Prejudice: Xenophobia, Homophobia, and Patriarchy in the World

Boroah, Vani

Ulster University

2021
Chapter 6

Prejudice: Xenophobia, Homophobia, and Patriarchy in the World

Abstract

The raison d'être of this chapter is to develop measures for xenophobia, homophobia, and patriarchy and, in so doing, to provide systematic information about the degree of prejudice against certain groups (foreigners, homosexuals, women) — in particular, whether prejudice differs by the world’s regions and religions, and between the groups that are the target of prejudice. Furthermore, the chapter enquires about the characteristics of persons — apart from their religion and region — that make for prejudice, or a lack of it. In developing the analysis, this chapter makes several conceptual contributions. It advances the concept of a “xenophobia score” which is used to measure the amount of xenophobia in different regions of the world. It links homophobia to attitudes towards homosexuality. Lastly, it examines dissonance between men and women in their views about gender equality and, in so doing, measures the amount of “gender tension” among adherents of different religions and denizens of different regions. Underpinning this analysis is a multivariate analysis of xenophobia, homophobia, and patriarchy. This allows one to answer questions that are of considerable societal importance: are women more liberal than men in their attitude towards foreigners and homosexuals? Do women seek greater equality than men are prepared to concede?
6.1. Introduction

This chapter has three purposes. The first is to study hostility towards foreigners (xenophobia); the second, to examine antipathy towards persons who are homosexual (homophobia); and the third, to examine the fact men often accord women an inferior status by restricting their freedom of action (patriarchy). These three forms of prejudice are studied in terms of their prevalence in different parts of the world. Xenophobia, homophobia, and patriarchy all erode the well-being of persons who are affected by these prejudices: the first causes anxiety and fear among foreigners living in a society that cherishes nativism; the second makes unwelcome, and even threatens the physical safety of, those of a different sexual orientation; the third limits the autonomy of women and reduces their status to that of second class citizens.

Tolerance of inter-personal behavioural differences is the leitmotif of Western society: many Western countries are major aid donors, most are high net recipients of immigrants, and all are signatories to a number of United Nations charters which repudiate discrimination and persecution and guarantee human rights. Yet, despite this reputation for liberalism, there can be little doubt that, in the past decade or so in Western countries, there has been an increasing awareness of, and a hardening of attitudes towards, people who are “different” and, in particular, towards im migrants. The rise to electoral prominence, in several of these countries, of populist parties, with explicitly anti-foreigner agendas, is testimony to this.¹

This hardening has, in part, has been triggered in countries like Greece, Italy, Hungary, and Germany by the waves of refugees from Syria and other Muslim countries that have hit Europe. Arguments about the Muslim veil in Britain, and the headscarf in France, are part of a wider debate taking place across Europe — embracing inter alia the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Italy, and Switzerland — about the erosion of national identity through the steady drip of special demands predicated on tolerance for cultural diversity.² In the UK, it was free movement of people within the
European Union that gave birth to anti-immigrant populist feeling — which in turn spurred the vote to leave the EU — as immigrants from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic countries arrived in Britain to take up low-paid jobs and (in the minds of the nativist population) push down wages and increase pressure on public services like schools and hospitals.

A dislike of immigrants is not confined to countries within Europe. Although President Donald Trump was elected on an anti-immigration platform, hostility to immigration in the USA predates his election. As his Democratic predecessor, President Barack Obama (2007, p.266) wrote, while still a senator: “And if I’m honest with myself, I must admit that I’m not entirely immune to such nativist sentiments. When I see Mexican flags waved at pro-immigration demonstrations, I sometimes feel a flush of patriotic resentment. When I’m forced to use a translator to communicate with the guy fixing my car, I feel a certain frustration”. Hostility to immigrants has had a long and unsavoury presence in South Africa with many South Africans believing that their economic woes were linked to the presence of foreigners in their country, the solution being to kill their competitors and torch their businesses (Turkewitz, 2019). In the state of Assam in India, resentment about the presence of immigrants from Bangladesh has often erupted into the large-scale murder of Bengali Muslims accompanied by the most flagrant human rights abuses of those suspected of being illegal immigrants (see Borooah, 2013).

Nor is anti-immigrant feeling a product of the recent past. Okrent (2019) examines anti-immigrant fervour in the USA at the turn of the 20th century which culminated in the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act setting quotas for immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe and banning immigration from Asia. There was, however, a crucial difference between the basis of anti-immigrant feeling then and now: “one hundred years ago the invocation of science was the key element in making Americans feel these newcomers were inferior; today, it’s more an economic argument and an argument about crime… the real reason [then and now] was one of ethnic superiority [to] Muslims and Latin Americans today and Jews and Italians then”.

3
Homophobia derives its justification from the belief that sex between persons of the same gender is unnatural. Proposals to legalise same-sex marriages and civil unions between homosexual couples are seen by those who regard homosexuality as being contrary to the tenets of Christian, Jewish or Islamic faith as threatening cherished social institutions like the traditional husband–wife family.

Indeed, as recently as 2003, a judge of the US Supreme Court opined that: “many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their house. They view this as protecting their families and their children from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive”.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to investigate the processes through which tolerance metamorphoses into intolerance: that is done elsewhere. For example, Glaeser (2005) argues that hatred is fostered when politicians believe that such fostering will help to discredit opponents whose policies benefit (or are seen to benefit) a minority group — “playing the race card”, as it is termed in Britain; according to Matlin’s (1995) and Buchanan’s (2006) “satiation hypothesis”, tolerance was extended to virtually any group when they were numerically insignificant and/or economically and politically weak but it was withdrawn when the opposite occurred and these groups became an actual or potential threat to the status quo; Jacques (2006) argues that an unforeseen effect of globalisation was to promote in the West a less respectful and more intolerant attitude to other cultures and societies — Western countries were at first bemused and, later, angered that the rest of the world could so readily accept their economic system, with all its apparent material benefits, but still stubbornly hold to their own political, cultural, and religious traditions.

Lying at the heart of “difference” are the twin issues of prejudice and tolerance. To “tolerate” something is neither to approve of it nor to be indifferent towards it. As Leiter (2008, pp.2–3) defines it: “for there to be a practice of toleration, one group must deem another group’s beliefs or practices as ‘wrong, mistaken, or undesirable’ and yet ‘put up’ with them nonetheless. This means that tolerance is not an issue when one group is simply indifferent to the other”. Thus, I approve if my...
neighbours are of the same religion as myself; I am indifferent if they are of a different religion; but I tolerate the fact that they are homosexual. According to Williams (1996), one reason for exercising tolerance is that “[it] emphasises the moral good in putting up with views that one finds offensive”. As Zee (2016) points out, to express one’s disapproval of views or actions that one finds offensive or distasteful is consistent with tolerance provided one does not try to prevent such views being held or actions being taken: “under tolerance, it is perfectly possible to not interfere in behaviour, for example the veiling of women in Islam, yet have an outspoken negative opinion on it” (p.37). Tolerance, however, morphs into intolerance, when disapproval takes the form of preventing the offending action from being taken. Consequently, prejudice can co-exist with both tolerance and intolerance, that is, not seeking/seeking to prevent what one dislikes or disapproves of.

The third aspect of prejudice that this chapter examines is patriarchy, defined as the belief that men are superior to women in terms of moral authority and are entitled to better education, a monopoly in the ownership and management of assets, and superior political authority. Patriarchy gives men a sense of entitlement the most egregious exercise of which is to be found in countries like Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Violence against women by their male partners is engendered by patriarchal family structures which creates a hierarchy of male domination and female subordination (Swart, 2015).

De Beauvoir (1953) argued that religious faiths encourage women to be meek, to put up with inequality, exploitation and suffering and, thereby, earn post-life rewards. The rules of religious organisations often restrict the freedom of, and sometimes exclude, women. Indeed, the purdah in Islam excludes women from general society. In both Islam and Hinduism, menstruation and pregnancy are treated as impure or ungodly. Holm and Bowker (1994) provide examples of gender exclusion by practically all major religions in the world. In the light of these views this chapter examines the link between patriarchy on the one hand and, on the other, religion and religiosity.
Against this background, the chapter derives its *raison d’être* from the fact that there is a lack of systematic information about the degree of prejudice that exists in countries against minority groups — in particular, whether it differs between the world’s regions, and between the groups which are the target of prejudice. Furthermore, who are the persons in a region most (least) likely to be prejudiced? This chapter attempts to answer these questions.

