A comparative analysis of confidence to the CIS between Ukraine and Russia

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Abstract

This study focuses on examining confidence to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) displayed by the Ukrainian and the Russian respondents in 2011. By juxtaposing its patterns of formation, I approximate the individuals' preference for a common unification shortly before the beginning of a military confrontation between the two countries. Drawn upon the World Values Survey (WVS) data, I demonstrate that the Ukrainian population viewed the CIS as incompatible with building national identity or increasing the importance of democracy as a form of governance in their country. While also linked to democracy, the CIS was primarily a matter of national pride and, to some extent, an issue of economic prosperity in Russia. In both countries, the CIS was similarly seen by the respondents as a supplement to the national government and an alternative to the West.

Keywords: Commonwealth of Independent States, Confidence to the CIS, Ukraine-Russia Relations, Comparative Analysis, Logistic Regression, WVS.

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Lately, Ukraine has attracted a lot of international attention. What makes the recent events stand out is the excessive focus of Russia on this country. Russia has difficulty dealing with the notion of Ukraine as a separate nation (Yekelchyk, 2015). By resorting to common history, culture and religion, the Kremlin leaders refuse the right of Ukraine to independence and promote the idea that the country's only national interest should be to unite with Russia. They openly accused Ukrainian politicians in denying the past and kindling the anti-Russian sentiments among the local population. Ukraine as a state is viewed by the Kremlin as an "anti-Russian" project, while the local language policy is described as a way of discriminating against the Russian-speaking minority (Ojala and Pantti, 2017).

At the same time, Ukraine strives for independence and accuses Russia of exploiting the country in the course of common history (Chayinska et al., 2021). Ukrainians blame Russians for distorting their national identity by reducing the country to the status of 'Little Russia' (Yekelchyk, 2015). The negative attitudes are on the rise among the population, especially as regards the Kremlin's extent of influence in Ukraine's process of state- and nation-building (Fengler et al., 2020; Turchyn et al., 2020). Russian media attribute this phenomenon to the "anti-Russian" policies chosen by the Ukrainian government and the "subordination" of the country to its conventional rivals – the United States and the European Union. Yet, the Ukrainian population sees Moscow as the major source of any danger for Ukraine, building up high expectations of a war with Russia and expressing a sincere desire to gain ultimate independence from this country's influence (Fengler et al., 2020).

This study attempts to analyze the individuals' attitudes to a common unification in both countries shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since major surveys lack the question directly asking about confidence that one nation would hold toward the other, I use confidence to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as its approximation. The CIS was expected to unite the former soviet republics by replacing the collapsed Soviet Union and legitimize Russia's power in the entire area (Feklyunina, 2016; Willerton et al., 2015). More specifically, I examine the level of confidence that the Ukrainian and the Russian respondents displayed to the CIS in 2011, while in parallel looking into the mechanism of confidence formation in both countries. This analysis is expected to provide a juxtaposition of the populations' attitudes toward the unification process and unveil sources that can be claimed responsible for the existence of distrust between the two nations.

The CIS in the context of Ukraine-Russia relations: A literature overview

The entire history of Ukraine-Russia relations could be characterized as asymmetric. Starting from the 14th century, Russia took control over various parts of Ukraine, brutely suppressing any attempt of the Ukrainian population to restore independence (Yekelchyk, 2015). The country's situation has only worsened with the creation of the Soviet Union (Düben, 2020). By taking the superior position, Russia acted as a 'significant Other' that denied the authencity of the in-group members and invested a lot of effort to subvert their separate existence (Feklyunina, 2016). Ukraine's position was inferior not only politically but also linguistically and culturally (Smirnova and Illiev, 2017). Russian was introduced by the Soviet government as the only official language in Ukraine. Speaking Ukrainian was limited to the informal domains and mostly to the western regions of the country, causing a large discrepancy between ethno-cultural identity and language use (Peacock,

2015). The identification with the Ukrainian nation was equally reduced to the idea of a 'Russian world' — an imagined community based on the Russian culture and the common glorious past (White et al., 2010).

It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that Ukraine gained lasting independent statehood of its own. On 8 December 1991, the three republics (the Byelorussian, the Russian, and the Ukrainian) signed the Belavezha Accords, declaring the Soviet Union as effectively ceasing to exist and announcing their independence. The same Accord established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a successor entity. Few days later, on 21 December 1991, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, also becoming members of the CIS. Georgia joined two years later, in December 1993, increasing the total number of CIS participants to 12 (of the 15 former Soviet Republics).

