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Uncertainty and Exchange Rates: Global Dynamics (Well, I Don't Quite Know Anymore)

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Abstract

This paper offers two points on the impact of uncertainty and exchange rate shocks on output. (1) A conceptual model where behavioural frictions — rational inattentiveness and bounded expectations — interact with uncertainty, generating aggregate fluctuations. Central banks can target these behavioural frictions to stabilise output and prices. (2) Empirical findings from a panel of advanced and emerging economies. Output and inflation slow in response to uncertainty shocks. Government bond yields moderate and exchange rates depreciate, suggesting within-country and between-country flight-to-safety respectively. Exchange rate appreciation shocks generate similar responses. The Malaysia-specific analysis finds divergent responses in employment and output, likely reflecting compositional effects in more productive tradable and less productive non-tradable sectors.

Keywords: Uncertainty, Rational Inattention, Bounded Rationality, VAR

JEL Classification: E0, E7

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1 Introduction

Two observations since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) — (i) a slowdown in output growth across emerging and advanced economies, though more noticeably for the former, and (ii) a sustained increase in economic policy uncertainty, due to Davis (2016) [1]. The latter, not only trends upwards, but registers spikes corresponding to major risk events — the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis, Brexit, the US-China trade war, the COVID-19 pandemic, and surges in geopolitical tensions. Certainly, these events have direct effects on output and prices. Of importance for policymakers is if the accompanying spike in uncertainty, in and of itself, affects output and prices.




Figure 1: [Global EPU Index \(LHS\)](#) and Real GDP Growth (RHS)

The literature has broadly two findings. Firstly, the response of real economic activity in response to uncertainty shocks is well established, though largely on the US and some advanced economies, and rarely considered in a panel data setting. Secondly, macro-financial responses to uncertainty shocks, such as exchange rates and bond yields, is more ambiguous and given less attention to. In light of these gaps, this paper expands both issues to a wider set of advanced and emerging economies. On the second issue, I analysed also the responses of currency and bond markets. Specifically, this paper considers the impact of exchange rates, a key macroeconomic variable for small open economies, which is better documented in the exchange rate and capital flows literature.

This leads us to two questions. Firstly, what are the dynamics between uncertainty, the exchange rate and output? Secondly, what may be the frictions and channels underlying these effects? The empirical section addresses the first and the theoretical section the second.

Empirical findings from the uncertainty literature suggest that in response to uncertainty shocks, real economic activity slows in the near-term. Bloom (2009)[2] used a calibrated general equilibrium model for the US to examine the impact of adverse shocks to the Chicago Board of Exchange Volatility Index (CBOE VIX), a measure of realised volatility over a rolling 20-day period in US equity markets, on investment made by firms. Subsequently, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016)[3] proposed a news-based index of economic policy uncertainty, which included a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)-weighted global index.

The degree of persistence and the presence of a post-shock correction in output varies according to the how uncertainty is measured. Macroeconomic uncertainty, as estimated in Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) [4], generates persistent output slowdowns without rebounds, compared to output responses to realised volatility in financial markets or subjective uncertainty. Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) [5] used a threshold vector autoregression (VAR) to assess differences in the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks between financial crises and normal times. They found that output responses during periods of financial stress are sharper, but recover within a similar duration compared to normal times.

The literature offers two strands of theoretical underpinnings. The first is a build-up of precautionary savings amongst households and firms. Risk averse agents defer expenditure, deterred by the possibility of downside surprises to real income. This subsequently leads to near-term losses in output. However, there are multiple points of contention. This includes a lack of consensus over the intensity and duration of such motives, as well as the appropriateness of selected uncertainty measures, as documented by Lugilde, Bande and Riveiro (2017) [6]. The second points to real options effects, where adjustments to employment and investment are costly. Firms enter a decision paralysis when faced with uncertainty, which results in a “wait-and-see” behaviour, deferring investment, production and employment decisions. Bloom (2000) [7] details the long and short-run impact of the real options channel.

In extension, Leduc and Liu (2016) [8] posit that uncertainty shocks are aggregate demand shocks. This contributed to theoretical and quantitative research linking sustained shortfalls in demand and output to transitory uncertainty shocks. Fajgelbaum, Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017) [9] viewed uncertainty as a shortfall of information flow essential to investment decisions. Using a calibrated quantitative model, they showed that a temporary uncertainty shock leads to a prolonged slowdown in output. Persistence arises from the endogeneity between uncertainty, the flow of economic information, and aggregate demand.

Kamber, Karagedikli, Ryan and Vehbi (2016) [10] offers a contrarian view. Using a structural factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) model on US data, they find that while macroeconomic uncertainty shocks lead to a shortfall in output as expected, the exchange rate appreciates and corporate bond yields increase, a direction that juxtaposes an aggregate demand shock.

However, the study also examines spillovers to other advanced and emerging economies. For emerging economies, exchange rates depreciate in response to uncertainty shocks originating from the US. The opposite is observed for advanced economies typically classified as safe havens, such as the Japanese Yen (JPY) and the Swiss Franc (CHF), suggesting flight-to-safety.

The real effects of exchange rates, and capital flows, are well documented, though only a selection consider uncertainty and exchange rates concurrently. Veerhoogen (2008) [11] used the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis as a ‘natural’ experiment, which found that the depreciation shock induced quality-upgrading in the manufacturing sector, especially exporters, consequently widening within-industry wage inequality. Cravino and Levchenko (2017) [12] documented the distributional effects of the Peso’s depreciation in 1994 on prices, and found larger inflationary pressures for households in lower income deciles. Saffie, Varela and Yi (2020) [13] and Benigno, Fornaro and Wolf (2020) [14] studied the effect of capital flows on sector-level productivity and output in Hungary and the US respectively.

I offer a theoretical framework to examine the effects of uncertainty shocks on the real economy, specifically output and inflation, through macro-behavioural frictions. The model has two behavioural frictions. Firstly, firms and households are rationally inattentive. I simplify Sims (2003)’s [15] conjecture that agents incur costs when processing information, leading to incomplete usage of the full set of information made available to them. My model posits that households and firms are less able to process ‘older’ information, hence overweighting the most recent information sets. This limited attention span informs expectations of future output and prices, and the degree of risk aversion. This state-dependent parameter then influences both the quantum and allocation of savings. Secondly, expectations formation are rational but bounded, drawing from Ding (2018)’s [16] κ -augmented Phillips Curve. In Ding (2018) [16], price expectations are forward-looking, limited, and anchored by the central bank’s forecast. I posit that macroeconomic uncertainty dis-anchors agents’ expectations from a credible ‘best guess’, represented by the central bank’s forecast. Agents then resort to their own judgment to form expectations, which are subject to innate biases.

These behavioural frictions have three implications. Firstly, output falls when risk aversion rises. Secondly, expectations of real output are biased downwards, due to a overweighting the immediate past, thereby deviating from optimal price-setting and expenditure-savings. This element contributes to the persistent shortfall in output relative to the steady state that recent literature on macroeconomic uncertainty has found, prominently Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) [4], and Kamber, Karagedikli, Ryan and Vehbi (2016) [10]. Thirdly, monetary policy eases aggressively, and the certainty over the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission diminishes. This presents scope for central banks to influence price and output expectations when uncertainty rises.

My empirical strategy is three-fold, each corroborating my attempt to answer the question — “what is the impact of uncertainty shocks on the aggregate economy for open economies in tandem with exchange rate shocks?”.

The first is closely related to Jackson, Klieson and Owyang (2019) [17], who employed a non-linear vector autoregression (VAR) with a max-uncertainty variable, drawn from Hamilton (1996)’s [18] max-oil variable. I depart from the extant literature that focuses on firm-level investment and aggregate-level private sector investment, and focus on aggregate real economic activity. The second extends the analysis to a panel of advanced and emerging economies with a panel VAR, with General Method of Moments (GMM)-style instruments as per Abrigo and Love (2016) [19], and a Bayesian pooled panel VAR as documented in Dieppe, Legrand and van Roye (2016) [20]. The third estimates a Bayesian Hierarchical Panel VAR to account for cross-sectional heterogeneity in the panel, as per Jarocinski (2010) [21] and documented by Dieppe, Legrand and van Roye (2016) [20].

The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows. Section 2 proposes the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategies and findings. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2 Theoretical Framework

The conceptual model contains four blocks — households, firms, the exchange rate, and policymakers.

2.1 Household

Households maximise expected-utility $\mathbf{E}(U(\cdot))$, subject to a budget constraint, shown in equations 1 and 2. Households are rationally inattentive. Expectations formation is rational but bounded. Decision-making is forward-looking. Written sequentially, consumption c_t and labour supply h_t are determined to maximise the household’s expected lifetime utility, where β is the subjective discount factor. This is the inverse of the long-term real interest rate $\frac{1}{1+r}$.