The data for this study are from the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 (hereafter, WVS6), covering the period 2010–14. As described on its website ([www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)), the WVS “is a global network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life, led by an international team of scholars, with the WVS association and secretariat headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden”. The survey, which started in 1981, consists of nationally representative surveys conducted in almost 100 countries which contain almost 90% of the world’s population, using a common questionnaire. The overall thrust of the WVS is to help scientists and policy makers understand changes in the beliefs, values and motivations of people throughout the world. The WVS6 contains information for the period 2010 to 2014 on 86,272 individuals covering 60 countries: the list of countries, and the number of respondents in each country, are presented in Appendix Table A.1 at the end of this chapter.

Information on xenophobia and homophobia was derived from individual responses to the following question: “Would you like to have persons from this group as your neighbours?”. A negative answer was taken to mean that the respondent was prejudiced against members of this group. In addition, the WVS6 contains a wealth of information on the attributes and circumstances of the respondents — *inter alia* their sex, age, income, social class, labour market and marital status, and education level. These data were used, in conjunction with the data on responses, to identify bigotry-inducing factors and to estimate their strength.

In her seminal book, Douglas (1966) argued that the purity laws of religion represented an all-encompassing system which guided and regulated how one lived and conducted one’s life. One of her
observations was that dirt was “matter out of place” which disrupted one’s idea of what the world should be. These notions of purity, while they might be muted, even suppressed, in shared spaces — places of work, shops, public transport — could flower in the private space of household and neighbourhood. For example, Borooah (2017) draws attention to the fact that, in India, following caste practices based on notions of purity at home becomes an assertion of personal sovereignty, which is proscribed by law in public spaces.

Through an audit experiment carried out using one of India’s largest real estate and rental websites, Datta and Pathania (2016) found strong evidence of discrimination against Muslim applicants, both in terms of probability of being contacted and the number of contacts, relative to upper-caste Hindu applicants, in the rental housing market in Delhi and its largest suburbs. More generally, a significant part of the literature on discriminatory behaviour has focused on segregation in the housing market (for example, Akbar et al., 2019; Danziger and Lin, 2000; Massey and Denton, 1993).

6.2. Measuring Xenophobia

Of particular interest to this chapter is that the 86,272 respondents (indexed $i=1,…,86272$) spread across 60 countries, were asked if they would like, as their neighbours, persons from three specific categories: (i) immigrants or foreign workers; (ii) persons from a different race; (iii) persons from a different religion. A respondent’s xenophobia score ($X_i$) was defined by the number of categories from which respondent $i (i=1,…, 86272)$ did not want such neighbours. Thus, $X_i=3$ if respondent $i$ did not want a neighbour from any of the three categories; $X_i=2$ for respondents who did not want a neighbour from two of the three categories; $X_i=1$ for respondents who did not want a neighbour from one of the three categories; $X_i=0$ for respondents who did not object to having a neighbour from any of the three categories.
More formally, suppose that there are $K$ different types of “strangers” (race, religion, country), indexed $k=1..K$, who might be “undesirable” from the perspective of the “native” population of a country and that $N$ natives (indexed $i=1..N$) are asked, individually, whether they would like persons from each of the $K$ types as a neighbour. For $i=1..N$, $k=1..K$, the variable $S^k_i = 1$ if respondent $i$ declares that he/she would not like a person of type $k$ as a neighbour, that is, is prejudiced against persons of type $k$; $S^k_i = 0$, otherwise.

For every respondent, define $X_i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} S^k_i$. Then $0 \leq X_i \leq K$: $X_i = k$ ($k=0..K$) means that respondent $i$ is prejudiced against persons from $k$ of the $K$ types. The value of $X_i$ represents a person’s xenophobia score: a person is “xenophobia-free” if $X_i = 0$, and “xenophobic” if $X_i > 0$, the strength of xenophobia being greater for higher values of $X_i$. This implies that $z=1$ is the “xenophobia line”, with xenophobic persons having scores at or above this line. In other words, persons who expressed antipathy to at least one of the three types (race, religion, and country) were regarded as “xenophobic” while those who did not express antipathy to any of the three groups were not xenophobic.

Therefore, one way of measuring xenophobia was to express $M$, the number of persons that objected to having as their neighbour persons from at least one of the $K$ types ($K=3$ in this chapter), as a proportion of $N$, the total number of persons in the sample. This proportion is the headcount measure of xenophobia and is referred to in this chapter as the xenophobia count ratio: $XCR = M/N$.

The headcount measure, however, does not take account of the degree of xenophobia — those who object to persons of just one type are regarded as equally xenophobic as those expressing antipathy towards persons of all three types. A corollary to this is that xenophobia as measured by the $XCR$ would not reflect a situation in which society became more xenophobic through a rise in the number of types of persons regarded by nativists as undesirable.
In order for a xenophobia measure to reflect the degree of xenophobia one can first define the xenophobia gap of those who are xenophobic as the difference between their xenophobia score \((X_i)\) and the xenophobia line \((z)\) and, following from this, compute the mean xenophobia gap, defined over the \(M\) xenophobic persons as: \(\sum_{i=1}^{M} (X_i - z) / M\). The Mean Gap Ratio (MGR) is then defined as the ratio of the mean xenophobia gap to the xenophobia line, \(z\):

\[
MGR = \sum_{i=1}^{M} (X_i - z) / Mz = \left(\mu^X / z\right) - 1 = \mu^X - 1
\]

where \(\mu^X = \sum_{i=1}^{M} X_i / M\) is the mean xenophobia score of those who are xenophobic.

The MGR shows the mean score surplus of those who are xenophobic as a proportion of the xenophobia line. The MGR, however, focuses only on those who are xenophobic and does not take account of those who might not be xenophobic. Thus two regions, \(A\) and \(B\), may have the same number of xenophobic persons (say, \(M\)) yielding the same MGR but region \(A\)'s population, \(N_A\), may be larger than that of region \(B\), \(N_B\). Then, since region \(A\) has a larger number of non-xenophobic persons than region \(B\) (\(N_A\ - M\) versus \(N_B - M\)), intuitively, the xenophobia measure should be lower for \(A\) than for \(B\). This is accommodated through the Xenophobia Gap Ratio (XGR) which computes the mean xenophobia gap over all the \(N\) persons in a region — not just over the \(M\) persons who are xenophobic — and expresses this as a proportion of the xenophobia line: \(\text{XGR} = \sum_{i=1}^{M} (X_i - z) / N_z = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{M} (X_i - z) / M_z\right) (M / N) = \text{MGR} \times \text{XCR}\)

The XGR shows the mean score surplus of all those in the sample, whether xenophobic or not, as a proportion of the xenophobia line. As equation (6.2) shows, the XGR is the product of the MGR and the XCR.

A drawback of all the three measures discussed above is that they are not decomposable in the sense that they do not establish sensible relationships between xenophobia in the regions and overall xenophobia. This, in turn, means that one cannot determine how much xenophobia in a region
contributed to global xenophobia. A xenophobia index, modelled on the poverty index proposed by Foster et al. (1984), (hereafter, FGT index) allows one to do so. This index — defined on a vector of xenophobia scores $X = \{ X_i \}$, a xenophobia line, $z$, and a parameter $\alpha$ — is represented as:

$$FGT(X, z, \alpha) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} (X_i - z)^{\alpha} / Nz^{\alpha}$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.3)

When $\alpha = 0$, $FGT(X, z, 0) = M/N = XCR$ and when $\alpha = 1$, $FGT(X, z, 0) = M/N = MGR \times XCR = XGR$. If the sample of respondents is portioned into $J (j=1 \ldots J)$ regions with $N_j$ respondents in each region,

$$\sum_{j} N_j = N$$

then the FGT index is *additively decomposable* because the overall index can represented as the weighted average of the individual regional indices with the regional population shares,

$$v_j = N_j / N$$

as weights:

$$FGT(X, z, \alpha) = \sum_{j=1}^{J} v_j \times FGT(X_j, z, \alpha)$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.4)

where:

$$FGT(X_j, z, \alpha) = \sum_{i=1}^{M_j} (X_{ij} - z)^{\alpha} / N_j z$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.5)

is the FGT index for region $j (j=1 \ldots J)$ such that $M_j$ is the number of xenophobic persons in region $j$, and $X_{ij}$ is the xenophobia score for person $i$ in that region.

