Monetary Union Among Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) Countries: Does the symmetry of shocks extend to the non-oil sector?

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4 July 2008

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11611/
MPRA Paper No. 11611, posted 17 Nov 2008 01:13 UTC
Monetary Union Among Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) Countries: Does the symmetry of shocks extend to the non-oil sector?

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March 2008
Abstract

AGCC countries’ output is heavily dichotomized into oil and non-oil. The oil shocks have similar effects on all member countries but little is known about their responses to non-oil shocks. This paper sets out to determine whether (1) aggregate demand (AD) and non-oil supply shocks (AS) are symmetrical across these countries to justify their suitability for monetary union; and (2) whether there is any commonality of shocks with the United States and the three major European countries, namely France, Germany, and Italy, which can warrant the choice of either the US dollar or the Euro as the anchor for the expected common currency of the bloc. We use bivariate structural vector autoregression models identified with long-run restrictions a la Blanchard and Quah (1989) to extract the shocks. Our results show that (a) AD shocks are unequivocally symmetrical but non-oil AS shocks are weakly symmetrical across AGCC countries thereby giving a green light for monetary union; (b) neither AD nor AS shocks are symmetrical between AGCC countries and the selected European countries; (c) AGCC’s AD shocks are symmetrical with the US but non-oil AS shock are not. We therefore surmise that the US dollar is a far better candidate for the new currency than the Euro since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in AGCC countries. Our results hold even when we consider the AGCC countries as a bloc. This paper makes a valuable contribution to AGCC decision makers who have been wrestling with the dilemma of whether to revalue or to depeg their actual currencies.

Keywords: AGCC, monetary union, shocks symmetry, currency anchor.

JEL Classification: E32, F33, F36.
Monetary Union Among Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) Countries: Does the symmetry of shocks extend to the non-oil sector?

Introduction

In this paper we address two key empirical questions. First, to what extent do the non-oil sectors of AGCC countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), satisfy the prerequisite of common shocks for monetary union?\(^1\) Second, does the degree of shocks symmetry or asymmetry between AGCC countries and either the United States (US) or the three largest European economies (France, Germany, and Italy) warrant the choice of either the US dollar or the Euro or a combination of the two as the anchor for the newly proposed single currency? This paper is motivated by the upcoming signing of a monetary union by AGCC countries in 2010 and the issuance of a single currency, which is to be pegged to the US dollar. Also, since the recent decline in the value of the dollar relative to the Euro and other major currencies has opened the way for many to question the merit of the dollar as a solid anchor; we are particularly interested in determining how suitable of an alternative the Euro could be for these countries.

There is an abundant literature focusing on the choice of exchange rate regime and on the dollarization of economies. Most notably, is the seminal paper of Mundell (1961) on optimum currency area (OCA) along with subsequent works by McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), and Tower and Willet (1976) that stress the importance of relative economic sizes, labor mobility, degree of openness, trade concentration, and similarity of shocks for assessing the suitability of fixed, flexible exchange rate regimes, and prospective monetary unions. The determination of the degree of symmetry between shocks across countries has been thus far the most popular criterion used in empirical works to evaluate OCAs. According to this

\(^1\) It is worth noting that the government of Oman has officially pulled out of the monetary union initiative in 2007 due to their inability to meet inflation targets.
approach, one needs to examine whether aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks are correlated across member countries to conclude on the desirability of monetary union, ceteris paribus. In this paper, not only are we interested in the suitability of either the US dollar or the Euro as the principal anchor for the new AGCC currency, but we also pay close attention to the symmetry of shocks both across and between member countries and possible anchor countries.

The debate on whether fixed regimes are better than floating regimes, vice-versa, is a very old one. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, monetary policy is imported and as long as fiscal and monetary disciplines are in order at home, inflation and output tend to be stable. The costs are forgone potential seignorage revenue, inability to respond to asymmetric shocks, among others. Under flexible exchange rate systems, countries usually experience higher inflation and lower growth but are better equipped to respond to economic shocks since the conduct of monetary policy rests with their central banks. However, the theory of optimum currency areas is clear on its prescriptions regarding the choice of exchange rate regime. Countries that are subjected to idiosyncratic shocks are better off in retaining monetary policy independence while those that are subjected to symmetric shocks may opt for a fixed exchange rate system. In this regard, it is the symmetry of shocks that dictates whether the Euro or the dollar is the suitable currency to peg the new currency to.