The budget constraint has three components. At equality, households’ consumption expenditure c_t , debt repayments (product of debt value d_t , and the prevailing real interest rate r_t) and savings over a class of A assets (sum of the product of price $z_t^{(a)}$ and quantity $b_t^{(a)}$ of asset a) are balanced by their contemporaneous wage income w_t , as well as the cash value of all assets held at the start of the period (sum of the product of quantity of assets held at the end of the previous period $b_{t-1}^{(a)}$, prevailing asset price $z_t^{(a)}$, and rate returns from the asset $r_t^{(a)}$). In summary, this is the household’s balance sheet condition.

$$\max_{c,h} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \mathbf{E}_0(U(c_t, h_t)), \beta < 1 \quad (1)$$

subject to

$$c_t + d_t(1 + r_t) + \sum_{a=1}^A (z_t^{(a)} b_t^{(a)}) \leq w_t h_t + \sum_{a=1}^A (z_t^{(a)} b_{t-1}^{(a)} (1 + r_t^{(a)})) \quad (2)$$

The utility function is increasing and concave in consumption (equation 3), but decreasing and concave in labour supply (equation 4). The former captures non-satiation and diminishing marginal utility. The latter allows for disutility from working. As work hours increase, the pace at which disutility rises increases.

$$U'(c) > 0, U''(c) < 0 \quad (3)$$

$$U'(h) < 0, U''(c) < 0 \quad (4)$$

The A classes of assets that households can invest in differ in two ways. The first is risk profile, particularly the variability in prices $z_t^{(a)}$, and co-variation with that of other assets, which is detailed later. The interest rate $r_t^{(a)}$ offered increases with the underlying degree of risk, reflecting the higher premium placed by investors to offset the disutility generated from the uncertainty in price outturns. The second is time-to-maturity. Returns risks and maturity are independent. This yields two concerns — households' tolerance of price uncertainty and liquidity shocks. Households invest savings between 'safe' and 'risky' assets, while considering their liquidity buffers. To generalise, this decision is defined by the euler equation for these assets, or savings instruments, where the marginal costs and benefits of saving in any asset type $a \in A$ are equal (equation 5).

$$U'(b_t^{(a)}) = \beta(1 + r_t^{(a)}) \mathbf{E}_t U'(b_{t+1}^{(a)}) \quad (5)$$

The empirical section studies output in response to a transitory shock to uncertainty. To this end, I consider risk preferences that are time-varying and expectations on returns that are informed by the immediate past, rather than the full set of information available at period t . The latter yields rational inattentiveness in savings decisions. Parameters in the savings euler equation can be made time-varying, influencing the expected marginal costs

and benefits of each class of assets (equation 6). This is reflected in γ_t , the risk preference of the household in period t , which determines the allocation of savings across all A classes of assets (equation 7). This parameter is influenced by two factors — the degree of economic uncertainty and expected future income at the start of period t .

$$U'(b_t^{(a)}; \gamma_t) = \beta(\gamma_t)(1 + r_t^{(a)})\mathbf{E}_t U'(b_{t+1}^{(a)}; \mathbf{E}_t \gamma_{t+1}) \quad (6)$$

$$\gamma_t = f(\mathcal{U}_t, \gamma_{t-k}; \rho(t)) \text{ where } \rho(t) < 1 \text{ and } \rho'(t) < 0 \quad (7)$$

A key channel in which uncertainty shocks affect output is through the temporary build-up of precautionary savings, as reflected by the risk preference parameter entering the subjective discounting factor. Crucially, the change in risk preference affects not only the allocation of savings, but the quantum of savings relative to total household budget inflows. I rewrite the household's optimisation problem as equations 8 and 9, allowing for this generalisation.

$$\max_{c,h} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \prod_{t=0}^{\infty} (\beta(\mathbf{E}_0 \gamma_t)) \mathbf{E}_0 (U(c_t, h_t)), \beta(\gamma_t) < 1 \quad (8)$$

subject to

$$c_t + d_t(1 + r_t) + \sum_{a=1}^A (z_t^{(a)} b_t^{(a)}) \leq w_t h_t + \sum_{a=1}^A (z_t^{(a)} b_{t-1}^{(a)} (1 + r_t^{(a)})) \quad (9)$$

A key aspect of the theoretical framework here is the range of assets that households can allocate savings to. λ_a characterises the risk profile of the A classes of assets considered, where $\lambda_a \rightarrow 1$ corresponds to a 'safe' asset. The covariance of its price with other assets $\sigma_{aa'}$ is increasingly negatively correlated when macroeconomic uncertainty \mathcal{U}_t rises. This is in the spirit of Baur and Lucey (2010) [22]'s description of 'safe haven' assets in terms of episodes of market stress. The converse, where $\lambda_a \rightarrow 0$, indicates a 'risk' asset, such that the covariance of its price with other assets is a positive scalar α_a . Written as equation 10, the proposed framework here generalises to assets with mixed characteristics of both 'safe haven' and 'risk' assets, where λ_a , the risk profile parameter, falls between 0 and 1. Households allocate their savings across the range of asset classes based on the any changes in their respective risk appetite parameter γ_t . For simplicity, during risk-on periods, allocation of savings tends towards 'risk' assets, and the converse occurs during risk-off periods. This

mechanism enables analysis of savings allocation under state-dependent risk preferences, in particular prevailing economic uncertainty, given heterogeneity in asset risk profiles.

$$\sigma_{aa'}(\mathcal{U}_t; \lambda_a) = \alpha_a - \lambda_a \mathcal{U}_t \text{ where } \alpha_a > 0, \mathcal{U}_t \geq 0 \text{ and } 0 \leq \lambda_a \leq 1 \quad (10)$$

Risk preferences vis-à-vis asset risk profiles form only one part of household response to uncertainty. Both the quantum and allocation of savings also depend on future expected asset value, written as equation 11, which is a function of expected economic growth g_{t+1} and inflation π_{t+1} . Rational inattention can imply a prolonged shortfall in output, similar to the conjectures in Leduc and Liu (2016) [8], Fajgelbaum, Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017) [9], and Ludvigson, Ma and Ng (2018) [23]. In this strand of the uncertainty literature, the build-up of precautionary savings and real options effects first lead to a shortfall in economic activity, leading to lower information flow. Agents then perceive the state of low information as a persistent state of uncertainty, further delaying investment and consumption. Ultimately, the shortfall in output is prolonged and uncertainty remain elevated.

$$\mathbf{E}_t(z_{t+1}^{(a)} b_{t+1}^{(a)}) = h(\mathbf{E}_t(g_{t+1}), \mathbf{E}_t(\pi_{t+1})) \quad (11)$$

There are broadly two strands of models of inattention, of which recent ones have attempted to marry both. Sticky information models comprise the first, prominently that of Mankiw and Reis (2002) [24], where agents receive new information sets infrequently due to a fixed cost when updating information. Noisy information models comprise the second, stemming from Sims (2003) [15], who posited that costs arising from processing the full span of information flow leads to a deviation from the full-information rational expectations (FIRE) behaviour. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) [25] discussed both types of models in detail, and found that real-world data among professional forecasters support either classes.

The model here falls closer to noisy information models of inattention. Where Sims (2003) [15] focused on a constraint on the rate of entropy of information flow, I posit a simple representation in equations 12 and 13 for economic growth and inflation expectations. Households form expectations using limited information from the immediate past k months, rather than the full span of information I_t . By assigning larger weights, $\rho(t)$, to the immediate past, post-shock, households treat the projected economic growth and inflation trajectories to be materially different from the true long-term average. We can treat $\rho(t)$ as an inverse of the cost of processing past information. We can treat this decreasing weight on ‘older’ information as the revealed preference of the household having considered the signal-processing cost. Where macroeconomic conditions undershoot expectations due to unanticipated shocks, agents behave as if the impulse of shocks do not dissipate, leading to prolonged

undershooting of macroeconomic outturns. Expectations on macroeconomic conditions are procyclical, which then provide justification for policy to intervene by augmenting expectations when adverse uncertainty shocks materialise. This mechanism complements Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) [26], who documented that the probability of revising HICP inflation forecasts among professional forecasters in the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is higher when the forecast horizon is shorter, and that forecasters do not always revise in light of new information. While a formal model of sticky and noisy information was rejected via moments-matching, Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) [26] posited that alternative specifications of inattention can be considered. The mechanism here proposes that agents extract less signals from ‘older’ information due to increasing latent signal-processing cost, even if the information set is updated continuously, when forming expectations than if under FIRE.

$$\mathbf{E}_t(g_{t+1}) = L_g(I(t, \dots, t - k); \rho(t)), \text{ where } 0 < \rho(t) < 1 \text{ and } \rho'(t) < 0 \quad (12)$$

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\pi_{t+1}) = L_\pi(I(t, \dots, t - k); \rho(t)), \text{ where } 0 < \rho(t) < 1 \text{ and } \rho'(t) < 0 \quad (13)$$

I propose further details on the formation of inflation expectations, drawing from the bounded expectations literature, particularly that of Ding (2018) [16]. Ding (2018) proposed a Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) with rationally bounded agents (κ -augmented NKPC), where inflation expectations are anchored by the central bank’s projection. I weave this principle with findings from surveys of inflation expectations conducted regularly in various advanced and emerging market economies, including the US, Japan, Philippines, and Malaysia, such that household inflation expectations are typically biased upwards, as documented by Abu Bakar and Abdul Ghani (2019) [27].