The decomposition of the FGT index, encapsulated in equations (6.4) and (6.5), allows one to identify regions which were particularly prone to xenophobia and to determine how much the region contributed to overall xenophobia. For region $j$, this contribution was:

$$C_j = [v_j \times FGT(X_j, z, \alpha)] / FGT(X, z, \alpha)$$  \hspace{1cm} (6.6)

Attempts to assess regional contributions using the non-decomposable measures — $XCR$, $MGR$, and $XGR$, above — could lead to two sets of problems. First, the regional contributions might not sum to unity. Second, a rise in the xenophobia index in a region may *ceteris paribus* lead to a fall in the value of the overall index. Both these problems are avoided by the FGT index — the first because the
weighted sum of the regional indices will sum to unity and the second because a rise in xenophobia in a region will automatically lead to a rise in overall xenophobia.

The *FGT* index also allows one to calculate the *risk* of xenophobia. This is defined as a region’s share in overall xenophobia to its share in overall population and is represented as:

\[ \rho_j = \frac{FGT(X_j, z, \alpha)}{FGT(X, z, \alpha)} = \frac{C_j}{\nu_j} \]  (6.7)

If \( \rho_j > 1 \), region \( j \) contributes more to xenophobia than its population share warrants; if \( \rho_j < 1 \), region \( j \) contributes less to xenophobia than its population share warrants; and, lastly, if \( \rho_j = 1 \), region \( j \)’s contributions to xenophobia and the population are the same.

### 6.3. Empirical Results for Xenophobia

The 60 countries identified in the WVS6 were, for the purposes of this chapter, aggregated into six regions: 1. Islamic countries; 2. African countries; 3. ex-Soviet Union countries; 4. Western countries; 5. Latin American countries; and 6. Asian countries.\(^{14}\) The individual countries associated with these broad regions are shown in Appendix Table A.1. Table 6.1 shows the values of the *XCR*, the *MGR*, and the *XGR* associated with these six regions.

<Table 6.1 here>

The lowest levels of xenophobia were recorded for countries of Latin America and the West. Only 17.9% of respondents in Latin American countries, and only 23.2% of respondents in Western countries, were xenophobic, meaning that they would have objected to persons from one or more of the three types of “strangers” — different country, race, or religion — as neighbours. By contrast, 55.6% of respondents in Islamic countries, 45.1% of respondents in Asian countries, and 41.5% of respondents from ex-Soviet Union countries were xenophobic.
The \textit{MGR} shows that mean xenophobia surplus (of the xenophobic) was lowest in countries of the West (52.5\%) and Africa (54.3\%) while it was highest in Islamic countries (71.3\%), followed by Asian countries (68.2\%), Latin American countries (66\%), and ex-Soviet Union countries (61.8\%). The Islamic and Latin American countries offer a study in contrasts. The latter had a small proportion of persons who were xenophobic (17.9\%) and the former had large proportion of persons who were xenophobic (55.6\%). In both sets of countries, however, those who were xenophobic were also very xenophobic — the MGR was 71.3\% for Islamic countries and 68.2\% for Latin American countries.

The \textit{XGR} shows that the mean xenophobia surplus (computed over xenophobic and non-xenophobic persons) was lowest in countries of the West (12.2\%) and Latin America (11.8\%) while it was highest in Islamic (39.7\%) and Asian (30.8\%) countries.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Region & \textit{XCR} \% of world’s xenophobia \\hline
Islamic & 31.2\% \\hline
Latin American & 20.2\% \\hline
Western & 11.4\% \\hline
African & 11.3\% \\hline
Ex-Soviet Union & 19.5\% \\hline
Asian & 18.7\% \\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Contributions to global xenophobia.}
\end{table}

The contributions that each region made to global xenophobia, and the risk of facing xenophobia in the different regions, are shown in Table 6.2. Whether one measures xenophobia by the count ratio, \textit{XCR}, or by the gap ratio, \textit{XGR}, the largest contributions to xenophobia were from Islamic countries: 31.2\% and 34.5\% of the world’s xenophobia as measured by, respectively, \textit{XCR} and \textit{XGR}, was from countries in this group. Table 6.2 also shows that the smallest contributions were from Latin American (6.5\% for \textit{XCR} and 6.7\% for \textit{XGR}), African (11.3\% for \textit{XCR} and 9.5\% for \textit{XGR}), and Western countries (11.4\% for \textit{XCR} and 9.2\% for \textit{XGR}). Sandwiched in between these two extremes were countries of the former Soviet Union and Asian countries contributing, respectively, 19.5\% and 20.2\% to global xenophobia on the basis of \textit{XCR} and 18.7\% and 21.4\% on the basis of \textit{XGR}.

Consistent with these results, Table 6.2 also shows that the risk of facing xenophobia was highest in Islamic countries. The \textit{XCR} value of 1.5 for this bloc means that the contribution of the Islamic bloc to xenophobia, computed using the count ratio, was 50\% more than its population share,\textsuperscript{15} while the \textit{XCR} values of 0.5 and 0.6 for, respectively, Latin American and Western countries meant that their contributions to xenophobia — again on the basis of the count ratio — were, respectively, 50\% and...
40% lower than their population shares. For the other blocs — Africa, Asia, and ex-Soviet Union — the contributions to xenophobia were roughly the same as their population shares.

6.4. Measuring Homophobia

When respondents to the WVS6 were asked if they would like to have homosexual neighbours, 50% (of 80,995) respondents answered that they would not. This proportion of persons in the total sample, who would be unwelcoming to homosexual neighbours, is defined in this chapter as the homophobia rate. This overall homophobia rate of 50% masked, however, considerable variable by region. Figure 6.1 shows that homophobia was highest in the ex-Soviet Union countries, with 72.4% of respondents not wanting homosexual neighbours, followed by approximately two-thirds of respondents in Islamic and African countries that were similarly minded. On the other hand, homophobia was lowest in Western and Latin American countries where, respectively, 21.4% and 26.8% of respondents would not welcome homosexual neighbours.

<Figure 6.1 here>

There is also another way to shed light on homophobia. The WVS6 asked respondents to score on a scale of 1 to 10 whether they thought homosexuality was “justifiable” with 1 representing “never justifiable” and 10 representing “always justifiable”. In this chapter, the original scores of 1 to 3 were recoded as 1 (“not justifiable”), the original scores of 4 to 7 were recoded as 2 (“ambivalent” about justifiability), and the original scores of 8 to 10 were recoded as 3 (“justifiable”). Figure 6.2 shows that nearly 64% of 79,400 respondents thought that homosexuality was “unjustifiable” — on a par with the proportion that regarded abortion as unjustifiable and slightly below the proportion that took a similar view of prostitution — while only 44% of nearly 73,000 respondents felt that sex before marriage could not be justified.

<Figure 6.2 here>
There was, however, considerable variation between the world’s regions in the proportions of their respondents who regarded homosexuality as “unjustifiable”. As Figure 6.3 shows, this proportion was highest in Islamic countries (87.8%), countries of the ex-Soviet Union (82.8%), and African countries (74.5%) and was lowest in Western countries (31.2%). The proportions regarding homosexuality as “unjustifiable” were broadly similarly in Latin American (48.6%) and Asian countries (52.1%).

Although it is possible that there was overlap between those who regarded homosexuality as “unjustified” and those who would not like to have a homosexual neighbour, this overlap would not necessarily be perfect. Examining attitudes towards homosexual neighbours by those who viewed homosexuality with varying degrees of justifiability, showed (Figure 6.4) that fewer than two-thirds (65%) of those who thought it “unjustifiable”, and more than one in ten of those regarding homosexuality as justifiable (13%), would not like homosexual neighbours. On the other hand, as Figure 6.5 shows, of those not wanting homosexual neighbours, 83% regarded homosexuality as “unjustifiable”, 14% were ambivalent about whether homosexuality was justified, and 4% thought it to be “justifiable”.

