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# **From Hyper-globalization to Global Value Chains Decoupling: Withering Global Trade Governance?**

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# From Hyper-globalization to Global Value Chains Decoupling: *Withering Global Trade Governance?*

Hubert Escaith \*

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**Abstract:** This conference paper is a contribution to the panel on “Future of Business: Disruptions and Strategic Impact”. While the 1990s and early 2000s were seen as a golden age for Global Value Chains, the 2010s have witnessed a series of crisis that shackled the political and institutional foundations of global trade. After years of neo-liberal trade policies, trend is now towards neo-realist mercantilism and trade politics. The COVID-19 pandemics and the rise of geopolitical tensions are redefining and perhaps reversing what have been the drivers of world trade since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Geopolitical and institutional uncertainties increase the chance of unpredictable or unforeseen event disrupting entire international segments of the value chain, with potentially extreme consequences. When fat-tailed black-swans run around like headless chickens, disruptions are unpredictable. Yet, understanding the main changes affecting the geo-politics of trade and the possibilities of safeguarding a functional global trade governance is expected to reduce the risks and help future managers preparing for new business paradigms.

**Key words:** international political economy, deglobalization, nearshoring, trade conflicts, WTO

**JEL codes :** D02, F13, F23, F53, P00

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# From Hyper-globalization to Global Value Chains Decoupling: *Withering Global Trade Governance?*

## 1. Introduction

This essay falls at the intersection of three loosely related research disciplines: International Business (IB), International Economics (IE), and International Political Economy (IPE). These three strands remain separated from an academic perspective, not only because of differences in their main subject of research (the multinational corporation, the welfare effects of trade policy and the international cohabitation of interdependent national states, respectively) but also because they use very different methodological approaches.<sup>1</sup> Yet, when it comes to discussing policy making, keeping them separate signifies missing important perspectives (Van Assche, 2018; Lundan and Van Assche, 2021).

The paper aims at better understanding changes in the global contexts in which internationalised firms do business. It mainly builds on the first and the last research approaches, identifying the main changes in Global Trade Governance from the IPE perspective and their interactions with Global Value Chains (GVC) analysed from the IB perspective. Implications in terms of economic welfare and sustainable development (an IE perspective) are only superficially treated.

The main observations that motivated the writing this essay were the following:

### *a. From the invisible hand to the visible one*

After decades of hyper-globalization where multinational firms and globalised consumer markets seemed to drive the world economy, the past decade saw the return of strong government interventions trying to limit or control trade and investment, and gear household consumption and behaviour towards “socially acceptable patterns”.

### *b. From Just in Time to Just in Case*

The shift affected principally global value chains. After decades of optimizing supply chains in search for maximum efficiency and Just in Time, managers began to think more in terms of risk mitigation and “Just in Case”.

### *c. The main pillar of global trade governance is being enfeebled*

The WTO, one of the main pillars of global trade governance, is going through an existential crisis which could break it. Global value chains, because they closely mix trade and inversion from long term

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<sup>1</sup> The gap between IB and IE was substantially reduced when IE started studying trade through the perspective of firm heterogeneity. Melitz (2003) advanced that size and high productivity are necessary conditions for internationalization in order to surmount the fixed costs of exporting: only few firms are able to compete internationally. Today, empirical IE researchers look more and more into microdata for evidences. Input-output analysts, at mid-point between macro and micro approaches, are busy disaggregating their models by firm size or national/international ownership (Escaith, 2015).

contractual perspectives, would be the first victims of the rise in systemic uncertainties that would accompany the withering of world trade governance.

## 2. Market vs. Nation State, Neoliberalism vs Neorealism: a few definitions

Albert Einstein <sup>2</sup> has a famous quote: “In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not.” Yet, it helps knowing the theory in order to understand the practice. Especially when practice depends on government policies that respond to ideological agendas.

Until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, trade practices responded mainly to a mercantilist approach of the social benefits of trade. For example, 15<sup>th</sup> century city-state of Venetia monopolized the spice trade from India, negotiating exclusive trade agreements along the route. Feudal lords put taxes at the city gates and tolls on the bridges. Similar situations could be found in ancient Asia, Africa or Latin America: a dominant power would use its supremacy to generate rents (monopolies, taxes on goods and travellers) and accumulate wealth and power.

Theory, if not practices, started changing in 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe. For Physiocrat economists, gold was less important than economic activity. They called for the free circulation of goods and people (*Laissez faire les hommes, laissez passer les marchandises*). Montesquieu, in his influential *Spirit of Law* (1748) theorized that trade is the building block for peace. Montesquieu spoke about the “doux commerce”, believing that “Commerce is a cure for the most destructive prejudices” and is a vector for peace. Montesquieu’s theory has been refined through the years to become what is called “capitalist peace”, but the main idea remains the same—States with economic ties benefit from trade and economic interactions, promoting a peaceful resolution of conflicts without violence.

On the other hand, some scholars have asked whether trade in certain “strategic” goods may diminish the pacifying effect of international exchange and even increase the potential for conflict. Coyne et al. (2022) refer to Hirschman’s analysis of the Nazi’s manipulation of trade to make Eastern Europe dependent on German industrial exports, which increased the Nazis’ ability to pursue an aggressive foreign policy.

Today, two of the main strands of International Political Economy (neo-liberalism on the Physiocrats’ side; neo-realism on the Mercantilists’ one) can be associated with this historical background. If we look at recent history, neo-liberalism dominated trade policy after the end of the Cold War, until 2010. Now, neo-realism is becoming the main driver of trade politics; politics understood here as just one instrument of a wider national political agenda.

### *d. The neo-liberal decades 1990-2010*

Neo-liberalism, sometimes called commercial liberalism or neoliberal institutionalism, refers in political sciences to theories linking free trade and peace. They embrace (at least implicitly) two other

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<sup>2</sup> It seems that Benjamin Brewster, at Yale in 1882, should receive credit for the saying.

dimensions: republican liberalism (democracy, rule of law) and sociological liberalism (international convergence and integration) (Baldwin, 1993). Perhaps the most chemically pure example is today's federalist view of developing the European Union into a supra-national entity diluting the two main pillars of the Westphalia European peace treaty.<sup>3</sup>

Diluting the normative and legislative functions of sovereign states, at least when international trade is concerned, called for the creation of a supra-national substitute. The institutional and normative core of that order is the set of liberal trade rules, what Mavroidis and Sapir (2021) call the "liberal understanding" embodied in the creation in 1995 of the World Trade Organization.<sup>4</sup>

The end of the Cold War (1991) marked the beginning of what became known as hyper-globalization. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994 and the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995 provided the institutional setting. Progress in information and telecommunication technologies greatly facilitated international commerce. China had already joined the global economy, and in 1980 the US Congress passed a trade agreement conferring Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status on China. But it is only in 2001, when China joined the WTO, that remaining uncertainties regarding trade with China were solved. Multinational firms took advantage of the new situation to outsource and offshore the most labour-intensive segments of their production to China. Global value chains (GVCs), which were already in place since the 1980s, became the dominant international business model as far as mass-market manufacture production is concerned.