Ukraine was one of the founding states that signed the Creation Agreement in December 1991. Still, Ukraine chose not to ratify the CIS Charter as it disagrees with Russia being the only legal successor of the Soviet Union. The country continued to participate in the CIS as an associate member, joining also the CIS's Economic Union in 1993. The CIS Charter stated that all member states were equal and independent participants, while the entity *de facto* was hegemonically governed by Russia (Feklyunina, 2016). The new unification was expected to reproduce the former Soviet Union by legitimizing Russia's power and control in the entire post-soviet area (Willerton et al., 2015).

In the first decade of the CIS membership, neither Ukrainian politicians nor the local population could define their attitude toward Russia or any unification with this country. While attracted to the West, Ukrainians also showed a strong inclination to the former Soviet republics

with which they were for so long associated. Among the transition economies, Ukraine was the most sharply polarized between these two foreign policy orientations (White et al., 2010). The situation was described as entering a 'gray zone' – a zone of ambivalence between the evolution toward the Russian model of governance and the transformation toward a West-European democracy (Wawrzonek, 2014).

In the course of transition, Russia gradually slid toward authoritarianism. In spite of shared religion, civilization, and racial proximity, Ukraine showed a greater preference for more liberal and democratic notions (Brudny and Finkel, 2011). The two countries slowly diverged in their choices regarding political and economic institutions. This created the pressure for political change in Ukraine, primarily regarding Russia's extent of influence in the country (Kuzio, 2001). The Orange Revolution of 2004 – 2005 was a first expression of collective angst among the population about the preferable path of development for Ukraine (Chayinska et al., 2021). The collision of conflicting narratives on 'what Ukraine is' and 'what it should be' largely evolved around the issue of Russia as regards its role in Ukraine's state– and nation–building processes (Reznik, 2016).

The ambivalence regarding Ukraine's direction of development was terminated in 2013, when the Ukrainian government decided to suspend the signing of an association agreement with the European Union, choosing closer ties to Russia. In response to this, large protests for democratic change were held not just in Western Ukraine, but throughout the East as well, where there is a significant Russian-speaking minority. This time, the major motivation of the Ukrainian population to revolt was the support for democratic and market values, along with the desire for a definite turn toward the 'West' (McGlynn, 2020).

Following the military invasion of Crimea and the East of Ukraine by Russia in 2014, relations between the two countries significantly deteriorated. Ukraine considered necessary to terminate its participation in the CIS. On 14 March 2014, a bill was introduced to Ukraine's parliament to denounce their ratification of the CIS Creation Agreement, but it was not approved. It is only in April 2018 that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko indicated that Ukraine would formally leave the CIS. On 19 May 2018, he signed a decree ultimately ending Ukraine's participation in the CIS statutory bodies.

Academic discourse still disagrees about Russia's motives to begin a war against Ukraine (Claessen, 2021; Düben, 2015). Multiple explanations are provided ranging from Russia's attempt to preserve the country's sphere of influence (Fengler et al., 2020) to the Kremlin's fear that a more democratic Ukrainian government may serve as an example to Russian citizens of how culturally-similar people can be alternatively governed (Cornell, 2014; Hove, 2016). Unexpectedly, what became uncontestable is that the Russian military aggression succeeded to positively influence the development of Ukraine by galvanizing the population's aspirations for independence (Fournier, 2018).

The military conflict with Russia created a political turbulence that made possible for the country to get out of the grey zone and embark on the stable path toward a liberal democracy (Turchyn et al., 2020). The war enhanced the formation of ethnic identity among the local population by strengthening the fear of Russia as an aggressor and causing a drastic change of attitudes toward the country and its language. On the one hand, many Ukrainian Russian speakers came to identify strongly with the Ukrainian nation without abandoning their accustomed language or even adding Ukrainian as an active part of their communicative repertoire (Kulyk, 2016). On the other hand, there was a strong mobilization of Russian speakers on the side of the Ukrainian

government (Aliyev, 2019). The rebels of the East were suspected of violating sociocultural, ideological, or religious values of their ethnic group, while third-party (Russia's) pro-rebel intervention further aggravated ethnic defection (Frahm, 2012). By invading into the eastern regions, Russia actually pushed Ukraine toward the West (Wolczuk, 2016). Ukrainians now see Russia as an aggressor in a war that unexpectedly came to define the nation's ongoing struggle for true independence (Smirnova and Iliev, 2017).