Earlier in this chapter, tolerance was defined as putting up with something that one did not approve of. Using the two definitions of homophobia, set out above — namely not wanting a homosexual neighbour and regarding homosexuality as unjustifiable — one can estimate the tolerance for homosexuality in the world. Homophobia in the sense of not wanting homosexual neighbours can emanate from two sources. The first is persons who regarded homosexuality as “unjustifiable”. Such persons are “intolerant” because they are not prepared to put up with something of which they disapprove. The second source is those who either regard homosexuality as “justifiable” or are agnostic about its justifiability. Such persons are “conformists” in the sense that they supress their liberal beliefs in order to conform to what they perceive to be societal norms.16 The outcome with respect to homophobia is the result of both intolerance and conformity.
These ideas can be made more precise through a formal model. Suppose that one can separate the sample of $N$ respondents into two mutually exclusive groups: an illiberal group (consisting of $M$ persons) that regards homosexuality as “unjustifiable” and a liberal group (consisting of $N-M$ persons) that views homosexuality as “justifiable”. Then $M/N$ and $(N-M)/N$ are defined, respectively, as the illiberal and liberal rates: these rates are the percentage of respondents who regarded homosexuality as, respectively, “unjustifiable” and “justifiable”. Suppose that a total number of $Q$ persons would not welcome a homosexual neighbour so that the homophobia rate is $Q/N$.

Now suppose that of the $M$ persons that were illiberal (that is, regarded homosexuality as unjustifiable), $H$ would not welcome a homosexual neighbour ($H \leq M$) while of the $N-M$ persons that were liberal (that is, regarded homosexuality as justifiable), $G$ would not welcome a homosexual neighbour ($G \leq N-M$). Then the ratios $H/M$ and $G/(N-M)$ are defined, respectively, as the intolerance and conformity rates. Then the homophobia rate can be decomposed in terms of the four rates defined above — illiberal, liberal, intolerance, conformity — by expressing it as the weighted sum of the intolerance and the conformity rates, the weights being the illiberal and the liberal rates:

$$Q/N = (H + G)/N = \frac{H/M}{\text{intolerance rate}} \times \frac{M/N}{\text{illiberal rate}} + \frac{G/(N-M)}{\text{conformity rate}} \times \frac{(N-M)/N}{\text{liberal rate}}$$

(6.8)

Table 6.3 shows the values of the five rates of equation (6.8) in terms of the six regions distinguished in this chapter. Aggregating across all the regions, there were a total of 77,395 respondents ($N$) of whom 39,096 ($Q$) said that they would not want homosexual neighbours, yielding a homophobia rate of $Q/N=50.5\%$. Of the 49,805 persons ($M$) who regarded homosexuality as unjustifiable, 32,364 ($H$) did not want homosexual neighbours. This yielded an intolerance rate of $H/M=65\%$ and an illiberal rate of $M/N=64.4\%$. Of the 27,590 persons ($N-M$) who either regarded homosexuality as justifiable or
were agnostic about its justifiability, 6,732 would not want homosexual neighbours, resulting in a conformity rate of \( G/(N-M)=24.4\% \) and a liberal rate of \((M-N/N)=35.6\%\). Applying the RHS of equation (6.8) to these numbers, yields the LHS, \( Q/N=50.5\%\).

Table 6.3 shows that 65\% of those who regarded homosexuality as unjustifiable would not tolerate a homosexual neighbour. Since the intolerance rate could take values between \( H=0 \) (a homosexual neighbour would be accepted by everyone who regarded homosexuality as unjustifiable) and \( H=M \) (a homosexual neighbour would not be accepted by anyone who regarded homosexuality as unjustifiable), 65\% of illiberal persons — those who regarded homosexuality as “unjustifiable” — were intolerant of homosexuals. On the other hand, the conformity rate shows that about one in four liberals (24.4\%) — those who either regarded homosexuality as “justifiable” or were agnostic about its justifiability — would also be homophobic. In other words, if homophobia was entirely the preserve of illiberal persons who regarded homosexuality as “unjustifiable”, the homophobia rate would be 41.9\%. The fact that, as shown in Table 6.3, it was actually 50.5\%, was due to the homophobia of liberals who contributed nearly nine additional points to the incidence of homophobia in the world.

The regional data show that an illiberal attitude towards homosexuals was most pronounced in Islamic countries and least evident in Western countries. As Table 6.3 shows, respectively, 87.8\% and 31.2\% of respondents in these regions viewed homosexuality as unjustifiable (the illiberal rate). Of the 14,636 illiberal respondents in Islamic countries, and of the 4,545 illiberal respondents in Western countries, respectively, 69.6\% and 49.2\% expressed homophobia (the intolerance rate).

Countries of the ex-Soviet Union and African countries had the highest intolerance rates and, except for Islamic countries, also the highest illiberal rates with, respectively, 74.5\% and 82.8\% of respondents in these regions regarding homosexuality as unjustifiable. Of the 7,272 illiberal respondents in African countries, and of the 11,922 illiberal respondents in ex-Soviet Union countries, respectively, 73.6\% and 78.1\% expressed homophobia (the intolerance rate).
Asian and Latin American countries displayed comparable levels of illiberality — respectively, 55.3% and 48.6% of their respondents regarded homosexuality as unjustifiable — but the level of intolerance was much higher in Asian than in Latin American countries with 52.3% of illiberal respondents in Asia but only 39.2% of such respondents in Latin America expressing homophobia.

An important and relevant question that emerges from the above analysis, which establishes a formal link between attitudes to homosexuality and homophobia, is the contributions that the different regions made to illiberality (that is, regarding homosexuality as unjustifiable) and homophobia (as reflected in not wanting homosexual neighbours). For example, 14,636 of the total of 49,805 illiberal respondents (29.4%) and 11,222 of the total of 39,096 homophobic respondents (28.7%) lived in Islamic countries (Figure 6.6). So, the shares of Islamic countries in illiberality and homophobia were approximately equal. Asian countries tell a similar story: 12.3% of illiberal (6,139 out of 49,805) and the same percentage of homophobic (4,805 out of 39,906) respondents lived in Asian countries.

In contrast, as Figure 6.6 shows, countries of the West and Latin American countries contributed more to illiberality (respectively, 9.1% and 10.6%) than they did to homophobia (respectively, 7.9% and 7.6%). The contributions of African and ex-Soviet Union countries to illiberality (respectively, 14.6% and 23.9% of the 49,805 illiberal respondents were from Africa and the ex-Soviet Union) was smaller than their contributions to homophobia (16.5% and 26.9% of the 39,096 homophobic respondents were from Africa and the ex-Soviet Union, respectively).

**6.5. Patriarchy and Attitudes Towards Women**

The WVS6 enquired about opinions on the status of women by inviting respondents to agree or disagree (on a scale of 1 to 4 with 1 representing ‘strong agreement’; 2, ‘agreement’; 3,
This chapter examines five of these statements: (i) when a mother works for pay, her children suffer; (ii) a university education is more important for a boy than a girl; (iii) on the whole, men make better business executives than women; (iv) being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay; (v) women do not have the same rights as men.

Each of these five statements explored attitudes of women vis-à-vis men about the appropriate division between home and work for women. For example, the first statement asserts that the welfare of children requires a “stay-at-home mum” while the second disparages the relative importance of higher education for women compared to men. These scores were recoded so that the original scores of 1 to 2 in terms of the first four items, (i)–(iv) above, were recoded as 1 (‘agree’), and the original scores of 3 and 4 were recoded as 0 (‘disagree’). For the fifth statement, reflecting women’s rights vis-à-vis those of men, the WVS6 asked respondents (both male and female), to mark on a scale of 1 to 10, how essential they thought it was that “in a democracy women had the same rights as men”, with 1 representing ‘not essential’ and 10 representing ‘essential’. In this chapter, the responses coded 1–9 in WVS6 were now coded as 1 (in that they represented varying degrees of ambivalence about the necessity for equal rights) while response 10 was coded as 0 (that is, equal rights were unequivocally essential).

