A Note on the Regulation of Add-ons

Ghosh, Meenakshi (2022): A Note on the Regulation of Add-ons.

Abstract

We model a situation where a seller trades a base good, and a bundle of higher quality comprising of the base good with an add-on, through an intermediary which charges a flat commission fee each time it makes a sale. In addition, the add-on can also be bought elsewhere, i.e. from a different provider, on a stand-alone basis. Apart from differences in valuations of quality and their distance from the seller, consumers differ in their levels of sophistication. Specifically, we assume that there is a fraction of consumers who are naive and either unaware that add-ons can be purchased separately from a different provider, or unwilling to deviate (de-select) from the options that have been set for them by default by a seller. This paper examines the impact of regulation (proposed, for instance, by the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK), that requires intermediaries to prompt consumers regarding the availability of stand-alone alternatives. We find that, ironically, regulation that seeks to protect the interests of the naive consumers may sometimes be detrimental to their welfare.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: add-on pricing, consumer naivete, regulation, platform fee, cost pass-through
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility

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