Estimación Máximo Verosímil y Bayesiana de la Probabilidad de Detección

Merino Troncoso, Carlos (2020): Estimación Máximo Verosímil y Bayesiana de la Probabilidad de Detección.

Abstract

This article estimates the probability of detection of cartels using a sample of cartels discovered between 2011 and 2016. This type of study has been questioned for using a sample considered biased of all cartels. This article uses two alternative methodologies to conclude, like (Harrington and Wei 2017), that there is no such bias, and that the estimation of the probability of detection around 15% using the traditional Bryant-Eckard method is acceptable, although it must be interpreted as a probability of disappearance (or death) of the cartels, which only equals the probability of detection when we assume that all the cartels disappear by detection. We must therefore consider that the result is an upper limit below which the real probability of detection should be.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian Estimation of Detection Probabilities
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: cartel, detection, probabilities
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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