The ’New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: the Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs

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Institutions in the ‘Birth of Europe’: Long Distance Trade, Fairs, and Transaction Costs

No institutions were more important than fairs in the early commercialisation of the European economy, following what Robert Lopez called ‘the Birth of Europe’, from the late tenth and eleventh centuries. This was the very era, according to the well-known if now unpopular Pirenne thesis, in which Europe experienced the revival of long-distance trade and the consequent growth of towns, as the chief motors of economic growth.1 Lopez also viewed the ensuing three centuries as the ‘Commercial Revolution’ era, during which Europe acquired the veritable foundations of modern capitalism in new commercial and financial institutions. Even those unsympathetic to the Pirenne or Lopez theses might still agree that international fairs based on long-distance trade did play a crucial role in European economic development during these three centuries.2

If the study of institutions, and in particular commercial institutions, has long been a commonplace feature old-fashioned forms of European economic history, the particular and often peculiar dynamics of such institutions did not really receive their proper due in theoretical Economics until the renowned economic historians Douglass North and Robert Fogel won the No-


2 Such emphasis on commercial institutions does not imply, however, any neglect of the more contemporary research that has been done on agrarian and demographic history; but neither time nor space permit an examination of the obviously crucial linkages between agrarian, demographic, and commercial and related institutional factors and forces in European economic growth.
bel Prize for Economics in 1993. North’s particular contributions to the so-called ‘new institutional economics’ are fundamentally based upon the roles that various institutions have played in reducing the burden of transaction costs in European economic development, from medieval to modern times. In one of the best articles to highlight this theme, Clyde Reed, a prominent student of Douglass North, has demonstrated that a given reduction in transaction costs (of, say, 10 percent) had a far more powerful effect in stimulating economic growth, in early-modern Europe, than did a proportional reduction in production costs.

In the fully-developed North model, the concept of ‘transaction costs’ includes all those directly, indirectly, and ultimately involved in transferring goods from producers to consumers. For North, the most important such costs were those incurred in seeking out and securing market information, and, in particular, ‘the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie all exchange’; but, also more broadly, all related costs involved in establishing and defending related property rights. Long before the seminal work of Douglass North, however, Frederic Lane (1900-84) had established his early reputation, during World War II, with several publications devoted to this very same theme of ‘protection costs’.

One of North’s major analytical contributions was to point out that ‘the transactions sector, unlike the production of industrial or agricultural goods [in the pre-modern economy], is subject to economies of scale’, thus involving very large fixed costs for most components of that sector. In other

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words, if trade and related commercial-financial transactions were organized on such a large scale that the normally high fixed costs could be spread over a large volume of commercial-financial transactions, especially if they could be concentrated rather than diffused, the unit transaction costs would necessarily fall. Conversely, if such commercial-financial transactions were disrupted, diminished, circumscribed, and reduced in scale or diffused, the unit transaction cost would adversely rise. Once more another eminent medieval economic historian, Michael Postan, had suggested something rather similar in contending that the ‘proportion of trading costs to total costs was probably less in the Middle Ages than it is now’, but also that they subsequently rose as ‘local taxation, war and piracy became more disturbing and more difficult to circumvent as the Middle Ages drew to their close’.

The emphasis that Douglass North’s model of the ‘transaction sector’ has placed on securing and defending market information and privileges (including privileged or asymmetric information), contracts, and property rights does not, however, seem to leave much room for the more mundane elements of distribution, marketing, and transportation costs. Yet surely these are also equally legitimate and important aspects of his concept of the all-embracing costs involved in transferring goods from producers to consumers, necessarily via the commercial-financial sector. Thus whether or not Douglass North and his disciples would fully approve of their inclusion, this current study will necessarily do so, much as Michael Postan certainly did.

Peace, Warfare, Transportation: and the Van der Wee Model on Long-Distance Trade

Furthermore the central theme of this study focuses as well upon Postan’s observations on the role of warfare in the later-medieval economy: in particular, the impact of related fiscal, monetary and commercial policies, of brigandage and piracy, and of various defensive responses, in raising

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7 M. POSTAN, The Trade of Medieval Europe: the North, in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, ed. M.M. POSTAN, E. MILLER, II, Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages, 2nd edn., Cambridge 1987, p. 204 [The chapter in the first edn. of 1952 has been reprinted in: M.M. POSTAN, Medieval Trade and Finance, Cambridge 1973, pp. 92-231.] But for more modern times, the rest of Postan’s quotation would differ markedly from that of Clyde Reed in stating that: ‘[this] is merely another way of saying that far greater economies have resulted from industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than from corresponding improvements in transport and distribution’.

8 See D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of the Western World, cit., pp. 71-96; Reed, ‘Transactions Costs’, pp. 177-190, but esp. pp. 180-186; D. NORTH, Structure and Change, cit., ch. 1-5; ID., Cost of Exchange in History, cit., pp. 255-264. In his more recent writings, North has given added emphasis to the ‘immense resources devoted to promulgating codes of conduct’ (ideological attitudes concerning property rights and contracts). Finally see ID., Transaction Costs in History, cit., p. 558, for a much narrower definition of transaction costs than the one employed here: ‘the costs of specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie all exchange’.
transportation and all other transaction costs in European long-distance trade, and especially in fair-oriented overland trade. The obvious converse deduction to be drawn from that central thesis, therefore, is that long-distance fair-oriented trade flourished most successfully during the preceding and succeeding eras of relative peace, relative security, and thus of relatively lower transaction costs. To facilitate this task we must recall and reconsider in depth the truly seminal but sadly neglected thesis that Herman Van der Wee published, with Theo Peeters, a full thirty years ago (1970), in *Annales*: ‘An economic model of the intersecular growth of world trade from the twelfth to eighteenth centuries’.

In basically just sixteen pages of text, followed by another eight pages of rather abstruse mathematics and econometric analyses (and then a brief, summary conclusion), the two authors may not have succeeded, however, in convincing most readers that they had truly unlocked the secrets of European economic growth – all the more so since this article appeared well before Douglass North had published his key, path-breaking studies on institutional economics and transaction costs, chiefly in and from 1973.

Anticipating some elements of the Van der Wee and North theses, both Postan and especially Lopez had propounded the dictum that the ‘Birth of Europe’ itself and the ensuing ‘Commercial Revolution’ era had fundamentally depended upon the ability of post-Carolingian Western Europe to repel its major chronic invaders (Norsemen, Muslims, Magyars) and to establish relative peace and security. If warfare was subsequently never absent from the European scene, chiefly in the form of sporadic, small-scale feudal conflicts, Western Europe also benefited from the ability to export most of its military energies abroad in the Crusades, which, somewhat surprisingly did more to foster than to inhibit the expansion of long-distance maritime trade, especially with the Muslim world, by ensuring a decisive Christian naval supremacy in the Mediterranean basin. Yet, Lopez and Postan implicitly and Van der Wee far more explicitly demonstrated that the chief dynamic elements in the expansion of long-distance trade, and thereby, by backward and forward linkages with other sectors, of the European economy were actually based much more on overland, continental trade routes.


10 See above, nn. 3-5, 8.
Under such conditions of relative peace and security, rapid commercial expansion, and economic growth over the next three centuries, European fairs, chiefly based on overland trade, both regional and continental, proliferated and flourished; and they did so the most impressively during the latter half of the Commercial Revolution era, often referred to as the ‘long thirteenth century’, from c.1180 to c.1320. Most economic historians would now agree that in this period Western Europe experienced its most dramatic and propulsive growth, economic and demographic, accompanied by the stimulus of at first mild and then more severe inflation. For many historians, Michael Postan and his disciples in particular, such rising prices provided good proof for their theorem of the immanent overexpansion of a still technologically inert European economy: one that was unable ultimately to sustain continuous population growth, so that it fell victim to a full-blown Malthusian crisis by the early fourteenth century. Though Europe certainly did experience a severe crisis by the early fourteenth century, the current evidence now indicates that it was due more to warfare and to structural problems in international trade than to any adverse Malthusian demographic factors.

Revisiting the North-Milgrom-Weingast Model: on Medieval Fairs & the Law Merchant

Furthermore, not all historians who have focused on the propulsive role of international trade in promoting economic growth during the Commercial Revolution have given the economics, and especially the institutional economics, of fairs their ‘fair’ due, as it were. The most famous of this era were, of course, the Five Fairs of Flanders, the English Midlands Fairs, and above all the Champagne Fairs, though there were many others of importance, if too numerous to be considered here.12

Douglass North did not himself neglect the significance of the Champagne Fairs; for ten years ago, with two colleagues, Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast, he published an important article on ‘The Law Merchant, Private

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11 See in particular M. POSTAN, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of the Medieval Economy, Cambridge 1973, especially pp. 186 - 213; and also below, pp.

Their fundamental contention is that ‘an enduring pattern of trade over a wide geographical area cannot be sustained if it is profitable for merchants to renege on promises or repudiate agreements’ -- in short, to cheat; and further that, ‘to capture the gains associated with geographic specialization [in long distance trade], a system had to be provided that ...provided for the enforcement of agreements across space and time [and that]...lowered information costs [about such enforcement].’ Indeed, all forms of commerce, for which so many individuals have the short-run temptation to cheat, require mechanisms or institutions to ‘promote the trust necessary for efficient exchange’. For simple bilateral exchanges in local trade, involving merchants well known to each other, that mechanism is usually the personal bond: in the commonplace sense that ‘a man’s word is his bond’, a bond that develops from continuing personal relationships that produce a strongly positive reputation for integrity. But how can such a ‘reputation system’ of personal bonds be transferred and transmitted to large-scale, long-distance, multi-lateral trades with so many participants, few of whom would have known each other?

In the North-Milgrom-Weingast model, for the Commercial Revolution era itself, the most efficient commercial institution, with the lowest transaction costs, was the evolving international Law Merchant, and more specifically the law-merchant courts to be found in the international fairs. The function of such courts was by no means merely the adjudication of disputes but more importantly the low-cost communication of vital information to the entire international community of merchants trading there: information derived from suits held before such courts, on both the good and bad behaviour of merchants, and then transmitted via their own national mercantile guilds and consulates elsewhere, to those who would never have the opportunity of previously encountering such miscreant, untrustworthy merchants in person. Hence ‘transferable reputations for honesty can serve as an adequate bond for honest behaviour if members of the trading community can be kept informed about each other’s past behaviour.’ Certain transaction costs were necessarily involved in this transmission: (1) in inculcating the proper response of all members of the community to behave honestly, lest they themselves lose customers, clients, and contracts; but more important (2) in ensuring that they be kept properly informed about the decisions of law merchant courts, to honour and respect those decisions concerning the behaviour of their colleagues, and thus to boycott or ostracise those found guilty of cheating and of other-

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wise reneging on contracts or informal promises. Thus, in the absence of formal state-authorized sanctions, they were required to punish the miscreants by excluding them from all commerce.

