A Comparative Analysis of Worries About a War in the Context of Ukraine-Russia Relations

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Abstract

This study examines the formation and a consequent mutation of Ukraine-Russia relations from a so-called brotherhood to the status of an open war. Drawn upon the World Values Survey (WVS) data, I juxtapose their populations' expectations of a war with another country or a civil war. I argue that Ukraine and Russia show significant differences in the key factors defining their people's worries about a war, and that these differences have increased considerably with the beginning of the military conflict in the East of Ukraine. My analysis demonstrates that the current worries among the Ukrainians largely relate to a war with another country and are closely linked to the issue of building national identity and liberal democracy in Ukraine. In the case of Russia, it is the concern about freedom and security, along with income satisfaction, that strongly predict the expectations of both war types among the local population.

Keywords: Ukraine-Russia relations, independence of Ukraine, state-building in Ukraine, national identity, WVS

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Introduction

Lately, Ukraine has attracted a lot of international attention. Its recent confrontation with Russia has not only demonstrated the existence of a geopolitical instability but also a certain type of dominance that Russia tries to impose at any means in the former soviet region. The conflict in the East of Ukraine shows how far Russia is willing to go in order to protect the national sphere of influence and control opportunities. Although the majority of experts agree that precisely this war may bring Ukraine real independence and set the country on the path of development toward the "West", the image of Russia as an aggressor still remains beyond the understanding for many citizens of Ukraine. A big brother of the Soviet times has unexpectedly become a dangerous foe and a source of instability in the course of transition. Russia openly denies the right of Ukraine for independence and insists on the inevitability of common future.

This study seeks to analyze the expectations of a war in both countries. More specifically, I focus on defining sources that spur worries about a military confrontation in Ukraine and Russia that can be framed as a civil war or a war with another country. By juxtaposing the patterns of war worries formation, I explore similarities and differences between the two countries as regards the major factors that shape their population's concerns about a war. Additionally, I examine change in the nature of war worries formation that has occurred in response to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Both analytical strategies are expected to contribute to clarifying the reasons for the tension in the context of Ukraine-Russia relations that has every danger to go beyond the two countries' national borders.

Building the Brotherhood: The Historical Context of Ukraine-Russia Relations

The joint history of Ukraine and Russia goes back to Kievsky Rus. Centered around today's Kiev, the state came into existence in the 9th century (Tolochko, 2007) but collapsed in the 13th century as a result of the increased internal political fragmentation and the Mongol invasion. Most of territories that belong to today's Ukraine were conquered by Poland and Lithuania in the early 14th century, remaining under their influence for around four hundred years (Belyayev, 2012). Both nations left a deep cultural imprint on the local population who gradually developed an identity distinct from the East Slavs, living in the territories under Mongol and later Muscovite rule (Düben, 2020).

Governed by the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, the Ukrainian lands were predominantly inhabited by Orthodox East Slavs who formed semi-autonomous hosts of peasant warriors – the Cossacks (Düben, 2020). In the 16th through 18th centuries, the Cossacks commenced to establish their own *de facto* statelets, the Zaporizhian Sich and later the Cossack Hetmanate (Subtelny, 2000). Following a major uprising against their Polish overlords in 1648, the Zaporizhian Cossacks signed a treaty of alliance with the Tsardom of Russia, insuring a temporary turn toward Moscow. Shortly after that, a series of civil wars took place, reflecting internal disagreements of whether to side with Poland or Russia. The Cossacks shifted their allegiance many times, having in the end the scope of gaining autonomy from both sides (Düben, 2020). In 1667, Poland-Lithuania had to cede to Moscow control of the territories east of and including Kiev. The Cossack statelets in the eastern territories gradually turned into a Russian vassal state, but its relationship with Russia was marked by conflicts. In response to sporadic Cossack uprisings against the Tsars, the Zaporizhian Sich was razed to the ground by Russian

forces in 1775, while the Cossack institutions of self-governance were liquidated (Düben, 2020). Following the final Partitions of Poland in the 1790s, the Russian Empire absorbed most of the remainder of modern-day Ukraine that became a part of the Russian state for the next 120 years (Subtelny, 2000). In spite of the occupation, a distinct Ukrainian national consciousness emerged among the local population and consolidated in the course of the 19th century. In response, Russia's imperial authorities systematically persecuted expressions of Ukrainian culture and made continuous attempts to suppress the Ukrainian language (Chayinska et al., 2021).

When the Russian Empire collapsed in the aftermath of the revolution of 1917, the Ukrainians declared a state of their own. After several years of welfare and quasi-independence, Ukraine was once again partitioned between the nascent Soviet Union and newly independent Poland (Düben, 2020). Ukraine's experience as a member of the Soviet state was rough. Due to the power structures of the Soviet system, Russia took a superior position anew. Acting as a "significant Other", Russia denied the authencity of the in-group members (republics) and invested a lot of effort and resources to subvert their separate existence (Feklyunina, 2016). The Soviet Union proclaimed Russia a 'big' brother that surveyed and protected everyone else fitted within the Soviet borders.

