Changing Objectives of Firms and Managerial Preferences: A Review of Models in Microeconomics

Kumar B, Pradeep (2021): Changing Objectives of Firms and Managerial Preferences: A Review of Models in Microeconomics. Published in: Shanlax International Journal of Management , Vol. 4, No. 8 (1 April 2021): pp. 43-46.

Abstract

Theoretically, producer behavior models postulate that firms have had different objectives ranging from profit maximization to setting aspirational levels. The assumption of objective of profit maximization was shaped on the basis of the rationality principles which has lost relevance with the coming of the principle of behavioral economic in recent time. The present paper intends to throw some light on changes that have been made in the objective of firms over years and attempts to review some models emphasizing managerial utility as the core objective of firms.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Profit Maximization, Sales Maximization, Managerial Utility Function, Managerial Discretionary Powers, Slacks and Salaries, Behavioral Economics
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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