Consumer naivete and competitive add-on pricing on platforms

Ghosh, Meenakshi (2021): Consumer naivete and competitive add-on pricing on platforms.

Abstract

We model a situation where two sellers trade vertically and horizontally differentiated goods on a platform for which they are charged a commission fee. Sellers' costs are asymmetric due to differences in the fees charged by the platform and in their costs of production. Consumers purchase either a base good, or a bundle comprising of the base good and an add-on, from one of the sellers on the platform. Consumers differ in their brand preferences, valuations of quality and in their levels of sophistication. More specifically, we assume that there is a fraction of consumers who are naive, and do not observe or consider add-on prices - possibly because they do not foresee their demand for an add-on - until after they have committed to buying the base good from a seller. We examine how the interplay of these forces shapes consumer behavior, sellers' pricing strategies and cost pass-through, and platform fees and revenues.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: add-on pricing, consumer naivete, cost asymmetry, horizontal differentiation, platform fees, cost pass-through
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility

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