Kurdoglu, Berkay and Yucel, Eray (2022): A Cointegration-based cartel screen for detecting collusion.
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Abstract
In this article, we propose a new empirical screen for detecting cartels, using the cointegration as our basis of modeling. The proposed screen is capable of identifying potential cartel behavior, indicating the strength of price adjustment among firms, and providing a basis for assessing structural change. The screen is applied to the Turkish cement market for an initial demonstration of use; we obtain promising results.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | A Cointegration-based cartel screen for detecting collusion |
English Title: | A Cointegration-based cartel screen for detecting collusion |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Antitrust; Cartel; Detection; Empirical screen |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Item ID: | 113888 |
Depositing User: | Mustafa Eray Yucel |
Date Deposited: | 27 Jul 2022 23:06 |
Last Modified: | 27 Jul 2022 23:07 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/113888 |