De facto, the big brother concentrated all the power, while Ukraine became a rich source of wealth-building for Moscow. This process gained the initial expression through the traumatic experience of the 'Holodomor' (Düben, 2020). A disastrous famine brought by Bolsheviks' agricultural policies in 1932-1933 killed between three and five million Ukrainians (Ellman, 2005), allowing the Soviet state to collect resources necessary to fund the industrialization process. Armed revolts against the Soviet rule were staged immediately after the Holodomor, as well as during and after World War II. The majority of them were, however, centered on the

western regions of Ukraine, annexed from Poland in 1939-1940 (Düben, 2020). All of them were brutally suppressed by Bolsheviks, while their initiators were presented as enemies of the ethnos.

Ukraine took an inferior position not only politically and culturally but also linguistically (Yekelchyk, 2015). The use of Russian was imposed by the Soviet Union and set as the only official language in Ukraine. Speaking Ukrainian was limited to the informal domains and mainly to the country's western part (Peacock, 2015). Ukraine's eastern territories adopted Russian as their main language of communication, increasing language fractionalization across the country's regions.

From the Fall of Brotherhood to the Rise of Nation

It was only with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 that Ukraine could gain an independent statehood of its own. While *de jure* independent, Ukraine *de facto* continued to be politically and economically controlled by Russia. The first decade of the post-communist transition was marked by a pseudo unification framed as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that was expected to replace the former Soviet Union and legitimize Russia's power in the post-soviet area (Willerton et al., 2015). By using political and economic influence, the Kremlin continued to actively promote the concept of collective identity in Ukraine (Feklyunina, 2016). In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the identity dominant among the Ukrainian population was increasingly associated with the idea of a "Russian world" – an imagined community based on the Russian language, the Russian culture and the common glorious past (White et al., 2010).

The first decade of transition was marked by the lack of any consensus among the Ukrainian ruling elite over how to relate to Russia and any unification with this country (Kuzio, 2001). They hailed from attempting to gain independence from Eurasia to seeing Europe as the

"Other" and Russia as the successor state to the former Soviet Union. The population of Ukraine also remained divided. While attracted to the West, the Ukrainians showed a strong inclination to the former Soviet republics with which they were for so long associated (White et al., 2010). Out of all the transition countries, Ukraine was the most sharply polarized between these two foreign policy orientations. The whole situation was framed as entering a "gray zone" – a zone of ambivalence between evolution toward the Russian model of governance and a transformation toward the West European democracy (Wawrzonek, 2014). The distribution of rival tendencies across the country largely resembled the historical division between the West and the East of Ukraine (White et al., 2010).

Partly due to this ambivalence, the first decade of independence saw very few attempts to build own national identity in Ukraine. An essential part of this process was reduced to promoting the use of Ukrainian as a viable language of power (Korostelina, 2013; Peacock, 2015). The view that Ukrainian should be the only national language was gaining in strength but not equally shared across regions of the country. In the western part, the majority of the population adhered to the idea of "one state, one language", while people in the eastern regions felt excluded and marginalized for their ethnic and linguistic differences. Russian-speakers preferred an upgrade of the status of Russian in order to ensure the equality of the two languages, which would enable them to remain unilingual in their capacities both as citizens and as employees (Kulyk, 2013). In spite of multiple disagreements, the government declared Ukrainian the sole official state language and the language of education, promoting it as a symbol of nationhood (Peacock, 2015). Both policies appeared though inefficient after a short period of time, failing to strengthen the link between the Ukrainian identity and the use of the Ukrainian language.

While divided over the issue of language, the Ukrainian political elite and the population showed a significant agreement over the vision about the country's desirable political and economic institutions that appeared very different from Russia's choice (Musliu & Burlyuk, 2019). At that time, Russia gradually slid toward authoritarianism as an outcome of a hegemonic national identity adopted by the main political players and society at large. In Ukraine, a hegemonic identity failed to take roots, while more liberal and democratic aspirations emerge among a considerable part of the population (Brudny & Finkel, 2011). The two countries' polar visions about future patterns of development commenced to contradict the nature of their mutual relations. The Orange Revolution of 2004–2005 revealed the existence of the pressure for political change, primarily regarding the extent of Russia's influence in Ukraine.

