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
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Magic and Witchcraft: Implications for democratization and poverty-alleviating aid in Africa

Dirk Kohnert ¹

Cartoon: "didn't we meet at Harvard ?" ²



Source: *Le Monde*, 11 December 1987

Abstract: The belief in occult forces is still deeply rooted in many African societies, regardless of education, religion, and social class of the people concerned. According to many Africans, its incidence is even increasing due to social stress and strain caused (among others) by the process of modernization. Most often magic and witchcraft accusations work to the disadvantage of the poor and deprived, but under particular circumstances, they become a means of the poor in the struggle against oppression by establishing "cults of counter-violence". Magic and witchcraft beliefs have increasingly been instrumentalized for political purposes. They lend themselves to support any kind of political system, whether despotic or democratic. The belief in occult forces has serious implications for development co-operation, too. Firstly, because projects, constituting arenas of strategic groups in their struggle for power and control over project resources, are likely to add further social stress to an already endangered precarious balance of power, which makes witchcraft accusations flourish. Secondly, because witchcraft accusations may serve as indicators of hidden social conflicts, difficult to detect by other methods.

Keywords: [occult belief systems](#), [democratization](#), [poverty alleviation](#), [development aid](#), [Sub-Saharan Africa](#)

JEL-classification: N3, N37, N97, O17, O2, O55, Z12, Z13

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² Cartoon on the modernity of occult belief in contemporary Africa, irrespectively of gender, religion, political affiliation and social class. --- Source: ['Serguei'](#), French cartoonist, Serguei Goizauskas, <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serguei> - In: Jacques de Barrin, *Le retour des sorciers - Désenchantement et traditions en Afrique*. *Le Monde*, 11 December 1987, p. 44.

The belief that persons are able to master [occult forces](#) is a socio-cultural phenomenon of great importance in [Africa south of the Sahara](#). Particularly in [Western Africa](#), magic and [witchcraft](#) have been deeply-rooted for generations, regardless of gender, religion, education, political belonging, social strata and urban or rural settings. [Magic](#) may be applied for good or bad ends ([‘white magic’](#) and [‘black magic’](#)). However, belief in ‘black magic’, or [witchcraft](#), used to harm other people for selfish purposes, is the most problematic aspect of this belief. Most Africans, that is, peasants, business people or politicians alike, even internationally renowned scientists and leaders of Christian churches, are convinced that witchcraft constitutes a real threat to society in Africa (cf. Geschiere 1995; Raynal, 1994:124-25; Awolalu 1979:81-84; cf. Marwick 1975; Mulhaupt 1990).

Based on a review of the literature and the author's comparative studies in three African societies, this article will answer the following questions: First, what are the general characteristics of occult beliefs in Africa? Second, what are the underlying reasons behind witchcraft accusations, and who are the major targets of such accusations? Third, how widely are occult beliefs instrumentalized for political purposes, and how does this affect the process of democratization? Fourth, do witchcraft accusations have any significance for [poverty-alleviating](#) development planning?

1. Incidence and general characteristics of magic and witchcraft beliefs in Sub-Saharan Africa

Despite widespread assumptions (cf. e.g. Brain 1982:382), the incidence of magic and witchcraft does not necessarily decrease in the course of [modernization](#). According to many Africans, it has rather increased, both in terms of frequency and in terms of effectiveness over recent decades (cf. Drucker-Brown 1993:539; Kohnert, 1983). Generally speaking, this may be due to a psycho-social reaction to the African Crisis, as de Jong explains in the case of the *njang-njang* movement in Guinea-Bissau (cf. Jong 1987a). In particular belief in witchcraft may be a reaction to an increasing ‘conflict-producing potential’ caused by processes of social differentiation in the context of the evolution of a market economy and ‘modernization’ of economy and society (cf. Drucker-Brown, 1993; Geschiere/Fisiy 1994; Jong 1987a; Kohnert 1983; McLeod 1975).

The gradual change from [subsistence production](#) to [a market economy](#) even in rural areas of [Sub-Saharan Africa](#), resulted in the spread of social relationships, typical for the stage of development of a [commodity](#) economy, even in the realm of organization and methods of witchcraft accusation. In pre-colonial times occult knowledge was organized and passed on rather in a collective way, at least in the majority of [acephalous African societies](#). Generally speaking secret societies on the village level were in charge of the identification and punishment of witches. Since the beginning of colonial rule, the persecution of witches has gradually been taken out of the hands of the village or ethnic community. It is either becoming individualized, being the domain of professional [witch-hunters](#), often [medicine men](#), or appropriated by external (state) agencies, regarded with dismay and distrust by their subjects (e.g. in cases of political witch-hunts, see below). Case studies from [Northern Nigeria](#) (cf. Kohnert 1983) or Zaire (cf. Duvieusart 1992:468/69) showed that already in the 1950s many witch-doctors started to pursue their art professionally, like any other business. Dating back to the time of the famous ["oil-boom"](#) of the 1970ths, there are reports from [Nupeland](#)