While most medieval fairs might have claimed to offer similar risk-averting and cost-saving measures for conducting commerce, the Champagne Fairs, in their view, enjoyed the greatest advantages of them all: in providing better organized and better trained law-merchants courts; in providing more efficient mechanisms for excluding miscreants and enforcing contracts; by attracting such a large and varied international community of merchants with their institutions (guilds, consulates, etc) for the international transmission of crucial information; and above all, by offering those requisite ‘economies of scope and scale that smaller fairs could not offer’, at such low unit transaction costs. Such considerations, obviously, are more important than mere considerations of scale-economies in conducting trade and in effecting the associated financial transactions. Most of their very intriguing article is devoted to mathematical exercises in Game Theory (‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game’) – and both the problems of cheating and shirking seem to be central to modern Game Theory – to prove their points that, in almost all circumstances, it paid merchants to be honest while trading at fairs equipped with law-merchant courts that supervised such commercial activities.14

North and his co-authors, in writing a very succinct game-theoretical article, did not wish to bother their readers with trivial historical details about the ways in which the Champagne and other Fairs actually functioned. But the fruits of research from more mundane narrative historians may be cited, nevertheless, to substantiate key components of their model: in particular, those offered by Robert-Henri Bautier, one of the most renowned and best informed historians of the Champagne Fairs and of their international trade in textiles.15 He has effectively demonstrated that these Fairs’ great success did not rest so much on their location -- for other potential fair towns lay on the same or even better overland routes between the northwestern textile-producing towns and their key Mediterranean markets --. Instead, their prosperity depended on the ability of the counts of Champagne to provide and guarantee all merchants, and their mercantile organisations, personal security and security of their property rights, not only in their commerce at the Fairs but also, with full royal support (from 1209), in travelling to and from Cham-

14 They also refer the reader to the following excellent article, to illustrate some of their key points, in a very different place and time, Muslim North Africa during the 11th century: A. Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, in “Journal of Economic History”, 49/4, 1989, pp. 857-882.
In particular, the counts sought to ensure that all commercial contracts signed at the Fairs were judicially valid throughout western Christendom. They empowered the Fair Wardens to ‘outlaw’ defaulting merchants, and even their fellow citizens, when judicial institutions in their own towns failed to compel them to honour debts contracted at the Fairs. The enforcement of mercantile security and mercantile contracts does not seem to have suffered any impairment from Champagne’s absorption into the royal domain in 1273, on the death of Count Henry III without a male heir. Indeed, one may well contend that the continued success of the Fairs depended much more broadly upon the general peace and security of this ongoing Commercial Revolution era.

The ‘Decline of the Champagne Fairs’: Institutional, Financial, and Transportation Models

In an ever changing and developing world, however, few such institutional advantages could possibly survive into the early-modern era -- or so most historians have contended. In the conclusion of their article, North-Milgrom-Weingast contend that the Champagne Fairs, and by implication, the fair-system itself, were eventually bound to be replaced by a system of ‘state enforcement’, i.e. with the emerging centralized and more powerful central monarchical or state governments, ‘typically in the late middle ages’. In their view, such state enforcement of commercial contracts and codes of conduct became more efficient, with lower transaction costs, because the state ‘could seize the property of individuals who resisted paying judgements, or put them in jail’; and thus, ‘if judgements could be enforced in this way, then, in principle, the costs of keeping merchants informed about another’s past behaviour could be saved.’

In a similar vein, most historians over the past century have propounded similar views to the effect that the Champagne Fairs were doomed to disappear, with the inexorable progress of European economic development, in

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16 Ibid: on several occasions (specifically in 1227 and 1262) the counts even intervened to ensure the presence at the fairs of French or Italian merchants who had been subjected to papal interdicts. See also H. Dubois, Les institutions des foires médiévales: protection ou exploitation du commerce, and P. Jeannin, La diffusion de l’information, both in Fiere e mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee, sec. XIII – XVIII. ed. S. Cavaciocchi, Firenze 2001 (Istituto internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Atti delle Settimane di Studi e altri convegni, 32), pp.

17 On seizing Champagne, Philip III also arranged the marriage of the heiress Joan with his own son, the future Philip IV the Fair (1285-1314), who subsequently did damage the Fairs, with both the warfare and especially the post-1295 coinage debasements, discussed below. See E. Fournial, Histoire monétaire de l’occident médiéval, Paris 1970, pp. 112-139.

particular with the concomitant technological and institutional changes that nullified their prior advantages. Thus if the Fairs’ chief prior advantage, in a more primitive era of economic development, had been to canalize and coalesce otherwise small and scattered trickles of long-distance trade, especially in overland continental trade, into a few large and fasting flowing Fair oriented-rivers, then surely the growth of much bigger and better organized, more commercialized towns and cities would offer even greater advantages for conducting international trade. As one of the first scholars to propose such a thesis, the famous Max Weber contended that international fairs, such as the Champagne Fairs, became redundant with the development of the ‘consignment system’ in the export trades by which ‘goods are sent abroad on a speculation... to a third party, the consignor, who must market them according to the directions of the consignor’. Consequently, ‘consignor and consignee do not meet as the earlier traders did, at the fair’. No evidence was offered to substantiate such views, delivered in a series of posthumously-published lectures -- not even a hint of details that would allow us to determine when, where, how, and why such a dramatic transition occurred.19

Such specific determinants, however, may be found in the publications of Raymond De Roover, by far the most influential modern proponent of these ‘ineluctable progress’ theories. According to his famous ‘Commercial Revolution’ thesis, the great Italian merchant-banking companies, who had dominated the commerce of the Fairs, effected two major and institutional innovations, both of which, by early fourteenth century, made the commerce and financial transactions of these Fairs redundant. They may be viewed through the currently fashionable lens of the principal-agent model in theoretical Economics.20

The first and most monumental change was the shift from itinerant fair-oriented trade to what he called ‘sedentary’ trade, as these firms established a network of branch offices with permanently stationed local fattore agents. Empowered with a much greater stock of more reliable market information, and perhaps with advantages of asymmetrical knowledge, certainly in relation to still itinerant mercantile rivals, they could far more effectively, and with

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much lower financial costs, transact commerce between the various branch offices and with their home offices in Italy, especially for the export of northern textiles to the Mediterranean and the import of southern and Asian luxury goods to the north-west Europe.

Second, and as a concomitant part of such principal-agent relationships, these Italian merchant banking houses soon adopted the more ‘advanced’ bill-of-exchange to displace the old fashioned, cumbersome, and very costly payment mechanism known as the instrumentum ex causa cambii.21 Because this instrumentum had been a formal bond of indebtedness, as both a loan or investment contract and a financial-transfer mechanism, it had to be notarized to have a valid standing in law courts. Furthermore, both because it was a fair-oriented three-party document, and because otherwise the legal standing of agents abroad was not secure, its use required the personal presence of the second principal, the debtor, to effect both the transaction of the Fair commerce and the Fair transfer-payments. Its Italian-devised successor in the bill-of-exchange or cambium was far simpler to use; and although its use did involve some additional transaction costs, on a net-basis, it was still the much cheaper financial instrument. Instead of being a formal notarized and bonded obligation to pay, the cambium was instead a simple holograph document commanding payment: in effect a letter by which the principal merchant in city A (the taker), having received investment funds or funds for remittance from another principal (the deliverer), instructed his resident payer agent in city B abroad to make payment on his behalf to the payee agent of that merchant from whom he had received the original funds (i.e. the deliverer).22


22 See example of bills-of-exchange, based on the Datini archives in Prato, involving Italian merchants in Bruges and Barcelona, in 1399-1400: in R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges, cit., pp. 56, 72. Typically, a bill-of-exchange transaction involved four, rather than three, parties: two principals in one city A and their two agents in the other, foreign city B. In city A, the first merchant ‘lends’, as the deliverer (dattore), a specified sum to another merchant, known as the taker (prenditore or traente), or invests in his foreign trade venture, receiving in return not a bond but a copy of the aforesaid
In De Roover’s view, the spread and final victory of the bill-of-exchange necessarily depended upon the concomitant victory of the ‘sedentary-commercial’ system, with the well organized network of branch offices run by resident fattore, over itinerant, fair-oriented forms of commerce. In fact, however, a closer examination of late-medieval bills of exchange, especially those in the Datini archives, indicates that many such principal-agent bills did not involve, or necessarily involve, such mercantile branch offices. For often the agents for both parties in city B were independent merchant bankers, who maintained deposit accounts on behalf of these and many other clients. Hence, one may argue, as many canon lawyers did, that the cambium was not a true loan contract, in the defined sense of the Roman-Law mutuum; that instead it was an investment contract by which the deliverer was, in effect, purchasing a claim on another merchant’s bank account assets in that foreign city B. Consequently, if no loan was involved, no usury was present. In De Roover’s view, however, the cambium was a loan contract, but one that had the major advantage of ‘disguising’ the true interest rate within the exchange rate, which was normally ‘raised’ in favour of the lender-deliverer, on both the original outgoing cambium (from A to B) and the return or incoming recambium (from B back to A, to remit the funds to the original deliverer). Those engaged in such bills-of-exchange transactions could still escape formal charges of usury so long as the exchange rate and thus the implicit interest rate on the recambium was not predetermined – the crucial test, along with the presence of a genuine mutuum contract, for evidence of usury.23

Whatever one’s view of this debate about the true nature of the later-medieval bill-of-exchange, quite clearly De Roover was correct, at least, in cambium, by which the taker instructs his agent in B to make payment, on his behalf, to the deliverer’s agent [technically: he ‘draws for payment upon’ his agent in city B]. In City B, the deliverer’s banking agent, serving as the payee (beneficiario), receives a copy of the cambium and presents it for ‘acceptance’ (not yet for payment) to the taker’s agent, the payer or drawee (pagatore or trattario), who writes his ‘acceptance’, with the date, on the back of the bill (e.g. Acettata a di 11 di gennaio 1399), thus signalling his obligation to make the required payment, on the due or maturity date, to the deliverer’s agent, the said payee. See the previous note.

23 In a mutuum contract the borrower obliged himself by a true bond to repay the exact sum of the principal lent to him, and the lender was forbidden to exact more than the principal sum, for in such a contract the ownership of the capital sum so lent passed from the lender to the borrower; and the lender thus could not exact any of the fruits of that ownership, as an investor in a partnership or in a commenda contract would be entitled to do, by virtue of purchasing an equity or ownership share in the venture or enterprise. If, in a set of bill of exchanges, the exchange rate on the recambium was determined at the same time as the rate on the original cambium, then, in the eyes of the Church, it became a mutuum loan contract, and such predetermined exchange rates were indeed deemed to include usury or interesse. See in particular, J.A. BRUNDAGE, Usury, in Dictionary of the Middle Ages, I-XIII, ed. J.R. STRAYER, et al, New York 1982-89, XII, 1989, pp. 335-339; J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Cambridge Mass. 1957, Part One: chapters I-III, and V, pp. 11-81, 100-133; T.P. MCLAUGHLIN, The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury (XII, XIII and XIV Centuries), in “Medieval Studies”, 1, 1939, pp. 81-147; 2, 1940, pp. 1-22.
implying that the net transaction costs involved in using the bill-of-exchange both for investments in trade (or for providing commercial loans) and for remitting funds between cities were much lower than those for the fair-oriented *instrumentum ex causa cambii*. To be sure, both the *instrumentum ex causa cambii* and then the subsequent *cambium* had provided an enormous savings in commercial-financial transaction costs in greatly reducing, if not eliminating, international payments in transported precious metals: inherently so high cost, because of the tremendous risks of theft, confiscation (in violating increasingly common bans on bullion exports), and other forms of loss while *en route*.

But the *instrumentum* remained and could not be disguised as anything but a formal loan contract: a *mutuum* in whose exchange rates any competent canon lawyer would detect the presence of *usury* (i.e. pure interest). The once commonplace view that the canonical usury doctrine was not taken seriously by medieval merchants is one that cannot be sustained, especially in view of the considerable research that demonstrates the significant intensification of both the ecclesiastical and secular campaigns against usury from the early thirteenth century, the era of the Fairs, and culminating in the later Middle Ages. We should also not forget the fundamentally religious character of the fairs themselves, especially in that all of the words for fairs refer to holy days (holidays), religious festivals, celebrations, or masses: *feria(e)*, *fiere*, *ferias*, *foires*, *Messen*, *kermis-se*. While the usury doctrine did not prevent the use of loan contracts in financing trade and industry, their use certainly did involve significant impediments and thus much higher transaction costs than did licit investment contracts, because of the inherent risks that a ‘usurious’ merchant

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would encounter: (1) in ecclesiastical and secular punishments or sanctions, and/or (2) moral ostracism, and (3) in the renunciation of usurious contracts that could not be upheld in courts of law.