The clash between the aggressive imposition of collective identity by Russia and the local adherence to liberal democratic institutions released collective angst about future of the country (Chayinska et al., 2021). The collision of conflicting narratives on 'what Ukraine is' and 'what it should be' unveiled the population's dissatisfaction with the country's state- and nation-building processes (Musliu & Burlyuk, 2019). The dissatisfaction reached its highest point in 2013 when the Ukrainian government decided to suspend the signing of an association agreement with the European Union, while choosing closer ties to Russia instead. Large protests were held in Western Ukraine, but throughout the East as well, where there is a significant Russian-speaking minority. This time, the major motivation of the Ukrainian population to revolt was the support for democratic values (Reznik, 2016) and the desire to trigger the ultimate turn of Ukraine from the Russian-driven collective identity and its authoritarian way of development toward a definite way of the "West" (McGlynn, 2020).

In response to the change in the mood of the Ukrainian population, Russia invaded Crimea and the East of Ukraine in 2014 (Fournier, 2018; Ojala & Pantti, 2017). The conflict reached its culmination in 2020 when Russia concentrated troops near the Ukraine's eastern borders openly threatening the country with a military intervention if the government allowed the NATO on its territory. Moscow used direct threats to the sovereignty of Ukraine, while the EU and NATO were ill-equipped to handle the circumstances (Cornell, 2014). The situation resembled what the world once witnessed before the collapse of the Soviet Union and was checked by Russia in a Cold War fashion (Hove, 2016). For the whole world, Ukraine became an issue associated with the long-term frustrations and an overall atmosphere of mistrust (Fengler et al., 2020).

Unexpectedly, instead of provoking the collapse of the Ukrainian statehood, the crisis events of 2013–2014 have actually pushed Ukraine toward the West. Although the EU refused to offer Ukraine membership, it softened the legal boundaries to placate Ukraine's demand for inclusion. The cultural boundary also became blurred through references to Europe as a discursive benchmark of "normality" in Ukraine, and Ukraine's Europeanness as evidence in support of so-called European values (Wolczuk, 2016).

The war created a political turbulence that made possible what seemed impossible in stable polities (Chaisty & Whitefield, 2017). Russia's military aggression succeeded in galvanizing the formation of the Ukrainian national identity (McGlynn, 2020). On the one hand, a further detachment of language use from the identification with the Ukrainian ethnos took place (Kulyk, 2016; Smirnova & Iliev, 2017). Many Russian-speakers came to identify strongly with the Ukrainian nation without abandoning their accustomed language or even adding Ukrainian as an active part of their communicative repertoire. On the other hand, there was a strong mobilization of Ukrainian Russian-speakers on the side of the Ukrainian government since they suspected rebels

of the East of violating sociocultural, ideological, and religious values of their ethnic group (Aliyev, 2019). Third-party (Russia's) pro-rebel intervention only aggravated national defection. Many individuals reconsidered their ethnic belonging in the presence of the common aggressor that required the unification with the nation to defend common interests (Frahm, 2012). Ukrainians commenced to see Russia as a foe in a war that suddenly came to define the nation's ultimate choice for independence.

All in all, the case of Ukraine confirmed the conventional knowledge that policy and institutions spread over the identity dimensions that are highly visible, such as religion, ethnicity, race, etc. Culturally similar people ended up choosing very different governance methods and systems. Ukraine drifted away from Russia and commenced to perceive Russia as a foe that threatened lasting independence, as well as the country's preference for more democratic forms of governance. At the same time, Russia is willing to use any means to restore its control over Ukraine and continue exploiting Ukraine for building national prosperity and protecting its own territory from the proximity of the NATO. Based on these ideas, I anticipate that:

H.1.: The expectations of a war relate more to national identity, language and aspirations for democracy in Ukraine than in Russia.

H.2.: The expectations of a war relate more to security issues and economic prosperity in Russia than in Ukraine.

Data and Methods Description

I use data from the World Values Survey to define the key determinants of war expectations in Ukraine and Russia. Two waves are selected for the analysis that correspond to a pre-war and an in-war periods of mutual relations. The pre-war measurement point refers to the sixth wave and

stems from the year 2011, when both countries were characterized by friendly relations, with no severe hint to any possible military conflict. The in-war measurement point refers to the seventh wave conducted in 2017 in Russia and in 2020 in Ukraine. Both years were associated with an acute deterioration of Ukraine-Russia political relations and the presence of a war in the East of Ukraine. The sample includes in total 5193 cases, with 2220 cases stemming from Ukraine and 2973 cases corresponding to Russia.

