The Dynamics of National Identity and Pride Formation in Ukraine

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Abstract

This article examines the process of national identity and pride building among the Ukrainian population. Drawn upon the recent developments in Ukraine, I analyze the relationship between the country's economic, political, and cultural characteristics and the content of national identification. Special attention is given to the issue of how the current military confrontation with Russia has affected the sense of national identity and pride among the Ukrainians. The analysis is conducted based on the World Values Survey (WVS) data from both the pre-war and the in-war periods. My results suggest that language spoken at home and one's evaluation of democracy can explain the nature of national identification and pride in Ukraine. In addition, I demonstrate that the way in which the respondents frame the current military confrontation with Russia should affect their sense of national identity and shape their ethnic pride.

Keywords: National identity, national pride, Ukraine, the WVS, country-specific analysis

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Introduction

National identity and pride are associated with a wide range of political and socio-economic outcomes ranging from the process of nation-building to the issue of government effectiveness (Ahlerup and Hansson, 2011; Qari et al., 2012). In spite of this important role, the factors that define their levels and patterns of formation are not yet precisely understood. Literature usually describes the sense of national identity and pride as a reflection of deep, historically rooted societal conventions that emerge and develop over a long period of time (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2016; Gellner, 1983). National identity should first enter the society and be shared through a polity's network by most societies' members, taking multiple generations till the diffusion reaches satisfactory levels (Anderson, 1991; Elkins, 2010; Greenfeld, 1992; Smith, 1978; Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010). At the same time, literature admits that both national identity and pride are dynamic concepts that can change their values over a relatively short period of time in response to more contemporary events (Jones and Smith, 2001; Kavetsos, 2012). One such event, that has been paid a particular attention by research, is a military confrontation. War can mobilize people and unite them against a common aggressor, strengthening their sense of belonging to the nation, as well as their ethnic pride (Wimmer, 2012).

This study focuses on investigating war effects by choosing Ukraine as a subject of analysis. The country represents a particularly interesting case because it gives a contemporary example illustrating how conflicts can contribute to the rise of national identity and pride. More specifically, I seek to analyze the impact that Ukraine's military confrontation with Russia has had on the patterns of ethnic identity and pride formation among the local population. In

addition, I attempt to clarify how the way in which the respondents frame the current conflict influences their sense of identification with the nation and pride.

Nation- and identity-building in Ukraine: A literature overview

With the independence proclaimed in 1991, Ukraine has commenced to build a national state by promoting democratic forms of governance and a free market economy (Turchyn et al., 2020). The democratization process as 'the government by the people' required the definition of 'the people' and thus raised the question of national identity (Frahm, 2012). Defining the contours of the nation was supposed to become the priority for politicians and a part of the state-building strategy. The lack of experience with the independence, aggravated by political uncertainty and an economic collapse, however, pushed the nation-building aspirations to the margins of the agenda while Ukrain*e de facto* continued to be influenced by Russia.

The first decade of post-communist transition was marked by a pseudo unification framed as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that was expected to replace the former Soviet Union and legitimize Russia's power in the entire post-soviet area (Willerton et al., 2015). Within the CIS, Russia acted as a 'significant other' (Hansen, 2015) continuing to impose the concept of collective identity on Ukraine (Feklyunina, 2016). Up to the early 2010s, the identity dominant among the Ukrainian population was largely associated with the idea of a 'Russian world' — an imagined community based on the Russian language, the Russian culture and the common glorious past (Feklyunina, 2016; White et al., 2010). As a consequence, the Ukrainian society appeared to be not united and had no real notion of 'us' (Korostelina, 2013).

In the course of transition, Russia adopted a hegemonic national identity and gradually slid toward authoritarianism. In contrast, the public discussion of national issues in Ukraine led to the

emergence of more liberal and democratic values accepted by a considerable part of the political elite and the local population (Brudny and Finkel, 2011; Musliu and Burlyuk, 2019). The two countries continued to share similarities in terms of religion, civilization, racial proximity or cultural patterns of behavior but displayed significant differences as regards their preferences for political and economic institutions.