Conversely, however, and for this very same reason, the simple holograph bill-of-exchange, and similar, if more loan-oriented, commercial contracts, such as the letter obligatory (what later became known as the promissory note) had no standing in any courts of law, including law-merchant courts, in this era, certainly not in the late thirteenth, early-fourteenth centuries. What courts did require as unassailable evidence of an obligation to make payment, or repayments, was the bond, and in particular formally notarized bonds, such as the instrumentum ex causa cambii, or its much longer-lasting English counterpart, the recognizance, whose repayment provisions were encoded in Parliamentary law, from as early as the Statute of Acton Burnell (Statutum de Mercatoribus) of 1283; and in the subsequent decisions of Common Law Courts. Therefore the risk of renunciation or of non-payment of bills-of-exchange and similar holograph bills -- as ‘dishonoured bills’ -- was far higher, all the more so if the bills had been transferred in payment for other transactions to third parties, as ‘bearer bills’. That was a severe problem that would not begin to be resolved until the 1430s, and was not fully resolved until the sixteenth century, under circumstances involving both law-merchant courts and, perhaps surprisingly, fairs.

For most medieval economic historians, however, the chief explanation for the disappearance of the Champagne Fairs, and by implication at least, of all inland-oriented international fairs, is to be found in an even more important technological revolution, in shipping and navigation: i.e. the establishment of a direct sea route from the Italian maritime republics to the chief ports of northern Europe, especially to Bruges, Southampton, and London.

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27 See below, pp. 443-444, for the final section of this paper.

If the Genoese and the Majorcans were evidently the first to do so, from about 1274, a regular, more or less continuous galley service between the major Italian maritime republics and the northern ports of Bruges, then Southampton, and London was not established until after 1317; and then the Venetians, after founding their Bruges consulate in 1322, came to dominate that northern galley trade.²⁹

The Bautier-Verlinden ‘Textile Industrialization’ Model and the International Trade in Textiles

For both R.H. Bautier and Charles Verlinden, the truly decisive factor, though one in their view clearly related to the establishment of the Italian galley routes, was the ‘industrialization of Italy’.³⁰ Its most important aspect was the establishment of high-quality, luxury-oriented woollen cloth industries, in Florence, and in a considerable number of other Tuscan and Lombard towns. That industry became heavily dependent on imported English wools, then by far the world’s finest; and most historians would naturally assume that the cheapest, safest way of importing them from far distant England was by galleys. Not before the early fifteenth century, furthermore, would the primacy of English wools begin to be seriously challenged, and from a much closer source: Spanish merino wools, whose use, however, was not so readily accepted in this era by all Italian (and certainly not by Netherlander) textile industries.³¹

The problem with all of these plausible and fanciful ‘progress-oriented’ theses to explain the decline of the Champagne Fairs is that they all pertain to

²⁹ See the previous note; and also Armando SAPORI, Le marchand italien au moyen âge, École Pratique des Hautes Études, VIe section: Affaires et gens d’affaires, Paris 1952, part IV: ‘Routes et transports,’ pp. 64-74; R.S. LOPEZ, Studi sull’economia genovese nel medio evo, Turin 1936; and IDEM, The Trade of Medieval Europe: The South, cit., pp. 374-479.


developments that came long after the Fairs’ decadence had been exposed in full view.32 Therefore, they should instead be considered more as consequences than as prior causes of either the decline itself; or at least the indirect consequences of the forces that had led to their decline, by the very early fourteenth century. Furthermore, the term for the final explanation given for the Fair’s decline, Bautier-Verlinden’s ‘industrialization of Italy’, is itself very misleading, and especially so in the sphere of textiles. For almost two centuries, from the twelfth to early fourteenth, Florence had achieved great fame for its Arte di Calimala, a mercantile-industrial organization that was based upon on importing, dyeing, finishing and then re-exporting Franco-Flemish woollens. Furthermore, during this same era, Florence and many other Italian towns had experienced an impressive industrial growth in several flourishing textile industries that had exported a wide variety cheap and light worsted or semi-worsted fabrics to markets in the Mediterranean. Marketed with such names as saia, saia cotonata, stametto, trafilato, taccolino, tritana (cf. Flemish tiretaines), they ranged in value from about 10 to 30 percent, at the most, of the Franco-Flemish woollens imported by the Arte di Calimala.33 Of even greater importance were fustians, equally cheap and light linen-cotton based fabrics,

32 Bautier, evidently supported in this thesis by Verlinden, added yet another, final monetary factor: the vicissitudes of bimetallism, with radical changes in the gold:silver ratios, ‘which completely disorganized the balances of the [Italian gold-based] companies whose activity rested on foreign exchange sales’. Indeed, earlier Bautier had established the point that ‘the main purpose of the fairs of Champagne was the provision of specie for the Italian purchases of French and Flemish draperies’. See R.-H. BAUTIER, Les foires de Champagne, cit., pp. 63, 62; Cf. also CH. VERLINDEN, Markets and Fairs, cit., pp. 133-34. But this thesis also fails to provide an adequate explanation of the Fairs’ decline for the same reason: these monetary changes came well after the onset of the Fairs’ decline. Indeed the bimetallic monetary perturbations, which led to what Frederic Lane called the ‘first infidelities of the Venetian lire,’ can be the most precisely dated: 1330-32, after which the bimetallic ratio (at Venice) plunged from a high of 14.2:1 to just 9.4:1 by 1350, thus radically undermining the assets of all gold-based commercial firms. Based upon the bimetallic ratios cited in P. SPUFFORD, Handbook of Medieval Exchange, London 1986, Table II, p. liii; and id., Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe, Cambridge 1988, pp. 271-282, with Graph II, p. 272; and Table 7, p. 354. See also F. LANE, The First Infidelities of the Venetian Lire, in The Medieval City, ed. H. MISKIMIN, D. HERLIHY, A.L. UDOWITCH, New Haven/London 1977, pp. 54-55. He comments that ‘gold coins, which had been rising generally [in value, relative to those of silver], took a sharp downward turn in Italy in 1326-32.’ Spufford, however, states that 1328 was the year in which gold values peaked; but the drop is not apparent until 1330. They both ascribe this dramatic change in the bimetallic ratio to sudden increases of both African ‘Sudanese’ and Hungarian gold supplies on west European markets.

whose production, chiefly in Lombardy, and export sales abroad enjoyed a spectacular expansion during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.34

The Great Medieval Turning-Point: the Warfare of c.1290-1340 and Rising Transaction Costs

What Bautier and Verlinden so misleadingly labelled ‘industrialization’ was in fact a dramatic industrial transformation that must be explained as the rational response to severe market adversities, with sharply rising transporta-
tion and transaction costs. These, in turn, were chiefly the deleterious conse-
quences of a spreading stain of continuous, chronic, ever more disruptive
and costly series of wars and other conflicts throughout the Mediterranean
basin and western Europe, from the 1290s to the 1340s, and then merging
into the better known and even more destructive era of the Hundred Years’
War (1337-1453) and related wars in western Europe. Having extensively ana-
lysed this warfare and its consequences elsewhere, I need do no more here
than point out the highlights. In the eastern Mediterranean, that warfare had
commenced in 1291 with the Mamluk conquest of Acre and the Latin King-
dom of Jerusalem, terminating a vital European connection with the Near
East and Asia; and worse, that conquest led to both papal and secular trade
bans with the Muslims, which, while not totally severing trade, certainly raised
the transaction costs of conducting that vital commerce. Furthermore, the
loss of these crucial Palestinian ports almost immediately led to a bitter war
between Venice and Genoa (1291-99) for control over alternative trade routes
to Asia via the Black Sea. Barely had that conflict ended when, in 1303, the
Ottoman Turks began their relentless conquest of Asia Minor and, subse-
quently, parts of Greece and the Balkans. In turn that was followed by Mon-
gol attacks against the Italian’s Black Sea colonies; by anarchy in the Mongol
Khanate in Persia and the Caucasus; and by Mamluk conquests in Lesser Ar-
menia (Cilicia), effectively closing off the last alternative route and subjecting
the Christian West to a virtual Mamluk monopoly over the Asian trades, at
Alexandria (the karimis cartel), certainly by 1344.35

18-69.
35 Italian trade had become very important in these Mongol-ruled areas; and this warfare marked the
initial crumbling of the famed ‘Pax Mongolica’. In Persia, the end of the Ilkhanid dynasty in 1335 was
followed by a ‘long period of anarchy’. Western merchants also utilized Crete, Cyprus, and Lajazzo (Cilicia
or ‘Lesser Armenia’) as intermediaries to conduct trade with the Muslim Levant, but paid a higher price in
doing so. Lajazzo was conquered by the Mamluks in 1347. See W. VON HEYD, Histoire du commerce du Levant
Trade in the Levant in the XIVth Century, in “Journal of European Economic History”, 5, 1976, pp. 533-586;
In the Muslim reaches of the western Mediterranean, equally destructive strife had commenced in 1291, when the aggressively expanding Berber Marinid state became embroiled in wars with Castile, Aragon, and Muslim Granada for control of the Iberian peninsula, a vicious struggle prolonged by military strife between these anti-Marinid allies, until the Spanish Christian victory at Rio Salado, in 1340, dispelled that Berber-Marinid threat forever.36

Perhaps even worse for western trade was an even earlier related conflict, the infamous Wars of the Sicilian Vespers, commencing in 1282, and soon embroiling not only Sicily but Naples, the Papacy and its allies, the Angevin realms of southern France, and Catalonia-Aragon. The ensuing papal Peace of Caltobellota in 1302 served only to unleash over ten thousand Catalan mercenaries: who, in being sent east to defend the Byzantine Empire against the Ottoman Turks, ended up ravaging parts of Anatolia, Macedonia, Thrace, and Greece (1303-12), while a smaller group plundered the North African coasts for many years with their fleets of corsairs. In Italy itself, Imperial German armies took advantage of this Peace to launch an invasion of Lombardy and Tuscany, which then provoked a resumption of the former intra-Italian wars in the form of the even more ferocious Guelf-Ghibelline Wars (Papal-Imperial, 1313-43) and then civil war within southern Habsburg Germany itself. Such wars devastated Italy in particular for the next three decades, with almost continuous foreign intervention by Catalan, French, German, and Hungarian armies, along with constant devastations from mercenary Free Companies of disbanded soldiers, whose depredations continued long after the wars had formally ended. Nor had north-western Europe been spared such conflicts. For again, from the 1290s, the Anglo-French, Anglo-Scottish, and Franco-Flemish wars (to 1319), which then led into the Flemish civil wars (1323-28), certainly did produce some sporadic disruptions in the commerce of this entire region, especially in the Low Countries and along the routes leading to the Champagne Fairs in northeastern France.

The most harmful consequences of these overlapping, entangling sets of wars and conflicts were by no means the destruction that they wrought or

even the physical impediments imposed on normal trade routes. More disastrous were the steadily rising transport and general transaction costs that ensued from their various ancillary consequences: from periodic but ever increasing trade embargoes, from ever more costly licences to transact trade with enemies (especially those in the Muslim-dominated Mediterranean ports), from increased tolls and taxes on trade, and from other fiscal and monetary policies, in particular from coinage debasements, adopted and long pursued to finance warfare, defence, and ever more costly modes of protection, on land and at sea. As Van der Wee, Lopez, and North have also contended, the negative consequences of such economic turmoil and disruptions, and of government responses, may have produced a more highly skewed distribution of wealth and income. The abundant and very detailed statistical evidence on such rising transport and transaction costs in international trade, from the 1290s into the fifteenth century, demonstrating a doubling or more in even maritime freight rates, are provided in several of my publications on these topics.37

The Impact of Rising Transaction Costs on the International Textiles Trades

How then, as the major question to be posed, did this very adverse combination of rising transportation and transaction costs affect and adversely alter the existing patterns and structure of international trade, particularly fair-oriented commerce? How did it affect the structure, orientation, and products of the various textile industries, north and south, that had served and fuelled the very growth of that trade? For the major textile industries of the western Mediterranean basin itself, principally in Italy and Catalonia, the impact of such rising costs was two-fold, by the early to mid fourteenth cen-

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tury: (1) to promote the growth of import substitution industries to replace some if by no means all of the high-grade Franco-Flemish woollen cloths, whose supplies, when not disrupted, were now much more costly to obtain; and (2) to undermine seriously the export-oriented production of the very cheap and coarse worsted, woollen, and worsted fabrics, which, to cite a common simile, could no longer ‘bear the freight’ in long-distance trade. Obviously the highly diversified textile industries of north-west Europe were even more seriously afflicted, because of their vastly greater distances from their primary markets, in the Mediterranean basin.