Following the work of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), output and prices are two key macroeconomic variables whose dynamics have been intensely scrutinized to gauge aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD) shocks. However, in the case of AGCC countries, it is well-known that output is highly dichotomized. About 54 percent of total output for the group comes from the non-oil sector while the oil sector contributes the
remaining 46 percent. An important feature of these economies is that they already face symmetric shocks in the oil sector which partially justify the undertaking of currency unification and eventually the pegging of that currency to the US dollar. Since oil output is traded in US dollar in the international market, they all react similarly to shocks tributary to that sector. Whether they themselves produce those shocks by curtailing production via the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or respond to those shocks emanating from increase or decrease in demand.

There have been renewed efforts from AGCC governments to reduce their reliance on the oil sector through reinvestment of oil revenues in infrastructure, tourism, construction, and other services in an attempt to further diversify their economies. In essence, the fundamental issue we address in this research is whether the growing importance of the non-oil sector for these economies likely to impose substantial adjustment costs if their responses to shocks are not synchronized.

The case of AGCC countries is peculiar. All member countries but Kuwait have had their currencies pegged to the US dollar since the 1970s. With the apparent demise of the US dollar as a reserve currency and the rise in inflation, there have been calls for a revaluation of individual currencies with respect to the dollar, and in some cases, for even a de-peg of the currency to the US dollar in favor of either the Euro or a basket peg. Since the AGCC countries plan to achieve a monetary union by 2010 and peg their new currency to the US dollar, it is imperative to test whether AGCC countries and the US are subjected to similar macroeconomic shocks, notwithstanding, it is monetary policy from the US that will shape the path of non-oil output and prices in these countries as an economic bloc. Since there have also been calls for the adoption of the Euro or a basket peg with major currencies such as the
Euro and the dollar, it is a natural extension while we are extracting the shocks to look into the suitability of alternative anchors. In view of the fact that the Euro would play the same role as the dollar for the AGCC countries, we investigate whether shocks from AGCC countries and the core European economies are symmetric.

The approach taken in this paper is in line with previous works in the literature (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994; Horvath and Rátfai, 2004) that employ bivariate structural vector autoregression (SVAR) of output growth and inflation identified with long-run restrictions à la Blanchard and Quah (1989). We compute these variables using data on non-oil output, real GDP, and GDP deflator for the period 1970 - 2006 from the United Nations Statistical Databases – National Accounts Main Aggregates. In the case of AGCC countries, our SVARs contain non-oil GDP growth and inflation. For the potential anchor countries, we use data on real GDP since we have no reason to breakdown their output into oil and non-oil components. Non-oil GDP can be seen as a proxy for industrial production, which is a subcomponent of real GDP. Therefore, there is no great loss of information from calculating the correlation between shocks originating from SVAR with non-oil output growth and those emerging from real GDP growth. We employ the long-run restriction that only non-oil supply (supply) shocks can have long-term effects on non-oil output (output) to identify our model. Our results show at the 5% significance level that: (a) although demand as well as supply shocks are symmetric for core European countries, these shocks are mostly asymmetric with shocks affecting AGCC countries; (b) AGCC non-oil supply shocks are asymmetric with US supply shocks; (c) with the exception of the UAE, demand shocks are mostly symmetric between AGCC countries and the US; (d) On average non-oil supply shocks as well as demand shocks are symmetric across AGCC countries, with the latter showing a tighter link. These results clearly suggest that there are major adjustment costs involved for AGCC
countries if they chose to anchor their new currency with the Euro. Despite its continuous
decline vis-à-vis other currencies, the US dollar remains a better option since monetary policy
from the US can smooth demand shocks both at home and in the AGCC countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4 discusses the empirical background
Section 3 presents the underlying theory and the SVAR methodology. Section 4 describes
and analyzes the data in details. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and Section 6
concludes the paper.