Partly due to the clash between the aggressive imposition of collective identity by Russia and the local preference for liberal democratic institutions, Ukraine begun to seek a separate existence bringing forward the questions of national identity again (Kuzio, 2001). In search of a common denominator that would unite the population of Ukraine, the government turned to the language (Peacock, 2015). The single language was expected to achieve both goals — to stress the similarities of the in-groups and to draw the differences with those outside of the national community (Kuzio, 2001). By introducing a more aggressive language policy and enforcing monolinguistic public education, the government actively promoted the Ukrainian language as a symbol of nationhood in the country (Smirnova and Iliev, 2017).

With time, it became obvious that the nation-building process through language is insufficient in the case of Ukraine. The prevalence of Russian language during the Soviet times produced a large discrepancy between ethno-cultural identity and language as a result of which the identification with the Ukrainian nation was not associated with the use of Ukrainian language (Peacock, 2015). After the onset of independence, this trend only persisted and the strengthening of national identity was not accompanied by a commensurate increase in speaking Ukrainian.

The weak progress with the identity-building released collective angst and revealed the nation's fear about the country's future (Chayinska et al., 2021). In 2013, mass protests took place sparkled by the Ukrainian government's decision to suspend the signing of an association

agreement with the European Union while choosing closer ties to Russia instead. (Kulyk, 2016). Protests for democratic change were held in Western Ukraine, throughout the East as well, where there was a significant Russian-speaking minority (McGlynn, 2020). In response to the anti-Russian movements, Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. The confrontation in the East gradually developed into a 'frozen conflict' that could ensure stability of Russia's control in the post-soviet area (Fengler et al., 2020; Fournier, 2018; Ojala and Pantti, 2017). In 2020, the conflict deteriorated, with Russia concentrating troops near the Ukraine's eastern borders and openly threatening the government with a military intervention if the country allowed the NATO on its territory.

Studies offer a wide set of explanations for Russia's motives to begin a war against Ukraine ranging from the country's attempts to protect its national interests and sphere of influence to the Kremlin's fear that a more democratic Ukrainian government may serve as an example to Russian citizens of alternative methods of governance. What appear uncontestable from the recent developments in Ukraine-Russia relations is that, instead of provoking the collapse of Ukrainian statehood, Russia's military aggression succeeded in intensifying the process of national identity building to the extent that none would previously imagine possible (McGlynn, 2020). More specifically, Russia's aggression promoted a further detachment of language use from national identity (Kulyk, 2016). Many Russian-speakers came to identify strongly with the Ukrainian nation without abandoning their accustomed language or even adding Ukrainian as an active part of their communicative repertoire. In parallel to that, there was a strong mobilization of Ukrainian Russian-speakers on the side of the government. Rebels of the East were suspected of violating or disregarding socio-cultural, ideological, and religious values of their ethnic group making Russian-speaking minority to reconsider their sense of national identity. Third-party (Russia's) pro-rebel

intervention only aggravated the situation and triggered mass ethnic defection (Aliyev, 2019). The Ukrainian population begun to see Russia as the aggressor in a war that threatened national independence. The presence of an external aggressor contributed to uniting the population and boosting their sense of ethnic belonging and pride (Frahm, 2012).

Taking all above into account, I suggest that the identification with the Ukrainian ethnos should be seen as a country-specific process influenced by both the government policies and the current events. More specifically, three key dominant tendencies should be selected from the Ukrainian context and recognized as major sources for national identity and pride formation. First, the Ukrainians' aspirations for a democratic state and liberal forms of governance can be a motivation for the separation from the Russia-related hegemonic identity and for the subsequent turn to the independent nation-building. Second, language policy, used by the government as a means of enforcing the identification with the Ukrainian nation, could be a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for the nation to rise. The identification with a nation requires that the individuals feel common bonds with their co-citizens and these bonds could start from the common language that they used in communication. Third, the military conflict with Russia was framed by the majority of the population as an aggression or a threat to the nation and could contribute to uniting the population of Ukraine. Defending common interests required an association of oneself with the Ukrainian ethnos and could strengthen the sense of national identity and pride among the population. Drawn upon these specificities, I hypothesize that

H.1.: Democracy is positively related to national identity and pride in Ukraine.