In general, the chief transformations that took place in the West European textile industries, certainly for those dependent on distant international markets, if not as much for those based on local or regional trade, was a re-orientation away from the cheap, light, coarse fabrics to concentrate more and more on much higher-quality and much higher priced woollens. In northern France, the Low Countries, the adjacent Rhineland, and England, those that were the most dramatically affected were the various sayetteries, other worsted-type draperies légères, and the cheaper, coarser linen and fustian (tiretaine) industries. Most, if not all, were then producing virtually undifferentiated fabrics, i.e. with many close substitutes, for export to Mediterranean markets, where they had to compete with lower-cost domestic producers, those with lower transportation costs in particular. Furthermore, to worsen the plight of these northern producers, such markets had evidently become saturated by the early fourteenth century, just when their combined production, transport, marketing, and other transaction costs were rising above the prevailing prices in the Mediterranean. In essence, those northern draperies that did survive, those with access to capital and market connections, were forced to transform themselves from mere passive ‘price-takers’ into aggressive ‘price-makers: i.e. to engage in ‘monopolistic competition’ producing much more differentiated, luxury-oriented woollens, with a far higher value:weight ratio, which could thus much better sustain these rising transport and transaction costs. Only a few would succeed in doing so and establish a secure market niche with their much-higher priced woollens.

For Italy itself such a radical industrial transformation is indeed clearly evident from the early fourteenth century. As Maureen Mazzaoui has shown, the once flourishing and widespread fustian industries began to experience a decline, at first gradual, but then steeper and inexorable, from at least the 1320s. By that same decade, the Tuscan and Lombard semi-worsted industries, were in even more serious decline. As Hidetoshi Hoshino has also dem-

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John H. Munro demonstrated, in various publications on the Italian cloth industries, first Florence, and then other Tuscan and Lombard towns began to reorient their textile production more and more, from the later 1320s, to much higher quality, indeed expensive woollens made from chiefly the better English wools. As early as the late 1330s, just a decade later, such woollens accounted for almost 75 percent of the aggregate value of their urban textile production, though this shift was not complete until the mid-century.39 Embraced within this same transformation of course was the decay of the cloth-importing and cloth-finishing Arte di Calimala, as the Arte di Lana became pre-eminent in producing the same type of luxury woollens, or even more luxurious varieties, from imported English wools. The very same and equally dramatic industrial transformations may be clearly observed in Catalan cloth production during this very same era.40

Even more substantial and much more detailed evidence for this very same industrial transformation may be observed in north-western Europe, especially throughout the southern Low Countries, from the very early years of the fourteenth century: (1) the virtual disappearance of almost all the once prominent and flourishing sayetteries, other draperies légeres or draperies sèches, and the coarser linen industries, except for the sayetteries of Hondschoote and Arras, which, though losing their southern markets, did manage to retain some local and northern, principally German markets; (2) the consequent relative shift of textile production to the so-called draperies ointes ('greased' draperies), of which the most important were in Ghent, Ypres, Bruges, Mechelen, Brussels, and Leuven. By the 1350s, their high-priced, heavy-weight woollen broadcloths, such as the Ghent dickedinnen (30 ells = 21 m), would cost a master mason over nine months daily wages (173 days' wages) for just a single broadcloth. For many historians, to be sure, one of the more striking aspects of the Flemish industrial transformation was the rise, in small towns and the larger villages, of the so-called nouvelles draperies, of which Wervik, Kortrijk, Menen, and Comines were the most prominent. But they, too, had transformed themselves from their former status as members of the draperies légères to join the draperies ointes in similarly producing heavy-weight woollens, but as

lower-priced imitations of those sold by the major urban draperies: by resorting to cheaper dyes, and especially by using lesser quantities of somewhat cheaper wools. These cloths, in contrast to the image of cheap, light fabrics, so falsely portrayed by Pirenne and his followers, were in fact better in quality and more expensive than later-medieval England's esteemed broadcloths. In the 1360s, a Wervik woollen broadcloth (27 ells = 19 m) would have cost a Bruges or Ghent mason 85 days’ wages, and the lesser paid English (Oxford) mason 132 days’ wages.41

In England itself, virtually all of the old, traditional eastern seaboard urban draperies, chiefly producing very cheap and light cloths (including stamfords or stanfortes and says) had collapsed by the 1330s, though Norfolk’s native worsted industry managed to survive until the 1370s, by focusing on the still relatively peaceful Baltic and north German-Scandinavian markets. Thereafter, and especially from the 1390s, the precipitous decline of the remaining worsted exports was mirrored by the dramatic rise of woollen broadcloth exports.42 But in this era, very few English woollen broadcloths reached Mediterranean markets; and they did not in fact begin to make a real impact there until about the 1430s or 1440s.43

In the continental north-west, the aforementioned industrial-transformation strategy did allow a small number of Norman, Brabantine, and Flemish producers, including, remarkably, the Flemish nouvelles draperies, to maintain or even gain some foothold in Mediterranean markets. Nevertheless, the luxury-oriented woollen draperies in northern France, the Low Countries – including the late-comer Leiden (Holland), which became a major participant from the 1360s -- and England, were also forced to rely on the more accessible, northern and especially Hanseatic-dominated markets in Germany,


Scandinavia, Poland, and Livonia-Russia, i.e. those with relatively lower transport and transaction costs, as did the few surviving sayetteries.

To gain historical perspective on this geographic market reorientation, we must remember that much earlier, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the northern textile industries had gained decisive dominance in most of the Mediterranean markets for both cheap fabrics and luxury woollens, even if some of the latter were re-finished there. But from the 1340s, the presence of northern-produced cheap says, other worsted and semi-worsted fabrics was almost non-existent in these southern markets, except for a few so-called ‘Irish sayes’ of doubtfull provenance. Furthermore, by the later fourteenth century, the northern industries’ share of Mediterranean markets for luxury-woollens had shrunk considerably, in the face of a growing preponderance from Tuscan, Lombard, and Catalan producers of finer woollens, some of which, the Florentine in particular, were in fact far more luxurious and costly than even the very best Flemish and Brabantine woollens.44

Textiles and Fairs: the Decline of the Champagne and English Fairs

The importance of the Champagne and other international Fairs of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and of their subsequent decline, as integral aspects of these industrial-commercial transformations from the later thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, cannot be too strongly emphasized. The publications of Patrick Chorley, if not necessarily my own, have surely demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Champagne Fairs had owed their great and flourishing expansion during the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries primarily to the sale or re-export of northern textiles to the Mediterranean basin. Furthermore, those textiles were not primarily high-quality woollens, as Pirenne, Bautier and so many others have wrongly asserted, but more especially, in terms of both volume and value, the aforementioned cheaper, lighter fabrics: the semi- and full worsteds, coarse woollens, mixed fabrics, and linens. Equally evident is the fact that the decline of these Fairs coincides exactly contemporaneously with the dramatic disappearance of these cheap and light sayetteries and other draperies légères in the Low Countries and elsewhere in north-western Europe.45


45 See P. Chorley, Cloth Exports of Flanders, cit., pp. 349-87; J. Munro, sources cited in nn. 42, 44.
Less well known is the indisputable fact that once famed medieval English fairs—such as the St. Ives, St. Giles (Winchester), Stamford, and Northampton Fairs—were also similarly undergoing a precipitous decline in commercial transactions from the 1290s, precisely when the once important English textile towns of York, Louth, Beverley, Lincoln, Stamford, Northampton, Leicester, Huntingdon, Norwich, Colchester, Oxford, Winchester, and London were all suffering from an equally dramatic slump in their export-oriented production. As Chorley, Childs, and myself have all contended, that cloth production had been predominantly in the form of very cheap and light fabrics, which were also chiefly destined for Mediterranean markets, via the English and then the Champagne Fairs: e.g. serges, says, wadmal, the famed if ill-understood, mixed-fabric stamfords (stanfortes) and the even cheaper and lighter ‘Northamptons’.46 Indeed, Ellen Moore, the leading historian of English medieval fairs, contends that the fortunes of all these Fairs had been very closely tied to the economies of the eastern textile-manufacturing towns, and thus that such cloths had constituted the major part of their commerce, especially in sales to visiting Flemish and Italian merchants.47

Relative Transportation Costs by Maritime and Continental Routes in the Fourteenth Century

The other and even more striking contemporaneous transformation, the aforementioned development of the direct sea route from the Mediterranean to northwestern ports, must now, therefore, also be viewed not as a cause but instead as one of the major consequences of the Fairs’ decline. More pre-

46 See P. CHORLEY, English Cloth Exports During the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries: the Continental Evidence, in “Historical Research: The Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research”, 61, 144, 1988, pp. 1-10; W. CHILDS, Anglo-Castilian Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Manchester 1978, pp 73-5; id., The English Export Trade in Cloth in the Fourteenth Century, in Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller, ed. R. BRITNELL, J. HATCHER, Cambridge/New York 1996, pp. 121-47; J. MUNRO, Industrial Crisis, cit., pp. 103-42. Thus at St. Ives, court incomes fell from £8 9s 2d in 1287 to £2 7s 6d in 1302. At Winchester’s St. Giles Fair, commercial revenues had dropped from £84 16s. 0d. in 1291 to £44 1s 0d in 1314; as early as 1291 their formerly reliable earnings from Lincoln cloth merchants had ceased; and by 1302 so had those from the York merchants. E.W. MOORE, The Fairs, cit., pp. 204-222.

47 Ibid. To be sure, Moore also adduces several other for this decline: including the dwindling attendance of Flemish merchants and the more aggressive role of London’s commercial sector. But, While London had certainly succeeded in enlarging its commercial role in the English economy by the later thirteenth century, Pamela Nightingale has recently demonstrated that London was experiencing a severe commercial depression (with some depopulation) by the 1320s, one that probably had begun somewhat earlier. See P. NIGHTINGALE, The Growth of London in the Medieval English Economy, in Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller, ed. R. BRITNELL, J. HATCHER, Cambridge 1996, pp. 89-106. For example, London’s share of taxable national wealth fell from 3.5 percent in 1307 to 2.1 per cent in 1315, retaining that low figure in 1334 assessment; in her view, the recession lasted until the 1360s. See also J. MUNRO, Industrial Crisis, cit., pp. 103-41.
cisely they were the consequence of those adverse war-related factors that so sharply raised the transport and transaction costs of trading along the frequently disrupted overland continental routes that had earlier fuelled the trade of the Fairs. To cite just one example, in 1327, an Italian merchant complained that the disruptions from the then raging Guelf-Ghibelline and Angevin wars had prevented his firm from transporting Franco-Flemish cloths from the Champagne Fairs to Genoa.\(^{48}\) Similarly, in 1342, a report commissioned by the government of the nearby port of Marseilles, so concerned about the serious decline in its trade and population, clearly evident from c.1330, specifically laid the blame on the very same Angevin wars, and also on the ‘the Fall of Acre’.\(^{49}\)

I am, of course, not the first to observe the basic nature of this early fourteenth-century shift from overland, continental trade routes, those based so much on the Champagne Fairs, to some increasing reliance on maritime routes to the North. Indeed, for the past thirty years much of my research has been inspired by Herman Van der Wee’s seminal but sadly neglected *Annales* article of 1970, even if I must now offer a minor criticism. For the Van der Wee article still leaves the reader with the impression that the establishment of the direct sea route was nevertheless a primary factor in the decline of the Fairs. In this all too brief article, he does, to be sure, focus on the consequences of warfare, but primarily the Hundred Years’ and related wars, in making the costs of overland, continental trade so often prohibitive, except for very high-value items; and thus his article does not really consider the impact of the previous era of warfare, that from the 1290s to the 1340s, which had been so crucial in determining the initial, if partial, shift from the continental overland to maritime routes. At the same time, one must also admit that this shift was far from ever becoming a total one, that much overland trade still continued, and that the relative shares of north-south commerce by


overland and maritime routes varied with the particular economic and political circumstances of the ensuing decades.