I model households’ expectations of inflation as biased upwards from the long-term mean or steady state $\bar{\pi}$, but anchored by the central bank’s forecast $\hat{\pi}_{t+k}^{t,CB}$. The weight on the latter’s projection decreases on two counts. The first comes from Ding (2018) [16], where the central bank’s credibility gravitates expectations formation closer to the rational expectations case. The second comes from the degree of prevailing economic uncertainty in period t . Uncertainty erodes the precision of macroeconomic indicators, reducing the reliability of central bank forecast. As the span of information set considered is rife with imprecision, agents resort to their own judgment. We may also generalise this conjecture to economic growth expectations. For brevity, this framework views economic growth as a function of inflation. Formally, written as equation 14, the household’s inflation expectation is a weighted average of its own projection, formed through judgment heuristics with an upward bias χ_t in period t , and the central bank’s forecast produced in the same period. Δ_t is an increasing and convex function




Figure 2: Aggregate Uncertainty and Agents' Reliance on Own Projection

of macroeconomic uncertainty \mathcal{U}_t (equations 15 and 16, and figure 2). Uncertainty erodes agents' reliance on the central bank's forecast $1 - \Delta_t$. This yields an inflation response that overshoots the baseline projection. Absent of shocks, expectations are anchored by the central bank. Once uncertainty shocks materialise, the upward bias pushes price-setting behaviour into an acceleration, despite output moderating. The proposed mechanism here marries prevailing thought on bounded rationality in expectations formation explicitly with exogenous aggregate economic uncertainty, leading to suboptimal economic outcomes.

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\pi_{t+k}) = (\bar{\pi} + \chi_t)\Delta_t + (1 - \Delta_t)\hat{\pi}_{t+k}^{t,CB}, \text{ where } \Delta_t \leq 1 \quad (14)$$

$$\frac{d\Delta_t}{d\mathcal{U}_t} > 0 \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{d^2\Delta_t}{d\mathcal{U}_t^2} > 0 \quad (16)$$

2.2 Exchange Rate

Consider the canonical model of the exchange rate under uncovered interest parity (UIP), with ϵ_t and s_t being the real and nominal exchange rates respectively, written as equations 17 and 18. \tilde{R}_t refers to the differentials in asset returns, a composite of the 'safe haven' and 'risk' assets described earlier, which households allocate their savings on. Asterisks refer to

foreign equivalents. Here, the expected evolution of the nominal exchange rate (Δs_t) is a function of the returns differential (\tilde{R}_t), and the inflation differential ($\pi_t - \pi_t^*$).

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\Delta \epsilon_t) = \mathbf{E}_t(R_t - R_t^*) = \mathbf{E}_t(\tilde{R}_t) \quad (17)$$

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\Delta s_t) = \mathbf{E}_t(\tilde{R}_t) - \mathbf{E}_t(\pi_t - \pi_t^*) \quad (18)$$

Building on equation 14, the exchange rate path is hence a function of macroeconomic uncertainty, the degree of bias in judgment heuristics, as well as the central bank's forecast, i.e., the respective economy's 'best guess' (equation 19). To simplify, equation 20 supposes that inflation expectations are primarily, or only, informed by common global macroeconomic uncertainty, a reasonable simplification for small open economies. In this instance, the nominal exchange rate is a function of the country differentials in returns \tilde{R}_t , steady state inflation $\tilde{\pi}$, bias in judgment heuristics $\tilde{\chi}_{t-1}$, and the central bank's 'best guess' inflation $\hat{\pi}_t^{t-1,CB}$. All else held equal, an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on the exchange rate path, which depends on the domestic-foreign differential in the innate bias of households and firms on inflation expectations $\tilde{\chi}_{t-1}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{E}_t(\Delta s_t) = & \mathbf{E}_t(\tilde{R}_t) \\ & - \mathbf{E}_t[(\tilde{\pi} + \chi_{t-1})\Delta_{t-1} + (1 - \Delta_{t-1})\hat{\pi}_t^{t-1,CB} \\ & - (\tilde{\pi}^* + \chi_{t-1}^*)\Delta_{t-1}^* - (1 - \Delta_{t-1}^*)\hat{\pi}_t^{t-1,CB*}] \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\Delta s_t) = \mathbf{E}_t(\tilde{R}_t) - \mathbf{E}_t[(\tilde{\pi} + \tilde{\chi}_{t-1})\Delta_{t-1} + (1 - \Delta_{t-1})\hat{\pi}_t^{t-1,CB}] \quad (20)$$

2.3 Firms

A continuum of $\{i\}_0^\infty$ firms employ labour L_{git} and capital K_{git} to produce an amount Y_{git} of goods of type g , priced at p_{git} , in period t . The production function $F(\cdot)$ satisfies constant returns to scale. A workhorse model would be the Cobb-Douglas production function, with labour input shares α_{git} and firm-goods-level total factor productivity (TFP) A_{git} , written as equations 21 to 23.

$$Y_{git} = A_{git}F(K_{git}, L_{git}; \alpha_{git}) \quad (21)$$

$$y_{git}^{(K)} = A_{git}f(l_{git}) \quad (22)$$

$$y_{git}^{(L)} = A_{git} f(k_{git}) \quad (23)$$

Firms maximise expected lifetime profits $\mathbf{E}_t(\Phi)_i$, which is the expected present discounted value of the sum of profits over the continuum of time $\mathbf{E}_0(\phi_{it})$ (equations 24 and 25). Employment $L_{git}^{(D)}$ and investment $K_{git}^{(D)}$ decisions, and similarly separation and dis-investment, depend on profit expectations.

$$\{L_{git}^{(D)}, K_{git}^{(D)}, \} = \max_{L, K} \{\mathbf{E}_t(\Phi)_i\} \quad (24)$$

$$\Phi_i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{\mathbf{E}_0(\phi_{it})}{(1+r_t)^t} \quad (25)$$

From the expected profit equation, written sequentially, employment and investment decisions are directly dependent on expected prices and output, and, by extension, expected wages and rent (equation 26). Similar to the household's problem, these decisions depend on the firms' expectations of economic growth and inflation (equations 27 and 28). While rational inattentiveness and bounded expectations similarly apply, parameters may differ. The degree of behavioural frictions among firms may be less binding than among households. Firms may have longer records-keeping and inertia in institutional behaviour. Hence, the information considered for the average firm may span a longer period than for the average household. By requiring the rate at which the information weights for period t decreases to be smaller among firms, we can capture the asymmetry in attentiveness between firms and households (equation 29).

$$\mathbf{E}_0(\phi_{it}) = \sum_{g=1}^G \mathbf{E}_0\{(p_{git} Y_{git} - w_{git} L_{git} - r_{git}^{(K)} K_{git})\} \quad (26)$$

$$\mathbf{E}_t(g_{t+1}) = L_g(I(t, \dots, t-k); \rho(t)), \text{ where } 0 < \rho(t)^{(i)} < 1 \text{ and } \rho'(t)^{(i)} < 0 \quad (27)$$

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\pi_{t+1}) = L_\pi(I(t, \dots, t-k); \rho(t)), \text{ where } 0 < \rho(t)^{(i)} < 1 \text{ and } \rho'(t)^{(i)} < 0 \quad (28)$$

$$\rho'(t)^{(firm)} > \rho'(t)^{(household)} \quad (29)$$

A key deviation in expectations formation among firms, notably that of inflation, from the household is the lack of a systematic upward bias. The empirical literature on firm-level expectations finds that biases are broadly firm-specific, informed by their experience. Presence of upward biases, similar to those that of household inflation expectations, is not uniform. For instance, Richards and Verstraete (2016) [28] finds that while upward biases are found in the Bank of Canada’s Business Outlook Survey (BOS), it is generally absent amongst firms surveyed in the Business Confidence Survey (BCS). However, Andrade and Le Bihan (2013) [26] documented upward inflation forecast bias among professional forecasters of the Euro Zone’s HICP inflation. Together with evidence elsewhere on upward inflation expectation bias among households, this gives rise to an upshoot of inflation away from its steady state in response to an uncertainty shock.