After winning the Cold War, the USA looked at consolidating its status of leader and champion of an international order of democratic capitalist nations. On the trade front, it took the role of importer of last resort, absorbing a large share of world imports. In 1991, low-income countries accounted for just 9 percent of U.S. manufacturing imports; by 2000, this share reached 15 percent and climbed to 28 percent by 2007. China claimed the lion's share of this market, accounting for 89 percent of this growth (Redding, 2020).

The emergence of GVCs as main driver of trade put the WTO in a complex situation.<sup>5</sup> The GATT balanced commitments to broadly liberal international trade rules with national policy space allowing countries to pursue their national goals with their own national instruments (Nelson, 2021). But GVCs require more than low tariff duties at the border. The long term "trade-investment" nexus

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<sup>3</sup> The treaty of Westphalia (1648) put an end to the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). The peaceful coexistence among sovereign states was based on two pillars: national self-determination; acceptance of principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. This non-interference principle guided Benito Juarez in Mexico when he declared in 1867 "*Entre los individuos, como entre las naciones, el respeto al derecho ajeno es la paz.*"

<sup>4</sup> Importantly, at the difference of the European Commission, the WTO never claimed a right to interfere with national policies, outside its core competency of building and maintaining international trade governance. Attempts at regulating domestic competition policy to guarantee "national treatment" to foreign firms were dismissed at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial conference.

<sup>5</sup> GVCs result from the geographical fragmentation across two or more countries of the production of a product. GVC management is based on formal linkages between a Lead Firm and its suppliers. Contractual arrangements with First Tier suppliers may include specifications (private norms ranging from industrial specifications to social and environmental standards, see page 4) applying also to second and third tiers suppliers.

that characterises GVCs requires the kind of stable business environment that Lead Firms enjoy in their domestic market. That is, they necessitate predictability and transparent competition policies that many developing members at WTO were not ready to offer, as became evident at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun.

Nature abhors a vacuum; this applies also to trade governance. One solution for filling the gap was to negotiate between nation-states preferential regional trade agreements (RTA). RTAs extended existing commitments or included the topics not covered by WTO (the so-called “WTO +” and “WTO X”). These agreements, such as the Single European Act of 1993 or the North American Trade Agreement of 1994 led to deep regional integration. The discussion on whether RTAs represent a stumbling or a stepping stone for multilateral governance has been, and remains, a topic of dissent. The World Trade Organization devoted a special issue to this topic in 2013 (WTO, 2011).

Less covered by economists is the emergence of private norms as a way for Lead Firms to minimize industrial and commercial risks and facilitate supply chain coordination (see Box 1).

### **Box 1. Private norms and transnational governance**

International supply chains can be very complex organizations, involving thousands of providers which must deliver their products “just in time” and with “zero default”. This interdependency was made possible by progress in telecommunication technologies, which allowed to coordinate many actors in real-time and monitor traded goods in transit. But coordination came also through the adoption of common industrial standards and managerial procedures at all stages of the chain. Private norms regulate also the way importers and exporters are expected to behave. One example is the Incoterms rules defined by the International Chamber of Commerce. They specify that “The seller and buyer can include Incoterms 2020 rules in their contract to cover who is responsible for every stage of the international supply chain, including customs clearance and insurance requirements. Incoterms 2020 rules also make it clear who pays for each different cost within the international supply chain”.

Internal GVC norms increasingly deal with the social and environmental impacts along the chain. The trend is known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or Environment, Social and Governance Practices, or the Three Pillars of Corporate Sustainability. With the rising importance of social networks, the reputation of a Lead-Firm – especially in developed economies – is increasingly associated to its adherence to CSR. The task of enforcing CSR is the responsibility of the Lead Firm, often located in developed countries where official standards regarding labour and environment are usually demanding. Lead Firms’ CSR norms percolate through the entire supply chain, spreading to suppliers in developing and least developed countries where legal public rules and regulations may be much less demanding.

The private norms that are emerging in the shadow of the WTO add a layer of hybridity in the global governance system. CSR includes topics such as labour standards, human rights and environment considerations that have been side-lined at WTO, but return through the back door, much to the irritation of some governments. It creates a series of issues. Some are due to existing gaps between private and official norms in developing countries, others are created by deeper cultural differences. Actually, the self-organization dynamics of GVCs may drain multilateral governance of part of its legitimacy and relevance. Instead of facilitating trade, the proliferation of private standards in GVC trade is often seen from the neo-realist perspective as trade barriers aimed at reducing the comparative

advantages of developing countries. An example is human rights violations being considered as an element defining bilateral trade policy (Slawotsky, 2022).

*e. The return of the visible hand: from trade policy to trade politics*

After decades of hyper-globalization, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) triggered a popular movement against the economic neoliberal order in Western countries. Meanwhile, most business and government circles remained favourable to free trade policies. A key reason for managers in high-cost countries to offshore part of the value chain is to outsource labour-intensive activities and re-import them while concentrating at home on their core high-value added activities. This is done at the expense of the blue-collar workers, who lose their jobs and cannot find similar employment opportunities.

Globalization became associated to deindustrialization, unemployment and income inequality: from a trade policy perspective, the interests of the managers of the firm and those of its workers started diverging, at least in developed countries. This was an explosive cocktail. The shattering of the traditional pre-GVC coalition of interest between workers and managers stirred the so-called populist movements against globalization. This drift challenged the established neo-liberal international trade order and strained inter-country relationships. While international economists still focused on the productivity and welfare-enhancing benefits of GVCs, the focus of discussion in policy circles tended towards highlighting risks rather than rewards.

