.08 (95.51)	-2.38 (1.52)
<i>Student</i>	51.09 (34.25)	113.33* (54.53)	.25** (.07)	46.24 (34.50)	73.09 (51.81)	.79 (.59)	135.27** (50.29)	162.66** (54.58)	.13** (.03)	7.17 (40.01)	38.15 (60.87)	1.14 (.62)
<i>Military Retired</i>	-97.85** (28.78)	-	-	-51.22 (35.83)	-42.17 (86.00)	.24 (1.23)	90.05 (94.52)	108.43 (91.22)	-	51.16 (117.48)	29.88 (217.04)	-.57 (1.32)
<i>Other</i>	-29.81 (33.88)	-50.43 (57.37)	-.08 (.11)	-75.69 (46.53)	-108.09 (66.71)	-.62 (.54)	-19.74 (67.48)	-27.03 (74.98)	-.02 (.08)	-87.57* (35.45)	-107.13 (63.39)	-.56 (.74)
<i>Empl. 1 month</i>												
<i>Self-Employed</i>	-20.04 (33.97)	-16.78 (41.20)	.04 (.05)	39.64 (32.71)	52.75 (38.84)	.39 (.31)	34.08 (37.82)	34.20 (40.01)	-.01 (.05)	28.87 (32.76)	35.60 (32.29)	.19 (.34)
<i>Looking for Work</i>	-57.01 (33.38)	-112.41* (50.70)	-.14 (.08)	-39.34 (30.42)	-81.20 (46.11)	-.71 (.40)	-86.06 (48.59)	-108.26* (53.87)	-.19 (.10)	-35.70 (30.74)	-95.44* (46.54)	-.93* (.39)
<i>Out of Work</i>	9.40 (29.63)	-19.70 (61.26)	.10 (.13)	-2.04 (26.66)	-33.05 (56.61)	-.57 (.57)	-45.45 (70.60)	-74.36 (79.66)	-.17 (.10)	31.28 (48.73)	36.97 (74.31)	.00 (.62)
<i>Homemaker</i>	26.46 (49.33)	115.39 (82.11)	.39** (.02)	66.64 (43.14)	176.15* (77.01)	15.81** (1.09)	66.25 (63.93)	95.94 (77.90)	.06 (.05)	47.17 (57.51)	108.53 (91.54)	1.98 (1.50)
<i>Student</i>	-68.63* (31.92)	-141.43** (52.53)	-.31** (.09)	-77.69* (31.80)	-124.88** (48.88)	-1.04 (.57)	-77.60 (45.30)	-91.80 (50.03)	-.19 (.15)	-41.74 (39.19)	-87.27 (60.92)	-1.30* (.60)
<i>Military Retired</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Other</i>	100.12* (50.29)	138.68* (69.17)	.12 (.11)	145.36* (59.84)	192.28** (72.60)	.98 (.70)	189.94* (83.17)	203.30* (89.55)	.03 (.06)	182.39** (50.04)	221.33** (70.72)	.93 (.90)
<i>Anxiety</i>												
<i>2.00</i>	9.79 (21.61)	40.54 (37.17)	.10 (.65)	37.81 (23.06)	58.84 (35.44)	.06* (.06)	23.00 (40.06)	28.62 (45.59)	.04 (.05)	37.39 (25.28)	80.72* (40.43)	.16* (.07)
<i>3.00</i>	23.43 (22.35)	62.95 (37.39)	.16** (.06)	44.53 (23.28)	68.98* (35.16)	.11** (.06)	8.30 (39.22)	17.85 (44.38)	.07 (.05)	58.7* (27.32)	108.32** (42.04)	.20** (.07)
<i>4.00</i>	39.78 (22.72)	80.45* (37.32)	.15** (.06)	60.58* (24.13)	88.16 (35.74)	.11** (.06)	21.13 (38.96)	31.91 (44.07)	.08 (.04)	60.44* (26.85)	106.65** (41.38)	.18** (.06)
<i>5.00</i>	54.70* (26.05)	94.75* (41.71)	.13* (.67)	77.98** (26.88)	105.76* (39.50)	.09* (.07)	36.51 (42.99)	52.03 (48.38)	.10* (.05)	96.57** (30.22)	155.13** (45.21)	.20** (.07)