Uncertainty clouds the reliability of expectations, leading to the build-up of precautionary savings and the exercise of real options by delaying investment and employment decisions. Drawing from the literature that discusses uncertainty traps, notably Fajgelbaum, Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017) [9], economic growth first undershoots the steady state as uncertainty shocks materialise, and firms subsequently take that as the ex post anchor due to inattentiveness to the full information set. Ultimately, a supposedly transitory downturn posited, such as Bloom (2009) [2] become prolonged and amplified, akin to that of Leduc and Liu (2016) [8] and Fajgelbaum, Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017) [9].

2.4 Policy

The economy has two policymakers — the treasury (fiscal policy authority) and the central bank (monetary policy authority). The former decides on public expenditure and taxes, while the latter determines the nominal interest rate through the policy rate. As with standard models, I assume exogeneity in government expenditure and taxes. However, this framework should be generalisable to the case of endogenous fiscal policy.

The central bank minimises a quadratic Barro-Gordon loss function (equation 30), due to Kydland and Prescott (1977) [29]. The central bank suffers value losses \mathcal{L}_t that are increasing in the deviation of inflation π_t and the output gap x_t from their respective targets, π^* and x^* , in period t . The relative importance of the inflation target relative to the output gap target, θ , is pre-determined. This may be informed by the central bank’s institutional memory, mandates and preferences of its monetary policy committee.

$$\mathcal{L}_t = \theta(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 + (1 - \theta)(x_t - x^*)^2, \text{ where } 0 < \theta < 1 \quad (30)$$

Due to lags in the collection and publication of macroeconomic data by statistical agencies,

central banks are unlikely to have access to the necessary span of contemporaneous data. GDP, industrial production, and labour market data such as wages, employment and unemployment, typically follow a substantial lag of up to a quarter. While inflation is published with a shorter lag, incomplete information motivates the use of an expected loss rather than a realised loss function, illustrated in equation 31. Uncertainty that concerns macroeconomic conditions now affects policy decisions, where the contemporaneous estimates of the output gap and inflation enter the loss function as second moments.

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\mathcal{L}_t) = \theta \mathbf{E}_t(\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 + (1 - \theta) \mathbf{E}_t(x_t - x^*)^2, \text{ where } 0 < \theta < 1 \quad (31)$$

Rather than solving for the optimal policy rule, which may be subject to a non-standard Phillips Curve and IS function due to the presence of macro-behavioural frictions outlined in the previous subsections, I consider a forward-looking Taylor Rule policy response function (equation 32), due to Taylor (1993) [30] and Romer and Romer (2004) [31], expressed in terms of inflation and the output gap. Taking first differences yields the evolution rule for the nominal interest rates in response to movements in inflation rate and in the output gap (equation 33). Adhering to the Taylor's Principle requires $\beta_{\pi,t} > 1$.

$$i_t = \beta_{0,t} + \beta_{\pi,t} \mathbf{E}_t(\pi_{t+1} - \pi^*) + \beta_{x,t} \mathbf{E}_t(x_{t+1} - x^*) + \epsilon_t \quad (32)$$

$$\Delta i_t = \beta_{\pi,t} \mathbf{E}_t(\Delta \pi_{t+1}) + \beta_{x,t} \mathbf{E}_t(\Delta x_{t+1}) + \Delta \epsilon_t \quad (33)$$

To relate uncertainty with policymaking, I posit that central banks face cognitive limitations on forming contemporaneous expectations, which builds on two observations. Firstly, macroeconomic data crucial to central banks, such as GDP and industrial production, are released with noticeable lags. Secondly, Central Banks are generally non-participants, or, at best, limited participants, in the real economy and financial markets. The ability to access information is likely less comprehensive than agents deeply integrated within market operations. In this model, central banks do not know what π_t and x_t are. Rather, they form expectations of inflation and the output gap, both of which are subject to estimation errors, contemporaneously. This is not to say that firms and households have an idea of what aggregate output and prices are contemporaneously. Rather, firms and households know their respective output and prices. The central bank's estimates are, amongst all economic agents, the 'best guesses' of aggregate economic variables contemporaneously. The central bank's $\mathbf{E}_t(\pi_t)$ and $\mathbf{E}_t(x_t)$ may differ from actual outturns. To simplify, the central bank's projection is a function of uncertainty, which multiplicatively interacts with the projection error (equa-

tions 34, 35, and 36). The proposed mechanism enables further analysis on policy decisions when reliability of the entire economy’s ‘best guess’ forecast, as well as that of individual agents’ ‘guesses’ are both state-dependent.

$$\mathbf{E}_t(\pi_t) = \pi_t + \kappa\epsilon_{\pi,t} \tag{34}$$

$$\mathbf{E}_t(x_t) = x_t + \kappa\epsilon_{x,t} \tag{35}$$

$$\kappa = p(\mathcal{U}_t), \text{ where } p(0) = 1, p'(\cdot) < 0, p''(\cdot) < 0 \tag{36}$$

Uncertainty adversely affects the precision in evaluating macroeconomic conditions crucial for policy decisions and the efficacy of monetary policy transmission channels. The latter draws from behavioural changes established in earlier subsections, where agents’ price, output and expenditure decisions deviate from a baseline where uncertainty is absent. With higher uncertainty having a multiplicative effect on the precision of inflation and output gap estimates, we expect the second moment of the deviation of inflation and output gap from respective targets to rise. Expected loss, therefore, increases with uncertainty, prompting central banks to react more aggressively to a shortfall in the output gap. Even if the central bank possesses full information rational expectations, without any behavioural frictions, central banks can respond to a shortfall in economic growth and hence the output gap, but to a different degree of aggressiveness. This differs from an increase in uncertainty in policy parameters, drawing from the literature on monetary policy uncertainty, notably Brainard (1967) [32], where policy reaction become more modest, contrary to the type of uncertainty here that concerns the first moment estimates in the loss function. Discussion of interactions with policy parameter uncertainty, as well as implications to monetary policy with quantitative applications may be steps for further research.

In sum, policy has a role in stabilising inflation and the output gap by influencing expectations formation. Importantly, $\mathbf{E}_t(\pi_t)$ and $\mathbf{E}_t(x_t)$, as well as k periods-ahead forecasts, $\pi_{t+k}^{\hat{C}B}$ and $x_{t+k}^{\hat{C}B}$ may be made known to the public to anchor expectations. Policy efficacy depends on the central bank’s ability to influence the reliance of agents on official projections, Δ_t , when uncertainty rises. Central banks can provide a credible anchor to lower $\frac{d\Delta_t}{d\mathcal{U}_t}$. Social welfare may be relative higher if the upward bias of households and firms χ_t is shut off when uncertainty rises, which could coincide with a shortfall in the output gap, as well as a multiplicative increase in the second moment terms $\mathbf{E}_t(\cdot)^2$ in the loss function.

3 Data

This paper uses a panel of macroeconomic data from 16 advanced and emerging economies — the United States of America (USA), Eurozone (EUR), Japan (JPN), United Kingdom (GBR), Canada (CAN), PR China (CHN), South Korea (KOR), Chinese Taipei (TWN), Singapore (SGP), Malaysia (MYS), Thailand (THA), Philippines (PHL), India (IND), Mexico (MEX), Brazil (BRA) and South Africa (ZAF).

This sample is sufficiently representative of the global economy, as they account for 71.1% of global real GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms in 2018, based on the IMF’s October 2019 World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database. It covers the major advanced and emerging economies, with added granularity in East Asia. All variables used — industrial production (IPI), consumer price index (CPI), 10-year government bond yields, nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and the news-based economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index — are commonly available from June 2013 to February 2020 at a monthly frequency.

The variables here are chosen as proxies for specific macroeconomic factors, considering their availability at a monthly frequency. IPI proxies for aggregate output, CPI for prices, NEER for the exchange rate and bond yields for the degree of risk aversion. EPU proxies for uncertainty. The Malaysia-specific study is conducted on quarterly data spanning 1Q 2001 to 3Q 2019. I used GDP growth as a proxy of output, instead of IPI growth, and also included employment growth as a measure of labour market conditions.

3.1 Uncertainty

The measure of uncertainty, EPU, was prepared by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) [3]. Country-specific indices were additionally prepared by Baker, Bloom, Davis and Wang (2013) [33], Arbatli, Davis, Ito and Miake (2019) [34] and Davis (2016) [1]. For economies without a country-specific index, the global PPP-weighted index was used, prepared by Davis (2016) [1]. These economies are small open economies, whose economic conditions likely depend on global developments. All major economies in the sample had respective indices.