(Northern Nigeria) of witch-doctors, who claim to be qualified by (more or less obscure) 'diplomas', proudly displayed in their office, together with photographs of famous cases of confessed or convicted witches, discovered by them (cf. Kohnert 1983). In [Zaire](#), these new *entrepreneurs* were even in possession of 'official' credentials issued by the provincial administration. Thus, 'witch-doctor' is becoming a profession, similar to that of a trader, lawyer, physician, or village chemist. Requests for his (or her) service most often come from concerned individuals. More rewarding, however, are calls by family heads or local village chiefs. At times local chiefs - probably 'convinced' by higher administrative authorities, eventually collaborating with the sorcerers - are obliged to 'purify' their villages from witches (cf. Duvieusart 1992:468 for Zaire; Kohnert 1983 for Northern Nigeria; Drucker-Brown, 1993:539 for Northern Ghana).

Usually, witch doctors are requested to search for persons, who might be held responsible for the calamity that struck some close relative, the family, or the village. The persecution and punishment of witches are increasingly being commercialized, comparable to indulgence practices (*Ablaßhandel*, i.e. traffic in [indulgences](#)) of the [Catholic church](#) in 16th century Europe (cf. the debate on the European witch-hunts, Ben-Yehuda 1980; Hoak 1983; cf. Elwert's 'venality-thesis'; Elwert-Kretschmer, 1995).

Witchcraft belief in Africa is expressed in different forms, according to region, religion, or ethnic affiliation. There are, however, also some essential common grounds. Thus, witchcraft belief *as such* is in general not gender-specific (contrary to the practice of its persecution). Moreover, all over Africa, the belief in occult forces is very common at different individual levels of education and various religious confessions. Since the [jihad](#) of the pre-colonial (19th century) [Shonghai empire](#), for example, Moslem rulers of the [Nigerian emirates](#), have skilfully employed witchcraft beliefs for their vested interests (cf. Kohnert, 1983). The same is true for Christian traditional leaders in [Yorubaland](#) (cf. Awolalu 1979:81-84). By the end of colonial rule, fundamentalist Christian churches and sects came to the fore which, eager to respond to a popular demand, integrated into their conception of the universe the very same traditional elements condemned by European missionaries as 'pagan' (e.g. [Chrétiennes Célestes](#), [Pentecostal-Church](#), [Rosicrucians](#), and various [independent African churches](#) like the [Kimbanguists](#) of [Zaire](#), now [DR Congo](#)). Most of them claim to provide the most effective protection against witchcraft to their followers. For this very reason, these fundamentalist Christian churches enjoy today a considerable attraction (cf. Meyer, B. 1992, about the combat of Pentecostal groups against *adzetwo* (witches) in south-east [Ghana](#)). High representatives of established Christian churches, such as the bishops of [Lagos](#) (Nigeria) and [Kinshasa](#) (DR Congo) believe in witchcraft too. According to the former, this belief is shared by about 80% of all Africans. Last, not least, even African scholars and decision-makers in economy and society, educated in renowned Western universities, strongly share witchcraft beliefs - according to occasion, more or less openly (cf. Kohnert 1983; Kadya Tall 1995).

2. Witchcraft-accusations, target groups, and development

Depending on the [mode of production](#) and living conditions in which witchcraft accusations are rooted, they may have either repressive or emancipatory effects. More often than not the gradual change over time, of both content and meaning of witchcraft accusations, happens to appear unnoticed by the population, because it is disguised by continuity in the outward appearance of the cult. Even though the formal framework of specific anti-witchcraft cults (e.g. masks, rituals, and structure of secret societies) like the *ndakó gboyá* of the [Nupe](#) remain

unchanged, under surface its witchcraft accusations may pursue different ends over time (cf. Kohnert 1983). This difference in content can be explained only in the light of the cultural and social setting in which the population concerned is embedded and which stimulates the faith in occult forces. Any analysis and prognosis regarding the influence of these belief systems on economic and cultural change in Africa would have to pay due consideration to the articulation of witchcraft accusations, its socio-cultural dimension, and modes of production from which it originates. Unfortunately, however, this insight begins to pave its way only gradually. It has been applied up to now just in some isolated field-studies (cf. e.g. Fisiy/Geschiere 1990; Geschiere/Fisiy 1994; Hunter-Wilson 1951; Kohnert 1983; Offiong 1983). There still exists a lot of confusion about the contradicting different political functions of witchcraft accusations and their underlying reasons (cf. controversy between Geschiere 1995 and Buijtenhuijs 1995). Much of these contradictions could be solved by referring to the articulation between witchcraft accusations and modes of production as indicated above.

