Group decision-making and voting in ultimatum bargaining: an experimental study

Sour, Laura and Elbittar, Alexander and Gomberg, Andrei (2011): Group decision-making and voting in ultimatum bargaining: an experimental study. Published in: B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 11, No. 1 (2011): pp. 1-33.

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory study of the group-on group ultimatum bargaining with restricted within-group interaction. In this context, we concentrate on the effect of different within-group voting procedures on the bargaining outcomes. Our experimental observations can be summarized in two propositions. First, individual responder behavior across treatments does not show statistically significant variation across voting rules, implying that group decisions may be viewed as aggregations of independent individual decisions. Second, we observe that proposer behavior significantly depends (in the manner predicted by a simple model) on the within-group decision rule in force among the responders and is generally different from the proposer behavior in the one-on-one bargaining.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: bargaining games; group decision making; experimental design
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics; A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O10 - General

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