3.2 Macroeconomic Data

The main measures used are IPI, CPI, 10-year government bond yields and NEER. Except the NEER, which is published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), all variables are published by the statistical agencies of respective countries, and compiled through Haver Analytics and CEIC.

Bond yields underwent year-on-year difference transformation, while the rest of are transformed into year-on-year growth rates. While this addresses non-stationarity issues in the respective time series, the transformation accounts for seasonality by directly comparing against the same period from the preceding year. One source of seasonality may be holidays that fall on the same period every year, such as Lunar New Year in several of the East Asian economies covered. Additionally, this transformation is commonly used by policymakers, market participants, and professional forecasters.

In the Malaysia-specific study, a different set of transformation was applied on the data set, which spanned a longer period and is available at a quarterly frequency. World GDP growth in this segment is a weighted average of real GDP growth in local constant prices of the following economies — United States, Eurozone, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, PR China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, South Africa and Turkey. Malaysia is excluded from this measure. These countries accounted for 83.1% of global real GDP in PPP terms in 2018, based on the IMF’s October 2019 WEO. The respective shares of global GDP in PPP terms from the IMF’s WEO are used as weights.

4 Empirical Strategy and Findings

Three empirical analyses are conducted, each to address a variant of the question outlined in section 1 — ‘what are the dynamics between uncertainty, the exchange rate and aggregate output?’. These empirical analyses are intended to document cross-country and country-specific evidence on the impact of uncertainty and exchange rate shocks on macroeconomic variables, including output, inflation and bond yields, rather than a formal test of the theory proposed in section 2. The theoretical framework serves as an explanation from the perspective of inattentive agents for why output and inflation may deviate from their optimal states in the presence of uncertainty shocks. Two additional statistical exercises are also documented in the supplementary appendix (sections A.2 and A.3).

1. A country-level max-uncertainty VAR (MUVAR), following Jackson, Kliesen and Owyang (2020) [17] sheds light on the dynamics between output, uncertainty and the exchange rate specifically for Malaysia, accounting for non-linear uncertainty effects during upward jumps in uncertainty. The later analyses trade off this detail for country coverage, and against the wider global economy.
2. I estimate a panel VAR, with GMM-style instruments, following Abrigo and Love (2016) [19]. The paper focuses on the impulse response functions (IRFs) from EPU

and NEER shocks, estimated with Cholesky Decomposition. Specifically, these are the estimated average within-country dynamic responses. I also estimated a Bayesian pooled VAR.

3. The Bayesian hierarchical panel VAR allows for cross-sectional heterogeneity, such that estimated country-specific dynamics differ from the sample ‘within’ estimates, as per Canova and Ciccarelli (2006) [35], due to Jarocinski (2010) [21] and documented in Dieppe, Legrand and van Roye (2016) [20]. Compared to the second approach, this allows for heterogeneous VAR estimates and IRFs across countries. Gibbs Sampling further overcomes the limited degrees of freedom posed by the data set.

4.1 Country-Level MUVAR

4.1.1 Methodology (Country-Level MUVAR)

The Max-Uncertainty VAR is adapted from Jackson, Kliesen and Owyang (2019)[17], and reproduced in equation 37. Y_t contains real GDP growth in period t . X_t is a vector of CPI inflation, NEER growth, 10-year government bond yield in period t , and global PPP-weighted real GDP growth. Z_t is the measure of uncertainty — the global PPP-weighted EPU. \hat{Z}_{t-1} is the max-uncertainty measure, which is the percentage change of uncertainty relative to its highest level in the past 12 months, shown in equation 38. \hat{Z}_{t-1} takes the value of zero if this change is non-positive. Additionally, sign restrictions are imposed on the Malaysian variables in the global equations to reflect Malaysia’s position as a small open economy. Shocks from the domestic economy should not affect the global economy. In the global GDP and EPU equations, the coefficients of Malaysian variables are restricted to zero.

$$\begin{bmatrix} Y_t \\ X_t \\ Z_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{11} & \beta_{11} & \beta_{11} \\ \beta_{21} & \beta_{22} & \beta_{23} \\ \beta_{31} & \beta_{32} & \beta_{33} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Y_{t-1} \\ X_{t-1} \\ Z_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \gamma_{yz} \\ \gamma_{xz} \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \hat{Z}_{t-1} + \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_{Y,t} \\ \epsilon_{X,t} \\ \epsilon_{Z,t} \end{bmatrix} \quad (37)$$

$$\hat{Z}_{t-1} = \max\left\{0, \frac{100 * (Z_{t-1} - \max\{Z_{t-2}, \dots, Z_{t-13}\})}{\max\{Z_{t-2}, \dots, Z_{t-13}\}}\right\} \quad (38)$$

The merits of this approach is of two-fold. Firstly, we distinguish between an elevation in uncertainty and spikes in uncertainty that are ‘abnormal’ relative to the immediate past. A 12-month period could reflect possible rational inattention of agents who may have limited retrospective vision. However, this choice of backward visibility could vary. This representation is a simplification of Sims (2003)’s [15] principles, where agents face signal-processing costs in consuming the span of informational set available to them, leading to inefficient

consumption of information and, hence, producing decisions that deviate from the rational expectations case. Kamdar (2019) [36] proposes a suite of structural models, augmenting workhorse models with these behavioural properties. We may interpret the limit on the backward-looking abilities of agents, as well as the decreasing weight of longer lags, as the revealed preference of the information-processing problem faced by the respective agents. Secondly, the convenient structure of the max-uncertainty VAR allows for a linear estimation, as well as standard computation of the IRFs, allowing for a simple, non-parametric and data-driven procedure.

Nevertheless, I note two key shortcomings, in reference to the theoretical underpinnings of this paper’s analysis. Firstly, while allowing for substantial jumps in uncertainty to have an added effect, parameters of the model remain linear. Secondly, similar to a regular VAR, responses to uncertainty shocks are symmetric.

4.1.2 Findings (Country-Level MUVAR)

Zooming into Malaysia, the estimated IRFs are broadly in line with that of the wider literature. Output growth moderates in response to an unanticipated increase in uncertainty for up to 2-years, with a correction absent (figure 3). Inflation moderates slightly but persistently (figure 4). At this juncture, this finding deviates from the theoretical model’s conjecture, and will be analysed together in section 4.2 with the panel VAR. The nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) tends towards depreciation persistently (figure 7). This squares with findings from Beckmann and Czudaj (2017) [37] where the EUR, GBP and CAD are expected to depreciate against the USD up to a 12-month horizon in response to EPU shocks from the US, but the JPY appreciate, akin to a safe haven currency. The depreciation response to a global EPU shock is expected for EME currencies, such as the MYR, in contrast to the JPY. In line with the negative output response, employment growth moderates (figure 5). Risk premia, as measured by the 10-year yield spread, relative to 10-year US treasury yields, closes, suggesting within-country flight-to-safety (figure 6). Kamber, Karagedikli, Ryan and Vehbi (2016) [10] finds that bond yields in advanced economies rise in response to uncertainty shocks. For Malaysia, an EME, the opposite response may be expected.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in the Change in the Global EPU Index




Figure 3:
Real GDP Growth




Figure 4:
CPI Inflation




Figure 5:
Employment Growth




Figure 6:
10-Year Bond Yields




Figure 7:
NEER Growth




Figure 8:
World Real GDP Growth




Figure 9:
Change in GEPU

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual change in the global economic policy uncertainty index. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence bands.

In response to an upward (appreciation) shock in the exchange rate, output moderates, as expected for a trade-dependent small open economy (figure 10). Inflation moderates, likely due to cheaper imports (figure 11). Bond yields fall, as prices of portfolio assets increase (figure 13). Viewed against other economies, a higher valued exchange rate may attract portfolio investors seeking to retain value, hence the higher demand and subsequently lower yields in Malaysian bonds.

While the upward response in employment growth (figure 12) may not be expected, this may arise from compositional effects, as more labour-intensive, less trade-dependent, sectors may experience real income windfalls from the stronger exchange rate, leading to stronger labour demand. The net employment gains can be reconciled with a net output loss if sectors that benefited from a stronger exchange rate, namely the labour-intensive non-tradable sectors, are less productive than capital-intensive tradable sectors, such as manufacturing. This suggests that employment gains in non-tradable sectors dominate the employment losses in tradable sectors. However, the productivity gap is sufficiently large such that output losses

in the tradable sectors dominate the output gains in the non-tradable sectors. To corroborate, Benigno, Fornaro and Wolf (2020) [14] argues that capital flows into the US, which strengthened the USD, had prompted a faster expansion in the less-productive services sector relative to manufacturing, hence dampening global productivity growth. Using detailed firm-level data spanning 1992-2008 in a ‘natural’ experiment — Hungary’s full capital account liberalisation in 2001 ahead of its ascension to the European Union (EU) — Saffie, Varela and Yi (2020) [13] found faster expansion in the services sector, whose estimated real productivity is lower as Hungary gained access to international capital markets. In these sectors, relative to the manufacturing sector whose real productivity is estimated to be higher, the number of firms also expanded faster, aligned with the estimated net employment gains in this paper.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in NEER Growth




Figure 10:
Real GDP Growth




Figure 11:
CPI Inflation




Figure 12:
Employment Growth




Figure 13:
10-Year Bond Yields




Figure 14:
NEER Growth




Figure 15:
World Real GDP Growth




Figure 16:
Change in GEPU

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER; appreciation). Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence bands.