<i>Financial</i>												
<i>2.00</i>	-9.40 (27.73)	-8.92 (45.40)	.03 (.07)	-15.62 (32.92)	8.42 (48.53)	.12* (.08)	-46.82 (50.17)	-43.83 (55.34)	.03 (.05)	-17.66 (34.20)	-4.21 (51.71)	.05 (.07)
<i>3.00</i>	-9.30 (27.83)	8.74 (44.37)	.11 (.07)	-17.99 (32.35)	14.92 (47.21)	.19* (.07)	-75.90 (49.49)	-74.49 (54.52)	.03 (.05)	5.12 (34.89)	28.90 (51.26)	.12 (.07)
<i>4.00</i>	-5.43 (27.43)	3.63 (43.49)	.08 (.07)	-21.46 (31.88)	-4.58 (46.53)	.12* (.07)	-75.94 (48.15)	-77.61 (52.77)	.01 (.05)	2.99 (33.83)	20.07 (49.98)	.08 (.07)
<i>5.00</i>	-.66 (31.80)	5.21 (48.95)	.05 (.07)	-12.29 (35.80)	7.03 (51.00)	.11* (.07)	-76.70 (51.30)	-83.72 (56.01)	-.02 (.05)	-7.45 (37.72)	-1.00 (54.77)	.04 (.07)
<i>Gov. Credible</i>												
<i>2.00</i>	-4.66 (14.80)	-8.57 (25.21)	-.02 (.05)	-15.37 (17.09)	-24.39 (25.13)	-.03 (.04)	-33.94 (27.61)	-32.64 (29.87)	.00 (.03)	-12.51 (15.51)	-10.56 (24.95)	.01 (.04)
<i>3.00</i>	-11.80 (14.29)	-4.12 (23.93)	.05 (.05)	-21.72 (16.39)	-16.51 (24.00)	.05* (.05)	-36.48 (28.62)	-30.33 (31.11)	.03 (.03)	12.93 (16.90)	35.19 (25.81)	.08 (.05)
<i>4.00</i>	49.59** (15.49)	103.01** (24.03)	.24** (.05)	46.50** (17.16)	84.04** (23.63)	.21 (.04)	-.12 (28.03)	18.77 (29.92)	.11** (.03)	83.23** (18.29)	143.97** (25.95)	.27** (.04)
<i>5.00</i>	77.63** (27.26)	133.38** (37.02)	.23** (.06)	57.68* (26.01)	98.05** (32.98)	.22 (.05)	-18.16 (37.52)	-.32 (39.80)	.11** (.04)	102.70** (31.64)	164.58** (38.02)	.28** (.05)
<i>Relatives</i>												
<i>2.00</i>	12.68 (39.96)	-.09 (69.91)	-.06 (.20)	-21.69 (48.42)	-60.31 (72.82)	-.18 (.13)	10.89 (65.18)	34.64 (88.04)	.03 (.13)	-41.37 (63.99)	-74.78 (83.91)	-.13 (.12)
<i>3.00</i>	55.62 (38.26)	65.11 (67.79)	.02 (.20)	27.08 (46.66)	5.04 (70.56)	-.11 (.12)	61.70 (64.62)	100.59 (87.37)	.11 (.12)	5.68 (60.77)	-10.00 (79.79)	-.04 (.12)
<i>4.00</i>	23.34 (36.09)	17.05 (65.85)	-.04 (.19)	-9.66 (45.23)	-50.22 (69.32)	-.20 (.12)	52.34 (61.62)	83.81 (84.88)	.06 (.12)	-45.30 (59.03)	-86.76 (78.56)	-.16 (.11)
<i>5.00</i>	28.74 (36.14)	11.85 (66.33)	-.08 (.20)	-9.11 (46.03)	-62.86 (70.18)	-.26 (.12)	40.10 (63.32)	67.55 (86.18)	.02 (.12)	-39.07 (59.23)	-89.97 (78.76)	-.22 (.12)
<i>Washington</i>	32.67 (24.58)	71.64* (36.65)	.17** (.07)	70.95** (26.95)	129.83** (36.81)	.31 (.07)	42.47 (39.94)	62.69 (43.05)	.12* (.05)	42.68 (27.44)	81.33* (38.17)	.16* (.07)
<i>New York</i>	2.89 (14.58)	5.39 (22.66)	.01 (.04)	12.50 (15.76)	21.18 (22.61)	.05* (.04)	-13.97 (25.53)	-17.24 (27.73)	.00 (.03)	18.97 (17.92)	25.26 (25.50)	.02 (.04)

