



Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Does democracy guarantee the resilience of African economies? Analysis based on a duration model

Koffi, Siméon

Conseiller Technique du Directeur Général de l'Economie (DGE),
Chargé de cours - Programme de Gestion des Politiques
Economiques (GPE) de l'Université FHB, Côte d'Ivoire,
Responsable du Pôle « Economie et Développement Durable » du
Groupe CONDAD Invest

1 August 2022

Online at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/113968/>
MPRA Paper No. 113968, posted 03 Aug 2022 14:05 UTC

Does democracy guarantee the resilience of African economies? Analysis based on a duration model

Koffi Siméon¹

Conseiller Technique du Directeur Général de l'Economie (DGE)

Chargé de cours - Programme de Gestion des Politiques Economiques (GPE) de l'Université FHB, Côte d'Ivoire
Responsable du Pôle « Economie et Développement Durable » du Groupe CONDAD Invest

(Courriel1 : simeon.koffi@toki.waseda.jp ; Courriel2 : si.koffi@dge.gouv.ci)

Abstract

Based on a panel of 144 developing countries for the period from 1960 to 2020 and using the duration model, our estimates focused on two (02) groups of countries, namely African countries, and countries outside Africa. For the latter, the results showed that democracy is a factor that strengthens their resilience insofar as it intervenes to support growth spells in the event of negative external shocks. In other words, democracy lengthens the duration of growth spells and promotes more resilient and sustainable growth. For African countries, however, the opposite effect occurs. Indeed, African countries with democratic regimes have a much shorter growth survival rate than autocratic ones.

Key words: duration model, resilience, growth spells

Résumé

Sur la base d'un panel de 144 pays en développement et en utilisant le modèle de durée sur la période 1960-2020, nos estimations ont porté sur deux (02) groupes de pays notamment les pays d'Afrique et les pays hors Afrique. Pour ces derniers, les résultats ont montré que la démocratie est un facteur qui renforçait leur résilience dans la mesure où elle intervient pour soutenir les épisodes de croissance en cas de chocs externes négatifs. En d'autres termes la démocratie allonge la durée des périodes de croissance et favorise une croissance plus résiliente et plus durable. En revanche, pour les pays africains, c'est l'effet contraire qui se produit. En effet, les pays africains appliquant un régime démocratique ont un taux de survie de la croissance beaucoup plus court que les pays autocratiques.

Mots clés : modèle de durée, résilience, période de croissance

¹ Les opinions exprimées ici sont celles de l'auteur et n'engagent la responsabilité d'aucune autre personne ou institution.

1. Introduction

Successive political crises (Guinea in 2021, Mali in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, Egypt in 2010...) highlight the need for populations to aspire to good governance. In some countries, on the other hand, the democratic transition has been well achieved: Ghana and Senegal. But this transition is not always associated with significant economic growth.

If we look at the past of the various economies, we can see that some economic performances were achieved during the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in Africa. For example, Côte d'Ivoire experienced its boom period called the "Ivorian miracle" during this phase. Yet, this period is classified as an autocratic era (Polity IV Project, Marshall *et al.*, 2016). Thus, it appears that the absence of democracy is not (always) negatively correlated with economic growth.

This paper attempts to show the effect of democracy on economic growth dynamics in Africa. Our main argument is that most African economies are still young and do not have the solid foundations to allow themselves to apply democracy in the true sense of the term.

In recent years, several countries have managed to maintain a high rate of economic growth without being considered democracies. Non-democratic focus more on maintaining a sustained rate of growth to the detriment of other structural policies, which would promote development, to avoid popular discontent and thus ensure the stability of the regime.

The case of China is particularly interesting and regularly cited as an example. The Chinese government manages to maintain a single party (the Chinese Communist Party) not only by limiting freedoms, but also by sustained economic growth for several years. For example, the average wage in China grew by more than 18% in 2011 and by more than 17% in 2012 according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics.

As we have just seen above, examples of strong growth in the absence of democracy are easy to spot, but it is not uncommon to find that commitment to democracy is not always accompanied by economic progress. South Asia represents a first significant region in this respect. From 1988 to 1999, Pakistan had a democratic regime characterized by a multiparty system, freedom of the press, and the organization of correct elections, with various alternations in power between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. During this same period, domestic unrest multiplied under the pressure of Islamist movements, corruption increased, and the debt burden grew. As a result, growth declined.

