



Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Positional Preferences and Efficiency in a Dynamic Economy

Aronsson, Thomas and Ghosh, Sugata and Wendner, Ronald

Umea University, Sweden, Brunel University London, UK,
University of Graz, Austria

3 April 2021

Online at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/108335/>
MPRA Paper No. 108335, posted 18 Jun 2021 07:49 UTC

Positional Preferences and Efficiency in a Dynamic Economy*

Thomas Aronsson ^{a,†} Sugata Ghosh ^{b,‡} Ronald Wendner ^{c,§}

^a *Umeå School of Business, Economics and Statistics, Umeå University, Sweden*

^b *Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University London, U.K.*

^c *Department of Economics, University of Graz, Austria*

Abstract

In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism.

Keywords: Positional preferences, endogenous growth, wealth, intertemporal distortion, welfarism, non-welfarism, inter-country externalities, Pigouvian taxation

JEL Classification: E71, H11, O43

*We thank Philippe Bontems, Daniel Buncic, Reto Foellmi, Gerhard Glomm, Michael Greinecker, Olof Johansson-Stenman, Marko Köthenbürger, Christoph Kuzmics, Marc Law, Nathalie Mathieu-Bolh, Xavier Raurich, Michael Scholz, and Stephen Turnovsky for very useful discussions and constructive suggestions. Earlier versions of the paper also benefited from comments of participants of the European Public Choice Society (EPCS) 2018 Meeting (Rome, Italy) and the Public Economic Theory (PET) 2019 Annual Conference (Strasbourg, France). Aronsson and Wendner gratefully acknowledge research grants from The Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation (MMW 2015.0037). We retain sole responsibility for any remaining errors.

[†]*E-mail:* thomas.aronsson@umu.se

[‡]*E-mail:* sugata.ghosh@brunel.ac.uk

[§]*E-mail:* ronald.wendner@uni-graz.at

1 Introduction

Does status seeking behavior induced by positional preferences lead to inefficient economic outcomes in the long run?¹ This paper examines whether positional preferences for consumption and wealth distort the consumption-savings tradeoff and thus economic growth. As positionality implies that individuals impose externalities on one another, it may be presumed that such preferences introduce distortions, which therefore call for corrective taxation. We show that this is not always the case, and that the answer critically depends on a number of factors. One such factor is whether individuals are positional with respect to consumption, wealth, or both. Another refers to the underlying social objective: do governments use a welfarist objective or some non-welfarist objective for identifying distortions (if any)? It also matters whether social comparisons are local in nature or international, such that agents compare their own consumption and wealth with those of people in other countries. If they do, allocations that are efficient based on a national objective may, nevertheless, be inefficient at the global level.

The contribution of the present paper is threefold. First, we develop an endogenous growth model to characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not give rise to intertemporal distortions from the perspective of national governments.² Second, we derive an optimal corrective tax policy in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. Finally, we extend the analysis to a global economy with multiple jurisdictions to examine whether the choices made by national governments lead to a globally efficient resource allocation.

¹That social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behavior was pointed out by, among others, Darwin (1871), who emphasized sexual selection besides natural selection (on this, see also Truyts, 2010). In the field of economics, following Smith (1759), Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), and Hirsch (1976), there is now a large body of empirical evidence showing that people derive well-being from their own economic outcomes relative to the outcomes of referent others (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway, 1998, 2005; Easterlin, 2001; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005; Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson, 2006; Clark and Senik, 2010).

²This is in contrast to most previous studies which concentrate on how positional concerns affect the atemporal consumption-leisure choice and the policy implications thereof (e.g., Tuomala, 1990; Dupor and Liu, 2003; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008, 2018).

A first central feature of our analysis is that we distinguish between two types of social objectives: a welfarist objective and a non-welfarist objective. Welfarism represents the conventional approach to normative economics and implies that the government (or social planner) respects all aspects of consumer preferences.³ As such, a welfarist government forms the social objective thereupon and seeks to internalize the externalities that relative consumption and wealth concerns give rise to. In contrast, the non-welfarist objective implies in our framework that the government does not respect attributes relating to relative consumption and relative wealth in individual preferences, although it respects all other aspects of consumer preferences. This government “launders” the individual preferences when forming the social objective by not attaching any social value to changes in relative consumption and relative wealth. The intuition is that a non-welfarist government would like individuals to behave as if these concerns were absent and designs public policy accordingly.⁴

The welfarist approach to normative economics is not uncontroversial when social comparisons influence individual well-being. This is because concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth can be interpreted as expressions of envy; an “anti-social” preference that several authors have argued against including in a social welfare function (e.g., Sen, 1979; Harsanyi 1982; Goodin, 1986).⁵ Other authors (such as Piketty and Saez, 2013, p. 453) are more positive towards the

³Although conceptually different, we use the terms “government” and “social planner” interchangeably in what follows.

⁴Micheletto (2011), Dodds (2012), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018) compare welfarist and non-welfarist governments with respect to optimal labor income taxation, and Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013) compare them with respect to optimal commodity taxation, in economies where the consumers are concerned with their relative consumption. There are no similar comparisons in the context of models of intertemporal choice and/or where individuals are concerned both with their relative consumption and relative wealth, which are major issues in our study.

⁵Harsanyi (1977), p. 29–30, nicely sums up this viewpoint, while advocating to define social utility in terms of the various individuals’ “true” preferences, i.e., how their preferences would have been under “ideal conditions”, rather than their explicit preferences, as the latter may be distorted by factual errors, ignorance, careless thinking, rash judgments, or strong emotions hindering rational choice, etc. In fact, he goes further, suggesting that one needs to disregard not only the above but also preferences based on clearly anti-social attitudes, such as sadism, resentment, or malice.

inclusion of positional preferences in a welfare function.⁶ However, irrespective of which perspective one takes, a relevant question is whether positional concerns distort the resource allocation and, in that case, what the optimal policy responses look like. This suggests to us that a broad perspective is useful when characterizing the distortive effects of social comparisons.

A second central feature of our analysis is that concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth may partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other jurisdictions. Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that the importance of inter-country comparisons has increased over time (e.g., Becchetti et al., 2013; Clark and Senik, 2011). To incorporate such comparisons in the analysis, we follow the methodological approach outlined by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2015).⁷ In our setting, we decompose the measures of reference consumption and reference wealth - the variables by which each individual compares their own consumption and wealth, respectively - in two parts: one originating from within-country comparisons and the other from comparisons with people in other countries. Clearly, the international dimension of positional concerns is likely to increase with globalization and the development of transportation and telecommunication technologies (internet, social networks, etc.), and also via traveling.⁸ This accords well with empirical evidence presented in Becchetti et al. (2013), showing a negative relationship between life satisfaction and the distance between the average disposable income in the individual's own country and that of the richest country in a given geographical area, and that this relationship has become

⁶Frank (2005) argues that positional concerns, rather than reflecting anti-social preferences, might reflect instrumental reasons such as the need for families to keep up with community spending to be able to live in areas where their children could attend good quality schools.

⁷Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2015) analyze a two-country model where people's concerns for relative consumption have an international dimension. By assuming that policy makers have a welfarist objective, the contribution of their study is to compare the optimal labor income tax policy implicit in a non-cooperative (Nash and Stackelberg) equilibrium with the corresponding policy implicit in a cooperative equilibrium.

⁸Clark and Senik (2010) appeal to a number of questions that appear in the European Social Survey and find that those with no internet access (23% of the sample) attach less importance to income comparisons. Those who spend more than one hour per weekday watching TV (72% of the sample) compare more with other people than those who spend less time watching TV, and city-dwellers (60% of the sample) compare more than rural inhabitants, especially to friends and acquaintances.

stronger over time. Note that cross-country comparisons have implications for the distortions that positional concerns give rise to. Under welfarism, one would expect cross-country comparisons to imply that a national government (whose objective is a national social welfare function) fails to implement the global social optimum, due to that the international externalities would still remain uninternalized, whereas the policy responses by national governments may coincide with the responses by a (hypothetical) global social planner under non-welfarism.