4.2 Panel VAR

4.2.1 Methodology (Panel VAR)

Taking the estimation exercise to the panel of 16 economies in section 3, the following model estimates the average within-country dynamics of IPI growth, CPI inflation, the annual difference of bond yields, NEER growth and uncertainty growth. The reduced form within-effect estimates β are estimated with GMM-style instruments. As described in Abrigo and Love (2016) [19], a Helmert transformation was implemented to remove the fixed effects, and the lag of the transformed variables are instrumented by the same lag of the untransformed variables.

Impulse responses are estimated with Cholesky Decomposition. In the main results, summarised in equation 39, EPU is ordered after IPI, CPI inflation and the NEER under the assumption that an unanticipated movements in uncertainty do not immediately feed into macroeconomic variables. This intends to reflect nominal frictions in trade, e.g. contract lock-ins, and price-setting, e.g. informational and price adjustment cost. An alternative set of estimates, where EPU is ordered first — that the pass-through of uncertainty shocks to macroeconomic variables (output, prices and the exchange rate) is immediate — is reported in the appendix for both the GMM-style and Bayesian Pooled Panel VARs (section A.1).

$$\textbf{Ordering: Output} \rightarrow \textbf{NEER} \rightarrow \textbf{Inflation} \rightarrow \textbf{Uncertainty} \rightarrow \textbf{Bond Yields} \quad (39)$$

In this model, described in equation 40, Y_{it} is the IPI growth of country i in month t , X_{it} the vector of CPI inflation, and the annual difference in bond yields, and Z_{it} the vector of EPU and NEER growth, the shock variables of interest. α_i^Y , α_i^X and α_i^Z are endogenous variable-specific fixed effects for country i . All variables here are treated as endogeneous. The fixed effects control for variable-country-specific heterogeneity that are time-invariant but unaccounted for by the variables in the reduced form VAR.

$$\begin{bmatrix} Y_{it} \\ X_{it} \\ Z_{it} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_i^Y \\ \alpha_i^X \\ \alpha_i^Z \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{11} & \beta_{11} & \beta_{11} \\ \beta_{21} & \beta_{22} & \beta_{23} \\ \beta_{31} & \beta_{32} & \beta_{33} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Y_{i,t-1} \\ X_{i,t-1} \\ Z_{i,t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_{it}^Y \\ \epsilon_{it}^X \\ \epsilon_{it}^Z \end{bmatrix} \quad (40)$$

4.2.2 Findings (Panel VAR)

Output contracts in the short-run in response to a positive shock in uncertainty growth, before normalising after approximately one year (figure 17). However, there is no positive cor-

rection in the aftermath, in contrast to earlier country-specific studies, such as Bloom (2009) [2]. This may be due to (i) the different transformation conducted to handle non-stationarity in the levels of some country-specific EPU series, and (ii) the differential dynamics of output and uncertainty in the later periods of the 2010s, where the extant literature focuses on the pre-GFC period and the early half of the 2010s.

Inflation moderates, nearly converging to its steady state after approximately 1 year (figure 18). This contrasts the theoretical mechanism proposed, where the upward bias of household expectations dominate during times of uncertainty. The sign here suggests that the aggregate demand effect, outlined in Leduc and Liu (2016) [8], may dominate. Output and prices move in the same direction.

Bond yields accelerate, suggesting stronger risk aversion behaviour on average across the panel of countries (figure 19). The overall findings reflects that of Kamber, Karagedikli, Ryan and Vehbi (2016) [10], where bond yields were estimated to rise in response to an uncertainty shock. Finally, the effective exchange rate depreciates, suggesting flight-to-safety in the currency market to trade partners in the basket of countries in Malaysia's NEER (figure 20).

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in Economic Policy Uncertainty Growth




Figure 17: IPI Growth

Figure 18: CPI Inflation

Figure 19: 10Y Bond Yields




Figure 20: NEER Growth

Figure 21: EPU Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of EPU. Shaded area represents the 95% confidence bands, estimated with 200 Monte Carlo draws using Gaussian approximation.

Output moderates persistently in response to an upward exchange rate shock, i.e. an unanticipated appreciation (figure 22). The response of NEER growth to its own shock suggest a slow convergence in prices relative to that of trade partners over a period of 4 years (figure 25). As a stronger exchange rate raises purchasing power relative to other countries, and reduces import prices, inflation moderates persistently (figure 23). In line with this conjecture, money supply slows gradually but persistently. Likewise, bond yields slow persistently, correcting only after approximately 4 years (figure 24). As prices of portfolio bond assets would now be more expensive in terms of trade partners' currencies, bond yields moderate. EPU moderates temporarily, likely as the news of higher purchasing power for domestic agents are treated as positive economic news, hence reducing the prevailing level of uncertainty modestly (figure 26).

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in NEER Growth




Figure 22: IPI Growth

Figure 23: CPI Inflation

Figure 24: 10Y Bond Yields




Figure 25: NEER Growth

Figure 26: EPU Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of the NEER (appreciation). Shaded area represents the 95% confidence bands, estimated with 200 Monte Carlo draws using Gaussian approximation.

4.3 Bayesian Panel VARs

4.3.1 Methodology (Bayesian Panel VARs)

In this segment, I estimate two versions — (i) a pooled panel VAR, as documented in Dieppe, Legrand and van Roye (2016) [20], with IRFs estimated with Cholesky Decomposition as per section 4.2, and (ii) a hierarchical model, due to Jarocinski (2010) [21], with IRFs estimated with sign restrictions ¹. Equation 41 shows a generalised form of the model.

$$\begin{bmatrix} Y_{it} \\ X_{it} \\ Z_{it} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_i^Y \\ \alpha_i^X \\ \alpha_i^Z \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{i,11} & \beta_{i,11} & \beta_{i,11} \\ \beta_{i,21} & \beta_{i,22} & \beta_{i,23} \\ \beta_{i,31} & \beta_{i,32} & \beta_{i,33} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Y_{i,t-1} \\ X_{i,t-1} \\ Z_{i,t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_{it}^Y \\ \epsilon_{it}^X \\ \epsilon_{it}^Z \end{bmatrix} \quad (41)$$

While not covered here due to computational limits with respect to number of macroeconomic variables and country panels considered, future analysis may implement the structural factor models described in Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) [38], which allows also for static and dynamic interdependencies. The reduced form errors are correlated across units, capturing static interdependencies. Shocks from the lagged endogenous variables of all countries $i \neq j$ affect variables in country i equation, capturing dynamic interdependencies. A model with less macroeconomic variables, but with wider country coverage may be useful in characterising possibly intricate global linkages.

The Bayesian hierarchical panel VAR extends the GMM-style model in section 4.2 by allowing for cross-sectional heterogeneity. Instead of β , we estimate β_i for each country i , as per Jarocinski (2010) [21]. Section 5.3 reports the IRFs of interest. Compared to the static GMM-style panel VAR, we can extract country-specific responses to their own shocks. This provides a richer characterisation of heterogeneous output responses to uncertainty and exchange rate shocks.

4.3.2 Findings (Pooled Model)

The Bayesian pooled estimates (figures 27 to 36) are similar to that of the GMM-style panel VAR, except the responses of inflation and bond yields to uncertainty shocks (figures 28 and 30). Responses to exchange rate shocks (figures 32 to 36) are similar to that of section 4.2.

Where the earlier estimates showed a temporary acceleration in yields, bonds yields here moderate before converging back to its steady state after approximately 2 years in response

¹The contemporary impact of a structural IPI shock on its own is restricted to be positive, that of a structural EPU shock on its own is restricted to be positive, and that of a structural EPU shock on IPI is restricted to be negative. No other sign restrictions are imposed.

to uncertainty shocks (figure 30). This suits the prediction of the theoretical model, where risk aversion and flight-to-safety behaviour raise the demand and subsequently prices of safe assets, such as long-term sovereign bonds, leading to lower yields in the near-term.