However, even for the trade in high-valued items, such as luxury woollens, two more statistical examples, from the 1390s, may be usefully cited. In 1397, a member of the Florentine Alberti firm contended that overland transport was feasible only for the very highest priced woollens. In 1398, the Italian merchant Gulgielmo Barberi, employed by the Datini firm of Prato, reported that the cost of shipping Wervik woollens from Bruges to Barcelona by sea amounted to 15 percent of the price (22 florins), while shipping them overland, when routes were safer, cost 22 percent of that price. But he also explicitly noted that some other merchants had ‘lost all their profit’ by so foolishly choosing to send their woollens overland. In contrast, we may note that, around 1310, the costs of transporting far cheaper Caen sayes overland via the Champagne Fairs and the Rhone valley route to Florence had cost only 8.8 percent of their much lower value (11.5 florins).

Even if maritime trade did subsequently become relatively cheaper than overland continental trade, via the traditional routes, the reasons for those advantages did not lie in any supposed technological innovations. For most of the supposed cost-savings advances, and especially those in naval technology that finally produced the caravel-designs and the full-rigged carracks, came a full century after this shift to maritime trade.52 In any event, Russell


51 A. SAPORI, *Una compagnia di calimala*, pp. 97-99: 1.01 florin per say in transporting 133 says; but total marketing costs amounted to 2.20 florins per say (19.2 percent). In another account, total marketing costs for 64 Caen says were 2.41 fl. per say, or 9.5 percent more per say in the smaller shipment. Caen says were then most expensive sold. See also P. CHORLEY, *Cloth Exports of Flanders*, p. 369. Comparing relative values is difficult, except to note that the early fourteenth century was a period of inflation, while the late fourteenth was one sharp deflation. See also R. LOPEZ, *Trade of Medieval Europe*, p. 374: noting that in 1318 the Del Bene Company, in transporting northern textiles to Florence, ‘paid less per mile [or km] on the overland stretch from Paris to Marseilles than on the maritime stretch from Marseilles to Pisa.’

Menard has argued that, from the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries, such changes in naval technology had little impact on direct shipping costs, whose changes were much more a function of political and commercial developments, especially in terms of providing relative security.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed on this very issue he also cited Postan’s comment: that ‘medieval communications, like other trading activities, suffered much more from instability and uncertainty, political in origin, than from high costs of an inefficient transport service.’\textsuperscript{54}

Furthermore, the actual costs of both shipbuilding itself and of maritime shipping rose in real terms, and quite substantially, principally again because of more advanced forms of naval warfare, partly in response to the piracy and corsair raids that so often accompanied such warfare. As Irene Katele has contended, the very commencement of the fourteenth century witnessed a veritable ‘watershed in the history of naval plundering.’\textsuperscript{55} In defence against such piracy and corsair warfare, Italians and Catalans built more heavily armed and thus much bigger, more sturdily designed ships, outfitted with larger complements of cross-bowmen, all of whom, along with regular sailors, were given steel-plated body armour. Costs mounted even more, from the 1330s, with the introduction of naval artillery and mobile small arms. Catalan shipping records show that freight rates indeed did rise substantially with such increased construction costs, at least for the heavily armed merchant ships: by over 25 percent between 1275 and 1330. Comparable Sicilian records reveal that freight rates virtually doubled over the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{56}

To be sure, that remarkable Genoese innovation of maritime insurance, from the early to mid fourteenth century, was designed to share the costs of such risks; but rising insurance premiums still added to transaction costs.

The Venetians, who curiously eschewed this financial innovation, instead chose, as their most cost-effective remedy, to design and build, with heavy


\textsuperscript{54} M. POSTAN, The Trade of Medieval Europe, cit., pp. 203-204.


\textsuperscript{56} CH.-E. DUFORCQ, L’Espagne catalane, cit., pp. 534-542. Shipping costs ranged from £200 Barcelonese for small ships (thirty-forty sailors) to £400 for galleys (eighty-120 rowers and 100-150 sailors); and costs of arming such ships against corsairs ranged from £50 to £100 extra per month. For Sicily, see H. BRESCH, Course et piraterie en Sicile (1250-1450), in “Anuario de estudios medievales”, 10, 1980, pp. 751-757; and ID., Un monde méditerranéen: Économie et société en Sicile, 1300 - 1450, I-II, Rome 1986, I, pp. 350-352.
state subsidies, even better galleys: the heavily-armed, three-masted so-called great-galley, a speedy military and commercial hybrid vessel that, as Lane has demonstrated, became the exclusive carrier of precious cargoes.57 By the fifteenth century they were outfitted as well with three lateen sails and one enormous forward-facing bronze cannon. Nevertheless, even Venetian merchants and their government would not risk sending their galleys to Alexandria, Constantinople, Beirut, or the northern ports (Bruges, Southampton, London), when shipping lanes were menaced by naval war (e.g. during the Venetian-Genoese War of 1350-55), or by fleets of corsairs. Thus, according to Venetian state records, the Flanders galleys made only 24 northbound voyages from 1332, when state-subsidies commenced, to 1400 (i.e. a mean of 2.8 per decade); but in the relatively more peaceful and commercially more propitious fifteenth century they made 86 such northbound voyages. 58 Even then, sea transport was hardly cheap, for shipping a sack of English Cotswold wool by galleys to Venice c. 1460 added about 25 percent to the cost.59


59 Wool, purchased in London for £8 sterling per sack, shipped to Venice with another £2 in shipping costs per sack; other charges raised total marketing costs to £6 11s sterling per sack (81.9 percent). BRITISH LIBRARY, ‘Noumbe de Weyghtes’, in Cotton MS Vespasian, E. IX, fo. 106r-108v, partially presented in Select Tracts and Table Books Relating to English Weights and Measures, 1100-1742, ed. H. HALL, F.J. NICHOLAS, London 1929(Camden Miscallany, XV, Camden Third Series, 12), pp. 120-20; and also partially cited in E. B. FRYDE, Anglo-Italian Commerce in the Fifteenth Century: Some Evidence about Profits and the Balance of Trade, in “Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire”, 50, 1972, pp. 345-355; reprinted in his Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance, London 1983, p. 355. The Genoese usually employed the much cheaper round ships or cogs, and later, the carracks; id., Italian Maritime Trade, cit., pp. 309-310, states that Genoese freight rates for wool were only 5.16% of the price (8s 3d per sack); those for alum and woad, about eight percent of their prices. See also id., English Cloth Industry, cit.; and E. AUSTOR, Catalan Cloth, cit., pp. 249-250. But other shipping costs were much higher. According to R. UNGER, Ship in the Medieval Economy, cit., p. 169, shipping salt from Portugal to Bruges accounted for 85 percent of the landed price; and shipping Baltic grain from Danzig to Bruges was about half the landed price, c. 1400.
By that time, however, and indeed perhaps even before the mid-fifteenth century, as Van der Wee has even more cogently demonstrated, the European economy was now undergoing yet another profound transformation in its international trading patterns, with: (1) the commercial development of chiefly new overland, continental routes; (2) a consequent relative shift away from the previously established maritime routes; and (3) a revival of internationally-oriented fairs. Indeed, the chief and clearly fatal flaw about all the ‘progress-oriented’ theories to explain the decline of the earlier medieval international fairs, the Champagne Fairs in particular, was to ignore this very phenomenon of the revived pre-eminence of international fairs from the early to mid-fifteenth century.60 Obviously they could not possibly have become outdated, and redundant; and obviously they still had much to offer in lowering or reducing transaction costs for international trade, especially after such costs, including transportation costs, had fallen, by the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, along the overland routes that serviced such international fairs.

Furthermore, in another important, much more recent article, Stephan Epstein has demonstrated that the European economy of the later Middle Ages (though clearly more so in the fifteenth than in the fourteenth century) had benefited from a profusion of regional, chiefly land-based fairs that reduced transaction costs in such regional trade, an article in which he similarly ridiculed traditional arguments about the decline of medieval fairs.61 While conceding the point that ‘why fairs should have been the preferred response to rising transactions costs ... is not in fact immediately clear’, he also correctly observes that the opposite is also true: that ‘the cost advantages of town markets over new fairs are hard to discern’. Indeed he then makes the very cogent points that capital investment and administrative costs for fairs, and living costs for visiting merchants there, were generally much lower than for permanent town markets, especially with smaller sizes. Even more important were the ability of fairs, and certainly the newer fairs, ‘to respond far more flexibly ... to changes in the character, patterns, and intensity of trade’ than did most town markets, especially in so flexibly changing locations for

60 But cf. CH. VERLINDEN, Markets and Fairs, cit., p. 133: ‘Contrary to a commonly expressed opinion, it was not apparently the localization of large-scale trade in the towns which caused the decay of the Champagne fairs; otherwise, it would be difficult to understand how, later, fairs such as those of Geneva, Lyons, Antwerp, Frankfurt and others could have played such an important role [even though] ... it is true that they were held in regions which developed later.’

61 S.R. EPSTEIN, Regional Fairs, cit., pp. 459-482.
new commercial opportunities. One might also add to these arguments that such fairs tended to congregate a greater variety of regional or international merchants than did most towns, thus facilitating the dissemination of market information. Finally, ‘the proof of the pudding is the fact that most of the new fairs survived.’

In so far as Epstein is concerned with regional European fairs that did flourish before what Van der Wee discerned to be the true fifteenth-century revival of international fairs, connected to the renewed growth continental long-distance trade, we may conclude that either: (1) the extent of the late-medieval decline in such overland trade and shift to maritime trade has been exaggerated; or (2) conversely, that, in terms of the North-Thomas (1973) model and of their own analyses of the economic transformations in this era, disruptions of traditional long-distance trade patterns and consequent rises in transaction costs not only reduced the scope of such trade but necessarily made it all the more regional and localized.

Indeed the major components of the earlier Van der Wee model, so closely corresponding to the North-Thomas model, must be reiterated here to elucidate the dynamics of this revival of overland continental trade. That revival had commenced from the early fifteenth century by following entirely new routes, those secure from the ravages of the Hundred Years’ and other wars: from Italy, especially from Venice, across the eastern Alps (Brenner Pass, from Bolzano to Innsbruck), into Austria-South Germany, and from there via Frankfurt to the Rhine, leading down that river highway to the Low Countries, and in particular to the Brabant Fairs of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom. As Van der Wee has argued, especially in his magnum opus *The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy*, the Brabant Fairs owed their later fourteenth-century origins to a purely regional trade in foodstuffs and raw materials; but these commercial transformations converted them into truly international fairs. As the very mirror image of the negative consequence of the earlier relative shift from continental to maritime routes, the renewed expansion in continental trade more than proportionately augmented demand for commercial services, manufactures, labour, raw materials and foodstuffs. It thereby increased aggregate incomes, and investments by a multiplier-accelerator effect: not just along these arterial routes, but via both international and regional fairs, throughout an interlacing network of regional

62 Ibid., pp. 470-471.
63 D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, *The Rise of the Western World*, cit., pp. 78-96: ‘The decline of population, coupled with war, confiscation, pillage and revolution, reduced the volume of trade and stimulated a trend toward local self-sufficiency. The losses to society due to the decline in specialization and reduced division of labor certainly argues against a rise in the standard of living’. (p. 78)
routes that serviced thousands of towns and villages in a vast continental hinterland. While earlier the maritime ports had gained disproportionately from the relative shift to maritime routes, the relative shift back to overland continental trade now benefited a far greater number of towns and villages, from very large to small. Nor should we just focus on the importance of the Brabant Fairs, even if they were to make Antwerp the commercial and financial capital of the early-modern European economy, in the full century from c.1460 to c.1568, i.e. to the commencement of the Revolt of the Low Countries against Spanish rule. For both the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries we must also consider the powerful stimulus from other international fairs, especially those in Frankfurt itself, above all, and then those in Lyons, Besançon, Geneva, Piacenza, Cremona, and Medina del Campo (Castile).