To the best of our knowledge, no earlier study addresses the relationships between positional preferences and intertemporal distortions, and the policy implications thereof, as comprehensively as we do. Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) show in a model without any wealth-dependent preferences that consumption positionality does not distort the resource allocation if people's concerns for relative consumption do not change over time. This result is, in turn, closely related to findings by Fisher and Hof (2000) and Liu and Turnovsky (2005), showing that positional consumption preferences have no impact on the steady state equilibrium (and, therefore, do not have a distortionary effect) once labor supply is exogenous. By using an Ak model (like us), Alonso-Carrera et al. (2006) examine a case where utility is affected both by consumption habits and consumption externalities, and demonstrate the inefficiency of an unregulated market equilibrium when the two are imperfect substitutes. Nakamoto (2009) considers wealth in the utility function, as we also do, although his model does not include wealth externalities (i.e., utility depends on absolute, not relative, wealth). He shows that consumption positionality always introduces a distortion in that case.⁹ Finally, note that none of the above studies allows for interjurisdictional spillover effects of social comparisons, and none of them examines the optimal resource allocation (or corrective policies) implied by a non-welfarist objective.¹⁰

⁹We show that, in a generalized framework, this holds true only in specific cases.

¹⁰Ghosh and Wendner (2018) develop a model similar to ours, which includes positional consumption and wealth externalities, albeit based on specific functional forms for the utility and production functions. Their study, however, neither examines the conditions under which positional preferences give rise to intertemporal inefficiencies, nor addresses interjurisdictional social comparisons or non-welfarism.

Our main results are summarized as follows. First, the conditions under which an unregulated market economy is locally efficient (i.e., from the perspective of a local/national government) differ depending on whether this assessment is made by a welfarist or non-welfarist government. We express these conditions in terms of degrees of positionality, enabling us to relate our work to empirical literature on the importance of relative concerns for individual well-being.¹¹ Under non-welfarism, and if individuals are positional in both dimensions, the unregulated market equilibrium is locally efficient if the degrees of consumption and wealth positionality are the same. As such, the two behavioral failures cancel out and do not affect the Keynes-Ramsey rule. Under welfarism, it also matters to what extent the social comparisons occur internationally, since the (national) welfarist government only internalizes the domestic part of the externality. Here, local efficiency instead requires that the share of the externality generated by domestic agents times the degree of positionality should be the same in both dimensions.

Second, we characterize, under both types of government, the capital income tax/subsidy implications of relative concerns in cases where the conditions for economic efficiency referred to above are not satisfied in the unregulated market economy. Linking this to previous research, we demonstrate that distortions and optimal policy responses can be quite different for welfarist and non-welfarist governments when international consumption and wealth externalities are involved. A non-welfarist government would choose this tax to be proportional to the difference between the degrees of wealth and consumption positionality, measuring the net behavioral failure from the perspective of this government. Under welfarism, the tax is instead proportional to a measure of “net domestic marginal externality”, which reflects (i) the difference between the two degrees of positionality and (ii) the extent to which each externality is generated by domestic agents.

Third, by considering the domestic and foreign economies simultaneously, we

¹¹The degree of consumption positionality measures the extent to which the utility gain of increased consumption is driven by concerns for relative (instead of absolute) consumption. The degree of wealth positionality can be measured analogously, albeit in terms of wealth instead of consumption. The formal definitions of consumption and wealth positionality are provided in Section 3.

show that Nash-competing national governments may have incentives to implement a global social optimum if based on a non-welfarist objective, while the global social optimum typically differs from Nash equilibrium under a welfarist objective.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the efficient resource allocations under a welfarist and a non-welfarist government. Section 3 derives conditions for efficiency as well as distortionarity of positional preferences in a single-country context, and examines the optimal tax policy implications for cases where distortions arise. Section 4 extends the analysis to a global economy, where a globally optimal resource allocation is compared with a non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium based on a welfarist and non-welfarist objective respectively. Section 5 concludes the paper. Detailed derivations of the results are presented in the appendix.

2 The Model

Consider a dynamic, continuous time general equilibrium model allowing for endogenous growth through constant returns to capital (Ak model). The time indicator, t , will be suppressed unless needed for clarity. We start by presenting the technology and preferences, respectively, and then continue by characterizing the unregulated market equilibrium as well as the resource allocations ideally preferred by the welfarist and non-welfarist governments.

2.1 Technology

A homogeneous output is produced by competitive firms according to the linear technology (Rebelo 1991):

$$y = Ak, \quad A > 0, \tag{1}$$

where y is gross production per capita, and k is capital per capita. The depreciation rate of capital is $\delta \in [0, 1]$, and we shall assume that $(A - \delta)$ exceeds the pure rate of time preference (see below) to ensure nonnegative endogenous growth.

2.2 Preferences

The economy is populated with a large number of identical consumers, whose number is normalized to one. The representative consumer derives utility from her own consumption, c , relative consumption, Δ_c , wealth, k , and relative wealth, Δ_k . Relative consumption is given by individual consumption relative to some consumption reference level \bar{c} , and relative wealth is given by individual wealth relative to some wealth reference level \bar{k} . Individuals are atomistic agents in the sense of treating the measures of reference levels (\bar{c}, \bar{k}) as exogenous, as in the existing literature.

The consumption and wealth reference levels are determined by two factors. The first factor is mean consumption and mean wealth, respectively, in the home (domestic) economy. As agents are homogeneous, mean consumption and mean wealth represent natural determinants for the reference levels. Importantly, these determinants are endogenous from the point of view of the domestic government. The second factor represents consumption and wealth, respectively, abroad: \bar{c}^f and \bar{k}^f , which are considered exogenous to both individuals and the domestic government. As we indicated in the introduction, such international comparisons might be driven by interaction via social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, or by television broadcasting. We begin by analyzing a one-country version of the model, where the foreign reference measures are fully exogenous, and extend the analysis to a two-country setting in Section 4, in which the foreign reference measures are endogenous (albeit treated as exogenous by each national policy maker).

In what follows, we specify relative consumption Δ_c and relative wealth Δ_k as

$$\Delta_c \equiv c - \bar{c}, \quad \bar{c} = \alpha c + (1 - \alpha)\bar{c}^f, \quad 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1, \quad (2)$$

$$\Delta_k \equiv k - \bar{k}, \quad \bar{k} = \beta k + (1 - \beta)\bar{k}^f, \quad 0 \leq \beta \leq 1. \quad (3)$$

Parameters α and β determine the importance of the domestic parts of the reference levels, while $(1 - \alpha)$ and $(1 - \beta)$ determine the importance of the foreign

parts. The standard case of fully endogenous mean value comparisons at the national level is obtained by $\alpha = 1$ and $\beta = 1$.¹²

In this paper, both relative consumption and relative wealth enter the utility function. The instantaneous utility function is given by:

$$u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k). \quad (4)$$

For the given Ak technology, we may interpret the concern for relative wealth, Δ_k , also as a concern for relative income $Ak - A\bar{k} = A\Delta_k$, as this gives rise to the same general instantaneous utility function (4).

Let a subscript to the utility function refer to a partial derivative. In a standard model where individuals neither derive utility from social comparisons nor from wealth per se, we have $u_c(\cdot) > 0$, and $u_i(\cdot) = 0$ for $i = \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k$. If $u_{\Delta_c}(\cdot) > 0$, individuals have positional preferences for consumption. Thus, an increase in the individual's own consumption leads to higher utility also through increased relative consumption (for a given \bar{c}). By a similar argument, if $u_k(\cdot) > 0$, agents derive utility from their own wealth, while $u_{\Delta_k}(\cdot) > 0$ means that they have positional preferences for wealth.

Throughout, we assume that the instantaneous utility function (4) is strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in c and weakly increasing in all other arguments.

This consumer's intertemporal utility function, U , as viewed from date $t = 0$, is given by:

$$U_0 = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) e^{-\rho t} dt, \quad \rho > 0, \quad (5)$$

where ρ is the constant pure rate of time preference.¹³

¹²Note that our model implies that individuals compare their current consumption and wealth with other people's current consumption and wealth, respectively, i.e., the social comparisons are of the keeping-up-with-the-Joneses type. An alternative would be to assume a catching-up-with-the-Joneses mechanism, where the reference measures partly reflect other people's earlier consumption and wealth. However, as demonstrated in different contexts by Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014), this distinction is not important for the qualitative results.