Section 2 Background

There are few studies on monetary union issue between AGCC countries, with differing
findings, that follow the footsteps of previous studies on European Union. These studies
typically look at the suitability of monetary union from a standpoint of costs and benefits for
each country. The focus is mostly on convergence criteria, primarily, comparisons of
inflation, real GDP growth, fiscal imbalances, tariff structures, current accounts, debt to GDP
ratio, non-oil fiscal deficits, intra-regional trade volume and movement in real effective
exchange rate across countries (Sturm and Siegfried, 2005; Pattanaik, 2007; Dar and Presley,
2001; Jadresic, 2002; Iqbal and Fasano, 2003; Fasano and Schaechter, 2003; Fasano and
and Ibrahim, 2004.). The most comprehensive of all these studies is Sturm and Siegfried
(2005). Although these authors do look into the similarity of economic structures among
member states and conclude that these structures are largely dominated by the production of
oil and gas, they did not focus on the responses of these countries to similar macroeconomic
shocks.
The most thorough empirical study in the literature on AGCC monetary union thus far is Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006), which is closest to ours. These authors use bivariate structural vector autoregression of total output and prices identified with long-run restrictions to extract aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks for the AGCC countries. They also rely on correlation analysis along with cointegration and common cycle tests to assess the long-run movements in real output across countries and to uncover the existence or lack thereof of common short-run cycles. Their findings show that while the transitory demand shocks are typically symmetric, the permanent supply shocks are asymmetric. It is worth noting that Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn did not find synchronous long-run and short-run movements in output for AGCC countries.

Besides Buiter's (2007) reservations on the use of long-run restrictions, it is important to note that there are two key shortcomings to Abu-Bader et al.'s (2006) paper. The first is related to the use of aggregate instead of non-oil output to measure macroeconomic shocks, which makes it difficult to disentangle symmetry from asymmetry of supply shocks. Since output is subject to both oil- and non-oil supply shocks, it is the relative magnitude of these shocks that can determine the overall disturbances to the economy of each member country. Oil-related supply shocks are most likely common to all AGCC countries, but what we do not know for sure is whether the non-oil sectors across these countries are subjected to the same shocks, and there are no empirical studies thus far on this issue. As Buiter also reported, the empirical studies cited earlier present overwhelming statistical and econometric evidences on the differing structure of these economies. Moreover, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, p.10) noted that for countries where output is denominated by the production of oil (or other raw materials), a rise in the price of oil is likely to increase both total output (due to the boost in oil production) and aggregate demand (through the impact of oil revenues on real incomes).
As they emphasized, it may be difficult for oil-producing countries to distinguish between aggregate demand and aggregate supply disturbances caused by a change in oil prices.

The second shortcoming to Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn's paper is that their analysis is mute on the choice of currency anchor for AGCC countries, which, in our view, is crucial. In the current state of economic integration between AGCC countries, does it really matter whether supply shocks are not symmetric if there are no other objectives beyond forming the monetary union? Five of the six countries have their currencies pegged to the US dollar. Whether external factors give rise to more serious supply shocks or not, the tools these countries possess currently to neutralize the effects of those shocks would be the same after entering the monetary union since they have decided to peg their unified currency to the US dollar. Hence, the pertinent question rather is whether the choice of the US dollar as the continued anchor is more appropriate than the option of adopting the Euro or a market basket or a free float.

Our paper represents an improvement over Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn's in the two aspects mentioned above. We consider our approach of incorporating non-oil output instead of total output in the SVAR and allow for demand shocks to possibly account for the impact of oil shocks on real incomes is relatively new to the literature. In addition, following Horvath and Rátfai (2004), we use France, Germany, and Italy as core European countries to determine whether supply and demand shocks from these countries are synchronized with those of AGCC countries, which could justify the use of the Euro as an alternative anchor currency.
Section 3    Theory and Methodology

The underlying theoretical framework of this paper is the aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) model. The short-run AS curve is upward sloping allowing for changes in AD to influence output. The long-run AS (LRAS) curve is vertical denoting potential output and prevents AD shocks to have long-term real effects on the economy. AD curve is downward sloping. In a price-output space, full employment equilibrium is achieved when all three curves intersect at once. A positive supply shock shifts both AS and LRAS to the right giving rise to an increase in output and a decrease in price permanently. A positive demand shock, though permanent, can only affect output temporarily due to its impacts first on prices, then on real wages and other price-sensitive determinants of AS. More precisely, this implies that output and prices move in the same direction when demand shocks hit the economy, and in opposite directions due to supply shocks. However, actual data for AGCC countries may not display these impulse response patterns since these economies' output is largely dominated by oil production, the points made by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). In other words, for countries with oil as a large share of their output, an increase in oil prices has also the real potential to insulate aggregate demand as oil revenues find their ways in other sectors and thereby increase real incomes. Since it might be "... difficult to distinguish between AS and AD shocks caused by a change in oil prices", impulse responses may be counter intuitive or even misleading.