**Falling Overland Transport and Transaction Costs in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries**

Furthermore, along these continental overland routes, transportation and transaction costs quite evidently did fall, from at least the mid-fifteenth century, and relatively more so than on the maritime routes. If the achievement of relative peace and security along these aforementioned new routes was the primary factor, also important, when the transaction sector was so subject to scale economies, was the rapid demographic, urban, and commercial expansion, especially in sixteenth-century Europe, and especially in the Mediterranean basin, which offered much larger and more concentrated markets. Secondly, overland transport itself benefited from several major innovations: the emergence of specialized ‘commission’ houses, transport, and cartage firms; the new, larger-scale, lower-cost Hesse wagons (carts), in well organized convoys. These new transport firms offered merchants, both large and small, those selling in nearby or in distant overland markets, fully insured passage for their goods at predetermined, fixed rates; and they also provided an efficient overland postal service. Beginning with the arterial Italy-Antwerp routes, these new modes of commercial transport soon spread to other overland routes servicing France, Germany, and Central Europe. According to

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both Van der Wee and Brulez, such improvements in overland transport made the overland continental routes both speedier and more reliable than Atlantic shipping routes from north-west Europe into the Mediterranean; and proof for that supposition may also be seen in the dramatic decline in Italian shipping to Antwerp, Bruges, and London, by the late fifteenth, early sixteenth century. Furthermore, even without these innovations, as any map will clearly reveal, the overland route from Antwerp to Venice had the enormous advantage of a far shorter distance: just 1300 km, less than 20 percent of the distance by sea.

Textiles, Overland Trade, and the Brabant Fairs: the Revival of the Sayetteries and English Cloths

The final proof for the economic superiority of the overland routes in later fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe is their overwhelming dominance in the transport of a renewed and greatly expanded trade in various cheap textiles from England and the Low Countries, via the Brabant Fairs, to the Mediterranean basin: not only in the steadily growing trade in South German fustians (see below, pp. 438-439), but also in cheap English woollen kerseys, and most especially in the says (says) and similar cheap, light serge-fabrics from the rapidly reviving and expanding Flemish sayetteries, and other draperies légères, once again led by Hondschoote. These says weighed only 40 percent as much as a Ghent dickedinnen broadcloth (260.4 g v. 633.8 g per m²); and in 1540 an
Antwerp master mason would have paid only 15.8 days’ wages to purchase a Hondschoote single say but 284.2 days’ wages for a Ghent dickeninnen. Without question the revival and dramatic expansion of this textile industry, the most remarkable industrial transformation in the early-modern Low Countries, is closely linked to the expanding overland continental trade. Thus, on the very eve of the 1568 Revolt of the Netherlands, when aggregate exports, chiefly from the Brabant Fairs, had an estimated value of about 16.0 million Carolus gulden (florins of 40d groot Flemish), aggregate say and serge exports accounted for about 2.5 million gulden (15.6 percent), while the domestic heavy-weight woollens now accounted for only 1.4 million gulden (8.8 percent); but re-finished English cloths (including kerseys), valued at 3.12 million gulden, accounted for the lion’s share of total textile exports (11.5 million gulden), and 19.5 percent of total exports by value (Table 5).

Indeed, more than a century earlier, the English cloth trade had provided the first leg of the tripod that supported the subsequent growth and ultimate hegemony of the Brabant Fairs in European commerce and finance. In 1421, after encountering severe difficulties in their chief overseas markets, especially in Prussia, those English merchants who had just organized the Merchants Adventurer Company established a new overseas cloth staple at Antwerp, which eagerly welcomed this trade, since it no longer had a local woollens industry to protect. That very reason, a long-standing, rigorously enforced Flemish ban on all English woollens, rendered the much larger and more international emporium of Bruges inaccessible, until well into the sixteenth century. By the mid-century, English merchants had lost all their other Baltic and Scandinavian markets, and with final defeat in the Hundred Years’ War, those in Gascony as well, while the Italians still barred their access to

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69 See Table 3 below; and J. MUNRO, Textiles as Articles of Consumption, cit., Tables 1 and 4, pp. 275-288.

70 J. MUNRO, New Draperies, cit., pp. 35-127; id., Symbiosis of Towns and Textiles, cit., pp. 1-74; id., Anglo-Flemish Competition in the International Cloth Trade, 1340 - 1520, in “Centre Européen d’Études Bourguignonnes”, 35, 1995, pp. 37-60 [in L’Angleterre et les pays bas bourguignonnnes: relations et comparaisons, XVIIe - XVIe siècle: Rencontres d’Oxford (septembre 1994), ed. J.-M. CAUCHIES]; J. MUNRO, The Low Countries’ Export Trade in Textiles with the Mediterranean Basin, 1200-1600: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Comparative Advantages in Overland and Maritime Trade Routes, in “International Journal of Maritime History”, 11/2, 1999, pp. 1-30. In the mid-sixteenth century, the southern Low Countries were then producing 3.64 million metres of cloth in the form of the various products of the sayetteries and other draperies légères, and only about 2.07 million metres of heavy-weight woollens, most of which were then produced by the so-called nouvelles draperies, no longer, and a few traditional urban draperies, led by Mechelen. H. SØLY, A. THIJS, Nijverheid in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, in „Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden“, 6, 1979, pp. 27-57. See the next note.

Mediterranean markets. Thus they were forced, more and more, to funnel virtually all of their export trade, certainly in the form of unfinished textiles, via London into the Brabant Fairs. Indeed merchants trading at these fairs commissioned dyers and shearers to ‘finish’ the English broadcloths that they had purchased for re-export to Germany, France, Central Europe, Italy, and elsewhere.72

That growing and finally overwhelming dependence of England’s key export, woollen broadcloths and kerseys, on Antwerp and the Brabant Fairs is well reflected in the export statistics. In 1416-20, London’s share of total English cloth exports was 41.7 percent (12,698 out of 27,977 cloths); in 1466-70, when the English cloth trade began to recover from a quarter-century slump, it was 55.5 percent; by 1486-90, it was 70.2 percent (35,122 out of 50,005 cloths); and by 1546-50, for 91.6 percent (123,780 out 135,910 cloths), when such textiles accounted for well over 90 percent of all English exports by value.73

At the same, time, of course, the Brabant Fairs also served as England’s chief source of European imports, via the agency of the London Mercers’ Company (of which the Merchants Adventurers had been an offshoot).74 That new Antwerp-based European commercial structure also explains why there was no comparable revival of England’s medieval fairs: simply because the Brabant Fairs now fully served that function for both the cloth export trade – as the Calais Staple had long done for the wool trade (1363-1558) – and also for the bulk of its import trades.


73 See Table 1. In these statistics, three kerseys are counted as one broadcloth. The Bergen-op-Zoom toll registers for the Brabant Fairs, for the three years 1495-98, record the importation of 44,753 genuine English broadcloths and 11,115 English kerseys, i.e. 24.83% of the former, by number. ALGEMEEN RIJKSARCHIEF (België), Rekenkamer, registers nos. 23,250-51; nos. 49,850-55.

Nevertheless, the initial and true catalyst for the revival and rapid expansion of the continental overland trade routes, the subsequent eighty-year boom in English cloth exports, and the real flourishing of the Brabant Fairs was to be found instead in the economy of South Germany, beginning with the development of its fustian textile industry in the later fourteenth century. More than a century earlier, the opening of the St. Gotthard Pass through the Swiss Alps (8° 31E, at the Schöllenen gorge, c.1220-38) and then more especially the development of the aforementioned Brenner Pass (11° 32E) had opened up the South German and other Central European markets to the growing sales of Italian fustians, a trade that was dominated more by German than Italian merchants and one that peaked in the early fourteenth century. Thereafter the slow but irredeemable decline of the Lombard fustian industry became all the more rapid from the 1370s, when warfare in both northern Italy and South Germany seriously disrupted the distribution of its textiles, thereby encouraging the Swiss and South German towns, especially the Swabian – Constance, Basel, Ulm, Augsburg, Ravensberg, Memmingen, Biberach, Nördlingen, and Regensburg – to transform their local linen crafts into very similar import-substitution industries using domestic flax and imported cotton. By the 1390s, that was chiefly Syrian cotton that the Germans purchased at Venice, via the relatively secure Brenner Pass, with their silver from Central European mines. This rapidly expanding production of fustians not

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75 See nn. 34, 38 above. Cf. R. LOPEZ, *Trade of Medieval Europe*, cit., pp. 374-75, 398-99, who contends that in the 11th century most of the limited commercial traffic from Italy to northern Europe went by the Septimer and other central-western Alpine passes; but that during the 12th and early 13th centuries, most of this traffic had been diverted to the Rhone Valley - Champagne Fairs route (via Genoa and Marseilles), which, though three times as long, was a much cheaper route. Even with competition from new routes via the St. Gotthard Pass, the Rhone-Champagne routes still remained much cheaper, especially with reductions in freight rates along them, routes ‘that exploited to the utmost the possibilities of cheap transportation by water’ (p. 374). See also M. BOYER, *Travel and Transport, Western European*, in *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. J.R. STRAYER, 12, New York 1989, pp. 148-162; A.C. LEIGHTON, *Travel and Communications in Early Medieval Europe, AD 500-1100*, London 1972; F. MELIS, *I trasporti e le comunicazioni nel medievo*, Firenze 1984.

only provided South Germany with her major growth industry from this era but also represented the first successful expansion of an internationally-oriented export trade in cheap, light textiles in later medieval Europe.

This export trade and the concomitant revival and expansion of the overland continental trade routes from Venice to the Brabant Fairs, via the Frankfurt Fairs, then received its most powerful stimulus from the South-German silver-copper mining boom, which commenced in the 1460s --at the very same time, therefore, as the onset of the English cloth trade boom. Evidently responding, in the mid-century, to a severely deflationary scarcity of silver, which had elevated the purchasing power of that metal, the South Germans had effected a dual technological revolution, in both mechanical and chemical engineering, one that succeeded in boosting European output of both metals over five-fold by the 1540s. Most of those mines lay near or astride the major overland routes linking Italy with the Brabant Fairs. As the South Germans directed more and more of those metals (and fustians) to Antwerp rather than to Venice, and as they established there major branches of their merchant banking houses, the Germans established the second leg of the tripod of Antwerp’s commercial greatness, while also more rapidly fostering the growth of the now flourishing Frankfurt fairs along that same route. The chief return commodities that the South Germans sought, in displacing the Rhenish merchants from that commerce, were these re-finished English textiles and the Low Countries’ own say and serge textiles. If nothing succeeds so much as success, that burgeoning commerce also attracted the Portuguese, with their newly acquired trade in Asian spices. In establishing their spice staple at Antwerp, and thus the third leg of its tripod, the Portuguese sought in particular the South German silver and copper, so necessary for purchasing those spices in the East Indies, and also the banking facilities of the Fuggers, Welsers, and Hochstetters.77

Venice (1372-73); the Swabian League against Emperor Charles IV (1376-78); Florence vs. the Papacy (‘War of Eight Saints’, 1376-78); Venice vs. Genoa (War of Chioggia, 1378-80); Visconti Milan vs. Verona, Padua, Bologna, Venice, Florence, Piedmont (1384-92).

