Optimal capacity allocation in a vertical industry

Antelo, Manel and Bru, Lluís (2022): Optimal capacity allocation in a vertical industry.

Abstract

We examine how a social planner should allocate productive capacity in a downstream industry when, upstream, there is an efficient supplier and a set of less efficient suppliers of an essential input. We show that optimal allocation consists of setting a large quota and small quotas for the remaining capacity. This allows the planner, without necessarily harming consumers, to reap licensing rents above those that would be obtained in a competitive downstream market or under public management of capacity. We also discuss circumstances under which a use-or-lose requirement for the large quota is welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, and under which banning price discrimination in the intermediate market may be socially optimal.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Capacity allocation, dominant firm, use-or-lose requirement, price discrimination, quota licence, soft-budget constraint
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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