In Africa, the progress of democracy in many states during the 1990s has generally not made a significant economic difference. For example, the transition to democracy in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi has not resulted in economic improvement. And while growth has occurred in some

cases, it has only benefited already advantaged urban minorities, exacerbating inequalities, and justifying the term “distorting development” (Hermet, 2000).

At the empirical level, much work has focused on the effect of democracy on economies. In this respect, it should be noted that these studies do not all lead to the same result. Indeed, Kurzman *et al.* (2002) identify 47 quantitative studies, of which 31 show a positive relationship between democracy and growth, 6 show a negative relationship and 10 find a non-significant relationship.

To our knowledge, only the work of Salah and Mohamed (2020) attempts to measure the role of democracy in the resilience of developing economies to exogenous external shocks. Based on a panel of 96 developing countries over the period 1965-2015, the estimates showed that democracy is a resilience factor insofar as it intervenes to sustain growth spells in the face of negative external shocks.

By splitting the sample of the present study’s database into two: Africa and outside Africa. We get the following results: (i) for a sample of 44 African countries over the period 1960-2020, we find that democracy is not a resilience factor for African economies. It even reduces periods of sustained economic growth in these countries, and (ii) this institutional factor favors the resilience of 100 countries outside Africa. Indeed, in the event of exogenous shocks, democracy lengthens the growth spells of the countries concerned.

The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and approach used, and section 3 presents and discusses the results. Finally, section 4 concludes and draws policy implications.

2. Methodology and data

2.1. Methodology

To analyze the effect of democracy on economies, we use a sample of 144 countries from five (05) continents (America, Africa, Asia, Europe, and Oceania) observed over the period 1960-2020. As Salah and Mohamed (2020), the duration method will be used to underline the role of this institutional factor. The left-hand side variable is the probability that growth spell ends.

This paper will assess the impact of democracy on the probability that a country’s period of sustained economic growth end. A country will have achieved sustained growth if its growth rate is steady and greater than or equal to 2% for a period (Berg *et al.*, 2012; Salah and Mohamed, 2020). The probability density function of the duration model can be defined by:

$$f(t; \gamma; \delta) = \frac{\gamma}{\delta} \left(\frac{t}{\delta} \right)^{\gamma-1} e^{-(t/\delta)^\gamma} \quad (1)$$

Where,

- $t > 0$ is the breaking time;
- $\gamma > 0$ is the shape parameter;
- $\delta > 0$ is the distribution scale.

The survival function can be written as follows:

$$S(t; \gamma; \delta) = e^{-(t/\delta)^\gamma} \quad (2)$$

and its complementary distribution function is:

$$F(t; \gamma; \delta) = 1 - e^{-(t/\delta)^\gamma} \quad (3)$$

The failure time associated with the duration of period j (t_j) is expressed as follows:

$$t_j = \exp\left(\sum_{k=1}^K \beta_k x_{k,tj}\right) \tau_j \quad (4)$$

where $x_{k,tj}$ is a set of explanatory variables, τ_j a random variable, β_k express time ratios that indicate how much a one-unit change in an explanatory variable would shorten or lengthen the expected baseline duration $E(\tau_j)$. It is assumed that t_j follows a Weibull distribution with parameter γ .

The dependent variable is therefore the probability that the growth spells will end. The unit of analysis (the duration variable) is a growth spell. This latter is composed of two phases, namely the full and incomplete growth spells. The complete growth spells begin with growth above 2 percent, followed by a period of per capita income growth averaging at least 2 percent, and ends with a decline in per capita income growth below 2 percent. Incomplete growth spells, on the other hand, begin with a period of per capita income growth averaging at least 2 percent and are still in progress at the end of the sample.

According to Berg *et al.* (2012), growth spells are periods of real GDP per capita growth that last at least 5 years. They begin with an increase in real GDP per capita of at least 2 percent and end with a decline followed by a period of growth averaging less than 2 percent, or simply with the end of the observation period.