¹³As the time indicator t is suppressed in order to simplify notation, we emphasize that the following variables are time-dependent: $c(t), \bar{c}(t), \bar{c}^f(t), \Delta_c(t), k(t), \bar{k}(t), \bar{k}^f(t), \Delta_k(t), y(t)$, as well

2.3 Unregulated market equilibrium

Consider the following maximization problem at date $t = 0$:

$$\max_{(c(t), k(t))_{t=0}^{\infty}} U_0 = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) e^{-\rho t} dt, \quad (6)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{k} = r k - c, \quad (7)$$

$$c \geq 0, \quad k \geq 0, \quad (8)$$

$$\bar{c}, \bar{k} \text{ exogenous}, \quad (9)$$

$$k_0 \text{ given}. \quad (10)$$

Agents choose $(c(t), k(t))_{t=0}^{\infty}$ so as to maximize intertemporal utility (6) subject to (7)–(10). Differential equation (7) reflects the flow budget constraint of the representative agent, and the variable r denotes the interest rate. In a competitive market, $r = A - \delta$. Restriction (9) reflects the fact that individuals treat the measures of reference consumption and reference wealth as exogenous. The current value Hamiltonian corresponding to problem (6)–(10) can then be written as

$$H(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k, \mu) = u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) + \mu (rk - c), \quad (11)$$

where the costate variable μ represents the shadow price of capital. Let superscript “ m ” denote “market equilibrium” such that $(c^m, k^m, \mu^m)_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solves problem (6)–(10). An interior solution implies the following conditions:

$$\mu^m = u_c(c^m, \Delta_c^m, k^m, \Delta_k^m) + u_{\Delta_c}(c^m, \Delta_c^m, k^m, \Delta_k^m), \quad (12)$$

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}^m}{\mu^m} = -[r - \rho] - \frac{u_k(c^m, \Delta_c^m, k^m, \Delta_k^m) + u_{\Delta_k}(c^m, \Delta_c^m, k^m, \Delta_k^m)}{u_c(c^m, \Delta_c^m, k^m, \Delta_k^m) + u_{\Delta_c}(c^m, \Delta_c^m, k^m, \Delta_k^m)}, \quad (13)$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mu^m k^m e^{-\rho t} = 0, \quad (14)$$

where we have used the fact that $\partial \Delta_c / \partial c = 1$ and $\partial \Delta_k / \partial k = 1$ from the point of view of an individual agent. Equation (12) is the conventional first-order

as the costate variable $\mu(t)$ (see below) and derived variables.

condition for consumption, according to which the costate variable equals the marginal utility of consumption at each point in time. Equation (13) states that the growth rate of the costate variable equals the negative of the difference between the rate of interest and the pure rate of time preference (as in the standard model) minus an additional term measuring the marginal willingness to pay for wealth out of consumption.

In summary, a competitive equilibrium is characterized by a path $(c^m, k^m, \mu^m)_{t=0}^\infty$ for which (7), (8), (10), (12)–(14) hold, and where $\bar{c}^m = \alpha c^m + (1 - \alpha)\bar{c}^f$, $\bar{k}^m = \beta k^m + (1 - \beta)\bar{k}^f$, and $r = A - \delta$.

2.4 Welfarist optimum

A welfarist government respects individual preferences, including the concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth. Since the welfarist government aims at internalizing the positional externalities, it takes into account that $\bar{c} = \alpha c + (1 - \alpha)\bar{c}^f$, $\bar{k} = \beta k + (1 - \beta)\bar{k}^f$ in equilibrium. However, both \bar{c}^f and \bar{k}^f are considered exogenous. From the point of view of this government, $\Delta_c = (1 - \alpha)(c - \bar{c}^f)$, and $\Delta_k = (1 - \beta)(k - \bar{k}^f)$.

The welfarist government chooses a path $(c(t), k(t))_{t=0}^\infty$ to maximize intertemporal utility

$$\max_{(c(t), k(t))_{t=0}^\infty} U_0 = \int_{t=0}^\infty u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) e^{-\rho t} dt, \quad (15)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{k} = (A - \delta)k - c, \quad (16)$$

$$c \geq 0, \quad k \geq 0, \quad (17)$$

$$\bar{c} = \alpha c + (1 - \alpha)\bar{c}^f, \quad \bar{k} = \beta k + (1 - \beta)\bar{k}^f, \quad (18)$$

$$k_0 \text{ given.} \quad (19)$$

The current value Hamiltonian corresponding to this decision-problem is given as follows:

$$H(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k, \mu) = u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) + \mu [(A - \delta)k - c]. \quad (20)$$

Let the superscript “ w ” indicate optimum from the perspective of the welfarist government. An interior solution, $(c^w, k^w, \mu^w)_{t=0}^\infty$, satisfies the following first-order conditions:

$$\mu^w = u_c(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w) + (1 - \alpha) u_{\Delta_c}(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w), \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}^w}{\mu^w} = -[(A - \delta) - \rho] - \frac{u_k(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w) + (1 - \beta) u_{\Delta_k}(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w)}{u_c(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w) + (1 - \alpha) u_{\Delta_c}(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w)}, \quad (22)$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mu^w k^w e^{-\rho t} = 0. \quad (23)$$

The canonical equations (21)–(23) have the same interpretations as given for the unregulated market economy above. The differences are given by the fact that the welfarist government takes the “home components” of the aggregate reference levels into account when deriving the optimality conditions. In other words, the welfarist government takes into account that part of consumption and saving is wasteful due to the negative positional externalities.

2.5 Non-welfarist optimum

In this subsection, we consider a non-welfarist government that respects all aspects of consumer preferences except the concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth. Therefore, instead of forming the social objective upon the individuals’s actual preferences, the non-welfarist government wants the agents to behave as if these relative concerns were absent.¹⁴

In our framework, the non-welfarist government attaches no social value to changes in relative consumption and relative wealth, which means that relative consumption and relative wealth are treated as exogenous when solving the optimization problem, even if these entities are (of course) endogenous in equilibrium. As such, the non-welfarist government chooses a path $(c(t), k(t))_{t=0}^\infty$ so as to max-

¹⁴That is, the government’s and agents’ preferences differ under this criterion; see Kanbur et al. (2006) for an excellent discussion, in a survey article on non-welfarist approaches to optimal taxation.

imize intertemporal utility, i.e.,

$$\max_{(c(t), k(t))_{t=0}^{\infty}} U_0 = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} u(c, \bar{\Delta}_c, k, \bar{\Delta}_k) e^{-\rho t} dt, \quad (24)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{k} = (A - \delta)k - c, \quad (25)$$

$$c \geq 0, \quad k \geq 0, \quad (26)$$

$$\bar{\Delta}_c, \bar{\Delta}_k \text{ exogenous}, \quad (27)$$

$$k_0 \text{ given}. \quad (28)$$

As before, let μ denote the current value costate variable, i.e., the marginal utility of wealth, and suppose that $(c^{nw}, k^{nw}, \mu^{nw})_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solve decision-problem (24)–(28), where superscript “nw” denotes optimum from the perspective of the non-welfarist government. By using the fact that $\bar{\Delta}_c = c - \bar{c}$ and $\bar{\Delta}_k = k - \bar{k}$ in equilibrium (where \bar{c} and \bar{k} are determined according to equations (2) and (3)), we can write the first-order conditions for an interior solution as follows:

$$\mu^{nw} = u_c(c^{nw}, \Delta_c^{nw}, k^{nw}, \Delta_k^{nw}), \quad (29)$$

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}^{nw}}{\mu^{nw}} = -[(A - \delta) - \rho] - \frac{u_k(c^{nw}, \Delta_c^{nw}, k^{nw}, \Delta_k^{nw})}{u_c(c^{nw}, \Delta_c^{nw}, k^{nw}, \Delta_k^{nw})}, \quad (30)$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mu^{nw} k^{nw} e^{-\rho t} = 0. \quad (31)$$

The canonical equations have the same general interpretation as the ones for the welfarist government. In contrast to the welfarist government, however, the non-welfarist government disregards status concerns, and the canonical equations equal those we would have for an economy without positional preferences.