Fairs, the Law Merchant, and the Financial Revolution in Negotiable Bills and Rentes

Indeed all these new Fairs -- those of Brabant, Frankfurt, Besançon, Geneva, and Lyons – were just as important in providing financial services; and in so doing these Fairs, beginning with those of Brabant, introduced a truly momentous financial revolution for the early-modern economy, in terms of both bills-of-exchange (and related) banking and in public finance. We are thus led back to North’s observations about the role of the international ‘law merchant’ and to the concluding financial contributions that these early-modern fairs provided in lowering the transaction costs of international, now world-wide commerce. Contrary to De Roover’s misconceived assertions about bills of exchange, alluded to earlier, such bills were not designed just and only for town-based ‘sedentary’ branch-plant town-based trade, but were also employed just as much in fairs, both regional and international. Nor did they supersede or displace the financial contract that was virtually identical to the old instrumentum ex causa cambi: the bill obligatory, so commonly used, along with bills of exchange, at the Brabant Fairs, by English and other merchants, into the seventeenth century.

Undoubtedly the most revolutionary development in the use of such bills for financing international trade was the introduction of full-fledged negotiability, via law-merchant courts. This most complex topic is also one that both Herman Van der Wee and myself have investigated at length, in other publications. My contribution was to demonstrate how the Mayor’s Court of London established, in 1436, the first legal precedent to ensure the full protection of property rights and financial claims of the ‘bearer’, as the third party to whom a bill of exchange had been transferred. This was a Parliamentary Staple court that was authorized by several English statutes to utilize the still evolving international law-merchant, with the same judicial power as that enjoyed by Common Law courts. What is indeed most striking about the deci-

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78 See above, pp. 413-415 and n. 21.
81 See: Ordinance of the Staples, 27 Edwardi III, stat.2, 1353, in Statutes of the Realm, cit., I, pp. 332-343. This statute formally established mercantile Staple Courts and commercial stapling obligations in fifteen English towns, and stipulated that ‘all Merchants coming to the Staple, their Servants and Meiny ... shall be ruled by the Law Merchant [lei merchant], of all Things touching the Staple, and not by the Common Law of the Land’ (cap. 8); and it also explicitly enjoined the King’s justices from interfering with anything ‘which pertaineth to the Cognizance of the Mayor and Ministers of the Staple’ (cap. 5). The Staple courts were to consist of the Staple or civic major ‘having Knowledge of the Law-Merchant to govern the Staple, two constables and a jury composed of domestic or foreign merchants, or both, depending upon
sion of this London law-merchant court, known as Burton v Davy, is that it involved a true bill-of-exchange: one that an English merchant in Bruges (John Audley), as the resident factor for the London Merchant Elias Davy, having received funds as the taker from another English merchant in Bruges (Thomas Hanworth, as the deliverer), and resident agent for the Norwich merchant John Burton, drew a bill upon his master Elias Davy (i.e. as the designated payer), in London, instructing him to pay ‘John Burton [the payee] or the bearer of this letter of payment’ the sum of £30 sterling on the following 14 March 1436.82 Subsequently, this bill was transferred to another merchant, John Walden, in payment for some other transaction; and when Davy refused to honour the ‘accepted’ bill that Walden presented, Walden then sued Elias Davy in this London court, necessarily having to secure the support of John Burton, who then played no further role in the proceedings.83 The court, having met on 10 August, 1 September, and again on 3 November, to hear witnesses and establish the facts, ruled as early as 19 November, that ‘according to the Law Merchant and the custom aforesaid in such like cases,’ John Walden had full and equal standing with Burton, and thus ordered Davy to pay Walden the £30 sterling in full, plus costs and 20s in damages.84 Significantly, as well, the London court pointedly stipulated that the parliamentary statutes on the law-merchant were designed to ensure speedy justice, *sine dilatione*; and that it would brook no further delays from Davy ‘because no discontinuance, according to the Law-Merchant and custom aforesaid, is permitted in any

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83 H. HALL, *Law Merchant*, cit., pp. 117-18. On 10 August 1436, after several further rebuffs, Walden presented this dishonoured bill to the London Mayor’s court, along with ‘a bill or supplication made in the name of the aforementioned John Burton, according to the Law Merchant and custom of the city of London’.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 117: ‘To my very honoured master, Elias Davy, mercer, at London, let this be given. Very honoured sir, please it you to know that I have received here [in Bruges] of John Burton [by the hands of Thomas Hanworth] by exchange, 30 l. [sterling] payable at London to the aforesaid John [Burton] or to the bearer of this letter of payment on the 14th day of March next coming, by this my first and second letter of payment. And I pray you that it may be well paid at the day. Written at Bruges, the 10th day of December [1435], by your attorney, John Audeley, etc.’
mercantile causes of a court of this nature'. The judge (John Mitchell) also rebuffed Davy’s demand to have the case heard in the Common Law court of King’ Bench, asserting that his court had sole jurisdiction, ‘according to the Law-Merchant ... and by divers statutes and Parliaments’ to hear this case. If ‘time is money’, then obviously the major savings in transaction costs was such speedy justice, compared to the often drawn out proceedings of Common Law courts, which, in any event, would never have given any standing to holograph documents, such as this bill of exchange, nor any weight to current mercantile practices as those established in fair-oriented law-merchant courts.

As Herman Van der Wee has also demonstrated, a similar law-merchant court in Antwerp issued, in 1507, an almost equivalent *turba* or verdict involving, this time, an English letter obligatory whose payment was due to an English cloth merchant trading at the Brabant Fairs. Subsequently, in 1527, another law-merchant court, in Bruges, similarly declared that ‘the bearer had all the rights of a principal’ in claiming payment on a commercial bill and in suing defaulting debtors. These in turn provided the necessary precedents to permit the Estates General of the Habsburg Netherlands to complete the necessary legal foundations for fully-fledged negotiability, in ordinances of March 1537 and October 1541, the first such national legislation in early-

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85 Ibid., pp. 118-19. The text in translation: ‘According to the Law-Merchant and the ancient liberties and free customs of the city itself, as by divers statutes and Parliaments...the mayor, etc. have the power and use of hearing and considering causes and actions of all and singular merchants, as to all manner of loans, barranties [vexatious litigations], exchanges and letters of payment and other things, and mercantile contracts made or entered into between merchants themselves or their factors making plaints at whatsoever ordinary fairs ... or merchant towns outside the realm of England... and of trying those causes and actions by juries of merchants passing between a foreign place’. Cf. Calendar of Letter-Books Preserved among the Archives of the Corporation of the City of London at the Guildhall: Letter Book K. Temp. Henry VI, ed. R. Sharpe, London 1911, pp. 208-209: ‘by the Law-Merchant and the ancient liberties and customs of the City the Mayor and Aldermen, from time immemorial, had exercised jurisdiction over mercantile disputes arising between merchants of the City; and that Elias Davy, mentioned in the writ, was for many years and is a merchant and citizen of London, and was warned by order of Henry Frowyk, the Mayor, and the Aldermen to appear before them in the Chamber of the Guildhall...’


modern Europe. Together, they permitted the bearer of any bill to sue any and all prior assignors of the note for the full payment, and provided other legal guarantees of the property rights of bearers. Furthermore, and rather astoundingly for a still Catholic legislature, these ordinances also permitted interest payments up to 12 percent per annum on all debts and commercial bills.\(^{88}\) Full and true negotiability, of course, depends upon the ability of third parties to engage in discounting – i.e. to sell a bill before maturity for less than its stipulated face value, i.e. by the amount of forgone interest; and that was possible only if merchants were not subjected to threats of prosecution for violating the usury laws (which thus now applied only to interest rates above 12 per cent).

**European Public Finance and the Fairs in Sixteenth-Century Europe**

As important as the principle of negotiability was for the world of private mercantile finance and international trade, equally significant was its immediate extension to the realm of government finance: in permitting, with far lower transaction costs, the transferability of government *rentes*, i.e. annuities, as the now almost universal form of public debt, to third parties. Because *rentes* (*renten*) were permanent and non-redeemable, except when the issuing government arbitrarily chose to repurchase them, they were not true loans (i.e. *mutuum*), and thus they escaped any taint of usury, especially after receiving sanction from the papal bulls of 1425 and 1455. Yet obviously more investors would be willing to purchase *rentes* if they had both the legal right and the ability to sell their *rentes*, i.e. their claims to annuity payments, and thus to recoup their principal (with capital gains or losses), and to do so in an efficient, low-cost secondary market. Such a financial market, and one clearly associated as an integral part of the Brabant Fairs, was provided by the founding of the Antwerp Bourse (*Beurs*) in 1531. The very major role that

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\(^{88}\) H. Van der Wee, *Credit and Banking Systems*, cit., p. 326: ‘...in this way, the various transferring creditors remained jointly responsible for payment’. For the text of the March 1537 ordinance, concerning bills of obligatory only, see *Recueil des ordonnances des Pays Bas, deuxième série, 1506 - 1700*, ed. C. Laurent, M. J. Lameere, H. Simont, Brussels 1907 (Commission Royale d’Histoire), IV, pp. 15-17, and 34-35. For the text of the 31 October 1541 decree (including bills of exchange), see H. Van der Wee, *Growth of the Antwerp Market*, cit., II, p. 344: ‘Ordonnons que desesavant tous ceulx qui aueront accepté ... quelque lettre de change seront tenus de payer la somme contenue en ycelle en deniers évaluez ... sans que pour lesdits changes ou aultres obligations contractez entre marchans on puist donner en payement aultres obligations par forme d’assignacions, lesquelles le crédeur ne sera tenu dacepter siel ne veult, et en acceptant lassignacion demeurea neantmoins le premier debteur obligé tant que le marchant sera réalement payé ou effec- tuellement contente de son due’. See also R. Usher, *Deposit Banking*, cit., pp. 98-99; and R. De Roover, *Gresham*, cit., pp. 117-152, who noted that the 1537 ordinance applied only to letters obligatory and not to bills of exchange, which ‘rarely if ever have bearer clauses in them’ (evidently unaware of the English examples).
such sixteenth-century fairs as those of Geneva, Besançon, Piacenza, and especially Castile (Medina del Campo) and Lyons, played in European public finance is too well known to require further elaboration here. The international fairs of early-modern Europe were thus arguably far more important in lowering the transaction costs of international trade, international finance, and government finance than they had been in their supposed heyday of the thirteenth century. Indeed, as the most striking evidence for such a decline in transaction costs in early-modern Europe, or reflection thereof, is the fall in nominal and real interest rates, by one half, from the 1440s to the mid 1550s, despite rational expectations of rising interest rates during the inflation that commenced c. 1515-20, marking the onset of famous Price Revolution era.

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89 See in particular H. VAN DER WEE, Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems, cit., pp. 315-335.
APPENDIX: Burton v Davy, 1436 and Negotiable ‘Bearer’ Bills of Exchange

The bill of exchange drawn in Bruges upon a London merchant:

A mon treshonure mestre Elys Davy, mercer, a Loundres, soit doné:

Treshonure sire vous please assavoir que jay rescceu yci de John Burton [per manus Thome Hanworth mercatoris, tunc factoris sui] par eschange xxx l. [sterling], appaiers a Loundres al avaunddit John ou al portour diceste lettre de paiement le xiii jours de March’ proch[ein] a venir, par cest ma premier et seconde lettre de paiement. Et je vous emprie quil soit bien paie a le jour.

Escript a Bruges le x jour de Decembre [1435], par vostre attourne,

John Audeley, etc.