While focusing on confidence to the CIS, this study attempts to analyze the attitudes toward a unification of Ukraine with Russia shortly before the outbreak of the military conflict between the two countries. My major line of reasoning is that the Ukrainian respondents should have had high trust levels toward the CIS if they perceived Russia, or common future with Russia, positively. By examining confidence to the CIS formation, I intend to reveal the key motives that governed trust to a common unification in both countries. I anticipate that there is a wide gap in the patterns of confidence building between Ukraine and Russia that can unveil differences in the interests for some common future between the two nations. As such, I hypothesize that

H.1.: Before the conflict, the Ukrainian respondents showed high levels of confidence to the CIS that were comparable to confidence levels among the Russian population.

H.2.: Even before the conflict, confidence to the CIS formation was defined by different factors in Ukraine and Russia, reflecting the cross – country variation in the preferences for the state– and nation– building processes.

Data and methods description

I use data from the World Values Survey to analyze the patterns of confidence to the CIS formation. Since the major purpose of my analysis is to make a comparison between Ukraine and

Russia, I limit my dataset to the year 2011 when both countries asked the relevant question. The total sample includes 3198 cases, with 1299 cases stemming from Ukraine and 1899 cases coming from Russia. A logistic regression is applied to calculate the model's parameters. The base model takes the following form:

$$Confidence_{ij} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Language\_group_{ij} + \gamma_2 Ethnic\_group_{ij} + \gamma_3 National\_pride_{ij} + \gamma_4 Feel\_insecure_{ij} + \gamma_5 Income_{ij} + \gamma_6 Democracy_{ij} + \gamma_7 Political\_scale_{ij} + \gamma_8 Self\_reliance_{ij} + \gamma_9 Confidence\_to\_government_{ij} + \gamma_{10} Confidence\_to\_UN_{ij} + \gamma_{11} Regions_{ij} + \gamma_{12} X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Here, *Confidence* describes the level of trust to the CIS and is operationalized through the question in which respondents should specify how much confidence they feel toward the Commonwealth of Independent States. The initial responses are measured on a four-point scale. I unite them to create a dummy with the value of 1 if the respondents feel 'a lot of confidence' or 'a great deal of confidence' and the value of 0 if otherwise.

Language_group captures the extent of language fractionalization and is operationalized through three dummies referring to the language that the respondents use to communicate at home – Ukrainian, Russian or other languages. *Ethnic group* describes ethnic fractionalization in society and is measured through three dummies – Ukrainian, Russian and other ethnicities – derived from the WVS question asking the respondents to indicate to which ethnic group they feel to belong. The dummies take the value of 1 if the respondents give the answer that corresponds to the relevant language or ethnicity group and the value of 0 if otherwise.

National_pride is measured through the WVS question 'How proud are you to be (corresponding nation)', with responses ranging from 1 'not at all proud' to 4 'very proud'. The

initial responses are recorded into a dichotomous variable by assigning the value of 1 to positive choices ('quite proud' and 'a great deal proud') and the value of 0 to the skeptical responses ('relatively proud' and 'not at all proud'). *Feel_insecure* is measured through the question, asking the respondents to indicate how secure they feel in their neighborhood. I create a dummy variable with the value of 1 when the respondents specify that they feel 'very secure' or 'quite secure' and the value of 0 when the respondents feel 'not really secure' or 'not at all secure'. *Income* controls for the respondents' income levels and is operationalized through the question in which the respondents have to estimate their satisfaction with the household's financial situation. The initial responses are provided on a ten-point measurement scale and further rescaled to change between 0 'fully dissatisfied' and 1 'fully satisfied'.

Democracy is operationalized through the question asking the respondents to evaluate the level of democracy in their countries by using a ten-point measurement scale. The responses are recorded to vary between 0 'not at all democratic' to 1 'completely democratic'. *Political_scale* is measured through the question asking the individuals to position themselves on a political scale ranging from 1 'left' to 10 'right'. The responses are recorded to change between 0 and 1, while retaining the ten-point measurement scale. *Self_reliance* captures the extent to which people adhere to liberal values, namely the level of self-reliance that the respondents consider acceptable as opposed to the state support. The responses vary between 1 'people should take more responsibility' to 10 'the government should take more responsibility' and are further rescaled to change between 0 and 1.

Confidence_to_government and *Confidence_to_UN* describe the level of institutional trust by referring to the self-defined level of confidence that the respondents feel toward their country's government and the United Nations, respectively. The initial responses are used to

create dummies that take the value of 1 if the respondents feel 'a lot of confidence' or 'a great deal of confidence' and the value of 0 if otherwise.

