The Performance of Privatized Utilities: Evidence from Latin America

Rossi, Martin (2021): The Performance of Privatized Utilities: Evidence from Latin America.

Abstract

This article analyzes the relative performance of recently privatized Latin American electricity distribution utilities. Empirical results show that privatized firms are more efficient in their use of labor and have higher labor productivity growth rates than public or cooperative companies. There is also evidence of increasing returns to scale.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Ownership, Efficiency, Technical Change, Input Requirement Function
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O30 - General

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