In most cases, the effects of witchcraft belief work to the disadvantage of the poor and deprived. It serves predominantly as an ideology that legitimates oppression and exploitation. Up to early colonial rule, anti-witchcraft movements, like the *ndakó gboyá* in the hands of the [Etsu Nupe](#) (emir of Nupeland, Northern Nigeria), served to exploit their subjects ruthlessly; in the 1920's the annual raids of the *ndakó gboyá* in the [Bida Emirate](#) grew to such dimension that the British colonial administration feared, there might be nothing left to pay its taxes. Thus, the movement was prohibited (cf. Nadel, 1954). Whether this prohibition has ever been effective, is open to question. Anyway, the *ndakó gboyá* reappeared in revised form by the time of independence (cf. Kohnert 1983). Apart from this, there are many examples of despots of modern independent Africa, like [Mobutu Sese Seko](#) of Zaire or [Gnassingbé Eyadéma](#) of Togo, who continue to use magic and witchcraft beliefs for the domination and exploitation of their citizens (cf. Ellis, S. 1993:471/72; Toulabor M. 1986:124-131 for Togo, and Buijtenhuijs 1995:134-35; Schatzberg, 1993:448/49 for Africa in general).

In addition, the use of witchcraft and magic in intra-elite competition for economic or political power is quite common. For example, all over Africa the use of experts in occult forces as high ranking councillors of African heads of state - independent of the latter's political orientation - are well known. The senegalesian [marabout](#) Kébé at the 'court' of Mobutu (cf. Nguza, 1982:63), or M. Cissé, the Malian *marabou* and minister of [Mathieu Kérékou](#), the 'communist' head of state of the former [Peoples Republic of Benin](#), are just two famous examples. [Nguza Karl-i-Bond](#) (1982:29/30), a former minister of foreign affairs of Mobutu, provides other illustrative examples of the use of 'black magic' by the wives of the *barons du régime* in the fight against political opponents.

Although women and men alike do take an active part in witchcraft accusations, women most often participate in a rather inferior way. In many secret cults, for example, they are excluded as office-holders, and in addition, they are more likely to suffer from accusations to employ witchcraft than men. It is not witchcraft belief in general, but rather its *persecution* which often has strong gender-specific, i.e. women discriminating features. Different - sometimes contradicting - reasons have been offered, to explain this apparent gender bias (cf. Brain 1982:374 for Tanzania; Drucker-Brown, 1993:540, 542-548 for the Manprusi of Northern Ghana; Nadel, S.F. 1952 for four African societies). The concept of 'sex-antagonism' developed by S.F. Nadel (ibid.) figures prominently among these explanations which have been reconsidered elsewhere (cf. Kohnert 1983:8-11, 25-27, 29-35). Here it might suffice to say that most of the 'pure' one-dimensional theories of witchcraft, be it cognitive, political, or

feminist, are likely to be too restrictive in reflecting the reality, although each of them may contain valid arguments.

In particular circumstances, the witchcraft belief can also be a means of the poor in the struggle against oppression. An example, often mentioned in this respect, are witchcraft accusations against the *nouveaux riches*. More often than not, they do not obey African traditional customary laws of the village community, like the rules of redistribution and solidarity with kinsmen, of sharing wealth and assisting the poorer members of the community. Sanctioning offenders of these rules employing occult forces is said to be an effective barrier to harm the social fabric of 'traditional' village societies by an individual accumulation of wealth, capital formation, and economic development, especially in African societies without strong central authorities, as among the [Maka](#) of Cameroon or the [Ibibio](#) of Eastern Nigeria (cf. Geschiere 1995:144, 230; Fisiy/Geschiere 1991:252/53, 269; Offiong 1983:81). But even in the highly stratified Northern Nigerian societies, like [Borno Emirate](#), witchcraft accusations, related to enrichment through development projects, do occur (Tijani 1976:130; cf. Geschiere 1995:10, 255, for other examples of witchcraft accusations related to development projects).

The rationale behind this kind of reasoning of the unusually successful, the *évolués*, is different according to individual circumstances: either they are afraid of being killed by envious local witches, or they fear being accused and harassed as witches themselves because the villagers hold they could have acquired their wealth only by occult powers at the expense of their fellows. But the result seems to be always the same: negative incentives for the development of individual achievement motivation and capital formation. The other side of this coin is the fear of the better-off and go-getters concerning 'exploitation' by their family or kinship group. Therefore many newly rich Africans migrate and hesitate to return to their families or home villages. A case study from the [Girjama](#) of Kenya even reports of rich traders who preferred to convert from their traditional animist religion to Islam, because they saw no other way to evade customary rules of greeting, which might involve poisoning in case the traders are accused of witchcraft (Parkin 1979:223).