We use a bivariate SVAR model with the right-hand side variables being log differences of non-oil output times 100 ($\Delta y_t$) and log differences of prices times 100 ($\Delta p_t$). Each of these variables is driven by both a non-oil supply shock ($e_{st}$) and a demand shock ($e_{dt}$). Using the

\footnote{The diagram is not reported here as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006) due to space consideration.}
lag operator $L$, the infinite moving average representation of the structural model can be represented as:

$$
\begin{bmatrix}
    \Delta y_t \\
    \Delta p_t
\end{bmatrix} = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} L^i \begin{bmatrix}
    \alpha_{11,i} & \alpha_{12,i} \\
    \alpha_{21,i} & \alpha_{22,i}
\end{bmatrix} e_{st}
\begin{bmatrix}
    e_{st} \\
    e_{dt}
\end{bmatrix}
$$

(1)

The model is identified with a long-run restriction \textit{à la} Blanchard and Quah (1989). We therefore assume that only non-oil supply shocks can have long-run effects on non-oil output. This implies the cumulative effects of demand shocks on the growth rate of non-oil output ($\Delta y_t$) are zero. That is,

$$
\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \alpha_{12,i} = 0
$$

(2)

Since the SVAR methodology is standard in the literature, we do not provide further details regarding the procedures of extracting the unobserved structural shocks.\textsuperscript{3} There is also the controversy surrounding the interpretation of shocks with permanent impact on output as supply disturbances, and shocks with temporary effects on output as demand innovations, found in Buiter (2007). However, we do not enter into this debate because there is always a reason to argue in favor or against specific restrictions. The SVAR methodology has lent itself to this criticism.

**Section 4 Data and Estimation**

The annual data set used for the empirical analysis covers the period 1970 – 2006. The series include non-oil GDP at constant 1990 prices in US dollar calculated as the total value added of all sectors but mining and quarrying; GDP deflator with 1990 as base year due to unavailability of consumer price index (CPI). All were taken from United Nations Statistical

Databases – National Accounts Main Aggregates. We take the AGCC member countries as if they were a union already and construct the non-oil output and GDP deflator variables for this bloc by taking the averages of the respective member countries' non-oil output and GDP deflator. This enables us to anticipate their reactions to shocks from the US and Europe. The series were then tested for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests and were found to be integrated of order 1 or non-stationary.

As a prelude to the empirical estimation, it is customary to look at the raw data in order to form an idea about the possible relationship among the variables. Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviations for real non-oil output growth and inflation for all AGCC countries, the US and the three core European countries. It shows that all the AGCC countries have experienced higher growth and higher inflation rates than the US and the European countries. However, when volatilities are considered, their non-oil output growth is at least 3 times less stable than that of the US and the European countries. Inflation appears to follow a similar pattern but with a lesser gap in relative variability to the selected European countries. The same holds for the AGCC countries as a bloc while the US is by far the most stable economy on all accounts. This table indicates that a move of the AGCC countries away from the US dollar as their principal anchor currency towards the Euro is a move from a low- to a high-inflation shelter, which is suboptimal, since there is no accompanying gain in employment.

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4 Although Saudi Arabia is the largest economy of all AGCC countries and the remaining members differ in terms of economic sizes, we did not take a weighted average.
5 The unit root results are available upon request.
6 All AGCC countries import foreign labor from the rest of the world. The short-run Phillips curve prediction of a tradeoff between unemployment and inflation may not hold for these countries.
Table 2 presents the cross-country correlations of AGCC real non-oil output growth with the USA and core European countries. We could only find two significant positive co-movements in non-oil output growth: Bahrain with France and Bahrain with Italy. These might be due to Bahrain status as an offshore country. Overall, AGCC countries' non-oil output is not correlated with either the US or the three European Countries. Table 3 depicts the cross-correlations of inflation. It shows that all AGCC countries' inflation save the UAE is significantly correlated with the US's. But the same cannot be said in relation with the European countries. Not a single correlation is significant. Again, there is no gain for AGCC countries in switching to the Euro, despite the tighter trade linkages with Europe.

Table 2 about here

Table 3 about here

Table 4 summarizes the cross-country correlations of real non-oil output and inflation among AGCC countries. With the exception of the UAE where a significant co-movement is detected with only Bahrain and Qatar, Inflation is significantly correlated among member countries. We are able to uncover only two positively significant correlations when we look into output linkages: Qatar with Bahrain, and the UAE with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, non-oil output growth is mostly not correlated among AGCC countries.