Inflation is estimated to accelerate marginally in response to an uncertainty shock (figure 28). This fits the prediction of the theoretical model, where uncertainty dislodges inflation expectations from the ‘best guess’ anchor, e.g. the central bank’s forecast, to households’ and firms’ own forecast. In this line of thinking, innate biases then drive pricing behaviour away from the steady state in either direction. An upward bias in household or firms expectations, such as documented in Richards and Verstraete (2016) [28], may affect aggregate price-setting behaviour, pushing push inflation upwards from the its steady state. Abstracting from the theoretical model, the exchange rate depreciates in response to an uncertainty shock, hence import prices may rise (figure 29). To the extent that the exchange rate pass-through affects consumer prices, inflation may accelerate. However, the estimated magnitude of the inflation IRF is small and imprecise.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in EPU Growth




Figure 27: IPI Growth




Figure 28: CPI Inflation




Figure 29: NEER Growth




Figure 30: 10Y Yields Change




Figure 31: EPU Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of EPU. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence bands.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in NEER Growth




Figure 32: IPI Growth




Figure 33: CPI Inflation




Figure 34: EPU Growth




Figure 35: 10Y Yields Change




Figure 36: NEER Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of the NEER (appreciation). Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence bands.

4.3.3 Findings (Hierarchical Model)

As the hierarchical model allows for cross-sectional heterogeneity in responses, this section analyses output responses to uncertainty and exchange rate shocks for all 16 economies (figures 37 to 68).

While the magnitude differs across countries, uncertainty shocks generate a dip in output growth, before converging to respective steady states after approximately 1 to 2 years (figure 37 to 52). This is similar to the pooled model. Post-shock overshoots are absent. Exchange

rate shocks generate heterogeneous output responses (figures 53 to 68). This may be due to varying trade intensity or exchange rate policy responses. Output growth in economies such as the USA, Japan, Korea and Malaysia slow in response to an appreciation shock. On the other hand, the Eurozone, Brazil and South Africa benefit from a stronger exchange rate. Stronger purchasing power may translate into higher goods and services demand. Finally, J-curve-like responses were estimated for the India, Brazil and South Africa. Stronger purchasing power first dominates, before being offset by export demand adjustments.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in EPU Growth




Figure 37: USA




Figure 38: EUR




Figure 39: JPN




Figure 40: GBR




Figure 41: CAN




Figure 42: CHN




Figure 43: KOR




Figure 44: TWN




Figure 45: SGP




Figure 46: MYS




Figure 47: THA




Figure 48: PHL




Figure 49: IND




Figure 50: MEX




Figure 51: BRA




Figure 52: ZAF

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of EPU. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence bands.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in NEER Growth
95% confidence bands omitted to illustrate clearer the IRFs




Figure 53: USA




Figure 54: EUR




Figure 55: JPN




Figure 56: GBR




Figure 57: CAN




Figure 58: CHN




Figure 59: KOR




Figure 60: TWN




Figure 61: SGP




Figure 62: MYS




Figure 63: THA




Figure 64: PHL




Figure 65: IND




Figure 66: MEX




Figure 67: BRA




Figure 68: ZAF

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of the NEER (appreciation).

5 Conclusion

Building on the growing literature on uncertainty and the macroeconomy, this paper offers two contributions.

Firstly, this paper proposed a conceptual framework to analytically view uncertainty shocks.

Macro-behavioural frictions, specifically agents with rational inattention and bounded expectations, produce a prolonged slowdown in output, as unanticipated uncertainty shocks materialise. Moreover, the model indicates that central banks could employ communication-based unconventional monetary policy to anchor expectations when aggregate economic uncertainty rises, thereby providing countercyclical balances against output shortfalls. This framework appends the literature on uncertainty through a macro-behavioural lens, whereas the extant literature mainly views uncertainty in a Neo-Keynesian framework, such as Leduc and Liu (2016) [8] and Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) [4] that characterises uncertainty shocks akin to demand shocks. From this paper’s perspective, uncertainty shocks generate output responses through behavioural frictions, and also allows for policy responses that exploit these frictions to generate countercyclical responses.

Secondly, this paper provides an empirical analysis on the impact of uncertainty and exchange rate shocks in open economies.

The country-level exercise, focusing on Malaysia, in a max-uncertainty VAR framework due to Jackson, Kliesen and Owyang (2019) [17], finds that output, price and bond yield responses are broadly in line with the extant literature. Specifically, output and inflation moderate while yields fall, suggesting flight-to-safety in response to an uncertainty shock. In response to an exchange rate appreciation shock, output moderates, an expected response as exports become more expensive. Inflation moderates, reflecting likely cheaper imports from a stronger exchange rate. Bond yields fall, likely an implication of higher priced portfolio

assets relative to that of other economies. Net employment gains and net output losses, taken together, indicate heterogeneity at the sectoral-level. Low productivity labour-intensive non-tradable sectors experience a boom from positive real income effects, prompting a larger expansion in labour hiring. However, output gains in the non-tradable sectors are offset by output losses in the higher productivity capital-intensive tradable sectors.

Taking the analysis to a panel of advanced and emerging economies, I find similar responses in a Bayesian panel VAR setting, except the response of bond yields, which suggests stronger risk aversion on average across the panel of countries. Output responses do not exhibit post-shock overshoots, in contrast to earlier studies. This may be due to two reasons. Firstly, key variables had undergone different transformation to overcome country-specific non-stationarity, which is likely absent in other country-level empirical studies. Secondly, the data covered heavily the later half of the 2010s, whereas the bulk of the uncertainty literature focused on the pre-GFC period and the early half of the 2010s. Dynamics may differ over the two periods. Additional analysis on statistical, rather than causal, co-movements in the data motivate deeper research on the distributional dimension in the output, uncertainty and exchange rate nexus.

Policy should then correct the ‘information gap’ faced by households and firms during periods of elevated uncertainty in at least two ways, beyond engaging in countercyclical policy. Firstly, deploying high-frequency real-time indicators as alternate anchors for the formation of economic expectations when uncertainty spikes. This is corroborated by the increasing use and publication of fast-moving data, such as mobility, transactions, and the Federal Reserve’s Weekly Economic Index (WEI), acting as anchors when economic uncertainty is high. Secondly, leveraging on frequent or front-loaded communications on economic conditions and the outlook when uncertainty spikes or major risk events materialise. In absence of adequate economic information, this anchors the expectations of households and firms, hence restraining the degree of risk aversion and sentiments as amplifiers of weak demand.

A Appendix

A.1 Additional Analysis with Alternate Ordering of Variables

This section reanalyses the GMM-style and Bayesian pooled panel VARs shown in sections 4.2 and 4.3 using alternate ordering of variables, which is summarised in equation 42. The estimated responses of output and inflation to uncertainty shock are sensitive to the ordering of variables in the initial months. However, the path and direction of IRFs in the both the GMM-style (figures 69 to 78) and Bayesian pooled panel VAR (figures 79 to 88) are relatively stable compared to the main findings. A plausible explanation is that the ordering of variables used here do not reflect frictions underlying the transmission of uncertainty to output and price-setting behaviour. Hence, the model produces counter-intuitive IRFs in the initial months.

$$\text{Ordering: Uncertainty} \rightarrow \text{Output} \rightarrow \text{NEER} \rightarrow \text{Inflation} \rightarrow \text{Bond Yields} \quad (42)$$

A.1.1 GMM-Style Panel VAR

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in Economic Policy Uncertainty Growth




Figure 69: IPI Growth

Figure 70: CPI Inflation

Figure 71: 10Y Bond Yields




Figure 72: NEER Growth

Figure 73: EPU Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of EPU. Shaded area represents the 95% confidence bands, estimated with 200 Monte Carlo draws using Gaussian approximation.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in NEER Growth




Figure 74: IPI Growth

Figure 75: CPI Inflation

Figure 76: 10Y Bond Yields




Figure 77: NEER Growth

Figure 78: EPU Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of the NEER (appreciation). Shaded area represents the 95% confidence bands, estimated with 200 Monte Carlo draws using Gaussian approximation.

A.1.2 Bayesian Pooled Panel VAR

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in EPU Growth




Figure 79: IPI Growth




Figure 80: CPI Inflation




Figure 81: NEER Growth




Figure 82: 10Y Yields Change




Figure 83: EPU Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of EPU. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence bands.

Responses to a 1 S.D. Shock in NEER Growth




Figure 84: IPI Growth




Figure 85: CPI Inflation




Figure 86: EPU Growth




Figure 87: 10Y Yields Change Figure 88: NEER Growth

Note: Solid lines show the median impulse response of respective variables to a +1.0 standard deviation shock in the annual growth of the NEER (appreciation). Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence bands.