Principals and Agents:

1. **The Deliverer in Bruges**: Thomas Hanworth, factor of John Burton, merchant of Norwich

2. **The Taker in Bruges**: John Audeley, factor of Elias Davy, London mercer, who receives the equivalent, in Flemish funds (amount not specified), of £30 sterling, and who then [10 December 1435] draws a bill on his master Elias Davy for payment on 14 March 1436.

3. **The Payer in London**: Elias Davy, London mercer, who has evidently accepted the bill for payment and then ‘dishonoured’ the bill: i.e. refused to pay the bearer on the redemption date.

4. **The Payee in London**: John Burton, or

5. **The ‘bearer of this letter’**: [portour diceste lettre de paiement] John Walden, who launched the suit in the London Mayor’s court, with support from the payee, John Burton

Ruling of the London Mayor’s Court of 29 November 1436:

Et super hoc quià tam per sacramentum dicti Thome Hanworth qui deliberavit, quam sacramentum precidenti Johannis Audeley, qui recepit denarios predictos per escambium in forma predicta .; ideo consideratum est per candem curiam mercatoriam juxta legem mercatoriam et consuetudinem predictam in hujusmodi casibus, etc. usitatas et approbatus, quod ilem Elias [Davy] juxta vim, formam, et effectum dicte litere solvat easdem xxx l. prefato supplicantu vel Johanni Walden portitori ejusdem litere, qui loco suo tenetur et habitur in hoc casu, etc., juxta legem mercatoriam et consuetudinem antedictam, etc., et xx s. ultra pro dampnis in hac parte et sustentatis, etc.

Table 1. Exports of English Broadcloths, 1347/48 to 1548/49

English Broadcloth = 24 yds by 1.75 yds, for cloths of assise: 4 straits and dozens = 1 broadcloth; and 3 kerseys = 1 broadcloth.

From one sack of wool, 4,333 broadcloths could be manufactured

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Michaelmas</th>
<th>Denizen Exports</th>
<th>Hanseard Exports</th>
<th>Other Aliens Exports</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPORTS</th>
<th>London Total</th>
<th>London as % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>1,921</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1526-30</td>
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<td>42.66%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1531-35</td>
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<td>42.66%</td>
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<td>1536-40</td>
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<td>10,427</td>
<td>42.66%</td>
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<td>1541-45</td>
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<td>42.66%</td>
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<td>1546-50</td>
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<td>10,427</td>
<td>42.66%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1551-55</td>
<td>14,064</td>
<td>10,427</td>
<td>42.66%</td>
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Table 2. *Production and Export of Says from the Hondschoote Sayetterie in quinquennials means, 1401-05 to 1596-1600*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hondschoote Drapery Tax Farm in £ parisis 240d per £ parisis</th>
<th>Cloths Represented by tax farm 8d. per cloth</th>
<th>Hondschoote Cloth Sales: Exports in Single Says*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1401-05</td>
<td>54.80</td>
<td>1,644</td>
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<td>1406-10</td>
<td>78.00</td>
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<td>1411-15</td>
<td>85.60</td>
<td>2,568</td>
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<td>1416-20</td>
<td>117.60</td>
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<td>1421-25</td>
<td>152.80</td>
<td>4,584</td>
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<td>1426-30</td>
<td>165.80</td>
<td>4,974</td>
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<td>1431-35</td>
<td>172.00</td>
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<td>1436-40</td>
<td>176.00</td>
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<td>180.00</td>
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<td>278.00</td>
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<td>388.00</td>
<td>11,640</td>
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<td>1461-65</td>
<td>404.00</td>
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<td>1466-70</td>
<td>435.20</td>
<td>13,056</td>
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<tr>
<td>1471-75</td>
<td>464.00</td>
<td>13,920</td>
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<tr>
<td>1476-80</td>
<td>424.00</td>
<td>12,720</td>
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<tr>
<td>1481-85</td>
<td>455.00</td>
<td>13,650</td>
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<tr>
<td>1486-90</td>
<td>488.70</td>
<td>14,661</td>
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<td>1491-95</td>
<td>399.95</td>
<td>11,999</td>
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<td>1496-1500</td>
<td>424.00</td>
<td>12,720</td>
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<tr>
<td>1501-05</td>
<td>588.00</td>
<td>17,640</td>
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<td>1506-10</td>
<td>667.20</td>
<td>20,016</td>
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<td>1511-15</td>
<td>757.60</td>
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<td>1526-30</td>
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<td>34,896</td>
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<td>1,452.80</td>
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<td>41,184.50</td>
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<td>44,547.60</td>
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<td>1,634.80</td>
<td>49,044</td>
<td>45,453.40</td>
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<td>74,172</td>
<td>67,026.20</td>
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<td>88,392</td>
<td>89,699.60</td>
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<td>2,987.20</td>
<td>89,616</td>
<td>93,057.20</td>
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<td>81,480</td>
<td>82,772.40</td>
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<td>1576-80</td>
<td>2,224.00</td>
<td>66,720</td>
<td>81,550.50</td>
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<td>384.00</td>
<td>11,520</td>
<td>16,961.20</td>
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<td>494.00</td>
<td>14,820</td>
<td>12,127.80</td>
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<td>1591-95</td>
<td>724.00</td>
<td>21,720</td>
<td>20,039.70</td>
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</table>

* A fine narrow say measured 28.0 m (40 ells) by 0.7 m (1 ell), with a finished area of 19.60 m², and with a weight of 260.4 grams per sq. metre; a small double say measured 25.725 m (36.75 ells) by 0.875 m (1.25 ells), with a finished area of 22.509 m², and with a weight of 322.4 grams per sq. metre. In the 1540s, at
the Antwerp market, Hondschoote single says sold for £0.783 to £0.967 *groot* Flemish (15s 8d. to 19s 4d. *groot* Flemish), which represented, in value, 13.42 days’ wages to 18.32 days wages for an Antwerp master mason, then earning 12.67d (1540-42) to 14.00d. *groot* per day (from 1543).

**Source:** E. Coornaert, *La draperie-sayetterie d’Hondschoote, XIV*-XVIII* siècle*, Paris 1930; calculated from Appendix IV, 485-90 (data extracted from: ARCHIVES DÉPARTEMENTALES DU NORD, Section B. État général, 4068-4236, 17600); Appendix V, 493-95 (data extracted from STADSARCHIEF HONDSCHOOTE, Series GG 53, 54, 70, 38, 398, 82; CC 89, 40-50, 61-82; and HH 12-13). Note: double says are counted as two single says; J. Munro, *Textiles as Articles of Consumption in Flemish Towns, 1330 - 1575*, in “Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis”, 81/1-3, 1998, pp. 275-288.

### Table 3. Prices of Flemish and Brabantine Says, Other Light Cloths, and Heavy-Weight Woollens: as Sold in Florence by the Del Bene Company, 1318-23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textile Town</th>
<th>Maximum soldi affiorini</th>
<th>Median soldi affiorini</th>
<th>Maximum Flemish shillings</th>
<th>Median Flemish shillings</th>
<th>Maximum % of Douai</th>
<th>Median as % of Ypres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Says and Other Draps Légers</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hondschoote</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2.333</td>
<td>1.917</td>
<td>32.81%</td>
<td>41.60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arras</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.833</td>
<td>1.833</td>
<td>26.04%</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poperinge</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.750</td>
<td>1.583</td>
<td>24.48%</td>
<td>34.40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghistelles</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>18.40%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Heavy-Weight Woollens</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Douai</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>7.167</td>
<td>6.583</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>141.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>6.917</td>
<td>5.750</td>
<td>96.35%</td>
<td>123.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechelen</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>5.917</td>
<td>5.750</td>
<td>82.29%</td>
<td>124.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghent</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>5.750</td>
<td>4.917</td>
<td>80.73%</td>
<td>104.80%</td>
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<td>Ypres</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>5.333</td>
<td>4.667</td>
<td>74.48%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
1 gold florin of Florence = 29 soldi affiorini; 1 florin = 13d groot Flemish  
1 canna of Florence = 4 braccia = 2.452 metres = 3.5 Flemish ells

Table 4. Prices of Ghent Dickedinnen Woollens, Mechelen Rooslaken Woollens, and Hondschoote Says, and the Daily Wages for an Antwerp Mason, 1535–1545 (in pence and pounds groot Flemish)

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<td>1535</td>
<td>14.150</td>
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<td>17.900</td>
<td>12.667</td>
<td>11.984</td>
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<td>0.759</td>
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<td>14.000</td>
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<td>0.783</td>
<td>1.775</td>
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<td>13.420</td>
<td>14.000</td>
<td>10.364</td>
<td>0.580</td>
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<td>1544</td>
<td>14.000</td>
<td>11.333</td>
<td>0.908</td>
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<td>240.000</td>
<td>15.570</td>
<td>14.000</td>
<td>9.571</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>351.070</td>
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Sources: STADSARCHIEF GENT, Stadsrekeningen 1534/5-1544/5, Reeks 400: nos.46-52; STADSARCHIEF ECHELEN, Stadsrekeningen 1534/5-1544/5, nos.209-19; H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of the Antwerp Markt and the European Economy, 14th to 16th Centuries, I-III, The Hague 1963, 1, pp. 457-468 (Appendix 39); sources cited in Tables 1 and 2.

Notes:

a. Converted from Brabant grooten: 1.5d Brabant groot = 1.0d Flemish groot (gros)
b. Ghent woollens (dickedinnen): 30 ells by 9.5 quarter ells, made from English March (Shropshire and Herefordshire) and Cotswolds wools.
c. Mechelen woollens (Rooslaken): 30 ells by 10 quarter ells (March wools), prices converted from pond groot Brabant into pond groot Flemish
d. Hondschoote single says: 18 ells by 5 quarter ells: Hondschoote price.
e. Hondschoote double says: 36.75 ells by 5 quarter ells: Antwerp price.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Value in gulden</th>
<th>Percent of Total Specified</th>
<th>Percent of Estimated Total</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Value in gulden</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textile Products</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Textile Products</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silks: Italian fabrics and raw</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>21.62%</td>
<td>17.78%</td>
<td>Says, worsteds, serges</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>15.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woollens: English</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>17.51%</td>
<td>14.46%</td>
<td>Linens</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>15.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fustians: German</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
<td>Woollens: Netherlander</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolls: Spanish*</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>6.76%</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
<td>Woollens: English (finished)</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>19.50%</td>
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<td>Wools: English</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
<td>Fustians: German</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woad: French</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>2.16%</td>
<td>1.78%</td>
<td>Silks: re-exports</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alum: Italian</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>Tapestries</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>4.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alum: Spanish</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>0.44%</td>
<td>Other Textile Exports</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochineal: Spanish-American</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total textile products</strong></td>
<td>10,095</td>
<td>54.57%</td>
<td>44.87%</td>
<td><strong>Sub-total textile products</strong></td>
<td>11,560</td>
<td>72.25%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foodstuffs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Other Exports</strong></td>
<td>4,440</td>
<td>27.75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grains: Baltic</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>16.22%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spices: Portuguese-Asian</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
<td>8.89%</td>
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<td>Sugar: Portuguese</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wines: French</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>6.22%</td>
<td>5.11%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wines: Rhenish</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
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<td>Wines: Italian</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wines: Spanish &amp; Portuguese</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt: French</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salt: Spanish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olive Oil: Spanish &amp; Portuguese</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total foodstuffs</strong></td>
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<td>44.57%</td>
<td>36.64%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Copper: German</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Percent of Estimated Total</td>
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<td>Value in gulden</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Total of Specified Commodities</td>
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<td>82.22%</td>
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<td>Estimated Other Commodities</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTALS</td>
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<td>100.00%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>16.000</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
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</table>

* Spanish merino wools imported into the Habsburg Low Countries chiefly via Bruges

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