H.2.: Speaking Ukrainian language is positively related to national identity and pride in Ukraine.

H.3.: The war conducts a positive impact on the formation of national identity and pride in Ukraine. Its ultimate impact is defined though by the way in which the individuals frame the current military confrontation between Ukraine and Russia.

Data and methods

To test my hypotheses, I use data from two most recent waves of the World Values Survey - 2011 and 2020. Since 2011 was characterized by the economic and social stability, along with the dominance of pro-Russian policies with no hint to any possible confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, this year is referred to as a pre-war measurement point. In contrast, the year 2020 was characterized by a stark confrontation of political relations between Ukraine and Russia and can hence be taken as an in-war measurement point for the key variables. My sample includes in total 2445 cases, with 1378 cases stemming from 2011 and 1067 cases coming from 2020. I use a logistic regression to calculate the model's parameters. The base model takes the following form:

$$Identity_{ij} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Language_{ij} + \gamma_2 Democracy_{ij} + \gamma_3 Income_{ij} + \gamma_4 War\_worries_{ij} + \gamma_5 X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Here, *Identity* is the measurements of national identity and pride. More specifically, national identity is operationalized through the question asking the respondents to specify to which ethnic group they feel to belong. The variable takes the value of 1 if the respondents give the answer 'Ukrainian' and the value of 0 if any other ethnicity is specified. National pride is measured through the WVS question asking the respondents about the extent to which they feel proud to be Ukrainian. The responses range from 1 'not at all proud' to 4 'very proud'. I record

the pride variable into a dummy by assigning the value of 1 to positive responses ('3' and '4') and the value of 0 to the initially negative responses ('1' and '2'). Note that the two variables show a considerable change between the waves. In 2011, around 83 percent of respondents declared to feel Ukrainians, while this percentage amounted to 95 percent in 2020. The rise of national identity was also accompanied by the rise of national pride. In 2020, almost 86 percent of respondents declared to feel proud of being Ukrainians as compared to 72 percent in 2011 (see Table 2).

As in Kunovich (2009), *Language* refers to the language spoken by the respondents at home. I distinguish between Ukrainian, Russian and other languages and create three dummies, with the Ukrainian dummy used as a reference category. Interestingly, around 50 percent of the population in Ukraine used the Ukrainian as a major language of communication at home in 2011; this percentage has only slightly increased (to 59.6 percent) by 2020. The rest of the population used predominantly Russian as a language of communication, pointing out to a substantial language fractionalization in the Ukrainian society (see Table 2).

Democracy refers to the level of democracy in the country as in Elkins and Sides (2007). The democracy variable is operationalized through the question asking the respondents to evaluate the level of democracy in Ukraine by using a ten-point scale. The responses are rescaled to vary between 0 'not at all democratic' to 1 'completely democratic'. The descriptive statistics (see Table 1) shows that Ukrainians evaluate their country as more democratic in 2020 than 2011 although this change in the perception of democracy can only be characterized as modest (from 0.45 to 0.50) (see Table 2).

I follow Greenfeld (2001) and include the *Income* variable in the analysis since both the country- and the individual-level financial performance is viewed as a basis for national identity

and pride. The income variable is operationalized through the question in which the respondents have to estimate their satisfaction with the household's financial situation. The initial responses are provided on a ten-point measurement scale and further rescaled to change between 0 'fully dissatisfied' and 1 'fully satisfied'. The two waves show approximately the same distribution of population across income satisfaction scores. In both years, around 60 percent of the population has indicated the average level (0.5) of satisfaction with their personal financial situation (see Table 2).

