Zaman, Md Monowaruz (2008): Welfare dynamics based on a new concept of inefficient equilibrium.
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This article has developed a new model of welfare dynamics under imperfect information or imperfect competition by introducing a new concept of ‘inefficient welfare equilibrium’. It assumes that an economy can be split into two virtual parts. For one part the fundamental welfare theorems are valid and for the other part welfare is yet to achieve. This model is enhanced to describe market dynamics where market is not uniform but distributed in layers of energy states. The probability of achieving Pareto efficiency decreases down along the market energy states.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Welfare dynamics based on a new concept of inefficient equilibrium|
|English Title:||Welfare dynamics based on a new concept of inefficient equilibrium|
|Keywords:||Pareto efficiency, Pareto improvement, information, principal-agent problem, welfare, poverty, bottom-up economics, information asymmetry, market energy, welfare dynamics|
|Subjects:||O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty > I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D52 - Incomplete Markets
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D60 - General
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D49 - Other
|Depositing User:||MD MONOWARUZ ZAMAN|
|Date Deposited:||30. Oct 2008 09:22|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 08:11|
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