A logit regression is used for calculating the model's parameters. The base model takes the following form:

$$logit\ (War\_worries_{ij}) = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Language\_group_{ij} + \gamma_2 Ethnic\_group_{ij} + \gamma_3 Democracy_{ij} + \gamma_4 Democracy\_important_{ij} + \gamma_5 Market\_values_{ij} + \gamma_6 Income_{ij} + \gamma_7 Confidence\_to\_government_{ij} + \gamma_8 Feel\_citizen_{ij} + \gamma_9 Feel\_free_{ij} + \gamma_{10} Feel\_insecure_{ij} + \gamma_{11} Regions_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Here, *War_worries* describe the respondents' worries that a war with another country or a civil war can occur on their country's territory. The initial responses for both variables vary from 1 "very much worried" to 4 "not at all worried" and are used to create dummy variables by assigning the value of 1 to the responses "very much worried" and "a great deal worried" and the value of 0 to the responses "not very worried" or "not at all worried". The first dummy captures the respondents' expectations of a war with another country, while the second measures the expectations of a civil war in their country.

Language_group captures the extent of language fractionalization and is operationalized through three dummies derived from the question that asks respondents to specify which language (Ukrainian, Russian or other languages) they use to communicate at home. *Ethnic_group* describes ethnic fractionalization in society and includes three dummies –

Ukrainian, Russian and other ethnicities. The dummies take the value of one if the respondents choose the relevant ethnicity group as a group they feel to belong to.

Democracy is operationalized through the question asking the individuals to evaluate the level of democracy in their country by using a ten-point scale. The responses are recorded to vary between 0 “not at all democratic” to 1 “completely democratic”. *Democracy_important* measures the importance that the respondents assign to democracy as a form of governance in their country. The responses are codified to change on a ten-point scale between 0 “democracy is not at all important for society” to 1 “democracy is absolutely important for society”.

Market_values represent a set of variables that measure the extent to which the respondents adhere to liberal values and include three items. The first describes one’s preference for private versus state property, with responses ranging between 1 “private ownership should be increased” to 10 “government ownership should be increased”. The second reflects the attitudes toward competition, with values varying from 1 “competition is good” to 10 “competition is harmful”. The third estimates the level of self-reliance that the respondents consider acceptable as opposed to the state support. The responses range between 1 “people should take more responsibility” and 10 “the government should be made more responsible”. The initial responses are recorded to change between 0 and 1, while retaining their ten-point measurement scale.

Income is operationalized through the satisfaction with income and income inequality variables. The first refers to the level of satisfaction with one’s household income provided by the respondents on a ten-point measurement scale and codified to change between 0 “fully dissatisfied” and 1 “fully satisfied”. The second captures the preference for economic differentiation in society. The responses vary from 1 “incomes should be made more equal” to 10 “we need larger income differences as incentives” and are also recorded to vary between 0 and 1.

Confidence_to_government captures the level of institutional trust and is operationalized through confidence that the respondents declare to feel to their country's government. The initial responses are used to create a dummy with the value of 1 corresponding to feeling "a lot of confidence" or "a great deal of confidence" and the value of 0 if the respondents specify "a bit of confidence' or "no confidence at all". *Feel_citizen* refers to the degree to which the respondents agree with the statement "I see myself as citizen of my country". Based on the initial responses, I construct a dummy variable with the value of 1 corresponding to "strongly agree" and "agree to a great extent" and the value of 0 corresponding to "disagree a lot" and "strongly disagree". *Feel_free* captures the degree of freedom that the individuals have in their everyday functioning. The initial responses vary from 1 "not at all free" to 10 "a great deal of freedom" and are further rescaled to range between 0 and 1. *Feel_insecure* refers to the extent of security that the individuals perceive in their neighborhood. The initial responses are used to construct a dummy variable with the value of 1 when the respondents specify that they feel "very secure" or "quite secure" and the value of 0 when the respondents feel "not really secure" or "not at all secure".

In addition, I include a set of *Regions* variables that describe the geopolitical division of the two countries into region groups. In the case of Ukraine, territorial dummies are constructed based on the geographical division map provided by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and include West, East, Center, South and Kiev (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Administrative_divisions_of_Ukraine#/media/File:Ukraine_KIIS-Regional-division2.png). The autonomous republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, that had a special status and were part of Ukraine in 2011, are included in the South dummy. In the case of Russia, I use regional dummies provided by the World Values Survey, such as Moscow,

North West, Central, Privolzhskiy, Urals, Far East, Siberian, and South. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the analysis.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables.

