Water Theft As Social Insurance: Southeastern Spain, 1851-1948: The Long Run

Donna, Javier D. and Espin Sanchez, Jose (2021): Water Theft As Social Insurance: Southeastern Spain, 1851-1948: The Long Run.

Abstract

The tragedy of the commons, when all members of a community suffer from each other’s overuse of a common good, is a pervasive problem. Communities that use a common good seem doomed to conflict and overuse. Conflict resolution with imperfect information in self-governed communities poses an important trade-off. Low punishments encourage overuse while high punishments inflict pain on those who need resources. Historically, however, many self-governed communities have managed to solve the collective-action problem.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Law and economics, crime, punishment, dynamics
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K0 - General > K00 - General

References

Becker, G. S., “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 76, 2 (1968), pp. 169-217.

Donna, J., and Espin-Sanchez, J.-A., 2019. “The Illiquidity of Water Markets,” http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2667654.

Donna, J.D., and Espin-Sanchez, J.-A., (2021). “Water theft as social insurance: south-eastern Spain, 1851-1948,” Economic History Review. DOI: 0.1111/ehr.13047.

Ostrom, E., “Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.” Cambridge, Mass., 1990.