Figure 6.7 shows, separately, the male and female responses to these statements. The proportion of male respondents who agreed with these statements exceeded by a considerable margin the corresponding proportion of female respondents. For example, 49.7% of men agreed that children suffered when women worked and 51.7% of men agreed that men made better executives than women; the corresponding proportions of women were 45% and 37.3%. The only exception to this pattern was the statement that being a housewife was as fulfilling as working for pay with approximately equal proportions of men and women (nearly two out of three) agreeing with this.
6.5.1. Religion and Patriarchy

The WVS6 asked respondents if they “belonged to a religion or a religious denomination” and this study placed those who answered this question into one (and only one) of the following religious groups: (i) No religion; (ii) Muslims; (iii) Roman Catholics (hereafter simply ‘Catholics’); (iv) Other Christians; (v) Hindu; (vi) Jewish; (vii) Buddhist. Of the 79,526 respondents in these seven categories: 20.1% were of no religion; 26.8% were Muslims; 18.6% were Catholic; 26.6% were ‘other Christians’ (that is, not Catholic); 2.2% were Hindu; 0.5% were Jewish; and 5.1% were Buddhist.

Table A.2 of the Appendix shows the religious composition of the countries in terms of the percentage of their population that are of the religions enumerated above: of No religion; Muslim; Catholic; Other Christian; Hindu; Jewish; and Buddhist. The WV6 also identified its respondents according to their ‘religiosity’: (i) No religion; (ii) declared religion, but not religious; (iii) declared religion and religious. The results showed that 62% of 77,095 respondents both had a religion and were religious; 17% were not religious within their declared faith; and 20.8% were of no religion.

Table 6.4 shows the proportion of respondents in each of the seven ‘religions’ (No religion; Muslim; Catholic; Other Christian; Hindu, Jewish; and Buddhist) who agreed that: (i) children suffer when mothers work; (ii) university education is more important for boys compared to girls; (iii) men make better business executives than women; (iv) an essential characteristic of democracy is that women have the same rights as men.

In terms of responses to these prompts, Table 6.4 shows that Muslims were the most ‘conservative’, and persons of ‘no religion’ the most liberal, in terms of attitudes towards women: 61.5% of Muslims (rivalled only by 58.5% of Hindus), compared to 33% those of no religion and 25.6% of Jews, thought that children suffered if their mothers worked. Only 34.2% of Muslims, compared to 51.1% of those
with no religion and 49.9% of Catholics, agreed that an essential characteristic of democracy was that women had the same rights as men.

The only religious group to rival Muslims in terms of patriarchy, were Hindus. Hindus provided the largest proportion of respondents who agreed that university education was more important for boys than girls (46.7%) and they also provided the smallest proportion who agreed that an essential characteristic of democracy was that women had the same rights as men (21.4%). In these two respects, Hindus were even more conservative than Muslims.

Table 6.5 compares the responses of persons in terms of their religiosity: (i) no religion; (ii) have a religion, but are not religious; (iii) have a religion and are religious. This shows that persons of no religion were more liberal in attitudes towards women than persons who regarded themselves as not religious within the context of a professed faith (hereafter, ‘not religious’): for example, while 51.1% of those with no religion agreed that an essential characteristic of democracy was that women had the same rights as men, only 42.8% of ‘non-religious’ persons were similarly minded. Indeed, in terms of attitudes towards women, non-religious persons had more in common with religious persons than they did with persons of no religion.

Table 6.6 compares the responses of persons in terms of their region of residence: (i) Islamic countries; (ii) African countries; (iii) ex-Soviet Union countries; (iv) Western countries; (v) Latin American countries; and (vi) Asian countries. This shows that persons who lived in the West had the most liberal attitudes towards women: 63.2% agreed that women had the same rights as men compared to only 30.6% from Islamic countries and 28.2% in African countries; conversely, only 9.2% agreed that university was more important for boys, compared to 35.6% in Islamic countries and 33.5% in African countries.
6.6. Measuring Patriarchy

One can compute the patriarchy rate in terms of male responses to the following five statements: (i) when a mother works for pay, her children suffer; (ii) a university education is more important for a boy than a girl; (iii) on the whole, men make better business executives than women; (iv) being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay; (v) women do not have the same rights as men.

The responses to these ‘patriarchy’ statements were coded as $R^k_i = 1$ (strongly agree/agree) and $R^k_i = 0$ (disagree/strongly disagree), for male respondents, $i=1\ldots M$ and for the $K (=5)$ statements $k=1\ldots K$. For every respondent define $S_i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} R^k_i$. Then $0 \leq S_i \leq K$ so that $S_i = s$ ($s=0\ldots K$) means that person $i$ agrees with $s$ (out of $K$) of the statements.

The value of $S_i$ is defined as a man’s patriarchy score: men are ‘patriarchy-free’ if $S_i=0$, and are ‘patriarchal’ if $S_i>0$, the strength of patriarchy being greater for higher values of $S_i$. This implies that $z=1$ is the ‘patriarchy line’, with ‘patriarchal’ men having scores at or above this line. The amount of patriarchy among the male adherents of a religion (or among the male citizens of a region) can be measured by defining a patriarchy rate, denoted $PR$, as the sum of the individual patriarchy scores of men belonging to a particular religion (or region), expressed as a proportion of the maximum patriarchy rate:

$$PR = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} S_i}{M \times K} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{i=1}^{M} R^k_i}{M \times K}$$

(6.9)

If every man in a religion (region) agreed with every one of the $K$ statements, $R^k_i = 1 \forall i, k$, $S_i = K \forall i$, and $PR=1$. On the other hand, if nobody in a country agreed with any of the $K$ statements, $R^k_i = 0 \forall i, k$, $S_i = 0 \forall i$, and $PR=0$. Consequently, $0 \leq PR \leq 1$. 

21
6.6.1. Welfare Equivalent Patriarchy

The definition of the patriarchy rate in equation (6.9) leaves open the question of the distribution of the patriarchy scores ($S_i$) among its respondents. Two religions (regions) could have the same patriarchy rate but with very different distributions of patriarchy scores. For example, if under an equal distribution of prejudice scores, $S_i = s$ for $i=1...M$, $PR = s/K$. But $PR = s/K$ would also result if, for half of the $M$ respondents, $S_i = 2s$ and, for the other half, $S_i = 0$.

If one was averse to inequality one might regard the social loss, from a given patriarchy rate, to be smaller if the patriarchy scores were more or less evenly distributed over the respondents (low levels of patriarchy spread thin) compared to their being concentrated in a small part of the population (high and concentrated levels of patriarchy). In such a case one would need to adjust the patriarchy rate of equation (6.9) by the amount of inequality in the distribution of the scores underlying this rate (the $S_i$), to obtain the welfare equivalent patriarchy rate.

Sen (1976b) shows that if $\mu$ is the mean level of achievement, and $I$ the degree of inequality in its distribution, then the level of social welfare, $W$, may be represented as $W = \mu(1-I)$: “this has the intuitive interpretation that the size of the pie ($\mu$) is corrected downwards by the extent of inequality (1-I)” (p.129). Pursuing this line of reasoning, Anand and Sen (1997) argue that a country’s achievement with respect to a particular outcome should not be judged exclusively by its mean level of achievement (for example, by the average literacy rate for a country) but rather by the mean level adjusted to take account of inter-group or inter-personal differences in achievements. This methodology is employed here to adjust the mean patriarchy rates of each religion by the value of the Gini coefficient, computed from the underlying patriarchy scores of that religion’s male adherents, to arrive at the welfare equivalent rate.

<Table 6.7 here>
Table 6.7 shows that 10.9% of male ‘no religion’ respondents, compared to 1.5% of Muslim males and 2.3% of Hindu males, had a score of zero — meaning that they disagreed with all the five ‘patriarchy’ statements, (i)–(v), above — while, at the other end of the scale, 18.4% of Muslims, compared to 5.6% of persons with no religion, had the maximum score of 5 — meaning that they agreed with all the five ‘patriarchy’ statements, (i)–(v), above.

The mean patriarchy rates \( PR \) of equation (6.9)) in Table 6.7 show that men with no religion and Catholic men had the lowest \( PR \) — respectively, 41.3% and 42.3% — while Muslim and Hindu men had the highest \( PR \) — respectively, 65.8% and 63.5%. Referring to equation (6.9), this means that Muslim men as a group ‘achieved’ 65.8% while men with no religion ‘achieved’ 41.3% of the maximum possible patriarchy. Considered over all the male respondents from the seven religions (including, no religion), the \( PR \) of 50.6% meant that when men from all seven religions were considered in their entirety, they achieved 50.6% of the maximum possible patriarchy. When the mean scores were equity-adjusted, using Sen’s (1976b) welfare index based on the Gini coefficient, to obtain the welfare-equivalent patriarchy rate (WEPR), shown in the last column of Table 6.7, the ranking of scores by religion was unaltered though, of course, the WEPR was less than the \( PR \).