VARIABLES	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Dataset for Ukraine				
Worry about a war	0.805	0.396	0	1
Worry about a civil war	0.785	0.412	0	1
Language group				
Russian	0.440	0.496	0	1
Ukrainian	0.545	0.498	0	1
Other	0.015	0.123	0	1
Ethnic group				
Russian	0.093	0.290	0	1
Ukrainian	0.884	0.320	0	1
Other	0.023	0.150	0	1
Democracy				
Democracy score	0.475	0.248	0	1
Importance of democracy	0.800	0.227	0	1
Market values				
Private ownership	0.644	0.273	0	1
Competition	0.432	0.268	0	1
Self-reliance	0.734	0.272	0	1
Income and inequality				
Satisfaction with income	0.474	0.238	0	1
Income inequality	0.469	0.293	0	1
Confidence to the Government	0.778	0.203	0	1
Feel citizen	0.478	0.499	0	1
Feel free	0.641	0.233	0	1
Feel insecure	0.520	0.179	0	1
Dataset for Russia				
Worry about a war	0.744	0.437	0	1
Worry about a civil war	0.658	0.475	0	1
Language group				
Russian	0.935	0.246	0	1
Other	0.065	0.101	0	1
Ethnic group				
Russian	0.866	0.432		
Ukrainian	0.003	0.000	0	1

Other	0.131	0.227	0	1
Democracy				
Democracy score	0.507	0.227	0	1
Importance of democracy	0.737	0.241	0	1
Market values				
Private ownership	0.654	0.275	0	1
Competition	0.439	0.262	0	1
Self-reliance	0.736	0.273	0	1
Income and inequality				
Satisfaction with income	0.513	0.235	0	1
Income inequality	0.480	0.314	0	1
Confidence to the Government	0.638	0.223	0	1
Feel citizen	0.519	0.499	0	1
Feel free	0.665	0.219	0	1
Feel insecure	0.559	0.169	0	1

Source. Author's own calculations using the WVS.

Empirical Results

Worries about a war were high already in 2011 in both Ukraine and Russia (see Table 2). If these expectations did not differ between the two countries in the case of a war involving another country, they were characterized by a wide gap regarding the expectations of a civil war. The Orange Revolution confirmed the existence of regional variations in the vision of future for Ukraine, with 72 percent of respondents anticipating a civil war in the country in 2011 and 86 percent in 2020 (see Table 2). This proportion amounted to 64 percent in the case of Russia, remaining relatively stable by 2017 (68 percent) (see Table 2). At the same time, the expectations of a war involving another country increased substantially in the seventh wave in both countries. Logically, Ukraine envisaged the highest growth: 93 percent of people could worry about a military aggression from another country in 2020. One can argue that the definition of "another country" in the minds of Ukrainians was largely limited to Russia, given the political situation at that time. In the case of Russia, this proportion increased to 81 percent

(see Table 2) by 2017. Considering a widespread believe among the Russian population about the dominance of anti-Russian attitudes in the world, Russian respondents could equally picture any state, other than Ukraine, with which their country could potentially have a war.

In spite of the wide differences regarding the war expectations, both countries shared a lot of similarities in many macro-level characteristics that continued to persist even after the beginning of the conflict in the East of Ukraine. These included the values capturing the respondents' preference for private property, competition and self-reliance. Equally, Ukraine and Russia only marginally differed in the extent of their respondents' income satisfaction, income inequality, freedom and insecurity levels, as well as making their respondents feel citizens.

Table 2. A Juxtaposition of Mean Values for the Key Variables Between Ukraine and Russia.

VARIABLES	Ukraine		Russia	
	2011	2020	2011	2017
Worry about a war	0.695	0.928	0.694	0.811
Worry about a civil war	0.720	0.859	0.642	0.678
Language group				
Russian	0.481	0.392	0.939	0.929
Ukrainian	0.501	0.596	n/a	n/a
Other	0.018	0.012	0.061	0.071
Ethnic group				
Russian	0.140	0.037	n/a	0.866
Ukrainian	0.827	0.951	n/a	0.003
Other	0.033	0.012	n/a	0.131
Democracy				
Democracy score	0.451	0.504	0.459	0.570
Importance of democracy	0.781	0.821	0.736	0.737
Market values				
Private ownership	0.666	0.616	0.661	0.644
Competition	0.445	0.414	0.436	0.441
Self-reliance	0.798	0.657	0.792	0.660
Income and inequality				
Satisfaction with income	0.454	0.497	0.484	0.553
Income inequality	0.348	0.616	0.335	0.671
Confidence to the Government	0.769	0.791	0.652	0.619

Feel citizen	0.593	0.341	0.654	0.332
Feel free	0.655	0.624	0.591	0.665
Feel insecure	0.516	0.525	0.556	0.563

Source. Author's own calculations using the WVS.

Rather, the two countries showed sharp contrasts, when considering both the pre-war or the in-war periods, regarding three variables – language fractionalization, democracy and confidence to the government. The most evident one is the language fractionalization level. While Russia could be described as a homogenous country, with around 93 percent of its population using Russian as a key language of communication, Ukraine had a large Russian-speaking minority that amounted to 48 percent of the residents in 2011 (see Table 2). Nonetheless, speaking Russian and not Ukrainian only slightly affected the sense of national identity. With a half of the population using Ukrainian as the primary language of communication in 2011, almost 83 percent declared to feel Ukrainians. In 2020, the spread of the Ukrainian language reached around 60 percent of the respondents, while the sense of ethnic identity increased to 95 percent. In the seventh wave, the process of national identity building in Ukraine even surpassed Russia that ended up with 87 percent of the population declaring that they feel Russians (see Table 2).