The methodological approach will make it possible to: i) determine the duration and frequency of GDP per capita growth spells; ii) produce a descriptive statistic of the variables in the event of a negative terms of trade shock according to the policy regime; iii) carry out non-parametric estimation of the survival of growth spells according to the policy regime; and finally iv) carry out maximum likelihood estimation of survival models in parametric regression, using the Weibull survival distribution.

2.2. Data

The data needed to conduct this study covers a non-cylindrical panel of 144 countries, observed between 1960 and 2020. The list and source of the variables used in this study are recorded in the table below:

Table 1. Variables and data sources

Variables	Sources
External debt / GDP	FMI, 2019
Gini coefficient	Standardized World Income Inequality Database, Solt (2019)
Trade openness	WDI, World Bank (2019)
Terms of trade (negative shock)	Global Financial Database (2019)
Démocracy Polity V	Marshall <i>et al.</i> , 2016
GDP per capita growth rate	WDI, World Bank (2019)
Three-month US Treasury bill rate (negative shock)	Global Financial Database (2019)
Investment rate as % of GDP	WDI, World Bank (2019)

Source : Author

3. Results

3.1. Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics is about the characteristics of the distributions of the series used. These are the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of the different variables.

Tables 2 and 3 show that income inequality is on average more pronounced in Africa (Gini coefficient equal to 0.4643) than on other continents (Gini coefficient equal to 0.3575). The other variable of interest is the level of external debt. On average over the period, it is estimated at 57.99% of GDP for African economies, compared with 45.92% of GDP for countries outside Africa.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables (Africa)

Variable	Observation	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
External debt / GDP	1999	57.99	53.86	0.49	547.78
Trade openness	2238	63.36	33.41	6.32	348.00
Gini coefficient	1129	46.43	6.88	32.7	67.2
Investment rate as % of GDP	1873	20.63	10.03	-2.42	93.55

Terms of trade	1696	119.77	45.53	21.40	357.58
Three-month US Treasury bill rate	2668	3.74	2.25	-1.28	8.59
Local interest rate	941	4.79	13.15	-93.51	52.44

Source: Author's calculations from the database

Tableau 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables (Without Africa)

Variable	Observation	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
External debt / GDP	4082	45.92	41.27	0.00	435.42
Trade openness	4353	74.05	52.05	0.02	437.33
Gini coefficient	3399	35.75	8.36	17.5	56.7
Investment rate as % of GDP	4094	22.95	7.09	0.00	95.32
Terms of trade	2446	116.18	45.68	50.19	721.05
Three-month US Treasury bill rate	5684	3.74	2.25	-1.28	8.59
Local interest rate	1968	5.98	19.88	-97.69	628.32

Source: Author's calculations from the database

3.2. (Duration and) Frequency of GDP per capita growth spells

Table 4 presents stylized facts about the frequency and duration of growth spells.

Table 4. Duration and frequency of GDP per capita growth spells

Continents	Countries	Complete growth spells	Average duration	Incomplete growth spells	Average duration
Afrique	44	41	7.80	4	5.8
Hors Afrique	100	144	8.41	21	10.65
America	23	39	6.80	02	07.5
Asia	36	47	9.80	10	15.2
Europa	38	54	8.60	09	06.3
Oceania	03	04	6.30	00	-

Source: Author's calculations from the database

We observe that while it is not unusual to start a growth spell. However, countries differ in their ability to sustain it for longer periods. African countries have an average duration of growth spells equal to 7.8 years, lower than that of Asia and Europa estimated at 9.80 and 8.60 years respectively. But the African growth spells is greater than that of America (6.80) and Oceania (6.30).

3.3. Effect of negative terms-of-trade shocks on the growth spells by political regime in Africa

3.3.1. Descriptive statistics in the event of a negative terms-of-trade shock by political regime (Africa)

Table 5 presents the position and dispersion characteristics (mean and standard deviation) of the potential determinants of the duration of economic growth spells in GDP per capita.

Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest strong heterogeneity in the sample. Splitting the sample according to the Polity 4 score, democratic countries, which have a score higher than 5, experience shorter periods (7.84 years), while autocratic countries, which have a score lower than 5, end up having longer periods (11.34 years). We also find that countries with democratic regimes are more indebted and have higher income inequality than autocratic countries. The average per capita growth rate in democratic countries is 3.86% compared to 4.34% for countries under autocracy. Also, contrary to the results of Salah and Mohamed (2020) who found that democratic countries were more open than autocratic countries, this study finds that the former have a lower openness rate (61.00% of GDP) than the latter (68.48% of GDP).

Table 5. Descriptive statistics (Africa)


Variable	Democracy			Autocracy		
	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Obs	Mean	Std Dev
Gini coefficient	297	52.17	112.16	841	46.00	7.56
External debt / GDP	727	60.52	59.42	1237	58.66	51.35
Average duration of growth spells	140	07.84	2.81	217	11.34	6.35
Trade openness	862	61.00	31.80	1347	68.48	64.89
Annual growth rate of GDP per capita	1358	03.86	5.08	906	04.34	8.62

Source: Author's calculations from the database

3.3.2. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates

Nonparametric estimation of the survival of growth spells by political regime (Figure 1) shows that non-democratic African countries (Democracy = 0) have a higher survival rate than democratic African countries (Democracy = 1).

Figure 1. Nonparametric estimation of the growth spells by political regime in Africa



3.3.3. Estimate of risk ratios

In this section, maximum likelihood estimation of survival models in parametric regression using the Weibull survival distribution is performed.

The results presented in Table 6 show the exponentiated regression coefficients that can be interpreted as risk ratios. For example, a hazard ratio of 1.081 means that a change of one unit in the regressor increases the risk of a growth slowdown in the next period by 8.1%. A hazard ratio of 1 means that there is no effect, and a hazard ratio of less than 1 indicates a growth-protecting effect.

The dependent variable is the risk that the growth spells stop. The coefficient associated with the explanatory variable represents the change in the probability that the growth spells will end next year for a one unit change in the given independent variable.

The results show that external shocks are not necessarily associated with higher failure rates of growth spells. For example, negative terms-of-trade shocks do not have a direct effect on the duration of a growth spells. These results highlight the inelasticity of foreign trade to price factors. In other words, exports and imports are not (very) sensitive to price variations in Africa. Furthermore, the results highlight the negative effects of democracy on growth spells. That means, democracy significantly shortens the duration of growth spells. This prevents growth from being more resilient and sustainable. A one-point improvement in the democracy score is associated with a decrease in the expected duration of a growth spells by about 8%. Democracy is not playing its role as a buffer against negative exogenous shocks. This calls into question the quality of the institutions that are supposed to ensure democracy.

Indeed, the role of democracy is to cushion the effects of negative exogenous external shocks. Conversely, in the absence of democracy, the effects of these shocks are amplified by the redistributive conflicts they trigger. Moreover, a one percentage point increase in the Gini is associated with a 5.2 percent higher default rate. Also, a one percentage point improvement in the level of investment is associated with a 5.2% increase in the expected duration of a growth spells. Investment favors growth spells. Finally, the debt ratio seems to have a negative effect on growth spells. For example, a 1% increase in the debt level reduces growth spells by 0.8%.

Table 6. Estimation of risk ratios according to the duration model (Proportional Hazard Inverse Weibull Distribution) for Africa

Variables explicatives	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy	1.081* (1.680)	1.087** (2.480)	1.095*** (2.760)	1.087*** (2.450)
Gini index	1.052* (1.740)			
Negative shock of Terms of trade	1.000* (1.610)	1.000 (1.110)	1.000 (1.250)	1.000 (0.980)
Investment rate as % of GDP	0.992 (-0.230)	0.948** (-2.060)	0.951** (-2.120)	0.952** (-1.950)
Initial GDP per capita	1.000** (1.920)			
Debt ratio as % of GDP		1.008* (1.780)		1.008* (1.830)
Negative US interest rate shock		0.897 (-1.15)	0.910 (-1.150)	0.908 (-1.030)
Trade openness		1.004 (0.670)	1.004 (0.770)	
Observations	68	114	132	114
Number of growth spells that ended	20	31	34	31
Log-likelihood	-21.15	-34.84	-39.52	-35.06

Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses; The null hypothesis is risk coefficient = 1; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.