<Tables 6.8 and 6.9 here>

Table 6.8 and 6.9 show, respectively, mean patriarchy rates by religiosity and region. Table 6.8 shows that there was barely any difference in the \( PR \) values between persons who had a religion but were not religious and those who were religious — 52.6% versus 53.8% — but the \( PR \) was considerably lower (41.3%) for persons who had no religion. Table 6.9 shows that the \( PR \) was highest in Islamic countries (67.5%), roughly equal in African, ex-Soviet Union, and Asian countries (respectively, 53.1%, 54.8%, and 52.9%), and lowest in Western (34%) and Latin American (38.7%) countries.

6.7. Multivariate Analysis of Xenophobia, Homophobia, and Patriarchy
Conclusions about the link between region, on the one hand, and xenophobia and homophobia on the other, or between religion/religiosity on the one hand and patriarchy on the other, based on the data presented in the previous sections, could have misstated the relationship because they ignored the effect of other (non-regional/non-religion/non-religiosity) factors which could also have affected attitudes towards foreigners, homosexuals, and women. For example, two persons living in the same region, of the same religion, and of the same religiosity may have different levels of education or income or be of different ages and these differences could influence their propensity to xenophobia, homophobia, and patriarchy. If that were so, then some of the observed strength of the region–homophobia, or region–xenophobia, or religion–patriarchy relations might be due to the fact that persons in some regions, or of some religions, were, on average, better educated/younger/richer than persons from other regions/religions.

In an effort to control for factors which might impinge on a person’s views on foreigners, homosexuals, and women, this study considered the following ten variables: (i) gender; (ii) age group (15–29 years; 30–59; 50 and above); (iii) the highest educational level (no formal education or incomplete primary schooling; completed primary or incomplete secondary; completed secondary; university education, with or without degree); (iv) social class (upper middle class; middle class; working class; lower class); (v) quintile of household income; (vi) region of residence; (vii) religiosity and (viii) religion; (ix) life satisfaction; (x) financial satisfaction.

The hypothesis that lies at the heart of the multivariate analysis, reported below, is that there are systematic gender differences between men and women in their degrees of prejudice towards “others” with men more likely to be prejudiced than women. There is some evidence from researchers that women are socially more liberal than men. Welch (1985) examined voting patterns in four congresses to show that in the US Congress women voted in a more liberal direction than their male counterparts. In the 2015 House of Representatives elections in Switzerland, women voted for candidates from the left wing Social Democrats and the Greens more often than men. In the Polish elections of October 2019, the UK’s Guardian newspaper suggested that there was a significant gender gap in
voting intentions, with men under 30 more likely than women to support nationalist parties and hold far-right views (Walker, 2019). More generally, Shorrocks (2018) showed that young women in Western Europe were more left wing than young men.

This hypothesis of a gender gap with respect to homophobia and xenophobia was tested first by including gender as an explanatory variable in a regression equation and examining its significance. This is referred to as the “naïve model”. A more nuanced test was to allow all the determining variables to interact with gender, so that the estimated coefficients for each of the determining variables were different between men and women. In this model, referred to as the “interaction model”, there was the potential for gender differences with respect to every variable — for example, men and women with the same level of education could express different levels of prejudice — whereas the naïve model only allowed for a single, omnibus gender effect. The presence of interaction effects allowed the statistical significance of each of these differences to be tested.

6.7.1. Homophobia and Xenophobia

The homophobia and xenophobia equations were estimated by logit methods. The dependent variable in the homophobia equation took the value 1 if the respondent did not want a homosexual neighbour; it took the value 0 if the respondent did not object to such a neighbour. The dependent variable in the xenophobia equation took the value 1 if the respondent did not want as a neighbour any one of the following: immigrants or foreign workers; persons from a different race; persons from a different religion; it took the value 0 if the respondent did not object to having any of these as neighbours.

Under a logit model,

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Pr(Y_i = 1)}{1 - \Pr(Y_i = 1)} &= X_i \hat{\beta} \Rightarrow \Pr(Y_i = 1) = \frac{\exp(X_i \hat{\beta})}{1 + \exp(X_i \hat{\beta})} = F(X_i \hat{\beta}) \nonumber \\
\end{align*}
\]

where: \( X_i = \{X_{ij}, j = 1...K\} \) represents the vector of observations, for person \( i \), on \( K \) homophobia/xenophobia influencing variables and \( \hat{\beta} = \{\beta_j, j = 1...K\} \) is the associated vector of
coefficient estimates. Following the advice contained in Long and Freese (2014), the results from the estimated equations are expressed in the form of predicted probabilities from the estimated logit coefficients (made possible by using a suite of options associated with the powerful margin command in STATA v14.0) and not in terms of the estimates themselves. This is because the logit estimates (represented by the vector $\hat{\beta}$) per se do not have a natural interpretation — they exist as a basis for computing more meaningful statistics which are the predicted probabilities $\Pr(Y = 1)$.

<Tables 6.10 and 6.11 here>

Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show the results in terms of the predicted probabilities from the naïve model of, respectively, homophobia and xenophobia. Overall, 50.8% of the 72,501 cases in the estimation sample for homophobia were homophobic (expressed reluctance to have a homosexual neighbour) and 37.8% of the 74,151 cases in the estimation sample for xenophobia were xenophobic (expressed reluctance to have a neighbour who was an immigrant/spoke a different language/was of a different religion).

The first feature of note was that men had a higher predicted probability for both homophobia and xenophobia (Table 6.10: 53.1% and Table 6.11: 38.3%) than did women (Table 6.10: 48.7% and Table 6.11: 37.3%) and that both sets of differences — between men and women for homophobia and between men and women for xenophobia — were significantly different from zero. The second feature of note was that the probability of being homophobic was significantly higher for adherents of all religions — Muslims, Catholics, other Christians, Hindu, and Buddhist — than for those who professed no religion. Within the religions, Muslims were the most, and Buddhists and Hindus were the least, homophobic (Table 6.10: respectively, 57.7%, 46.7%, and 46.4%). The predicted probability of being homophobic was significantly lower for Catholics than for non-Catholic Christians (Table 6.10: 48.4% versus 50.8%) but it was significantly higher, albeit at only 10% significance level, than for Hindus (Table 6.10: 48.4% versus 46.4%).
The level of xenophobia was highest among Hindus (63.5%) and Buddhists (46%). Since 64% of the 1,664 Hindu respondents in WVS6 lived in India, xenophobia among Hindus could be best understood in the Indian context. As Kruijtzer (2009) argues, xenophobia in India was not a colonial construct, born out of a “divide and rule” policy, but existed in the 17th century long before the East India Company arrived. Three features of Hindu life in India promote xenophobia. The first is the caste system based around the notion of “untouchability” of the lower castes. In the overwhelming majority of Indian villages, this group still lives in segregated sections of the village (Sainath, 2000). The second is hostility between Hindus and Muslims in India exemplified by its long history of inter-communal violence (Varshney, 2002). Lastly, since states in India are demarcated on linguistic lines, some states have seen the rise of political parties, which are invariably led by Hindus, that are hostile to the presence of those in the state who are not native speakers of its language.

The regions with the highest level of homophobia were the ex-Soviet Union countries (70.7%), African countries (68.6%), and Islamic countries (62.3%) with the degree of homophobia in ex-Soviet Union countries being significantly greater than that in African or Islamic countries. The lowest rate of homophobia was in Western countries (24.1%) and this was significantly lower than the next lowest rate, in Latin American countries (30.7%). The degree of xenophobia was highest in Islamic countries (53.1%) and this was significantly higher than the next highest rates in ex-Soviet Union (42.1%), and Asian (41.8%) countries, though there was no significant difference in the xenophobia rates in the two latter regions.

The rate of homophobia increased with age, rising significantly from 49.1% for the 15–29 group, to 50.1% for the 30–49 group, to 53.2% for the 50+ group. Xenophobia did not, however, display an age effect — there was no significant difference between the rates for the three age groups.