Another source for the significant differences between the two countries is democracy. Although Ukraine and Russia were characterized by similar democracy scores in 2011, the Russian respondents assigned higher values to the perceived quality of their democratic settings than the Ukrainians in the seventh wave (0.570 in Russia versus 0.504 in Ukraine) (see Table 2). The tendency was though reverse in the case of the importance that the individuals attributed to democracy as a form of governance in their country. If in Russia this score remained almost unchanged over the analyzed period (around 0.740), the Ukrainian respondents assigned higher values to the importance of democracy not only in the in-war period (0.821) but also in the initial

pre-war period (0.781) (see Table 2). The cross-country gap in the role of democracy directly related to the contrast found between the two countries regarding the third variable – confidence to the government. If 65 percent of the Russian respondents declared to trust their government in 2011 and 62 percent did so in 2017, this percentage amounted to 77 percent in 2011 and 79 percent in 2020 in the case of Ukraine (see Table 2).

The differences derived from the descriptive statistics could also be confirmed by a logistic regression analysis, exploring key sources of war worries among the population. Table 3 presents results for both variables – the war with another country and the civil war –calculated for Ukraine for each of the selected periods independently. The results suggest that the level of self-reliance, confidence to the government, satisfaction with income, along with the importance of democracy, were key factors predicting the Ukrainians' worries about a war with another country in 2011 (see Table 3). In the in-war period of 2020, these worries followed a different pattern of formation by relating more to the factors directly associated with the scope of the war. More specifically, the respondents who attributed higher values to the importance of democracy as a form of governance in Ukraine and to competition as a framework for economic transactions had higher expectations of a war with another country (see Table 3). Also, the respondents who declared to feel citizens in Ukraine were less likely to worry about an external aggression in 2020 (see Table 3) than those who had difficulties to identify themselves as citizens of Ukraine. Both findings suggest that Ukrainians related their recent expectations of a war to the issues of liberal democracy and national identity.

Table 3. Key Determinants of Worries About a War With Another Country and a Civil War in Ukraine.

VARIABLES	Worry about a war with another country		Worry about a civil war	
	2011	2020	2011	2020
Language spoken at home				
Russian	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Ukrainian	-0.014	0.447	0.128	-0.095
	(0.159)	(0.422)	(0.165)	(0.300)
Other	0.131	0.035	0.183	0.013
	(0.563)	(0.063)	(0.534)	(0.056)
Ethnic group				
Russian	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Ukrainian	0.133	-0.771	-0.146	-0.330
	(0.200)	(1.085)	(0.204)	(0.652)
Other	0.912*	-1.464	0.431	-1.252
	(0.485)	(1.586)	(0.456)	(1.043)
Democracy				
Democracy score	0.065	-0.420	0.126	-1.219***
	(0.274)	(0.670)	(0.281)	(0.423)
Importance of democracy	0.068**	0.193***	0.055**	0.046
	(0.026)	(0.068)	(0.027)	(0.052)
Market values				
Private ownership	0.026	-0.288	0.181	1.461***
	(0.221)	(0.717)	(0.223)	(0.454)
Competition	-0.376*	-1.293***	-0.054	0.036
	(0.228)	(0.404)	(0.234)	(0.432)
Self-reliance	0.685***	0.993	0.538**	0.768*
	(0.249)	(0.615)	(0.258)	(0.406)
Income and inequality				
Satisfaction with income	-0.636**	-1.428*	-0.522*	-0.214
	(0.279)	(0.778)	(0.283)	(0.522)
Income inequality	-0.143	0.126	0.244	0.354
	(0.259)	(0.660)	(0.268)	(0.429)
Confidence to the Government	-0.953***	1.149*	-0.786**	-0.736
	(0.320)	(0.686)	(0.323)	(0.501)
Feel citizen	-0.474	-2.880***	-0.770**	-0.838
	(0.311)	(0.709)	(0.312)	(0.534)
Feel free	0.447	0.414	0.158	0.701
	(0.286)	(0.772)	(0.289)	(0.486)
Feel insecure	0.325	-0.948	0.922***	-1.013*
	(0.345)	(0.854)	(0.357)	(0.573)

Regions				
East	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
West	0.191	-2.586**	0.279	-0.317
	(0.222)	(1.144)	(0.221)	(0.486)
South	-0.109	-1.459	0.200	0.265
	(0.177)	(1.089)	(0.175)	(0.450)
Center	0.212	-2.811**	0.588***	-0.969**
	(0.208)	(1.099)	(0.212)	(0.447)
Kiev	0.009	-2.539**	0.972***	-0.442
	(0.238)	(1.103)	(0.268)	(0.469)
Constant	0.542	5.775***	0.190	2.354**
	(0.589)	(1.977)	(0.595)	(1.183)
Observations	1,336	884	1,336	884

Source. Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2020).