Table 4 about here

Section 5  Empirical Results

We estimate a bivariate SVAR for each of the 10 countries with 2 lags despite in some cases the optimal lag length recommended for some countries is higher. According to Enders
OLS estimates are asymptotically efficient and consistent provided that the independent variables are the same in each equation. We extract the AD and AS shocks for each country and compute the bilateral correlations. Positive correlation indicates symmetry while negative correlation indicates asymmetry of shocks.

Table 5 presents the correlation of AGCC countries' non-oil supply shocks with overall supply shocks from the US and the core European countries. We also explore the correlation of supply shocks between the core European countries to test whether our SVAR models are capable of producing results similar to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). We report a stronger statistically significant correlation of supply shocks at the 5 percent level: 0.90 for France with Germany; 0.85 for France with Italy, and 0.81 for Germany and Italy.\(^7\) Surprisingly, we could only detect two significant correlations of supply shocks between AGCC countries and the core European countries at the 10 percent level: Qatar with France displaying symmetry and the UAE with France exhibiting asymmetry. Supply shocks are categorically asymmetric between US and AGCC countries. This can be explained by the fact that oil shock is a large component of supply shocks in the US and in Europe while it is mostly a demand shock for AGCC countries (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994).

Table 5 about here

Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients of demand shocks. It shows that the three European countries respond similarly to demand disturbances but they are not synchronized with AGCC countries. A different picture, however, emerges in relation with the US. With the exception of the UAE, demand shocks are mostly symmetric between AGCC countries.

\(^7\) It appears that 13 years of data since the publication of Bayoumi and Eichengreen's work have made a great difference but also this is a sign that economic integration has contributed to the synchronization of the countries in response to disturbances.
and the US. These relationships are statistically significant. Moreover, when we consider the AGCC as a bloc the same relationships surface, suggesting that at least monetary policy from the US can potentially serve the purpose of the AGCC countries. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for European monetary policy on the basis of what we could infer from the three major European Union members.

Table 6 about here

We report in Table 7 the correlations of both supply and demand shocks among AGCC countries. We place the correlation coefficients for supply shocks on the upper triangle while those of demand shocks are on the lower one. Demand shocks are mostly symmetrical among AGCC countries. Twelve or 80 percent of the fifteen coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. UAE's linkages with Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia are non-significant. These results are by and large consistent with Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006). However, we could not agree with their conclusion that supply shocks are mostly asymmetric, hence their stance on the readiness of the Gulf countries to form a monetary union. Six or 40 percent of the possible fifteen pairwise correlations are positive and statistically significant while only one of the coefficients (UAE-Bahrain, -0.47) is significantly negative. Interestingly enough, Saudi Arabia which has the largest economy shares common non-oil supply shocks with all but the UAE.\(^8\) Percentage-wise, we cannot conclude that non-oil supply shocks, and to that effect, supply shocks are asymmetric when we are convinced that oil shocks affect these countries in a similar way. Nevertheless, we

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\(^8\) The discrepancy between the correlation of non-oil output growth results and the responses to shocks is an anomaly of the data also found in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) for the case of Canada with the United States. In their case, they had used as an alternative quarterly data to confirm their findings, but in our case we cannot because such data are not available.
shall acknowledge a tighter relationship between the AGCC countries in response to demand shocks.

Table 7 about here

To summarize, our results indicate that:

1) The Euro may not be the appropriate anchor for GCC countries due to shocks asymmetry.

2) Despite the US’s misfortune lately, the dollar remains the best option for pegging the individual AGCC currencies and the expected single currency to. The US currency can at least help five of the six countries, including the largest economy of the region, in smoothing demand shocks.

3) The member country that is to be most concerned about the monetary union with the rest should be the UAE not Oman. UAE appears to be on a path of its own.

4) AGCC countries are on average subject to similar shocks and are therefore good candidates for monetary union. They are all reliant on oil and have channeled substantial portions of their oil revenues, at a differing degree, towards development in infrastructure, manufacturing, and services. Although this is reassuring when we consider these countries have in common language, religion, and culture in general, labor mobility remains one of the major hurdles in combating asymmetric shocks.

