Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The grand surplus value

Besner, Manfred (2021): The grand surplus value.

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_112670.pdf]

Download (423kB) | Preview


We propose a value for games with transferable utility, called the grand surplus value. This new value is an alternative to the Shapley value, especially in games where the worth of a coalition depends on goods that are more or less arbitrarily multipliable or applicable, particularly in the intellectual property domain. Central is the concept of the grand surplus, which is the surplus that results when all coalitions, each lacking one player of the player set, no longer act individually, but only cooperate together as the grand coalition. All the axiomatizations presented have an analogous equivalent for the Shapley value, including the classics by Shapley and Young. A further new concept, called multiple dividends, provides a close connection to the Shapley value.

Available Versions of this Item

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.