For "neo-realists", neo-liberals are too focused on the welfare gains and underestimate the importance of distribution. Neo-realists tend to see international relations as a competition: I am on the losing side if I gain less than my neighbours. In particular, nation-states worry more about the gains of their enemies than of their allies (Baldwin & Freeman, 2021). The neorealist agent is a statesperson who decides that the national interests will be served more effectively through power-based bargaining than through international laws (Pollack, 2022).

*f. Export restrictions and the weaponization of trade*

Protectionism and discrimination have proliferated rapidly, adopting a more "us vs. them" geopolitical approach. Neorealism has morphed into a confrontational situation as governments engage in geopolitical conflicts. GVC interdependence is now seen as a weakness or an instrument of coercion. In a GVC trade network, the output of one firm in a country is used by another firm in another country to produce a more complex product. The various transformational steps that a product undertakes between its initial entry in the production process are also points of potential disruption.

The rupture may be caused by natural events that prevent the production and delivery of parts and components; this was the case in 2011 with the earthquake and tsunami in Japan or the shutdown in 2019 of factories in countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemics. Leaving a deep trade agreement may also result in extensive losses from disrupting global value chains, as many observers supposed it would be the outcome of Brexit.

Yet the issue has acquired a new geo-political nature which is much more worrisome.

Some governments realised that industrial interdependency could be used to promote strategic interests when they could control a key intermediate input. At the difference of traditional protectionism (protection of national market), the weaponization of trade looks at debilitating the productive potential of the adversary by embargoing the exports of critical inputs. This strategy, employed in the 1970s with the oil embargo, has taken a new life with the spread of GVCs. They are very dependent on the Just in Time availability of intermediate inputs. When an exporter has a quasi-monopoly on the production of some of these products, it can use them for leveraging its negotiation position. Transactions along GVCs involving intermediate inputs are usually based on long-term contracts and often entail significant specific investments (the GVC “trade and investment” nexus) as well as other sources of inflexibilities in the management of international supply chains. In a paper related to the theoretical modelling of the impacts of trade conflicts on the WTO multilateral system when GVC trade is prevalent, Beshkar and Lashkaripour (2020) conclude that the gains from non-cooperative trade taxation and the externality inflicted by these taxes on the rest of the world have doubled in the presence of GVCs.

In 2010, the threat of supply chain disruption was used in a dispute on maritime territory, when China banned rare earths exports to Japan during a diplomatic standoff after the Senkaku boat collision incident. At that time, this threat was not formally recognised as a retaliation by the Chinese authorities: business as usual under WTO rules officially remained the best international option. But maintaining the status quo ante was mainly wishful thinking; the global crisis of 2008-2009 had already changed the way the public opinion and many governments considered globalization and its cost/benefit balance.

The status quo ante was officially altered in 2018 with the bilateral trade conflict that arose between China and the USA. This trade conflict has been extensively analysed from the geo-political angle, in particular the hegemonic stability theory. According to this theory, the expectation is that shifts in the underlying balance of power will destabilize existing agreements, leading dissatisfied (rising or falling) powers to reform existing institutions and, failing that, to withdraw from or undermine them.

According to Enderwick (2011), the main differences from traditional protectionism are:

- (i) the scope of protectionism is expanded beyond trade restrictions to include capital movement, FDI, offshore sourcing, migration;
- (ii) besides traditional trade barriers —tariffs, quotas, non-tariff measures —, the instruments include subsidies, public procurement, industrial policies, the creation of national champions, the promotion of state-owned enterprises, finance measures;
- (iii) the instruments use economic strength and monopolies to include export restrictions in order to promote geopolitical gains and extract an additional rent;
- (iv) the protectionist pressures do not come only from local industries, but includes other opinion and decision makers in the country (political leaders, NGOs, social networks);


- (v) strategic approaches are devised to maximize the benefits of globalization, while avoiding perceived costs;
- (vi) protectionist policies are no more the instrument of choice of developing economies as in the 1950s but extend to all countries.

Although there are profound differences between today’s globalized economy and its historical equivalents, learning from the past should not be precluded, as it can help avoid dangerous paths from being followed that could lead to universally undesired outcomes in the future. As recalled by Mariotti (2022) scholars find similarities between today’s early twenty-first century economic and geopolitical situation and its late nineteenth century equivalent, whose endgame was World War I. Even if history does not repeat itself, it remains a good exercise to learn from history, including the history of international political economy.

### 3. Looking at the data: the rise and pausing of global trade 1995- 2019

The speed of trade globalization is often measured as the relationship between its growth rate (in volume) and the variation in World GDP. Note that it is only one of various possible measures, such as geographical diversification of trade partners or average distance travelled by traded goods. As we see in Figure 1, the speed of globalization is far from being stable over the long period.

*Figure 1 World Trade/GDP elasticity, 1960-2023(f)*



Note: Elasticity based on 5-year rolling periods. Trade in merchandises only.  
 Source: Author, based on WTO data and 2023 forecasts.

### *a. Hyper-globalization: 1990-2008*

After the end of the Cold War and the formalization of world trade governance with the creation of WTO in 1995, world-wide GVCs started dominating business strategies. The extension and the higher complexity of international supply chains as well as the apparition of the “global consumer” intensified trade and investment exchanges.

The “golden” age of GVC participation contributes to corporate performance in terms of productivity, efficiency and economies of scale. It has been one of the leading factors which contributed to a decade-long period of low inflation in developed countries, the reversal of the decreasing trend in the price of commodities relative to manufactures and the emergence of large developing countries as major world players.

This trend stalled after 2009 and reversed after 2013. International fragmentation of production has lost its momentum and GVCs seem to be stagnating in recent years (De Backer and Flaig, 2017).

2008 was supposed to be a year of triumph for the New Global Order. At WTO, the Doha negotiations were almost concluded, staff and delegations were busy finalizing their notes and analysing their tariff schedules before the summer break. The Beijing Olympics marked a new milestone in China’s return as a major player in the world Top League.

But it was also a year of US presidential election, and Barack Obama, still a candidate, accused China of manipulating its currency to gain trade surplus and promised to closely monitor Chinese trade policy. After nine days of talks among a select group of trade ministers in July at WTO, the meeting ended with no deal and the Doha round collapsed. 2008 was definitely a critical year, first for US financial markets after a gloomy 2007, then for the rest of the planet. Lehman Brother, the fourth-largest investment bank in the United States, filed for bankruptcy in September.