It is useful to compare (30) with (22) for the extreme case where $\alpha = \beta = 1$. This is the case where the foreign components of the reference consumption and reference wealth are absent, and thus the reference consumption is nothing but the mean-value of home consumption. This means that the social first-order conditions coincide for the welfarist and non-welfarist objectives, which can be seen if we plug in $\alpha = \beta = 1$ in (22): we then obtain (30). In other words, the two types of government would make the same choice in this case, albeit for

different reasons. The intuition is that the externality coincides with the marginal behavioral failure of individuals (who are identical by assumption), in which case the non-welfarist government wants to implement the same resource allocation as the welfarist government.¹⁵

3 Conditions for Efficiency and Corrective Policies

In this section, we present our first main result, answering the question of whether or not positional preferences give rise to intertemporal economic distortions in a single-country context. By *distortions*, we refer to situations in which the unregulated market equilibrium differs from the allocation preferred by a welfarist or non-welfarist government. As we will see below, these distortions are manifested in terms of differences between the private and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption. The *private* marginal rate of substitution of k for c , evaluated at the respective (welfarist and non-welfarist) optimum is defined by:

$$MRS_{k,c}^i = \frac{u_k(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i) + u_{\Delta_k}(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}{u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i) + u_{\Delta_c}(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}, \quad i = w, nw. \quad (32)$$

The *social* marginal rates of substitution of k for c for the welfarist and the non-welfarist government, respectively, are defined as follows:

$$SMRS_{k,c}^w = \frac{u_k(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w) + (1 - \beta)u_{\Delta_k}(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w)}{u_c(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w) + (1 - \alpha)u_{\Delta_c}(c^w, \Delta_c^w, k^w, \Delta_k^w)}, \quad (33)$$

$$SMRS_{k,c}^{nw} = \frac{u_k(c^{nw}, \Delta_c^{nw}, k^{nw}, \Delta_k^{nw})}{u_c(c^{nw}, \Delta_c^{nw}, k^{nw}, \Delta_k^{nw})}. \quad (34)$$

Our analysis also employs the concept of the *degree of positionality* (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002), as a measure of how status concerned or positional an

¹⁵As shown by Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2018), welfarist and non-welfarist governments do not in general make the same choices, even if the reference levels are fully endogenous. For instance, if the individuals were allowed to be heterogeneous, and if we continue to assume (i) mean-value comparisons and (ii) that $\alpha = \beta = 1$, the welfarist and non-welfarist governments would typically make different choices.

individual is. The degree of positionality with respect to consumption and wealth, respectively, is given by

$$\zeta_c \equiv \frac{u_{\Delta_c}(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k)}{u_c(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) + u_{\Delta_c}(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k)}, \quad (35)$$

$$\zeta_k \equiv \frac{u_{\Delta_k}(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k)}{u_k(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) + u_{\Delta_k}(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k)}. \quad (36)$$

The degree of consumption positionality defines the fraction of the utility gain from an additional unit of consumption stemming from a rise in relative consumption Δ_c . A value of zero indicates no positionality at all, while a value of unity indicates that only relative (not absolute) consumption matters. The degree of wealth positionality has a parallel interpretation.¹⁶ These degrees of positionality will play an important role in the characterization of efficiency, distortions, and corrective taxation.

3.1 Efficiency and distortions

Our efficiency results employ the assumption of stationarity of the degrees of positionality, ζ_c , ζ_k , over time.

Assumption 1. *The degrees of positionality, ζ_c , ζ_k , are stationary:*

$$\dot{\zeta}_c(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) = 0, \text{ and } \dot{\zeta}_k(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) = 0.$$

In the appendix, we show that Assumption 1 is satisfied under the following conditions:

- (i) $u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k)$ is homogeneous of some degree $R < 1$ in (c, Δ_c) and homogeneous of some degree $\hat{R} < 1$ in (k, Δ_k) ;
- (ii) $c^f = \lambda^c c$, $k^f = \lambda^k k$, $\lambda^c, \lambda^k > 0$ constant.

¹⁶Evidence based on quasi-experimental research suggests that the (average) degree of consumption positionality is in the range 0.2–0.6 (see, e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Wendner and Goulder, 2008; Clark and Senik, 2010). There are no corresponding empirical estimates of the degree of wealth positionality, although more visible goods, which include homes and other durables, are most likely characterized by higher degrees of positionality than other goods (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Carlsson et al., 2007). An informative brief discussion is provided in Wendner (2014).

Equipped with Assumption 1, we now state¹⁷

Proposition 1. *Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied.*

1. *Welfarism*

The unregulated market equilibrium is efficient in the sense of replicating the social optimum if and only if either

$$\beta \zeta_k = \alpha \zeta_c ,$$

or

$$u_k = u_{\Delta_k} = 0 .$$

The equilibrium is distorted if these conditions are not satisfied. Specifically, if $\zeta_k > 0$ and $\zeta_c > 0$, then $\beta \zeta_k > \alpha \zeta_c$ implies over-saving and $\beta \zeta_k < \alpha \zeta_c$ implies over-consumption relative to the allocation preferred by the welfarist government.

2. *Non-welfarism*

The unregulated market equilibrium is efficient in the sense of replicating the social optimum if and only if either

$$\zeta_k = \zeta_c ,$$

or

$$u_k = u_{\Delta_k} = 0 .$$

The equilibrium is distorted if these conditions are not satisfied. Thus, if $\zeta_k > 0$ and $\zeta_c > 0$, then $\zeta_k > \zeta_c$ implies over-saving and $\zeta_k < \zeta_c$ implies over-consumption relative to the allocation preferred by the non-welfarist government.

Proof. In the appendix, we show that the proposition follows directly from comparing the private and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption, as given by (32)–(34). We note that a negative (positive) difference between the private and social marginal rates of substitution implies over-consumption (over-saving). ■

¹⁷As the degree of wealth positionality is not defined for $u_k = u_{\Delta_k} = 0$, this case is stated separately from those cases in which either $u_k > 0$ or $u_{\Delta_k} > 0$ in Proposition 1.

The welfarist government aims at internalizing *the domestic parts* of the externalities caused by consumption and wealth. In contrast, the non-welfarist government aims at correcting behavioral failures, independently of any externalities (domestically or abroad) such failures cause.

Under Assumption 1, the positional consumption externality is the same at each point in time, so there is no incentive for the consumer to reallocate the consumption over time in order to keep-up-with-the-Joneses in the consumption dimension. As such, in the absence of any preferences for wealth ($u_k = u_{\Delta_k} = 0$), the unregulated market economy is efficient regardless of whether the government is welfarist or non-welfarist. This special case will be further discussed in Subsection 3.2 and related to earlier research on economic growth under relative consumption concerns.

If the individuals are also positional in terms of wealth, the condition under which the unregulated market economy is efficient differs across the two governments. In the welfarist case, we can interpret ζ_c and ζ_k as the value of the marginal positional consumption externality and wealth externality, respectively, meaning that $\alpha\zeta_c$ and $\beta\zeta_k$ reflect the marginal willingness to pay to avoid the externalities generated by domestic agents. Thus, if $\alpha\zeta_c = \beta\zeta_k$, the two distortions cancel out. Under non-welfarism, we can correspondingly interpret ζ_c and ζ_k in terms of the marginal behavioral failure in the consumption and wealth dimension, respectively. If these behavioral failures are the same, their net effect on the consumption-saving tradeoff vanishes.

The efficiency conditions for the welfarist and non-welfarist governments coincide if $\alpha = \beta = 1$, such that $\zeta_k = \zeta_c$. The intuition is that in this case, the externality generated by domestic agents equals the behavioral failure of these agents. However, if $\alpha < 1$ or $\beta < 1$, the externality generated by domestic agents (as viewed by the welfarist government) is smaller than the behavioral failure of these agents (as viewed by the non-welfarist government). The non-welfarist government attempts to internalize the same behavioral failure regardless of whether the relative concerns are driven by domestic or foreign comparisons (or a combina-

tion thereof). Thus, in this case, the efficiency conditions, as stated in Proposition 1, differ between the welfarist and non-welfarist governments.

Note that Proposition 1 also characterizes the conditions for over-consumption and over-saving in cases where the consumption distortion differs from the wealth distortion. The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 1:

Corollary 1. *If individuals are positional both in terms of consumption and wealth, there is over-saving according to the welfarist criterion and, at the same time, over-consumption according to the non-welfarist criterion if*

$$1 > \frac{\zeta_k}{\zeta_c} > \frac{\alpha}{\beta}.$$

There is over-consumption according to the welfarist social welfare criterion but over-saving according to the non-welfarist criterion if

$$1 < \frac{\zeta_k}{\zeta_c} < \frac{\alpha}{\beta}.$$

Corollary 1 thus identifies cases where positional preferences cause one type of distortion under the welfarist criterion and, at the same time, another type of distortion according to the non-welfarist criterion. As such, the choice of welfare criterion alone may determine whether the optimal policy response is a tax or a subsidy.

3.2 Special cases in the literature

Let us first consider the special case where individuals do not have a preference for wealth: $u_k = 0, u_{\Delta_k} = 0$. Then, under Assumption 1, positional concerns with respect to consumption do not introduce any distortions. The result follows from stationarity of the degree of positionality, ζ_c , implying the same constant growth rate of marginal utility of consumption in market equilibrium as well as in the two social optima (the analytical details are shown in the appendix). As initial consumption is given by $c(0) = [(A - \delta) - g]k_0$, not only the growth rates coincide but also the levels — thereby the full path $(c(t), k(t))_{t=0}^{\infty}$. Thus, the positional

consumption externality does not introduce a distortion, as in Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Arrow and Dasgupta (2009).

