Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Collusion in Supply Functions under Technology Licensing

Celen, Ihsan and Saglam, Ismail (2021): Collusion in Supply Functions under Technology Licensing.

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We consider an infinitely-lived duopoly with asymmetric costs and study the incentives of the firms to collude or compete in supply functions under the possibility of technology licensing. Simulating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of alternative industry organizations, we show that licensing makes collusion harder; but it always has a positive effect on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in the duopoly.

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