When you are too big to fail, but you fail, things get as “interesting” as an unsuspected “black swan”. Statisticians pretend that black swans have non-normal “fat tails”. Fat-tailed distribution of events can be traced to the early 1950s, when Harold Edwin Hurst (1880 – 1978) was asked to studying the hydrological properties of the Nile basin. He concluded that the tendency of outliers to occur in groups is greater in natural events than in random events (Koutsoyiannis, 2013). Unexpected pooled shocks (“black swans”) are more frequent and intense than commonly perceived (as the saying goes: “when it rains, it pours”).

The systemic nature of the melt-down of structured financial investment, supposedly designed to optimize risk/benefit by spreading the –theoretically uncorrelated risks– came as a surprise. Most stochastic business or financial models are based on a normal “thin tail” distribution of low-probability extreme shocks. They cannot cope with fat tails, when lots of bad news start to pile up and people run for shelter. What is true for finance is also true for international business in general, and for supply chain management in particular, especially when neo-realists run the global trade show.

*b. From trade policy to trade politics*

The subsequent 2008-2009 global financial crisis marked also a change in the public opinion of most developed economies. Globalization became associated to deindustrialization, unemployment and income inequality. Meanwhile, most business and government circles remained favourable to free trade policies. From a national policy perspective, the interests of the managers of the firm and those of its workers started diverging, at least in developed countries. This was an explosive cocktail.

A key reason for managers in high-cost countries to offshore part of the value chain is to outsource labour-intensive activities and re-import them while concentrating at home on their core high-value added activities. This is done at the expense of the blue-collar workers, who lose their jobs and cannot find similar employment opportunities. This fragmentation of the traditional pre-GVC coalition of interest between workers and managers has stirred the so-called populist movements against globalization in Western countries.

#### 4. Deglobalization vs. Slowbalization

*An era can be said to end when its basic illusions are exhausted* (Arthur Miller)

Trade collapsed during the global financial crisis and, since then, the pace of globalization has noticeably slowed (slowbalization). Yet, it is perhaps wrong (or too early) to speak about “deglobalization”.

*Table 1 World Trade/GDP elasticity, 1950-2023*

Period	Trade/GDP elasticity
1950-2023(f)	1.7
- 1950-1989	1.4
- 1990 - 2013	2.2
- 1995-2005	2.4
- 2014-2023(f)	1.4

Note and source: see Figure 1.


In truth, exports are slowing significantly in relation to economic growth. Trade/GDP elasticity is now about 1.4 (Table 1), same as during the Cold War era (1950-1989). Recent studies on world trade deceleration prove that the decline in international production fragmentation is one of the reasons (World Bank, 2020).

Figure 2 represents the evolution of the “trade-investment” nexus typical of GVCs. The total GVC participation measured as the share of global exports crossing at least two national borders in the total world exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) is the sum of outflows from developed and developing countries.

Based on GVC Reports (2019 and 2021), it is estimated that the participation rate in GVCs increases by 4.3% annually during the period of expansion before the crisis (2000-2008). This rate drops

down by 14.9% during the crisis of 2009, but it restores its previous values in 2010-2011. After 2012, the average global rate of GVC participation falls by 1.6% annually after the sharp slowdown in global trade.


*Figure 2 Foreign Direct Investment and GVC participation, 1970-2020*




Source. World Development Report, 2020, Figure 1.15

My own calculations do not indicate a negative trend, but a slowing down of globalization after 2015.

*Figure 3 Decomposition of the average distance to imports, 1995-2018*





Note: The structural effect is due to changes in the geographical distribution of imports and exports; the globalization effect measures the appetite for travelling long distance. Trade in Value Added identifies the origin of value-added embodied in final goods and services at the country of final destination.

Source: Author, based on OECD TiVA database.

Figure 3 confirms that there is less appetite for procuring its imports from far-away countries. This may be due to several reasons. The pessimistic view is that global firms are anxious about the future and are reluctant to internationalise their business. The risk is to enter a new phase of deglobalization when the trend enters into negative territory. The optimistic view is that hyper-globalization is now mature and has reached a plateau: thanks to the emergence of new industrial countries, procuring required imports is more geographically diversified, and many countries trade more regionally (Intra-EU trade, NAFTA, ASEAN+3). Controlling for this structural effect, we see that the appetite for looking for new opportunities in far-away countries has diminished, but is not regressing. The pausing effect seems stronger for trade in value added (Figure 3 panel b, a typical measure of GVC trade) than for traditional trade statistics. Accordingly, we have entered a new normal of “slowbalization”.

More recent data on maritime shipping from UNCTAD (Figure 4) shed important additional light on changes in the globalization component of distance travelled by traded goods. We observe a break in trend for containerships after 2009 (panel b.), when they start travelling shorter distance, at the difference of all types of cargo ships taken together (panel a.). From 2009 to 2021, average distance travelled by containerships decreased by 275 nautical miles (-5.5%) while the average for all cargo ships rose by 204 miles (+4.4%). This confirms a break in trend for GVC trade, containerships being used by GVC trade to transport inputs (parts and components) as well as finished manufactured products. For UNCTAD (2022), this declining trend is due to higher growth rates recorded on intra-Asian routes serving intraregional supply chains. Implicitly, it can be inferred from this diagnostic that there was no absolute decrease on longer inter-regional routes. All that concurs with Lamy and Köhler-

Suzuki (2002): evidences suggest that global economic integration continues, even if it is slowing and changing

*Figure 4 Maritime shipping: Average distance travelled by journey, 2000-2021 (nautical miles)*



Source: Based on UNCTAD (2022)

The internationalization of the Russia-Ukraine war of 2022 complicates even more the geopolitical context. COVID-19 in 2020-21 and NATO's trade and investment embargoes followed by Russia's own export restrictions in 2022 have sharply exposed vulnerabilities in many supply chains.

## 5. The 2020s: decoupling and antagonism?

Economic protectionism and trade wars are escalating. The emergence of new economic superpowers (China, *in primis*) calls into question the market and geopolitical equilibria that have been consolidated in the "Long Peace" period since after the Cold War. Albeit there is nothing wrong with a multipolar

world order, numerous scholars call our attention on the risks of military conflicts that may result from the transition. The danger is to fall into the so-called Thucydides' Trap of war accompanying the emergence of new international powers threatening to replace the previous hegemon.<sup>6</sup>

Even if the military implications of the Thucydides' Trap are less than a guaranteed outcome in modern times, its economic consequences should not be underestimated. This is in particular true for GVCs, which must now consider "government resilience" in addition to other risk factors when designing their business strategies.