The fact that there is no distortion, when Assumption 1 is satisfied, does not mean that the positional consumption externality has no impact on consumption- and savings behavior, on the c/k -ratio, or on the endogenous growth rate. All of these are affected by the positional consumption externality, albeit in the same way as in the (welfarist and non-welfarist) social optimum.

Now, by adding preferences for wealth, two special cases arise. Suppose first that $u_k > 0$ and $u_{\Delta_k} = 0$ such that $\zeta_k = 0$. According to the welfarist criterion, if $\alpha = 0$ positional consumption externalities do not introduce any distortion in this case, as the government is solely concerned with the domestic part of the externality. However, if $\alpha > 0$, positional consumption externalities always create a distortion, as $\alpha \zeta_c > 0$, as in Nakamoto (2009). Specifically, $\alpha \zeta_c > 0$ implies over-consumption, as the private marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption is smaller than the social one. A similar result holds for the non-welfarist criterion if $\zeta_k = 0$. Since $\zeta_c > 0$, positional consumption externalities always create a distortion (over-consumption). For $\alpha = 1$, the distortions according to the two welfare criteria coincide, as the behavioral failure equals the externality in the consumption dimension.

Suppose next that $u_{\Delta_k} > 0$ and $u_k = 0$. From definitions (32)–(36), it follows that

$$\beta = \alpha \zeta_c \tag{37}$$

implies efficiency, as the private and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption coincide under welfarism. Clearly, for $\beta > (<) \alpha \zeta_c$ the private marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption exceeds (falls short of) the social one, implying over-saving (over-consumption). For the non-welfarist government, the social marginal rate of substitution of wealth for consumption equals zero, as individuals do not have a preference for absolute wealth, and Δ_k is exogenous in the government's social welfare function. Therefore, the private marginal willingness to pay for wealth formation (in terms of consumption) strictly

exceeds the social one that equals zero.

3.3 Tax policy implications

We now turn to the optimal tax policy implications of the social comparisons described above. A welfarist government would like to internalize the positional externalities that the relative consumption and wealth concerns give rise to, whereas the non-welfarist government would like each individual to behave as if these concerns were absent. As such, the two types of government have different reasons to intervene.

To simplify the interpretation, and connect the analysis to the results presented in Proposition 1, we consider the case where Assumption 1 is satisfied. In this case, the two market (behavioral) failures reduce to a single effective distortion. As such, we only need one properly designed corrective tax instrument combined with the lump-sum repayment of the tax revenue. We exemplify by considering a capital income tax policy.¹⁸ The asset accumulation equation, facing each individual at any time t , can now be written as

$$\dot{k}^m = (A - \delta)k^m(1 - \tau) - c^m + T \quad (38)$$

where τ denotes the capital income tax and T represents a lump-sum transfer (positive or negative). Since the individuals are identical by assumption, the only role of the welfarist (non-welfarist) government is to correct for market (behavioral) failures; therefore, since the timing of the lump-sum transfer is not important here, we assume that the government's budget constraint balances at each instant, such that

$$\tau(A - \delta)k = T. \quad (39)$$

We follow Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008, 2010, 2018) by characterizing the corrective tax policy in terms of degrees of positionality (which can be empirically estimated), which are constant under Assumption 1. By using the

¹⁸We could alternatively use a wealth tax or a consumption tax, which would give optimal policy rules very similar to those in Proposition 2.

private and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption, given by (32)–(34), the optimal tax policy response to relative consumption and wealth concerns is summarized in Proposition 2.

Proposition 2. *Under Assumption 1, the optimal tax policy responses to positional preferences are as follows.*

1. *Welfarist optimum: If τ satisfies*

$$\tau(A - \delta) = MRS_{k,c}^w - SMRS_{k,c}^w = MRS_{k,c}^w \frac{\beta\zeta_k - \alpha\zeta_c}{1 - \alpha\zeta_c} \quad (40)$$

for all t , then $c^m = c^w$ and $k^m = k^w$ for all t , such that the market economy replicates the welfarist government's preferred resource allocation.

2. *Non-welfarist optimum: If τ satisfies*

$$\tau(A - \delta) = MRS_{k,c}^{nw} - SMRS_{k,c}^{nw} = MRS_{k,c}^{nw} \frac{\zeta_k - \zeta_c}{1 - \zeta_c} \quad (41)$$

for all t , then $c^m = c^{nw}$ and $k^m = k^{nw}$ for all t , such that the market economy replicates the non-welfarist government's preferred resource allocation.

Proof: see the appendix. ■

Starting with the tax policy chosen by the non-welfarist government, we can see that the optimal corrective tax depends on a discrepancy between $MRS_{k,c}^{nw}$ and $SMRS_{k,c}^{nw}$. If the private marginal rate of substitution exceeds the social marginal rate of substitution, such that $MRS_{k,c}^{nw} > SMRS_{k,c}^{nw}$, then $\tau > 0$. The intuition is that the tendency to over-accumulate wealth (due to wealth positionality) dominates the tendency to over-consume (due to consumption positionality), in which case an unregulated market economy would lead to more wealth accumulation at each point in time than preferred by the non-welfarist government. A capital income tax based on the policy rule given in equation (41) internalizes this behavioral failure. Correspondingly, if the $MRS_{k,c}^{nw} < SMRS_{k,c}^{nw}$, the behavioral failure implied by consumption positionality dominates the behavioral failure implied by wealth positionality, in which case equation (41) would imply $\tau < 0$.

The final part of equation (41) allows us to interpret the optimal tax policy response directly in terms of degrees of positionality. We should tax capital income if the degree of wealth positionality exceeds the degree of consumption positionality, i.e., if $\zeta_k > \zeta_c$, and subsidize capital income if the degree of wealth positionality instead falls short of the degree of consumption positionality such that $\zeta_k < \zeta_c$. The net behavioral failure (captured by the difference between the two degrees of positionality) determines the sign of the corrective tax. We can also see that the corrective tax is zero for all t if, and only if, $\zeta_k = \zeta_c$, in which case the two behavioral failures cancel out, or $MRS_{k,c}^{nw} = 0$ (in which case individuals have no preference for wealth).

Continuing with the tax policy implemented by the welfarist government given in equation (40), the sign of the optimal capital income tax will also in this case depend on a discrepancy between the private and social marginal rates of substitution between wealth and consumption. However, in the welfarist case, we can interpret the degree of wealth positionality, ζ_k , in terms of the marginal positional wealth externality per unit of wealth, and the government internalizes the domestic fraction, β , of this externality. Similarly, the degree of consumption positionality, ζ_c , measures the marginal positional consumption externality per unit of consumption, and the government internalizes the domestic fraction, α , of this externality. From the perspective of a national welfarist government, the net marginal externality is, therefore, given by $\beta\zeta_k - \alpha\zeta_c$. If this difference is positive (negative), the optimal capital income tax is positive (negative). In other words, the larger the positional wealth externality (ζ_k) or the larger the fraction of this externality that the government internalizes (β), ceteris paribus, the higher will be the optimal capital income tax. Conversely, the larger the positional consumption externality (ζ_c) or the larger the fraction of this externality that the government internalizes (α), ceteris paribus, the lower will be the optimal capital income tax. The corrective tax is zero if the two “effective externalities” cancel out, i.e., $\beta\zeta_k = \alpha\zeta_c$, or if the individuals have no preferences for wealth such that $MRS_{k,c}^w = 0$.

4 Extension to a Global Economy

Contrary to the previous sections, which focus on a single country and treat “the rest of the economy” (“the rest of the world”) as exogenous, this section extends the analysis to a global economy with two countries.¹⁹ In this setting, the foreign parts of the reference measures for consumption and wealth, respectively, have natural interpretations in terms of the consumption and wealth of individuals in the other country. The purpose is to examine to what extent national policy-making, as reflected in the choices made by the national governments in the preceding section, is able to internalize market and behavioral failures also on a global (multi-country) level. In other words, we shall briefly discuss whether positional consumption and wealth preferences are still distortive on a global level, despite the national governments having made their optimal choices. The benchmark is thus an optimal resource allocation from the perspective of a global social planner, whose objective is based on welfarism and non-welfarism, respectively, as formalized above.