Source: Author's calculations from the database

3.4. Effect of negative terms-of-trade shocks on growth spells by policy regime in countries other than Africa countries

3.4.1. Descriptive statistics in the event of a negative terms-of-trade shock by political regime in countries other than Africa countries

A descriptive analysis is presented in Table 7 and focus on the characteristics (mean and standard deviation) of the potential determinants of growth spells.

By splitting the sample according to the Polity 4 score, the data show that democratic countries experience longer periods (13 years), while autocratic countries end up with shorter periods (10 years). Democratic countries are found to have less debt and higher income inequality. The

average per capita growth rate in democratic countries is 5.32% compared to 3.60% for countries under autocracy. Moreover, the results indicate that autocratic countries are more open (75.59% of GDP) than democratic countries (67.54% of GDP).

Table 7. Descriptive statistics (other than Africa countries)


Variable	Democracy			Autocracy		
	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Obs	Mean	Std Dev
Gini coefficient	431	37.11	8.20	2960	35.71	8.49
External debt / GDP	779	39.72	51.35	3338	46.69	37.83
Average duration of growth spells	297	13.23	4.76	1188	9.93	3.78
Trade openness	883	67.54	39.67	3499	75.59	54.57
Annual growth rate of GDP per capita	893	5.32	8.48	3622	3.60	5.37

Source: Author’s calculations from the database

3.4.2. Kaplan-Meier survival estimates

Using nonparametric estimation of the survival of growth spells by political regime, we find that democratic countries have a higher survival rate than autocratic countries (Figure 2). This result is contrary to those for African countries where autocratic countries have longer growth spells than democratic countries.

Figure 2. Nonparametric estimation of the growth spells by political regime in other countries than Africa countries



3.4.3. Estimate of risk ratios

In contrast to African countries, the results highlight the beneficial effects of democracy on economic growth. Indeed, democracy significantly lengthens the duration of growth spells. This promotes more resilient and sustainable growth. A one-point improvement in the democracy score is associated with an increase in the expected duration of a growth spells of about 5%. In this case, political institutions act as buffers to exogenous shocks.

Furthermore, a one percentage point decrease (increase) in the Gini (the level of investment) could reduce (increase) growth spells by 2.8% (7%).

Table 8 : Estimation of risk ratios according to the duration model (Proportional Hazard Inverse Weibull Distribution) in other countries than Africa countries

Variables explicatives	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy	0,954* (-1,780)	0,952*** (-2,970)	0,964** (-2,460)	0,953*** (-2,940)
Gini index	1,028* (1,600)			
Negative shock of Terms of trade	1,000* (-1,560)	1,000* (-1,850)	1,000** (-1,930)	1,000* (-1,900)
Investment rate as % of GDP	0,919*** (-3,790)	0,922*** (-4,380)	0,931*** (-4,220)	0,925** (-4,380)
Initial GDP per capita	1,000*** (2,820)			
Debt ratio as % of GDP		1,006 (1,390)		1,006 (1,480)
Negative US interest rate shock		0,964 (-0,770)	0,969 (-0,700)	0,966 (-0,730)
Trade openness		1,001 (0,610)	1,001 (0,660)	
Observations	411	631	660	631
Number of growth spells that ended	80	115	126	115
Log-likelihood	-85,68	-133,38	-155,54	-133,56

Notes: The z-statistics are in parentheses; The null hypothesis is risk coefficient = 1; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.

Source: Author's calculations from the database

4. Conclusion

The objective of this study was to highlight the importance of democracy in the resilience of countries to exogenous shocks. The duration growth spells can be interrupted by exogenous shocks, especially in the most vulnerable countries. According to our hypothesis, countries with a democratic regime have a higher survival rate than autocratic countries, in other words, democracy is likely to protect the growth process of these countries.

Working on a panel of 144 countries, the results indicate that African countries with democracy are less resilient to shocks than autocratic regimes, which is contrary to our study hypothesis. This result is in line with the theories developed by Alesina *et al.* (1996), Rodrik (1999) and

Przeworski and Limongi (1993), which state that multiparty systems favor clientelism and redistributive logics at the expense of capital accumulation.