### *a. Setting a Thucydides' Trade War Trap*

One major force of the changes in global supply chains is the US–China decoupling (Todo, 2022). At the difference of previous systemic shocks (2008-2009 global financial crisis or COVID-19 pandemics) most of the perturbations were caused by governments "visible hand". In the neo-realist era, the cost/benefit balance of international trade is increasingly assessed from the perspective of national geopolitical strategy.<sup>7</sup> This "them vs. us" situation can be analysed in terms of the Thucydides' Trap developing as an economic and trade war, rather than a military one.

Albeit signs of bilateral tensions had appeared some times before, the Made in China 2025 (MIC25) plan issued in 2015 formalised the hegemony contest. The stated objective of MIC25 was to achieve independence from foreign suppliers, especially in high-tech products. At the difference of Germany's Industry 4.0 strategy, MIC25 was interpreted by other industrialised countries as "inimical" for both economic reasons (MIC25 has a strong protectionist bias) and its supposed military implications. In a Tit for Tat strategic move, the US government restricted exports and technology transfer of high-tech products and technologies to some Chinese companies identified as being linked to the People's Liberation Army, most notably Huawei (other companies have been scrutinised as well because of national security concerns). Despite having signed a free-trade agreement with China in 2005, Australia banned Huawei from rolling out the country's 5G network on the basis of national security concerns. The Japanese government followed similar strategies, restricting exports of information and communication technologies (ICT)

The reactions were not only defensive, but looked at copying MIC25 by adopting voluntarist industrial policies, subsidizing their own "strategic" industries. In the afterwards of COVID-19, the objective is to build resilient supply chains for critical products. In 2021 and 2022, the US government announced programs to promote the local production ("onshoring" or "reshoring") of semiconductors,

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<sup>6</sup> The Harvard Thucydides' Trap Project (<https://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/case-file>) identified sixteen cases in which a major rising power has threatened to displace a major ruling power. Twelve of these sixteen rivalries ended in war.

<sup>7</sup> This has theoretical implications for modelling international economics: up to now, the instrument of choice to analyse trade policy was General Equilibrium theory in its computable form. Neo-realism calls for an analysis in terms of strategic game theory resulting in non-Pareto (dis)equilibria.

large capacity batteries, and pharmaceuticals. As before, the objective is to reinforce national security.<sup>8</sup> In its 2021 budget, Japan provided subsidies for "reshoring" and "onshoring" to companies producing essential products that locate their production plants in Japan, or set up their production facilities in ASEAN for supply chain diversification (in line with the "China-Plus" and "friends-shoring" GVC strategies). European countries followed a similar path. The UK devised the 5G Network Diversification Strategy with a budget of 250 million GBP in 2020 and the European Union ratified in 2022 the European Chips Act with 43 billion euros. The purpose of all these policies is to construct resilient supply chains of high-tech products that do not rely on Asia, particularly China.

As expected in a Tit-for-Tat strategy, China reacted to these policies by setting up its own export control law in 2020, aimed at restraining some exports and limiting the options for technology transfer. In addition, the Chinese government increased subsidies to high-tech sectors from 40 billion RMB (6 billion US dollars) in 2015 to 100 billion RMB (15 billion US dollars) in 2020 (Todo, 2022). The succession of measures and counter measures has created a subsidy race. According to Evenett (2022), in October 2022 subsidies to import-competing firms (other than duty taxes on imports) were estimated to be in products covering 41% of traded goods; export incentives—typically in the form of tax breaks—covering 64% of them.

Although the US and Japan have imposed a number of restrictions to decouple from the Chinese economy, bilateral trade flows did not decline in general. Analysing changes in the geographical distribution of trade, Todo (2022) observes that US–China decoupling is occurring in limited industries and technology fields that are critical to national security. Japan's reliance on China has declined slightly, but the trend was already perceptible since 2012. Germany is increasing its reliance on China, but starting from a modest basis: most of Germany's supply chain partners are European countries.

### ***b. Scenarios for the GVC future***

According to UNCTAD (2020) estimates, the international production system is currently in a state of "perfect storm". After two decades of growth followed by one of stagnation, the forthcoming decade leading up to 2030 could be defined as a period of probable deep reconfiguration. In its diagnostic, UNCTAD is in-line with most other international organizations such as OECD or the World Bank.

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the GVC management leitmotiv has been "building resilience". "Resilience" is defined as the ability of supply chains to effectively respond to and recover from disruptions. Under the more generic concept of Business continuity disaster recovery (BCDR), resilience is usually associated with "robustness", which is the ability to maintain operations despite a disruptive shock. Robustness is often associated with building redundancy, either by accumulating buffer stocks or/and diversifying suppliers. Resilience has more to do with advance contingency

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
<sup>8</sup> The CHIPS ("Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors") and Science Act, effective in August 2022, counts with a budget of about \$280 billion. It aims at attracting to the US productive investment from US and "friendly" foreign global leaders in the semiconductor industry. Another objective is promoting research and development activities in strategic industries.

planning to manage unpredictable supply chain disruptions. A mid-point between robustness and resilience would be negotiating contracts with potential backup suppliers, in order to give a company priority over others should a disruption with the primary supplier occur.

From a strategic management perspective, the objective is also to minimize the financial impact of disruption to optimize a company’s “time to survive” when faced with a major shock. A standard tool is to calculate the Risk Exposure Index (REI) that characterizes supply chain operation (Simchi-Levi, Schmidt & Wei, 2014). The REI enables prioritization of risk mitigation based on the most critical areas of the supply chain focus their mitigation efforts on the most important suppliers and risk areas. GVC manager may select suppliers with lowest REI to reduce the overall risk of disruption. From a national perspective, GVC indices based on trade in value-added indicators provide a measure of exposure (Baldwin and Freeman, 2021).