With a welfarist social planner, a global social optimum can be derived by choosing consumption streams to maximize the following sum of intertemporal utilities (where super-indices $i = 1, 2$ and $j = 1, 2$ ($j \neq i$) are country indicators):

$$\max_{(c^\ell(t), k^\ell(t))_{t=0}^{\infty}} U_0 = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{\ell=1}^2 u(c^\ell, \Delta_c^\ell, k^\ell, \Delta_k^\ell) e^{-\rho t} dt, \quad (42)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \dot{k}^i = (A - \delta)k^i - c^i, \quad (43)$$

$$c^i \geq 0, \quad k^i \geq 0, \quad (44)$$

$$\bar{c}^i = \alpha c^i + (1 - \alpha)c^j, \quad \bar{k}^i = \beta k^i + (1 - \beta)k^j, \quad (45)$$

$$\Delta_c^i = c^i - \bar{c}^i, \quad \Delta_k^i = k^i - \bar{k}^i, \quad (46)$$

$$k_0^1 = k_0^2 \text{ given.} \quad (47)$$

¹⁹The number of countries (as long as it exceeds one) is not important for the results to be presented below. Without loss of generality, therefore, we consider the simplest possible case with only two countries.

Except for the country indicators, the notation is the same as above. To be able to focus on the distortions caused by positional preferences in the simplest possible way, the above decision-problem assumes that the countries are identical. This allows us to abstract from redistribution policies at the international level, which are not essential for the nature of the positional externalities involved.²⁰ If the global social planner is non-welfarist, the instantaneous utility function in equation (42) is replaced by $u(c^\ell, \bar{\Delta}_c^\ell, k^\ell, \bar{\Delta}_k^\ell)$ for $\ell = 1, 2$, where $\bar{\Delta}_c^\ell$ and $\bar{\Delta}_k^\ell$ are treated as exogenous during optimization albeit endogenous in equilibrium (such that $\bar{\Delta}_c^\ell = \Delta_c^\ell$ and $\bar{\Delta}_k^\ell = \Delta_k^\ell$). Thus, restriction (45) is redundant in the non-welfarist case.

By using the approach presented in Section 3, the social optimum is characterized in Proposition 3.

Proposition 3. *Based on the decision-problem (42)–(47), and irrespective of whether the global social planner is welfarist or non-welfarist, the global social optimum satisfies the following conditions:*

$$\mu = \mu^i = u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i), \quad (48)$$

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}}{\mu} = -[(A - \delta) - \rho] - \frac{u_k(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}{u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}, \quad (49)$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mu^i k^i e^{-\rho t} = 0, \quad (50)$$

for $i = 1, 2$.

Proof: see the appendix. ■

The result given in Proposition 3 arises because the two countries are identical, meaning that $c^1 = c^2$ and $k^1 = k^2$. Therefore, the externalities that the global welfarist planner internalizes coincide with the behavioral failures that the non-welfarist planner corrects for.

We can now compare the global social optimum characterized in Proposition 3

²⁰Instead of assuming that the initial capital stocks are equal, an alternative way of deriving Proposition 3 would be to assume a redistribution policy by adding a lump-sum subsidy to each country, T^i , along with a budget constraint for the global social planner, $T^1 = -T^2$.

with the Nash-equilibrium allocation that would follow if (i) the policies were based on national objectives and (ii) each national social planner treats the decision-variables of the other country as exogenous. Such an allocation would imply that each country satisfies equations (21) and (22) or equations (29) and (30), depending on whether the national decision-makers are welfarist or non-welfarist governments. More specifically, and in addition to (43)–(47), Nash-competition among welfarist national governments satisfies the conditions

$$\mu^i = u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i) + (1 - \alpha) u_{\Delta_c}(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i), \quad (51)$$

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}^i}{\mu^i} = -[(A - \delta) - \rho] - \frac{u_k(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i) + (1 - \beta) u_{\Delta_k}(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}{u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i) + (1 - \alpha) u_{\Delta_c}(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}, \quad (52)$$

whereas Nash-competition among non-welfarist national governments satisfies

$$\mu^i = u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i), \quad (53)$$

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}^i}{\mu^i} = -[(A - \delta) - \rho] - \frac{u_k(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}{u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)}, \quad (54)$$

for $i = 1, 2$. Since the two countries are identical by assumption, we have $c^1 = c^2$ and $k^1 = k^2$ (even if the levels typically differ between the two governments). The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 3 and equations (51)–(54):

Corollary 2. *Within the given framework, Nash-competing non-welfarist governments would always implement the global social optimum. Under Assumption 1, Nash-competing welfarist governments would implement the global social optimum if, and only if, $(1 - \zeta_c \alpha)/(1 - \zeta_c) = (1 - \zeta_k \beta)/(1 - \zeta_k)$.*

Therefore, whereas the choices made by Nash-competing non-welfarist national governments lead to a global social optimum, Nash-competition among welfarist national governments does not in general lead to a globally optimal resource allocation. The intuition is, of course, that the behavioral failure of each individual, which the non-welfarist government wants to correct for, is the same regardless of whether the social comparisons have an international dimension. In the welfarist

case, on the other hand, the national governments only internalize the domestic parts of the two externalities, implying that the resource allocation implemented by Nash-competing welfarist governments will typically differ from the allocation preferred by a global social planner. An exception arises when the value of the uninternalized externality is the same in the consumption and wealth dimensions, as indicated in the corollary, which means that Nash-competition among welfarist national governments leads to a global social optimum. If the extent to which the relative concerns are based on domestic comparisons is the same for consumption and wealth such that $\alpha = \beta < 1$, then Nash-competing welfarist governments would implement the global social optimum if, and only if, the degrees of consumption positionality and wealth positionality are equal. A more distinct special case arises if $\alpha = \beta = 1$, in which the welfarist allocation coincides with the global social optimum.

5 Conclusion

This paper uses an endogenous growth model to examine whether positional preferences for consumption and wealth distort the consumption-savings trade-off and thus lead to inefficient outcomes in the long-run. In cases where inefficiencies arise, we suggest a corrective tax policy that allows the decentralized economy to replicate the social optimum. Our study takes a broad perspective by integrating three key aspects of social comparisons in the same framework: One is that social comparisons may arise both in the consumption and wealth dimensions, which interact in terms of their influence on the consumption-savings trade-off. Another important aspect is that concerns for relative consumption and wealth may (partly) emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries, suggesting that national policy makers need not have the incentives to implement a global social optimum. Finally, we compare two social welfare criteria: a conventional welfarist objective where the policy maker respects all aspects of consumer preferences, and a non-welfarist objective where the policy maker does not respect the consumer preferences for relative consumption and relative wealth (and

consequently “launders” these preferences when forming the social objective).

We highlight three distinct results from our paper. First, the conditions under which the unregulated market economy is locally efficient depend on whether this local government has a welfarist or a non-welfarist objective. Under the latter, the unregulated market economy is efficient if the behavioral failures, as measured by the (estimable) degrees of positionality, are the same in both dimensions, in which case their influences on the consumption-savings trade-off cancel out. With a welfarist objective, the analogous condition is that the internalized (domestic) part of the marginal externality is the same in both dimensions. Consequently, welfarism and non-welfarism can lead to different optimal resource allocations also in a representative-agent model, and not just in economies with heterogeneous agents, because the allocation preferred by the non-welfarist government does not depend on whether the relative concerns imply social comparisons at home or with people in other countries. An interesting implication of this result is that the unregulated market economy may imply over-consumption according to one welfare criterion and over-saving according to the other.

Second, if the conditions for local efficiency of the unregulated market economy described above are not satisfied, we show that a non-welfarist government can implement its desired resource allocation through a capital income tax proportional to the difference between the degrees of wealth and consumption positionality, where the factor of proportionality is given by the private marginal willingness to pay for wealth in terms of consumption. As such, this government taxes capital income if the behavioral failure in the wealth dimension exceeds that in the consumption dimension, and vice versa. For a welfarist government, the corresponding corrective tax is proportional to the difference in the effective marginal externality in the wealth and consumption dimensions. This means that the welfarist government taxes capital if the effective marginal externality in the wealth dimension exceeds that in the consumption dimension, and vice versa.

Third, having characterized conditions for economic efficiency (as well as corrective policies in cases these conditions are not satisfied) at the local/national

level, we extend the analysis to a global economy where the foreign reference levels (for consumption and wealth) are endogenous. The main result here is that Nash-competing non-welfarist governments would implement a global social optimum, whereas Nash-competing welfarist governments do not (except for a special case).