Section 6 Conclusion

On the issue of monetary union between AGCC countries and that of pegging the new currency of the bloc to the US dollar, this paper has examined the feasibility of monetary
union by determining whether these countries are subject to symmetric AD and non-oil AS shocks. Since there have been a lot of discussions as to whether the Euro could have been a better alternative anchor currency due to the continuous decline of the US dollar, we have also tested the suitability of the Euro on the basis of shocks asymmetry between the three major European economies and the AGCC countries. The paper follows closely the works of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Horvath and Rátfai (2004) and employs the structural vector autoregression technique to extract the structural shocks. The SVAR models are just-identified with long-run restrictions à la Blanchard and Quah (1989) that demand shocks have no long-run effects on non-oil output. The overall results show that (a) AD shocks are unequivocally symmetrical but non-oil AS shocks are weakly symmetrical across AGCC countries thereby giving a green light for monetary union; (b) neither AD nor AS shocks are symmetrical between AGCC countries and the selected European countries; (c) AGCC’s AD shocks are symmetrical with the US but non-oil AS shock are not. We therefore surmise that the US dollar is a more appropriate candidate for the new currency than the Euro since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in AGCC countries. This is the conclusion reached partially from the cross correlation analysis on non-oil output growth and inflation. Our results still hold even when we consider the AGCC countries as a bloc. This paper contributes to the debate on the anchor currency by providing statistical evidence to AGCC decision makers who have been wrestling with the dilemma of whether to revalue or to depeg their actual currencies.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that our findings partially contradict Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn’s (2006) that supply shocks are asymmetric across AGCC countries. In our view, the math just does not add up in Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn’s, when we consider oil supply shocks are mostly symmetrical across these countries and oil output represents almost 50 percent of
the average AGCC country’s total output. At best, it is the relative importance of these two shocks that should dictate symmetry or asymmetry. Our differences can be explained in part by the fact that these authors do not disaggregate real GDP into oil and non-oil components and also the unreliability of their dataset, which comes from various sources with differing sample sizes.

We are also aware that our finding that US monetary policy can at least help contain demand shocks affecting AGCC economies is debatable. Many believe that imported inflation resulting from the depreciation of the US dollar lately has worsened the inflation problem in these countries. We have however two arguments in response: (1) imported inflation is temporary and is a negligible share of total inflation; and (2) as the AGCC economies are gearing towards more diversification, the depreciation of the dollar has the potential to boost exports and improve current account balances as long as they do not rely to heavily on imported raw materials and intermediate goods. The problem of inflation in AGCC countries is mostly due to rent and food prices. A better solution is for governments to release the pressure on the prices of land they control and the fees they charge to developers so that rentals can become affordable. Our paper therefore hints that depegging or revaluing the respective currencies to curb inflation will not accomplish much and the choice of the Euro instead does not guarantee a better outcome, despite these countries' closer trade links with Europe. Moreover, although we rely solely on the dynamics of macroeconomics shocks to suggest that a monetary union is feasible among the AGCC countries, labor mobility along with the level of intraregional trade remains some of the issues that they must address if they want to reap the full benefit of the union.
References


Table 1
Real non-oil output growth and GDP deflator: means and standard deviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Real non-oil output</th>
<th>GDP deflator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St. Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>8.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Variables are measured in first log differences times 100.

Table 2
Correlations of GCC’s real non-oil output growth with USA and core European Countries output growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGCC</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Variables are measured in first log differences times 100. * Significant at the 5% level.

Table 3
Correlations of GCC's inflation with USA and core European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>0.69*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.49*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.42*</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGCC</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Variables are measured in first log differences times 100.
Table 4
Correlations of real non-oil output growth and inflation for GCC countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>United Arab Emirates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.68*</td>
<td>0.66*</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.93*</td>
<td>0.65*</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.63*</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.52*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.75*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The upper triangle contains correlation coefficients for inflation; the lower one presents correlation coefficients for output.
* Significant at the 5% level.

Table 5
Correlation of GCC's non-oil supply shocks with overall supply shocks from USA and core European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.30**</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.32**</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGCC</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.90*</td>
<td>0.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.81*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. *,** Significant at the 5%, 10% levels, respectively.

Table 6
Correlation of demand shocks between GCC and USA and core European Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.69*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.42*</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGCC</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.85*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 7**
Correlation of non-oil supply and demand shocks among GCC countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>United Arab Emirates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.56*</td>
<td>0.35*</td>
<td>-0.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.66*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.99*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.66*</td>
<td>1.00*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.63*</td>
<td>0.63*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0.67*</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
<td>0.94*</td>
<td>0.64*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The upper triangle contains correlation coefficients for supply shocks; the lower one presents correlation coefficients for demand shocks.
* Significant at the 5% level.