BCDR, a management concept, became an agenda item for policy makers in the post-COVID19 era, when geo-political risks became the focus of interest of national policy makers. It has been reported that Germany's foreign ministry plans to tighten the rules for companies deeply exposed to China, making them disclose more information and possibly conduct stress tests for geopolitical risks.<sup>9</sup> When incorporating geo-political risks, international supply chain resilience and robustness strategies are usually developed according to several directions, as in Figure 3. The focus of attention is habitually on supply chain (upstream linkages); much less analysed by scholars is the downstream risk of being prevented from selling to main markets, as occurred to the Huawei company (see Escaith, 2021, for evaluating both upstream and downstream risks).

*Figure 5 Strategies for building GVC resilience and robustness*



<sup>9</sup> “Germany plans to tighten rules for firms highly dependent on China”, Reuters, 19 November 2022.

UNCTAD (2020) identifies three possible trajectories of international production reconfiguration; all of them pointing to some degree of deglobalization. Two of the trajectories (re-shoring and regionalization) include smaller and more compact GVCs. Even the third alternative scenario of continued diversification and growth of value chains may result in more geographical concentration on some key players, either in developed or developing countries.

Strong deglobalization scenario envisages re-shoring to countries of origin, where domestic value chains would substitute international ones. New technologies, automation and robotization advances would play a key role in this scenario by lowering the cost of previously labour-intensive tasks and render production more efficient and comparably cheaper in high-income economies. The current surge in subsidies for reshoring and attract high-technology may play a role in this trend. But most analysts predicts that the scope for re-shoring will remain limited, at least in the short term.<sup>10</sup>

The second scenario calls for rethinking corporate strategies when launching new production activities, without sacrificing existing ones. This scenario is characteristic of the recent strand of GVC-resilience studies, promoting geographical diversification in order to cope for the risks entailed by relying on too few and far-away suppliers. This is a typical case of “Just in Case” strategy, where managers accept higher costs by including more locations and more suppliers into the supply chain in order to build resilience. Here again, digitalization technologies (AI, robotization, Internet of things) will play a key role in transferring know-how and monitoring new suppliers.

Kearney’s 2021 Reshoring Index report reveals that many US companies consider a “China plus” strategy in an attempt to decrease their reliance on China, while maintaining a foothold in the Chinese market (Blaesser, Castaño, Serraneau and Van den Bossche, 2021). In this perspective, the decoupling will only be partial. As a Nomura investment bank reckons, Vietnam is expected to be the largest beneficiary of trade diversion out of China and may gain the equivalent of about 8% of GDP (Loo, Subbaraman and Varma, 2019). Indeed, US Census Bureau data indicate that Chinese exports to the US have stagnated (+6% in value) between January-September 2018 and the same period in 2022, its share of US import market decreasing from 21% to 17%. Imports from Canada and Mexico (14% of US imports in 2022) have risen by 39% and 34%, respectively. Exports from Vietnam are up by more than 170% and represent now 4% of import market, from Thailand are up by more than 80% (1.8% import market share in 2022), from India (2.3% share) and Indonesia (1% share) by more than 60%.<sup>11</sup>

The third GVC scenario envisaged by UNCTAD (2020) is one of near-shoring, with the regionalization of value chain. This would entail more compact GVCs, organised in deep regional trade agreement sharing common trade policies (e.g., ASEAN, Europe, North America). A new term

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<sup>10</sup> Supply chain relocation is not a decision that managers take lightly. Because of the strong GVC “trade-investment” nexus, many lead-firms have invested a lot in offshore facilities producing at the frontier of technical efficiency. They have also spent many years developing long-time relationship and protocols with first-tier suppliers. It takes years to write-down the associated sunk cost of investments already in place.

<sup>11</sup> Source: The Economist, November 12<sup>th</sup> 2022 and Census Bureau Trade Highlights:Top Trading Partners - September 2022. Data are for goods only.

was coined in April 2022, when the US Secretary of the Treasury spoke of “friend-shoring”, privileging economic ties with countries that “have a strong adherence to a set of norms and values about how to operate in the global economy and about how to run the global economic system.” Friend-shoring is a kind of “near-shoring” where the distance is not measured in geographical terms but in terms of political proximity.

This reminds us of the building of trade blocks along political alliances, like in 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Under this scenario, Western GVC will diversify away from China and towards countries perceived as “closer” in terms of common institutional and political systems as well as geo-political interests.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, from China’s perspective, the Belt and Road initiative is aimed at creating its own economic backyard.<sup>13</sup> If this becomes a trend, world economies will gradually be separated along trading blocs fighting for hegemony in a multipolar world economy. Already, some companies may need to fence-off operations serving China from those that touch the US, adding to cost and complexity of their value-chain.<sup>14</sup> A risky scenario, if history is a guide...

An OECD study on the future of GVCs (OECD, 2017) attempts at modelling a scenario involving new global manufacturers, growing demand in developing countries, larger labour costs and new disruptive technologies (artificial intelligence, production automation and digitalization). The report incorporates also future additional production and trade costs arising from policy instruments aimed at internalising environmental considerations. The results indicate that the negative impact on GVCs is greater than their positive effects. World Trade/GDP ratio will fall by 4.1% in 2030. Due to near-shoring, the report predicts that North-North trade will gain relative importance.

Both OECD and UNCTAD scenarios paint a pessimistic, yet not apocalyptic, future for GVCs. Some will gain, as diversified supply chains should be expanded to countries with lower risks to national security, aiming at “friend-shoring,” because the risk of supply chain disruption because of national security issues has increased recently. China-Plus strategy will also benefit the labour abundant countries, especially in Asia, that have already built a reliable industrial basis (e.g., Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam). The main losers might be the new comers in Central Asia, Middle East and Africa, or the South American economies that need to balance their economic relationship with two of their increasingly antagonist trade partners: China and the USA.

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<sup>12</sup> For the European Centre of International Political Economy, the defensive measures designed by Brussels have also an offensive nature. Officially, they were created to retaliate against coercion and unfair trade practices by partner countries. But, “the objective is not just about creating an equal playing field but also ensuring that the rest of the world follows EU rules. Particularly, the EU aims at regulating non-EU companies directly and unilaterally through EU policies, which increases the risk of retaliation against the EU” (Erixon, Guinea, Lamprecht, Sharma and Zilli, 2022).

<sup>13</sup> The Belt and Road Initiative was announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 as a modern Silk Road, making clear, according to Masina (2022), China’s ambition to return to its historical role as a world superpower.

<sup>14</sup> Financial Times "Europe wakes up to collateral damage from US-China rivalry", Europe Express newsletter 29 October 2022.