On the other hand, when we refer to the non-African countries applying democracy, we find that they are more resilient to shocks; this confirms the hypothesis of our study. This result is consistent with the work of authors, such as Berg *et al.* (2012) and Ostry *et al.* (2014), according to which external shocks and macroeconomic volatility are negatively associated with the length of growth spells and that democracy constitutes a support to growth spells.

At the end of this study, we recommend that African states give top priority to the application of democracy while adapting it to their realities. As African economies evolve in an uncertain world, it is important to integrate these risk factors into development strategies.

References

- Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N., and Swagel, P. (1996). Political instability and economic growth, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1(2), 189-211.
- Berg, A., Ostry, J. D., and Zettelmeyer, J. (2012). What makes growth sustained? *Journal of Development Economics*, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), 149-166.
- Hermet, G. (2000). *Culture et Développement*. Paris : Presses de sciences PO.
- Kurzman, C., Werum, R., and Burkhart, R.E. (2002). Democracy's Effect on Economic Growth: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1951-1980. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, 3-33.
- Marshall, M.G., Ted, R.G., and Keith, J. (2019). *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018. Dataset Users' Manual*. Center for Systemic Peace.
- Ostry, J.D., Berg, A., and Tsangarides, C.G. (2014). Redistribution, inequality, and growth. IMF Staff Discussion Note, SDN/14/02.
- Przeworski, A., and Limongi, F. (1993). Political Regimes and Economic Growth. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7 (3), 51-69.
- Rodrik, D. (1999). Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflict and growth collapses. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 4 (4), 385–412.
- Salah, A., and Mohamed, T.A. (2020). Chocs externes, Institutions démocratiques et Résilience économique. MPRA Paper 100382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Solt, F. (2019). Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. *Social Science Quarterly*, 90 (2), 231–42.

Appendix 1. List of countries included in this study

Afghanistan	Comoros ^a	Hungary	Mauritania ^a	Sierra Leone ^a
Albania	Congo-Brazzaville ^a	India	Mexico	Singapore
Algeria ^a	Costa Rica	Indonesia	Moldova	Slovak Republic
Angola ^a	Cote D'Ivoire ^a	Iran	Mongolia	Slovenia
Argentina	Croatia	Iraq	Montenegro	Solomon Islands
Armenia	Cyprus	Ireland	Morocco ^a	South Africa ^a
Australia	Czech Republic	Israel	Mozambique ^a	Spain
Austria	Denmark	Italy	Myanmar (Burma)	Sri Lanka
Azerbaijan	Djibouti ^a	Jamaica	Namibia ^a	Sudan ^a
Bahrain	Dominican Republic	Japan	Nepal	Suriname
Bangladesh	Ecuador	Jordan	New Zealand	Swaziland ^a
Belarus	Egypt ^a	Kazakhstan	Nicaragua	Sweden
Belgium	El Salvador	Kenya ^a	Niger ^a	Switzerland
Benin ^a	Equatorial Guinea ^a	Korea South	Nigeria ^a	Syria
Bhutan	Eritrea ^a	Kosovo	Norway	Thailand
Bolivia	Estonia	Kuwait	Oman	Timor Leste
Bosnia	Finland	Kyrgyzstan	Pakistan	Togo ^a
Botswana ^a	France	Laos	Papua New Guinea	Tunisia ^a
Brazil	Gabon ^a	Latvia	Paraguay	Turkey
Bulgaria	Gambia ^a	Lebanon	Peru	Turkmenistan
Burkina Faso ^a	Germany	Lesotho ^a	Poland	Uganda ^a
Burundi ^a	Ghana ^a	Liberia ^a	Portugal	Ukraine
Cameroon ^a	Greece	Libya ^a	Qatar	United Kingdom
Canada	Guatemala	Lithuania	Romania	United States
Cape Verde ^a	Guinea ^a	Luxembourg	Russia	Uruguay
Central African Republic ^a	Guinea-Bissau ^a	Madagascar ^a	Rwanda ^a	Venezuela
Chad ^a	Guyana	Malawi ^a	Saudi Arabia	Zambia ^a
Chile	Haiti	Malaysia ^a	Senegal ^a	Zimbabwe ^a
Colombia	Honduras	Mali ^a	Serbia	

Note: ^a denotes African countries