Regions include a set of dummies that capture the geopolitical division of countries. In the case of Ukraine, the territorial dummies include West, East, Center, South and Kiev that are constructed based on the geographical division map provided by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_Ukraine#/media/File:Ukraine_KIIS-Regional-division2.png). The autonomous republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol that had a special status and were part of Ukraine in 2011 are included in the *South* dummy. In the case of Russia, the regional dummies are derived from the World Values Survey dataset and comprise Moscow, North West, North Caucasian, Central, Privolzhskiy, Urals, Far East, Siberian, and South. The need to control for the variation at the regional level is justified by the fact that both countries, especially Ukraine, can be characterized as heterogenous across various geographical parts, that can be explained by historical specificities of their territorial formation. Finally, X is a set of control variables and includes standard socio-demographic characteristics of respondents that have been shown to affect an individual's confidence level (Uslaner, 2008). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the analysis.

Table 1 near here

Empirical results

Almost a half of the respondents (48.1 percent) in Ukraine declared to have a good deal of confidence or complete confidence to the CIS, while this proportion was only 40 percent in the

case of Russia. Under the assumption that confidence to the CIS could closely relate to the confidence to Russia, these results suggest that Ukrainians trusted Russians more than Russians trusted themselves in 2011. Alternatively, if confidence to the CIS could reflect the level of trust that the respondents displayed toward the unification of the two nations, one might conclude that Ukrainians wanted much more to be with Russians than Russians with Ukrainians. Although both assumptions should be taken with some caution, these numbers support Hypothesis 1 and point out that the Ukrainian population had a great deal of confidence to the CIS in 2011, hardly expecting a severe conflict with Russia.

A significant detail, that is important for the analysis of Ukraine-Russia relations, is that Ukraine was characterized by the presence of a large Russian-speaking minority, while Russia could be considered a relatively homogenous society. In 2011, 48 percent of the Ukrainian population used Russian as a key language of communication at home, which could surely explain the high proportion of people wanting the unification with Russia. Note also that in spite of this extensive language fractionalization, around 83 percent of respondents declared that they felt Ukrainians and not Russians, suggesting that the language spoken at home did not affect one's sense of ethnic identity in Ukraine (see Table 1).

Still, language spoken at home was an important determinant of confidence to the CIS. Table 2 presents the parameters for a multivariant model and suggests that speaking Russian increased significantly the odds of trusting in the CIS among the Ukrainian population in 2011. This effect partly loses its strength when one controls for the regional variables, pointing out to the wide variation of the use of Russian language across regions of Ukraine. By contrast, ethnic identity showed no relation to confidence to the CIS in the case of the Ukrainian sample. This finding can be seen as evidence that the unification with Russia was not fully commensurate with

the sense of national identity among the Ukrainian population already in 2011 but rather related to the common culture of the two nations, largely limited to the common language. Opposite to Ukraine, confidence to the CIS was strongly linked in the case of Russia to the nation building process and not to the common cultural features. Table 3 indicates that the confidence variable developed no relation to the language fractionalization in Russia but was strongly associated with the sense of ethnic belonging (see Table 3). This conclusion is further supported by the impact that national pride had on confidence levels in 2011. In the case of Ukraine, this variable proved insignificant in its effect, advocating again for the idea that building nation and national identity in Ukraine was regarded as an independent process from any unification governed by Russia (see Table 2). As opposed to Ukraine, national pride was one of the influential factors for confidence formation in Russia. People who were prouder of Russia strived more for the CIS in 2011 by displaying higher levels of confidence to this organization (see Table 3). This evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 2.

Table 2 and Table 3 near here

In contrast to Russia, the Ukrainian data show that confidence to the CIS was additionally shaped by three factors – age, political preferences and liberal values (see Table 2). These variables point to the CIS supporters' adherence to pro-social policies and values related to the common soviet past. Soviet nostalgia that increases with age and usually dominates the minds of people that had experience with the Soviet Union might explain the positive effect of the age variable on confidence levels. Similarly, adherence to the left and the idea that the state should be taking more responsibility as opposed to self-reliance also suggested a certain influence of the past, while developing a positive association with confidence levels. Reversely, adhering to the

liberal values that promote self-reliance and limited intervention of the state were not viewed by the Ukrainian respondents in 2011 as compatible with the Russia-related unification that would instill confidence into Ukrainians.