## 6. Crisis at the WTO

Mercantilist competition between governments to stimulate industrialization or re-industrialization is growing. Such neo-realist national policies may give rise to negative cross-border spillovers, either by design or inadvertently. In particular, they may limit the ability of foreign firms to sell goods and services and constrain the ability of firms to utilize new technologies (Hoekman, Tu and Wolfe, 2022). These events develop while WTO, the institution that enacted and monitored global trade governance, is going through an existential crisis.

### *a. Reforming WTO: Mission Impossible?*

WTO is in a limbo. Pressures to reform WTO reflect a growing dissatisfaction with the operation of the organization by some WTO members, especially its inability to adapt to a changing global economy. But not all Members agree... This was evident during the Cancun Ministerial meeting in 2003 when the Singapore Agenda, especially the part dealing with the GVC related issues of competition policy or trade and investment, was abandoned. Negotiations on trade in services, the most dynamic component of world trade, was also put on the back-burner, falling hostage of the discussions on more traditional Agricultural and manufacture (NAMA) market access. This strategy to restrain Doha-round negotiation to pre-1990 issues reached a dead-end in 2008. It is revealing that the 23 WTO members who decided in 2012 to move the negotiations on an agreement on services outside the WTO identified themselves as the “Really Good Friends”.

Yet, a major trigger of the crisis is the trade tensions between the US, EU and China. In recent years, the US has repeatedly expressed its serious concerns with China’s non-market-oriented economy and associated policies and practices “that have resulted in damage to the world trading system ...”. China made clear in its submission on WTO reform that it sees the US as the problem, with proposals on tightening disciplines on unilateral measures that are inconsistent with WTO rules. In other words, the WTO is stuck in a dialogue of the deaf that threatens its relevance.

A vital dimension of the global governance offered by the WTO is independent, third-party adjudication of trade disputes reflected in the principle of de-politicized conflict resolution. Note that the “de-politicized” adjective reflects the neo-liberal approach to trade policies, where supra-national bodies are expected to be neutral referees. It is at odd with the post-2010 neo-realist emphasis on trade seen as a power struggle.

An effective dispute settlement mechanism is critical for existing WTO agreements to remain meaningful, and for the negotiation of new agreements. A failure to do so may coerce the WTO into irrelevance (see Box 2). Rather than engaging in lengthy discussions at the WTO on the minutiae of formal China’s commitments when it joined the WTO, the US engaged in unilateral actions. It also launched a trilateral process with the EU and Japan, to address “concern with the non-market-oriented policies of third countries and [...] actions being taken and possible measures that could be undertaken in the near future.” (Hillman, 2022).

### **Box 2. Two visions on WTO resilience: compliance or withdrawal**

According to Pollack (2022), two different visions are discussed by trade lawyers and institutional specialists. The first is rather optimistic on the capacity of the organization to return to some kind of normality, while the second is more pessimistic.

- International Law is Change-Resistant

Historical institutionalists agreed that institutional choices can persist, or become “locked in”. Adverse shocks are relatively easily reversed thanks to positive feedbacks that make institutions more stable. Institutions, in this view, lock in advantages for winners, who might be expected to support existing institutions – but also disadvantages for losers, who might be expected to challenge them. In the context of the WTO, this corresponds to the move by large countries to negotiate plurilateral agreements, or move the negotiation outside the formal context of the WTO, as occurred for trade in services, in order to keep the ball rolling.

- Hostile Acts are Possible and Path-Dependent

The other view takes into consideration the toxic influence of hostile agents aiming at forcing the organization into a state of irrelevance. For example, a systematic noncompliance with the letter or the spirit of legal agreements weakens them by undermining the reciprocity that underlies such agreements. Pollack (2022) gives as example the recent China-US trade war and the so-called “phase 1” China-US agreement of January 2020. This agreement hasn’t been implemented at the time of writing this essay and was more a cease-fire in the ongoing trade war than a settlement. Thus, the phase 1 agreement remains in place, along with China’s subsidies and the US countervailing tariffs, with no clear sign of settlement, either bilateral or through the WTO instances.

Faced with this deadlock, many countries decided in 2017 to move away from multilateral negotiations by launching so-called “joint statement initiatives” (JSIs). In 2017 JSIs addressed e-commerce, domestic regulation of services, investment facilitation, and measures to enhance the ability of micro and small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to capture trade opportunities. These joint initiatives include a broad cross-section of the members. But that does not mean that negotiations to establish new plurilateral agreements have been endorsed by all Members.

This kind of “Club of Clubs” approach is only a partial solution to the difficulty of concluding negotiations by consensus. Each negotiation can only be formally concluded if a critical mass of Members participates. Plurilaterals are not a panacea. They may, nevertheless, be considered as stepping stones where deals are struck as waypoints towards the ultimate objective of reaching the consensus. At the very least, they have the merit of keeping the WTO negotiation bicycle moving.

#### ***b. Is it ‘deglobalisation’ or ‘reshaped globalisation’?***

There is no consensus on the definition of ‘deglobalisation’. It is clear, however, from what we have seen, that the process of international economic integration has been slowing down after the Global Financial Crisis. The last decade has witnessed a decline in the growth of international trade in merchandise, a slow-down in the dynamics of Global Value Chains (GVCs), and significant decline in international capital flows in some years (see Figure 2 again).

Among possible scenarios, reshoring is probably the least certain and can only materialize for specific sectors receiving substantial government subsidies (high-technology, pharmaceutical). The

megatrends of increasing international political tensions favours the scenario of regionalization. On the other hand, new technologies related to so-called “Industry 4.0” (robotics, digitization, artificial intelligence) may facilitate the reconfiguration of GVCs, towards more resilience and geographic flexibility. The literature I reviewed for this Conference usually converges on a scenario of “regional value chains” as a result of both pre-pandemic and post pandemic factors. Yet, at the difference of traditional supply chain management (Figure 5 again), geo-political resilience should include both upstream (where you get your inputs) and downstream aspects (where you sell your output), because embargoes may affect both segments of the value chain.

*c. The risk: Fragmentation of the Global Governance and the Return to 19<sup>th</sup> century Trade and Military Alliances*

From an historical perspective, the situation is preoccupying. Even if history does not repeat itself, the precedent of the League of Nations, an attempt to build peace after the first World War, makes preserving a functional WTO a priority.