In summing up, there seems to exist surprising parallels concerning the function of African witchcraft beliefs, based on communal modes of production with similar beliefs in other parts of the world. Concerning [Tudor England](#) of the 17th century, for example, witchcraft prosecution has been described as a means of effecting decisive social change from the egalitarian mutually dependent village community to a more individualistic and stratified social structure. The old values of mutual aid were undermined, while on the surface, they were maintained by witchcraft accusations (cf. Macfarlane, 1970:302-03), an explanation which seems to fit quite well into the present conditions in Africa (as summarized above).

Still another form of social conflict resolution are messianic grass-root movements 'from below' which use magic and witchcraft accusations as a means to fight the 'evil' in this world by establishing 'cults of counter-violence' (cf. Wilson 1992; Buijtenhuijs 1995:136-37). Such cults are more often than not dependent on [charismatic leaders](#), as shown in the battle of the *Naprama* under Manuel António against the terrorism of the 'devils' of the [RENAMO](#) in Northern [Mozambique](#) in 1990/91 (cf. Wilson, K.B. 1992:582). The RENAMO too tried effectively to legitimize its violence by rituals performed in collaboration with their *feticeiros*. The fight of the Holy-Spirit-movement of the [Acholi](#) against the government army in [Uganda](#) in 1987 (cf. Behrend, H. 1992), and the contested use of witchcraft accusations against their enemy by militants of the guerrilla army of [Amilcar Cabral](#) in the early stages of the [Guinean](#)

[liberation war](#) are similar examples. The latter may have had in mind to follow the example of the [Fulbe](#) of [Portuguese-Guinea](#), who revolted against their colonial emperors at the beginning of this century. Their revolt, again, was to a large extent initiated and lead by the *jambacos* ([fetish priests](#)) who applied their magic with considerable success (cf. Nogueira 1947:716). Thus witchcraft movements directed against colonial domination were quite common in other parts of Africa too. An interesting case to study are the *Ijov*-, *Haakaa*-, and *Inyambuan* movements of the [Tiv](#) in Northern Nigeria analyzed by Tseyayo (1975:57-74). Also witch-hunting of war-mongers, and (alleged) brains behind disasters like epidemics, starvation etc. occurs fairly often, e.g. in [Burundi](#) 1993 (cf. *Afrique Express*, 12.10.93).

Finally, even frustrated efforts of social groups which took an active part in liberation movements did result in systematic witchcraft accusations 'from below'. The *njang-njang*-movement in [Guinea-Bissau](#) in the 1980s may serve as a convenient example in this respect. The hopes of some [Balante](#) women, who during their active participation in the liberation struggle of Guinea-Bissau succeeded in shaking off the yoke of paternalistic domination, are supposed to be the driving force behind this movement. After independence had been achieved and the [PAIGC](#) took control, some women grew disappointed when they realized that mainly their male counterparts harvested the fruits of their common victory. The grudges of the *njang-njang* women against the alleged dominance of the *homens grande* took the form of witchcraft accusations. Later on, such accusations launched by village-youth (male and female) in general against those who had betrayed the ideals of the liberation war (and also their ideals based on a somewhat fundamentalist Christian ethic) posed a real threat to Government which tried to legitimate its rule with similar egalitarian socialist ideals. The *njang-njang* became forbidden, many of its followers imprisoned, and some of the able-bodied men were coerced into forced labour in state development projects, where they had to assist the villagers in the reconstruction of dykes in rice polders (cf. Kohnert, 1988; Cardoso 1990; Jong 1987).

In the beginning, even some progressive missionaries of the region saw these witchcraft accusations as a dynamic element in the process of development rather than a barrier (personal communication, Padre Lino, Bissau, June 22, 1986). In the cases mentioned above, however, witchcraft beliefs have just limited 'emancipatory' effects - if any at all - and even those are outweighed by negative side-effects. Therefore we strongly advise against any form of utilization of witchcraft beliefs in promoting development.

As soon as the charismatic leaders of these grass-roots movements die, the hopes for a life free from conflict and violence that once motivated the movement, are usually disappointed. In fact, it is difficult to transmit occult power, particularly if it is linked with specific personal charisma, which has not yet been replaced by recognition of institutionalized spiritual powers of a secret cult. Successors of charismatic leaders often become victims of the temptation that lies in the possession and execution of power which then is mainly used for their own selfish purpose.

All these examples demonstrate the crucial importance of occult power in the social control of violence in Africa. Modern and traditional rulers alike have to understand and speak the language of ritual violence if they want to guarantee anything near to a state-monopoly of violence which has been considered as a necessary, but not sufficient, pre-condition of advanced stages of civilization (cf. Elias, 1976:444-447; Ellis, 1995).