War_worries is a set of variables that describe the respondents' worry that various types of military confrontations can occur on their country's territory. More specifically, I choose three questions that refer to a terrorist attack, a civil war and a war involving their country. The initial response scale varies from 1 'very much worried' to 4 'not at all worried'. I use the initial responses to create three dummies by assigning the value of 1 to the choices 'very worried' and 'a great deal worried' and the value of 0 when the respondents are 'not very worried' or 'not at all worried'. Note that the expectations of a war were quite high even in 2011, while reaching an unprecedented level in 2020. If in 2011 the respondents' worries were more about a civil war, they turn to frame the source of aggression from the internal (civil) to an external one by assigning the highest value to the possibility of a war with another country (see Table 2).

In addition, I create five dummies that capture the geopolitical division of Ukraine's territory into West, East, Center, South and Kiev. The need to control for the variation at the regional level is justified by the fact that Ukraine represents a heterogeneous country due to historical specificities of its territorial formation. The territorial dummies are constructed based on the geographical division map provided by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_Ukraine#/media/File:Ukraine_KIIS-

Regional-division2.png). The autonomous republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (that had a special status and were part of Ukraine in 2011) are included in the South dummy.

X is a set of *control variables* and includes standard socio-demographic characteristics of respondents that have been shown to affect an individual's national identity and pride (Bekhuis et al., 2014; Evans and Kelley, 2002; Han, 2013; Kavetsos, 2012; Smith and Jarkko, 1998). More specifically, I control for background origins, gender, age, and educational levels. The descriptive statistics is summarized in Table 1, while a juxtaposition of values for the key variables between the two measurement points is provided in Table 2.

Table 1 and Table 2 near here

Empirical results

Over the analyzed period, Ukraine envisaged a rise in the levels of national identity and pride (see Table 2). A final separation from the collective identity linked to Russia and the Soviet past signified an ultimate turn to building not only an independent state but also an independent identity. As Table 3 suggests, this phenomenon can to a limited extent be attributed to socio-demographic characteristics or economic change in the country. In the case of Ukraine, many conventional factors, commonly viewed as a basis for the identification with the nation, do not show any association with the sense of national identity among the local population (see Model 1 in Table 3). More specifically, gender and educational background do not relate to the identity scores. Age is only modestly associated with the individuals feeling Ukrainians. Neither has the citizens' individual financial situation been found to frame national identity among the Ukrainians.

Table 3 near here

In Column 2 (see Table 3), I include the region groups into the analysis and focus on the variations in national identity across territories of Ukraine. My results fail to provide any evidence of stark differences in the identification with the nation across Ukrainian regions. This allows me to negate the claim about cultural, social and political proximity between Russia and Southern or Eastern regions of Ukraine that amount to a sharp contrast with the Western regions regarding being and feeling a Ukrainian. Rather, my results point out that people living in the Eastern regions do not differ in their ethnic identification from the people living in the West or South. Only Kiev and surrounding central regions that are characterized by being a center for political, economic and social developments stand out from other regions and show a substantially higher level of national identity in Ukraine.

In line with my expectations, political factors and recent political events largely predict the sense of national identity among the population. The primary political determinants are the respondent's migration background, democracy evaluation and language fractionalization. People who are born in Ukraine are more than twice likely to feel Ukrainians than the individuals with the migrant background. Also, national identity shows a considerable dependence on the quality of the democratic system in the country. An improvement in the evaluation of democracy by 1 point increases the odds of feeling a Ukrainian between 1.1 and 1.3 times. An even stronger effect comes from the language spoken at home. Individuals whose first language of communication is other than Ukrainian are more than four time less likely to feel Ukrainians than individuals who use the Ukrainian language as their primary language of communication.

Here, a special subcategory is made by people who speak Russian at home even if they were born in Ukraine. The Russian-speaking minority is more than three times less likely to feel Ukrainians than those who communicate in Ukrainian at home. Both findings can be considered sufficient evidence to support Hypotheses 1 and 2.

In addition, my results suggest that the war can be a strong predictor of national identity (see Table 3, Column 3). The odds of feeling a Ukrainian in the in-war period are 1.34 times higher than in the pre-war period. The ultimate effect of the war is though defined by the particular understanding that the individuals assign to the current military confrontation with Russia. The effect is strongest when the war is framed by the respondents as an external aggression (see Table 3, Column 6). When individuals see the current war as a civil war or a terrorist attack than the war effect is much weaker (see Table 3, Columns 4 and 5). This finding is in line with the existing studies demonstrating that the national identity rises in the presence of the common external aggressor. This confirms Hypothesis 3.