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

A slightly different pattern has been established in the case of worries about a civil war in Ukraine. The democratization variables were strongly associated with the level of worries, with the importance of democracy playing a crucial role in the pre-war period and the actual quality of democracy largely predicting worries in the in-war period. Also, the expectations of a civil war related to the value of private property in the in-war period and to self-reliance in both periods. The current military confrontation terminated the influence of confidence to the government and feeling of citizen on one's anticipations of a civil war in Ukraine and substantially weakened the respondent's concerns about insecurity as a factor of war worries formation. Unlike worries about a war with another country, the anticipations of a civil war were not related by the Ukrainian population to the process of state- and nation-building that reflected the direct scope of the conflict in the East. Rather, they were largely shaped by the actual quality of formal institutions, including democratic settings and the protection of property rights.

Finally, one should note that there were substantial regional differences in Ukraine regrading the expectations of both war types in 2020.These differences were especially pronounced in the case of worries about a war with another country, suggesting that the majority of the population did not frame the current military confrontation in the East of Ukraine as a civil war, but as a war caused by an external aggression.

In the case of Russia, the war expectations were predicted by a broader set of factors whose patterns of influence saw a substantial transformation over the analyzed period. Concerning worries about a war with another country, my results suggest that it is more about the threat to the nation's freedom, security and wealth that the Russian respondents recently put forward in defining their fears of a conflict. Additionally, the importance of democracy showed some influence in both periods of analysis, with the actual quality of democracy becoming a strong predictor of war worries more recently, in 2017 (see Table 4). There was no effect of liberal or market values on the expectations of an external aggression in the later period, although the importance of private property and self-reliance still significantly influenced the expectations of a war against Russia in the pre-war period (see Table 4). Also, satisfaction with income and confidence to the government, along with the concerns about feeling citizens, security and freedom, commenced to contribute in 2017 to worries formation among the Russian population (see table 4). Note that their influence was substantially weaker or missing in the earlier period of 2011.

Worries about a civil war in Russia followed a similar pattern of formation and dynamics of change with the expectations of an external aggression. In 2011, they were largely caused by the importance of private property rights, satisfaction with income, insecurity levels and feeling citizens (see Table 4). In 2017, the concerns about a civil war continued to relate to the insecurity

and income satisfaction levels, as well as to the importance attributed by Russians to democracy as a form of governance in their country. In addition to these factors, war worries became associated by the local population with confidence to the government, freedom levels and the importance assigned by the respondents to competition as a form of economic regulation in their country (see Table 4). Overall, both types of war worries showed significant resemblance in the sources of their formation in Russia, relating strongly to the issues of security, freedom and income satisfaction. Interesting is also the fact that not only worries about a war with another country but also worries about a civil war were associated with the importance of democracy in Russia. This suggests that the democratization process was seen threatened by Russians not only from outside but also from within the country.

Table 4. Key Determinants of Worries About a War With Another Country and a Civil War in Russia.

VARIABLES	Worry about a war with another country		Worry about a civil war	
	2011	2017	2011	2017
Language spoken at home				
Russian	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
Other	0.327	-0.319	0.275	-0.610*
	(0.272)	(0.375)	(0.256)	(0.341)
Ethnic group				
Russian	n/a	Ref. cat.	n/a	Ref. cat.
Ukrainian		-0.756		0.111
	n/a	(1.260)	n/a	(1.248)
Other		0.216		0.418
	n/a	(0.298)	n/a	(0.272)
Democracy				
Democracy score	-0.343	-0.935**	-0.227	-0.619*
	(0.276)	(0.399)	(0.261)	(0.320)
Importance of democracy	0.061***	0.152***	0.040*	0.088***
	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.030)

