Collusion in Supply Functions under Technology Licensing

Celen, Ihsan and Saglam, Ismail (2021): Collusion in Supply Functions under Technology Licensing.

Abstract

We consider an infinitely-lived duopoly with asymmetric costs and study the incentives of the firms to collude or compete in supply functions under the possibility of technology licensing. Simulating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of alternative industry organizations, we show that licensing makes collusion harder; but it always has a positive effect on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in the duopoly.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Duopoly; collusion; supply function equilibrium; licensing.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O30 - General

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