Interesting is also the fact that the war has changed the relationship between political factors and national identity. Table 4 presents regression results calculated separately for the two periods. The sense of national identity shows more sensitivity to the language spoken at home in the in-war period than in the pre-war period in the case of Russian-speaking population. Similarly, the identification with the nation is substantially more sensitive to the perceived quality of democracy in the in-war period rather than in the pre-war year (1.410 versus 0.852). Finally, the war eliminated the heterogeneity in the feeling of national identity across regions. If some differences can be found in the pre-war sample, they tend to disappear or become only marginal in the in-war period.

Table 4 near here

In the case of national pride, the picture is slightly different (see Table 5). The migration background only has a marginal effect on the pride scores, not like in the case of national identity. Gender and age do not relate in any way to the sense of national pride among the Ukrainian population. However, education can boost the level of ethnic pride: More educated people are more likely to be proud of their nation than the less educated.

Table 5 near here

Also, the individuals draw on their personal financial success while defining their national pride levels. Those who are more satisfied with their financial situation are more likely to feel proud of being Ukrainians. In the case of national pride, personal economic success is more important than the country's progress with building democracy. The positive impact of improvements in democracy on national pride is almost twice weaker compared to the impact of change in income levels. Still, the evaluation of democracy is important for the definition of national pride levels, which confirms Hypothesis 1. Similar to national identity, national pride develops a certain relationship to the language fractionalization, which is in line with Hypothesis 2. The relationship is though considerably weaker than in the case of national identity: Speaking Russian at home reduces the odds of feeling proud for Ukraine by 0.9 to 1.1 times.

In contrast to national identity, national pride among the population in the East does not differ from that in Kiev and surrounding central regions (see Table 5). The stark differences are found between the East and the West and to some extent between the East and the South.

Individuals living in the Western and Southern regions feel to the same extent Ukrainians as individuals living in the East. But, they are much prouder of their country than people in the East. This can of course be explained by the fact that war caused a lot of destruction of various natures to the individuals living in the Eastern regions impacting their sense of national pride.

As in the case of national identity, the war dummy shows a strong positive impact on the national pride, as Hypothesis 3 suggested. Again, people's understanding of the war nature shapes its ultimate effect on their pride levels. The strongest impact comes when the individuals frame the current military confrontation as an external aggression. In addition, national pride is strongly affected when the individuals understand the current war as an attack. The pride of nation is least affected among individuals who frame the war as a civil war.

As in the case of national identity, the war has influenced the importance of various factors in their impact on national pride (see Table 6). If in 2011, the respondents show no relationship between their migration background and the sense of pride for their nation, this factor becomes marginal, but still statistically significant in its impact on pride formation in 2020. Similarly, high education appears to be an important and strong determinant in defining national pride in the in-war period while revealing no effect in the pre-war period. The war has intensified the negative impact of using Russian as the key language of communication at home in the process of national pride building. A similar trend also appears in the case of the perceived evaluation of the democratic quality. The positive impact of democracy on national pride is double in its size in the in-war compared to the pre-war period. Finally, the war eliminated the differences in national pride levels between the West and the East, but intensified these differences between the Center and the East.

Table 6 near here

Overall, my analysis provides strong evidence of a country-specific mechanism that the sense of national identity and pride follow in their patterns of formation in Ukraine. Local policies of using language for nation-building, strong adherence to democracy and reginal heterogeneity resulted from Ukraine's historical specificities of territorial formation all contribute to the identification with, and pride for, nation. The war also appears to be an important factor in boosting the sense of national identity and pride by strengthening bonds among the local population and uniting people in their struggle against the common aggressor. In addition, the war increased the impact of language- and democracy-relevant variables on building national identity and pride.