Market values				
Private ownership	1.019***	0.284	0.817***	0.293
	(0.202)	(0.313)	(0.191)	(0.259)
Competition	-0.061	-0.014	0.096	0.575**
	(0.227)	(0.311)	(0.215)	(0.265)
Self-reliance	0.486**	-0.169	0.400*	0.357
	(0.243)	(0.300)	(0.236)	(0.242)
Income and inequality				
Satisfaction with income	-0.497*	-1.406***	-0.512**	-0.812**
	(0.255)	(0.405)	(0.241)	(0.329)
Income inequality	-0.207	0.472	0.337	0.335
	(0.247)	(0.296)	(0.240)	(0.245)
Confidence to the Government	-0.462	-1.101***	0.132	-0.482*
	(0.284)	(0.350)	(0.269)	(0.291)
Feel citizen	-1.232***	-1.378***	-0.939***	-0.440
	(0.343)	(0.365)	(0.334)	(0.315)
Feel free	-0.013	0.830**	-0.092	0.714**
	(0.267)	(0.386)	(0.252)	(0.324)
Feel insecure	1.074***	1.190***	1.486***	1.414***
	(0.368)	(0.452)	(0.353)	(0.381)
Regions				
Moscow	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.	Ref. cat.
North West	0.426	0.696	0.275	0.009
	(0.268)	(0.458)	(0.243)	(0.391)
Central	0.225	0.574	0.606***	0.078
	(0.224)	(0.391)	(0.212)	(0.351)
Privolzhskiy	0.038	0.312	0.109	0.555
	(0.220)	(0.375)	(0.206)	(0.346)
Urals	0.056	1.110**	0.496*	-0.437
	(0.276)	(0.455)	(0.262)	(0.383)
Far East	-0.596*	0.941*	-0.329	0.701
	(0.340)	(0.519)	(0.339)	(0.462)
Siberian	0.148	0.860**	0.454**	-0.102
	(0.241)	(0.436)	(0.227)	(0.372)
South	0.544**	0.207	0.614***	-0.147
	(0.241)	(0.426)	(0.223)	(0.382)
Constant	-0.107	0.969	-1.181**	-0.784
	(0.562)	(0.771)	(0.534)	(0.663)
Observations	1,644	1,329	1,644	1,329

Source. Author's own calculations using the WVS (2011 and 2017).

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

All in all, the two countries showed significant differences as regards the set of determinants that defined their war worries over the analyzed period. Note that the recent conflict between Ukraine and Russia further widened the initial gap. In the case of Ukraine, the expectations of a war were primally associated with the population's preferences for a democratic form of governance and liberal economy, along with feeling citizens in their own country. In the case of Russia, it is the concern about freedom and security, as well as income satisfaction, that largely predicted the expectations of any war type. These findings can be regarded strong evidence confirming Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 about the nature of differences in the formation of war expectations between the two countries.

Conclusion and Discussion

This study provided a historical overview of relations between Ukraine and Russia. My analysis demonstrated that Ukraine was struggling for its independence for many hundreds of years. Unsuccessful in its attempts, the country was exploited and downgraded by Russia for the entire history of mutual relations. This included the imposition of the Russian identity and the aggressive suppression of every attempt to build own state or distinct identity by the Ukrainian population. The idea of brotherhood in the context of Ukraine-Russia relationship was a mere illusion artificially created and promoted by Russia alone. In Ukraine, it was only supported by a Russian-speaking minority.

My analysis suggested that the anticipation of a war existed even in earlier periods, questioning the idea of brotherhood. The current military confrontation between the two countries only intensified these worries, as well as the desire of the Ukrainian population to ultimately quit

Russia's sphere of influence. The fact that the recent expectations of a war with another country are primarily linked by the Ukrainian respondents to the concept of national identity and to the value of democracy and liberal economy should be viewed as strong evidence of their preference for lasting independence.

The recent conflict between the two countries brought about a significant change in Ukraine by putting more weight on the importance of Ukrainian language and Ukrainian identity for the country. In the light of recent events, the tradition of speaking Russian was severely questioned, while the perception of Russia as a foe took in strength and received a wide spread among the Ukrainians. These trends are likely to only intensify in the coming years. The policy of the monopolistic use of Ukrainian as the language of instruction in education will contribute to the gradual integration of the Russian-speaking minority into the sphere of national language. Internal migration caused by unequally distributed employment opportunities across the regions and the reallocation of the population due to the war will contribute to smoothening regional differences resulted from the historical division between the East and the West of Ukraine. Gradual change of generations will ultimately terminate the soviet nostalgia that now remained evident only among the oldest cohorts and will enhance the deviation from the memories of the common history and past with Russia. Ukraine is on the rise as a nation and a state, and these trends will only take in strength regardless of the fact whether they are supported or suppressed by Russia.

Further studies need to provide more clarifications over these issues. There is still a need to focus directly on the dynamics of expectations dominant among the Ukrainian population regarding the country's direction of change. The question of whether Ukraine sees Russia as the opposite to the European Union integration or whether it is a mere question of dignity and nation-building that governs the recent surge of opposition to the Russian influence is still open. Equally

under-researched remains the issue of attitudes that the Russian population holds about the current conflict with Ukraine and the dynamics of their visions regarding Ukraine's state- and nation-building processes. Russia cannot be limited to Kremlin's political leaders and the opinion of the population can differ from what Putin thinks about Ukraine as an independent country and its right to exist as an independent state.

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