A.2 Fixed Effects Regression

A.2.1 Methodology (Fixed Effects Regression)

Departing from structural analysis, I analyse the non-linear relationship between economic uncertainty, the exchange rate and other macroeconomic variables in a fixed effects setting. Additionally, I apply a judgment-free approach to determine any non-linearities implied by the data by estimating a panel regression augmented with the Least Absolute Shrinkage Selection Operator (LASSO), following Tibshirani (1996) [39] and Ahrens, Hansen and Schaffer (2019) [40]. The sensitivity parameter is estimated through a 10-fold cross validation.

We are interested in the possible heterogeneous relationship between output, prices, risk aversion, the exchange rate and uncertainty. This approach entails two steps — (i) model selection with LASSO and (ii) estimation of the selected fixed effects ‘within’ model.

Firstly, I implemented the LASSO on a fixed effects model with a triple interaction of risk aversion, uncertainty and the exchange rate. This shrinks the coefficient estimates β towards zero. Variables that are estimated to be close to zero in the fixed effect model are dropped (zero-rised), effectively dropping noise interaction terms. The objective function for selecting β is described in equation 43.

$$\min \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (y_i - x_i' \beta)^2 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^p |\beta_j| \quad (43)$$

Secondly, I estimate the fixed effects model with interaction terms selected in step one,

described in equation 44. Y_{it} is the IPI growth for country i in month t , X_{it} the vector of selected variables amongst bond yields and inflation, and Z_{it} that of NEER and EPU growth. $X_{it} \cdot Z_{it}$ is the vector of selected interaction terms. ϵ_{it} is the unexplained variation in IPI growth.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + X_{it}\beta_1 + Z_{it}\beta_2 + X_{it} \cdot Z_{it}\beta_3 + \epsilon_{it} \quad (44)$$

A.2.2 Findings (Fixed Effects Regression)

Table 1 column 1 shows the LASSO estimates of the selected variables. Not shown here are the dropped interactions between NEER growth, EPU growth and the 10-year bond yields, each proxies for the exchange rate, uncertainty and risk aversion, drawing from the theoretical framework in section 2.

VARIABLES	(LASSO) IPI	(FE) IPI
Inflation		-0.135 (0.290)
10-Year Bond Yields	0.307	0.544 (0.503)
NEER		-0.0144 (0.0507)
EPU	-0.00203	-0.00498 (0.00377)
10-Year Bond Yields * NEER	0.0251	0.0418** (0.0150)
10-Year Bond Yields * EPU		
NEER * EPU		
10-Year Bond Yields * EPU * NEER		
Observations	1,296	1,296
Number of countries	16	16
FE	Yes	Yes
R-squared		0.022

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1: LASSO and Fixed Effects Regression Estimates

In line with the previous sections, uncertainty has a negative relationship with output growth. Corroborating findings in sections 5.1 to 5.3, NEER is negatively associated with output growth. Additionally, the interaction effect between the NEER and bond yields is estimated to be a small and statistically significant positive. This suggests that the negative relationship between the exchange rate and output is drawn smaller and towards positive territory as bond yields accelerate, likely during periods of rising risk aversion. Nevertheless, the setup does not permit interpreting these results as causal.

These findings should be interpreted only as statistical co-movements implied by the data. Nevertheless, this may motivate further structural or quantitative analysis that account for

non-linearities along the dimensions of risk aversion and the exchange rate in an environment with economic uncertainty.

A.3 Panel Quantile Regression

A.3.1 Methodology (Panel Quantile Regression)

To uncover statistical distributional co-movements in the data, I estimated a panel quantile regression, as per Machado and Silva (2018) [41]. This borrows from Adrian, Boyarchenko and Giannone (2019) [42]. I examine if there are material differences in the relationship between uncertainty, the exchange rate and output across various points of the output distribution. The same interaction terms chosen by the LASSO in section 4.4 were included in the model shown in equation 45. We are interested in β_k^q , the average within-country effect of variable k on IPI growth for country at quantile q of IPI growth, as per Machado and Silva (2018) [41].

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i^q + X_{it}\beta_1^q + Z_{it}\beta_2^q + X_{it} \cdot Z_{it}\beta_3^q + \epsilon_{it} \quad (45)$$

A.3.2 Findings (Panel Quantile Regression)

Next, building on the model selected in section 5.4, table 2 reports the quantile regression estimates. Figures 89 and 90 show the estimated coefficients on EPU growth and NEER growth (for which the annual change of bond yields is zero) respectively along quantiles of IPI and their 95% confidence intervals. Coefficient estimates on inflation and bond yields are reported in figures 91 and 92.

Of interest here are the coefficients on EPU and NEER. Other variables are included as controls but are nevertheless reported. While uncertainty is negatively associated with output along the distribution of output, the estimates are larger at lower quantiles. The NEER is increasingly negatively associated with output growth along the distribution of output growth, except at the 5th percentile, where it registers a small positive. In table 2 row 5, the estimates of the interaction term between NEER and bond yields are statistically different from zero, except at the 5th percentile and upper quantiles, and are positive. As with section 5.4, future quantitative or structural work may consider distributional dimensions of the output-exchange rate-uncertainty nexus.

Panel quantile regression coefficient estimates (reported in table 2)




Figure 89: EPU Growth




Figure 90: NEER Growth
(Bond Yields Change = 0)




Figure 91: CPI Inflation




Figure 92: 10-Year Bond Yields Change

Note: Solid lines show the coefficient estimates of respective variables at 5 percentile intervals from a panel quantile regression of IPI growth on EPU growth, NEER growth, CPI inflation, change in 10-year government bond yields, and an interaction term of NEER growth and the change in 10-year government bond yields. Dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals at each quantile.

VARIABLES/ PERCENTILES	(1) 5	(2) 10	(3) 15	(4) 20	(5) 25	(6) 30	(7) 35	(8) 40	(9) 45	(10) 50	(11) 55	(12) 60	(13) 65	(14) 70	(15) 75	(16) 80	(17) 85	(18) 90	(19) 95
CPI Inflation	-0.296 (0.354)	-0.256 (0.286)	-0.233 (0.250)	-0.217 (0.225)	-0.199 (0.200)	-0.181 (0.178)	-0.166 (0.163)	-0.153 (0.152)	-0.141 (0.146)	-0.130 (0.142)	-0.118 (0.142)	-0.107 (0.145)	-0.0962 (0.150)	-0.0848 (0.159)	-0.0695 (0.174)	-0.0557 (0.190)	-0.0394 (0.212)	-0.0152 (0.247)	0.0203 (0.304)
10-Year Bond Yields	1.072** (0.499)	0.940** (0.403)	0.865** (0.351)	0.811** (0.317)	0.753*** (0.282)	0.696*** (0.251)	0.646*** (0.229)	0.604*** (0.214)	0.566*** (0.205)	0.528*** (0.200)	0.489** (0.200)	0.453** (0.204)	0.418** (0.212)	0.381* (0.224)	0.331 (0.245)	0.286 (0.268)	0.233 (0.298)	0.154 (0.348)	0.0381 (0.429)
NEER	0.00373 (0.0509)	-0.000792 (0.0412)	-0.00338 (0.0359)	-0.00522 (0.0323)	-0.00721 (0.0288)	-0.00919 (0.0256)	-0.0109 (0.0234)	-0.0123 (0.0218)	-0.0136 (0.0209)	-0.0150 (0.0204)	-0.0163 (0.0204)	-0.0175 (0.0208)	-0.0187 (0.0216)	-0.0200 (0.0228)	-0.0217 (0.0250)	-0.0232 (0.0273)	-0.0251 (0.0304)	-0.0278 (0.0356)	-0.0317 (0.0437)
EPU	-0.00716 (0.00562)	-0.00662 (0.00454)	-0.00631 (0.00396)	-0.00608* (0.00357)	-0.00584* (0.00317)	-0.00561** (0.00283)	-0.00540** (0.00258)	-0.00523** (0.00241)	-0.00507** (0.00231)	-0.00491** (0.00225)	-0.00475** (0.00225)	-0.00460** (0.00230)	-0.00446* (0.00239)	-0.00431* (0.00252)	-0.00410 (0.00276)	-0.00391 (0.00302)	-0.00369 (0.00336)	-0.00337 (0.00393)	-0.00289 (0.00483)
10-Year Bond Yields * NEER	0.0798 (0.0490)	0.0703* (0.0396)	0.0649* (0.0345)	0.0610** (0.0311)	0.0568** (0.0277)	0.0527** (0.0247)	0.0491** (0.0225)	0.0461** (0.0210)	0.0433** (0.0201)	0.0406** (0.0197)	0.0378* (0.0196)	0.0352* (0.0201)	0.0327 (0.0208)	0.0300 (0.0220)	0.0264 (0.0240)	0.0232 (0.0263)	0.0194 (0.0293)	0.0137 (0.0342)	0.00533 (0.0421)
Observations	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296	1,296

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Panel Quantile Regression Estimates

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