Conclusion and discussion

This study focuses on a country-specific analysis of national identity and pride formation by providing interesting insights into the mechanisms of their emergence in Ukraine that can be summarized in four points. First, the results suggest that national identity and national pride follow different paths of formation and can be determined by a different set of factors. Although being closely related, national identity shows sharp differences from national pride in the range of factors that influence their emergence among the population. In the case of Ukraine, national identity is strongly related to migration background, language fractionalization and the quality of democratic settings in a country. National pride shows a substantially weaker relationship with these three factors but strongly relates to one's perception of personal economic prosperity.

Second, both national identity and national pride are still strongly determined by the political sphere in Ukraine. Building democracy can increase the sense of ethnic belonging in the post-communist area. People's sense of identification with their nations grows in strength not because their countries become richer but because they make a big progress in building democratic states in which everyone can have a say and influence the course of events. This suggests that governments of transition economies should strengthen democratic settings in their countries to enforce not only state- and nation-building processes but also the sense of pride that their populations feel about their nations.

Third, although highly criticized, the language policy seems to be an essential part of national identity building in Ukraine. My empirical results show that language should be seen as a common determinator that can unite the population of Ukraine. Language spoken at home may to a considerable degree frame both the sense of national identity and pride. This suggests that the government should resume its language policy to ensure a smooth transition to a single official language in the country. The monopoly of the Ukrainian language in education is the right strategy in achieving this goal and enforcing a wide-spread use of the national language among the individuals in the long run.

Fourth, the war, that is unfolding in Ukraine since 2014, has contributed considerably to raising national identity and pride among the country's population. This finding is not new in the literature. The experience of many developing countries shows that the presence of a common aggressor can be productively used for nation-building and constitutes a very effective instrument in the hands of politicians in the process of identity framing (Frahm, 2012). The Ukrainian case is characterized, nonetheless, by some specificity. Since the war is initiated by the rebels while supported by a third party (Russia) in a hidden way, there is no clear definition

of what this military confrontation is among the country's population. The war's ultimate effect on national identity and pride can be linked to the personal understanding that Ukrainians assign to this conflict. If individuals see this war as a civil war, they change a lot their sense of identity and national pride. The effect is though much stronger when this war is interpreted as a war that involves another country. In this case, the war is not regarded as an internal conflict but a conflict caused by OTHERS and viewed as an aggression from outside that encourages the formation of a strong attachment towards the Ukrainian nation and the state.

Future studies should expand the analysis of national identity and pride formation by resorting to longitudinal data that provide the possibility to control for the problems of endogeneity and timing. Additionally, there is a necessity for a comparative study that would juxtapose the process of national identity and pride formation between the EU countries, Russia and Ukraine. This would allow one to understand the extent to which the process found for Ukraine is a rather country-specific phenomenon or similar in nature to other countries. Particularly interesting is the question of whether these similarities go more to the direction of the West (the EU) or to the past, seen as Russia. Identifying similarities and differences of this kind would permit defining a relative positioning of Ukraine in the complex world of geopolitics.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for key variables.

VARIABLES	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
National identity	0.883	0.320	0	1
National pride	0.781	0.413	0	1
Born in the country	0.930	0.254	0	1
Male	0.403	0.491	0	1
Age	47.389	17.467	18	89
Education				
Low	0.075	0.237	0	1
Middle	0.438	0.496	0	1
Higher	0.487	0.499	0	1
Language spoken at home				
Ukrainian	0.546	0.498	0	1
Russian	0.439	0.496	0	1
Other	0.015	0.124	0	1
Satisfaction with income	0.474	0.238	0	1
Democracy score	0.475	0.248	0	1
Worry about				
Terrorist attack	0.731	0.443	0	1
Civil war	0.784	0.412	0	1
War in general	0.805	0.396	0	1

Source: Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2020).

Table 2. A juxtaposition of key variables between 2011 and 2020.