The results reported in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show that homophobia was highest among the lowest class (Table 6.10: 52%) and generally fell significantly as one moved up the social class ladder: homophobia was lowest for respondents in the upper and upper middle class (Table 6.10: 48.9%).
xenophobia was lowest for lower middle class respondents (Table 6.11: 35.6%). These findings are consistent with McGee’s (2016) findings for the USA, which showed that the acceptance of homosexuality increased steadily as one ascended the social ladder, and with COWI (2009) finding a similar relationship for Europe.

Mirroring the relation between social class and homophobia is the fact that homophobia decreased with rising income: respondents in the lower household income quintile were most likely (Table 6.10: 51.7% for Q1 and 52.6% for Q2), and persons in the higher household income quintile were least likely (47.5% for Q5 and 49.3% for Q4), to be homophobic. In terms of xenophobia, persons in the lowest and highest household income quintiles were most xenophobic (Table 6.10: 40.8% for both) but in between these two extremes the level of xenophobia was significantly lower for persons in the other three quintiles.

There was clear indication that the level of homophobia fell significantly for rises in the level of education. The highest level of homophobia was for those with completed primary education (Table 6.10: 53.4%) and the lowest for those that had been to university (Table 6.10: 48.5%). Similarly, the level of xenophobia was highest for those with completed primary education (Table 6.11: 41%) and the lowest for those that had been to university (Table 6.10: 33.9%). These results are consistent with Denny (2011) who, using data for Ireland, asked if higher levels of education contributed to greater tolerance of homosexuals and concluded that increases in education causes individuals to be significantly more tolerant of homosexuals.

An interesting result to emerge from Tables 6.10 and 6.11 was the link between life satisfaction and financial satisfaction with homophobia and xenophobia. The broad thrust of these results was that homophobia and xenophobia were strongest for persons who were dissatisfied with their lives and their finances (Table 6.10: 54.1% and 53.3% and Table 6.11: 41.9% and 39.7% for, respectively, life and financial satisfaction) and were weakest for respondents who were satisfied with their lives and their finances (Table 6.10: 49.3% and 48.4% and Table 6.11: 36.2% and 37.5% for, respectively, life...
and financial satisfaction). All the differences for homophobia and xenophobia between the respondents’ three levels of life and financial satisfaction were significantly different from zero.

6.7.2. Gender Differences in Homophobia and Xenophobia

The interaction model for homophobia and xenophobia allowed the coefficient on each of the determining variables shown in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 to be different for male and female respondents. The results for estimating this model are shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 for, respectively, homophobia and xenophobia. The second and third columns of the two tables show the predicted probabilities for men and women against the relevant variable category; the fourth column shows the difference in probabilities. Dividing this difference by its standard error (column 5) then yields the z-value shown in column 6.

| Table 6.12 here |

Table 6.12 shows that the overall results for homophobia were such that 53.1% men and 48.7% of women expressed homophobia (in the sense of not wanting a homosexual neighbour) and this difference of 4.4 points was significantly different from zero. This broad result was mirrored in terms of the individual variable categories: for almost every category, the predicted probability of homophobia was significantly higher for men than for women. For example, of respondents with no religion, 45.8% of men and 42% of women expressed homophobia; for respondents that had been to university, 51.7% of men and 45.6% of women expressed homophobia; for respondents that expressed dissatisfaction with their lives, 56.2% of men and 52.2% of women expressed homophobia. The only categories for which the gender difference with respect to homophobia was not significantly different from zero were Hindus and Buddhists.

| Table 6.13 here>
Table 6.13 shows that the overall results for xenophobia were such that 38.3% men and 37.3% of women expressed xenophobia (in the sense of not wanting people who were “different” as neighbours). There were, however, not many instances in which there was a significant gender gap for xenophobia. For example, in terms of religion, a significant gap existed only for Hindus; in terms of region, it was only for those living in the West and in Latin America; in terms of age, it was only for those in the 15–29 age group; in terms of social class, it was only for the lowest class.

6.8. Multivariate Analysis of Differences in Male–Female Views on Gender Equality

The WVS6 asked respondents (both male and female) to mark, on a scale of 1 to 10, how essential it was that “in a democracy women had the same rights as men” — hereafter, referred to as “gender inequality” (GE) — with 1 representing “GE is not essential” and 10 representing “GE is essential”. For the purposes of the econometric estimation reported in this section, these responses were recoded as: “GE is not essential” (original coding: 1–6; new coding: 1); “GE is not necessarily essential” (original coding: 7–9; new coding 2); and “GE is essential” (original coding 10; new coding: 3). Of the 73,281 respondents to this question, 26.7% viewed GE as “not essential”; 29.9% thought it was “not necessarily essential”; and 43.4% regarded GE as “essential”. Not surprisingly, these proportions varied by gender: 40.1% of men, in contrast to 46.4% of women, regarded GE as “essential” while, at the other end of the scale, the proportions of men and women who regarded GE as “not essential” were, respectively, 29.4% and 24.2%.

These are the raw figures. The interesting question is the shape of these male–female differences after non-gender factors (inter alia religion, region, age, social class, income) had been taken into account. For example, Islam, by offering fewer rights to women than it does to men, is predicated on the belief that men and women are not equal. So, are male and female Muslims similarly minded in regarding GE as “not essential”, or is there a difference of opinion between Muslim men and women regarding
the importance they attach to GE? And do Muslim men and women attach a lower importance to GE than their counterparts from other religions?

In order to answer these questions a *multinomial model* was estimated in which the dependent variable took the value 1 for respondents who viewed GE as “not essential”; 2, for respondents who thought GE was “not necessarily essential”; and 3, for respondents who regarded GE as “essential”. In a multinomial logit model with $J$ mutually exclusive possible outcomes, indexed, $j=1...J$, for each individual $i$, indexed $i=1...N$, the dependent variable $Y_i$ is defined as taking the value $j$ for individual $i$ $Y_i = j$, if that outcome $j$ occurs for individual $i$. If outcome $J$ is taken as the base outcome, the multinomial logit represents, for each individual ($i=1...N$), the logarithm of the odds ratio of outcome $j$ ($j=1...J-1$) to the base outcome, $J$ as a linear function of $K$ determining variables (indexed, $k=1...K$) with $X_{ik}$ representing the value of variable $k$ for individual $i$:

$$\log\left(\frac{p_{ij}}{p_{iJ}}\right) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_{jk} X_{ik} = Z_{ij}, \quad j = 1...J - 1$$

(6.10)

where: $p_{ij} = \Pr(Y_i = j)$, $\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{ij} = 1$ and $\beta_{jk}$ are the coefficients associated with $j^{th}$ outcome for the $k^{th}$ determining variable, with by definition, $\beta_{jk} = 0 \ (k = 1...K)$. The assumption is that these coefficients do not vary across the individuals in the sample.

In order to test the hypothesis that men and women, on average, held differing views on GE, the model allowed all the determining variables to interact with the gender of the person concerned: these interaction effects allowed the estimated coefficients to be different for men and women with appropriate statistical tests allowing the statistical significance of these differences to be assessed. The multinomial interaction model for GE was estimated using all the determining variables shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 but, since the focus of interest in this section is religion and region, the results in Table 6.14, displayed in terms of the predicted probabilities of the two extreme attitudes towards GE namely, “GE is essential” and “GE is not essential”, pertain only to these two variables.
The first point of interest about the results in Table 6.14 was that the predicted probability of regarding GE as essential was, for every religion and for every region, significantly lower for men than for women while the predicted probability of regarding GE as not essential was, except for the West where the difference was insignificantly small, significantly higher for men than for women.

The second point of interest was that the predicted probability of regarding GE as essential was lowest, and the predicted probability of regarding GE as not essential was highest, among Hindu and Muslim men (Table 6.14: 24.8% and 34.1%, for essential and 36.8% and 33.8% for not essential, respectively). This result was mirrored for women. The predicted probability of regarding GE as essential was also lowest, and the predicted probability of regarding GE as not essential was also highest, among Hindu and Muslim women (Table 6.14: 29.1% and 41.7%, for essential and 31.4% and 27.2% for not essential, respectively).