Several research questions, not addressed in this study, are potentially important. If agents are heterogeneous in terms of wealth, skills, or preferences, an interesting extension of our research would be to simultaneously examine redistributive and corrective aspects of consumption and wealth positionality. In addition, since empirical research on relative concerns and well-being has started to discern social reference groups, as well as estimated degrees of positionality for consumption and for certain aspects of wealth (or related durable goods), there is scope for testing our theoretical predictions. Such estimates are likely to vary between individuals and between countries, and so would the policy implications thereof. We leave these and related questions for future research.

Appendix

Assumption 1

Assumption 1 is satisfied under the following conditions:

- (i) Homogeneity: $u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k)$ is homogeneous of some degree $R < 1$ in (c, Δ_c) and homogeneous of some degree $\hat{R} < 1$ in (k, Δ_k) ;
- (ii) Proportionality: $c^f = \lambda^c c$, $k^f = \lambda^k k$, $\lambda^c, \lambda^k > 0$ constant.

The homogeneity requirements (i) imply that the marginal rates of substitution of Δ_k for k as well as of Δ_c for c are functions of respectively Δ_k/k and Δ_c/c . The proportionality requirements (ii) imply that $\Delta_k/k = (1 - \beta)(1 - \lambda^k)$ and $\Delta_c/c = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c)$ are constants. Thus, the marginal degrees of positionality, as defined by (35) and (36), are constants.

Assumption 1 implies that (i) $u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) = c^R k^{\hat{R}} \hat{u}$, with $\hat{u} \equiv u(1, (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c), 1, (1 - \beta)(1 - \lambda^k))$; (ii) ζ_c, ζ_k constant; (iii) $u_k/u_c = (\hat{R}/R)/(c/k)$, as

shown below.

By Homogeneity, $u(tc, t\Delta_c, \hat{t}k, \hat{t}\Delta_k) = t^R \hat{t}^{\hat{R}} u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k)$, for $t, \hat{t} > 0$. By Proportionality, $u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) = u(c, (1-\alpha)(1-\lambda^c)c, k, (1-\beta)(1-\lambda^k)k)$. Let $t = 1/c$ and $\hat{t} = 1/k$. Then, $u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) = c^R k^{\hat{R}} \hat{u}$, with $\hat{u} \equiv u(1, (1-\alpha)(1-\lambda^c), 1, (1-\beta)(1-\lambda^k))$, where \hat{u} is a constant.

By Homogeneity, the marginal rates of substitution u_{Δ_c}/u_c and u_{Δ_k}/u_k are functions of (Δ_c/c) and (Δ_k/k) respectively. By Proportionality, these functions are constant functions, as $u_{\Delta_c}/u_c = (1-\alpha)(1-\lambda^c)$ and $(1-\beta)(1-\lambda^k)$ are constants. Therefore, ζ_c, ζ_k are constant.

Finally, considering $u(c, \Delta_c, k, \Delta_k) = c^R k^{\hat{R}} \hat{u}$, where \hat{u} is a constant, we clearly have $u_k/u_c = (\hat{R}/R)/(c/k)$.

Proposition 1

1. $(u_{\Delta_c} > 0)$ and $(u_{\Delta_k} > 0 \text{ or } u_k > 0)$

Consider the private and social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption, as given by (32)–(34). Considering the definitions of ζ_c and ζ_k , we can express the social marginal rates of substitution by:

$$\begin{aligned} SMRS_{k,c}^{nw} &= MRS_{k,c}^{nw} \frac{1 - \zeta_k}{1 - \zeta_c}, \\ SMRS_{k,c}^w &= MRS_{k,c}^w \frac{1 - \beta \zeta_k}{1 - \alpha \zeta_c}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the differences between the private and social marginal rates of substitution are given by

$$\begin{aligned} MRS_{k,c}^{nw} - SMRS_{k,c}^{nw} &= MRS_{k,c}^{nw} \frac{\zeta_k - \zeta_c}{1 - \zeta_c}, \\ MRS_{k,c}^w - SMRS_{k,c}^w &= MRS_{k,c}^w \frac{\beta \zeta_k - \alpha \zeta_c}{1 - \alpha \zeta_c}. \end{aligned}$$

These differences equal zero (no distortion), when $\zeta_k = \zeta_c$ (non-welfarist government) or $\beta \zeta_k = \alpha \zeta_c$ (welfarist government). ■

2. $(u_{\Delta_c} > 0)$ and $(u_{\Delta_k} = 0, u_k = 0)$

It is easy to show that – as in the standard Ak framework – the dynamic system is one-dimensional, and the steady state is unstable. That is, there is no transitional dynamics, and consumption and capital grow at their balanced growth rates “from the beginning.” This argument follows standard textbook reasoning.

Step 1. In this case, ζ_k is undefined. Define $\xi_c = u_{\Delta_c}/u_c = \zeta_c/(1 - \zeta_c)$.

Consumption and capital grow at the same rate. We show that the endogenous growth rate of the market economy equals that of the welfarist- and non-welfarist governments: $g^m = g^w = g^{nw}$. Given that consumption and capital grow at their balanced growth rates “from the beginning,” \dot{k}/k is constant, and (7) requires c to grow at the same rate as k . Let g denote this growth rate. In the following we show that $g = \dot{c}/c$ is the same for the economy as for the welfarist-/non-welfarist optima. Although the costate variables μ^m, μ^w, μ^{nw} may differ in levels, their respective growth rates are the same: $-[(A - \delta) - \rho] = \dot{\mu}^m/\mu^m = \dot{\mu}^w/\mu^w = \dot{\mu}^{nw}/\mu^{nw} = \dot{u}_c/u_c$, where the last equality follows from $\mu^m = u_c^m(1 + \xi_c)$, $\mu^w = u_c^w(1 + (1 - \alpha)\xi_c)$ and $\mu^{nw} = u_c^{nw}$, with α, ξ_c being constant by assumption.

In order to find the consumption growth rate, we note that

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}}{\mu} = \frac{\dot{u}_c}{u_c} = \frac{u_{cc}c}{u_c} \frac{\dot{c}}{c} + \frac{u_{c\Delta_c}c}{u_c} \frac{\dot{\Delta}_c}{c}.$$

Employing (i) $\dot{\Delta}_c/c = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c)\dot{c}/c$; (ii) $u_{c\Delta_c} = u_{\Delta_c c} = \partial u_{\Delta_c}/\partial c = \partial \xi_c u_c / \partial c = \xi_c u_{cc}$; (iii) homogeneity of degree R , $u_{cc}c/u_c = -(1 - R)$, yields

$$g^i = \left(\frac{\dot{c}}{c}\right)^i = \frac{(A - \delta) - \rho}{(1 - R)[1 + \xi_c(1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c)]}, \quad i \in \{m, w, nw\}. \quad (55)$$

First, (i) $\dot{\Delta}_c/c = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c)\dot{c}/c$ follows directly when Proportionality is applied to 2. Second, in (ii), $u_{c\Delta_c} = u_{\Delta_c c}$ follows from Young’s Theorem. The final step follows from (35) and (36): $u_{\Delta_c} = \xi_c u_c$. Thus, $u_{\Delta_c c} = \xi_c u_{cc}$. Third, in (iii), by Homogeneity, $u(c, \Delta_c, \cdot, \cdot) = c^R u(1, (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c), \cdot, \cdot)$, where $u(1, (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c), \cdot, \cdot)$ is a constant. Obviously, $u_{cc}c/u_c = -(1 - R)$.

Step 2. As $g^m = g^w = g^{nw}$ we have $c_t^m = c_t^w = c_t^{nw}$ for all $t \geq 0$. From (7), (16) and (25), $c_0 = [(A - \delta) - g] k_0$, where the initial capital stock is the same across regimes. Therefore, $c_0^m = c_0^w = c_0^{nw}$. Finally, as the growth rates are identical, we also have $c_t^m = c_t^w = c_t^{nw}$ for all $t > 0$.

Step 3. The transversality conditions (TVC) are satisfied. Let $\hat{u} \equiv u(1, (1 - \alpha)(1 - \lambda^c, \dots))$. We have $\mu^m = R(1 + \xi_c)\hat{u}c^{R-1} \neq \mu^w = R(1 + \xi_c(1 - \alpha))\hat{u}c^{R-1} \neq \mu^{nw} = R\hat{u}c^{R-1}$. Next we consider $\mu_t^i = \mu_0^i e^{-[(A-\delta)-\rho]t}$, $i \in \{m, w, nw\}$, $c_t = c_0 e^{gt}$, and $k_t = k_0 e^{gt}$. Plugging these expressions into the respective TVC yields the following necessary and sufficient condition for the TVC (in all three frameworks) to be satisfied: $(A - \delta) > g$. This condition, however, is satisfied in all three frameworks (market, welfarist, non-welfarist), as $c/k = (A - \delta) - g > 0$.