3. The instrumentalization of the belief in occult forces and its meaning for democratization

Since the end of colonial rule magic and witchcraft beliefs have been instrumentalized in various ways for political purposes. Thus, occult forces become a weapon in the battle for supremacy over rival politicians. Even newly democratized states like [Benin](#) are no exception to this rule. For reasons of convenience we suggest a categorization of this instrumentalization in three different types:

First, the legitimization of political power employing [occult](#) beliefs. Thus politicians document their power also in the spiritual realm by attributing personal magic powers to themselves. This is a common practice that can be found in the bulwarks of 'traditionalism', as the Northern Nigerian emirates, as well as in young African democracies. The case of the present head of State of Benin, [Nicéphore Soglo](#) may serve as a useful example. Educated at western universities and employed by the [World Bank](#) as one of its directors in [Paris](#), he contested the place of [Kérékou](#) as president of the Benin Republic in 1991. At the end of the campaign for the presidential elections, Soglo fell seriously ill. He had to be flown out for treatment at the military hospital of Val-de-Grace in Paris. For every Benin citizen, it was clear beyond doubt that Soglo had been 'bewitched' by his adversary Kérékou. Later on, Soglo was at pains to invoke the backing of renowned *vodounon* (priests of the [vodun](#) cult) to demonstrate his superior power even in the realm of occult forces. With the organization of an international *vodun* festival "[Ouidah 92](#)", he became known among the population as a leading figure in the combat against witchcraft (cf. Kadya Tall 1995:199-207; Mayrargue 1995). In January 1996 *vodun* became finally recognized officially by the Head of State as one of the great religions of Benin, besides Islam and Christianity. Many voters believed that the timing of this recognition had been chosen in a bid to enhance Soglo's chances of reelection in the presidential elections two months later. Typical of this and similar cases is that rulers use witchcraft beliefs in a defensive manner, both as a deterrent *vis à vis* their adversaries and to impress or assure their followers.

On the other hand, some autocratic rulers use magic and witchcraft beliefs in rather offensive ways, either by attacking rivals directly using 'black magic' (e.g. poisoning, psycho-terror) or in using psychological warfare, by threatening potential voters and political opponents under the pretext of being able to see who is voting for them, and the subsequent threat of reacting accordingly. Examples of this aggressive form of instrumentalization of witchcraft belief abound all over Africa. They range from more or less veiled threats up to the assassination of political adversaries (for example cf. Schatzberg, 1993:448-450; Toulabor 1986:124-131; Ellis, 1993:471/72). During the [Togolese National Conference](#) of August 1991, for example, the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) exposed several cases of political opponents of the [Eyadéma](#)-Regime which were imprisoned, tortured, and executed because of alleged 'witchcraft' against the Head of State. In some cases mere accusation of opponents by district officers was regarded as sufficient proof that they were witches which had to be imprisoned secretly in the concentration camp of Kazaboua-Agombio and Mantouri ([Sotouboua](#) and Otadi prefecture in [Wawa](#), Togo) or elsewhere (cf. Kaboré, 1991:25; Africa Confidential, 13/09/91:3).

Finally, opposition against the belief in witchcraft may be used as a cover or convenient means to discredit other political opinions or opponents and the socio-cultural setting in which they are embedded. Advocates of [modernization theories](#), for example, use to discard African

belief- and value-systems which incorporate the belief in magic and witchcraft summarily as 'traditionally minded'. They want it to be eradicated and replaced as soon as possible by Western standards of [democratization](#). The usual argument is that African belief systems are based on irrational attitudes (cf. chap. 4) or '[false consciousness](#)'. Left and right-wing doctrinism is especially liable to favour this kind of simplistic reasoning. The struggle of the 'Marxist' regime of [M. Kérékou](#) against traditional rulers and 'relics of feudalism' in [Benin](#) (from Dec. 1975 onwards) may serve as an example (cf. Kadya Tall, 1995:196-99; Elwert-Kretschmer, 1995; Mulhaupt 1990:231-32): Apparently, its campaign against 'obscurantism, witchcraft, and fetishism' was based on the pseudo-Marxist thesis that the belief in occult forces is a manifestation of 'false consciousness' which ought to be eliminated as soon as possible in the interest of the people. Although the way of these political anti-witchcraft campaigns was certainly paved with good intentions, its final results were counter-productive.

For example, local party leaders and the population of Southern Benin misunderstood the campaign of the communist party against the 'relics of feudalism', backed by the state-owned radio and newspaper "[Ehuzu](#)" ('revolution' en the vernacular Fongbe), as an official call to open up the hunt for witches, i.e. political and other 'enemies' of the socialist state, namely traditional chiefs and *vodun*-priests. The mass of the population regarded witch-hunting in politics, press and radio rather as a confrontation of old and new masters, i.e. a competition about political supremacy. Under prevailing socio-cultural structures of clientelism and the [rent-seeking](#)- or 'prebend economy' in African states like Benin, the one who displays the most effective power (including occult power) is more often than not considered to be also the legitimate ruler.

