Optimal Law Enforcement: Nuance Between Arrest and Punishment

Ramanambonona, Ambinintsoa and Razafindravonona, Jean and Ranoelimanana, Dimby (2023): Optimal Law Enforcement: Nuance Between Arrest and Punishment.

Abstract

In the economic literature on law enforcement, the distinction between the probability of arrest and the probability of conviction is not explicit. However, detection does not necessarily imply punishment. This paper focuses on proving that punishment cannot be applied without preceding detection. In this context, in the case of non-apprehension, the offender expects a double gain: monetary and non-monetary gains. The result shows that if the arrest is optimal, the reputation is equal to zero, which means that the arrest deters reputational gain. Punishment has a negative impact on the monetary gain expected by the offender

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Deterrence; Law Enforcement; Probability of Arrest; Probability of Conviction; Reputation; Sanction
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

References

Bar-Gill, O., & Harel, A. (2001). Crime rates and expected sanctions: The economics of deterrence revisited. The Journal of Legal Studies, 30 (2), 485-501. doi: https:// doi.org/10.1086/322055

Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76 (2), 169-217. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/259394

Buchen, C., Deffains, B., & Palermo, A. (2019). Stigmatization, liability and public enforcement of law. Revue d’ ́Economie Politique, 129 (2), 235-259. doi: https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.292.0235

Chopard, B., & Obidzinski, M. (2021). Public law enforcement under ambiguity. International Review of Law and Economics, 66 , 105977. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2021.105977

Deffains, B., & Fluet, C. (2019). Social Norms and Legal Design. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 36 (1), 139-169. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz016

Fluet, C., & Mungan, M. C. (2022). Laws and norms with (un)observable actions. European Economic Review , 145 , 104-129. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104129

Garoupa, N. (1997). The theory of optimal law enforcement. Journal of Economic Surveys,11 (3), 267-295. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00034

Garoupa, N. (2001). Optimal magnitude and probability of fines. European Economic Review , 45 (9), 1765-1771. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00084-2

Harel, A., & Klement, A. (2007). The economics of stigma: Why more detection of crime may result in less stigmatization. The Journal of Legal Studies, 36 (2), 355-377. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/511893

Iacobucci, E. M. (2014). On the interaction between legal and reputational sanctions. The Journal of Legal Studies, 43 (1), 189-207. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/675761

Mungan, M. C. (2015). Stigma Dilution and Over-Criminalization. American Law and Economics Review , 18 (1), 88-121. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahv026

Mungan, M. C. (2016). A generalized model for reputational sanctions and the (ir)relevance of the interactions between legal and reputational sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics, 46 , 86-92. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2016.03.002

Obidzinski, M., & Oytana, Y. (2018). Presumption of innocence and deterrence. TEPP Working Paper , No 2018-07 . doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3202230

Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2007). The theory of public enforcement of law. In A. M. Polinsky & S. Shavell (Eds.), Handbook of law and economics (Vol. 1, p. 403- 454). Elsevier.

Rasmusen, E. (1996). Stigma and self-fulfilling expectations of criminality. The Journal of Law and Economics, 39 (2), 519-543. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/467358

Zasu, Y. (2007). Sanctions by social norms and the law: Substitutes or complements? The Journal of Legal Studies, 36 (2), 379-396. doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/511896 18