An Application of Game Theory in Strategic Decision of Marriage Occurrence

Prajapati, Hari Ram (2012): An Application of Game Theory in Strategic Decision of Marriage Occurrence.

Abstract

Game theory illustrates independent and interdependent decision-making practice of human behaviour. It studies the formal conflict and cooperation between two players. The concept of Game theory is applied whenever the actions of agents are interdependent. These agents may be individuals, groups, firm etc. It also provides a language to formulate structure, analyze, and understand strategic scenarios. This paper examines the decision making process of marriage occurrence in India by using Expected Utility Theory (EUT). There are two important players, one is parent of bridegroom’s and another is parent of bride’s. The occurrence of marriage determined with the satisfaction of both the parties in terms of utility. The study is based on observation of my own marriage occurrence and applied game theory for, analyzing the strategic decision of both families

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Game theory, Expected Utility, Marriage Occurrence and Strategic Decision
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics

References

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