For about two decades, we can observe the revival of the recognition of witchcraft within the African judiciary for similar reasons. This recognition had been refused for almost a century due to the influence of colonial law, which ruled that a defence founded on the belief in witchcraft should be rejected, at least as far as 'modern' formal law is concerned (in contrast to [customary law](#); for different case studies cf. Fisiy 1990, on Cameroon; Chavunduka 1980, on Zimbabwe; Kohnert 1983 on Nigeria). But by now some African judges seriously consider even the training of judges in matters of supernatural powers to assure a more effective legal prosecution of witches. Thus a judge at the court of appeal at [Daloa, Côte d'Ivoire](#), at the occasion of his installation (in Nov. 1993), made an appeal for the initiation of judges into the art of witchcraft (cf. *Fraternité Matin*, 16.11.93). Already in the early 1980's a staff member of the faculty of law at [Ahmadu Bello University](#), Northern Nigeria, one of the renowned Nigerian Universities, called publicly for a change in the attitudes of Nigerian courts towards witchcraft too, with similar reasoning (cf. Chukkol 1981:30-34).

The belief in occult forces thus lends itself to support any kind of political system, whether despotic or democratic. This is not as surprising as it might seem at first sight. Most supernatural, e.g. religious beliefs have been used at one time or another exactly for the same purpose. Just remind the political position of [Christian churches](#) from the time of the crusades up to the First and Second World Wars. Similar to any other system of belief, there are no scientific methods of falsification of African magic and witchcraft belief. By its very nature, it evades inter-subjective control on the part of the faithful.

However, believers in [occult forces](#) everywhere (not just in Africa) are particularly exposed to the danger of domination and exploitation by their cult leaders because of the atmosphere of secrecy that surrounds these cults, combined with gender- and age-specific access restrictions

(African secret societies are often women-discriminating), hierarchical systems of knowledge (according to different levels of initiation etc.), and, last not least, the threat of severe punishment (ultimately the death penalty) in case of treason. I should dare to formulate as a working hypothesis that the degree of secrecy and its rigidity of enforcement for a given religious cult closely correlate with the degree of exploitation of its followers. Of course, this should not be regarded as an iron rule, and one may argue that any religious cult, and any political system supported by it, depends on at least some degree of secrecy. However it is obvious to me that this is not just a question of degree, but of qualitative differences: anti-witchcraft cults, for example, are detrimental to equality, transparency, and accountability, three basic conditions of both the development of democratic attitudes and [poverty-alleviating](#) development projects.

On the other hand, the promotion of [transparency](#) and the [democratization](#) of decision-making processes, on all levels, in politics as well as in society and economy, would not just favour the process of democratization and development in general. It would most likely contribute to the gradual eradication of witchcraft beliefs too. Where there is transparency, insight into the motives of your neighbour, relative, or political rival, and more equal access to resources, there is less need to look for scapegoats which could be blamed for individual misfortune.

In general, the commandments of magic-religious belief systems such as the [vodun](#) are meant to conserve traditional social and ethnic structures from which they originate. But there are exemptions. First, we showed already above that the overall impact of those belief systems does not necessarily correspond with the intended results and aims. The long-term effect of the witchcraft accusations based on the communal [mode of production](#), for example, might very well result in the unintended weakening of communal structures of mutual aid, and the individualization and commercialization of social relationships. Second, under certain favourable circumstances, enlightened progressive leaders may be able to effect a gradual change in the meaning of their cults. They may even try to adapt it to the requirements of democratization and the construction of [civil society](#). For example by mediating basic ethical values (e.g. solidarity, integrity, courage, respect towards authorities) which may be favourable to the creation of civil society and consolidation of the state (e.g. monopolization of violence) as well, if the point of reference will be no longer the [clan](#) or the [patronage](#) network but the [nation](#).

However, the experience of the past five years of democratization in Africa tells us that it is extremely difficult to effect such a change in the short run, even under favourable conditions, like in [Benin](#). In case of conflict between local *versus* national or international value systems, customary rules and the clientelistic network of traditional rulers rather support the *status quo* of existing power relations, with all its negative consequences on [nation-building](#) and the [quality of state government](#). This is exactly one reason, why it is so difficult to translate the political conditionality of the international donor community into public policy. Even western educated, well-meaning high-ranking African politicians with excellent international reputation are sometimes helpless about the struggle against corruption and nepotism. They might dispose of sufficient resources to be independent in material and financial matters, but could nevertheless feel at the same time a pressing need for protection against imminent menaces by occult powers.

