van Suntum, Ulrich (2021): The Global Protection Organisation (GPO) - A Proposal to Improve the Handling of Global Challenges.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_108984.pdf Download (411kB) | Preview |
Abstract
The paper proposes a new approach for making global contracts, mainly based on the Coase-theorem. In particular, it is argued that combining several, normally unrelated issues to a bargaining bundle could facilitate Pareto-efficient contracts that benefit all, even including future generations. For this ends, a new institution called Global Protection Agency (GPO) is suggested that should be organized quite similar to the WTO, however with a much larger scope of competences.A formal model is used to demonstrate how this could work.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | The Global Protection Organisation (GPO) - A Proposal to Improve the Handling of Global Challenges |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Global warming;WTO;Coase-theorem |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H70 - General K - Law and Economics > K0 - General > K00 - General Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q50 - General |
Item ID: | 108984 |
Depositing User: | Prof. Dr. Ulrich van Suntum |
Date Deposited: | 04 Aug 2021 15:15 |
Last Modified: | 04 Aug 2021 15:15 |
References: | Acemoglu, D. (2003), Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics. Journal of Comparative Economics 31, 620 – 652. Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. (1962): The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI Coase, R. (1960): The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1 – 44 Demsetz, H. (1967): Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review 57, 347 – 359 Dixit, A., and Olsen, M. (2000): Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase theorem? Journal of Public Economics 76, 309-335 Guzman, A. T. (2004): Global Governance and the WTO. Harvard International Law Journal 45, 303 – 351. Hoekman, B.M., Kostecki, M.M. (2009): The Political Economy of the World Trading System. The WTO and Beyond. Oxford 3rd. ed. Holmström, B., Nalebuff, B. (1992): To the raider goes the surplus? A re-examination of the free-rider problem. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1, 37 – 62. Krueger, A.O., Aturupane, C. (eds.) (2000) The WTO as an international organization. University of Chicago Press. McKelvey, R. D., Page, T. (1999): Taking the Coase theorem seriously. Economics and Philosopy 15, 235 – 247. Libecap, G. D. (1989): Contracting for property rights. Cambridge Medema, Steven G.,. Zerbe, R.O. Jr. (1995): The Coase Theorem. CRESP, Center for Research on Economic and Social Policy, University of Colorado at Denver. Schelling, T.C. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict. Ann Arbor, MI |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/108984 |