VARIABLES	2011	2020	T-test of the difference in the means	
			Difference	t-value
National identity	0.827	0.950	0.123***	10.721
National pride	0.716	0.855	0.139***	8.876
Born in the country	0.907	0.957	0.050***	5.320
Male	0.400	0.406	0.006	0.349
Age	47.232	47.573	0.341	0.517
Education				
Low	0.043	0.107	0.064***	4.127
Middle	0.617	0.430	-0.187***	8.310
Higher	0.340	0.463	0.123***	9.230
Language spoken at home				
Ukrainian	0.501	0.596	0.094***	5.029
Russian	0.480	0.392	-0.088***	4.670
Other	0.019	0.012	-0.007	1.523
Satisfaction with income	0.454	0.497	0.043***	4.787
Democracy score	0.451	0.504	0.053***	5.580
Worry about				
Terrorist attack	0.642	0.835	0.193***	11.762
Civil war	0.720	0.859	0.139***	8.983
War in general	0.695	0.928	0.233***	16.504

Source: Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2020).

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3. Key determinants of national identity formation in Ukraine.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Born in the country	2.355***	2.476***	2.434***	2.524***	2.510***	2.511***
	(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.209)	(0.206)	(0.207)	(0.209)
Male	-0.217	-0.174	-0.213	-0.140	-0.148	-0.190
	(0.145)	(0.148)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.152)
Age	-0.013***	-0.011**	-0.013***	-0.010**	-0.012**	-0.009*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education						
Higher	0.079	0.055	0.034	-0.080	0.019	0.083
	(0.324)	(0.332)	(0.364)	(0.346)	(0.340)	(0.341)
Middle	-0.119	-0.106	0.288	-0.172	-0.076	-0.016
	(0.320)	(0.329)	(0.361)	(0.343)	(0.336)	(0.338)
Low	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Language spoken at home						
Ukrainian	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Russian	-3.313***	-3.180***	-3.123***	-3.110***	-3.104***	-3.121***
	(0.292)	(0.351)	(0.342)	(0.351)	(0.350)	(0.351)
Other	-4.636***	-4.629***	-4.672***	-4.551***	-4.526***	-4.528***
	(0.444)	(0.481)	(0.486)	(0.485)	(0.484)	(0.485)
Satisfaction with income	0.663**	0.412	0.421	0.463	0.459	0.465
	(0.316)	(0.332)	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.338)
Democracy score		1.135***	1.123***	1.176***	1.295***	1.238***
		(0.321)	(0.329)	(0.330)	(0.334)	(0.331)
Regions						
East		Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
West		-0.046	0.063	-0.110	-0.151	-0.090
		(0.381)	(0.379)	(0.380)	(0.381)	(0.382)
South		0.043	-0.004	-0.002	-0.054	0.018
		(0.170)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.174)
Center		0.863***	0.968***	0.844***	0.803***	0.866***
		(0.274)	(0.280)	(0.280)	(0.281)	(0.281)
Kiev		0.865***	0.845***	0.790***	0.823***	0.825***

		(0.297)	(0.302)	(0.303)	(0.310)	(0.301)
War dummy			1.338***			
			(0.185)			
Worry about						
Terrorist attack				0.396**		
				(0.163)		
Civil war					0.460***	
					(0.171)	
War in general						0.618***
						(0.171)
Constant	2.958***	2.055***	1.547**	1.723***	1.621**	1.294*
	(0.567)	(0.640)	(0.651)	(0.659)	(0.665)	(0.668)
R sq.	0.354	0.365	0.395	0.366	0.366	0.368
Log likelihood	-632.081	-621.789	-592.392	-595.945	-593.637	-594.886
Observations	2,436	2,436	2,436	2,436	2,436	2,436

Source: Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2020).

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4. Change in national identity formation patterns between the pre-war and the in-war periods.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Born in the country	2.407***	2.703***
	(0.258)	(0.405)
Male	-0.336*	0.205
	(0.176)	(0.330)
Age	-0.012**	-0.024**
	(0.005)	(0.012)
Education		
Higher	-0.230	0.698
	(0.480)	(0.534)
Middle	0.120	0.851
	(0.464)	(0.605)
Low	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Language spoken at home		
Ukrainian	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Russian	-3.050***	-3.538***
	(0.365)	(1.057)
Other	-4.741***	-4.532***
	(0.557)	(1.318)
Satisfaction with income	0.520	0.238
	(0.395)	(0.730)
Democracy score	0.852**	1.410**
	(0.384)	(0.705)
Regions		
East	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
West	-0.156	-0.040
	(0.405)	(0.114)
South	-0.162	0.428
	(0.200)	(0.396)
Center	0.922***	1.229*
	(0.311)	(0.723)
Kiev	1.978***	-0.588
	(0.471)	(0.452)
Constant	1.830**	2.813*
	(0.752)	(1.564)
R sq.	0.375	0.354
Log likelihood	-430.085	-141.743
Observations	1,500	850

Source: Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2020).