In terms of the regions, the predicted probability of men and women regarding GE as essential was lowest for African countries (Table 6.14: 26.7% and 33.1% for men and women, respectively) and highest for Western countries (Table 6.14: 57.5% and 61.5% for men and women, respectively). Conversely, the predicted probability of men and women regarding GE as not essential was highest for African countries (Table 6.14: 37.2% and 31.7% for men and women, respectively) and lowest for Western countries (Table 6.14: 15.5% and 15.3% for men and women, respectively).

On the basis of these predicted probabilities one can define gender assertion as the ratio of the predicted probabilities of women and men regarding GE as essential where this ratio is represented by $\alpha$, $\alpha \geq 1$: $\alpha = 1$ means that there is no gender assertion since the predicted probabilities of women and men regarding GE as essential are the same; the greater the value of $\alpha$ the greater the divergence between these two probabilities and, therefore, the greater the degree of gender assertion. So, for
example, Table 6.15 shows that the overall degree of gender assertion is $\alpha=\frac{0.460}{0.405}\times 100=114$
or, in other words, 14% higher than the “no assertion” base value, $\alpha=100$.

In a similar vein, one can define gender deference as the predicted probabilities of men and women regarding GE as non-essential where this ratio is represented by $\delta$, $\delta \geq 1$; $\delta=1$ means that gender deference is at its highest since the predicted probabilities of women and men in regarding GE as non-essential are the same; the greater the value of $\delta$, the greater the divergence between these two probabilities and, therefore, the lower the degree of gender deference. So, for example, Table 6.15 shows that the overall degree of gender deference is $\delta=\frac{0.291}{0.244}\times 100=119$ or, in other words, 19% lower than the maximum deference value, $\delta=100$.

Combining the two concepts of gender assertion and gender deference, one can define gender tension (GT) as the disjoint between women and men in their respective views of whether GE is essential or non-essential. Following from the above discussion, GT may be measured as a weighted average of $\alpha$ (gender assertion) and $\delta$ (gender deference): $GT = \alpha \times w_{\alpha} + \delta \times w_{\delta}$ where $w_{\alpha}$ and $w_{\delta}$ are the weights assigned to, respectively, assertion and deference, $w_{\alpha} + w_{\delta} = 1$. If $\alpha = \delta = 1$, $GT=1$ and there will be no gender tension. On the other hand, GT will be larger, the greater the values of $\alpha$ (high degree of gender assertion) and $\delta$ (low degree of gender deference). Without loss of generality, in computing the degree of GT, one could place equal weight on assertion and deference by setting $w_{\alpha} = w_{\delta} = 1/2$.

Then the overall degree of GT is: $(114 + 119)/2 = 116.5$, that is 16.5% above its “no tension” value. <Table 6.15 here>

Table 6.15 shows that, at 123.2 — or 23% above the baseline no tension value of 100 — gender tension was highest, both in respect of assertion (122.2) and of deference (124.2), among Muslims and lowest among Catholics (111.3), non-Catholic Christians (114.7), and Buddhists (109.1). It is importance to emphasise that the gender tension referred to is latent, as opposed to overt, tension. It does not mean that Muslim men and women are more likely to be at war with each other than men
and women from other religions. What it does mean, however, is that Muslims displayed the greatest dissonance between male and female attitudes towards women’s rights and that Christians (Catholic and non-Catholic) and Buddhists displayed the smallest. Mirroring this finding, the highest level of gender tension — at 134.2 or 34% above the baseline no tension value of 100 — was in Islamic countries and the lowest level was in Western countries (104.4), Latin America (106.6), and Asia (107.7).

6.9. Conclusions

The *raison d’être* of this chapter was to develop measures for xenophobia, homophobia, and patriarchy and, in so doing, to provide systematic information about the degree of prejudice against certain groups (foreigners, homosexuals, women) — in particular, whether prejudice differed by the world’s regions and religions, and between the groups that were the target of prejudice. Furthermore, the chapter enquired about the characteristics of persons — apart from their religion and region — that made for prejudice, or a lack of it.

In developing the analysis, this chapter made a number of conceptual contributions. First, borrowing from the literature on poverty, was the concept of “xenophobia score” which was used to measure the amount of xenophobia in different regions of the world and of the contributions that these regions made to the world’s xenophobia. The second was to link homophobia to attitudes towards homosexuality and, thereby, to develop in an operational sense the twin factors contributing to homophobia: intolerance (homophobia expressed by those who regarded homosexuality as unjustifiable) and conformity (homophobia expressed by those who regarded homosexuality as justifiable). The third contribution was to examine dissonance between men and women in their views about gender equality and, thereby, to measure the amount of “gender tension” among adherents of different religions and denizens of different regions.
Underpinning this analysis was a multivariate analysis of xenophobia, homophobia, and patriarchy. The novelty of this lay in estimating an interaction model which allowed men and women to take different views on these three faces of prejudice, with respect to every variable. This allowed one to answer questions that are of considerable societal importance: are women more liberal than men in their attitude towards foreigners and homosexuals? Do women seek greater equality than men are prepared to concede?

References


[https://www.brookings.edu/product/muslims-in-the-west/](https://www.brookings.edu/product/muslims-in-the-west/)


Notes

1 The National Front in France, Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, Golden Dawn in Greece, Fidesz in Hungary, the League (formerly, The Northern League until its rebranding in 2018) in Italy, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Law and Justice Party in Poland, and the Brexit and UK Independence parties in the United Kingdom. See Brookings (2019) for details of the rise of these parties.

2 See Jacques (2006) for a discussion of growing intolerance in Western countries towards some segments of their own society and the rest of the world.

3 Daniel Okrent, in an interview for the *New Yorker* (Chotiner, 2019).

4 Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code of 1861, modelled on the British Buggery Act of 1533, made sexual intercourse “against the order of nature”, which included anal sex, illegal. This state of affairs prevailed in India till September 2018 when the Indian Supreme Court declared that its application to consensual homosexual acts between adults was unconstitutional.

5 Both Jews and Christians regard homosexuality as an abomination: “If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood is upon them” (Leviticus, chapter 20, verse 13). For Muslims, homosexuality is forbidden because, in its narration of the story of Lot, the Quran condemns the denizens of Gomorrah for carnal acts between men.


7 See Leiter (2008) for a discussion of reasons in favour of the *principle of toleration* by which is meant that unpalatable minority views and practices are tolerated by the majority even when it has the means to end them.

8 For example, women of menstruating age are not permitted to enter the Sabrimala temple in Kerala; this exclusion has become a *cause celebre* in India.

9 Thus, Hindu women are polluted during menstruation and may not cook food for their family during this time. The most extreme example of ritual pollution associated with menstruation is the requirement among the Gond and Madiya tribes of central India that their menstruating women should physically leave the main dwelling and live in outhouses (called *gaokars*) during the period of their menstruation (Kaur, 2015).


11 See, for example, Anas (2002) who argues that it is difficult to understand the structure of metropolitan areas in the USA without making adequate reference to racial prejudice and residential discrimination.

12 This analysis follows the methodology for measuring poverty in Sen (1976a).

13 In performing this calculation, the xenophobia scores, \( X_i \), of non-xenophobic persons are set equal to the xenophobia line \( z \) so that \( X_i - z = 0 \).

14 Note that although East and West Germany are separately identified they constitute a single country.

15 From equation (6.7), \( C_j = 1.5 \times v_j \)
The term ‘conformity’ derives its name from a commonly used justification for exclusion: “I have nothing against homosexuals/Muslims/immigrants but my neighbours would be upset if I had one living next to me”.

From Table 6.3, $65 \times 64.4/100 = 41.9$

Men for whom $S_i = 1$ agreed with at least one statement.


These options, which are only available from STATA 13.0 onwards, are very demanding of computing power.

Meaning that physical contact with members of these groups is polluting.

This is usually the southern part of the village which, from a Hindu perspective, is inauspicious. So, as Sainath (2000) says, housing segregation has a religious sanction.

For example, the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and the Assam Gana Parishad in Assam.

The difference in xenophobia between respondents from the lower and upper middle classes was not statistically significant.

McCormack (2014), however, found an increasing tolerance for homosexuality among working class boys in the South of England.

Since there were only 376 Jewish respondents in WVS6, the observations corresponding to them were not used in the estimation.