Both countries showed no significant relationship between confidence to the CIS and the sense of insecurity. Similarly, income variable developed no relationship to the confidence levels in Ukraine. Only in the case of Russia, there is evidence that economic prosperity measured through income satisfaction was weakly associated with confidence to the CIS levels (see Table 2 and Table 3). These are interesting findings taking into account that security issues and economic cooperation were the key objectives on the agenda of the CIS creation (Willerton et al., 2012). Also, both countries were characterized by a negative relationship between confidence to the CIS and confidence to the national governments or to the United Nations. This suggests that the unification between the former soviet republics was seen in 2011 as a supplement to the national governments, largely due to their inability to solve political, economic and social problems, or as a substitute to the unification with the West.

Finally, there was a substantial variation in confidence levels in 2011 across Ukrainian regions, while this was not the case in Russia. Russian regions were quite homogenous in terms of their distribution of preferences for a unification across the country. Due to the historical specificity of Ukraine's territorial formation, the country was, and still is, characterized by a wide variation of attitudes toward Russia across regions, even after controlling for the language spoken at home.

Overall, the above analysis allows one to draw two key conclusions: On one hand, Ukraine and Russia displayed quite high levels of confidence toward a common unification in 2011 as limited to the CIS in this particular case. On the other hand, trust that both countries had

regarding a common unification was shaped by different set of factors, reflecting the key differences in the preferences that both countries defined for their future state- and nation-building.

Conclusion and discussion

This study focuses on analyzing confidence to the CIS in Ukraine and Russia. My results suggest that confidence levels were slightly higher in Ukraine than in Russia in 2011, advocating for the positive stance among the Ukrainian population to the idea of the unification with Russia. This process was still largely supported by the Russian-speaking minority and older population that could be interpreted as a sign of soviet nostalgia. Also, Ukrainians did not associate the unification with Russia with their sense of national identity and pride. Neither building democracy or enforcing liberal values were positively related to the idea of the CIS.

All in all, these findings allow me to conclude that, despite high levels of confidence to the CIS, Ukraine begun already in 2011 to show a significant deviation from Russia in the preferences chosen for the state- and nation-building. Broadly speaking, the Ukrainian population could not perceive the possibility of developing national identity, democracy and liberal economy through the CIS. In Russia by contrast, the CIS was a matter of ethnic identity and pride since it would allow the country to retain control over the former soviet republics. Confidence to the CIS was also related among the Russian population to the issue of personal economic prosperity, even if only to a quite limited extent. In both countries, the CIS was though regarded as the opposite to the national government and the West (limited to the United Nations in my analysis).

Overall, my results support the conventional knowledge that Ukraine was still in the gray zone in 2011, indecisive between closer ties with Russia and the West. By contrast, Russia of that period was characterized by the strengthening of national hegemonic identity, adopted by the large proportion of the population. Future studies should expand this analysis by focusing directly on examining the individuals' preferences for the EU as opposed to the CIS unification in the two countries. What is particularly interesting is to explore the possible impact that cultural similarities and institutional differences between Ukraine and Russia could produce on their populations' view regarding future memberships in the wide and complex network of geopolitical organizations.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variables	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Ukraine's dataset				
Confidence to CIS	0.481	0.499	0	1
Born in the country	0.930	0.255	0	1
Male	0.403	0.490	0	1
Age	47	17	18	89
Education level				
Higher	0.488	0.499	0	1
Middle	0.439	0.496	0	1
Low	0.073	0.398	0	1
Language used to communicate at home				
Ukrainian	0.501	0.498		
Russian	0.481	0.496	0	1
Other	0.018	0.123	0	1
Ethnic group				
Ukrainian	0.827	0.356	0	1
Russian	0.140	0.290	0	1
Other	0.033	0.150	0	1
National pride	0.782	0.413	0	1
Feel insecure	0.520	0.179	0	1
Satisfaction with household income	0.474	0.238	0	1
Democracy score	0.475	0.248	0	1
Left to right political scale	0.559	0.199	0	1
Preference for self-reliance	0.734	0.271	0	1
Confidence to the Government	0.778	0.204	0	1
Confidence to the United Nations	0.635	0.215	0	1
Russia's dataset				
Confidence to CIS	0.403	0.491	0	1
Born in the country	0.954	0.210	0	1
Male	0.432	0.495	0	1
Age	46	17	18	91
Education level				
Higher	0.455	0.498	0	1
Middle	0.482	0.450	0	1
Low				
Language used to communicate at home				
Ukrainian	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Russian	0.935	0.246	0	1
Other	0.065	0.246	0	1
Ethnic group				
Russian	0.866	0.525	0	1
Ukrainian	0.003	0.481	0	1

Other	0.131	0.227	0	1
National pride	0.854	0.353	0	1
Feel insecure	0.559	0.169	0	1
Satisfaction with household income	0.513	0.235	0	1
Democracy score	0.507	0.227	0	1
Left to right political scale	0.572	0.212	0	1
Self-reliance	0.736	0.273	0	1
Confidence to the Government	0.638	0.223	0	1
Confidence to the United Nations	0.711	0.224	0	1

Source: Author ’s own calculations using the WVS.