By painful personal experience, several African politicians realized that in case of conflict nobody could protect them against threats of the supernatural universe but their traditional rulers. In this case, they would still have to pay allegiance to the spiritual overlords of their

local setting which are more often than not rather traditionally minded, i.e. they would have to serve the interests of patronage and local solidarity first. Recent attempts in Benin to upgrade *vodun* as an officially recognized national religion, have been successful, last not least because of the active support of the Head of State himself. This has been interpreted by many Benin citizens as the paying of 'old debts' on the part of the [Soglo](#) family. Whether this constitutes at the same time a point of departure for the creation of a new authentic African ethic, such as '[Ubuntu](#)', to promote the economic and social development of the Nation, similar to the function of the [Protestant ethic](#) in the course of capitalist development in Europe, remains to be seen.

4. On the meaning of occult belief for planning and implementation of development projects

Development projects - especially [poverty-alleviating](#) ones - usually intervene in existing social structures of a target population, overloaded with conflicts between different strata, ethnic or religious groups, young and old, male and female. As a rule, the benefit of the project is not distributed equally between these conflicting groups. Therefore it is likely to add further social stress which endangers the already precarious balance of power. By now it has been recognized that even the most sophisticated planning methods cannot prevent vested interests and hidden agendas of all parties involved to exercise a decisive but incalculable influence on the implementation of development projects.

From this point of view, projects create new arenas for strategic groups in their struggle for power and control over project resources (cf. Bierschenk et al 1993:97-106). Given what has been said above about the close relationship between social stress, witchcraft accusations, and development it is only reasonable to expect that the belief in occult forces exerts a strong influence on the implementation of development projects in Africa too. Examples of interference of witchcraft belief with project planning and execution in Africa abound for those who want to see ³. But unfortunately, most Western development experts, the majority of which is still rather interested in [technology transfer](#) than in improved human relations, do not want to recognize this problem, at least not officially, and not as a problem that should be tackled professionally. At informal occasions, at the hotel bar, for example, many of them

³ cf. Tijani, 1976:130; Geschiere, 1995:10, 255 for examples of witchcraft-related social conflicts in development projects. - However, in general, the documentation of such cases proves to be quite difficult. Not just because of neglect of such cases by conventional development experts, but also, because this constitutes a highly sensitive subject. Let me illustrate the complexity of the documentation problem by just one example: In 1995 I participated in an impact study of church development projects in [Zimbabwe](#). Although I was told by one country expert before my departure that - unlike Western Africa - occult belief systems did not constitute a major problem in Zimbabwe, I came to realize that out of five rural development projects three of them, at one stage or another, run into serious problems because of witchcraft accusations. In one irrigation project implementation had been delayed for several years because of "land tenure conflicts" as the project officer told me. Later on, I realized that it was rather the traditional chief of a neighbouring village who was opposed to the construction of the irrigation dam at the planned site because he wanted to have the project in his home village. Quite understandably he did not forward his real interest but warned the neighbouring villagers that if they would proceed with their project, they would run into serious problems because the land of the construction site had to be regarded as the sacred land of their ancestors. After some years the dispute was solved with the help of a local priest and the dam was constructed at the original site. However, shortly afterwards the priest died suddenly; actually he committed suicide (out of reasons which do not interest here), but the villagers thought he got bewitched and killed; this incidence again put at risk the whole project.

readily admit knowing of such strange incidences. But as they consider it as the mere outcrop of irrational (i.e. "primitive") behaviour, they see no point in solving these problems professionally, that is by the means of proven scientific methods. They might think that the process of [modernization](#), investment in human capital and education, as well as exposure to the [enlightened](#) 'advanced' European culture, embedded in development aid, would automatically eliminate this kind of problem. This, however, is a fallacy as shown above. Eradication of magic- and witchcraft belief is not a question of intelligence or education, but of [modes of production](#), [social relations](#), and the [openness of society](#).

African systems of occult belief are anything else but 'irrational' as has been demonstrated already by a classic of ethnographic literature (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1937). Although its inherent logic can hardly be grasped in thought patterns of natural science, yet its methodological structure is no less rational than the impulse-giving ethics of the [Protestant ethic and spirit of capitalism](#) in 19th century Europe or [Confucianism](#) in the case of newly industrialized Asian countries. The relevant distinction in this respect is that each adheres to a different rationality with different degrees of achievement- and development orientation.

Even though we might not want to accept this kind of occult rationality, we are in a position to comprehend it. We can analyze its internal logical fabric as well as its impact on the economy, society, and politics in Africa in general, and on target groups, project policy and implementation in particular.

Due to the long experience of blind missionary zeal or arrogant attitudes of Colonialists and educated Westerners, Africans (beneficiaries and local experts alike, cf. Kohnert 1995) tend to think that Western development experts are principally unable to understand the peculiarities of African magic. Due to lack of information and concern, Western attitudes towards this issue have been characterized by ignorance and intolerance. For these reasons, it is difficult to arrive at an open discussion on the topics in question with African counterparts or decision-makers.