Table 6: Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating. Other controls

Variables	Anonymous			Neighbour			Relative			Government		
	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit	OLS	Tobit	Logit
<i>Marital Status</i>												
<i>Married</i>	29.30** (10.78)	42.30** (16.28)	.05 (.03)	31.28** (11.19)	45.76* (15.72)	.07** (.03)	-11.04 (18.09)	-11.14 (19.46)	.00 (.02)	23.73 (12.89)	28.53 (17.97)	.04 (.03)
<i>Widowed</i>	109.48 (162.57)	76.94 (228.93)	-3.3 (.18)	102.65 (167.88)	61.14 (234.42)	-.42 (.21)	9.51 (175.57)	-59.11 (225.31)	-.34 (.19)	70.07 (173.00)	24.60 (250.96)	-.32 (.20)
<i>Divorced</i>	26.44 (24.50)	31.34 (41.38)	-.01 (.08)	25.48 (26.95)	31.93 (38.93)	.02 (.07)	-12.50 (53.38)	-33.50 (59.88)	-.12* (.06)	13.74 (25.75)	19.19 (39.99)	.02 (.07)
<i>Separated</i>	35.30 (33.59)	9.33 (75.69)	-.04 (.14)	29.61 (31.54)	23.05 (60.70)	.00 (.12)	33.08 (66.57)	62.06 (65.18)	- (-)	20.62 (27.36)	86.37 (51.50)	.25** (.08)
<i>Gender</i>												
<i>Female</i>	-19.61* (9.56)	-11.81 (14.56)	.03 (.03)	-22.85* (10.23)	-16.35 (14.31)	.03* (.03)	22.19 (16.54)	28.11 (17.82)	.03 (.02)	-34.37** (11.58)	-42.22** (16.17)	-.02 (.03)
<i>Non-Binary</i>	-29.12 (46.34)	-90.98 (101.78)	-.29* (.14)	-72.52 (47.11)	-94.01 (79.58)	-.15 (.15)	-32.82 (96.67)	-46.47 (104.45)	-.10 (.14)	-80.22** (28.95)	-99.55 (59.19)	-.06 (.14)
<i>Age</i>												
<i>25-34</i>	-17.43 (16.38)	-16.68 (26.17)	.03 (.05)	-14.02 (16.24)	-20.73 (24.60)	-.02 (.04)	-21.39 (16.54)	-29.27 (31.72)	-.04 (.03)	-19.92 (19.50)	-32.81 (28.35)	-.03 (.04)
<i>35-44</i>	-45.6* (18.55)	-59.67* (29.18)	.00 (.05)	-37.75* (18.28)	-47.60 (27.12)	-.01 (.05)	-33.50 (32.32)	-36.25 (34.59)	-.02 (.04)	-50.73* (21.45)	-67.17* (31.15)	-.03 (.05)
<i>45-54</i>	-46.58* (21.54)	-71.03* (34.73)	-.07 (.06)	-25.74 (22.58)	-35.81 (32.52)	-.05 (.06)	-51.67 (36.59)	-62.33 (39.75)	-.06 (.04)	-67.82** (24.14)	-100.54** (36.13)	-0.12* (.06)
<i>55-65</i>	-24.24 (22.38)	-21.23 (34.45)	.02 (.06)	-16.54 (21.80)	7.79 (30.60)	.13** (.06)	-21.39 (39.76)	-23.42 (42.55)	-.02 (.04)	-49.95 (26.83)	-63.05 (37.26)	-.04 (.06)
<i>65+</i>	-19.28 (40.83)	-27.08 (57.06)	.02 (.11)	-40.85 (36.38)	-56.79 (50.06)	-.01 (.10)	-79.26 (59.50)	-82.25 (63.86)	.00 (.05)	-38.73 (38.11)	-40.37 (53.45)	.02 (.10)
<i>Education</i>												
<i>Graduate</i>	-78.07 (95.66)	-183.55* (87.48)	- (-)	-10.36 (64.22)	-104.57 (71.32)	- (-)	83.14 (99.97)	60.38 (98.66)	- (-)	-26.06 (90.13)	-110.28 (91.85)	.06 (.72)