The world trade economy is slowly being segmented in three large blocks. In Asia, China has successfully challenged the existing geopolitical frameworks, developing strong links with East and Southeast Asia economy through, inter alia, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At the 47th G7 summit in June 2021, the USA announced a Tit-for Tat multilateral plan named “Build Back Better World” (B3W). This initiative was implicitly aimed at countering China’s BRI. On December 2021 the European Union launched its own response with a 300-billion-euro project called Global Gateway. The war in Ukraine added a new dimension to this conflict for economic influence, when a NATO member formally asked third-world countries to side against Russia. <sup>15</sup>

It is between the extremes of neoliberal globalization and the “toxic blend of nationalism, militarism and imperialism” (Mariotti, 2022) that we need to find a new normal. In light of the recent changes in global governance and international political economy, neo-realist policies adopted to strengthen the national competitiveness of domestic industries should be designed according to a win-win approach to avoid (trade) wars, i.e., assuming the co-competitive synergies associated with inter-country economic interdependence as a fundamental driver. Easier said than done, win-win strategies not being the most expected outcome of neo-realist (non-cooperative) strategic games.

## **7. Conclusions: Waiting for another Fat-Tailed Black Swan?**

During many years trade policy lived on a nice narrative based on economic theories and rationality. Geopolitics and trade politics are back. “After Rationality and Illusions, this is the time of Reality and Passions” declared Brazilian representative Alexander Parola at the 2022 WTO Public Forum. On the

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<sup>15</sup> At the UN General Assembly, French President Macron appealed for neutral countries to “stop being complicit by remaining silent” about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Reuters, Sept 20). The UN decided also to hold a public vote and not a secret ballot on a draft resolution that condemns Russia. 143 of the body’s 193 members voted against Russia. The states that chose to abstain represent nearly half of the World population.

other hand, today's Nation States cannot live in isolation and can prosper only through trade: they need to remain globalised.

### *a. Business and Global Economic Uncertainty*

When policy shocks are driven by Tif-for-Tat strategic games, adverse events will tend to happen in clusters rather than randomly. From a modelling perspective, it means that the future states are much more uncertain and unpredictable on long time horizons than implied by standard probabilistic approaches based on a normal distribution of events. This is particularly relevant for international business, usually conducted by large firms over long-term trade and investment horizons. Businesses should internalize this and adjust for the new reality. This can be done by closely tracking global events, paying for flexibility, and considering contingency plans.

In uncertain times, monitoring and market intelligence (including geo-political situation) is key, but may point to very different directions. Implementing choice under uncertainty is definitely a challenge; it has been investigated by theoreticians. When I was a student, a basic book in English on the subject was Raiffa (1968); The French “futuribles” school of decision analysis developed also methods for business and policy choice under uncertainty in the 1960s (Godet and Durance, 2011).<sup>16</sup> Pragmatic rules, such as the Sarewitz-Nelson rules (Almudi and Fatas-Villafranca, 2022) can help decision-makers. Most of these long-term strategic planning tools under uncertainty follow some kind of “Delphi method” structural analysis, as a way for pooling different ideas referring to domain-specific experts. Basically, it is an analytical way of asking them regarding the degree to which each specific disruptive event (technology; government regulation, NGO and geo-political risks) verifies a probability of null-fulfilment or full fulfilment; then processing the results.

### *b. Rebalancing efficiency and resilience*

Looking for resilience is not turning its back on trade. Trade is beneficial and should not become a victim of the situation. But trade is not a miracle and must be managed to be sustainable from social, governmental, economic and environmental perspectives. With the “visible hand” driving the market, we must now include “government resilience” in the traditional three pillars of resilience.

A significant hurdle in the management of the supply chain is the uncertainty experienced by organizations which increases risks across the supply chain. Traditional business modelling, based on a normal (thin-tailed) distribution of risks may not be sufficient when fat-tailed black-swans run around like head-less chickens.<sup>17</sup> This is mainly attributed to a lack of visibility across the supply chain. COVID-19 Pandemic has proven the precarious condition of the global supply chains and the disastrous

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<sup>16</sup> There was a booming school in France at that time, as the government was actively involved in long-term planning. Since 1960, Futuribles (<https://www.futuribles.com/en/>) has played a leading role in the development of foresight studies, first in France then internationally.

<sup>17</sup> Sorry, I could not resist the zoological analogy. In statistical terms, I should have said that we are now in a situation of random walk and confronted with an increasing variance on the possible range of outcomes.

impact of any systemic disruption, even occurring in remote parts of the world. The deafening sound of sabre rattling in Eastern Europe or Eastern Asia does not send optimistic signals.

UN continued reporting that “countries’ efforts are still not enough to avoid catastrophic global warming” will add pressure to more regulatory interventions. Some may offer business opportunities (e.g., subsidies on electrical vehicles), other will add to production or trade costs. Both will increase uncertainty, because rules can change at the stroke of a pen, and subsidies may suddenly disappear.

Business organizations should anticipate increasing regulatory and social pressures to make sure the supply chains are government resilient to handle such shocks. First, it is more valuable than ever to pay attention to global economics and politics. In calm times it makes sense for firms to focus on markets, following the old saying that “the business of business is business.” But in turbulent times there is value in following current geo-political events to avoid being caught by surprise by global shocks. Indeed, for larger firms there can even be value in trying to steer the political process through chambers of industry engagement and lobbying. Second, greater uncertainty makes flexibility more valuable. Therefore, firms must be willing to spend more to keep options open. This involves anything from signing shorter leases, leasing rather than buying property, hiring contractors rather than permanent staff, and renting rather than buying equipment. Finally, they must prepare contingency plans. When major shocks happen – like the war in Ukraine – there is huge value to making rapid decisions. Firms that have contingency plans in place can act faster and reduce the risk of being transmuted in lame ducks by black swans (see foot note 17 again).

But international business cannot develop in an institutional void, and global governance matters. The business community lost interest in the WTO in the early 2000s, after the Cancun ministerial. Yet a functional WTO is necessary to create a global governance made up of rules and constraints that apply to all. This does not preclude the possibility for governments to implement national policies, as long as they are not predatory and remain in accordance with reciprocal commitments. Neo-realist strategic competition is here to stay, but nation-states must also preserve the multilateral institution inherited from the neo-liberal times to have space for strategic cooperation.

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