Table 2. Key determinants of confidence to CIS in Ukraine.

Variables	(1)	(2)
Born in the country	0.085	0.086
	(0.297)	(0.299)
Male	-0.140	-0.097
	(0.133)	(0.136)
Age	0.014***	0.015***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Education level		
Higher	-0.110	-0.021
	(0.364)	(0.368)
Middle	0.154	0.187
	(0.346)	(0.348)
Low	Ref. category	Ref. category
Language used to communicate at home		
Ukrainian	Ref. category	Ref. category
Russian	0.744***	0.358**
	(0.148)	(0.171)
Other	1.167*	0.728
	(0.624)	(0.642)
Ethnic group		
Ukrainian	Ref. category	Ref. category
Russian	0.023	-0.141
	(0.247)	(0.254)
Other	-0.558	-0.489
	(0.467)	(0.477)
National pride	-0.025	-0.003
	(0.153)	(0.156)
Feel insecure	0.096	-0.078
	(0.360)	(0.370)
Satisfaction with income	0.432	0.444
	(0.292)	(0.299)
Democracy score	0.292	0.394
	(0.293)	(0.298)
Left to right political scale	-1.022***	-0.936***
	(0.340)	(0.346)
Preference for self-reliance	0.821***	0.770***
	(0.259)	(0.261)
Confidence to the Government	-1.890***	-1.975***
	(0.351)	(0.358)
Confidence to the United Nations	-5.056***	-5.172***
	(0.369)	(0.374)
Regions		

East		Ref. category
West		-0.952***
		(0.236)
South		0.002
		(0.199)
Center		-0.745***
		(0.224)
Kiev		-0.712***
		(0.252)
Constant	3.056***	3.742***
	(0.747)	(0.779)
R sq.	0.215	0.230
Log likelihood	-706.513	-692.487
Observations	1,299	1,299

Source: Author ’s own calculations using the WVS.

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3. Key determinants of confidence to CIS in Russia.

Variables	(1)	(2)
Born in the country	-0.456	-0.458
	(0.280)	(0.281)
Male	0.158	0.160
	(0.118)	(0.118)
Age	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education level		
Higher	-0.182	-0.219
	(0.263)	(0.267)
Middle	-0.139	-0.158
	(0.277)	(0.280)
Low	Ref. category	Ref. category
Language used to communicate at home		
Russian	Ref. category	Ref. category
Other	-0.388	-0.311
	(0.260)	(0.275)
Ethnic group		
Ukrainian	Ref. category	Ref. category
Russian	0.354**	0.363**
	(0.146)	(0.150)
Other	0.857***	0.947***
	(0.282)	(0.297)
National pride	0.525***	0.508***
	(0.180)	(0.181)
Feel insecure	-0.054	-0.067
	(0.363)	(0.369)
Satisfaction with income	0.452*	0.456*
	(0.274)	(0.275)
Democracy score	0.599**	0.569**
	(0.289)	(0.281)
Left to right political scale	-0.019	0.057
	(0.290)	(0.293)
Preference for self-reliance	0.282	0.325
	(0.232)	(0.235)
Confidence to the Government	-2.513***	-2.444***
	(0.299)	(0.300)
Confidence to the United Nations	-5.754***	-5.756***
	(0.322)	(0.324)
Regions		
Moscow		Ref. category
North West		0.258

		(0.344)
Central		0.416
		(0.327)
North Caucasian		-0.618
		(0.618)
Privolzhsky		0.418
		(0.328)
Urals		0.081
		(0.383)
Far East		0.047
		(0.457)
Siberian		0.192
		(0.347)
South		0.354
		(0.337)
Constant	4.313***	3.982***
	(0.667)	(0.734)
R sq.	0.283	0.286
Log likelihood	-915.476	-911.233
Observations	1,899	1,899

Source: Author ’s own calculations using the WVS.

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.