From steps 1 to 3 we conclude that the equilibrium path $(c^m(t), k^m(t))_{t=0}^\infty$ equals the paths of both the welfarist and the non-welfarist optima. ■

Proposition 2

The proof of Proposition 2 builds on the proof of Proposition 1. The tax rates described in (40) and (41) ensure that the private and respective social marginal rates of substitution of wealth for consumption become equal. Naturally, the (sign of the) tax rates are closely related to the efficiency conditions provided by Proposition 1. ■

Proof of Proposition 3

With a non-welfarist planner at the global level, a social optimum satisfies the following first-order conditions:

$$\mu^i = u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i), \quad (56)$$

$$\dot{\mu}^i = -\mu^i[(A - \delta) - \rho] - u_k(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i), \quad (57)$$

whereas a welfarist planner satisfies the corresponding conditions

$$\mu^i = u_c(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i) + (1 - \alpha)[u_{\Delta_c}(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i) - u_{\Delta_c}(c^j, \Delta_c^j, k^j, \Delta_k^j)], \quad (58)$$

$$\dot{\mu}^i = -\mu^i[(A-\delta)-\rho]-u_k(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)-(1-\beta)[u_k(c^i, \Delta_c^i, k^i, \Delta_k^i)-u_k(c^j, \Delta_c^j, k^j, \Delta_k^j)] \quad (59)$$

for $i = 1, 2$ and $j \neq i$. Since the two countries are identical, equations (56)–(57) and equations (58)–(59) are equivalent. As such, and irrespective of whether the global social planner is welfarist or non-welfarist, the optimal resource allocation satisfies equations (48)–(50) in Proposition 3. ■

References

- [1] Alonso-Carrera, J., J. Caballé, X. Raurich (2006), Welfare Implications of the Interaction between Habits and Consumption Externalities, *International Economic Review* 47, 557–571.
- [2] Alpizar, F., F. Carlsson, O. Johansson-Stenman (2005), How Much Do We Care About Absolute Versus Relative Income and Consumption?, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 56, 405–421.
- [3] Aronsson, T., O. Johansson-Stenman (2008), When the Joneses' Consumption Hurts: Optimal Public Good Provision and Nonlinear Income Taxation, *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 986–997.
- [4] Aronsson, T., O. Johansson-Stenman (2010), Positional Concerns in an OLG Model: Optimal Labor and Capital Income Taxation, *International Economic Review* 51, 1071–1095.
- [5] Aronsson, T., O. Johansson-Stenman (2014), Positional Preferences in Time and Space: Optimal Income Taxation with Dynamic Social Comparisons, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 101, 1–23.

- [6] Aronsson, T., O. Johansson-Stenman (2015), Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas: On International Tax Coordination and Social Comparisons, *Journal of Public Economics* 131, 71–86.
- [7] Aronsson, T., O. Johansson-Stenman (2018), Paternalism against Veblen: Optimal Taxation and Non-respected Preferences for Social Comparisons, *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* (10), 39–76.
- [8] Arrow, K.J., P.S. Dasgupta (2009), Conspicuous Consumption, Inconspicuous Leisure, *Economic Journal* 119, F497–F516.
- [9] Becchetti, L., S. Castriota, L. Corrado, E.G. Ricca (2013), Beyond the Joneses: Inter-Country Income Comparisons and Happiness, *Journal of Socio-Economics* 45, 187–195.
- [10] Blanchflower, D.G., A.J. Oswald (2005), Happiness and the Human Development Index: The Paradox of Australia, *Australian Economic Review* 38, 307–318.
- [11] Carlsson, F., O. Johansson-Stenman, P. Martinsson (2007), Do you Enjoy Having More Than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods, *Economica* 74, 586–598.
- [12] Clark, A.E., C. Senik (2010), Who Compares to Whom? The Anatomy of Income Comparisons in Europe, *Economic Journal* 120, 573–594.
- [13] Clark, A.E. and C. Senik (2011), Will GDP Growth Increase Happiness in Developing Countries? IZA Discussion Paper No. 5595.
- [14] Darwin, C. (1871), *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*, London: John Murray.
- [15] Dodds, S. (2012) Redistributive Taxation and Heterogeneous Relative Consumption Concerns, *Canadian Journal of Economics* 45, 220–46.
- [16] Duesenberry, J.S. (1949), *Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behavior*, New York: Oxford University Press.

- [17] Easterlin, R.A. (2001), Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory, *Economic Journal* 111, 465–484.
- [18] Dapor, B. and W. F. Liu (2003) Jealousy and Overconsumption, *American Economic Review* 93, 423–428.
- [19] Eckerstorfer, P., R. Wendner (2013) Asymmetric and Non-Atmospheric Consumption Externalities, and Efficient Consumption Taxation, *Journal of Public Economics* 106, 42–56.
- [20] Fisher, W.H., F.X. Hof (2000), Relative Consumption, Economic Growth, and Taxation, *Journal of Economics* 72, 241–262.
- [21] Frank, R.H. (2005), Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventative Welfare Distortions, *American Economic Review* 95, 137–141.
- [22] Ghosh, S., R. Wendner (2018), Positional Preferences and Efficient Capital Accumulation when Households Exhibit a Preference for Wealth, *Oxford Economic Papers* 70, 114–140.
- [23] Goodin, R.E. (1986), Laundering Preferences, in: Elster, J., A. Hylland, *Foundations of Social Choice Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [24] Harsanyi, John C. (1977), Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory, *Erkenntnis* 11(1), 25–53.
- [25] Harsanyi, J. (1982), Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in: Sen, A., B. Williams (eds.), *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [26] Hirsch, F. (1976), *Social Limits to Growth*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- [27] Johansson-Stenman, O., F. Carlsson, D. Daruvala (2002), Measuring Future Grandparents’ Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing, *Economic Journal* 112, 362–383.

- [28] Johansson-Stenman, O., P. Martinsson (2006), Honestly, Why Are You Driving a BMW?, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 60, 129–146.
- [29] Kanbur, R., J. Pirtill, M. Tuomala (2006), Non-Welfarist Optimal Taxation and Behavioral Public Economics, *Journal of Economic Surveys* 20, 849–868.
- [30] Liu, W.F., S.J. Turnovsky (2005), Consumption Externalities, Production Externalities, and Long-Run Macroeconomic Efficiency, *Journal of Public Economics* 89, 1097–1129.
- [31] Micheletto, L. (2011) Optimal Nonlinear Redistributive Taxation and Public Good Provision in an Economy with Veblen Effects, *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 13, 71–96.
- [32] Nakamoto, Y. (2009), Jealousy and Over-Saving in a One-Sector Model with Wealth Preference, *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 33, 2015–2029.
- [33] Piketty, T., E. Saez (2013), Optimal Labor Income Taxation, in: Auerbach, A., R. Chetty, M. Feldstein, E. Saez, *Handbook of Public Economics*, Vol. 5, Elsevier-North Holland.
- [34] Rebelo, S. (1991), Long Run Policy Analysis and Long Run Growth, *Journal of Political Economy* 99, 500–521.
- [35] Sen, A.K. (1979), Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What’s Wrong with Welfare Economics, *Economic Journal* 89, 537–558.
- [36] Smith, A. (1759), *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, in: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, republished in 1976, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [37] Solnick, S.J., D. Hemenway (1998), Is More Always Better? A Survey on Positional Concerns, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 37, 373–383.
- [38] Solnick, S.J., D. Hemenway (2005), Are Positional Concerns Stronger in Some Domains than in Others?, *American Economic Review* 95, 147–151.

- [39] Tuomala, M. (1990). *Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- [40] Turnovsky, S.J., G. Monteiro (2007), Consumption Externalities, Production Externalities, and Efficient Capital Accumulation Under Time Non-Separable Preferences, *European Economic Review* 51, 479–504.
- [41] Truyts, T. (2010), Social Status in Economic Theory, *Journal of Economic Surveys* 24, 137–169.
- [42] Veblen, T. (1899) *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, in: *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, republished in 1973, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- [43] Wendner, R. (2014), Ramsey, Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents, and Non-atmospheric Consumption Externalities, *Journal of Public Economic Theory* 16, 491–521.
- [44] Wendner, R., L.H. Goulder (2008), Status Effects, Public Goods Provision, and Excess Burden, *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 1968–1985.