<i>College no</i>	-77.57 (94.74)	-171.14* (85.34)	.96 (.79)	-4.41 (63.66)	-87.02 (69.67)	-1.21 (.74)	76.33 (98.98)	56.96 (97.39)	-.67 (.44)	-28.79 (88.88)	-98.73 (90.20)	.29 (.70)
<i>Vocational</i>	-38.30 (99.13)	-104.33 (96.75)	-73.00 (.78)	9.27 (67.05)	-70.91 (79.10)	-.90 (.72)	169.62 (111.91)	163.27 (111.97)	-.71 (.39)	-.64 (96.35)	-107.38 (107.78)	-.53 (.79)
<i>Associate Degree</i>	-71.08 (96.97)	-158.47 (89.59)	-.53 (.87)	-5.15 (66.72)	-83.46 (74.33)	-1.01 (.80)	106.67 (102.29)	94.97 (100.84)	.01 (.67)	4.32 (92.55)	-49.19 (95.56)	.42 (.74)
<i>Bachelor's</i>	-48.46 (94.43)	-127.05 (86.39)	-.80 (.80)	22.27 (62.38)	-40.00 (66.68)	-.91 (.74)	95.46 (96.18)	80.53 (93.92)	-.25 (.51)	11.79 (88.56)	-41.61 (88.19)	.64 (.68)
<i>Master's Degree</i>	-53.08 (94.56)	-127.72 (84.35)	-.49 (.76)	36.38 (63.07)	-23.27 (68.09)	-.42 (.69)	131.77 (97.75)	122.72 (95.79)	-.35 (.29)	22.30 (88.82)	-20.54 (89.04)	.88 (.69)
<i>Professional</i>	-13.01 (103.63)	-68.72 (101.70)	.44 (.76)	68.76 (76.88)	43.49 (83.53)	-.42 (.70)	213.25 (124.49)	219.93 (122.47)	- (-)	18.77 (96.11)	-58.23 (105.28)	.03 (.79)
<i>PhD Degree</i>	-82.34 (98.31)	-135.38 (99.49)	-.18 (.90)	-48.42 (69.70)	-104.75 (86.26)	.71 (.90)	195.83 (137.77)	205.06 (136.43)	- (-)	-65.48 (94.12)	-155.86 (114.16)	- (-)

Notes: Other states compare with California, Employment with "Employed", Marital Status with "Single", Education with "Some High-school", Age with "18-24". For Self-reported variables: 2="Disagree", 3="Neither Agree nor Disagree" 4="Agree", 5="Strongly Agree", all compared to "Strongly Disagree". In Logit regressions, all coefficients are from average marginal effects, except for present and previous employment, and education. Other controls: Relative Game First, Game Position, Week, Concerned About Covid, Percentage Change in Deaths. Significance levels: \*, 5%; \*\*, 1%. Observations: 1245.

Table 7: Main Regressions, Amount Donated and Probability of Donating. Other controls




Figure 1: Mean Donations, by Dictator Game




Figure 2: Cumulative Donations, by Receiver




Figure 3: Average Donations by State: Anonymous, Neighbours, Government and Relatives (clockwise, starting from top-left)




Figure 4: Donations, by Gender




Figure 5: Average Donations, by Week

# Appendix




Figure 6: Total Covid-19 Deaths, by State




Figure 7: Total Covid-19 Cases, by State




Figure 8: Percentage Change in Covid-19 Deaths, by State




Figure 9: Percentage Change in Covid-19 Cases, by State