It is quite surprising that although there exist innumerable case studies and a long-dating discussion among anthropologists and sociologists on the meaning of witchcraft in the African socio-cultural context, neither the so-called 'applied' social science nor development experts recognize how important the consideration of magic- and witchcraft beliefs are relative to their actual work. Social research regarding the phenomenon of occult beliefs with an implementation-oriented approach is still in its initial stage, and so far was practically limited to the area of psychiatry and social psychology (cf. Jong 1987a). It would be especially desirable to strengthen the systematic analysis of the impact of these beliefs on the socio-structural and socio-cultural changes in Africa in general (for first examples cf. Aguessy 1993; Brain 1982), and on the process of democratization and development co-operation in particular (cf. Kadya Tall 1995; Mayrargue 1995). In the domain of conflict research, witchcraft accusations could serve as social strains gauge (cf. Marwick 1964; Kohnert 1983) and indicators of deep yet latent conflicts.

Although we are at pains to demonstrate that the belief in occult powers is already a serious constraint on ordinary development cooperation, it is even more relevant in the context of the political dialogue and democratization projects which are presently favoured by the international donor community in Africa. The quest for '[good governance](#), accountability and transparency, human rights projects, and the constant underlining of poverty-alleviation puts increasing stress on the political and social elite of recipient states of development assistance.

In this social climate, witchcraft accusations flourish because of the search for scapegoats to explain individual misfortune; and this poses additional threats to the requested openness of dialogue. All this needs to be taken into account if we really want to promote participatory planning and implementation of projects under adverse socio-cultural conditions, on whatever level: Whether during bilateral government negotiations, or the cosy atmosphere of project planning workshops, guided by the philosophy of the [logical framework approach](#), or in the course of ‘exposure programs’ with the target groups, we have to stress over and over again that development is a question of improving human relations, self-help capacities, i.e. of social, and not so much of technical assistance.

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Résumé : *[Magie et la sorcellerie : Implications pour la démocratisation et l'aide pour la réduction de la pauvreté en Afrique]*

La croyance dans les forces occultes est encore profondément enracinée dans de nombreuses sociétés africains, indépendamment de l'éducation, de la religion, et la classe sociale des personnes concernées. Selon de nombreux Africains, son incidence est encore agrandissant à cause d'un stress sociale croissant et tension causée (entre autres) par le processus de modernisation. Le plus souvent, des accusations de la sorcellerie travaillent sous ces conditions au détriment des pauvres et des misérables. Mais dans des circonstances particulières, ils deviennent des moyens des pauvres dans la lutte contre l'oppression en développant de « cultes de contre violence ». Les occultes croyances africaines, comme magie et sorcellerie, ont été instrumentalisées à des fins politiques. Apparemment, ils peuvent être utilisés pour soutenir tout type de système politique, soit despotique ou démocratique. La croyance dans les forces occultes à de graves conséquences pour la coopération au développement. Les projets de développement, qui constituent des arènes de groupes stratégiques dans leur lutte pour le pouvoir et le contrôle sur les ressources du projet, sont susceptibles d'ajouter un stress supplémentaire à l'équilibre précaire de la puissance au niveau local, causant des accusations de sorcellerie à augmenter. En outre, des accusations de sorcellerie peuvent servir comme indicateurs de conflits sociaux cachés qui sont difficiles à détecter par d'autres méthodes.

Zusammenfassung : *[Magie und Hexerei: Implikationen für Demokratisierung und armuts-lindernde Entwicklungshilfe in Afrika]*

Der Glaube an okkulte Kräfte ist immer noch tief in vielen afrikanischen Gesellschaften verwurzelt, unabhängig von Bildung, Religion und sozialer Schicht der betroffenen Menschen. Laut vielen Afrikanern nimmt das Vorkommen im Modernisierungsprozeß eher zu als ab, und zwar aufgrund sozialer Spannungen und Belastungen, die durch die Modernisierung und Globalisierung verursacht werden. Meistens wirken sich Zauberei und Zauberei zum Nachteil der Armen und Benachteiligten aus, aber unter bestimmten Umständen werden sie zu einem Mittel der Armen im Kampf gegen die Unterdrückung, indem sie "Kulte der Gegengewalt" gründen. Magie und Hexenkult wurden zunehmend für politische Zwecke instrumentalisiert. Offensichtlich können sie verwendet werden, um jede Art von politischem System zu unterstützen, ob despotisch oder demokratisch. Der Glaube an okkulte Kräfte hat ernsthafte Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Entwicklungsprojekte, die in ihrem Kampf um Macht und Kontrolle der Projektressourcen Arenen strategischer Gruppen bilden, werden wahrscheinlich zu einem weiteren sozialen Stress für ein ohnehin gefährdeter prekärer Machtgleichgewichts führen, der Hexenbeschuldigungen aufblühen lässt. Darüber hinaus können Hexenbeschuldigungen als Indikatoren für versteckte soziale Konflikte dienen, die mit anderen Methoden schwer zu erkennen sind.