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5. Key determinants of national pride formation in Ukraine.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Born in the country	0.375**	0.364*	0.289	0.391**	0.367*	0.377*
	(0.190)	(0.192)	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.196)	(0.197)
Male	-0.126	-0.117	-0.160	-0.064	-0.090	-0.075
	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Age	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education						
Higher	0.389*	0.413**	0.417*	0.374*	0.419**	0.388*
	(0.201)	(0.207)	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.215)
Middle	0.242	0.285	0.606***	0.223	0.283	0.256
	(0.198)	(0.203)	(0.213)	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.211)
Low	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Language spoken at home						
Ukrainian	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Russian	-1.154***	-0.971***	-0.966***	-1.026***	-1.014***	-1.024***
	(0.104)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.135)
Other	-0.917**	-0.880**	-0.980**	-1.078**	-0.988**	-1.007**
	(0.407)	(0.420)	(0.421)	(0.423)	(0.421)	(0.422)
Satisfaction with income	0.898***	0.829***	0.823***	0.884***	0.876***	0.888***
	(0.221)	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.238)	(0.236)	(0.237)
Democracy score		0.601***	0.506**	0.624***	0.690***	0.644***
		(0.209)	(0.212)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.216)
Regions						
East		Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
West		0.636***	0.582***	0.572***	0.585***	0.555***
		(0.194)	(0.194)	(0.199)	(0.200)	(0.199)
South		0.329**	0.258*	0.287**	0.296**	0.289**
		(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.144)

Center		0.167	0.099	0.044	0.100	0.089
		(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.169)	(0.168)	(0.169)
Kiev		0.137	0.077	-0.020	0.018	0.080
		(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.187)
War dummy			0.852***			
			(0.116)			
Worry about						
Terrorist attack				0.959***		
				(0.109)		
Civil war					0.648***	
					(0.117)	
War in general						0.912***
						(0.118)
Constant	0.728**	0.061	-0.169	-0.481	-0.431	-0.565
	(0.358)	(0.398)	(0.402)	(0.413)	(0.416)	(0.417)
R sq.	0.068	0.074	0.095	0.102	0.085	0.097
Log likelihood	-1250.389	-1242.994	-1214.981	-1169.462	-1177.310	-1177.155
Observations	2,436	2,436	2,436	2,436	2,436	2,436

Source: Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2020).

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6. Change in national pride formation patterns between the pre-war and the in-war periods.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Born in the country	0.227	0.586*
	(0.240)	(0.344)
Male	-0.153	-0.227
	(0.128)	(0.180)
Age	0.003	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Education		
Higher	0.140	0.752***
	(0.326)	(0.284)
Middle	0.521*	0.517*
	(0.310)	(0.313)
Low	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Language spoken at home		
Ukrainian	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Russian	-0.896***	-1.172***
	(0.155)	(0.262)
Other	-1.337**	-0.556
	(0.524)	(0.843)
Satisfaction with income	0.938***	0.804**
	(0.286)	(0.410)
Democracy score	0.456*	0.920**
	(0.267)	(0.382)
Regions		
East	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
West	0.696***	0.147
	(0.227)	(0.398)
South	0.533***	-0.459
	(0.172)	(0.283)
Center	0.498**	-0.913***
	(0.200)	(0.332)
Kiev	-0.071	0.177
	(0.223)	(0.382)
Constant	-0.215	0.937
	(0.511)	(0.709)
R sq.	0.075	0.098
Log likelihood	-773.754	-421.786
Observations	1,403	1,140

Source: Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2020).

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.